2004-05-27 Mapping of Non-State Armed Groups in the ECOWAS

REPUBLIC OF MALI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Mapping of Non-state Armed Groups in the ECOWAS Region

Preliminary report presented at the 6th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network

Not for quotation or attribution – Comments Welcome (Point of contact: [email protected])

Bamako, Mali 27–29 May 2004

1 Mapping of Non-state Armed Groups in the ECOWAS Region Small Arms Survey and Malian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2

PART I: INTRODUCTION 3

PART II: COUNTRY STUDIES 5

Côte d’Ivoire 5

Guinea 8

Guinea-Bissau 10

Liberia 11

Mali 13

Niger 15

Nigeria 17

Senegal 22

Sierra Leone 23

PART III: OBSERVATIONS 26

PART IV: POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS FOR PHASE 2 28

ENDNOTES 30

LIST OF ACRONYMS 41

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its 15 members have long understood the destabilizing and deleterious effects of small arms and light weapons (SALW) on the region. Indeed, its members – working unilaterally and together – have been at the forefront of international efforts to combat this scourge. The ECOWAS Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa represents an important step towards this end.

The Small Arms Survey, in conjunction with the Foreign Ministry of Mali, as the chair of the Human Security Network, and with the support of the governments of Switzerland, Norway, and Canada, agreed to undertake a two-phase project – a desk study followed by field-based research – to address the problem of non-state armed groups (hereafter referred to as NSAs) in the ECOWAS sub- region. Three short visits to the region supplemented the initial desk research to help identify priority concerns and possible local partners for Phase 2. The ECOWAS Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence, and Security, Gen. Cheick Oumar Diarra, and other senior officials were briefed on the planned study.

This initial study1 documents that some 25 NSAs are active in nine of the fifteen ECOWAS member countries: Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. Country studies on each of these countries are included in Part II of this report. Background information is provided on each group, as is an overview of their SALW stockpiles and means of acquisition. Several indicators of these groups’ impact on human security are also included.

Although more research and time are required to complete an overview and to benefit more fully from feedback from our many interlocutors and peer institutions, several main findings and initial policy recommendations can presently be noted:

• The need to recognize the large number and diversity of non-state armed groups in the region. In addition to rebel and insurgency movements, non-state armed groups that pose a threat to the region include pro-state militias, vigilantes, and religious organizations. Today’s pro-government militias may become tomorrow’s rebel groups.

• The need to have better control over the sources of small arms in the region. International transfers are only one of the many ways non-state armed groups obtain weapons. Other sources include looted state stockpiles, black market sales of pre-owned weapons, corrupt officials, and illicit craft production workshops.

• Peacebuilding initiatives, such as programmes aiming at the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, need to better address the regional dimensions of armed conflict. More specifically, such programmes should take into account the transnational nature of non-state armed groups, whose members are often based in several countries and end up fighting in several conflicts.

• Making refugee camps more secure is crucial. Reports that some armed groups recruit combatants and hide in refugee camps are alarming not only for the refugees but also for host countries, as they risk becoming entangled in conflict.

PART I: INTRODUCTION

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its 15 members have long understood the destabilizing and deleterious effects of small arms and light weapons (SALW)2 on the region. Their decisions to undertake six regional peacekeeping operations since 1990 acknowledge these challenges and underscore the resolve to confront them.3 Indeed, the members – working unilaterally and together – have been at the forefront of international efforts to combat this scourge. The ECOWAS Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa represents an important step towards this end,4 as does the ‘Plan of Action’ being developed by the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom in cooperation with ECOWAS on how to better implement the Moratorium. Another noteworthy example is the government of Mali’s groundbreaking initiative to enter into a meaningful dialogue with members of its Tuareg and Arab minorities, resulting in the voluntary disarmament of 3,000 combatants.5

The Small Arms Survey, in conjunction with the Foreign Ministry of Mali, as chair of the Human Security Network, and with the support of the governments of Switzerland, Norway, and Canada, agreed to undertake a two-phase research project to address the problem of non-state armed groups (NSAs) in the ECOWAS sub-region. NSAs in this report refer to sizeable groups with clearly defined, shared agendas, which might include ethnic, religious, geographic, economic, social, or political aspirations. They may be in support of the state or against the state. Phase 1 would include desk research by the Small Arms Survey to investigate and document the scope of the problem, as well as to provide some initial observations and recommendations for follow-up action during Phase 2, which would concentrate on field-based research.

Three short visits to the region during Phase 1 were planned to supplement the desk research and to help identify priority concerns and possible local partners to undertake the field research in Phase 2. Accordingly, the Small Arms Survey sent Eric Berman and Nicolas Florquin to visit the region. Mr Berman visited Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone from 22 February to 6 March, and Mr Florquin visited Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal from 3 to 20 March. Mr Mahamadou Nimaga, Foreign Affairs Adviser at the Malian Foreign Ministry, visited Benin, Burkina Faso, and Niger from 1 to 21 March. Their interlocutors included diplomats from ECOWAS countries and those from the West, officials from the United Nations System and other international humanitarian aid organizations, and a wide array of representatives of civil society. In addition, Mr Berman visited ECOWAS Headquarters, where he briefed the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defence, and Security, Gen. Cheick Oumar Diarra, and other senior officials on the planned study.

The detailed findings of this first phase are presented in the second part of this report. That section shows that NSAs are active in nine of the fifteen ECOWAS member countries: Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. Country studies on each of these countries are provided. Where there is relevant information on Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, and Togo as it pertains to the activities of NSAs in other ECOWAS countries, it is included in these reports. The focus is on current events and future concerns. Thus, for example, the decision was taken not to document the creation and effects of the various armed groups during the Liberian civil war in 1989–97. The research team felt, however, that the conflict in Sierra Leone was recent enough to warrant an exploration of the NSAs active in that conflict.

A template was created to document each case. The format was designed to clearly and concisely present the information gathered. Revisions to the structure can be made easily. It was also hoped that the format would facilitate updating so that this initial study could serve as the basis for a fuller and more detailed accounting during Phase 2 and beyond.

Each study is organized into three sections. The first identifies the NSAs active in the country in question. The second reviews the small arms and light weapons believed to be in their possession.

And the third notes the humanitarian effects of these groups’ activities with special focus on transgressions of human rights.

The first section on non-state armed groups lists each group separately. Every entry is divided into five broad self-explanatory sections: (1) origins/composition; (2) leadership; (3) areas of control/activity; (4) sources of financing/support; and (5) status.

The second section on small arms and light weapons (SALW) has three categories: (1) stockpiles; (2) sources; and (3) recovered. The stockpiles subsection attempts to record small arms and light weapons in the inventories of the various armed groups discussed above. The sources subsection tries to explain how these groups received their weapons and focuses on seizure from, and corruption among, state security institutions, as well as the roles of foreign governments and foreign manufacturers. The subsection on arms recovered looks at disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes, and other initiatives designed to reclaim weapons from these groups.

The third section on human rights issues highlights (1) the recruitment and use of child soldiers by NSAs, (2) documented abuses against civilians, and (3) the extent of displacement resulting from the activities of NSAs, as measured by the number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

The third part of the report distils the country studies into a number of policy-relevant observations. These are followed by a set of research questions, which the Small Arms Survey and the Foreign Ministry of Mali propose to explore in Phase 2 of this project to increase knowledge and understanding of NSAs in the region.

PART II: COUNTRY STUDIES

CÔTE D’IVOIRE ▪ On 19 September 2002, a group of about 800 combatants called the Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast (MPCI for Mouvement patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire) attempted a coup against president Laurent Gbagbo. After failing to capture Abidjan, the country’s commercial capital, the group retreated northward to the city of Bouaké, about 100km north of the capital Yamoussoukro. French troops and West African peacekeepers together have stopped the rebels from seizing either capital, but the rebels have since captured other cities in the northern and central regions. MPCI signed a cease-fire with the government on 17 October 2002. On 28 November 2002, two other groups emerged (the Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West – MPIGO for Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand Ouest, and the Movement for Justice and Peace – MJP for Mouvement pour la justice et la paix) and seized cities in the western region. Eventually, on 13 January 2003 in Lomé, MJP and MPIGO concluded a cease-fire agreement with the Ivorian government. On 24 January 2003, the three rebel groups reached an accord with the Ivorian government in Linas-Marcoussis in France to create a new ‘government of reconciliation’ that incorporated representatives of these rebel movements, now unified under the umbrella name ‘New Forces’ (Forces nouvelles). The government of reconciliation’s programme includes Overview preparing transparent national elections, investigating human rights violations, organizing the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-rebel forces, as well as restructuring the Ivorian National Armed Forces (FANCI for Forces armées nationales de Côte d’Ivoire).6 On 4 April 2004, the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) was established with a mandate to monitor the cease-fire and to assist the government of reconciliation in the DDR process.7 The 1,300-strong ECOWAS force known as ECOMICI was quickly ‘blue-hatted’ to help establish ONUCI, whose mandated strength is 6,240. Around 4,000 French troops based in the country remain outside the UN mission, but may provide support to ONUCI as a rapid intervention force.8 Although the civil war had its origins in long-standing differences within the Ivorian body politic, mercenaries from the region’s wars and materiel and financial support from neighbouring countries have helped fuel the conflict.9 ▪ Patriotic Origins/composition: The group wanted President Gbagbo to step down; they accuse him of Movement discriminating against Muslims (who represent a majority in the north);10 they also wanted of Ivory elections in which all Ivorians could participate.11 The movement was made up of northerners, Coast who enrolled after MPCI started occupying their territory, but also of Baoulé soldiers, as well as (MPCI) some members of western groups like the Yacouba.12 MPCI has increased from 800 in 2002 to approximately 5,000 combatants as of March 2003.13 Leadership: Guillaume Soro;14 another political leader is Louis Dacoury-Tabley.15 There are several local military commanders: among them, Chérif Ousmane is the strong man of Bouaké. Areas of control/activity: Northern and central regions of the country, towns of Bouaké and Korhogo. Sources of financing/support: MPCI has used the resources of the territory they seized (cocoa, cotton) to finance their rebellion.16 Financial support has also reportedly come from Liberian president Charles Taylor, wealthy businessmen close to an Ivorian political party named RDR, political-financial networks close to the president of Burkina Faso, and French multinationals and cocoa traders.17 Burkina Faso is believed to back MPCI.18 Ex-rebels robbed 20 billion CFA francs (at the time 30 million EUR) from a bank in Bouaké in September 2003,19 which Soro has reportedly been Non-state armed groups using to provide MPCI members with a monthly allowance of 5,000 CFA francs (7.50 EUR).20 Status: Having signed the Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement on 24 January 2003, the main political leaders of the group (including Soro) have come to occupy ministerial posts. The group is now split between those who are willing to negotiate peace with Gbagbo and those who oppose any compromise. In August 2003 a member of the latter faction, IB Coulibaly, was arrested in Paris for plotting a coup against Gbagbo and recruiting mercenaries.21

▪ Ivorian Origins/composition: MPIGO appeared with MJP in the west of the country in November Popular 2002, claiming that it wanted to avenge the death of former president General Robert Guei,22 Movement and to defend the rights of the Yacouba ethnic group.23 Liberia’s then-president Charles Taylor for the was directly implicated in the creation of both groups, which claimed not to be bound by the Great West cease-fire signed between MPCI and the government. MPIGO attacked towns and villages in (MPIGO) the western part of the country.24 The group is mainly composed of English-speaking Yacouba,25 as well as Sierra Leoneans and Liberians.26 The total strength of both MPIGO and MJP is estimated to be around 2,000.27 Leadership: N’dri N’Guessan, also known as Felix Doh, signed the cease-fire agreement between the Ivorian government, MPIGO, and MJP. He was killed in April 2003.28 Areas of control/activity: In November 2002, MPIGO captured the city of Danane in the western part of Côte d’Ivoire (near the Liberian border). It then took control of Bangolo, which is located 40 km south of Man,29 but failed to capture the port of San Pedro, vital for the export of cocoa and coffee.30 Sources of financing/support: A likely financer of MPIGO is Roger Banki, son-in-law of Gabon president Omar Bongo.31 Liberia has allegedly trained and armed MPIGO.32 Along with his forced, the Sierra Leonean warlord Sam Bockarie, who had broken off from Foday Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front, also assisted MPIGO after the death of Felix Doh in April 2003.33 (Bockarie was killed in May 2003, less than two weeks after Doh.) Status: MPIGO signed a cease-fire agreement with the French troops and the Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement on 24 January 2003.34 ▪ Movement Origins/composition: MJP appeared with MPIGO in the western part of the country, in for Justice November 2002, with the same objectives as MPIGO. It wants to remove President Laurent and Peace Gbagbo from power and to avenge the death of General Robert Guei.35 Like MPIGO, it (MJP) attacked towns and villages in the western area. MJP leaders claim to have broken away from MPCI after they engaged in peace talks with the government, although they seem to be still in contact with MPCI leadership.36 MJP is composed of many Sierra Leoneans and Liberians,37 as well as traditional hunters.38 The total strength of both MPIGO and MJP is estimated to be around 2,000.39 Leadership: Commander Deli Gaspard signed the cease-fire agreement of 13 January 2003. Areas of control/activity: The western part of the country, below the cease-fire line; MJP signed an agreement with MPIGO when they captured the city of Man.40 Sources of financing/support: Liberia.41 Status: MJP signed a cease-fire agreement with the French troops and the Linas-Marcoussis peace agreement on 24 January 2003.42 ▪ Lima Origins/composition: Lima, after the radio call sign ‘L’ for Liberia, emerged in March 2003 as a group of Liberian mercenaries based in Côte d’Ivoire. Many of these recruits allegedly come from the Nicla refugee camp, where young Liberian refugees reportedly were offered 10,000 CFA francs (about USD 17 at the time) to become Lima fighters. Lima is thought to be 1,000 strong.43 Leadership: Lima mercenaries reportedly served under the command of the Ivorian army.44 Areas of control/activity: Lima operated in the west of the country, where it was involved in military operations against MJP and MPIGO.45 Sources of financing/support: Ivorian government and FANCI. Status: Lima as well as other informal armed groups (such as CPP) are not part of the Linas-Marcoussis process.46 The majority of Lima mercenaries, however, joined MODEL (see Liberia) in mid-2003 in its fight against Charles Taylor.47 ▪ Convention Origins/composition: CPP (for Convention des patriotes pour la paix), formerly known as of Patriots GPP (Group of Patriots for Peace, for Groupe des patriotes pour la paix), is a pro-government for Peace movement composed of young activists drawn from student networks and political parties, 48 (CPP) including the ruling Ivorian Popular Front.49 Its armed wing, the Union for the Total Liberation of Côte d’Ivoire (UPLTCI, for Union pour la libération totale de la Côte d’Ivoire) comprises several pro-government militia units such as the Bees, Gazelles, Ninjas, and Panthers.50 No precise figure of their total size is available, although membership is said to number several thousand. Most members are Bété, the same ethnic group as President Gbagbo. Leadership: Charles Groguhé. Areas of control/activity: CPP militias are active in Abidjan, as well as in the west and southwest of the country. Sources of financing/support: There are allegations that the Ivorian government and FANCI provided training and weapons to CPP militias. Status: CPP militias are reported to harass and assault peasant farmers of foreign origin (Burkinabe and other West African migrants) in the west and southwest of the country.51 They are not part of the Linas-Marcoussis process.52

▪ Stockpiles Small arms: MJP holdings comprise a wide array of small arms, including AK-47s, MAT-49s, PPShs, semi-automatic rifles such as the MAS49 or the FN M1949, and Colt-type revolvers.53 MPCI and MPIGO holdings are believed to be similar to MJP’s.54 Lima forces were reportedly armed with AK-47s.55 Light weapons: MPCI appears to have RPG-7 anti-tank rockets, surface-to-air, and surface-to-surface missiles.56 MPCI has also obtained artillery for air defence in October 2002.57 ▪ Sources Seizure/corruption: At least some of the rebel groups’ weapons come from captured government armouries.58 Foreign governments: Most of the arms of MPIGO and MJP came through Monrovia.59 Local manufacture: Although it is not clear whether there is local manufacture in Côte d’Ivoire, there are reports that Ghanaian locksmiths have been ‘invited’ to 60

SALW Côte d’Ivoire to demonstrate their gun-making skills. ▪ Recovered DDR: The Ivorian government is officially in charge of the DDR programme but as of April 2004 the New Forces were refusing to surrender weapons before the convening of new elections; in addition, rebels based in the north have been refusing any inspection of their arsenals.61 Other: In March 2003, French forces confiscated 72 AK-47 assault rifles from Lima supporters in Bangolo. These weapon types were found to match those used by the Ivorian National Security Forces.62 One major challenge to an eventual DDR programme revolves around the question of integrating pro-government militias as well as Liberian combatants in the programme. ▪ Child Reports indicate the recruitment and use of child soldiers by MPCI, MPIGO, and MJP. soldiers Particularly among those groups fighting in the west of the country, human rights organizations reported a strong presence of Liberian child combatants.63 In January 2003, the United Nations expressed fears that Burkinabe children could be recruited by Ivorian rebels.64 Government armed forces also allegedly recruited Liberian combatants, including child soldiers, from the Liberian groups MODEL and LURD as well as from refugee camps and transit centres in Abidjan and Nicla.65 Preliminary discussions undertaken by UNICEF and Save the Children suggest that MPCI, MPIGO, and MJP agree in principle to demobilize children bearing arms.66 ▪ Abuses There are numerous reports of abuses against civilians perpetrated by both the rebel groups and against government armed forces during the conflict67 and after the Linas-Marcoussis talks.68 Abuses civilians included killings, abductions,69 arbitrary arrests, attacks based on nationality, ethnicity, or religious beliefs, and destruction of private property.70 The discovery of mass graves containing up to 120 bodies is also documented.71 MPCI has been accused by Amnesty International of killing dozens of paramilitaries and some of their children in October 2002.72 Pro-government militias are accused of killings, torture, and assaults,73 especially against immigrants,74 and were allegedly involved in the bloody repression of an opposition rally in March 2004,75 during 76

Human rights issues which 200 were killed and 400 wounded. A UN commission described the latter events as ‘the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians and the committing of massive human rights violations’, and as ‘a carefully planned and executed operation by the security forces, i.e. the police, the gendarmerie, the army, as well as special units and the so-called parallel forces, under the direction and responsibility of the highest authorities of the State.’77 ▪ Displacement About 50,000 refugees from other countries, mostly Liberia, remain in Côte d’Ivoire. Some 20,000 Ivorian nationals fled to Liberia, 2,000 to Guinea, 1,000 to Mali, and nearly 2,000 Ivorians were asylum seekers in industrialized countries. An estimated 80,000 immigrants who lived in Côte d’Ivoire also fled the country.78 As of October 2003, there were an estimated 500,000 to 800,000 IDPs in Côte d’Ivoire.79 ▪ The Linas-Marcoussis peace process suffered a serious setback when rebels and opposition parties decided to suspend participation in the government of reconciliation late March 2004.80 This move, which resulted in 26 ministers leaving the 41-member government, was triggered by the violent repression of a banned opposition rally in Abidjan by state security forces and pro-government militias.81 As a result, the peace process appears to be in a stalemate with supporters of Gbagbo asking for the immediate disarmament of ex-rebels as a condition for holding new elections, and the New Forces asking for the implementation of the Linas- 82 83 Outlook Marcoussis agreement and the dissolution of pro-government militias. There are even speculations that the northern region might secede from the rest of the country, although this has been denied by New Forces officials.84 The country, however, remains effectively divided in two zones, and the disarmament of combatants appears improbable in the absence of a political breakthrough.

GUINEA ▪ Since Guinea achieved independence in 1958, Sékou Touré and Lansana Conté are the only two leaders to have ruled the country, often at the expense of political pluralism and good governance. Although Guinea is one of the few countries in the region not to have experienced civil war, events in the last decade have threatened the country’s apparent stability. An army mutiny in 1996, and deadly cross-border attacks in 2000– 01 by Liberia-sponsored rebels are raising fears that Guinea might soon face the same fate as neighbouring Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau.85 The volatile regional context led more than one million refugees to flee to Guinea in the last decade and facilitated the infiltration of armed groups in the country. Guinea’s involvement in the region’s conflicts appears to have had an even greater destabilizing Overview effect. Guinean military support to the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD),86 and the presence of LURD rebels and Sierra Leonean Kamajors (see CDF in Sierra Leone) in Guinean refugee camps87 is likely to have motivated Liberian president Charles Taylor in 2000–01 to sponsor cross-border attacks by the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Guinea (RFDG, for Rassemblement des forces démocratiques de Guinée).88 ▪ Movement Origins/composition: RFDG was composed of Guinean dissidents as well as Sierra Leonean of the and Liberian fighters.89 It was estimated to be 1,800-strong.90 Leadership: The group’s Democratic spokesman, Mohamed Lamine Lofana, claimed the group’s leaders were dissident Guinean Forces of military officers who fled the country after the failed 1996 mutiny.91 It is widely reported, Guinea however, that Taylor instigated the RFDG attacks.92 Areas of control/activity: RFDG raids (RFDG) affected a number of towns located along Guinea’s southern border with Sierra Leone and Liberia, including Macenta, Guéckédou, Kissidougou, Pamalap, N’Zérékoré, and Madina Woula. Sources of financing/support: RFDG was backed by Taylor93 and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF, see Sierra Leone).94 Status: The Guinean military was able to defeat the RFDG attacks only after recruiting an estimated 9,000 young Guinean volunteers (see Young Volunteers Militia), benefiting from the military support of LURD, and using disproportionate force as illustrated by the January 2001 bombing and partial destruction of Guéckédou.95 ▪ Young Origins/composition: Responding to a public appeal by President Conté, approximately 9,000 Volunteers young volunteers were mobilized to counter the 2000–01 attacks by RFDG.96 While the Militia Guinean military handled most of the recruitment process, local authorities, such as the mayor 97 Non-state armed groups of N’Zérékoré, played a key role in the process. Leadership: Guinean military/government. Areas of control/activity: The volunteers were recruited in the areas threatened by the rebel attacks (Guéckédou, Kissidougou, Faranah, Dabola, Mamou, Kindia, Forecariah, N’Zérékoré). They are also present in Conakry. Sources of financing/support: The Guinean military armed and supported the volunteers during the crisis. Status: An estimated 7,000 ex-volunteers have yet to be reintegrated in civilian life,98 almost 4,000 of which appear to remain under the Guinean army’s supervision.99 ▪ Stockpiles Small arms: There is no precise data available on the quantities or weapon types distributed by the army to the young volunteers. In the town of Guéckédou, which was heavily affected by the 2000–01 attacks, 70 per cent of the 2,380 volunteers were armed and participated in combat.100 Ministry of Security data on 222 weapons seized in 2001–03, however, suggest the presence of AK-47s, SKSs, hunting rifles, 12-gauge shotguns, carbines, Makarov, TT30, and TT27 pistols, revolvers, and craft pistols.101 Light weapons: The Guinean military seized SAM-7 surface-to- air missiles from RFDG.102

SALW ▪ Sources Seizure/corruption: N/A. Foreign governments: Liberia and the RUF provided armed fighters to RFDG.103 The Guinean military armed the young volunteers. Local manufacture: Guinea’s Anti-Crime Brigade seized 52 craft 12-gauge shotguns between 2001 and 2003,104 which confirms reports of the existence of illicit small arms production workshops in the country.105 Although Guinea produced small arms in the past, it no longer appears to be doing so.106

▪ Recovered DDR: There has been little effort to demobilize ex-volunteers. As of March 2004, an estimated 2,000 volunteers had reintegrated civilian life,107 although the fate of their weapons remains unclear.108 These include the 350 young volunteers who participated in a joint UNICEF and Guinean government pilot DDR programme. UNICEF has launched an appeal to demobilize an additional 1,000 young volunteers in 2004.109 How to disarm and demobilize former LURD rebels who remain in Guinea110 is another concern.111 The Guinean government denies their presence and there is no plausible estimate of their current number. Other: The Guinean government destroyed 21,000 small arms and light weapons as well as 90,000 rounds of ammunition in October 2003. These included weapons seized from RFDG rebels, obsolete weapons from the Guinean army, as well as weapons seized by state security forces.112 ▪ Child An undetermined number of children, some as young as 12, joined the young volunteers in soldiers 2000–01.113 There are reports that LURD recruited Liberian child soldiers in Guinean refugee camps.114 ▪ Abuses RFDG perpetrated killings, rapes, and abductions against civilians and refugees in Guinea against during the cross-border attacks.115 Some ex-Young Volunteers are organized in youth gangs and civilians intimidate and threaten the population.116 Tougher anti-crime measures implemented by the government since December 2003 appear to have reduced banditry by the ex-Volunteers.117 ▪ Displacement Due to shared borders with countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea has hosted more than a million refugees over the last ten years.118 As of September 2003, there were more than 280,000 refugees in Guinea, 60 per cent of whom lived outside camps; 140,000 were Liberian, 30,000 came from Sierra Leone, 7,000 from Côte

Human rights issues d’Ivoire, and more than 100,000 were Guinean returnees fleeing fighting in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire.119 The 2000–01 cross-border attacks led to the internal displacement of 250,000 Guineans.120 There were approximately 100,000 IDPs in Guinea in May 2003, primarily in Guinea’s Forest region due to the proximity of fighting in Liberia.121 The latter figure has most likely gone down since the end of the Liberian conflict. ▪ The effectiveness of the peace processes currently underway in neighbouring countries will undoubtedly influence the security climate in Guinea. On the other hand, the large number of unattended ex-combatants present in the country also threatens regional stability. Although officials do not lack will, resources to disarm and reintegrate ex-volunteers seem difficult to mobilize despite the potential pool of fighters they represent.

Outlook The suspected presence of former LURD rebels is equally worrying, as it highlights the limitations of national DDR programmes, which fail to take into account the regional dimensions of armed conflict.

GUINEA-BISSAU ▪ In June 1998, a military junta (junta militar) led by former Chief of Staff Ansumane Mané mutinied against the Bissau-Guinean government of President Joao Bernardo Vieira over allegations of collaboration with Senegalese rebels of the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC for Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance).122 The outbreak of civil war prompted the dispatch of about 2,500 Senegalese and several hundred Guinean troops to Bissau in support of the government,123 followed by the deployment of an ECOWAS contingent (ECOMOG) in December 1998.124 A cease-fire agreement was eventually signed in February 1999 leading to the appointment of a government of national unity and to the withdrawal of all Senegalese and Guinean troops in March. Fighting resumed in May 1999, however, with the military junta rapidly taking over the government. A fragile calm returned to the country, and presidential elections in Overview January 2000 resulted in the successful transition from military to democratic rule, bringing President Kumba Yala to power. In November 2000, the government made several hundred arrests following an attempted coup by Brigadier Ansumane Mané, who was killed by forces loyal to the government later that month.125 The new president failed to unite the country, and a new military coup in September 2003 ousted Yala and led to the appointment of a transitional government. Parliamentary elections were held in March 2004,126 and the next presidential elections are scheduled for December 2004. ▪ Military Origins/composition: The military junta comprised mainly members of the national armed junta forces and was backed by veterans of the liberation struggle as well as fighters from MFDC. 127

med The junta numbered 15–17,000 combatants during the civil war. An estimated 100–200 ‘irréductible’ Mané followers appear to remain active today.128 Leadership: Mané was killed by government forces in November 2000 after a failed coup attempt.129 Areas of

groups control/activity: Mané ‘irréductibles’ are based along the Senegalese border. Sources of financing/support: MFDC supported the military junta during the civil war. Status:

Non-state ar Demobilization is ongoing. The 100–200 ‘irréductible’ Mané followers appear to be engaged primarily in acts of banditry.130 ▪ Stockpiles Small arms: There is very little information available on small arms stockpiles in Guinea- Bissau, and therefore even the best estimates can only be seen as speculative. Based on the number of fighters, however, experts suggest that veterans of the liberation struggle possessed approximately 20,000 small arms, including AK-47 assault rifles, and captured NATO firearms as well as old hunting rifles. Similarly, it is possible that as many as 10,000 small arms were distributed to civilians during the 1998–99 civil war, including Kalashnikovs of type AK-65 and AK-79.131 Light weapons: RPG-7s, mortars. ▪ Sources Seizure/corruption: Most of the weapons in circulation today were distributed to civilians during the liberation struggle or during the 1998–99 civil war. Seizures from state stockpiles were also reported.132 Foreign governments: N/A. Local manufacture: N/A. SALW ▪ Recovered DDR: It is estimated that approximately 20,000 combatants fought during the civil war. These included 3–5,000 supporters of former President Vieira, and 15–17,000 fighters supporting the military junta of Ansumane Mané.133 Some 11,300 ex-combatants are registered with the government for reintegration, although funds were only available for 4,372 ex-combatants as of December 2003.134 Current World Bank-sponsored demobilization and reintegration programmes, however, do not have a disarmament component. Voluntary weapons collection schemes are currently being elaborated and considered by the National Commission on Small Arms of Guinea-Bissau and relevant international actors.135 Other: N/A. ▪ Child An estimated 600 children fought during the 1997–98 civil war.136 Most were aged seventeen, soldiers although some reports suggest the participation of children aged fourteen.137 ▪ Abuses Reports suggest that the military junta committed human rights abuses during the civil war, against including beatings of prisoners, killings, and looting.138 civilians ▪ Displacement Guinea-Bissau hosted about 7,000 refugees at the end of 2002, including some 6,000 from Senegal, and up to 1,000 from other countries, primarily Liberia and Sierra Leone.139 The 1997– 98 civil war led to the internal displacement of more than 300,000 civilians, the majority of Human rights issues whom have now resettled,140 and led 13,000 refugees to flee the country.141 ▪ While the September 2003 coup was bloodless142 and the March 2004 parliamentary elections relatively transparent,143 Guinea-Bissau remains in a potentially explosive situation due to the large number of ex- combatants not yet disarmed and demobilized. Given the severe economic difficulties the country is currently facing,144 the large number of ex-combatants can only represent a threat to the fragile democratization process.

Outlook For instance, recent clashes at the Senegalese border between the Bissau-Guinean army and an armed group believed to comprise elements of MFDC killed four and injured 14 soldiers.145

LIBERIA ▪ In 1999, two years after Liberia’s devastating eight-year civil war ended, the country again found itself embroiled in armed conflict. President Charles Taylor, the erstwhile leader of the National Patriotic Front for Liberia (NPFL), faced challenges from two new rebel groups: the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), which split from the LURD in March 2003. The country’s Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) fared poorly against the rebels and by June, the capital, Monrovia, was under siege. The three parties engaged in negotiations in Ghana, leading to a cease-fire

Overview agreement on 17 June, the 18 August Accra Peace Agreement, and Charles Taylor’s exile to Nigeria. The peace agreement provided for the disarmament of ex-combatants and the formation of a transitional government that is to lead Liberia to elections in 2005. About 14,000 peacekeeping troops are currently deployed in Liberia under the command of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).146 ▪ Liberians Origins/composition: LURD was formed in 2000 by Liberian exiles who felt frustrated by United for and excluded from the implementation of the 1997 Abuja Peace Accords. It is primarily Reconciliation composed of ethnic Mandingos and Krahns. These same ethnic groups formed the bulk of the and Democracy United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO), which fought Taylor’s (LURD) NPFL during the civil war.147 The Mandingos have historical roots in Guinea. The estimated size of LURD is 8,000 combatants, not including child soldiers.148 Leadership: Sekou Conneh,149 of the Mandingo ethnic group. Areas of control/activity: LURD’s stronghold is Lofa county, in the northwest of the country. An undetermined number of LURD combatants were based in Guinea’s Forest region during the civil war, including the Kouankan refugee camp150 and the towns of Macenta,151 Guéckédou, and Nzérékoré.152 Sources of financing/support: Guinea provided weapons as well as logistical and medical support to LURD.153 Former members of Sierra Leone’s Civil Defence Force (CDF), Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and West Side Boys have also fought alongside LURD.154 Status: LURD signed the Accra peace agreement and is currently participating in the DDR process.155 ▪ Movement for Origins/composition: MODEL is mainly composed of Krahn supporters who split from Democracy in LURD in March 2003.156 A number of MODEL fighters had previously fought in Côte Liberia d’Ivoire as Lima mercenaries.157 The estimated size of MODEL is 5,000 combatants, not (MODEL) including child soldiers.158 Leadership: Thomas Yaya Nimely is currently the transitional government’s foreign minister.159 Areas of control/activity: MODEL was active in the eastern and south-eastern parts of Liberia, which border Côte d’Ivoire. The Krahn are related

Non-state armed groups to Côte d’Ivoire’s We ethnic group. MODEL and LURD fighters frequently crossed the Ivorian border for logistical support and participated in the Ivorian conflict on President Gbagbo’s side.160 Sources of financing/support: Côte d’Ivoire.161 Status: MODEL signed the Accra peace agreement and is currently participating in the DDR process.162 ▪ Government of Origins/composition: Taylor created a number of militias and paramilitary groups (e.g. the Liberia Militias Anti-Terrorist Unit) to defend his government after the 1997 elections. These armed groups and included fighters of the pre-1997 civil war as well as new and younger recruits, including Paramilitaries child soldiers affiliated with the RUF.163 About 15,000 AFL, paramilitary, and militia ex- combatants are expected to participate in the current phase of the DDR process, not including child soldiers.164 Leadership: Taylor loyalists. Areas of control/activity: Monrovia, Bong, and Nimba counties. Sources of financing/support: Charles Taylor/Liberian government. Status: In December 2003, 12,664 AFL and ex-militia/paramilitary fighters were demobilized.165 ▪ Stockpiles Small arms: LURD rebels have self-loading pistols, M72 AB2 automatic rifles, FN FAL rifles, AKM assault rifles, SKS rifles, PKM light machine guns, RPK and RPD machine guns, and Chinese M-60 type 7.62mm medium machine guns.166 Members of MODEL were seen in October 2003 carrying new AK-47 assault rifles.167 Light weapons: LURD have SALW RPG-7s, RPO-type grenade launchers, SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles, as well as British- made 60mm and 81mm mortars and DSHK 12.7mm heavy machine guns.168

▪ Sources Seizure/corruption: N/A. Foreign governments: Although LURD rebels claim to use only weapons and ammunition captured from government forces,169 reports suggest they also obtained weapons from Guinea,170 Iran,171 and the United Arab Emirates.172 MODEL has allegedly received arms and other military equipment from the Ivorian government.173 In violation of the 1992 Security Council embargo, the government acquired weapons from June to August 2002 through the Belgrade-based Temex brokering company, using false Nigerian end-user certificates.174 Since the end of the war, however, external support appears to have ended.175 Local manufacture: N/A. ▪ Recovered DDR: From 7 to 17 December 2003, 12,664 government soldiers and militia were disarmed, surrendering 8,686 weapons in the process.176 The Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRR) programme was then suspended given misunderstandings among ex-combatants about the benefits they were to receive, disturbances caused by some ‘disgruntled elements’.177 The programme was re-launched on 15 April 2004, with an additional 7,870 fighters demobilizing by early May and returning 2,500 weapons and 53,000 rounds of ammunition.178 The weapons surrendered in this second phase include 2,185 rifles and sub-machine guns, 45 machine guns, 23 pistols, 187 RPG launchers, and 8 mortars. The programme aims at collecting and destroying 70,000 weapons179 and demobilizing between 38,000 and 53,000 ex-combatants.180 Other: N/A. ▪ Child soldiers MODEL, LURD, and government armed forces all recruited and used child soldiers.181 According to the UN, government militia groups and rebels recruited up to 15,000 child soldiers, forcibly or voluntarily.182 Recent DDRR operational planning documents set the range of ex-child soldiers requiring demobilization between 8,000 and 23,000.183 ▪ Abuses Government troops and pro-government militias have perpetrated killings, torture, rape, against extortion, and abduction for forced labour and forcible recruitment, and the systematic civilians looting and burning of towns.184 Although abuses committed by LURD were reportedly less widespread and systematic than those by pro-government forces, they nevertheless included summary killings, abduction, rape, forced recruitment of men and children, and forced labour.185 MODEL also subjected civilians to forced labour, and engaged in the widespread looting of civilian property, sometimes accompanied by rape and other forms of sexual violence.186 Human rights issues ▪ Displacement Although 50,000 Liberian refugees have already returned to Liberia since August 2003, approximately 300,000 remain scattered across West Africa (primarily in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Sierra Leone).187 About 50,000 Sierra Leonean and Ivorian refugees are hosted in Liberia.188 As of August 2003, there were an estimated 500,000 to 600,000 IDPs in Liberia.189 ▪ The December 2003 incidents illustrate how disarming a country affected by 14 years of civil war will not be an easy task, especially with neighbouring countries facing their own internal security challenges. Some have voiced concerns that LURD and MODEL might be transferring some of their weapons to Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, although the groups’ respective leaders have denied this.190 The re-launched DDRR process and

Outlook recent declarations by group leaders, however, raise hopes that the transitional government is actively engaged in the peace process.191

MALI ▪ Active armed groups in Mali originated in the Tuareg-Arab rebellion of the late 1980s to the mid-1990s. The origins of the rebellion can be viewed, simply, as worsening drought in the Sahel from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s, government marginalization and repression of the north, and Islamic radicalization of young Tuareg men. Malian armed groups included those engaged in the rebellion and those formed in reaction to the incursions and violence associated with the rebellion. Despite a drastic reduction in violence, two main groups still exist.192 While both armed groups display heterogeneous ethno-religious compositions, the

Overview Movements and United Fronts of Azawad (MFUA, for Mouvements et Fronts Unis de l’Azawad) could be described as a loose Arab and Tuareg coalition. The Patriotic Movement of Ganda Koy (MPGK, for Mouvement Patriotique de Ganda Koy) is composed of sedentary peoples, including the Songhoy, who are organized largely in opposition to the Tuareg and Arabs. ▪ Movements Origins/composition: MFUA is an umbrella organization comprised of the four groups most and United active in the Tuareg/Arab rebellion: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad Fronts of (MPLA, for Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l’Azawad), the Popular Front for the Azawad Liberation of Azawad (FPLA, for Front Populaire de Libération de l’Azawad), the (MFUA) Revolutionnary Army for the Liberation of Azawad (ARLA, for Armée Révolutionnaire de Libération de l’Azawad), and the Islamic Arab Front of Azawad (FIIA, for Front Islamique Arabe de l’Azawad). The birth of MFUA is attributed to common cause between the four groups, namely the opposition to the government. The group’s composition is largely Tuareg and Arab, and is estimated to contain between 3,000 and 10,000 potential combatants.193 Leadership: Zahaby ould Sidi Mohamed was MFUA’s spokesman in 1992.194 Areas of control/activity: In general terms, the groups comprising MFUA are active within the northern half of eastern Mali, north of the line drawn between Timbuktu and Menaka via Gao.195 Sources of financing/support: Allegedly Algeria and Libya.196 Status: Active. ▪ Patriotic Origins/composition: MPGK was formed in reaction to the Tuareg/Arab rebellion, for the Movement purposes of defence against attack and to stop northern encroachment against the generally of Ganda sedentary peoples of the south.197 MPGK was officially formed on 19 May 1994.198

Non-state armed groups Koy Leadership: Captain Abdoulaye Hamadahamne Maiga, self-declared military commander in (MPGK) 1995.199 Areas of control/activity: MPGK reportedly operates in areas of predominantly Songhoy ethnicity, and peoples in opposition to Tuareg and Arabs in the areas in and around Kidal. It has also attracted support from the Riverain people in the region of Gao.200 Sources of financing/support: MPGK has reportedly benefited from support from the Malian army, including alleged continued payment from officers who have left the Malian army to support the MPGK.201 MPGK has a committee of elders in Gao and a support committee in Bamako.202 Status: Active. ▪ Stockpiles Small arms: AK-47s, rifles, pistols. Light weapons: Grenade launchers, machine guns, mortars.203 ▪ Sources Seizure/corruption: Military personnel joining MPGK are known to have brought with them ‘the contents of an armoury’ in Sevaré.204 Foreign governments: Libya.205 Local manufacture: Reports indicate the existence of illicit workshops producing craft hunting rifles, shotguns, and pistols.206 ▪ Recovered DDR: Following the Timbuktu donor roundtable of July 1995, the UN Resident Coordinator and the UN Department for Political Affairs engineered a trust fund for peace building with a particular emphasis on the resettlement of ex-combatants. Combatants presented themselves in

SALW four cantonment sites (Léré, Bourem, Menaka and Kidal) to surrender their weapons, which were later symbolically burned on 27 March 1996. The Trust Fund offered USD 200 to each of the 3,000 combatants who had surrendered a weapon, and USD 100 to each of the approximately 7,000 who did not have weapons. Weapons surrendered ranged from older rifles to AK-47s. Some 1,479 combatants were later selected to join the Malian armed forces, police, and customs; a further 150 were selected for civil service; and the remainder returned to civilian life with a demobilization premium. Many of the latter, however, were reportedly dissatisfied with their lot in the process.207 Other: N/A. ▪ Child There are no reports of child soldiers being used or recruited by Malian armed groups. soldiers ▪ Abuses There are reports that all groups involved in the Tuareg rebellion, as well as MPGK, Rights

Human against perpetrated terrorist acts, pillaging and looting. civilians

▪ Displacement About 200,000 Malians fled to neighbouring countries in the early 1990s. From 1996 to 1998,

around 150,000 Tuareg refugees returned to Mali.208 The Malian conflict is reported to have produced 50,000 IDPs, who returned to their homes at the end of the conflict.209 ▪ Although Mali has enjoyed peace and a relative stability since 1996, it remains one of the poorest countries in the world, and one in which the re-insertion of refugees is not a completely solved problem. While the state’s treatment of the Tuareg has certainly improved since the days of President Traoré, when the central government marginalized the north, harsh environmental conditions (drought and competition for land in the worsening climate of the Sahel) are factors that still afflict Malian society.210 Moreover, SALW still appear to be in ready supply in Mali for any non-state armed group with funds to purchase them. An Algeria-based rebel group known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC for Groupe salafiste pour la Outlook prédication et le combat) reportedly travelled to northern Mali to obtain mortar launchers, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and surface-to-air missiles, which they took back to Algeria with them.211 GSCP members then clashed with Nigerien forces in the north of Niger, where they were carrying 14.5mm anti-aircraft guns, six mortars, AK-47s, and other weapons and ammunition.’212

NIGER ▪ In the early 1990s, the nomadic Tuareg in the north and Toubou in the east engaged in an armed rebellion against the Nigerien state, asking for more political rights and a more equitable distribution of national resources. A fragmented guerrilla war ensued in the Aïr, Azawak, Manga, and Kawar regions, prompting the local Arab and Peulh communities to create self-defence militias as the rebels began stealing cattle and property to fund their war effort. Three peace accords in Ouagadougou (1995), Algiers (1997), and Overview N’Djamena (1998), followed by the adoption of a new constitution in 1999 and fresh elections in 2000, restored peace in what remains one of the world’s poorest countries. ▪ Tuareg and Origins/composition: There were as many as 13 Tuareg and Toubou rebel groups active in Toubou rebel 1992–98. These NSAs signed various agreements with the government throughout the groups rebellion.213 The Union of Armed Resistance Forces (UFRA, for Union des forces de la résistance armée, a coalition of three groups), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Sahara (FARS, for Forces armies révolutionnaires du Sahara), and the Democratic Front for Renewal (FDR, for Front Démocratique du Renouveau) were the last groups to agree to peace in 1997 and 1998.214 Estimates of the total number of ex-combatants vary between 5,000215 and 7,000.216 Leadership: UFRA was led by Mohamed Anacko, FARS by Chahai Barkay, and FDR by Issa Lamine. 217 Areas of control/activity: The rebellion was active in the regions of Aïr, Azawak, Manga, and Kawar. The Tuareg and Toubou live in the desert areas along the borders with Mali, Algeria, Libya, and Chad. Sources of financing/support: As their own resources decreased, Toubou and Tuareg rebels stole cattle and goods from other communities to purchase arms and finance their war effort.218 Status: Demobilization is ongoing. None of the rebellion’s armed groups remain active today.219 Arab and Origins/composition: Arab and Peulh communities organized self-defence militias as they Peulh self- became the victims of attacks perpetrated by rebels seeking to finance their war effort. The Non-state armed groups defence Vigilance Committee of Tassara (CVT, for Comité de vigilance de Tassara), the Self- militias Defence Committee (CAD, for Comité d’Autodéfense), and the Peulh and Arab militias were the principal self-defence groups.220 Leadership: CVT was led by Najim Boujima, CAD by Boubacar Ahmed, the Peulh Militia by Maazou Boukar, and the Arab Militia by Hamid Ahmed.221 Areas of control/activity: CVT and CAT were based in Azawak, and the Peulh and Arab militias operated in the Manga region.222 Sources of financing/support: Arab and Peulh communities. Status: None of the self-defence militias remain active today.223 ▪ Types Small arms: Small arms collected during the N’Guigmi ‘Arms for development’ pilot project included old mousqueton rifles, MAS 36, SIG, AK-47s, and FAL automatic weapons.224 Light weapons: RPG-7s, grenades.225 ▪ Sources Seizure: N/A. Foreign governments: There are no reports that foreign governments provided weapons directly to Nigerien rebels. Chadian rebels entered Niger with their weapons during the civil war in that country.226 Weapons were also smuggled in from other neighbouring countries, including Nigeria, Lybia, and Algeria.227 Assault rifles reportedly cost between two and four camels during the rebellion.228 Local manufacture: Very rudimentary craft small arms can be found in N’Guigmi.229 SALW ▪ Recovered DDR: The 1,243 weapons surrendered as part of the peace agreements230 were subsequently destroyed at a ‘Flame of Peace’ ceremony on 25 September 2000 in Agadez. Out of 7,014 registered ex-combatants,231 3,160 remained to be demobilized as of March 2004.232 Other: A pilot UNDP ‘Arms for development’ project collected 160 weapons by March 2004 in N’Guigmi, 103 of which were destroyed.233 A total of 1,188 weapons had been surrendered voluntarily to the National Commission on Small Arms or seized by the authorities as of September 2003; 300 of them have been destroyed.234 ▪ Child soldiers There are no reports of the use or the recruitment of child soldiers during the rebellion.235

▪ Abuses With the exception of cattle rustling and robbing, there are no reports of abuses against issues against civilians during the rebellion.

Human rights civilians

▪ Displacement About 200,000 refugees reportedly fled from Niger and Mali in the early 1990s.236 Most

Nigerien refugees had repatriated by 2000. Niger was hosting about 1,000 refugees and asylum seekers from various African countries at the end of 2000.237 ▪ Even though drought and under-development are the most serious challenges facing the country today,238 peace in Niger should not be taken for granted, as evidenced by the 2002 army mutiny239 and late 2003 reports of sporadic fighting between Toubous and Tuaregs in the Tesker area.240 Furthermore, Niger is not exempt from the activities of North African terrorist groups. In March 2004, for instance, the Algeria-based Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC for Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat) clashed with Nigerien forces in the north of the country, leaving behind it 14.5mm anti-aircraft guns, six 241 Outlook mortars, AK-47s, and other weapons and ammunition. Nigerien authorities reported that GSCP had been collaborating with Nigerien armed bandits and ‘was using hideouts and caches left over from the Tuareg rebellion’.242 These recent events highlight the need to complete the ongoing DDR process, and to further collect the weapons left behind after the rebellion.

NIGERIA ▪ Nigeria, a country of some 120 million people, is beset by widespread and growing ethnic and religious tensions and hostilities. There are more than 250 ethnic groups, of which five – the Hausa and Fulani (in the north), the Yoruba (in the southwest), the Igbo (in the southeast), and the Ijaw (in the Niger Delta region) – comprise around three-quarters of the population. Corruption and economic mismanagement during the latest military dictatorship, which ended in 1999, have both enfeebled the central government while simultaneously strengthening the resolve of many states and citizens’ groups to assert themselves in the more permissive political space. It is in this context that an increasing number of non-state armed groups have arisen either as a direct challenge to state authority or to supplement state security apparatuses. Besides ethnic and religious rivalries, the growing prominence of these groups also results from economic deprivation, political machinations, and the long-standing tensions in the oil-rich Niger Delta.243 More than half of Nigeria’s 36 states have witnessed violence due to the activities of these various militias, resulting in thousands of deaths and the displacement of tens of thousands of people. Small arms and light weapons in militias’ hands

Overview contribute significantly to this predicament. Efforts of the central government to clamp down on these groups have made limited progress in reining them in. Ethnic and geographic criteria and concerns characterize many of the groups and the largest ones – ‘APC’ (Hausa and Fulani), ‘MASSOB’ (Igbo), ‘EBA’ (Ijaw), and ‘OPC’ (Yoruba) – are listed below, as are several others. The groups recorded here, however, can best be understood as the tip of the iceberg. Between September 2000 and October 2001, for example, governors and state representatives from thes states of Adamawa, Akwa Idom, Bayelsa, and Niger either proposed or enacted legislation to establish various types of ‘neighbourhood watch’ – or vigilante – groups.244 Moreover, the Niger Delta is known to have a number of ethnic militias in addition to the Egbesu Boys – including those of the Itshekiri, the Urohobo, and the Andoni – while the north of the country has an uncharted number of Sharia vigilante groups similar to the ‘Taleban’/Al-Sunna Wal Jamma.245 ▪ Bakassi Origins/composition: The group that eventually became known as the Bakassi Boys around Boys 1999 arose from a number of disparate vigilante groups active in 1997–98 in Abia State, — among them the Onitsha Traders’ Association (OTA). They were viewed as having been Onitsha successful in stemming the growing tide of armed robberies in the city. Others in the region Traders’ subsequently hired them and ‘by mid-2000, the Bakassi Boys had become an accepted part of Association daily life in the large cities in the south-east’.246 They became known also as AVS (noted (OTA) above) as well as the Abia State Vigilante Service (also ‘AVS’), and the Imo State Vigilante — Service (IVS), although the names and acronyms of the latter two are not as frequently used. Anambra 247 State Leadership: Gilbert Okoye, the ‘leader of the Bakassi Boys’, was arrested in March 2001. Vigilante It is not clear who, if anyone, succeeded him. The Anambra State governor, Chinwoke Service Mbadinuju, is understood to have exerted considerable control over the Anambra Vigilante (AVS) Service (AVS) and its successor, the Anambra State Markets Amalgamated Traders — Association (ASMATA), known as the ‘ASMATA Boys’.248 The structure of AVS included a Abia State security board composed of the chairperson of the AVS and a police superintendent. Other Vigilante members are the chairperson of the Security Committee at the state House of Assembly, a Service lawyer, the chairperson of the Council of Traditional Leaders of the state, and other (AVS) community representatives. Areas of control/activity: The Bakassi Boys and their successor — Imo State groups have been active in the states of Abia, Anambra, and Imo in south-eastern Nigeria. Non-state armed groups Vigilante Sources of financing/support: The Bakassi Boys have enjoyed the support of the three state Service governments in which they operate, and have been provided with offices, uniforms and (IVS) vehicles, as well as salaries.249 The government of Anambra State has gone the furthest in — terms of open support for the Bakassi Boys by introducing to the state assembly and ensuring Onitsha the adoption of a law in August 2000, which officially established them as the Anambra State Vigilante Vigilante Services. The law outlines the groups’ functions and powers, effectively making Services them a full-fledged law enforcement agency. Status: The government outlawed the Bakassi (OVS) Boys and then the Anambra Vigilante Service, but the basic structure and ‘services’ rendered — ASMATA are believed to still exist. Boys

▪ O’odua Origins/composition: OPC emerged in August 1994 in the wake of the annulled June 1993 People's national elections that Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba chief, is widely believed to have won. The Congress organization, which is active in south-western Nigeria, was established to protect the interests (OPC) of the Yoruba ethnic group. Importantly, Adam’s OPC is not part of the more political Coalition of O’odua Self-Determination Groups (COSEG), which Fasehun and a number of other groups have created.250 There are (at least) 20 OPC ‘zonal commanders’ each claiming to lead 200 armed men.251 Leadership: The group is led by Frederick Fasehun, a medical doctor by profession, and a number of highly skilled professionals and intellectuals. Nevertheless, OPC has split into the moderates under Fasehun, and a more radical militant wing under Gani Adams, which eschews the OPC’s role in Nigeria’s political transition.252 (Kayode Ogundamisi is the OPC’s National Secretary).253 Areas of control/activity: OPC is active in Lagos, Oyo, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Ekiti, Kwara, and Kogi states (south-western Nigeria). The militia is engaged in violence against other ethnic groups, vigilantism, crime fighting and robbery. It has also clashed with police, including attacks on police stations. Fasehun has acknowledged the existence of ‘a few anti-social elements’ in such a huge organization as OPC (adding that ‘we cannot all be angels’).254 Sources of financing/support: Contributions from bus drivers and residents who solicit protection from thieves cover significant portions of OPC’s operational expenses. It claims membership from more than five million Nigerians at home and abroad.255 OPC enjoys the support of some state government authorities, including the governor of Lagos state.256 Status: Active. Human Rights Watch reported that, by early 2003, killings by OPC had declined; yet OPC remained ‘active and visible’.257 ▪ Arewa Origins/composition: The election of Olusegun Obasanjo (a ‘southerner’) and the activities People’s of the OPC provided the impetus for the creation of APC to safeguard northern interests. It Congress formally came into existence in December 1999.258 Importantly, unlike other ethnic militia (APC) groups such as OPC and the Bakassi Boys, APC is a manifestation of elite military discontent at losing former privileges. It has also underscored its intent to counter southern-initiated violence against northerners.259 Leadership: Sagir Mohammed, a former army officer, heads APC.260 Areas of control/activity: APC is active in northern Nigeria (Hausa-Fulani areas). Sources of financing/support: Key backers appear to be retired army officers, who have provided the Congress with ‘sophisticated’ weapons.261 Status: Active. Note: Some analysts and commentators note that APC is not an NSA as it does not have armed members – although some of its members have access to arms and/or facilitate the arming of others. It is included here nevertheless as to leave it out would detract from the report’s utility. ▪ Egbesu Origins/composition: The Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) was formed in 1998 as an umbrella Boys of organization of Ijaw civil and youth groups following a meeting in Bayelsa state of more than Africa 5,000 youths from 25 Ijaw associations. It was designed to be a pro-militant organization to (EBA) promote Ijaw interests and challenge those of the various oil companies active in the Niger Delta.262 The Egbesu Boys essentially are IYC’s military wing; rather than a standing force, they are a collection of like-minded youth from various IYC sub-groups. The Egbesu is a deity and belief system and is perceived as a unifying spirit among the Ijaws. The group follows the will of the chief priest who communes with and speaks on behalf of the deity.263 Leadership: Their de facto leader is the chief priest of the Egbesu shrine at Amabulou. In addition to the chief priest, ‘in 1998, the executive comprised the late Alex Preye, the chief priest, the general secretary Mr. Felix Tuodolor, the Directors of Mobilization Mr. F. Denumighan, Finance, Clayton Daunumingnan, Environmental Affairs, Ambah Binaebi, and Public Relations, Patrick Ziakede. The present chief priest (as of 2003) is Chief Augustine Ebikeme, a first class chief in Bayelsa State; another notable priest lives in Egbema in Delta State. The Chairman of the Supreme Egbesu Assembly is Sergeant Were Digifa.’264 Areas of control/activity: IYC is active throughout Nigeria’s six south-eastern states that comprise the Niger Delta: Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Ondo, and Rivers. Sources of financing/support: The Egbesu Boys and IYC derive most of their support from Ijaws. Status: Active.

▪ Niger Delta Origins/composition: Active in the general struggles involving the Ijaw youth movement and Volunteer closely associated with the Egbesu.265 ‘In the Niger Delta some 4,000 Ijaws launched protests Force in December 1998, to which the government responded by sending in additional military (NDVF) troops and declaring a state of emergency.’266 NDVF gave the government 60 days to respond to their demands for sharing oil wealth or face sabotage.267 The group’s demands involve a significant increase in oil revenues, as well as undertakings from the companies to employ many thousands of local youths.268 Leadership: Reportedly created by Major Isaac Boro (who died in 1967) for the Ijaws.269 Its leader was reportedly Bello Orubebe in 2000.270 It is also claimed that Orubebe is the coordinator, while Ekiokenagha Zuokumor is the group’s president.271 Areas of control/activity: Niger Delta, in particular, the state of Bayelsa and its capital, Yenagoa (south-eastern Nigeria). Sources of financing/support: N/A. Status: Active. ▪ Movement Origins/composition: The group was formed in late 1999 to revive the secessionist state of for the Biafra, which had led to the Nigerian civil war in 1967–70.272 Clashes in 2000 with military Actualization over fuel prices.273 The group was later involved in seizing fuel tankers.274 It was banned by of the Abbia state in 2001.275 It is unclear how many members the group has, although 2,500 were Sovereign reported to be imprisoned.276 In March 2003 more than 150 members were killed in Umulolo State of Okigwe, Imo State, when they confronted combined police and army patrol teams.277 Biafra Leadership: MASSOB’s leader is Ralph Uwazurike. Areas of control/activity: MASSOB is (MASSOB) active in south-eastern Nigeria in the states of Abia, Anambra, Eboniyi, Enugu, and Imo. Sources of financing/support: While MASSOB has many Igbo supporters, it does not enjoy the support of the five south-eastern states’ governors, nor has it received the backing of the leader of the 1967 secession effort.278 Status: Active. ▪ Federated Origins/composition: The most recent bout of conflict was sparked by a dispute that broke Niger Delta out in the Delta town of Warri in February 2003 between the Urhobo and the Itshekiri Ijaw communities over the delineation of electoral wards ahead of April–May general elections.279 Communities Ijaws accuse Obasanjo's government of favouring the Itshekiri, giving them the best of (FNDIC) government patronage and most of the few amenities given to the impoverished region.280 FNDIC joined the Urhobo in demanding the modification of the constituency boundaries that, they alleged, favoured the Itshekiri.281 FNDIC seized oil-pumping stations and threatened to blow them up in March 2003.282 There were reportedly around 3,000 youths involved in February 2003.283 Leadership: President: Mr. Oboko Bello, spokesman: Hon. George Timinimi, secretary: Mr. Kingsley Otuaro and adviser: Mr. Dan Ekpebide.284 Areas of control/activity: Warri Southwest, particularly around the towns of Oporoza, Eghoro, Oghoye, Ogidigben Ajudaibo Ugboegwugwu, Akpakpa, Ugogoro Ajakosogbo, Ugbogbodu, Deghole, Utonlila, Wakeno, Tobu, and Kolokolo (south-eastern Nigeria).285 Sources of financing/support: N/A. Status: Active. ▪ Al-Sunna Origins/composition: Al-Sunna Wal Jamma reportedly was established around 2002, and Wal Jamma demands Nigeria become an Islamic state. Its adherents are believed to be predominantly (Followers university students from the northeast region. About 200 members of the group apparently of the took up arms for the first time in December 2003,286 possibly in response to the Yobe Prophet) governor’s initial moves to disband the group.287 The group is locally known as ‘the Taleban’ because of its admiration for the former government in Afghanistan.288 (Indeed, the group (also known replaced the Nigerian flag with the Afghan flag at a state building they briefly occupied during as their altercations with police.289) Leadership: The Nigerian police claim that a man called ‘Taleban’) ‘Mohammed Yusuf,’ was the group’s leader and that he has fled to Saudi Arabia.290 Another report notes that the group’s leader was locally known as ‘Mullah Omar’ in deference to the deposed Afghan leader.291 Areas of control/activity: Al-Sunna Wal Jamma attacked two towns in the north-eastern state of Yobe in December 2003. Followers subsequently skirmished with Nigerian security forces on the outskirts of Maiduguri, the capital of neighbouring Borno state.292 Sources of financing/support: The group is believed to have minimal support among the local population.293 Nigerian authorities detained the head of the Kano-based Almundata Al-Islam Foundation for allegedly financing the group. Wealthy Saudis reportedly fund the Foundation.294 Status: Uncertain. By one account, the government ‘neutralized’ the group, killing 18 of its members and arresting many others during a series of skirmishes after the group failed to occupy Damaturu, the capital of Yobe state.295

▪ Zamfara Origins/composition: The Zamfara State Vigilante Service has been described as a ‘ragtag State volunteer army’ in red uniforms that patrols Zamfara state arresting anyone suspected of Vigilante violating Islamic law.296 They operate in six-person teams.297 ZSVS was likely established Service only after Zamfara state adopted sharia law in November 1999. Leadership: N/A. Areas of

(ZSVS) control/activity: ZSVS is active in Zamfara state. Sources of financing/support: The state government authorized several Zamfara Sharia Implementation Monitoring Committees with powers to arrest suspected criminals,298 which apparently covers the activities of ZSVS. Status: N/A. ▪ Stockpiles Small arms: Al-Sunna Wal Jamma possesses AK-47 assault rifles.299 The Bakassi Boys’ leaders repeatedly deny that their members possess firearms, yet eyewitness accounts indicate that they possess such weapons, and members have been arrested and firearms confiscated.300 The Egbesu Boys carry a variety of firearms.301 Eyewitnesses report the OPC to carry ‘long guns’, ‘sophisticated weapons’, and ‘pistols’, despite OPC leaders’ protestations that its members are not provided with such weapons.302 APC does not have ‘armed cadres’ along the lines of the Bakassi Boys, OPC, and Egbesu Boys, but it possesses the means to purchase arms and ammunition on a significant scale.303 Chadian rebels were reported to have ‘highly sophisticated weapons’.304 FNDIC have some military rifles.305 ZSVS reportedly carry pistols (along with homemade machetes and whips).306 Light weapons: The secretary-general of a Nigerian Islamic group has alleged that armed groups from the Christian Tarok ethnic group have used ‘machine guns’ in their attacks on Muslim Fulanis in Plateau state.307 Ijaw youths are known to possess ‘sophisticated’ weapons.308 ▪ Sources Seizure/Corruption: Firearms that were initially in service with the Nigerian police and military ‘constitute [a] notable source’ of small arms circulating in the country through seizures or illicit sales, as do weapons brought back to the country by peacekeepers serving abroad.309 Al-Sunna wal Jamma seized guns and ammunition from two police stations in the SALW towns of Geidam and Kanamma in Yobe state.310 Retired military officers from the Niger Delta region have reportedly provide arms to Ijaw youth.311 OPC have seized weapons belonging to the police or suspected criminals apprehended by OPC.312 FNDIC reportedly seized a number of military rifles from security personnel. 313 Foreign governments: There are not any reports of foreign governments providing weapons directly to Nigerian non-state armed groups. Local Manufacture: Nigeria produces a variety of small arms and ammunition at its Defence Industries Corporation (DICON), but there are no reports that any Nigerian armed groups receive these weapons directly. Blacksmiths represent ‘a significant source’ of small arms in the country, producing mostly single- and double-barrelled shotguns as well as various models of pistols. Vigilante groups and members of ethnic militias are increasingly turning to these artisans for weapons.314 ▪ Recovered DDR: Not applicable. Other: The police and military have undertaken numerous raids to recover weapons. In August 2002, for example, police recovered 12 locally made single- and double-barrelled shotguns and pistols, one pump-action rifle, 68 rounds of live ammunition (and 141 expended cartridges), as well as seven swords.315 ▪ Child According to the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSC), armed Ijaw youth thought soldiers to be 16 years of age and older are believed to be active in the conflicts in the Niger Delta region for various Ijaw groups. CSC reports that it has additional information concerning other ethnic militias’ use of children.316 As many non-state armed groups draw considerable support from youth, such as the Egbesu Boys, NDVF, and OPC, the problem of children under the age of 18 taking up arms is likely to be more widespread than among Ijaw-dominated groups in the Niger Delta region. ▪ Abuses OPC is accused of murder, summary execution, and torture.317 The Bakassi Boys are accused against of murder, and torture.318 AVS is accused of murder and summary execution.319 By one

Human rights issues civilians account, ethnic and religious unrest has resulted in at least 10,000 deaths in the first three years of the return to democratic rule.320 OTA/Bakassi Boys reportedly summarily executed more than 1,500 people between September 1999 and July 2000.321

▪ Displacement Displacement due to the activities of vigilante groups and altercations between them and Nigerian security forces is common and widespread. For example, at least 10,000 inhabitants of the towns of Babangida, Dankalawar, Geidam, and Kanamma in Yobe state fled their homes in late December 2003/early January 2004 due to fighting between Al-Sunna wal

Jamma and government forces.322 Most recently, fighting in Plateau state has resulted in ‘tens of thousands’ of residents being forced to flee their homes in response to the violence.323 No ‘foreign’ displacement is reported, although Chadian rebels could fall into this category. The extent of internal displacement is not known, but certainly very localized. The 2003 violence between security forces and FNDIC reportedly displaced around 4,000 people.324 ▪ There appears to be no slowing of the growth of vigilante groups. One hypothesis is that contagion is behind this trend. Citizens, associations of traders, or government officials form vigilante groups, often along ethnic lines (Bakassi Boys, ZSVS, OPC, OVS). Their often-unlawful action provokes other groups to form their own vigilante organizations. Other types of non-state armed groups tend to be regional umbrella organizations for disaffected youths, whose principle aim is to secure better rights/wealth for their region (EBA, NDVF, FNDIC). The government’s crackdown against vigilante groups has yielded very limited

Outlook results. It is not encouraging that some politicians – at the level of state governors – openly undermine President Obasanjo’s policies in this regard. Recent killings in Kano city and Plateau state illustrated the gravity of the situation, prompting Obasanjo to declare a state of emergency in Plateau and to dismiss the state’s governor.325

SENEGAL ▪ The separatist Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC, for Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance) and the Senegalese government have been struggling since 1982 over the statute of Casamance, Senegal’s southern region. Originally limited to large MFDC demonstrations, the conflict intensified in the late 1980s as the group moved towards perpetrating attacks against the Senegalese administration. Intermittent conflict continued throughout the 1990s and was broken by a series of cease-fire agreements that resulted in the political and military division of MFDC. The latest peace agreement was Overview signed in March 2001 by the newly elected President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and MFDC leader Abbé Augustine Diamacoune Senghor. Even though further incidents of fighting were reported between May and June 2002, calls by MFDC leaders at their annual conference in October 2003 raised prospects for peace.326 ▪ Movement Origins/composition: MFDC is motivated by feelings of under-representation and economic of the under-development among the Casamance population. The Diola is the main ethnic group in Democratic Basse-Casamance and MFDC.327 MFDC was estimated to be 2,000–3,000 strong in 2002.328 Forces of Leadership: Abbé Diamacoune is the political leader of MFDC. Sidy Badji, the founder of the Casamance hardline/military wing of MFDC, died in May 2003. MFDC’s military wing is currently divided (MFDC) in a number of factions. Areas of control/activity: MFDC has its roots in Casamance, Senegal’s southern region between The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Most MFDC members were based along the borders with these two countries: approximately 2,000 MFDC members were in neighbouring Guinea-Bissau, while 1,000 were located on both sides of the border with The Gambia.329 It remains unclear how many were armed combatants as opposed to refugees. Sources of financing/support: Donations from the Diola community in Senegal and abroad as well as marijuana trafficking have been MFDC’s major sources of financing.330 Government

Non-state armed groups and military officials in Guinea-Bissau provided weapons to MFDC until the 1998 civil war in that country.331 Status: The political wing of MFDC is engaged in negotiations with the Senegalese government. Militarily, MFDC appears weak given declining resources and foreign support; it seems limited to groups of armed bandits.332 ▪ Stockpiles Small arms: In the early stages of the Casamance rebellion, MFDC used such rudimentary weapons as arrows and spears. As the conflict intensified in the late 1980s, rebels started using more sophisticated weapons, starting with hunting rifles but also AK-47 assault rifles. Light weapons: MFDC began using RPGs and mortars in the early 1990s.333 ▪ Sources Seizure: N/A. Foreign governments: Government and military officials from Guinea-Bissau provided weapons to MFDC prior to 1998. Allegations against Bissau-Guinean military 334

SALW officials over arms smuggling to MFDC actually sparked the civil war in that country. Mauritania and The Gambia have also been accused of trafficking Libyan arms to MFDC.335 Local manufacture: Reports suggest the presence of illicit craft production workshops in Senegal. Senegalese craft weapons, however, are unlikely to be sophisticated.336 ▪ Recovered DDR: There have been no DDR programmes in Casamance. Other: N/A ▪ Child There is no evidence of children being used as soldiers by MFDC.337 soldiers ▪ Abuses Both Senegalese forces and MFDC rebels abused civilians during the Casamance conflict.338 against Abuses perpetrated by MFDC included killings, torture, beatings, and looting. 339 civilians ▪ Displacement Senegal hosted approximately 45,000 refugees and asylum seekers at the end of 2002, including an estimated 40,000 from Mauritania. There were an estimated 10,000 Senegalese refugees at the end of 2002, including some 6,000 in Guinea-Bissau and the remaining in The Gambia.340 At the end of 2002, 5,000 people remained internally displaced in Senegal. Acts of banditry Human rights issues perpetrated by armed groups nevertheless force an additional 8,500 civilians to flee their homes at least once a year.341 ▪ With the political wing of MFDC and the Senegalese government engaged in negotiations, Senegalese and Bissau-Guinean military authorities increasing cooperation at the border,342 and the Casamance population seemingly eager to move away from conflict, prospects for peace in Casamance appear relatively reasonable. The division of MFDC combatants in various factions, however, is worrying and may present a threat to

Outlook neighbouring countries. This was made particularly clear when recent clashes at the Senegalese border between the Bissau-Guinean army and alleged armed elements of MFDC killed four and injured 14 soldiers.343

SIERRA LEONE ▪ The Sierra Leone civil war began in March 1991 when a small number of fighters called the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked Sierra Leone from Liberia. An Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), comprising mutinous members of the Sierra Leone Army (referred to as ‘ex-SLA’), overthrew the government in May 1997. RUF accepted AFRC’s invitation to join the new junta, but the international community overwhelmingly supported the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, exiled in Conakry. Nigerian troops as part of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) re-installed Kabbah in March 1998, but the civil war raged until its official cessation in January 2002. Low points in the conflict included the AFRC/RUF siege of Freetown in January 1999 that resulted in Overview more than 5,000 deaths, and an RUF hostage-taking incident involving the capture of some 500 UN peacekeepers in May 2000. The civil war has been noteworthy for the sheer scale of human rights violations and extensive use of child soldiers. The country has remained relatively stable since Kabbah was reelected in a landslide victory in May 2002. In March 2004, the UN Security Council extended the drawdown of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to 2005. ▪ Revolutionary Origins/composition: At its height, the RUF may have numbered around 20,000. While more United than 24,000 RUF combatants participated in the various phases of the government’s Front disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programme,344 this is an inaccurate (RUF) indicator of the group’s actual strength. (See ‘Child soldiers’ box below.) Leadership: Foday Sankoh led RUF until his capture in May 1999. Issa Sesay emerged as interim leader in November 2000. Sankoh died in custody in July 2003. Areas of control/activity: Widespread and long-standing discontent with the country’s government and political elites in Freetown initially provided RUF with a base of popular support that ran across ethnic and district lines throughout parts of the hinterland. As RUF relied increasingly on terror and forced conscription, their control of several districts within the Northern and Eastern provinces increased, but at the expense of their popular support. Sources of financing/support: RUF received considerable funding from the illegal sale of alluvial diamonds.345 Burkina Faso, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and Libya are widely reported to have provided RUF with weapons.346 Status: The peace accords called for RUF to be transformed into a political party. This effectively occurred under Sesay. The RUF is no longer a cohesive fighting force. While many disarmed and demobilized, other RUF members left Sierra Leone to fight in regional wars. In March 2003, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) indicted Sesay. He presently awaits trial on charges of crimes against humanity, serious violations of international humanitarian law, and war crimes. ▪ Civil Origins/composition: CDF constituted a loose-knit collection of tribally based hunting Defence societies that defended their communities, initially against SLA and later RUF. Its members Non-state armed groups Force included the Tamaboros (Koinadugu district), the Donsos (Kono district), the Kapras (Tonkolili (CDF) district), and the Gbethis (Port Loko and Tonkolili districts). More than 37,000 CDF members participated in the DDR programme,347 but the numbers of CDF fighters was considerably larger. Leadership: Sam Hinga Norman, who served as Kabbah’s Deputy Minister of Defence for a time, was the National Coordinator of CDF. The degree to which he exerted control over CDF militias other than his Kamajor kinsmen is believed to have varied among the various groups, but not to have been particularly strong. Areas of control/activity: See ‘Origins/composition’ above. Sources of financing/support: The Kamajors received training from a British private security company (Sandline International), and weapons from Nigerian ECOMOG troops and from SLA.348 Status: Hinga Norman, indicted by SCSL in March 2003, currently awaits trial. The Kamajors still have a command structure, but the status of many of the other CDF militias is unclear.349

▪ Armed Origins/composition: Disgruntled members of the armed forces established the group at the Forces time of the coup d’état. Leadership: Johnny Paul Koroma was Chairman of AFRC and ruled Revolutionary the junta from May 1997 to February 1998. He remained influential with ‘ex-AFRC’ and Council members of the former Sierra Leone armed forces through the May 2002 elections. Areas of (AFRC) control/activity: AFRC was forced to flee Freetown in February 1998, but some elements continued to operate in small groups. Koroma continued to enjoy the allegiance of some ex- SLA and gained additional supporters among the general Freetown population for his defence of the capital in May 2000. Sources of financing/support: AFRC was politically isolated, although it might have received support from Liberia and perhaps some of Liberia’s supporters.350 Financially and militarily, AFRC benefited from exercising effective control of the country and its assets during its eight-month rule. Status: Koroma has not been seen in public since his reported ‘death’ in June 2003, which some believe is simply a ploy to avoid arrest by the Special Court, which had handed down its indictment three months earlier. Indeed, according to SCSL, Koroma’s ‘fate and whereabouts remain unknown’.351 ▪ West Side Origins/composition: The nucleus of WSB included former SLA members. Their strength was Boys believed to number in the hundreds. Leadership: Foday Kallay headed WSB. Areas of (WSB) control/activity: Largely limited to the Rokel Creek area near Occra Hills in Port Loko district. Sources of financing/support: WSB attacked and robbed people traveling along the roads in their area of control. Status: Defunct. Neutralized in September 2000 after UK Operation Barass, which rescued British soldiers taken hostage by WSB that August. Those not killed in the raid surrendered and later enlisted in the DDR programme. ▪ Stockpiles Small arms: RUF possessed a wide array of weapons including rifles such as AK-47 assault rifles of Chinese, Soviet, and Eastern European origin, Belgian FN-FALs, German G3s, and British Lee-Enfield no. 4s, and sub-machine guns such as the German Sten and Israeli Uzi.352 CDF possessed large numbers of hunting rifles, but also examples of assault rifles. For example, Gbethis who disarmed in Port Loko district turned in AK-47s, SLRs, and G3s.353 Light weapons: RUF possessed Chinese 12.7mm machine guns, various 60mm, 82mm, and 120mm mortars, and small numbers of anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles.354 ▪ Sources Seizure/Corruption: Sierra Leonean non-state armed actors seized weapons from the Sierra Leone armed forces as well as UN and ECOWAS peacekeeping troops. For example, RUF took hundreds of weapons from Guinean, Kenyan, and Zambian troops during the May 2000 UNAMSIL hostage crisis. AFRC took weapons from Malians in ECOMOG.355 Foreign SALW governments: At least eight countries – Burkina Faso, Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, the Slovak Republic, and Ukraine – reportedly provided materiel to RUF.356 RUF also seized arms from the SLA, ECOMOG, and UNAMSIL.357 Local manufacture: Craft manufacture is believed to be limited to hunting rifles. ▪ Recovered DDR: Between September 1998 and January 2002, some 25,000 small arms, 1,000 light weapons, and almost one million rounds of ammunition were collected during the DDR process.358 Other: A Community Arms Collection and Destruction Programme (CACD), which focused on weapons exempted from DDR such as pistols and hunting rifles, retrieved some 9,660 weapons and 17,000 rounds of ammunition between December 2001 and March 2002.359 ▪ Child The government demobilized approximately 6,850 child combatants during the civil war, but soldiers this figure does not represent the full scope of the issue. For example, some commanders did not register child soldiers with the DDR programme, preferring instead to enter into kickback schemes with non-combatants whereby the commanders would receive part of the recipient’s benefits. Some children, especially those associated with RUF, were afraid of being stigmatized and elected instead to remain anonymous. ▪ Abuses All parties to the conflict engaged in human rights violations during the civil war. RUF and against AFRC committed systematic and widespread violations of human rights including amputations, civilians rape, torture, mutilations, and summary executions. CDF and SLA reportedly committed serious human rights violations as well. ▪ Displacement Completion of the Sierra Leone DDR programme in early 2002 facilitated large-scale repatriation of refugees and resettlement of IDPs. By November 2003, 244,800 refugees had Human rights issues returned to Sierra Leone, and 73,200 remained in asylum countries in the sub-region. At that time Sierra Leone also hosted 66,300 Liberian refugees.360 At least 600,000 Sierra Leoneans were displaced within their own country at the end of 2001.361 More than 65,000 IDPs and returnees were resettled between May 2001 and February 2002.362 The final ‘official’ group of 12,800 IDPs were resettled in November 2002.363

▪ Although DDR was deeply flawed, it appears that small arms and light weapons are not easily available in the capital and throughout the country. Unemployment remains high, yet armed robberies and assaults are rare. Johnny Paul Koroma’s supporters tried (unsuccessfully) to steal weapons from the army engineer unit’s depot in Wellington in January 2003. This attempt suggests weapons are not circulating freely. There can be little doubt that demand for weapons in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia has been satisfied in part by surplus weapons from Sierra Leone. Reasons for concern remain, however. Popular support for SCSL may dissipate once the three group trials of nine indictees begin in mid-2004. Strident youth groups have appeared in the eastern Outlook diamond mining districts, and the government continues to struggle in asserting control over illegal mining in this area. The Security Council’s March 2004 decision to extend the UNAMSIL peacekeeping force’s mandate is a welcome development, but the Sierra Leone armed forces and police are still far from being able to provide for the country’s defence or to uphold law and order on their own.

PART III: OBSERVATIONS

The country studies presented above illustrate the complex, context-specific nature of NSAs in the ECOWAS region. A number of general observations, however, emerge from research conducted during Phase 1 of this project.

The large number and diversity of NSAs. The research indicates there are approximately 25 NSAs active in the region. They include rebel movements (e.g. MPCI, MPIGO, and MJP in Côte d’Ivoire, MFDC in Senegal), pro-government militias (e.g. Young Volunteers in Guinea), community- based vigilante groups (e.g. Bakassi Boys in Nigeria, self-defence militias in Niger and Mali) as well as religious movements (e.g. Al-Sunna Wal Jamma in Nigeria). Some possess locally produced hunting rifles while others have powerful assault rifles, heavy machine guns, and surface-to-air missiles. Their sizes vary from 200 to more than 10,000 combatants.

The use of NSAs as instruments of foreign policy. Some groups are backed by governments seeking to protect themselves from hostile neighbours. Examples include alleged Guinean support to LURD in Liberia, reported Ivorian support to MODEL in Liberia, and apparent Liberian support to RFDG in Guinea and MJP and MPIGO in Côte d’Ivoire. Countries providing support to armed groups operating abroad risk retaliation and the emergence of opposition groups within their own borders.

The relative ease with which NSAs can acquire weapons from domestic sources. Weapons procurement patterns illustrate the limits of current efforts to control the supply of small arms in the region. NSAs do not always have the means to acquire weapons from foreign suppliers on a large scale. Rather, they collect weapons in small numbers by seizing existing stocks (e.g. rebel attacks on government stockpiles and peacekeeping forces in Sierra Leone). Some groups in Nigeria have allegedly obtained weapons from retired military officers and corrupt policemen. Local production of small arms is another source of weapons for NSAs.

The great sensitivity of the region to relatively small NSAs. The massive refugee and IDP flows in the region illustrate how the activities of relatively small groups can affect the lives of a disproportionate number of people. For example, the small and lightly armed Al-Sunna Wal Jamma/‘Taleban’ militia in north-eastern Nigeria reportedly displaced more than 10,000 people after just a few days of armed activity against state authorities.

NSAs and the diffusion of conflict. Some NSA combatants have been fighting outside of their country of origin as ‘mercenaries’. For example, Liberian fighters have participated in the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire both in support of and against the Ivorian government (e.g. Liberians fighting with Lima and MPCI). RUF participated in Taylor-sponsored rebel attacks against Guinea, while members of LURD allegedly helped the Guinean military resist the attacks. The mobility of NSAs in the region suggests that DDR programmes would have a greater impact using a regional approach.

Not all NSAs recruit and use child soldiers. The research shows that not all armed groups in the region recruit and use children under 18 years of age. The use of child soldiers appears to be more prevalent in zones affected by conflict over a long period of time, such as in Sierra Leone or Liberia. It also remains unclear to what extent child soldiers actually participate in combat or simply assist fighting forces logistically. This ambiguity has led specialized agencies and NGOs to distinguish between child combatants and children associated with fighting forces (CAFF).

Most NSAs commit abuses against civilians. There are very few NSAs that have not committed abuses against civilian populations, which raises the issue of their accountability under international humanitarian law. Abuses include killings, torture, rape, amputations, mutilations, assaults, abductions, looting, forced labour, and forced recruitment. State forces engaged in fighting against NSAs are also frequently reported to commit abuses against civilians.

It is easier to create NSAs than to disband them. It is extremely challenging for governments and international institutions to disband or demobilize armed groups. In Nigeria, for example, despite the federal government's efforts to outlaw and disband many of these groups, those targeted persist – sometimes aided by local government authorities. Despite the ongoing DDR process at that time, ex-RUF fighters from Sierra Leone allegedly participated in the 2000–01 cross-border attacks against Guinea. The latter attacks prompted the Guinean government to call upon the support of several thousand young volunteers, whom it has yet to demobilize and disarm.

Refugee camps and NSAs. Reports that some armed groups recruit combatants and hide in refugee camps are alarming not only for refugees but also for host countries, as they risk becoming entangled in conflict. Examples include the alleged recruitment of Liberian refugees at the Nicla Camp to participate in the Ivorian conflict, as well as LURD’s reported infiltration of the Kouankan refugee camp in Guinea.

PART IV: POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS FOR PHASE 2

The following are proposed research questions to acquire a more in-depth understanding of the problems associated with NSAs and small arms in the ECOWAS region.

Assessment of DDR programmes in Mano River Union states. The mobility of NSAs across borders suggests that DDR programmes could have had a greater impact using a regional approach. This study would seek to trace the movements of ex-combatants of the Sierra Leonean and Liberian conflicts to other countries in the region, including Guinea. It would also analyze data on levels of violence before, during and after DDR programmes in the three Mano River Union states (Sierra Leone has completed its DDR process, Liberia has just started one, and Guinea has yet to demobilize several thousands of Guinean volunteers and Liberian fighters). Lastly, the study would examine the sensitive question of rewarding weapon holders (and sometimes abusers) rather than victims. The approach used would be a mixture of investigative research and quantitative data analysis to be carried out by the Small Arms Survey, and interviews with ex-combatants, child soldiers, and people not eligible for DDR to be undertaken by selected local partners.

Regional supply-side SALW initiatives. There remains a series of unanswered questions around the ECOWAS moratorium. The Small Arms Survey 2004 yearbook, for instance, shows that the volume of legal SALW trade to the region is greater than that authorized by ECOWAS secretariat exemptions. This Phase 1 report illustrates how NSAs acquire weapons from diverse sources, with international transfers representing only one part of the picture. Regional policies geared towards controlling the supply of small arms would undoubtedly gain from further in-depth research on key transfers issues. These would include an investigation into the continuing legal trade in SALW, research on undocumented/recent cases of trafficking, as well as focused attention on the availability of ammunition in the region.

West African craft production of small arms. Phase 1 revealed how craft small arms are produced in several countries in the region. These arms can be quite sophisticated. They are not limited to hunting shotguns, but rather include ‘AK-47-type’ assault rifles. How prevalent is the local production of automatic weapons? Are homemade weapons used by NSAs? Do these weapons represent a threat to ECOWAS member states when placed in the hands of NSAs? What can be done to reduce and control craft production? This research project would look specifically at craft production in Ghana, and its relationship to the conflict in neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire. The project could be undertaken with a Ghanaian research institute that has begun work on this subject and has expressed willingness to do a more in-depth and comprehensive study working with the Small Arms Survey.

Vigilante groups in Nigeria. The growing number of non-state armed groups in Nigeria is particularly worrying, as evidenced by the recent killings in Kano and Plateau state that prompted President Obasanjo to declare a state of emergency in Plateau. While some Nigerian NSAs have received significant attention (such as the Bakassi Boys and their successors, as well as those active in the Niger Delta), many in the ‘middle belt’ and northern parts of the country have received less coverage. Relatively little is known about these groups’ chain of command, level of organization, weapons procurement patterns, sources of financing, and the profile of their members. Too often media reports simplify and distort the conflicts to be of a religious nature, which feeds into stereotypes and heightens tensions unnecessarily. The Small Arms Survey identified at least two Nigerian research organizations that might conduct fieldwork on selected Nigerian groups.

Child soldiers. This report has found that child soldiers are not systematically used by West African NSAs. A subsequent study in Phase 2 could determine whether the prevalence of child soldiers is linked to a series of factors, including the availability of small arms, the length of conflict, the types of armed groups involved, shortages of combatants, and traditional beliefs. It would also examine

Preliminary report presented at the 6th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network Not for quotation or attribution – Comments welcome (Point of contact: [email protected]) Bamako, Mali, 27–29 May 2004 29 Mapping of Non-state Armed Groups in the ECOWAS Region Small Arms Survey and Malian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation recruitment patterns, whether voluntary, incentive-based, or forcible, as well as the various roles played by child soldiers in armed conflict. Data collection would involve interviews with children to be carried out by local partners, as well as quantitative and qualitative data analysis by the Small Arms Survey.

Illicit SALW transfers between the region and ECOWAS’s neighbouring states. In a number of cases, the weapons used by NSAs originated from countries bordering the region but not members of ECOWAS. For example, many of the small arms used by Nigerian NSAs were brought in and sold by Chadian ex-fighters. Similarly, weapons used in the region’s own conflicts risk being reshipped to groups fighting outside ECOWAS. Recent reports that a North African terrorist group purchased an assortment of small arms and light weapons in northern Mali provide grounds for this fear. This study would help assess the recent steps taken to ensure that the ECOWAS region does not become a source of SALW to NSAs outside the region, and vice versa.

ENDNOTES

1 This report was written by Nicolas Florquin and Eric Berman of the Small Arms Survey. It draws upon field research conducted by the authors and Mahamadou Nimaga of the Malian Foreign Ministry, as well as desk research conducted at the Small Arms Survey by James Bevan, Pamina Firchow, Stéphanie Pézard, and Ruxandra Stoicescu. 2 This report uses the definition of ‘small arms and light weapons’ established in the 1997 United Nations Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. The definition covers both military style weapons and commercial firearms (handguns and long guns). • Small arms: revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns, and light machine guns. • Light weapons: heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile systems, recoiless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of less than 100mm calibre. 3 One peace operation, the ECOWAS mission for the Guinea-Liberian border, never deployed. 4 For an overview of the ECOWAS moratorium and other small arms control initiatives in the region, see Ebo, Adedeji. 2003. Small arms control in West Africa. West Africa series No. 1. Security and Peacebuilding Programme. International Alert. London. October. 5 Poulton, Robin-Edward and Ibrahim ag Youssouf. 1998. A Peace of Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. UNIDIR/98/2. Geneva: UNIDIR. February. 6 Accord de Linas-Marcoussis. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.asp?ART=31727 7 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2004. Resolution S/RES/1528. 27 February. 8 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2004. ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Government confirms paramilitary role in Abidjan unrest’. 2 April. 9 For example, MJP, MPIGO and Lima forces have recruited former combatants from various armed groups in Sierra Leone. See UN Document S/2003/498. para. 66. 10 AFP (Agence France Presse). 2003. ‘Details of three Ivory Coast rebel groups and French forces’. 12 January. 11 Welsh, Paul. 2003. ‘Ivory Coast: Who are the rebels?’. BBC News. 15 January. . Accessed April 2004. 12 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Côte d’Ivoire: The War Is Not Yet Over. Africa Report N°72. 28 November. p.15 13 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Secretary-General on Cote d’Ivoire. S/2003/374. 26 March. para.46. 14 BBC News. 2003. ‘Ivorian Leader Defends Peace Deal’. 7 February. . Accessed May 2004. 15 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Côte d’Ivoire: The War Is Not Yet Over. Africa Report N°72. 28 November. p.16. 16 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Côte d’Ivoire: The war is not yet over. Africa Report N°72. 28 November p.15. 17 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Côte d’Ivoire: The war is not yet over. Africa Report N°72. 28 November. p.12. 18 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Côte d’Ivoire: The war is not yet over. Africa Report N°72. 28 November. Also see HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2003. Côte D’Ivoire: Trapped Between Two Wars; Violence Against Civilians in Western Côte D’Ivoire. New York: HRW. Vol. 15: 14. August. Accessed May. 19 Le jour. 2003. ‘Attaque de la BCEAO de Bouaké; Les rebelles se partagent 20 milliards.’ 3 November. . Accessed May 2004. 20 Confidential written correspondence with Western diplomat based in West Africa, May 2004. 21 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Côte d’Ivoire: The war is not yet over. Africa Report N°72. 28 November. p.16. 22 Global Security. 2004. Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest Profile. Accessed February 2004. 23 AFP (Agence France Presse). 2003. ‘Details of three Ivory Coast rebel groups and French forces’. 12 January. 24 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Côte d’Ivoire: The war is not yet over. Africa Report N°72. 28 November. 25 Global Security. 2004. Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest Profile. Accessed February 2004. 26 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Côte d’Ivoire: The war is not yet over. Africa Report N°72. 28 November. 27 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. S/2003/498. 24 April. para.49. 28 Zajtman, Arnaud. 2003. ‘Murky death of Ivory Coast rebel’. BBC News. 29 April. 29 Global Security. 2004. Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest Profile. Accessed February 2004. 30 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Côte d’Ivoire: The war is not yet over. Africa Report N°72. 28 November. 31 Silver Konan, André. 2003. ‘Doh Félix du MPIGO absent à Accra’. Le Nouveau Réveil. Abidjan. 3 June. 32 Global Witness. 2003. The Usual Suspects: Liberia’s Weapons and Mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. Report. March. . Accessed May. 33 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Côte d’Ivoire: The war is not yet over. Africa Report N°72. 28 November. 34 La Documentation française. 2004. La crise en Côte d’Ivoire: les forces en presence. Dossiers d’actualité. Accessed April. 35 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Côte d’Ivoire: The war is not yet over. Africa Report N°72. 28 November. 36 AFP (Agence France Presse). 2003. ‘Details of three Ivory Coast rebel groups and French forces’. 12 January. 37 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Côte d’Ivoire: The war is not yet over. Africa Report N°72. 28 November. 38 AFP (Agence France Presse). 2003. ‘Details of three Ivory Coast rebel groups and French forces’. 12 January.

39 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. S/2003/498. para.49. 24 April. 40 AFP (Agence France Presse). 2003. ‘Details of three Ivory Coast rebel groups and French forces’ 12 January. 41 Global Witness. 2003. The Usual Suspects: Liberia’s Weapons and Mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. Report. March. 42 La Documentation française. 2004. Dossiers d’actualité. La crise en Côte d’Ivoire: les forces en présence. . Accessed 22 April 2004. 43 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. S/2003/498. para.56- 57. 24 April. 44 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. S/2003/498. para.56- 57. 24 April. 45 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. S/2003/498. para.56- 57. 24 April. 46 OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2004. Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): West Africa 2004. p.7. 47 Confidential written correspondence with Western diplomat based in West Africa, May 2004. 48 Confidential written correspondence with Western diplomat based in West Africa, May 2004. 49 HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2003. Cote d’Ivoire: Militias Commit Abuses With Impunity. Human Rights News. 27 November. . 50 Confidential written correspondence with Western diplomat based in West Africa, May 2004. 51 HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2003. Cote d’Ivoire: Militias Commit Abuses With Impunity. Human Rights News. 27 November. . 52 OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2004. Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): West Africa 2004. p.7. 53 Confidential written correspondence with diplomat with military experience based in West Africa, May 2004. 54 Confidential written correspondence with diplomat with military experience based in West Africa, May 2004. 55 UN Document S/2003/498. para. 56. 56 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Côte d’Ivoire: The war is not yet over. Africa Report N°72. 28 November. pp.11- 12. 57 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Côte d’Ivoire: The war is not yet over. Africa Report N°72. 28 November. pp.11- 12. 58 Confidential written correspondence with senior diplomat with military experience based in West Africa, May 2004. 59 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Côte d’Ivoire: The war is not yet over. Africa Report N°72. 28 November. p.12 60 Aning, Kwesi. 2003. Small Arms and Crime in Africa: The Ghana Case. Background paper. Small Arms Survey. 61 Samson, Didier. 2004. ‘L’ONUCI est en place.’ Radio France Internationale. 9 April. 62 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. S/2003/498. para.57. 24 April. 63 CSC (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers). 2004. Child Soldiers Use 2003: A Briefing for the 4th UN Security Council Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict. January. 64 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2003. ‘Burkina Faso-Côte d’Ivoire: UN Envoy fears children could get involved in conflict’. 29 January. 65 CSC (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers). 2004. Child Soldiers Use 2003: A Briefing for the 4th UN Security Council Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict. January. Also see Amnesty International. 2003. ‘No Escape; Liberian refugees in Cote d’Ivoire’. AI Index: AFR 31/012/2003. 24 June. 66 CSC (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers). 2004. Child Soldiers Use 2003: A Briefing for the 4th UN Security Council Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict. January. 67 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2002. ‘Côte d’Ivoire: US condemns rights abuses’. 15 November. Accessed April 2004. 68 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Secretary-General on Cote d’Ivoire. S/2003/374. para.60. 26 March 69 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2003.‘Côte d’Ivoire: Amnesty exposes rebel atrocities, calls for end of impunity’. 28 February. Accessed May 2004. 70 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2002. ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Top UN official urges end to rights violations’. 16 October. Accessed May 2004. 71 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2002. ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Reports of abuses worry UN human rights expert’. 13 December; Global Witness. 2003. The Usual Suspects: Liberia’s Weapons and Mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. p.40. 72 Global Witness. 2003. The Usual Suspects: Liberia’s Weapons and Mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. p.40. 73 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2004. ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Militias commit abuses with impunity’. 26 April. Accessed May 2004. 74 Global Witness. 2003. The Usual Suspects: Liberia’s Weapons and Mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. Report. March. p.39. 75 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2004. ‘Côte d’Ivoire: No sign of break to political impasse.’ 26 April. Accessed April 2004.

76 Ivorian Human Rights Movement estimate. The official death toll is 37, while the opposition claims 500 people died in the protest. See IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2004. ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Government confirms paramilitary role in Abidjan unrest’. 2 April. 77 OHCHR (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights). 2004. Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Events Connected with the March Planned for 25 March 2004 in Abidjan. UN Document No. 5/4/2004. 29 April. Para. 72. 78 USCR (United States Committee for Refugees). 2003. World Refugee Survey 2003 Country Report: Cote d’Ivoire. . 79 Global IDP Project. 2003. IDPs in Cote d’Ivoire: Population figures and profile. Updated November. 80 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2004. ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Opposition parties suspend role in government’. 25 March. Accessed March 2004. 81 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2004. ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Government confirms paramilitary role in Abidjan unrest’. 2 April. Accessed May 2004. Also see OHCHR (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights). 2004. Report of the Commission of Inquiry on the Events Connected with the March Planned for 25 March 2004 in Abidjan. UN Document No. 5/4/2004. 29 April. 82 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2004. ‘Côte d’Ivoire: No sign of break to political impasse’. 26 April. Accessed May 2004. 83 AFP (Agence France Presse). 2004. ‘Ivory Coast rebel leader says ‘no way’ he will return to government.’ 27 April. 84 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2004. ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Northern rebels play down talk of secession’. 13 April. Accessed April 2004. 85 BBC News. 2000. ‘Civil war fears in Guinea. 23 October. 86 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. S/2003/498. para.67- 68, 24 April; and UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. S/2003/937. para.39-40. 28 October; ICG (International Crisis Group). 2002. Liberia: The key to ending regional instability. Africa Report No. 43. Freetown/Brussels. 24 April. p. 11; HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2003. Weapons Sanctions, Military Supplies, and Human Suffering: Illegal Arms Flows to Liberia and the June-July 2003 Shelling of Monrovia. Briefing Paper. 3 November. 87 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Guinée: Incertitudes autour d’une fin de règne. Africa Report No74. 19 December. 88 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Guinée: Incertitudes autour d’une fin de règne. Africa Report No74. 19 December. 89 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. S/2003/498. para.67- 68, 24 April. 90 International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2002. The Military Balance 2002-2003. Oxford University Press. October. 91 Le Monde. 2000. ‘Un mystérieux movement d’opposition revendique les attaques aux frontières’. 26 December. 92 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Guinée: Incertitudes autour d’une fin de règne. Africa Report No74. 19 December. 93 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Guinée: Incertitudes autour d’une fin de règne. Africa Report No74. 19 December. p.18. 94 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2001. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. S/2001/1015. para.132. 26 October. 95 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Guinée: Incertitudes autour d’une fin de règne. Africa Report No74. 19 December. p.18 96 Confidential interviews with Guinean military officials, Ministry of Social Affairs representatives, and UNICEF officials, Conakry, March 2004. Some claim as many as 11,000 volunteers responded to the government’s appeal. 97 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Guinée: Incertitudes autour d’une fin de règne. Africa Report No74. 19 December. p.18 98 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Guinée: Incertitudes autour d’une fin de règne. Africa Report No74. 19 December. p.18 99 OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2004. Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Guinea 2004. p. 56 100 Republic of Guinea. 2001. Rapport Technique ; Mission de sensibilisation et d’évaluation des jeunes volontaires impliques dans la gestion des conflits armés. Conakry: Ministère des Affaires Sociales, de la Promotion Féminine et de l’Enfance. 24 July. 101 Republic of Guinea. 2001-2003. Statistiques des armes saisies par les services de sécurité de 2001 à 2003. Conakry: Ministry of Security. Courtesy of Cissé Mahmoud, Secrétaire Permanent de la Commission nationale de lutte contre le commerce illicite des armes légères. 102 Brabazon, James. 2003. Liberia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Royal Institute of International Affairs. Armed non-state actors project. Briefing paper No. 1. February. Also see UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. S/2003/498. 24 April. 103 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Guinée: Incertitudes autour d’une fin de règne. Africa Report No74. 19 December. p.18 104 Republic of Guinea. 2001-2003. Statistiques des armes saisies par les services de sécurité de 2001 à 2003. Conakry: Ministry of Security. Courtesy of Cissé Mahmoud, Secrétaire Permanent de la Commission nationale de lutte contre le commerce illicite des armes légères. 105 Confidential interview with Guinean official, Conakry, March 2004. 106 Small Arms Survey. 2003. Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied. Oxford (Oxford University Press). pp. 50-51. 107 Confidential interview with Guinean Ministry of Social Affairs official, Conakry, March 2004. Preliminary report presented at the 6th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network Not for quotation or attribution – Comments welcome (Point of contact: [email protected]) Bamako, Mali, 27–29 May 2004 33 Mapping of Non-state Armed Groups in the ECOWAS Region Small Arms Survey and Malian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

108 While Guinean officials claim the army has recuperated some of the weapons that were distributed to the young volunteers, there is consensus that many weapons still need to be collected. There are no statistics available on the number of weapons handed to the volunteers or on the weapons surrendered after the 2000-2001 crisis. 109 OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2004. Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Guinea 2004. 110 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2001. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. S/2001/1015. para.167. 26 October. 111 Reports and key informants suggest the presence of former LURD combatants in the town of Macenta (see ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Guinée: Incertitudes autour d’une fin de règne. Africa Report No74. 19 December. p.18) and in the Kouankan refugee camp, where LURD rebels were present during the Liberian conflict and allegedly recruited child soldiers (HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2002. Liberian refugees in Guinea: Refoulement, militarization of camps, and other protection issues, Vol. 14. No. 8 November (A)). 112 Confidential interview with Guinean official, Conakry, March 2004. The number of weapons destroyed was confirmed by a Western official. 113 Confidential interview with UNICEF officials, Conakry, March 2004. 114 HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2002. Liberian refugees in Guinea: Refoulement, militarization of camps, and other protection issues. Vol. 14. No. 8 (A). November. 115 Amnesty International. 2001. ‘Guinea: Refugees must not be forced to choose between death in Sierra Leone or death in Guinea’. 29 March. 116 OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2004. Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Guinea 2004. p. 56. 117 Confidential interview with UN officials, Conakry, March 2004. 118 OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2004. Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Guinea 2004. 119 O’Connor, Hilary. 2003. Guinea assessment report. Foundation for International Dignity (FIND). December. 120 OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2004. Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Guinea 2004. p.10. 121 Global IDP Project. 2004. IDPs in Guinea: Population figures and profile. 122 Global IDP Project. 2004. IDPs in Guinea-Bissau: Population figures and profile. 123 Confidential interview with west African military official, Bissau, March 2004. 124 Global IDP Project. 2004. IDPs in Guinea-Bissau: Population figures and profile. 125 Amnesty International. 2001. Guinea-Bissau: Human rights violations since the armed conflict ended in May 1999. 17 August. AI Index AFR 30/011/2001. 126 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2004. ‘Guinea-Bissau: International observers generally satisfied with polls’. 30 March. Accessed May 2004. 127 Confidential interview with Bissau-Guinean official. Bissau, March 2004. 128 Confidential interview with West African official, Bissau, March 2004. 129 Amnesty International. 2001. Guinea-Bissau: Amnesty International concerned about arrests after alleged coup attempt, 11 December. AI Index AFR 30/011/2001. 130 Confidential interview with Western official, Bissau, March 2004. 131 Written correspondence with Robin Edward Poulton, International Consultant and Senior Research Fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, May 2004. 132 Written correspondence with Robin Edward Poulton, International Consultant and Senior Research Fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, May 2004; Obasi, Nnamdi K. 2002. Small Arms Proliferation & Disarmament in West Africa: Progress and Prospects of the ECOWAS Moratorium, Abuja: Apophyl Productions, p.64 133 Confidential interview with Bissau-Guinean official, Bissau, March 2004. 134 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in that country. UN Document S/2003/1157. Para. 16. 135 Confidential interview with Bissau-Guinean official, Bissau, March 2004. 136 Confidential interview with Bissau-Guinean official, Bissau, March 2004. 137 CSC (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers). 2004. Guinea-Bissau profile. 138 Amnesty International. 1998. ‘Guinea-Bissau: Human rights under fire.’ 1 July. AI Index: AFR 30/004/1998 139 USCR (United States Committee for Refugees). 2004. World Refugee Survey 2003 Country Report: Guinea-Bissau. Accessed May 2004. 140 Global IDP Project. 2004. IDPs in Guinea-Bissau: Population figures and profile. Accessed May 2004. 141 Amnesty International. 1998. ‘Guinea-Bissau: Human rights under fire.’ 1 July. AI Index: AFR 30/004/1998 142 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2003. ‘Coup applauded by politicians and ordinary people'. 15 September. Accessed April 2004. 143 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2004. ‘Guinea-Bissau: International observers generally satisfied with polls’. 30 March. Accessed April 2004. 144 United Nations News Service. 2004. ‘Security Council Concerned about economic difficulties in Guinea-Bissau’. 7 April. Accessed April 2004. 145 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2004. ‘Guinea-Bissau: Army admits that four soldiers died’. 19 February. Accessed April 2004.

146 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2004. ‘Liberia: UN troops extend deployment, ready for disarmament’. 8 April. Accessed April 2004. 147 Brabazon, James. 2003. Liberia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Royal Institute of International Affairs. Armed non-state actors project. Briefing paper No. 1. February. 148 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2004. Strategic and operational framework of reintegration support for ex-combatants. 2nd draft for discussion. . It must be noted, however, that troop strengths are very difficult to verify, and estimates tend to vary. For example, a recent statement by Liberia’s disarmament commission claimed that 60,000 combatants (all groups) are expected to disarm, as opposed to the 38,000-53,000 contained in the UNDP document cited above. See IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2004. ‘Liberia: Disarmament Official Estimates 60,000 Combatants.’ 30 April 149 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2004. ‘All weapons will be turned over, warlords promise’. 28 April. Accessed April 2004. 150 HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2002. Liberian refugees in Guinea: Refoulement, militarization of camps, and other protection issues. Vol. 14. No. 8 (A). November. 151 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Guinée: Incertitudes autour d’une fin de règne. Africa Report No74. 19 December. p.18. 152 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2001. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. S/2001/1015. para.167. 26 October. 153 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2002. Liberia: The key to ending regional instability. Africa Report No. 43. Freetown/Brussels. 24 April. p. 11; Global Witness. 2003. The Usual Suspects: Liberia’s Weapons and Mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. Report. March. 154 Brabazon, James. 2003. Liberia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Royal Institute of International Affairs. Armed non-state actors project. Briefing paper No. 1. February. 155 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2004. ‘All weapons will be turned over, warlords promise’. 28 April. Accessed April 2004. 156 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. S/2003/498. para.56- 57. 24 April. 157 Confidential written correspondence with Western diplomat based in West Africa, May 2004 158 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2004. Strategic and operational framework of reintegration support for ex-combatants. 2nd draft for discussion. 159 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2004. ‘All weapons will be turned over, warlords promise.’ 28 April. 160 CSC (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers). 2004. Child Soldiers Use 2003: A Briefing for the 4th UN Security Council. January. Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict. Also see Amnesty International. 2003. ‘No Escape; Liberian refugees in Côte d’Ivoire’. AI Index: AFR 31/012/2003. 24 June. 161 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Tackling Liberia: The eye of the regional storm. Africa Report No. 62. Freetown/Brussels. 30 April. 162 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2004. ‘All weapons will be turned over, warlords promise’. 28 April. Accessed April 2004. 163 HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2004. How to fight, how to kill: Child soldiers in Liberia. Vol. 16. No. 2 (A). February. 164 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2004. Strategic and operational framework of reintegration support for ex-combatants. 2nd draft for discussion. http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/liberia/coordination/sectoral/DDR/index.asp 165 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2004. Second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. S/2004/229. para.19, 22 March. 166 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. S/2003/498. 24 April. 167 Brabazon, James. 2003. Liberia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Royal Institute of International Affairs. Armed non-state actors project. Briefing paper No. 1. February. Also see ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Liberia: Security challenges. Africa Report No. 71. Freetown/Brussels. 3 November. p.11. 168 Brabazon, James. 2003. Liberia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Royal Institute of International Affairs. Armed non-state actors project. Briefing paper No. 1. February; UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. UN Document No. S/2003/498. 24 April; HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2003. Weapons Sanctions, Military Supplies, and Human Suffering: Illegal Arms Flows to Liberia and the June-July 2003 Shelling of Monrovia. Briefing Paper. 3 November. 169 Brabazon, James. 2003. Liberia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). Royal Institute of International Affairs. Armed non-state actors project. Briefing paper No. 1. February. 170 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. UN Document No. S/2003/498. 24 April. Para.112. 171 HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2003. Weapons Sanctions, Military Supplies, and Human Suffering: Illegal Arms Flows to Liberia and the June-July 2003 Shelling of Monrovia. Briefing Paper. 3 November. 172 Global Security. 2004. LURD profile. . Accessed May 2004. 173 ICG (International Crisis Group). 2003. Liberia: Security challenges. Africa Report No. 71. Freetown/Brussels. 3 November. p.11. 174 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2003. Report of the Panel of Experts concerning Liberia. 24 April. S/2003/498. para.69. 70. 175 Confidential written correspondence with informed source, May 2004. Preliminary report presented at the 6th Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network Not for quotation or attribution – Comments welcome (Point of contact: [email protected]) Bamako, Mali, 27–29 May 2004 35 Mapping of Non-state Armed Groups in the ECOWAS Region Small Arms Survey and Malian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation

176 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2004. Second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. 22 March. S/2004/229. para.19. 177 UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2004. Second progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia. 22 March. S/2004/229. para.19. 178 Confidential written correspondence with UN official, May 2004. 179 Humanitarian Information Centre for Liberia. 2004. ‘Liberia Needs Assessment Sector Report on Demobilization, Disarmament, Rehabilitation and Reintegration.’ 21 January. 180 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2004. Strategic and operational framework of reintegration support for ex-combatants. 2nd draft for discussion. 181 CSC (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers). 2004. Child Soldiers Use 2003: A Briefing for the 4th UN Security Council, Open Debate on Children and Armed Conflict. January. Accessed April. 182 IRIN (United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks). 2003. ‘Liberia: Up to 15,000 child soldiers in Liberia, UN says.’ 24 September. 183 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2004. Strategic and operational framework of reintegration support for ex-combatants. 2nd draft for discussion. http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/liberia/coordination/sectoral/DDR/index.asp 184 HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2002. Back to the brink: War crimes by Liberian government and rebels - A Call for Greater International Attention to Liberia and the Sub Region. Vol. 14. No. 4 (A). May. 185 HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2002. Back to the brink: War crimes by Liberian government and rebels - A Call for Greater International Attention to Liberia and the Sub Region. Vol. 14. No. 4 (A). May. 186 HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2004. Human rights overview: Liberia. 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344 Thokozani Thusi and Sarah Meek, 2003, Chapter 1: Disarmament and Demobilization. In Malan, Mark et al (eds). Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery. ISS Monograph Series No. 80. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. p. 33. 345 Smillie, Ian, Lansana Gberie, Ralph Hazleton. 2000. The Heart of the Matter. Partnership Africa Canada Publication. January. pp 52-54. . Accessed April. 346 Obasi, Nnamdi K. 2002. Small Arms Proliferation & Disarmament in West Africa: Progress and Prospects of the ECOWAS Moratorium. Abuja: Apophyl Productions. pp.58-59; Global Witness. 2001. ‘Liberia breaches UN Sanctions – whilst its logging industry funds arms imports and RUF rebels.’ Press release. 6 September; Global Witness. 2003. The Usual Suspects: Liberia’s Weapons and Mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. March. 347 Thokozani, Thusi and Sarah Meek. 2003. Chapter 1: Disarmament and Demobilization, In Malan, Mark et al (eds). Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery. ISS Monograph Series No. 80 Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. p. 33. 348 Berman, Eric G. 2000. Re-armament in Sierra Leone: One Year After the Lomé Peace Agreement. Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper Series No. 1. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. pp. 20-22. 349 Confidential correspondence, 5 May 2004. 350 Liberia, as a member of ECOWAS, officially condemned the coup d’état and continued to recognize the Kabbah government. However, given Liberian president Charles Taylor’s long-standing support for the RUF, which entered into an alliance with the AFRC, it can be expected that Taylor’s support for the sanctions ECOWAS and the UN imposed were in word rather than deed. 351 See . Accessed 4 May 2004. 352 Berman, Eric G. 2000. Re-armament in Sierra Leone: One Year After the Lomé Peace Agreement. Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper Series No. 1. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. p. 25. 353 Concord Times. 2001. ‘300 Gbethis Disarm at Petifu Malal.’ 22 October. . Accessed April 2004. 354 Berman, Eric G. 2000. Re-armament in Sierra Leone: One Year After the Lomé Peace Agreement. Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper Series No. 1. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. p. 25. 355 Berman, Eric G. 2000. Re-armament in Sierra Leone: One Year After the Lomé Peace Agreement. Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper Series No. 1. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. pp. 17-20. 356 See Berman, Eric G. 2000. Re-armament in Sierra Leone: One year after the Lomé Peace Agreement. Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper Series No.1. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. pp. 13-17; and UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2000. Report of the panel of experts appointed pursuant to the UN Security Council resolution 1306 (2000). S/2000/1195. December. paragraphs 194-195, 203-211. 357 Berman, Eric G. 2000. Re-armament in Sierra Leone: One year after the Lomé Peace Agreement. Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper Series No.1. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. pp. 17-20. 358 Thusi, Thokozani and Sarah Meek. 2003. Chapter 1: Disarmament and Demobilization. In Malan, Mark et al (eds). 2003. Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery. ISS Monograph Series No. 80. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. p. 29. 359 Thusi, Thokozani and Sarah Meek. 2003. Chapter 1: Disarmament and Demobilization. In Malan, Mark et al (eds). 2003. Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery. ISS Monograph Series No. 80. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. p. 33. 360 OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). 2004. Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): West Africa 2004. 361 USCR (United States Committee for Refugees). 2004. Sierra Leone Profile. Accessed April. 362 Malan, Mark. 2003. Introduction. In Malan, Mark et al (eds). Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery. ISS Monograph Series No. 80. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. p. 15. 363 Global IDP Project. 2004. IDPs in Sierra Leone: Population figures and profile. Accessed April.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFL Armed Forces of Liberia AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone) APC Arewa People’s Congress (Nigeria) ARLA Revolutionnary Army for the Liberation of Azawad (Mali) ASMATA Anambra State Markets Amalgamated Traders Association (Nigeria) AVS Anambra State Vigilante Service, Abia State Vigilante Service (Nigeria) BCEAO Central Bank of West African States CAD Self-Defence Committee (Niger) CAFF Children Associated with Fighting Forces CDF Civil Defence Force (Sierra Leone) CPP Convention of Patriots for Peace (Côte d’Ivoire) CSC Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers COSEG Coalition of O’odua Self-Determination Groups (Nigeria) CVT Vigilance Committee of Tassara (Niger) DICON Defence Industries Corporation (Nigeria) DDR Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration DDRR Disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration EBA Egbesu Boys of Africa (Nigeria) ECOMICI Economic Community of West African States Mission in Côte d’Ivoire ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EUR Euro FANCI National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire FARS Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Sahara (Niger) FDR Democratic Front for Renewal (Niger) FIIA Islamic and Arab Front of Azawad (Mali) FNDIC Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (Nigeria) FPLA Popular Front for the Liberation of Azawad (Mali) GPP Group of Patriots for Peace (Côte d’Ivoire) HRW Human Rights Watch ICG International Crisis Group IDP Internally displaced person IRIN United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks IVS Imo State Vigilante Service (Nigeria) IYC Ijaw Youth Council (Nigeria) LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (Liberia) MASSOB Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (Nigeria) MFDC Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance (Senegal)

MFUA Movements and United Fronts of Azawad (Mali) MJP Movement for Justice and Peace (Côte d’Ivoire) MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia (Liberia) MPCI Patriotic Movement of Ivory Coast (Côte d’Ivoire) MPGK Patriotic Movement of Ganda Koy (Mali) MPIGO Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West (Côte d’Ivoire) MPLA Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mali) N/A Not available NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDVF Niger Delta Volunteer Force (Nigeria) NPFL National Patriotic Front for Liberia (Liberia) NSA Non-state armed group OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ONUCI United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire OPC O’odua People's Congress (Nigeria) OTA Onitsha Traders’ Association (Nigeria) OVS Onitsha Vigilante Services (Nigeria) RFDG Movement of the Democratic Forces of Guinea (Guinea) RUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone) SALW Small arms and light weapons SCSL Special Court for Sierra Leone SLA Sierra Leone Army UFRA Union of Armed Resistance Forces (Niger) ULIMO United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (Liberia) UPLTCI Union for the Total Liberation of Côte d’Ivoire (Côte d’Ivoire) UN United Nations UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia UNSC United Nations Security Council USD United States dollar WSB West Side Boys (Sierra Leone) ZSVS Zamfara State Vigilante Service (Nigeria)