ECONOMY OF TOMORROW

Fighting in transformation societies Marc Saxer 2nd edition December 2014

. Corruption is the abuse of power. As a symptom of the disparity of rights and opportunities between the powerful and the powerless, corruption is a problem of social justice.

. Corruption, and clientelism are not only individual moral failures, but symptoms of an outdated political operating system producing social disparity. To remove bottlenecks for social and economic development, the political operating system needs to be upgraded to a legal-rational order with merit-based, impersonal institutions and effective rule of law.

. Fighting corruption means to hold the powerful accountable. This is why the fight against corruption can neither be neutral nor technical, but must be part of the greater struggle between those who benefit from the status quo, and those who seek democratic change.

. This struggle can only be won by the political muscle of a broad societal coalition. Allowing social groups with diverging interests and opposing beliefs to join forces, a common platform is needed which unites the fight against corruption with the struggles for social justice and deeper democratization. In order to do this, the false discursive equation of democracy with corruption needs to be replaced with an anti-corruption narrative firmly rooted in the struggle for deeper democratization.

. The common vision, of a “Legal-rational order as the basis for a Good Society with full capabilities for all”, shows the way out of the transformation conflict. Such a social compromise between those who seek a merit-based order and those who struggle for equal opportunities enables the laying of the social foundation for a new social contract. MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

Table of Content

I. Introduction ...... 2

II. A short history of corruption ...... 2

2.1 Setting the Default: Kinship and Reciprocity as evolutionary strategies ...... 3 2.2 Scaling up: patron-client cooperation in agricultural societies ...... 3 2.3 Cultural Embedding: Patrimonial order and Patronage Systems ...... 3 2.4 Fighting Decay: “Moral Corruption” as an ethical problem ...... 4 2.5 Increasing Effectiveness: the impersonal state ...... 5 2.6 The Invention of : the legal-rationalist political order ...... 6 2.7 Exposing Euro-centricity: Corruption is a universal phenomenon ...... 6 III. The effects of corruption on political and economic development ...... 7

3.1 (Dys)-functional influences of corruption on economic growth ...... 7 Early Developmentalism ...... 7 The devil’s advocate: Revisionism ...... 7 Investment and Rent Seeking: the emergence of the Washington Consensus 8 Threshold between functionality and dysfunctionality ...... 8 3.2 The impact of corruption on political development ...... 9 Political economy: struggle between emerging and declining classes ...... 9 Institutionalization...... 11 Corruption and Legitimacy ...... 13 Imagining the state: Corruption narratives in the construction of the polity ... 14 In the Vertigo of Change: Transformation drives corruption ...... 14 Corruption as a catalyst for change ...... 15 Corruption in transformation societies ...... 16 IV. The Politics of (Anti-) Corruption ...... 16

4.1 Handle with Care: The ideological baggage of ‘Global Anti-Corruptionism’16 4.2 Corruption in Transformation Conflicts: The case of ...... 18 Corruption as a structural transformation catalyst...... 19 The role of corruption discourses in Thailand’s transformation conflict ...... 20 The constructed divide between red and yellow discourse alliances ...... 22 Four functions of corruption narratives ...... 25 Anti-corruption discourses can lead into a development trap ...... 28 V. Anti-corruption strategies for transformation societies ...... 29

5.1 Handle with Care ...... 30 5.2 Curbing corruption in transformation societies means to finalize the legal-rational order ...... 31 5.3 The fight against corruption must be part of the struggle for democracy .... 33

1 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

I. Introduction back in is a challenge for every new generation. Few social practices have had such a The fight against corruption is destined to fail turbulent history as corruption. Outrage over if the nature of the obstacle is not fully corruption may very well be as old as understood. After decades of research, human civilization itself. From the Sanskrit many questions remain. How do patterns of Samaveda to the Bible, from classical Greek corruption vary in different environments? Is philosophers to the teachings of Confucius corruption really on the rise, or only the and the Buddha, moral weakness was awareness of it? What are its effects on condemned for “corrupting” society. Then development? And why are anti-corruption again, feudal myths are full of praise for the efforts more successful in some societies loyalty of tribute paying clients and the than in others? Which are the most effective generousness of patrons sharing spoils. To strategies in the struggle against corruption? this day, the practice of gift giving is an integral part of many cultures. In order to fight it, one has to understand the incentives which induce individuals to Today, outrage over corruption is boiling in participate in corruption.1 A quick historical all corners of the world. Anti-corruption review of the shifting perspectives on movements are taking to the streets, “corruption” may be a good starting point shaking regimes and bringing down to put our contemporary beliefs into governments. Although not always perspective. Deconstructing ideological successful, anti-corruption policies are being biases and hidden agendas helps to avoid implemented with fervor. The fight against blind spots and political minefields. The role corruption has made it to the top of the of corruption in Thailand’s conflict can offer global agenda. important insights. Finally, lessons will be There should be no doubt that corruption, drawn to make the fight against corruption clientelism and cronyism can indeed in transformation societies more successful. undermine sustainable development, democratic consolidation and social justice. Corrupt officials loot public coffers, distort II. A short history of corruption policy making and strangle private initiative. The poison of corruption turns political visions The notion of political corruption as we into a two-faced rhetoric, justice into double commonly understand it today is by standards and bold plans into definition ‘modern’, because only after the laughingstocks. The patronage system turns division between public and private was the potential of future entrepreneurs, introduced, the concept of “abusing public scientists and administrators into sleaze. funds for private gains” made any sense. Therefore, any society that seeks to develop However favoring kinship, dividing spoils must purge corruption, clientelism and amongst loyal followers, or building regimes cronyism. based on personal relationships are as old as mankind. This indicates that these This is a herculean task which can only be behaviors fulfill certain social functions. If achieved with enlightened and unwavering corruption fighters seek to replace these leadership encouraged by intense pressure behaviors with less obstructive ones, they from below. Even then, corruption, first need a clear understanding of the clientelism and cronyism can only be social functions of corrupt behavior. In an curbed, but never fully rooted out. effort to better understand why humans Preventing patrimonialism from creeping engage in activities such as corruption,

2 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

, racketeering, , and production necessitates professional favoritism, it is helpful to identify what social specialization, while warfare requires the functions these behaviors fulfilled, and how cooperation of thousands. A new form of they were perceived in different historical societal organization was needed to extend periods. political order beyond the realm of everyday direct interaction. Tribal societies 2.1 Setting the Default: Kinship and started to build monarchies, with steep Reciprocity as evolutionary strategies social hierarchies replacing the egalitarian organization of kinship based polities. In Human sociability is based on the two ancient absolute monarchies, the state was principles of kin selection and reciprocal considered the property of the king, and all altruism. Biologists recognize kin selection the resources of the country were claimed and reciprocal altruism as sources of for the glorification of the ruler.5 Therefore in cooperative behavior. Behaving altruistically ancient times, corruption meant to steal towards one’s own kin in proportion to the from the king.6 number of shared genes makes perfect sense from an evolutionary perspective, as Feudalism, while still based on the personal not the survival of the individual matters, but relationship between a patron and a client, the procreation of those carrying shared no longer required kinship, but a legal genes, i.e. parents and children, brothers contract.7 The feudal lord was assigned land 2 and sisters. Reciprocal altruism does not for “his own use in the manner of a fief”8, depend on genetic connection, but on with the entitlement to collect “the fat of repeated, direct personal interaction. the land” in the form of tributes from the Building relationships of mutual benefit and peasantry. In return for loyalty, the feudal mutual trust allows societies to overcome patron offered protection. Feudalist rulers problems of collective action and paves the emphasized their role as ‘paternalistic way towards more complex forms of fathers of the people’.9 Their ostentatiously cooperation and political order. Ever since lavish lifestyles symbolized their ability to look the dawn of mankind, band level societies after their ‘inferiors’. “Noblesse oblige”, the based on kinship and reciprocal altruism willingness to help the unfortunate reflected have been the most basic forms of political the code of honor of the ruling warrior order, and the default form of social caste: sense of hierarchy and status, cooperation that always re-emerges in the camaraderie between brothers-in-arms, 3 event impersonal institutions break down. pride, heroism and paternalism. Aristocratic The tendency to favor family and friends is generosity to cultivate loyalty and brutal one of the most basic human conditions coercion to uphold the feudal order were that linger on as the foundation of two sides of the same coin. Today, the sense sociability. Given this default human of entitlement of ruling elites is an echo of condition to favor one’s own kin, the feudal order. patrimonialism may at best be curbed, but never fully rooted out.4 2.3 Cultural Embedding: Patrimonial order and Patronage Systems 2.2 Scaling up: patron-client cooperation in agricultural societies Max Weber distinguishes two types of states. In patrimonial states, "the polity is Kinship as an organizational principle considered a type of personal property of reaches its limits once populations grow well the ruler, and state administration is beyond families and neighbors. Agricultural essentially an extension of the ruler's

3 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

household. The natural forms of sociability, the land’. Finally, the logic of redistributive reliance on family and friends, are still at accumulation, or the obligation to provide work in patrimonial states. A modern state, for the members of your network.14 on the other hand, is impersonal: a citizen's Many Asian patronage networks work along relationship to the ruler does not depend on very similar cultural logics. The imperative to personal ties but simply in one's status as a ‘save face’ is predominantly motivated by citizen. State administration does not consist the imperative to safeguard reputation in of the ruler's family and friends, rather, lifelong personal networks, which being a recruitment to administrative positions is member of is vital for almost every aspect of based on impersonal criteria, such as merit, life. As the short Thai case study in Chapter education, or technical knowledge." 10 IV.2 will show, these cultural logics are even “Patrimonial states began to form in many ingrained into emotions and the parts of the world around eight thousand construction if the Self. In order to years ago.” 11 understand why individuals engage in corruption behaviors, it is important to “Most premodern social systems revolved understand the incentive system of a around the ability of the leader or Big Man patrimonial order. in a group to redistribute goods to his 12 followers.” 2.4 Fighting Decay: “Moral Corruption” as an “Today, patrimonialism has evolved into ethical problem what is called 'neopatrimonialism', in which political leaders adopt the outward forms of In classical philosophy, corruption was not a modern states- with bureaucracies, legal political, but primarily a moral problem. systems, elections, and the like- and yet in Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle employed reality rule for private gain.”13 the notion of “the corruption of the bad polity” for situations marked by the decay of Contemporary patronage networks work the moral and political order. 15 upon very similar rules. In exchange for loyalty, patrons are wise to reward “Corruption will often take the form of a supporters, protect clients, distribute spoils, perversion of legal rules by and favor their own kin. Corruption, misinterpretation. Such a perversion, like clientelism and cronyism, then, are not a breach, challenges the intended diseases or degenerations, but the very DNA generality of the rule. […] This sort of of a patronage system. “moral corruption” is what concerned Patrimonial orders are deeply embedded political philosophers in the past. into political and social culture. Olivier de Aristotle, and after him Machiavelli Sardan identifies five logics of corruption in particularly, but basically Plato in his African patrimonial cultures: First, the logic of theory of the “corrupted” or “perverted” negotiation, which makes everything constitutions […] stressed the point that negotiable, even the rules of the game. these regimes instead of being guided Second, the culture of gift giving as a show by the law (we would say public interest) of respect or loyalty, which is often hard to were serving the interest of the rulers. distinguish from a bribe. Third the logic of [Corruption is seen as] a disintegration of solidarity networks, in which members the belief system upon which a political cannot refuse to give a favor asked. Fourth, system rests, […] destructive of a the logic of predatory authority, a direct particular political order. The classic echo of the feudal right to extract ‘the fat of conception of corruption as a general disease of the body politic persisted into

4 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

modern times, and is central to the administrators without any kinship ties. political thought of Machiavelli, Finally, the French Revolution and Prussian Montesquieu and Rousseau.”16 Reforms created the first truly modern bureaucratic systems. Concerned with moral decay, all of the world’s religions propose moral compasses However, patrimonial elites do not give up for individual “good” behavior. From the their status, power, and access to resources tale of Noah to the destruction of Sodom without a fight and will always try to reinsert and Gomorrah, the Bible imposes horrifying themselves. Where the power of patrimonial sanctions for moral decay. Seeking an elites could not be decidedly broken, the antidote to the corruption of his society, modernization of the state fell short, or was Confucius developed an educational rolled back after the modernizing emperor system that was intended to train vanished. government officials not only to be wise, but more importantly to be “good”. Buddhists Even modern states can fall into political consider corruption as an unwholesome decay. Fukuyama calls the capture of the state of mind contributing to an unhealthy state by powerful elites society. Greed (lobha, also tanha – craving) 'repatrimonialization': is one of the three poisons which, "Political decay can be driven by the accompanied by a lack of moral shame "default mode" of human sociability (ahirika) and moral dread (anottappa), may namely "kin selection and reciprocal lead to suffering (dukkha). In other words, altruism-that is, the preference for family an individual who engages in corruption is and friends [...] Elites in most societies suffering from a serious absence of moral tend to fall back in networks of family insight or wisdom. Corruption is seen as both and friends [...] When they succeed, a manifestation of previous bad kammic elites are said to "capture" the state, forces as well as generating fresh bad which reduces the latter's legitimacy kamma. If corruption is not rooted out, the and makes it less accountable to the cycle that has haunted relationships and population as a whole. Long periods of quality of life is continually renewed. Thus peace and prosperity often provide the eliminating corruption, either by suppressing conditions for spreading capture by it or by awakening greater morality, is elites, which can lead to political crisis if 17 inherently important. followed by an economic downturn or external political shock." 19 2.5 Increasing Effectiveness: the impersonal state Today, many states have failed to build strong impersonal and effective Under the existential pressure of constant bureaucracies. As a consequence, they are warfare, state builders throughout history too weak to provide basic public goods have come to realize that patrimonial orders such as security, health, education and are not effective enough. In order to extract infrastructure. Francis Fukuyama observes and use resources more efficiently, some that often democracy itself is blamed for states replaced patrimonial structures with weaknesses of the state: impersonal, merit-based institutions. 18 The first modern state with an impersonal "In very many countries democracy itself administration recruited on the basis of merit is threatened because the state is too was developed in China 2200 years ago. corrupt or too incompetent [...] People Both Mamluk Arabs and Ottoman Turks begin to wish for a powerful authority -a solved the problem of patronage with dictator or savior- that will cut through

5 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

the blather of politicians and actually people. Hence the emergence of a public make things work.” 20 sphere devoted to the public interest makes corruption a ‘crime against the public’. "Many of the failures attributed to The scope and depth of corruption varies democracy are in fact failures of state widely between societies. David Lowell administrations that are unable to deliver on even conceives a different kind of problem promises made by newly elected in ‘developed’ and ‘transitional’ societies: democratic politicians to voters who want not just their political rights but good “Incidental corruption takes place governance as well." 21 against a background of established rational-legal authority: endemic 2.6 The Invention of Political Corruption: the corruption takes place where rational- legal-rationalist political order legal authority is not yet predominant.” 25

The distinction between public and private 2.7 Exposing Euro-centricity: Corruption is a sphere of the ruler marked the invention of universal phenomenon political corruption: The Weberian model presumes an extensive “States can be more or less impersonal: and anonymous society in which individuals, early states were indistinguishable from not families, are the basic units. It struggles the ruler's household and were to describe societies with substantial described as 'patrimonial' because they traditional and kinship structures, where rigid favored and worked through the ruler's distinctions between politics and family and friends. Modern, more highly administration do not exist. 26 In many developed states, by contrast, make a developing societies, the difference distinction between the private interest between public role and private interest of of the rulers and public interest of the a state official is blurred. In fact, traditional whole community. They strive to treat codes may require officials to take citizens on a more impersonal basis, responsibility for their families and provide applying laws, recruiting officials, and rewards and employment to them. undertaking policies without favoritism." 22 Post-colonialist scholars criticize the assumption that all societies are on a The notion of political corruption as transition towards a “modernity” defined by commonly understood today is an invention Enlightenment ideas, liberal democracy and of the legal-rational state. It rests on two capitalist economies. Edward Said exposed political innovations, the division between how Western scholars describe the Global ‘public’ and ‘private’, and the broad South through the lens of “orientalism”, acceptance of rational-legal norms of establishing a global hierarchy of behavior in the public sphere.23 Max Weber developed vs. underdeveloped societies.27 famously described how professional Rose-Ackermann pointed out that the bureaucracies formalized and regulated the association of corruption with “weak” or relationship between citizens and officials.24 “developing” states systematically overlooks With roles and duties of the public official the endemic corruption in stable and clearly defined, the dereliction of these hegemonic political structures, such as state duties would be considered “corruption”. and private sectors in core industrialized While in a pre-modern order “stealing from countries.28 the sovereign” meant to steal from the king, the victim in a modern political order is the

6 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

The transition paradigm needs to be “If the top political elite of a country abandoned. 29 Not all societies move consumes its time and energy in trying to towards a legal-rationalist order, and if they get rich by corrupt means, it is unlikely do, the development paths may differ that the development plans will be greatly from those of Western countries. fulfilled.”32 Nevertheless the Modernization theory still The career choices of young talents may has important insights to offer on how the not lead them to dynamic economic change of economic regimes transforms the sectors, but to administrative posts with the social fabric of society and puts pressure on prospects of graft. On the other hand, established political and moral orders.30 young talents may be appalled by the prospect of making a living by corruption, III. The effects of corruption on political and leading to a brain drain in the underpaid economic development public administration, or even the entire country. 3.1 (Dys)-functional influences of corruption The devil’s advocate: Revisionism on economic growth These views were challenged by ‘revisionist’ The debate over the relationship between scholars. If development is driven by the political corruption and economic growth investments of private entrepreneurs and has been the subject of fierce debates for free markets, so the argument went, then decades. everything which unleashes market forces is good for economic development. Early Developmentalism Huntington pointedly articulated the liberal Early development scholars were mostly fear of the bureaucratic monster: concerned with the direct impact of “In terms of economic growth, the only corruption on the capacity to carry out thing worse than a society with a rigid, development projects. A major concern over-centralized, dishonest bureaucracy was the impact of political corruption on is one with a rigid, over-centralized and investment. 31 Government resources may honest bureaucracy.”33 be channeled away from development project and into foreign bank accounts. Bribery was therefore interpreted as the Development Aid projects may go to waste. weapon of weak but clever entrepreneurs Private sector investment decisions may not against the omnipotent but reckless be guided by economic profitability, but Leviathan. Myron Weiner asserts that without instead by the interests of both public and the flexibility of backshish, bureaucratic red private decision makers in corrupt tape would strangle economic activity. kickbacks. At the same time, political Nathaniel Leff touts that every penny saved corruption may undercut government from the tax collector may be a penny revenue and inflows of money. Corrupt tax better spent by private entrepreneurs for collectors may significantly distort the investment. 34 With a view to the socially amount of taxes paid. Foreign Direct precarious position of ethnic minority Investment may be discouraged by the entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia and East prospect of administrative sleaze, delays, Africa, corruption may provide the means to and corruption. overcome discrimination.35 From the micro perspective of the individual entrepreneur, A second concern was the waste of human corruption may be conducive for economic resources. growth.

7 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

Investment and Rent Seeking: the All of these arguments resonated well at the emergence of the Washington Consensus onset of globalization of financial capitalism and the emergence of neo-liberal ideology. In the 1980s, the debate shifted back to the Chapter IV.1 will trace how ‘anti- corruption skeptics when IMF economist corruptionism’ became part of the Paolo Mauro linked high levels of corruption Washington Consensus and the good with lower levels of investment, both in terms governance agenda. of government expenditure for developmental aims as well as private However, despite decades of economic sector investment. 36 From a macro liberalization, systemic corruption persists. A perspective, corrupt ‘lubricants’ work as an recent comparison of six transformation incentive system which encourages more countries from different world regions bureaucratic “toll posts” and in the end concluded that there is no direct link encourage delays in the system as a between the level of economic whole.37 liberalization and systemic corruption.41 On the contrary, privatization of state property Corruption may disrupt the vital function of has often created a gold rush for ‘crony states in laying the foundations for growth capitalists’.42 Deregulation has opened new by providing infrastructure and public opportunities for corruption in the private goods. Consequentially, Rose Ackermann sector. Corruption scandals involving private linked corruption to the overall paradigm of corporations showed that corruption is not a good governance: problem of “overregulated states and the “Stable states that operate under the absence of markets”. 43 Despite all this rule of law have a developmental evidence, “Crony Capitalism” is about to advantage […] Thus since corruption make a comeback as part of the neoliberal undermines this commitment, it struggle to lay the foundations for global undermines state legitimacy and in the financial capitalism.44 process harms the prospects for Threshold between functionality and growth.”38 dysfunctionality The second paradigm shift in the academic More recent research attempts to paint a discourse on corruption and economic more balanced picture between the growth came from the ‘rent-seeking’ functionalities and dysfunctionalities of literature. Rent seeking is capaciously corruption for economic development. 45 defined as any redistributive activity which Given the economic boom in countries with takes up resources.39 By definition, rent can endemic corruption, corruption cannot be only occur when the state restricts the all out detrimental to economic growth.46 In market.40 Rent economies not only occur in the context of transformation, corruption the deeply intertwined state-private run may even temporarily play a beneficial role sector of commodities extraction, but in substituting or complementing the similarly by monopolies build on exclusive functions of effective institutions. New licenses, e.g. in the telecommunication and research tries to determine the threshold media sector. Political economists point out when functionality turns into that at the root of every “rent economy” lies dysfunctionality. 47 In China with its a patronage system between rulers and deficiency of formal institutions, for instance, their cronies. Vice versa, by providing corrupt networks may provide a framework resources for distribution in client networks, for transactional security where political risks rent seekers stabilize patronage regimes.

8 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

can be mediated, temporarily leading to a time, then the key challenge of transitional more efficient allocation of resources: societies is to build political structures and processes capable of coping with social “Corruption in early stages of change.49 transformation might partly contribute to overcoming the problems of a hybrid There is little doubt that corruption, system of order [...] However as clientelism and cronyism play an important corruption transforms its quality from role in transformation processes. But what ‘entrepreneurial’ to ‘predatory’, the exactly is the structural impact of corruption institution becomes increasingly in such an instable and conflict-prone dysfunctional with respect to economic transitional period? For decades, scholars growth and the efficient allocation of have debated if corruption works as an resources.”48 obstacle or driver of political development.

In other words, the relationship between Political economy: struggle between corruption and economic growth is not emerging and declining classes merely black or white. Under certain From a political economy point of view, conditions, corruption can be functional, transformation processes are not an while at a later point, it may have anonymous change of underlying structures, dysfunctional influences on economic but a fierce political struggle between growth. winners and losers over the control of the In sum, the relationship between political country. corruption and economic growth continues “The contest over public resources is to be hotly debated. Assessments on the particularly severe because the early scope and depth of the negative impact beneficiaries of these contests are differ widely, and seem to be correlated to winners in a game of class evolution that the economic development model an is likely to have consequences for author subscribes to. This may imply that generations to come.”50 corruption literature is not free of underlying ideological biases. Mushtaq Khan argues that while corruption is a key factor in shaping a capitalist 3.2 The impact of corruption on political political economy, the way how this development transformation happens creates the need for corruption to ‘buy off’ groups opposing Economic innovation changes the fabric of this process: society. However, while society is changing quickly, political and moral orders tend to “In many cases, the individuals who be sticky. Resistance to change stems from succeed in establishing themselves at declining elites struggling to uphold their this critical stage only do so as a result of supremacy as well as individuals anxious to a great deal of fortune, political lose their identity. Structurally speaking, connection, some initial wealth and transition periods are characterized by the corruption. None of these characteristics co-existence of two rival economic, social, can legitimize the large differences in political, normative and moral orders. income and wealth that subsequently emerge. Given the inherent unfairness If ‘political development’ can be involved in these processes it has been understood as the growth (or decline) of the relatively easy to organize opposition to capacity of a society’s structures and these characteristics [...] Opposition has processes to maintain their legitimacy over typically been organized by members of

9 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

the emerging middle class groups who political power for money, the other have been left behind [...] Paradoxically, money for political power.”52 the opposition of these groups has often Joseph Nye looks at class conflicts triggered resulted in a second set of structural by social change from the perspective of pressures generating high levels of the newcomers which seek a place at the corruption [...]. The opposition of table: organized groups has often had to be bought off by payoffs [...] to the most “Corruption may help to overcome troublesome or vociferous opponents in divisions in a ruling elite that might an attempt to ‘purchase’ support or otherwise result in destructive conflict legitimacy. [...] Here the state allocates […by bridging] the gap between groups resources to those with the greatest based on power and those based on ability to create political problems...”51 wealth. […] For new urban residents, a political machine based on corruption Huntington points to the complex interplay may provide a comprehensible point at between corruption and class conflict. While which to relate to government by other emerging classes use corruption as a means than pure ethnic or tribal means.”53 to smoothen their rise into the political sphere, corruption works as an anti- In the economic transformation of China, inflammatory catalyst, preventing the arbitrage processes between the powerful delicate balance of the social hierarchy but poor old elites and the rich new elites escalating into (violent) class war: without any political influence stabilized the reform process by keeping the old elites ‘on “Corruption in this sense is a direct board’: product of the rise of new groups with new resources and the efforts of these “Corruption may even be understood as groups to make themselves effective a stabilizing element for the reform within the political sphere. Corruption process as it kept politically the may be a means of assimilating new influential old elite, which was now groups into the political system by quickly deprived of its social status and irregular means because the system has relative ‘wealth’ position, satisfied and been unable to adapt sufficiently fast to prevented it from obstructing the reform provide legitimate and acceptable movement.”54 means for this purpose. [...] The new While corruption may be a means for ruling millionaires buy themselves seats in the elites to ‘buy off’ emerging classes and Senate [...] and thereby become opposition groups, it also gives those groups participants in the political system rather access to spheres which used to be than alienated opponents of it, which exclusively controlled by these elites. might have been the case if this Accordingly, Nathaniel Leff observes that opportunity to corrupt the system were swelling criticism of corruption is often denied them. informed by the interests of powerful and So also the recently enfranchised masses articulate groups: [...] use their new power of the ballot to “Graft may be the only institution buy themselves jobs and favors from the allowing other interests to achieve local political machine. There is thus the articulation and representation in the corruption of the poor and the political process. Therefore, if the ruling corruption of the rich. The one trades elite are to maintain its exclusive control

10 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

of the bureaucracy, it must cut off or complex. On the one hand, corruption can control this channel of influence.”55 work as a means to shore up a lack of ruling power, to buy off opposition and co-opt Nye points to the particular difficulties of emerging classes into the political order and weak states to cope with change. Lacking on the other, corruption works as a grapnel the means to project power, elites may for emerging and excluded classes to gain have to rely on corruption to be able to access to the political sphere. govern: Institutionalization “The capacity of the political structures of many new states to cope with Huntington interprets corruption as a lack of change is frequently limited by the political institutionalization: weakness of their new institutions and “Corruption is, of course, one measure of (often despite apparent centralization) the absence of effective political the fragmentation of power in a institutionalization. Public officials lack country. […] Leaders in such a country autonomy and coherence, and have to rely (in various combinations) on subordinate their institutional roles to ideal, coercive and material incentives exogenous demands. Corruption [...] to aggregate enough power to govern. seems to be most prevalent during the Legal material incentives may have to most intense phases of modernization. be augmented by corrupt ones.”56 The differences in the level of corruption At the same time, ruling elites may use which may exist between [...] societies corruption as a valve to release class [...] in large part reflect their differences pressure for structural change. Huntington in political modernization and political already pointed to the similarities in the development.”58 functions of corruption, violence and reform. When societies manage to institutionalize All are encouraged by modernization and the political negotiation process over are all symptomatic of the weakness of distribution, the need for informal political institutions. In some measure, one mechanism such as corruption will wane. form of deviant behavior may substitute for Writing in the 1960s, Huntington puts his the other: hopes on the emergence of effective “Like machine politics or clientelistic political parties as the vehicles of all groups politics in general, corruption provides to participate in the political process: immediate, specific, and concrete “Corruption is most prevalent in states benefits to groups which might otherwise which lack effective political parties, in be thoroughly alienated from society. societies where the interests of the Corruption may thus be functional to the individual, the family, the clique or the maintenance of a political system in the clan predominate. In a modernizing same way that reform is. Corruption itself polity the weaker and less accepted the may be a substitute for reform and both political parties, the greater the corruption and reform may be likelihood of corruption. In countries like substitutes for revolution. Corruption Thailand and Iran where parties have serves to reduce pressure for policy had semi-legality at best, corruption on changes, just as reform serves to reduce behalf of individual and family interests class pressure for structural changes.”57 has been widespread.”59 In sum, the interplay between power, The historical experience of the West also corruption and change is enormously reflects this pattern.

11 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

“The parties which at first are the “To battle party hegemony and leeches on the bureaucracy in the end compensate for the weakness of the become the bark protecting it from state, various federal courts tried to exert more destructive locusts of clique and their influence. Their decisions were family. Partisanship and corruption, as intended to fulfill a social regulatory Henry Ford argued, are really function and reaffirm a notion of the antagonistic principles. Partisanship common good. [...] The judges were so tends to establish a connection based disgusted by the incompetence and upon an avowed public obligation, corruption of the politicians that they while corruption consults private and became champions of business and individual interests which secrete laisser-faire capitalism. In their eyes, it themselves from view and avoid was progress to deny a corrupt political accountability. The weakness of party system control over society’s activities.”62 organization is the opportunity of Public distrust of an executive deemed to corruption.” 60 be partisan gave birth to the independent The emphasis on the systemic function of commissions and a strong judiciary. political parties helps to understand the “The executive recognized that there paradigm shifts introduced by was a public suspicion that a partisan modernization. From a traditional government could not be trusted to be perspective, conflicts endanger societal an impartial agent of the general unity. Accordingly, competition in electoral interest. Aware that this suspicion of democracy is seen as fueling corruption and partiality amounted to a denial of populism, as political parties try to gain or legitimacy, the executive actively maintain their grip on the feeding trough. passed some of its responsibilities to From a modern point of view, open independent agencies. Hence as a competition under the scrutinizing eyes of reaction to rampant political corruption, the public constrains corruption. More so, a the institutional architecture of the competitive political system leads to United States was rebuilt to reflect a frequent changes of administrations, distinction between electoral legitimacy punishing incompetence and corruption, and the legitimacy of impartiality.”63 hence effectively cleaning out the sleaze. The echo of Adam Smith’s invisible hand of The push for anti-majoritarian to majority rule the market, aggregating the behavior of tends to be driven by class interests. Alexis egoistic individuals into the benefit of the de Tocqueville’s warning against the public, cannot be overheard. ‘Tyranny of the Majority’ was always popular with elites and middle classes fearful of Given their vital role in patronage systems being at the mercy of the majority today, political parties in developing population. countries are seen much more critical light.61 This echoes the anger and frustration with Against the hopes of promoters of liberal “political party machines” in the United democracy and free markets, systemic States and Europe at end of the 19th corruption persists in many countries. Hence century. Frustration with political corruption more recently, the calls of modernization gave rise to a liberal reform movement theorists to conclude the transition to which sought to strengthen impartiality as consolidated democracy have made a an anti-dote to political corruption: comeback. Christian van Soest concludes that despite the build-up of democratic institutions and considerable pressure for

12 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

good governance, democratization has not considered arbitrary in a society, public been ‘deep enough’ to decisively influence support ceases to exist and people are no the level of corruption: longer willing to live by the rules”. 67 As a result, corruption causes the decline of a “The level of democratization is the regime’s legitimacy. decisive factor determining the extent of systemic corruption, clientelism, and – in This approach was challenged by particular- informal power concentration ‘revisionist’ scholars in the 1960s, who […] Only systems with strong democratic regarded corruption as potentially features seem to exert a positive effect beneficial to state legitimacy. Arnold on systemic corruption, clientelism and Heidenheimer claimed that: informal power concentration. This “In the early stages of political- democratic threshold [...] is high.”64 administrative development ... nepotism, In countries which have not passed this spoils and graft may actually promote threshold of democratic maturity, lower national unification and stability, nation- repression may lure more actors to enter into wide participation in public affairs, the corrupt and clientelistic exchanges, formation of a viable party system and therefore decentralizing personal rule. The bureaucratic accountability to political threshold of democratic maturity is not institutions.”68 temporal but qualitative. It is not the By destroying the legitimacy of the political ‘endurance’ of democratic rule (e.g. structures, corruption can contribute to continuous elections) does not affect the instability and possible national level of systemic corruption, but its disintegration. It is not clear if corruption of ‘deepness’ – the level of electoral the old regime is a primary cause for social competition, political rights, and civil rights revolutions. If corruption causes a loss of which makes the difference. 65 legitimacy in the eyes of the military, it may All things considered, corruption is be a direct cause of instability and national interpreted as a lack of political disintegration. 69 institutionalization by some and as the result “Generally speaking, the habitual of it by others. Some recommend practice of bribery and dishonesty tends strengthening the role of political parties, to pave the way for an authoritarian others seek to curb it. Both solutions have regime, whose disclosures of corrupt proven to be flawed by recent practices in the preceding government developments. Again, it seems impossible to and whose punitive action against analyze the complex interplay between offenders provides a basis for its initial corruption and institution building without acceptance by the articulate strata of the political and social context. the population. [...] The elimination of Corruption and Legitimacy corrupt practices has also been advanced as the main justification for The relationship between corruption and military takeovers.”70 legitimacy was fiercely debated between ‘Moralists’ and ‘Revisionists’. Moralism is Despite its prominence in post-coup rooted in the Weberian view found in rationalizations, Joseph Nye suspects that modernization theory which holds that, [corruption] is only a secondary cause in corruption by nature, is detrimental to most cases: developing societies. 66 ‘Moralists’ believe “Perhaps more significant is military that “when legislation and regulation are leaders’ total distaste for the messiness

13 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

of politics- whether honest or not- and a ancient regime which they want to tendency to blame civilian politicians for destroy. 76 The often idealistic streak which failures…“71 pervades radicals and reformers may echo the Jacobins in their seeking after virtue.77 Accordingly, Crozier sees “revulsion against civilian incompetence and corruption” as a Imagining the state: Corruption narratives in major cause of coups in several Asian the construction of the polity countries.72 Apart from the structural impact of Huntington also made the observation that corruption, there are social functions of attitudes towards corruption in transitional corruption narratives in the construction of societies are more influenced by politics social reality and social struggles. and psychology than by facts: Corruption and society’s reaction towards “The initial exposure to modernism tends corruption scandals may play a role in the to give rise to unreasonable puritanical construction and reproduction of the standards [...] This escalation in values normative order. Corruption typically leads to a denial and rejection of the functions as an idiom through which people bargaining and compromise essential to try to make sense of the political world they politics and promotes the identification inhabit. Anthropologists have shown how of politics with corruption. To the discourses of corruption not only construct modernizing zealot a politician’s promise ‘proper’ or ‘improper’ moral behavior, but to build irrigation ditches for farmers in a have also enabled rural citizens and village if he is elected seems to be just as bureaucrats to imagine the state. corrupt as an offer to pay each villager Corruption narratives splay a fundamental for his vote before the election. [...] In role in the very constitution of the state and the extreme case the antagonism to what it can and should do for its citizens.78 corruption may take the form of the Periodic scandals can sometimes lead to intense fanatical puritanism [...] the affirmation of general principles about Paradoxically, this fanatical how the country should be run. These anticorruption mentality has ultimate inquiries may not alter what actually effects similar to those of corruption happens, but they affirm an ideal condition itself. Both challenge the autonomy of of unity and justice. 79 politics: one substituting private goals for To exemplify the catalytic and symbolic public ones and the other replacing roles of corruption narratives, Chapter IV will political values with technical ones.”73 examine the emergence of global ‘Anti- However, different groups may judge the Corruptionism’, and the political conflict in corrosive effect of corruption on the Thailand. legitimacy of the political order quite In the Vertigo of Change: Transformation differently. In the eyes of “modern” groups drives corruption such as students or middle classes (who have profited from achievement and While political corruption avant la lettre was universalism), the absence of honesty may pervasive all over human history, some destroy the legitimacy of the system. 74 scholars argue it becomes a particular Intellectuals often attribute sacral value to problem in times of transition from one the government sphere, hence their hostility political, cultural and organizational to the venality that would corrupt it.75 Others structure to another. 80 In the complex may perceive graft as an integral part of interplay between historical path the political culture and system of the dependencies and transformational

14 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

pressures for change, hegemonic norms even ‘invents’ it. Simply put: transformation and values influence political and drives corruption. economic development, while the Corruption as a catalyst for change functional necessities of emerging economies and societies encourage the The relationship, however, goes two ways: redefinition of norms and values. Changing corruption also encourages social and norms explain why behaviors that were political change. Political and moral orders socially accepted or even encouraged for are to provide the foundation of economic centuries are suddenly seen as deviant and life: trust in personal interactions. From even criminal. For Samuel Huntington, the everyday life to complex business emergence of a new moral order reframes operations, economies only work if the behavior as ‘corrupt’ which used to be transaction costs between individual agents perfectly acceptable in the traditional are not too high. Simply put, whenever we moral order: buy a good or use a service, we need to have trust that dozens of unexpressed “Corruption in a modernizing society is conditions are met; the product must not be thus in part not so much the result of the hazardous, the service provided with due deviance of behavior from accepted care, the contract obligations complied. As norms as it is the deviance of norms from we cannot verify these basic terms by established patterns of behavior.”81 ourselves for every transaction, we are In other words, ancient patronage dependent on public institutions to regulate practices are being reinterpreted though the behavior of all agents. the lens of new social norms. What used to For relatively simple agricultural societies, be celebrated as the good lord rewarding the political system based on personal his loyal supporters is now being relationships between feudal lord and loyal denounced as populism. Protecting clients tribute was good enough. With the is condemned as cronyism, favoring kin emergence of vast industrial societies castigated as nepotism, and distributing integrated in global division of labor, spoils criminalized as corruption. individuals can no longer rely on personal However, the widely perceived increase in relationships to provide trust. Corruption and corruption is not only due to “re-labeling” of sleaze further undermine the performance behavior, but reflects the ‘normative of patrimonial systems. The failure to satisfy chaos’ typical for transformation societies. the needs of complex economies and People in positions of authority in pluralistic societies erodes the output transformation societies are caught legitimacy of the patrimonial order. between two value systems82: The necessities of modern life change how “The calling into question of old people define their interests, frame their standards, moreover, tends to beliefs and set their aspirations. No longer undermine the legitimacy of all dependent on the protection of a personal standards. The conflict between modern patron, emerging classes start to question and traditional norms opens the necessity of ‘tributes’ in the form of opportunities for individuals to act in bribes. Citizens are outraged over corruption ways justified by neither.”83 and nepotism, and demand clean and effective institutions. In the struggle over the Hence the co-existence of normative future order, the patrimonial social contract orders encourages corrupt behavior, or is terminated.

15 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

All things considered, corruption and erode their legitimacy. Additionally nepotism work as a transformational corruption may be the lubricant to ease the catalyst, speeding up the decline of political transition; however it may also patrimonial order, and highlighting the need trigger rollbacks by established elites. In the for a legal-rational order. eyes of some, corruption reflects the rot of the ancièn regime, while others equate it to Corruption in transformation societies the emergence of a capitalist society. By Corruption is then located at the breaking looking at it through the perspective of edge between the eroding patrimonial and different schools of thought, ‘corruption’ the emerging new order. It is at the same serves a variety of social functions, and time the working principle of the patronage affects political development in highly system and the lubricant for the social rise of ambiguous ways. Nonetheless, there seems new classes. It is a ruling technique of to be a consensus that corruption is coopting new elites into the patrimonial particularly damaging to the legitimacy of order, as well as a subversive tactic by nascent democracies. emerging classes to gain access to the political field. It reflects the lasting validity of patrimonial norms, as well as the normative IV. The Politics of (Anti-) Corruption void created by the co-existence of rival moral orders. Corruption helps to conserve Reviewing these historical and academic the dominance of the patronage system, perspectives on corruption, it becomes and fills the functional gaps left uncovered obvious that we are dealing with a multi- by ineffective legal-rational institutions. faceted and complex phenomenon Simply put, corruption has a catalytic influenced by a wide variety of political, function in the transformation of the economic and cultural factors. In turn these political, social and economic order. factors will impact the political and social development. It consequently comes as no The exact role of corruption is highly surprise that different schools of thought ambivalent. Corruption seems to have come forward with very diverse views simultaneously slow down and speed up on corruption. transformation. As the literature discussion has already shown, this ambivalence allows Alternately, what views came to dominate for many contradictory readings and the scholarly field and in turn shape the interpretations. At the same time, it sees as if domestic and international anti-corruption the ambivalence of corruption mirrors the policies? Here, we have to take a deeper Janus faced character of co-existing orders look on the political economy of the fight typical for transformation societies. against corruption, as well as the (hidden) Therefore, it may not come as a surprise that agenda of those who loudly promote anti- corruption narratives play a central role in corruption policies. the way societies try to make sense of the 4.1 Handle with Care: The ideological vertigo of change and construct the baggage of ‘Global Anti-Corruptionism’ struggle over the future order. In sum, the impact of corruption on political The fight against corruption has made an development is anything but clear. astonishing career from obscurity to the top Corruption may help to integrate excluded of the global policy agenda. Beginning as groups into the polity but it may also upset an American legal standard for businesses, ethnic balances. Corruption seems to both anti-corruption evolved into a global norm stabilize authoritarian regimes as well as as part of good governance agenda. 84

16 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

Early anti-corruption strategies limited their Is it only a coincidence that the neoliberal focus to the public administration, aiming to reading of rent-seeking sounded like the reduce or remove the opportunities for blueprint of the Washington Consensus? corruption, raising salaries of civil servants Development was now almost unanimously and political leaders, and ensuring a high understood as driven by free markets degree of policing and supervision. 85 The unburdened by the restrains of kleptocratic initial Five Point Anti-Corruption Program by bureaucracies, legal red tape, inefficient Transparency International founder Peter state sectors and greedy tax collectors. Eigen was more comprehensive, adding Corruption was reframed from a secondary commitment by leaders, anti-corruption but somewhat useful “lubricant benefitting legislation and enforcement and a wider entrepreneurs” into a major spoiler to review of government procedures.86 USAID development. The medicine prescribed by advisor Keith Henderson expanded these to IMF and World Bank are subjecting public an Eight Point Action Plan, adding ways to officials to the regulatory discipline of the improve government accountability and market, to cost-consciousness and to the transparency of democratic processes, entrepreneurial ethics.92 In the framework of to increase trade, investment and “good governance” and “accountability”, economic growth, to encourage the the fight against corruption was placed at building of capacity and public confidence the top of the global political agenda at the in governmental institutions while fostering end of the 1990s. public respect for rule of law societies. 87 From there, it was only a small step to the Michel Foucault exposed the ruling wider good governance agenda of the IMF technique to present policies as ‘above and World Bank. In 1998, then President of politics’. 93 In this sense, the postulation of the World Bank James Wolfensohn declared good governance as the epitome of a “Crusade against the Cancer of modernity is a powerful discursive strategy. Corruption” 88 , while others called for a Stripping away the neutral and technocratic “World War on Bribery”.89 language, critics point to the ideological bias of and vested interests behind the Where did this sudden prominence of the global good governance agenda. Steven fight against corruption come from? For Sampson puts it bluntly: once, the relationship between political corruption and a decline in investment, in “The “global anti-corruption agenda is particular Foreign Direct Investment, not a reaction to the neoliberal agenda, became a concern at the onset of the it is the neoliberal agenda.”94 globalization of financial capitalism. Seen from this perspective, the objective of Moreover, the focus on the deficient good governance agenda is to lay the relationship between state and market normative foundations for the emerging introduced by rent-seeking literature global financial capitalist regime. resonated well with the emerging neoliberal Accordingly, some have criticized the good ideology. If rent-seeking was by definition governance agenda as the “new stick to created when the state restricted the beat non-Western governments into market, then the solution was seemingly self- compliance with the economic and 90 evident : political agenda of the United States and “The state’s sphere should be reduced the dictates of capitalism”.95 Others slam the to the minimum, and bureaucratic anti-corruption agenda as the battering ram control should be replaced by market to open emerging markets for global mechanisms wherever possible.”91 financial capitalism.96

17 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

The global financial crisis gave a new boost transnational forces of immorality and to the anti-corruption agenda. Unable to profiteering, the struggle against identify the internal flaws of capitalism, corruption is an effort to restore conservatives blamed the crisis on the standards that were lost, the standards immoral behavior of individuals, be it the of morality and responsibility which regulator “sleeping at the switch” or the connote what we call ‘community’ […] ‘greedy’ investor. Under the label of ‘crony The fight against corruption is thus more capitalism’, The Economist conveniently than just the ‘tactics’ of governments or locates corruption and nepotism in corporations who want to look good: it is developing countries again: a moral crusade.”99

“In the emerging world, the past century One does not have to share these extreme has been great for rent-seekers […] The criticisms of the good governance agenda larger problem, though, lies in the in general, and the anti-corruption agenda emerging world…”97 in particular to see that anti-corruption programs, despite their technocrat Unsurprisingly, the recipes of the Washington language, are neither neutral nor innocent. Consensus are warmed up again: To be perfectly clear, this does not make “Governments seeking to make their anti-corruption measures wrong; it simply countries rich and keep people happy means one has to be aware of the need to make markets work better.”98 ideological baggage that comes with it. The In other words, governments need to build Washington Consensus heritage makes anti- the political infrastructure for market corruption strategies ill-equipped to deal economies and then get out of the way. with the political challenges of transformation conflicts. Therefore, However, the global anti-corruption corruption fighters in transformation societies community also promotes an need to adapt anti-corruption measures to emancipatory, even anti-global-capitalist the conditions of transformation to make vision. Steven Sampsom detected this them work. moralist streak in what he calls the “ideology of anti-corruptionism”: 4.2 Corruption in Transformation Conflicts: The case of Thailand “Anti-corruption is not just a set of policy measures enacted by governments to The raging transformation conflicts from prevent bribery and punish nepotism. It is Egypt to Turkey, from Ukraine to Venezuela also a moral force, reflecting the challenge the conventional expectation indignation of ordinary people and that middle classes are the main drivers for among articulate elites that things are democratization.100 Indeed, the middle class not right. Anti-corruption entails not only protesters in Caracas, Kiev and Istanbul are making governments or aid programs outraged by rampant clientelism, cronyism more effective, but also making people and corruption. However, amongst the calls more honest, raising people’s for greater democratization, anti- consciousness to a new level. Anti- democratic and sometimes even fascist corruption is thus a moral, even religious voices can be heard. Protesters deny the force […] This is why some activists within legitimacy of elected governments and Transparency International, the leading deride their fellow citizens as too anti-corruption organization, see uneducated to vote. Some even call for the themselves as ‘integrity warriors’. end of electoral democracy, and the Responding to unscrupulous establishment of an authoritarian regime. In

18 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

Egypt, the military has seized the opportunity order which has not yet adapted to these to justify their authoritarian roll-back as new realities. Similar to many transformation saving the nation. In Ukraine, many crises around the globe, Thailand’s conflict acknowledge the role of fascist militias in rages over the political, social, economic the overthrow of an elected government. In and cultural order. 101 Thailand, anti-government protesters A particularly interesting feature of the marched for the suspension of electoral present conflict in Thailand is the central role democracy and called on the military to of the corruption discourse in the stage yet another coup d’état. construction of the so-called “red-yellow In all of these transformation conflicts conflict”. In order to explain this conflict corruption narratives play a central role. formation one has to understand (1) the What is the function of corruption discourses structural function of corruption in political in transformation crises? How do the development and (2) the role of (anti-) corruption narratives differ between corruption discourses in the construction of conflicting parties? And what are the the conflict. hidden agendas of anti-corruption bodies Corruption as a structural transformation and the judiciary? catalyst Taking a closer look at how these conflicts On a structural level, corruption is endemic are framed, it becomes evident they are in Thailand. Thais perceive corruption in their often not constructed around the “status country as relatively high (CPI Score of 38, quo versus change” cleavage. By framing ranking 85 out of 175 countries)102, meaning the conflict in nationalist, ethnic, racial, they are confronted with corruption in their religious or moral terms, those who benefit daily lives. 103 Frequent corruption scandals from the status quo often manage to rally shake the society and have been used by enough support to uphold the old order the military to justify many of its 19 coups. despite all structural and social changes. It cannot be stressed enough that Corruption is closely related to Thailand’s transformation processes do not follow a entrenched patronage system which still linear path, and certainly do not inevitably dominates political and economic life result in a modern democratic system. The behind the facades of democratic complex interplay between structures, institutions. Personal relationships between classes, institutions and discourses can lead patrons and clients are embedded in Thai into a development trap which many society and culture to such extent that societies find hard to escape. every member of society has a distinct place in social hierarchy. In Thai language, Taking a closer look into the transformation different personal pronouns reflect the social conflict in Thailand can be useful to relationship between speakers, thereby understand these complex interplays. This inscribing the social status deep into the protracted conflict, which has crippled construction of the Self. Even emotions Thailand’s development for a decade, has (kraeng-jai, noi-jai) regulate the vital need at least two interrelated dimensions. On the to keep personal relationship intact at all elite actors’ level, it is a conflict between cost. The urge to prove one’s loyalty makes two battling elite factions over the political, it socially and emotionally nearly impossible social and economic control of the country. to refuse a request or turn down a ‘gift’ from On the structural level, it reflects the gap a senior (phoo-yai). On the other hand, it is between a rapidly modernizing economy expected of a patron to share the spoils of and society, and a political and normative corruption within his personal network.

19 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

Failure to do so may result in the withdrawal patron intervention undermines the of goodwill and may end the career of the rationality and legality of formal decision- “too greedy” political entrepreneur through making processes. In other words, the feudal a sudden raid by the police. In other words, heritage of the patronage system, which the distribution of resources and favors owes its legitimacy to the moral integrity of within personal networks is not degenerate, individuals instead of to the performance of but rather the essential mechanism of institutions, thwarts the process of building a patronage systems. modern state. By widening the gap between the needs of a complex economy This patronage system and the ruling and pluralist society and the capacity of the ‘network monarchy’ have come under political system to respond to these needs, pressure by the emergence of a capitalist the restoration of feudalist mechanisms economy. Within the time span of just over deepens the transformation crisis. one generation, Thailand has developed into an upper middle income country. The role of corruption discourses in Millions have been lifted out of poverty and Thailand’s transformation conflict are now demanding equal political rights. This structural analysis of the role of Changing lifestyles, interests, identities and corruption in Thailand’s transformation values are all creating a pluralist society.104 process seems to suggest a straight-forward Despite all its flaws and inefficiencies, an conflict between those who benefit from elaborate system of legal-rational institutions the patronage system, and those who seek has been built. Disseminated by community to stamp out corruption by modernizing the radios and social media, universalist political order. A deeper look into the Thai discourses on electoral legitimacy, human case, however, shows this is not how the rights, the rule of law and good governance red-yellow conflict is unfolding. In fact, the are gaining ground even in the remotest Thai case poses a series of puzzles which villages. Capitalist elites and new rural and cannot be addressed with structural analysis urban middle classes challenge the alone. supremacy of the ‘network monarchy’, and have effectively terminated the old social Notably, it is the middle classes who protest contract. With the patrimonial political, corruption and the abuse of power. In 2006, social and moral order eroding, the struggle 2008 and 2014, the yellow protests resulted over the future order is raging. in the overthrow of an elected government. Remarkably, it was Bangkok’s middle class In stimulating bottle necks and sleaze, who ended the role of the military in politics promoting incompetence and inaptitude, in 1992, and installed a liberal democracy in corruption, clientelism and crony capitalism 1997.105 Today, it is often the same men and are corroding the legitimacy of the old women who insist that “Thai society is not order. Public awareness of corruption is so ready for democracy”. This seems to fly in high that “monkey business” is assumed the face of conventional wisdom which behind every major policy initiative. By suggests that a growing middle class will exposing the fatal flaws of the old system, ultimately result in democratization. What and nurturing demands for a general caused the established middle class in overhaul of the political order, corruption is Bangkok to switch sides? working as a catalyst in the transformation crisis. No less puzzling are the odd red and yellow alliances which seem to defy the At the same time, the patronage system characteristics of a typical class struggle. acts as a spoiler to modernization. Every How could a coalition be forged of royalists

20 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

and former communists, business people Allegations of corruption have been a major and workers, armed forces and civil society tool in the political conflict. Elected Prime on the yellow side; and neoliberal tycoons, Ministers Thaksin Shinavatra, Somchai the poor, progressive academics, police Wongsawat and were and local godfathers on the red? In part, removed from power on highly controversial these unusual alliances are brought allegations. The military coup in together by patrons pursuing their vested 2006 was partly justified by “widespread interests. However, tactical considerations corruption and nepotism.” 106 Despite cannot fully explain the extraordinary ideological, personal and political resilience of these formations. What makes differences, all anti-Thaksin street protests these odd alliances stick together for almost voiced strong grievances over political a decade? corruption. Amidst controversy, a military junta-appointed drafting assembly wrote a Finally, the red-yellow divide seems to run new constitution107: against the structural cleavages of a transformation conflict. In fact, both camps “Some of the most important provisions, include reactionaries and modernizers, however, are the different agencies conservatives and reformers, urbanites and created in the Constitution to oversee villagers, superrich and poor and, the . Each of these interestingly, three rivaling middle classes. agencies is directed at ensuring the How did this odd red-yellow cleavage allegations of rampant corruption which come about, and how does it impact the sparked the 2006 coup to not way the transformation conflict plays out? reoccur.”108

To explain these puzzles, it is necessary to Other observers interpret the fight against look closer into the role of corruption corruption as a pretext to strengthen the discourses in the construction of the red- electoral minority by anti-majoritarian yellow conflict. instruments:

In Thailand’s conflict, corruption discourses “Thaksin’s unprecedented electoral are front and center. The outrage over popularity among the rural poor and an corruption motivates hundreds of thousands emerging rural middle class favoring his to take to the streets. Every major street populist policies was seen as a threat to protest has agitated, prominently or the old establishment. [...] The [2014] implicitly, against endemic corruption and constitutional amendment struggle is the abuse of power by the powerful. Every part of the larger ongoing tug of war military junta has, sometimes more explicitly that started even before the 2006 coup than other times, justified their power grab between the old establishment aligned with the necessity of cleansing the polity with the military, the judiciary, from corrupt politicians. Hundreds of independent agencies and the elected office holders have been banned opposition party with the backing of the from political life based on corruption conservative urban elite and the old charges. Every reform process over the last middle class on one side, and the new decade has attempted to tackle anti-establishment forces personified by corruption. School children are taught Thaksin and represented by his party about corruption, anti-corruption road with the broad-based support of the shows are organized across the country, rural poor, a new middle class and and anti-corruption initiatives have sprung democracy advocates on the other. The up in the business sector. clashes of the old and new forces came

21 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

to a breaking point with the 2006 coup, indeed, the main strategies of both camps with the old establishment reasserting its aim at establishing their own legitimacy, power. [… The 2007 Charter] increased while undermining the legitimacy claims of the power of independent state the other side. agencies and the judiciary, while In other words: deconstructing the discourse curbing the power of elected politicians. is key to the analysis of the red-yellow With increased power, the role of the conflict. In particular, it can be helpful to judiciary and independent agencies take a closer look into the role of corruption would become politically dominant discourses. under the 2007 Constitution.” 109 The constructed divide between red and In 2013-2014, history repeated itself in the yellow discourse alliances seven-month long showdown between yet another elected Shinavatra government The yellow discourse alliance and its opponents in the streets, the courts, The yellow discourse explains the the independent commission and the transformation crisis as one of “moral military. Hundreds of thousands were corruption which leads to social decay”. marching against alleged corruption and From a conservative point of view, the order the abuse of power. Prime Minister Yingluck its adherents seek to conserve is not flawed and several key figures in her camp faced at all. Unable to decipher the underlying prosecution and impeachment. economic and social changes, moralists Interestingly, while none of the pending blame structural problems on individual charges directly accused the government moral failure.112 of corruption, in the public discourse these charges were almost exclusively framed as The moralist political discourse is rooted in political corruption. 110 Finally, the military Theravada Buddhist cosmology which took over power in Thailand’s nineteenth justifies steep social hierarchy with the coup d’état on the 22nd of May 2014. The kamma acquired in prior lives. Simply put, a junta justified its power grab amongst other good ruler brings happiness into the world, things with the need to fight corruption. while a bad ruler causes suffering. The crucial difference is thus the morality Ever since, several purges have been residing in the person of the ruler. Hence, in presented as measures to clean up order to end suffering and return happiness corruption. to the people, morality must be restored by This seminal struggle over the political and replacing a bad ruler with a good ruler. economic control of Thailand is fought while Accordingly, the Thai political discourse is both the rules of the game as well as the traditionally not structured around balance of power are shifting. Under the ideologies or projects, but instead focuses changing rules of the game, domestic and on the moral quality of its leaders.113 international opinion, especially of the This is why political corruption causes such middle classes, have gained in moral outrage. Corrupt practices 111 importance. In the seven-month stand-off committed by political leaders is proof that between the government and its “immoral people” are at the helm of opponents, success or failure of political society. This perversion of the social and actors were partly determined by their moral order must then be responsible for the ability to play by the rules of a discursive suffering in the world. This is why yellow struggle. In discursive struggles, legitimacy reformers argue that in order to return claims are of fundamental importance. And happiness, immoral “bad people” must be

22 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

replaced with “‘good people” of high moral democracy altogether. Many yellow shirts integrity. prefer “Thai-style governance” by “neutral people with high moral integrity”. With When corruption is understood as the reference to Plato’s “philosopher king”, reflection of a lack of morality in the ruler, some moralists even propagate the return to then corruption allegations become a “absolute monarchy” administered by loyal powerful weapon in the political struggle. It technocrats. is therefore no coincidence that corruption allegations play a central role in Thai politics. At the margins of the yellow discourse Accordingly, three waves of yellow anti- alliance, fascist elements vow to protect corruption protests have resulted in the their interpretation of “Thainess” 114 . “Vile” overthrow of three elected governments. critics of the social order “have no place in decent society” 115 ; they cannot be “real Moralists are highly suspicious of Thais” and should leave the country “to live democracy, because it empowers those at somewhere else” 116 . By dehumanizing 117 the bottom of society, people of low ‘The Other Within’ as “buffalos” 118 , morality by definition, to “make the wrong “rubbish” 119 , or “germs infecting the Thai choices”. Because “corrupt politicians” can political body”120, they seek to “hunt down easily buy or fool “uneducated voters”, and exterminate the human garbage which elections are perceived as a gateway for causes Thailand’s problems”121. In order to corruption. “root out the rotten regime”, the economic Reform, in the yellow discourse world, base of those in power needs to be means to clean out the bureaucratic polity “purged” 122 , including the system of by replacing bad people with good people. “Parliamentary dictatorship”123. Again, elections are a danger because they After the coup, the military junta tapped allow bad people to creep back in. Hence, into the moralist political discourse to the battle-cry of the latest incarnation of the legitimize its rule. By cracking down on vice yellow street mob, the People's Committee and crime, the junta claimed to bring back for Absolute Democracy with the King as happiness by restoring morality. Patriotic (re- Head of State (PDRC), was “Reform before ) education, attitude adjustments programs Elections!” and the crackdown on academic freedom Some protesters went even further and are justified by concerns that “debate may called for the abolishment of electoral cause social divisions”. The attempt to

23 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

enforce “reconciliation” by imposing Just short of postmodern acceptance of the artificial unity belies claims of political relativity of truth claims, the red progressive neutrality and makes the junta part of the community promotes modern norms such as yellow discourse alliance. The junta-installed human rights and electoral majority rule as reform bodies are similarly promoting universal truths. Those who promote narratives emphasizing the need to put traditional ideas are consequentially good people with high moral integrity in accused of being “on the wrong side of charge. Accordingly, many reform history”. Accordingly, the red narrative proposals seem to be inspired by the need explains moral injustices such as “double “to keep the bureaucratic polity clean” by standards” as symptoms of ‘ancièn régime” preventing bad people from creeping back decay. in. Whereas the yellow discourse assumes that The reform process once again places the “moral corruption causes social decay”, the technocrats at the center of the legislative red discourse claims that “social decay process. The legalist-technocratic discourse causes moral corruption”. The red paradigm understands corruption as a governance discourse claims that corruption cannot be problem threatening economic growth, the curbed inside the old political and social rule of law, or democratic legitimacy. order, because it is merely a symptom of the Technocrats are afraid that “populism” failing system. The solution is then to build a could lead to state bankruptcy. 124 The new and truly democratic regime solution is to install institutional safeguards, if legitimized by the consent of the ruled. necessary by imposing them onto society. 125 Corruption is primarily seen as a problem of social justice, especially of double standards This sense of urgency is sometimes rooted in in the judicial system. The solution is to a Jacobian reformist zeal which strives to complete democratization and promote promote the absolute ‘Truth’, which needs social equality. 127 Corruption of elected to be enforced to save society from politicians is dismissed as leftovers from the decay. 126 Yellow and red versions of the feudal culture of past times. Progressive ‘Truth’ lead to diverging political visions, political visions vary, but usually share a dividing the legalist-technocratic discourse strong emphasis on electoral majority rule. community between two camps. Fearful that yellow demands for reform only In short, the heterogeneous yellow discourse disguise an attempt to do away with alliance is held together by a common fear electoral democracy, the red battle-cry of moral and social decay, and the desire could have been “Elections before Reform!” to reverse social decay by restoring morality. The rural red discourse community is still The yellow discourse alliance has found a rooted in pre-modern notions of authority unifying reform platform, namely to stamp and universal truths. The rural “amaart out corruption by replacing “bad people” conspiracy” discourse hopes that social ills with “good people”. such as corruption will be resolved once The red discourse alliance “feudalism” is overcome by true 128 The red discourse alliance is even more democracy.” Emancipatory demands, heterogeneous. In addition to the however, are mixed with hopes for a strong mentioned “red” legalistic technocrats, the and benign leader, explaining perhaps a “neoliberal”, “progressive” and “ammaart certain nonchalance of the rural red conspiracy” discourse communities can be discourse community towards corruption identified. committed by its own leaders.

24 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

Similar “hopes for salvation” can be seen in corruption”, appeals to all who feel the the neoliberal discourse community. By current order violates their dignity, those trimming back the incompetent and corrupt who see the social order as unjust and those state, neoliberals hope a genuinely free who feel excluded and seek to obtain a market will unleash the full potential of the piece of the pie, those who demand equal Thai economy. rights and those who seek to consolidate democracy. So while the yellow discourse alliance is relatively unified under the "Thainess"- The raging middle classes: Mobilizing social umbrella, the red discourse alliance is more pressure diverse. Nonetheless, the red discourse Second, corruption narratives are striking a alliance rallies on the common narrative cord with social groups, making them the that the old order is decaying and needs to ideal rallying cry to mobilize mass political be replaced with a truly democratic system. support. Corruption narratives particularly Four functions of corruption narratives seem to be at the core of Bangkok’s middle class rage, echoing similar phenomena in Narratives are shaping the way how people transformation conflicts around the world. see and interpret social and cultural changes. In Thailand, corruption discourses The origin of middle class anger lies in a play important roles in constructing the red- political mechanism typical of many flawed yellow conflict. Four such functions can be democracies. In order to win elections with identified. the support of the rural vote, candidates forge alliances with local power-brokers. What’s going on? Explaining the world Once elected, local politicians tend to First, corruption narratives help to explain follow the logic of the patronage system, of what is going on. For most people, the which the feudal heritage is even more alive complex and fundamental structural in the provinces than in national politics. transformations currently taking place Patronage politics dictates that allies have transcend their understanding. They need a to be nurtured, loyalties rewarded, support symbolic representation to make these bought and clients protected. changes tangible and actionable. Corruption narratives explain in simple terms At the same time however, the what is at stake in the bigger struggle over interpretation of these ancient patronage the political and moral order, thereby practices is shifting. Rewarding supporters is boiling down the complex processes of now criticized as populism, favoring the kin is transformation into a nutshell. Thus, it seems condemned as nepotism and distribution of to be no coincidence that so many spoils is criminalized as corruption. But who transformation conflicts around the globe brings out the pitchforks against the are constructed around corruption issues. patronage system? Obviously, it is neither the patrons who abuse the system to gain In the Thai conflict, the topoi “moral billions nor the poor who need patronage to corruption causes social decay” works as a survive. battle cry for those who are wary of change, those who feel that something is Here the middle classes come into play who not quite right in the new capitalist order, built their social status upon years of those who are concerned about state education, successful entrepreneurship or failure or bankruptcy, and those who seek artistic talent. Their desire for recognition of to reaffirm the traditional order. The mirror these merits, however, is constantly being narrative “social decay causes moral frustrated by a system which values personal

25 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

connections over merit. Most importantly, The fallacy is to equate these patronage however, the abuse of power by the ruling practices with democracy. Evidently, non- elites threatens the middle classes. elected politicians are equally part of the Pummeled from below by emerging classes patronage system which runs through all who demand equal opportunities, the institutions. Traditional elites, however, have established middle classes based in the managed to build a “discursive firewall” capital now see its constitutional safeguards distinguishing between “decent people with taken away by elected autocrats who high moral integrity” and “corrupt elected undermine checks and balances, erode the politicians”. Therefore, it should not be rule of law, and disrespect political rights. surprising that every military junta claims to This may offer an explanation why the “ban bad politicians” and put the middle classes are marching against responsibility for the common good firmly corruption and the abuse of power, back into the hands of “good people”, demanding good governance and the rule namely their own supporters. of law. This equation of democracy with corruption Not too long ago, the urban middle classes has prompted hundreds of thousands of were also demanding democracy. So why middle class members to favor an are hundreds of thousands of angry middle authoritarian regime „cleansed from bad class men and women now demanding the people” over an electoral democracy. The very suspension of democracy? Is not the irony that the suspension of democracy empowerment of the people the best tool actually strengthens the very patronage against the abuse of power by the system which incentivizes corrupt practices powerful? Again, it is necessary to dissect seems to be lost on these angry anti- the discourse. While the interests of the corruption warriors. middle classes around the world seem In sum, middle class rage cannot be comparable, some are protesting for more explained by some supposed ‘objective democracy, while others are marching for class interest’, but is largely driven by the less. Therefore, a plausible explanation for intermediary role of discourses in defining this dichotomy appears not to lie in some interests, identities and visions. These sort of “objective class interest”, but rather in narratives equating electoral democracy the way how political outlooks and with corruption (“vote buying”, “populism”, perceived interests are constructed by “mafia rule”) eclipse the ongoing structural discourses. alienation of the middle classes away from The established Bangkokian middle class the traditional patrimonial order. Combined fears “to be robbed by corrupt elected with additional social fears of being politicians who steal our money to buy the squeezed between “greedy poor” and votes of the immoral poor with populist “abusive elites”, the narratives equating projects”. 129 By framing elected politicians elections with corruption mobilize the urban as corrupt and abusive, democracy itself middle classes even stronger in their struggle has been equated to the ills of the to curb, suspend or overthrow electoral patronage system. democracy. 130 Simply put, the established middle class of Bangkok which pushed for Obviously, there is some truth in this. For liberal democracy in the 1990ies has now decades, professional politicians have effectively switched sides, and is today rewarded their supporters, favored their kin, siding with traditional elites against the punished their opponents and distributed onslaught of modernization, capitalism, the spoils into their networks. emerging classes and new ideas that come

26 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

along with them. Here, we can see clearly alliances together despite diverging class the role of discourse as a source of power: interests, personal rivalries and opposing by integrating the established middle class ideologies needs a strong common cause. of Bangkok into the status quo alliance, Because of their broad appeal to many traditional elites successfully manage to different social groups, corruption narratives preserve the traditional order. are ideally placed to function as unifying discursive platforms for such heterogeneous At the same time, the very fact that such a societal alliances. "Saving the nation from fierce struggle between rivaling discourse moral corruption" is what royalists and worlds is raging shows that the “royalist” former communists, military men and discourse community has lost the discourse workers, southern farmers and Bangkok’s hegemony it held for decades. Only a few middle class can all agree on, despite all years back, the traditional elite still had the their differences. Whereas "overcoming a uncontested monopoly to explain “what is corrupt and unjust system" is the battle cry going on” and “what needs to be done for the red alliance between capitalist about it”. Today, reflecting the increased tycoons and the poor, academics and taxi political awareness in every corner of drivers, rural farmers and Bangkok’s country, more and more people are openly cosmopolitan bohème.133 challenging this authority. Hence, the loss of royalist discourse hegemony accelerates Formatting the political field the ongoing shift in the balance of power Finally, corruption discourses structure the away from traditional elites. political battlefield by framing issues, Therefore, in the face of eroding political empowering actors, but also setting limits to and economic power of the traditional their room for maneuver. The discursive elites, the main ideological pillar of the juxtaposition of “reform before election” traditional order, namely the “Thainess” versus “elections before reform” defined the discourse, is under attack by modern battle lines of the showdown between the discourses such as democracy and Yingluck government and its opponents on pluralism, universal rights and equal the streets, leaving very little room for opportunities. 131 By equating democracy compromise. Corruption discourses played with corruption, however, the established a central role in empowering actors, namely middle classes who are demanding good the People's Democratic Reform Committee governance and the rule of law are now (PDRC), the Constitutional Court and marching in the columns of the traditional independent commissions such the National patrons. This shows how critical corruption Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), while discourses are in the build-up of alliances limiting the room for maneuver of the and the formatting of the political playing government.134 field. Corruption discourses define roles and give Platform for discourse alliances orientation. The yellow discourse rages against the “Villain Thaksin”, cheers for the Third, corruption narratives function as a “Hero Kamnan Suthep” and bemoans the common platform for broad and “Great Mass of the People” as the victim of heterogeneous societal coalitions. the “Thaksin regime”. The red discourse As shown above, the rival red and yellow despises the “Villain Suthep”, celebrates the alliances manage to bring together groups “Democracy Heroine Yingluck” and points from an enormously broad political, social to the “betrayed 20 million voters” as the and ideological spectrum.132 Bringing these victims of the “ammaart coup”.

27 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

Corruption narratives largely determine the Corruption narratives are also central for the political solution a speaker has in mind. construction of the deeper transformation Those who fear corruption as moral decay conflict. As we have seen, the red-yellow will seek to restore morality by exchanging divide is largely constructed. The way how immoral “bad people” with “good people” the conflict is constructed, however, of high moral integrity. Those who blame it matters, as it partly determines the balance on “human garbage” will aim to of power between those who seek to “exterminate” this “rubbish”. Those who uphold the status quo and those who want identify it as a problem of governance will change. If agents for change manage to install new laws and institutions, while those unify a broad societal coalition on a who see it as the decay of the ancien modernization platform, they can succeed régime will strive to overcome it.135 The “all in building a functioning democratic order. politicians are corrupt” narrative erodes the However, by framing the conflict in critical resource of trust, in effect nationalist, ethnic, racial, religious or moral undermining the ability of political actors terms, those who benefit from the status quo from all sides to broker a deal. 136 More often manage to rally enough support to generally, the discursive equation of the uphold the old order despite all structural democratic process of negotiation, and social changes. Accordingly, as long compromise, and trade-offs between as the red- yellow divide continues to interest groups with “moral corruption” cripple the ability of society to organize deepens the legitimacy crisis of the political along the status quo versus modernization system. The “vote buying” and “populism” cleavage, traditional elites will be able to topoi are used to equate democratic uphold the old order to their own elections with corruption. In its seminal ruling advantage. on the constitutional amendment seeking to Anti-corruption discourses can lead into a have a fully elected Senate, the Thai development trap Constitutional Court used the “Spouse Parliament” narrative to link elections with In sum, as the Thai case has illustrated, nepotism, arguing that “It is an attempt to corruption can play a key role in draw the Nation back into the canal, as it transformation conflicts. On a structural would bring the Senate back to the state of level, it works as an (ambivalent) catalyst in being an assembly of relatives, assembly of the transition between a patrimonial and a family members and assembly of husbands legal-rational order. In the discourse field, and wives.”137 corruption narratives offer explanations for the anonymous and sometimes frightening Consequently many of the "reforms" of the forces of change, and offer common past decade were aimed at curbing the platforms for broad discourse alliances. influence of elected politicians by checking Given the vital function of corruption in them with "neutral" institutions. The proposals patronage systems, corruption narratives put forward by members of the junta- are ideally suited to spark middle class installed National Reform Council all seem outrage and mobilize mass protests against to be inspired by the need to restore governments. Traditional elites, despite morality by putting good people with high being patrons themselves, use corruption moral integrity in charge. Proposals to discourses to frame the transformation in disenfranchise uneducated voters, appoint such a way which allows them to integrate parts of the legislature, and install unelected the established middle classes into the status bodies to control the Parliament and quo alliance, and uphold the traditional government are all part of this effort.138 order amidst change.

28 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

The restoration of the feudalist patronage exact opposite is needed and the system, however, undermines the governance operating system must be modernization of the state, and can lead upgraded, from personal relationship- into a development trap. By widening the based, to merit-based institutions. To escape gap between the needs of a complex the trap of a corrupt equilibrium, societies economy and pluralist society and the need to complete Weber’s modernization capacity of the political system to respond program. In other words, societies need to to these needs, the restoration of feudalist leap forward from patrimonialism to a legal- mechanisms deepens the transformation rational order, which can satisfy the needs crisis. Upholding the status quo undercuts of a complex economy and a pluralist necessary reforms, and hurts the ability of society. the economy to compete in a highly The United Nations Convention against dynamic regional market. Corruption reflects a global consensus on In short, corruption discourses are widely what needs to be done on the technical used to construct transformation struggles, side: and are key power resources for conflict “An entire chapter of the Convention is parties. Tragically, the equation of dedicated to prevention, with measures corruption with democracy can lead into a directed at both the public and private development trap which societies crippled sectors. These include model preventive by conflict find hard to escape. This is why policies, such as the establishment of the fight against corruption must not be anticorruption bodies and enhanced limited to technical measures, but take the transparency in the financing of election discursive framing of anti-corruption into campaigns and political parties. The account. The fight against corruption, as we Convention requires countries to will see, can only succeed as part and establish criminal and other offences to parcel of the greater struggle for a modern cover a wide range of corrupt acts. The democratic order. Convention goes beyond previous instruments of its kind, criminalizing not V. Anti-corruption strategies for only basic forms of corruption such as transformation societies bribery and the embezzlement of public funds, but also in trading of influence Corruption, cronyism and clientelism are and the concealment and laundering of social practices that have had important the proceeds of corruption. Offences functions in pre-modern societies. Today, in committed in the support of corruption, the absence of effective modern institutions, including money-laundering and they continue to fulfill the same social obstructing justice, are also dealt with. functions. With the emergence of complex Convention offences also deal with the modern economies and pluralist societies problematic areas of private-sector however, these social practices can corruption. Countries are bound by the become obstacles to development, Convention to render specific forms of democratization and social justice. mutual legal assistance in gathering and Misunderstanding corruption as an transferring evidence for use in court, to individual moral failure of “bad people”, extradite offenders. Countries agreed on leads to the wrong therapy, reverting back asset-recovery, which is stated explicitly to the traditional order which works on the as a fundamental principle of the basis of distributing spoils within personal Convention.“139 networks. To effectively curb corruption the

29 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

However, as revealed by the disappointing engineering, and contribute to the track record of many anti-corruption renegotiation of the social contract. programs, curbing corruption is easier said . Beware the role of corruption narratives. than done.140 Technocratic instruments are In many transformation conflicts, corruption doomed if they fail to take into account the discourses play a central role because they context of the political economy, social symbolically represent the larger, yet difficult functions and cultural roots of corruption. to understand struggle between a Without a proper conceptual framework, patrimonial and a legal-rational order. If anti-corruption policies may possibly do corruption can only be curbed by even more harm than good. Particularly in completing the legal-rational order, then transformation societies anti-corruption the fight against corruption means to take strategies need to be embedded into sides in the transformation conflict between broader strategies to tackle the broader those who seek to uphold the patrimonial challenges for political and economic order, and those who seek democratic development. Nevertheless given the change. The fight against corruption can rapidly shifting economic, political and only be successful as part of the larger cultural opportunity structures of struggle for democratization. transformation societies, fighting corruption would mean hitting a moving target. 5.1 Handle with Care Corruption fighters can easily get embroiled in political conflicts. Given the public The Washington Consensus disguised its outrage over corruption, as well as the political agenda for building the institutional resistance from those who benefit from the infrastructure for a capitalist economy into status quo, designing successful anti- technical language. This is not to say that corruption strategies is a delicate task.141 the good governance agenda is wrong; on the contrary, it is indispensable to build a Three lessons learnt may be helpful at the legal-rational order. However, these onset of the long and cumbersome struggle seemingly technical programs are cloaking against corruption: stark political choices. Those who believe . Beware the ideological baggage. The that only the fire and fury of the capitalist fight against corruption is neither neutral nor monster can break the chains of traditional innocent. To make good governance feudal orders will follow its advice and let reforms work, they have to be stripped off markets run free. Those who are fearful of the conceptual flaws and hidden agendas replacing one devil with another will have to of the Washington Consensus. carefully watch how the institutional cage is . Beware the social functions of constructed. Hence, it is important to corruption. In the absence of functioning understand that anti-corruption programs legal-rational institutions, corruption often fills are always political. the gap in fulfilling crucial social functions. Anti-corruption strategies unaware of Hence, the fight against corruption can only political and discursive minefields can easily succeed if it does not simply build be entangled in political conflicts, or end up institutional facades, but seeks to lay the doing someone else’s bidding: political, social and cultural foundations “Anti-corruption is not innocent. Insofar necessary to make the legal-rational system as anti-corruption is one tool for work. Similarly anti-corruption strategies controlling resources and maintaining need to be more than institutional control over others, we should expect that even the most unscrupulous

30 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

regimes and leaders will develop anti- reform, or at least work as a social cleansing corruption agencies and strategies to process with the effect of reaffirming ‘what please donors and obtain funds […] One is right and wrong’. If corruption means the should assume that anti-corruption abuse of power by unconstrained ruling agencies can themselves be corrupt, elites, however, then calls to strengthen just as we find those organs fighting morality by ethical self-restraint, education what is called ‘organized crime’ can or awareness campaigns seem ill equipped themselves be linked to organized for the task. In an ironic twist, the moralistic crime. Anti-corruption is not innocent.”142 discourse of corruption as individual moral failure ("bad people") in effect reaffirming As shown in the case of Thailand, corruption the exact same patronage system which narratives play a major role in the functions by distributing spoils into personal construction of the conflict, while anti- networks.144 corruption bodies are being used by elite minorities to defend privilege and status In short, anti-corruption policies which are against the will of the electoral majority. unaware of ideological biases and hidden Technical anti-corruption programs are in agendas may end up creating facade danger of confusing form with substance: institutions, and can do more harm than good. “People [...] mistake the outward forms of the rule of law for its substance. Thus, 5.2 Curbing corruption in transformation for example, “checks and balances” is societies means to finalize the legal-rational taken to be a hallmark of a strong rule- order of-law society, since the branches of government check the behavior of one Over the last decade, the recommended another. But the mere existence of a anti-corruption policy mix has been largely formal check is not the same thing as consolidated. However, success stories strong democratic governance. Courts remain scarce. Corruption fighters have can be used to frustrate collective understood that given the vast variety of action, [...] prolonged judicial appeals corruption syndromes in countries with can bog down critical infrastructure contrasting contexts, there cannot be any projects, or can be used to protect the blueprints for reform: interest of the elites against the will of “This reformers must have political the government. Thus the form of strategies as well as good ideas for separated powers periodically fails to corruption control-; and as for the latter, correspond necessarily to the substance what might seem to be a good reform of a law-abiding society.”143 idea in country A may well be impossible Caution is also recommended with the in B, irrelevant in C and downright understanding of corruption as a moral harmful in D.”145 problem. Corruption is indeed a moral Curbing endemic corruption in problem to the extent that it erodes the transformation countries, in particular, seems normative barriers and impersonal to require a different approach from fighting institutions erected to hold the powerful incidental corruption in established legal- accountable. Without these barriers, rational polities. humans will revert to the default mode of governance: building trust based on “The procedural approach to reducing personal relationships. Moral outrage over the problem of corruption in rational- corruption can also be a powerful driver for legal systems is now well-established. But

31 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

the large problems associated with normative foundations and the mindsets of endemic corruption occur where citizens. By definition, transformation crisis tensions exist between different types of occur in the transition between an eroding social relationship which are assumed by but still powerful patrimonial order and an traditional and modern forms of emerging, but yet to be effective legal- ruling.“146 rational order. As long as new governance institutions are not yet effective, the rule of The over-reliance of anti-corruption policies law incomplete and the clash between on procedural means has been attributed traditional and new values and norms to a flawed understanding of the nature of ongoing, there is still room and even a need corruption: for patrimonial modes of social organization. “Existing Anti-Corruption Programs fail This is why transformation crises offer a fertile because they conceptualize corruption breeding ground for corruption. To avoid as a principal-agent problem, when in creating institutional facades, anti- fact, in situations of systemic corruption, corruption strategies need to identify the it is actually a collective action problem. social functions corrupt behaviors fulfill, and […] On the basis of this [flawed] replace them with less obstructive, yet understanding of corruption, anti- functionally equivalent social practices and corruption programs have taken the institutions. form of institutional reforms aimed at In transformation societies, the struggle increasing oversight by principals and against corruption must be understood as reducing the opportunities and part and parcel of the larger challenge of incentives of the agents for corruption: building the political, legal and moral order reducing the discretion of bureaucrats, necessary to satisfy the needs of a complex improving their salaries, improving economy and pluralist society. To overcome transparency and information flows, etc. transformation crisis, society needs to make […] Corruption is more accurately an ultimate choice between going viewed as a collective action problem: “backward” to the old order or “forward” although in the long-term everyone towards modernization. would benefit from a corruption-free environment, in the short-term no-one While the path towards modernization may has immediate incentives to change widely vary from one society to another and their behavior. As one respondent says the resulting “modern state” may look ‘It is that feeling that if I don’t take it, it is decidedly different between one culture going to be taken by somebody else’. and another, building a Universalist legal- In this kind of context, society is trapped rational order is only possible way of curbing in a corrupt equilibrium where no one corruption. Building a legal-rational state is has an incentive to change, and there a not “Westernization in disguise”, but the few reasons to expect any change.”147 finalization of a process which started with the emergence of a capitalist economy, is To overcome the “corrupt equilibrium” that driven by social changes, and is being has been holding many transformation articulated in the political demands and societies hostage, anti-corruption strategies aspirations of emerging classes. In other need to go well beyond the procedural words, the problems triggered by the measures. Procedural measures are rationalist re-organization of the economy insufficient to break the pertinacious have to be tackled by a rational re- patronage structures and are incapable of organization of the political order. This re- facilitating the necessary changes in the organization goes well beyond the

32 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

institutional architecture and the legal that are no less ugly in themselves... [...] framework and must include a redefinition The patterns of corruption are [...] of norms and values, organizational and determined by the distribution of power political cultures, collective identities and between the state, capitalists and legitimizing ideologies. intermediate classes. The economic (as opposed to moral) problem is not Curbing corruption in transformation corruption per se but the political societies means to finalize the transition to a structures that generate growth- legal-rational order with effective, merit- retarding corruption.”148 based, impersonal institutions. However, institutions are only strong if they are Anti-corruption is at the heart of the recognized and accepted by all sides. If construction of a political and normative one side imposes rules onto the other, they order fit to serve the needs of a complex will be resisted. The “fruit of the poisonous economy and pluralist society. Simply put, it tree” of imposed rules, no matter how well means to effectively change the rules of the crafted, severely damages the legitimacy of game for everyone, including the rich and anti-corruption institutions, and spoils their powerful. ability to tackle politically sensitive cases of This is where the core political challenge of corruption. Put differently, it is not only the the fight against corruption lies. Most design of the legal-rational order which political, social and economic elites owe matters, but the way it comes into being. their position to the patrimonial order. Only an inclusive and participatory process Beneficiaries from the patronage system are of renegotiation of the social contract can not limited to traditional feudalist elites; lay the social foundations for the legal- emerging capitalist elites also have a stake rational order. in it. There must not be any illusions that the 5.3 The fight against corruption must be part fight against corruption, as part of the larger of the struggle for democracy project of building a legal-rational order, will face stiff resistance from this status quo Transitions from patrimonial to legal-rational alliance. orders are neither natural nor technocratic. In other words, the fight against corruption They can only be the outcome of a takes place right in the middle of a protracted political struggle over the future transformation conflict between those who order: seek to uphold the traditional order, and “Corruption cannot be properly studied those who struggle to change it. Deeply outside the context of capitalist entrenched in the political economy, the accumulation and the political contests social order and the hegemonic ideology, that it faces from other emerging classes these elites are a powerful political force. in the surrounding social milieu. [...] This How can the powerful and wealthy be approach raises fundamental problems brought within limits, to be made for policy approaches to corruption. The answerable to others? 149 To make things public face of corruption is clearly even more challenging, the case of unacceptable and in the long run it may Thailand has shown how anti-corruption destroy the limited legitimacy of some bodies can be used as tools to defend elite developing country states. On the other interests, and anti-corruption narratives are hand, the visible face of corruption is instrumental to build broad societal often an integral part of processes of alliances struggling to uphold the status quo. accumulation and social compromise So if a large part of society opposes the

33 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

idea of change, how can the legal-rational bringing more voices and interests into order indispensable for curbing corruption the governing process. It is ‘deep’ in a come into being? double sense: it draws force from many levels of society, reflecting the lasting This is why the fight against corruption interests of the humblest as well as the cannot be neutral, but is part and parcel of elites; and it extends deep into the the larger struggle for democratic institutions and processes of emancipation and social justice: government, making those interests a “It may be utopian to believe that the factor in policy making and transition to capitalism can be entirely implementation, not just slogans at just. Yet unless the transition process is election time.”151 widely perceived to be just, it is difficult Contrary to traditionalist fears that conflict for it to be organized in a legally drives social decay, or reactionary concerns regulated way in an open polity. that electoral competition encourages External pressure to tackle corruption corruption, it is the very noise and may help development only if such contestation of a pluralist society which pressure contributes to the legitimization helps to check corruption: of the processes through which capitalism is being created. On the “The clash of interests and values; other hand, it is very likely that anti- contestation over the acceptable corruption strategies may sometimes sources and uses of wealth and power, make the problem of organizing internal and over accountability; and the political stability more difficult during the disputes over the nature and processes of capitalist transition that significance of rights are of the essence could in turn prolong instability and the in deep democratization and […] in perpetuation of underdevelopment.”150 checking corruption. […Deep democratization’s] four key tasks involve Hence, Johnston places the fight against increasing pluralism, opening up safe corruption into the struggle for deeper political and economic space, reform democratization: activism, and maintaining “Corruption will continue […] until those accountability.”152 with a stake in ending it are able to Deep democratization aims to overcome oppose it in ways that cannot be social conflict not by moral appeals, but by ignored. […] Even the best anti- political settlements: corruption ideas need strong political and social foundations- the support of “In extensively corrupt societies deep people and groups with lasting reasons, democratization is unlikely to attain and the ability, to defend themselves breakthroughs in political morality or politically against abuses by others […] anything like fully open, rational Lasting corruption control is more likely government. It can (though by no to succeed as a part, and outcome, of means must) culminate in settlements deep democratization. ‘Deep and accommodations that democratization’ does not mean that institutionalize accountability and limits democracy itself, or processes like on power.”153 competitive lections, will control Fighting corruption means to empower the corruption […] Deep democratization is people to stand up to the rich and powerful. a continuing process of building To achieve this herculean task, Johnston workable rules and accountability by

34 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

does not put his hopes on morality, but on ethics is good business, neoliberal more profane motivations of self-interest: governments who see corruption as a brake on trade, and international aid “Those sorts of political energy are not organizations who want their donor easily sustained solely through appeals funds to be more effective […] In the to virtue; the defense of one’s own world of anti-corruption, diverse actors interests – property, rights personal normally at odds with each other can safety, the chance to earn a living- is a come together in the same moral more lasting motivation when it comes crusade. The movement against to confronting the wealthy and corruption is one of the few platforms powerful.”154 which can bring virtually all of us However, given the political, economic, together. After all, who can be for ideological and coercive power of the corruption?”156 entrenched patrimonial elites, individuals The case of Thailand, on the other hand, struggling to defend their rights and interests should be seen as a warning that anti- are fighting an uphill battle. The epic corruption movements are not necessarily struggle over the political order can only be democratic. Conflicts over the right way to won by the political muscle of a broad curb corruption may even split the societal change coalition. democratic camp by pitting those who Given the heterogeneous and often prioritize the rule of law against those who divergent interests of social groups, such a focus on electoral majority rule. The appeal broad societal coalition needs a common of anti-corruption platforms to authoritarian discursive platform on which actors can join players, to be sure, is a global phenomenon: forces. How that can be done can be “[Anti-corruption] can also constitute a learned from one of the most successful political platform for ambitious politicians coalition builders in the global fight against and ex-military officers who want to corruption, Transparency International (TI). ‘clean up’ government. Anti-corruption The success of TI is rooted in its ability to is invariably part of most military mobilize players with a common mission, coups.”157 despite the obvious varying differences of interests between them. To effectively If the fight against corruption can only be isolate or shame corrupt politicians or won by installing a legal-rational order, it unaccountable institutions into better must not be carried by a reactionary governance, a vast coalition of international alliance, but by a coalition struggling for donor organizations, the international democratic change. Consequently, business community and local politicians corruption fighters need to forge alliances has to be brought ‘on board’.155 The global with those who seek a politically anti-corruption community is an impressive democratic, socially just and symbolically example of how alliances between pluralist order.158 politically, socially and ideologically diverse To form a discursive platform for a ‘Grand groups can be formed on the basis of a Rainbow Coalition for Democratic Change’, common cause. democracy and anti-corruption narratives “The anti-corruption community […] is need to be combined.159 now so extensive that it includes groups The history of democratization suggests the normally at odds with each other: themes around which such a narrative grassroots activists pursuing social justice, could be build. In Europe, temporary enlightened corporations who believe

35 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

coalitions between middle class and supported by the middle classes. Therefore, working class were instrumental to end it is indispensable to bring the raging middle aristocratic rule. Their common vision classes back into the democratic flock. As bridging vast differences of interests and shown above, the political attitude of culture was a social order which allowed middle classes is less based on interest, but social rise based on personal achievement, framed by narratives which equate as opposed to aristocratic heredity.160 Equal electoral democracy with corruption. opportunities for all, combined with Therefore, a new corruption narrative is effective rule of law protecting the minority needed which reframes how society at from the electoral majority was the formula large, and the middle classes in particular many could agree on. Social democratic think and talk about corruption. compromises between all classes finally If corruption means the abuse of power, ended decades or even centuries of social then fighting corruption means to empower conflict. At the heart of the new social people to defend their rights and interests contract was the promise that society would against the powerful and wealthy. In other provide full capabilities for all, empowering words, to fight corruption, more democracy, everyone to ‘make it’ based on talent, hard not less, is needed. work, and merit. This dynamic and egalitarian social order was radically Deepening democratization in the different from patrimonial order with their provinces will help reconcile the middle static social hierarchies and personal class with elections. Deeper relationship based governance systems. By democratization will help to strengthen the combining the quest for a legal-rational rule of law, making political parties more order with the struggle for social justice and responsive and elected leaders more political emancipation, the social accountable. democratic compromise provided the In order to effectively curb corruption, social foundation for political and economic checks and balances, limits and controls of development, and decades of social powerful are needed. However, the false stability. equation between democracy and In today’s transformation societies, the key corruption nurtures mistrust over “ultimate challenge for political and economic motives” of corruption fighters, fueling development is the renegotiation of the ideological proxy battles and paralyzing the social contract to lay the social foundation policy making process. An escalating for a democratic legal-rational order. To transformation conflict can even result in the marginalize extremists, and win the struggle total breakdown of the political system and against those who benefit from the status violent conflict. Hence, in order to allow the quo, those who seek to fight corruption and implementation of effective anti-corruption those who want social justice need to join policies, the fight against corruption needs forces in a broad societal Grand Rainbow to be purged of “hidden agendas” by firmly Coalition. In order to allow social groups and unmistakably embedding it into the with diverging interests and opposing beliefs struggle for deeper democratization. to come together, a common platform is In order to unite the fight against corruption needed which unites the fight against and the struggle for deeper corruption with the struggles for social justice democratization, corruption needs to be and deeper democratization. redefined from an individual moral failure Building a strong political center for a social into a collective problem of social justice. democracy, however, can only work if it is Again, Transparency International has taken

36 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

the lead by reframing the anti-corruption agenda as the common struggle for social justice and the rule of law:

“Popular movements do not distinguish between anti-corruption or human rights in their demand for social justice and the rule of law. Policymakers need to follow suit by breaking down the conceptual and institutional barriers and better synergizing anti-corruption and human rights efforts.“161

Combining the struggles for social justice, the rule of law and deeper democratization is a winning formula which offers a way out of deadlock of transformation conflicts. A social compromise between those who seek a merit-based order and those who struggle for equal opportunities enables the laying of a social foundation for a new social contract. The common vision of a “Legal- rational order as the basis for a Good Society with full capabilities for all” helps to transcend fears and conflict by opening a new path into the future.162

37 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

causes-impacts-and-solutions , accessed on April 12, 1 Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert W. “Corruption”. 2014. 18 In: Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 108, 1993, pp. Fukuyama, Francis. The Origins of Political Order, p. 599-617; Taube, Markus. “Relational Corruption in the 208f, 227, 312. 19 Ibid., p. 27. PR China: Institutional Foundations and its (Dys)- 20 functionality for economic Development and Ibid., p. 54. 21 Growth". In: (Dys)-functionalities of Corruption, Ibid., p. 38. Comparative 22 Fukuyama, Francis. Political Order and Political Perspectives and Methodological Pluralism, Decay, FSG, New York, 2014, p. 23. Comparative Governance and Politics Special. 23 Lovell, David. “Corruption as a Transitional Tobias Debiel and Phenomenon.” In: Corruption, Haller and Shore Andrea Garwich (eds.). Issue 3, Wiesbaden: Springer (eds.)., VS, 2013. 24 Weber, Max. Parlament und Regierung im 2 Hamilton, William as cited in: Fukuyama, Francis. The neugeordneten Deutschland: Zur politischen Kritik Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the des Beamtentums und Parteiwesens. München: French Revolution. London: Profile Books Ltd., 2011, p. Duncker and Humblot, 1918. 30. 25 Lovell, David. “Corruption as a Transitional 3 Fukuyama, Francis. The Origins of Political Order, pp. Phenomenon”. In: Corruption, Haller and Shore (eds.), 51, 81. p.79. 4 Ibid., pp. 51, 81. 26 Lovell, David. “Corruption as a Transitional 5 van Klaveren, Jacob. “Corruption as a Historical Phenomenon”. In: Corruption, Haller and Shore (eds.), Phenomenon”. In: Political Corruption: Concepts & p.70ff. Contexts Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael 27 Saïd, Edward W. Orientalism, New York: Pantheon Johnston (eds.). New Brunswick: Transaction Books, , 1978. Publishers, 2007, p. 83. 28 Ackermann, Susan Rose. “Democracy and ‘Grand’ 6 Lovell, David. ”Corruption as a Transitional Corruption”. In: International Social Science Journal. Phenomenon: Understanding Endemic Corruption in Vol. 48, Issue. 149, 1996, p. 365-381. Postcommunist States.” In: Corruption: 29 Carothers, Thomas. “The End of the Transition Anthropological perspective. Dieter Haller and Cris Paradigm”. In: Journal of Democracy. Vol. 13, No. 1, Shore (eds.), Plutopress, Ann Arbor, 2005, p. 77. 2002, p. 5-21. 7 Bloch, Marc. Feudal Society. Chicago: University of 30 Inglehart, Ronald and Welzel, Christian. Chicago Press, 1968. Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy: 8 Heidenheimer, Arnold J. and Johnston, Michael. The Human Development Sequence. New York: “Introduction to Part II”. In: Political Corruption, Cambridge University Press, 2005. Heidenheimer and Johnston , pp.77f. 31 Nye, Joseph. “Corruption and Political 9 Priestland, David. Merchant, Soldier, Sage: A New Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis”. In: Political History of Power. London: Penguin Books, 2012, p. 26. Corruption, Heidenheimer and Johnston, p. 288. 10 Fukuyama, Francis. Political Order and Political 32 Leys, Colin. “What is the Problem About Decay, FSG, New York, 2014, p.10. Corruption?”. Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 11 Ibid., p. 10. 3, Issue 2, 1965, p. 224-225. 12 Ibid., p. 56. 33 Huntington, Samuel. “Political Order in Changing 13 Ibid., p. 26. Societies”. Yale University Press, 1968. “Modernization 14 de Sardan, J. P. Olivier. “A moral economy of and Corruption”. In: Political Corruption, corruption in Africa?”. In: The Journal of Modern Heidenheimer and Johnston, p. 69. African Studies. Vol. 37, 1999, pp 25-52, 34 Leff, Nathaniel H. “Economic Development through http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022278X99 Bureaucratic Corruption”. In: Political Corruption, 002992. Heidenheimer and Johnston. 15 Heidenheimer, Arnold J. and Johnston, Michael. 35 Nye, Joseph. “Corruption and Political “Introduction to Part I”. In: Political Corruption, Development”. In: Political Corruption, Heidenheimer Heidenheimer and Johnston (eds.). and Johnston. 16 Friedrich, Carl. “Corruption Concepts in Historical 36 Mauro, Paolo. “Corruption and Growth”. In: Perspective”. In: Political Corruption, Heidenheimer Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 109, 1995, p. 681- and Johnston, pp. 17f. 712. “The Effect of Corruption on Growth, Investment, 17 Crawhall, Nigel. “Corruption. A Buddhist and Government Expenditure: A Cross-Country perspective on causes, impacts and solutions”. Analysis”. In: Corruption in the World Economy. Fred http://www.inebnetwork.org/news-and-media/6- Bergsten and Kimberly Elliott (eds.). Institute for articles/409-corruption-a-buddhist-perspective-on- International Economics, Washington DC, 1996.

38 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

37 Root, Hilton. “: Has it become 50 Khan, Mushtaq. “Patron-Client Networks and the systemic?”. In: Asia Survey. Vol. 35, No. 8, 1996, p. 752; Economic Effects of Corruption in Asia”. In: Political and Hutchcroft, Paul D. “The Politics of Privilege: Rents Corruption, Heidenheimer and Johnston. and Corruption in Asia”. In: Political Corruption, 51 Khan, Mushtaq. “Patron-Client Networks and the Heidenheimer and Johnston. Economic Effects of Corruption in Asia”. In: Political 38 Ackermann, Susan Rose. “When is Corruption Corruption, Heidenheimer and Johnston. Harmful?”. In: Political Corruption, Heidenheimer and 52 Huntington, Samuel. “Modernization and Johnston. Corruption”. In Political Corruption, Heidenheimer 39 Murphy, Kevin M., Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, and Johnston, p. 255. Robert W. “Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to 53 Nye, Joseph. “Corruption and Political Growth?”. In: The Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis”. In: Political American Economic Review. Vol. 83, No. 2, 1993, pp. Corruption, Heidenheimer and Johnston,p. 286. 409-414. 54 White, Gordon. “Corruption and the Transition from 40 Hutchcroft, Paul D. “The Politics of Privilege: Rents Socialism in China”. In: Journal of Law and Society. and Corruption in Asia”. In: Political Corruption, Vol. 23, No. 1, p. 149-169. Cited in Taube, Markus. Heidenheimer and Johnston, p. 490. “Relational Corruption in the PR China". In: (Dys)- 41 von Soest, Christian. “Persistent systemic corruption: functionalities of Corruption, Debiel and Garwich why democratization and economic liberalization (eds.). have 55 Leff, Nathaniel H. “Economic Development through failed to undo an old evil”. In: (Dys)-functionalities of Bureaucratic Corruption”. In: Political Corruption, Corruption, Debiel and Garwich (eds.). Heidenheimer and Johnston, p. 310. 42 Mauro, Paolo. “Corruption: Causes, 56 Nye, Joseph. “Corruption and Political Consequences, and Agenda for Further Research”. Development”. In: Political Corruption, Heidenheimer In: Finance and Development. Vol. 385, No.1, 1998; and Johnston, p. 287. Sokolov, V. “Privatization, Corruption, and Reform in 57 Huntington, Samuel. “Modernization and Present-day Corruption”. In: Political Corruption, Heidenheimer Russia”. In: Demokratizatsiya. Vol. 6, No. 4, 1998, p. and Johnston, p.257. 664-80. Lovell, David. ”Corruption as a Transitional 58 Ibid., p. 253. Phenomenon”. In: Corruption, Haller and Shore (eds.), 59 Ibid., p. 262. p. 79. Khan, Mushtaq. “Patron-Client Networks and 60 Ibid., p. 262. the Economic Effects of Corruption in Asia”. In: 61 Saxer, Marc. “Parteiförderung als Instrument der Political Corruption, Heidenheimer and Johnston, p. Demokratieförderung“. Interne Handreichung, 470. Friedrich-Ebert- Stiftung, Berlin, 2006. 43 Shore, Cris and Haller, Dieter. “Introduction”. In: 62 Rosanvallon, Pierre. Democratic Legitimacy: Corruption, Haller and Shore, (eds.), p. 9. Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity. Princeton: Princeton 44 “The new age of crony capitalism”. In: The University Press, 2011, p. 76. Economist. March 15th-21st, 2014, p. 11; 54-55. 63 Rosanvallon, Pierre. Democratic Legitimacy, p. 76. 45 Debiel, Tobias and Garwich, Andrea, (eds.). “(Dys)- 64 von Soest, Christian. “Persistent systemic corruption: functionalities of corruption.” why democratization and economic liberalization 46 Svensson, Jakob. “Eight Questions about have Corruption”. In: Journal of Economic Perspectives. failed to undo an old evil”. In: Zeitschrift für Volume 19, No. 3, Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, Comparative 2005, p. 40. Governance and Politics. Vol. 7, 5th Oktober 2013, p. 47 Sindzingre Alice N. and Milelli, Christian. "The 57-87. Uncertain Relationship between Corruption and 65 Ibid., p. 57-87. Growth in Developing Countries: Threshold Effects 66 Dix, Sarah, Hussmann, Karen and Walton, Grand. and State Effectiveness". In: EconomiX Working “Risks of corruption to state legitimacy and stability in Papers 2010-10. fragile situations“. U4 Anti-Corruption Centre. Issue No University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, 3, May 2012. EconomiX, 2010. 67 Elders, J. L. M. “Legitimiteit en Recht”. In: Recht en 48 Taube, Markus. "Relational Corruption in the PR Legitimiteit. E. H. L. Brugmans and J. L. M. Elders (eds.). China: Institutional Foundations and its (Dys)- Zwolle, 1987, p. 16. As cited in Bakker, H. E. functionality for “Corruption and Legitimacy: An Institutional Economic Development and Growth". In: (Dys)- Perspective.” In: Corruption and Legitimacy. H. E. functionalities of Corruption, Debiel and Garwich Bakker and N. G. S. Nordholt (eds.). Amsterdam, 2000, (eds.). p. 24. 49 Nye, Joseph. “Corruption and Political 68 Heidenheimer, A. J. Political Corruption: Readings Development”. In: Political Corruption, Heidenheimer in Comparative Analysis. New York, 1970, p. 479. and Johnston.

39 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

69 Nye, Joseph. “Corruption and Political Reached Earth-shaking Proportions, Prompting Development”. In: Political Corruption, Heidenheimer Herculean International Efforts to Clear Out the and Johnston, p.288. Muck”. In: Time Magazine International. 22th June 70 Myrdal, Gunnar. “Corruption as a Hindrance to 1998. Modernization in South Asia”. In: Political Corruption, 89 Walsh, James. “A World War on Bribery”. In: Time Heidenheimer and Johnston. Magazine International. 71 Nye, Joseph. “Corruption and Political 90 Hutchcroft, Paul D. “The Politics of Privilege”. In: Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis”. In: Political Political Corruption, Heidenheimer and Johnston, Corruption, Heidenheimer and Johnston,p. 289. pp. 49f. 72 Crozier, Brian. The Morning After: A Study of 91 Paraphrased by Evans, Peter. Embedded Independence. London, 1963, p. 62, 74. Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. 73 Huntington, Samuel. “Modernization and Princeton University Press, 1995, p.24. Corruption”. In: Political Corruption, Heidenheimer 92 Tanzi, Vito. “Corruption around the World: Causes, and Johnston, p. 256. Consequences, Scope, and Cures”. In: IMF Working 74 Nye, Joseph. “Corruption and Political Paper, May 1998. Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis”. In: Political 93 Foucault, Michel. Power/ Knowledge: Selected Corruption, Heidenheimer and Johnston. Interviews and other Writings 1972-1977. Colin Gordon 75 Shils, Edward. “Political development in the New (ed.). Brighton, Harvester, 1980, p. 133. States”. In: Comparative Studies in Society and 94 Sampson, Steven. “Integrity Warriors: Global History. Vol 2., No.3., 1960, p.279. Morality and the Anti-Corruption Movement in the 76 Leff, Nathaniel. “Economic Development through Balkans”. In: Bureaucratic Corruption”. In: Political Corruption, Corruption, Haller and Shore (eds.),, pp. 105ff. Heidenheimer and Johnston, p.310. 95 Shore, Cris and Haller, Dieter. “Introduction”. In: 77 Ibid., p. 310. Corruption, Haller and Shore (eds.), p.19. 78 Gupta, Akhil “Narrating the State of Corruption”. In: 96 Bello, Walden. “ From Melbourne to Prague: the Corruption, Haller and Shore (eds.). Struggle for a Deglobalized World”. Talk delivered at 79 Gluckman, Max. Customs and Conflict in Africa. a series of engagements on the occasion of Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1955, p. 135. demonstrations against the World Economic Forum 80 Lovell, David. “Corruption as a Transitional (Davos) in Melbourne, Australia, 6-10 September Phenomenon”. In: Corruption, Haller and Shore (eds.), 2000., p.78ff. http://www.ratical.org/co-globalize/WB0900.html#p2 81 Huntington, Samuel. “Political Order in Changing ,accessed 27.4.2014. Societies”. Yale University Press, 1968. “Modernization 97 “The new age of crony capitalism”. The Economist. and Corruption”. In: Political Corruption, March 15th-21st, 2014, p. 11; 54-55. Heidenheimer and Johnston, p.254. 98 “The new age of crony capitalism”. The Economist. 82 Lovell, David. “Corruption as a Transitional March 15th-21st, 2014, p. 11; 54-55. Phenomenon”. In: Corruption, Haller and Shore (eds.), 99 Sampson, Steven. “Integrity Warriors”. In: p.78. Corruption, Haller and Shore (eds.), pp. 105ff. 83 Huntington, Samuel. “Modernization and 100 Mason, Paul. Why it’s still kicking off everywhere: Corruption”. In: Political Corruption, Heidenheimer The new global revolutions. Verson, 2nd ed., 2013. and Johnston,p.254. 101 Saxer, Marc. “Building the Good Society in 84 Jakobi, Anja P. “The Changing Global Norm of Anti- Thailand. Resolving transformation conflict through Corruption: from bad business to bad government”. inclusive compromise”. FES Thailand study, October In: Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft. 2014. http://library.fes.de/pdf- 85 Quah, Jon S.T. “Responses to Corruption in Asian files/bueros/thailand/10974-20141030.pdf , accessed Societies”. In: Political Corruption, Heidenheimer and 16.12.2014. Johnston, p. 515. 102 Transparency International Corruption perception 86 Eigen, Peter. “Field Reports: Combatting Corruption Index 2014, around the World”. In: Journal of Democracy. Vol. 7, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results No.1, p. 158-68. accessed 16.12.2014. 87 Henderson, K.E. “Corruption: What can be done 103 Phongpaichit, Pasuk/ Piriyarangsan, Sungsidh. about it?”. In Demokratizatsiya. Vol. 6, No. 4, 1998. As „Corruption & Democracy in Thailand“, Silkworm cited Books, Bangkok, second edition, 1996. in Lovell, David. ”Corruption as a Transitional 104 Saxer, Marc. “In the Vertigo of Change. How to Phenomenon”. In: Corruption, Haller and Shore (eds.), resolve the Political Crisis”. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung p.70. Thailand, 88 Wolf, Martin. “Corruption in the spotlight”. In: Bangkok 2011. Financial Times. 16th Sept. 1997; Walsh, James. “A World War on Bribery: The Costs of Corruption Have

40 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

105 Callahan William A. “Imagining Democracy: forced to step aside Senate Speaker faces Reading "the Events of May" in Thailand”, Institute of impeachment probe”. Bangkok Post. 21.3.2014. Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.1998, pp. 124 http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/400953/ 106 General Sonthi Boonyaratglin. TV address. senate-speaker-nikhom-wairatpanich-ousted-to- 20.9.2014, face-impeachment-trial ; The Election Commission is http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Thai_coup_d%27% looking into the violation of election law by using C3%A9tat state resources for election campaigns; Laohong, 107 Kaemala. “Constitutional amendment and the King-oua and Bangprapa, Monkol . “EC tables talks guardians of Thai democracy – Part 1: Constitutional on broken laws”. Bangkok Post. 14.3.2014. Court and constitutional amendment”. http://www.ww.bangkokpost.net/news/local/399796 http://asiancorrespondent.com/113100/constitutiona /ec-tables-talks-on-broken-laws , all accessed -amendment-and-guardians- 21.4.2014. of-thai-democracy-part-1/ ,accessed 21.4.2014. 111 Wongsatayanont, Chanon and Chan, Cattleya 108 Constitutional , Constitution.net, and Kurz, Sopaporn. “Thai protests against amnesty International IDEA, bill spread to other countries”, The Nation, 9.11.2013, http://www.constitutionnet.org/country/constitutiona http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/Thai- l-history-thailand ,accessed 21.4.2014. protests-against-amnesty-bill-spread-to-other- 109 Kaemala. “Constitutional amendment and the 30219115.html; Corr, Anders. “Election Boycott will guardians of Thai democracy – Part 1: Constitutional Weaken Thailand’s Democrat Party and the PDRC”, Court and constitutional amendment”. Journal of Political Risk, Vol. 1, No. 8, December 2013, http://asiancorrespondent.com/113100/constitutiona http://www.jpolrisk.com/election-boycott-will- -amendment-and-guardians- weaken-thailands-democrat-party-and-the-pdrc/ of- thai-democracy-part-1/ ,accessed 21.4.2014. ,accessed 6.5.2014. 110 In the “rice pledging” case, the Anti-Corruption 112 Kanchanalak, Pornpimol. “Thailand is swerving Commission (NACC) investigates malfeasance in towards the edge of a moral, political precipice”. The office charges against the Prime Minister. The Nation, 20.3.2014, Constitution Court (CC) ruled the legislative bill to http://www.nationmultimedia.com/opinion/Thailand- empower the Finance Ministry to seek two trillion baht is-swerving-towards-the-edge-of-a-moral-p- in loans for infrastructure development projects 30229607.html ; Sophie Poulsen. “Moral Decline in violated Art. 160 and 170 Charter for lacking details Thailand? Why the Government Always get it and accountability. B2trln Infrastructure bill ruled Wrong?”. Chiang Mai City News, 19.7.2013, unconstitutional”. Bangkok Post. 12.3.2014, http://www.chiangmaicitynews.com/news.php?id=2 http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/399515/ 093 ,all accessed 24.4.2014. constitution-court-rules-against-b2-trillion-transport- 113 Aphornsuvan, Thanet. Buddhist cosmology and infrastructure-bill ; The CC ruled the amendment of the genesis of Thai political discourse, in, 2008: Art. 190 Charter (ratification of international treaties) Religion and democracy in Thailand, edited by violated Art. 68 Charter for bypassing the legislature, Imtiyaz Yusuf and Canan Atilgan, Bangkok: Konrad- “Constitutional Court rules against Article 190 Adenauer-Stiftung, 2008. amendment bill”. The Nation. 8.1.2014. 114 Sattayanurak, Saichol. “The Construction of http://www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/C Mainstream Thought on ‘Thainess’ and the ‘Truth’ onstitutional-Court-rules-against-Article-190-ame- Constructed by ‘Thainess’”, 30223777.html ; Chomchuen, Warangkana. “Thai http://www.fringer.org/wp-content/writings/thainess- Court Rules Against Constitution Amendment”. Wall eng.pdf accessed 16.12.2014. Street Journal. 20.11.2013. 115 Dawson, Alan. “The BIG STORY: Happy New http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270 Year?”. Bangkok Post, 20.4.2014. 2303653004579209584204486364 ; “Constitution Court http://www.bangkokpost.com/lite/topstories/405721/ throws out Section 190 amendment”. Bangkok Post. the-big-story-happy-new-year ,accessed 21.4.2014. 8.1.2014. 116 Nanuam, Wassana and Bangprapa, Mongkol. http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/388593/c “Prayuth takes aim at TV monarchy debate”. onstitution-court-throws-out-section-190-amendment Bangkok Post, 20.3.2013. ; http://www.bangkokpost.com/lite/local/341395/pray After the CC ruled the Amendment to make the uth-takes-aim-at-tv-monarchy-debate ,accessed Senate fully elected violated Art. 68 Charter by 21.4.2014. “destroying checks and balances”, the NACC 117 Phasuk, Sunai as cited in Samabuddhi, Kultida: National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) pressed “Call to stop lese majeste witch hunts. Rights Group charges against 308 former MPs and senators of warns of massacre risk”. Bangkok Post. 20.4.2014. misconduct in connection with the charter http://www.bangkokpost.com/lite/topstories/405686/ amendment and recommended to impeach the call-to-stop-lese-majeste-witch-hunts ,accessed Senate Speaker for abuse of authority, ”Nikhom 22.4.2014.

41 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

118 Philip, Bruno. “Redshirts in Isan, North-East Thailand, controversial-about-nitirats-constitution-draft/ :Aim keep Faith with Benefactor Thaksin”. The Guardian, Sinpeng. “Nitirat: monarchy, constitution and 24.3.2014. democracy”. New Mandala. 17.10.2011. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/24/th http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2011/10 ailand-redshirt-movement-isan-activists ,accessed /17/nitirat-monarchy-constitution-and-democracy/ 21.4.2014. ,all accessed 24.4.2014. 119 Samabuddhi, Kultida and Jikkham, Patsara. 127 Tejapera, Kasian et al, Manifesto of the Assembly “Monarchists vow to fight ‘armed threat’”. Bangkok for the Defence of Democracy, 10.12.2013, Post, 21.4.2014. http://prachatai.com/quote/2013/12/50353 http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/405808/m accessed 7.5.2014. onarchists-vow-to-fight-armed-threat ,accessed 128 Vanijaka, Voranai. “The United Fiefdoms of Siam”. 21.4.2014. Bangkok Post, 6.3.2014, 120 Winichakul, Thongchai. “The ‘germs’: The reds’ http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/3984 infection of the Thai political body”. New Mandala, 78/the-united-fiefdoms-of-siam ,accessed 24.4.2014. posted May, 2010, 129 Saxer, Marc. “How Thailand’s Middle Class Rage http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2010/05 Threatens Democracy”. First published in New /03/thongchai-winichakul-on-the-red-germs/ Mandala. 21.1.2014, ,accessed 21.4.2014. http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/01 121 “Unwelcome Rise of Hatred”. Bangkok Post. /21/middle-class-rage-threatens-democracy/ 22.4.2014, ,accessed 25.4.2014. http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/4059 130 Saxer, Marc. “How Thailand’s Middle Class Rage 82/unwelcome-rise-of-hatred ,accessed 22.4.2014. Threatens Democracy”. First published in New 122 Vanijaka, Voranai. “Purging the Thaksin Regime”. Mandala. 21.1.2014, Bangkok Post. 12.12.2013, http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2014/01 http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/3844 /21/middle-class-rage-threatens-democracy/ 45/purging-the-thaksin-regime accessed 22.4.2014. ,accessed 25.4.2014. 123 “Dangerous nonsense about parliamentary 131 Saxer, Marc. „In the vertigo of change. How to dictatorship”. Bangkok Post. 10.12.2013, resolve Thailand’s transformation crisis, openworlds, http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/3840 Bangkok, 2014. http://openworlds.in.th/wp- 22/dangerous-nonsense-about-parliamentary- content/uploads/2014/12/In-the-Vertigo-of- dictatorship Change.pdf accessed 19.12.2014. , accessed 22.4.2014. 132 Walker, Andrew. Thailand’s political peasants: 124 Phusadee, Arunmas. “Graftbusters set to pitch Power in the modern rural economy. University of proposals”. Bangkok Post, 2.4.2014, Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, 2012; Mishra, http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/news/402937 Pankaj. From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt Against /graftbusters-set-to-pitch-proposals accessed the West and the Remaking of Asia. Picador, 2013. 24.4.2014. 133 Saxer, Marc. “Deepen democratization to end 125 Pathom, Sangwongwanich. “TDRI urges budget crisis”, Bangkok Post, 2.5.2014, audit, transparency”. Bangkok Post , 24.2.2014, http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/4077 http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/news/396776 44/deepen-democratisation-to-end-crisis accessed /tdri-urges-budget-audit-transparency; Erich Parpart. 7.5.2014. “Amid clamour for 'reform', TDRI elicits practical 134 McCargo, Duncan. “The Thai Malaise”. Foreign suggestions to tackle economic, political woes”. The Policy. 18.2.2014, Nation, 3.3.2014, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/02/18/th http://www.nationmultimedia.com/business/Amid- e_thai_malaise , Paul Chambers, “Thailand in 2014: A clamour-for-reform-TDRI-elicits-practical-sug- Democracy Endangered by Juristocracy?”. 3 April 30228167.html ; Pathom, Sangwongwanich. “Appeal 2014, http://www.fairobserver.com/article/thailand- for budget watchdog New body would fight graft, democracy-endangered-juristocracy-69712 , both say academics”. Bangkok Post, 10.4.2014, accessed 17.4.2014. http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/news/404222 135 Saxer, Marc. “Deepen democratization to end /appeal-for-budget-watchdog ,all accessed crisis”. 24.4.2014. 136 Pitsuwan, Surin. “Serious reform: A seven-point 126 Outline of Nitirat's Constitution Draft, proposal”, Bangkok Post, 5.5.2014, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1iqT_D4a7cs4 http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/4081 74vYV7z8VFYXpfsvm50ZJHP42LuM0q1Q/edit?pli=1 ; 52/serious-reform-a-seven-point-proposal accessed Prach, Panchakunathorn. “Thailand: What’s so 7.5.2014. controversial about Nitirat’s constitution draft?”. Siam 137 "ค ำวินิจฉัยศำลรัฐธรรมนูญที่ 15–18/2556" [Constitutional Court Voices Blog. 2.2.2012, Decision No. 15–18/2556] (PDF). Government Gazette http://asiancorrespondent.com/75049/whats-so-

42 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

(in Thai) (Bangkok: Cabinet Secretariat) 131 (5 A): 1– 150 Khan, Mushtaq. “Patron-Client Networks and the 132. Economic Effects of Corruption in Asia”. In: Political 138 Bangprapa, Mongkol. “Panel offers preview of Corruption, Heidenheimer and Johnston. reform ideas - NRC crafts 20-year vision at seminar”, 151 Johnston, Michael. Corruption, Contention and Bangkok Post, 11.11.2014 Reform, p. 1ff. Similar Acemoglu, Daron and http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/442569/ Robinson, James A. Why Nations Fail. panel-offers-preview-of-reform-ideas 152 Johnston, Michael. Corruption, Contention and Pawakapan, Puangthong. “The Thai junta’s anti- Reform, pp. 4f. majoritarian rule” Aljazeera. 22.8.2014, 153 Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the Commons: The http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/8/thaila Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. New nd-prayuthchanochademocracypoliticalreforms.html York, Cambridge University Press, 1990. As cited in Saiyasombut, Saksith. “Thailand’s post-coup Johnston, Michael: Corruption, Contention and constitution: Familiar faces, uncharted territory “, Reform, p. 5. Asiancorrespondent. 5.11.2014. 154 Johnston, Michael. Corruption, Contention and http://asiancorrespondent.com/127996/thailands- Reform, p. 4. post-coup-constitution-drafting-familiar-faces- 155 Sampson, Steven. “Integrity Warriors”. In: uncharted-territory/ Corruption, Haller and Shore (eds.), p.113. “Changing of the garb”. The Economist. 2.10.2014, 156 Ibid., pp. 105, 110. http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/10/t 157 Ibid., p. 110. hailands-political-future all accessed 17.12.2014. 158 Saxer, Marc. “How can Thailand overcome its 139 UNODC. “United Nations Convention against transformation crisis? A strategy for democratic Corruption, Convention highlights”. change”. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/con Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Thailand, Bangkok 2012. vention-highlights.html#Criminalization ,accessed 159 Saxer, Marc. “How can Thailand overcome its 19.4.2014. transformation crisis?”. 140 Persson, A. , Rothstein B. and Teorell, J. "Why 160 Blom, Philipp. The Vertigo Years. Basic Books, 2010: Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Priestland, David. Merchant, Soldier, Sage. Collective Action Problem". Governance. Vol. 25, No. 161 Gareth Sweeney at the European Parliament DROI 4, 2012; Debiel, Tobias and Garwich, Andrea, (eds.). Committee‘s workshop on “Corruption and human “(Dys)-functionalities of corruption”. Johnston, rights in third countries”. Michael. Corruption, Contention and Reform. The http://www.transparencyinternational.eu/2013/03/shi Power of Deep Democratization. Cambridge, fting-perspectives-corruption-is-a-human-rights-issue/ Cambridge University Press, 2014. ,accessed 27.4.2014. 141 Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James A. Why 162 Saxer. Marc. The Economy of Tomorrow. How to Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and produce socially just, resilient, and green dynamic Poverty. 1st ed. New York, Crown Publishers, 2012, p. growth for a Good Society. Economy of Tomorrow 107. series, FES Thailand, 2nd edition, December 2013, 142 Sampson, Steven. “Integrity Warriors”. In: http://library.fes.de/pdf- Corruption, Haller and Shore (eds.), p.127. files/bueros/thailand/10550.pdf accessed 5.5.2014. 143 Fukuyama, Francis. The Origins of Political Order, p. 251. 144 Saxer, Marc. “Deepen democratisation to end crisis”. Bangkok Post. 2.5.2014, http://m.bangkokpost.com/opinion/407744 ,accessed 2.5.2014. 145 Johnston, Michael. Corruption, Contention and Reform, pp. 3f. 146 Lovell, David. ”Corruption as a Transitional Phenomenon”. In: Corruption, Haller and Shore (eds.), p.79.

147 Persson, A. , Rothstein B. and Teorell, J. "Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail ". In: Governance. 148 Khan, Mushtaq. “Patron-Client Networks and the Economic Effects of Corruption in Asia”. In: Political Corruption, Heidenheimer and Johnston. 149 Johnston, Michael. “Corruption, Contention and Reform”, p. 29.

43 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

About the author

Marc Saxer is the Resident Director Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Bangkok, Thailand Thanapoom Tower, 23rd Fl. and the founding member of the ‘Asian- 1550 New Petchburi Road, European’ Economy of Tomorrow project Makkasan, Ratchathewi Bangkok 10400 Responsible: Marc Saxer, Resident Director Tel.: +66-2652-7178/9 | Fax: +66-2652-7180 www.fes-thailand.org

Disclaimer The views expressed in this publication are not necessarily those of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung or of the organization for which the author works. Commercial use of all media published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is not permitted without the written consent of the FES.

44