HUMANITARIAN ACCESS TEAM (HAT) PRELIMINARY IMPACT ASSESSMENT: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern

MARCH 2019 Executive Summary

The near total collapse of Ahrar al-Sham at the hands of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the subsequent creation of the HTS-affiliated Salvation Government (SG) have greatly complicated service provision in opposition- controlled northwestern Syria. Since its emergence in late-2017, the SG has systematically consumed two rival local administrations, the HTS-affiliated General Administration for Services (GAS) and the Ahrar al-Sham-affiliated General Commission for Service Management (GCS). It also sought to expand its influence and unify governance structures, including judicial and service provision directorates, across the opposition-controlled northwest. The SG’s influence did not exceed the limits of HTS-controlled communities, until HTS launched a military campaign targeting National Liberation front-held areas in Idleb and western Aleppo in January 2019, leading to widespread expulsion of NLF combatants and the consolidation of control under the SG.

The SG’s expansion poses substantial and direct challenges to the internationally supported humanitarian response. When assessing the impact of this development however, one must recall three important dimensions. First, and like HTS’s GAS governance model, the SG targets revenue-generating services and directorates, of which very few are funded by international actors. Second, outside of a few isolated incidents, the SG has tended to avoid confrontation with humanitarian agencies and imposed no restrictions, impediments, or taxes on the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Third, local councils have maintained some autonomy, and in many cases, the SG’s Ministry of Local Administration and Services (MLAS) has not altered council structures or membership, neither has it interfered with project proposals, needs assessments, or relief activities.

This paper examines the impact of the SG’s control over humanitarian activities, local councils, security and judicial entities, and administrative and service provision institutions. To better understand the administrative and governance environment prior to July 2017, readers are strongly advised to read Consolidation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s Control in Opposition-controlled Northwest Syria, published in September 2017. Current Situation

Recent clashes between HTS and the NLF began on December 28 after HTS accused NLF-member, Nourredine al-Zinki (NDZ) of killing four HTS fighters in Jabal Sheikh Barakat, in Daret Azza subdistrict. Although both NDZ and the NLF were quick to deny involvement, even signing an agreement with HTS to prevent any related clashes, HTS launched a campaign against NDZ in the western Aleppo countryside. By January 6, after heavy fighting, HTS had expelled NDZ and established full control over western Aleppo. Throughout the clashes, HTS employed the SG as a tool to undermine NDZ, and further expand its administrative control in formerly NDZ-held communities. At the start of clashes, HTS called on communities to reject NDZ’s presence and cede local governance and service authorities to the SG. Only Oweijel, in Atareb subdistrict, and Daret Azza, in Daret Azza subdistrict responded to this call immediately, but by January 6 all other communities formerly under NDZ control had ceded authority over local governance and service provision to the SG.

Following the expulsion NDZ, HTS turned its attention to the south. HTS threatened to launch similar operations against the NLF-affiliated Ahrar al-Sham and Suqour al-Sham in Idleb and northern Hama if the NLF refused to dissolve itself and cede all remaining administrative responsibilities to the SG. The NLF’s refusal was met with an offensive, and by January 9, HTS had expelled Ahrar al-Sham from the al-Ghab Plains in northern Hama. After major losses for NDZ and Ahrar al-Sham, and with remaining NLF forces completely isolated, the NLF leadership signed a ceasefire agreement with HTS. Though the NLF was not forced to dissolve itself as part of the agreement, it was forced to abandon many fixed military positions in communities across Idleb (but kept positions on frontlines). The NLF was also forced to cede remaining administrative responsibilities to the SG.

Less than a week after the HTS-NLF ceasefire agreement, the HTS media outlet Amjad released an interview with the commander of HTS, Abu Mohamad al-Jolani. During the interview al-Jolani explained the reasons for the recent fighting and HTS’ plans moving forward, including the formation of a unified military council and an expanded role for the SG. Though al-Jolani did not provide details on the unified military council proposal, a February 2 Hurras al-Deen statement objecting to the initiative offered some insight. According to this statement, the proposal envisioned a council, led by a Faylaq al-Sham or a defected Syrian Arab Army commander, which would oversee compliance with the Sochi demilitarized zone (DMZ) agreement, including restoration of transit along the M5 and M4 highways.

The Salvation Government

The SG, based in Idleb city, is currently the leading governance body and service provision body in areas falling outside of Government of Syria control in northwestern Syria. Though the SG maintains it is a neutral entity, unaffiliated with HTS or any other armed faction, the SG is in fact an HTS affiliate and an important element of HTS’ efforts to consolidate control.

Established in November 2017, the SG emerged in the wake of Ahrar al-Sham’s near total collapse at the hands of HTS. After a week of intense fighting in mid-July, HTS expelled Ahrar al-Sham from dozens of communities across the northwest. Prior to the HTS campaign, HTS and Ahrar al-Sham had each maintained separate, competing revenue generating service provision bodies: HTS’s General Administration for Services (GAS), and Ahrar Al-Sham’s General Commission for Service Management (GCS). Though suffered a range of organizational issues and were often overruled by military commanders, they lent a civilian face to the management of the most lucrative assets under their control, to include electricity and cross-line/international border crossings. A financially, politically, and militarily weakened Ahrar al-Sham meant nearly all GCS assets were taken up by HTS’s GAS. Meanwhile, HTS further increased pressure on local councils previously affiliated with Ahrar al-Sham and its administration.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 2 Following the July 2017 campaign, HTS immediately sought to establish a friendly governance body to cement its role in the civilian sphere. In late August 2017, the president of Idleb University, Dr. Mohammed al-Sheikh, convened local activists, notables, civil society actors and journalists to discuss the establishment of a neutral, alternative governance body with a view to creating a unified civilian and military opposition. Though attendees emphasized the meeting was unconnected to HTS, the rhetoric surrounding the event, its timing and objectives, as well as the opaque links between attendees and HTS indicate that even if it were not initiated by HTS, it was at least HTS approved.

The August meeting represented the first direct step towards the formation of the SG, with attendees agreeing on the formation of the Establishment Committee (EC).1 By September 11, the EC, headed by Dr.Bassam Suhyoun, announced the formation of a constituent assembly to determine the structure of the SG, as well as the appointment of Dr. Mohammed al-Sheikh as the SG’s Prime Minister. By early November, the constituent assembly and Dr. al- Sheikh had concluded their work in coordination with the EC, and an 11 ministries were subsequently announced. Of note, the EC is still officially responsible for SG oversight and enjoys significant influence over several facets of SG operations, including appointees and personnel, administrative structure, and decision making.

The SG immediately assumed varying degrees of responsibility for bodies previously overseen by HTS. First, the GAS, which itself had recently taken over the GCS, was dissolved. The SG’s Ministry of Local Administration and Services (MLAS) subsequently assumed all GAS duties. HTS continues to control assets administered by the MLAS, but the MLAS is tasked with the day-to-day management of these assets and any associated policy development. Second, responsibility for the HTS court network, known as Dar al-Qada or the Higher Judicial Council, was transferred to the SG’s Ministry of Justice. Finally, HTS’ nascent police force, known previously as Islamic Police or al-Hisbah forces, was placed under the Ministry of Interior. Renamed under the SG as simply the Police Force, this move has proven largely superficial, as HTS continues to operate an extensive network of security and policing services superseding the limited authority enjoyed by the SG Police Force.

While these bodies represent a significant portion of the SG’s work, the organization has cooperated with HTS in repeated attempts to to expand its portfolio and usurp authority from remaining governance bodies and service provision administrations in the northwest, namely those under the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and the Idleb and Aleppo Provincial Councils. Ad-hoc and sector specific attempts will be discussed in detail in the following sections, though the first wide-ranging attempt to capture governance in opposition-controlled areas was made in mid-December 2017, when a number of local notables put forward an initiative to integrate the SG and the SIG. Though SG officials showed no objection to the initiative, SIG officials publicly rejected the initiative and stressed an unwillingness to deal with a government linked to terrorism. As a result, SG officials required the SIG to close all offices in northwest Syria within 72 hours, a demand that was eventually enforced by HTS security forces. SIG education, health, and local administration offices in Ma’ret An-Nua’man were subsequently closed, only reopening after the NLF seized control of Ma’ret An-Nua’man in late February. The second such attempt came in late July 2018, when al-Jolani offered the SIG and NLF seats in the EC in exchange for dissolving themselves. This offer, though made personally by al-Jolani, was swiftly rejected. The most recent attempt to consolidate the northwestern opposition happened earlier this month, with the emergence of the General Conference of the Syrian Revolution initiative. This initiative aims to establish a new governance body from the SG and SIG, but given its suspected links to the SG, has so far been rejected by the SIG.

The SG is currently in its second term, which began in December 2018 following a leadership shakeup and ministerial restructure, both of which were overseen by the EC. Of note, the number of ministries has been reduced from 11 to 9, after the Ministry of Agriculture was merged with the Ministry of Economy, and the Ministry of Housing and Construction was merged with the Ministry of Local Administration.

1.The EC consisted of 32 members and was initially known as the Civil Administration for the Liberated Areas.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 3 Ministry Current Minister Background Bachelor of Economics and 1 Prime Minister Fawaz Mahmoud Hilal Diploma of International Relations Ministry of Development and 2 Abdul Rahman Shamus Veterinary Doctor Humanitarian affairs (MDHA) Ministry of Local Administration 3 Muayed Al Hassan Mechanical Engineer and Services (MLAS)

4 The Ministry of Economy Mohammed Taha Al Ahmad Agricultural Engineer

5 Ministry of Health Ahmed Al-Jarrak Master of General Surgery

6 The Ministry of Education Abdul Hafeez Jawad Bachelor of Chemistry

7 The Higher Education Council Magdy Nasr El Hassany PhD in Agricultural Engineering

8 Ministry of Interior Ahmed Mohammed Latouf Bachelor of Law

9 Ministry of Justice MIbrahim Shasho PhD in Shari’a Studies Ministry of Awqaf (Religious 10 Muhaid Sahan Bachelor in in Shari’a Studies Endowments)

Table 1: Salvation Government ministries and leadership

Humanitarian Activities

Presently, three SG ministries have direct jurisdiction over humanitarian activities: the Ministry of Development and Humanitarian affairs (MDHA); the Ministry of Local Administration and Services (MLAS); and the Ministry of Economy (MoE). Despite their humanitarian mandates, none of these entities have issued any formal policy requiring humanitarian activities to be coordinated with the SG, neither have they endorsed any direct interference in local or international NGO operations.

The MDHA2 is nominally responsible for registering and overseeing humanitarian operations. As such, it is the successor to the now defunct Office of Humanitarian Organizations which fell under HTS’s General Administration for Services. In December 2017, the MDHA’s General Directorate of Organization Affairs, the predecessor of the HTS General Administration for Services Office of Humanitarian Organizations, called on representatives from humanitarian NGOs operating in northwest Syria to attend the “First Consultative Conference”. Contrary to expectations, MDHA officials did not present any SG policies relating to humanitarian activities, but rather sought suggestions from attendees on how best to register humanitarian NGOs and regulate their activities. Since then, the MDHA has not requested official registration from local or international humanitarian agencies, imposed no duties or taxes on humanitarian goods or deliveries, and neither has it implemented any regulations which restrict the work of relief organizations. This state of affairs has persisted until the present, with the MDHA stressing that humanitarian and health activities must remain neutral in the aftermath of HTS’s comprehensive expansion in January 2019. An MDHA statement on the matter also announced the establishment of Safety and Security department to provide safety updates to relief workers (see Annex I).

2. Originally known as the Ministry of Social Affairs and Displaced Persons when the SG was first established.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 4 The Ministry of Local Administration and Services (MLAS) manages local council affairs. Although the SG has successfully expanded its authority over local councils through the MLAS by using the threat of HTS intervention for any noncompliance, the MLAS has not sought greater influence over the humanitarian activities conducted by local councils. As such, local council humanitarian offices, also known as Relief Offices, continue to act as direct links between humanitarian agencies and local communities, providing independent services including needs assessments, beneficiary lists, local coordination, and project specifications. The MLAS also oversees the Electricity and Water Directorate, which has replaced the Office of Services falling under HTS’s General Administration for Services. Like its predecessor, the Electricity and Water Directorate is responsible for inquiring and inspecting the technical specifications of electricity and water projects, including those developed by humanitarian actors.

The Ministry of Economy (MoE) is mandated to formulate policies to bolster the local economy and mobilize financial resources. Its most notable interaction with humanitarian agencies has been through the Directorate of Grains and Supplies which, in December 2017, asked all organizations supporting local bakeries to visit the directorate in order to coordinate on new projects (see Annex II). Humanitarian organizations uniformly refused this invitation however, and no further attempts to coordinate or interfere have been reported.

Although the three SG ministries with direct jurisdiction over humanitarian activities have largely adopted a hands off approach to humanitarian operations, the growth of the SG and HTS poses serious challenges to humanitarian operations. The first arises from the SG’s mounting involvement in local councils generally. While this involvement usually precludes humanitarian activities, in most other matters local councils are openly coordinating with the SG. Thus, any direct humanitarian support to such councils is potentially furthering, albeit indirectly, the SG’s HTS endorsed governing agenda. One way to mitigate these challenges is to assess the level of level of autonomy through comprehensive screening procedures before entering into specific projects or financial transactions. In addition to the issue of local councils, humanitarian activities remains subject to the whims of SG and HTS security and judicial entities which will be discussed further in the following section.

Local Councils

Without a strong, unified opposition body, governance, administration and service administration has been overseen largely by community-based local councils. Structurally, most local councils are comprised of several offices, including some combination of the following offices: finance, services/projects, agriculture, education, relief/humanitarian, medical, media, public relations, and legal. Council members have most commonly been selected by a Shura council through irregular, closed voting.3 Notably, although armed factions are not directly represented on local councils, they often enjoy representation in area Shura councils, either through membership or through affiliated local notables. This affords significant indirect influence within local councils given Shura councils commonly inform the selection process for local council membership. Ordinarily, the role of local councils has been highly dependent on community dynamics and relations between notables. Where these dynamics have not given rise to major disputes, councils emerged as fairly representative, active and effective. Where local power brokers contested the role and activities of local councils however, local councils have been crippled by competition.

Local council structures, representation, affiliation, roles and activities continue to be determined by local dynamics, but the expansion of HTS and decline of rival bodies has witnessed efforts by the SG to expand its authority over local councils through the Ministry of Local Administration and Services (MLAS). Following the establishment of

3. Shura Councils are informal oversight bodies operating at the community level. Often they are made up of between 8 to 25 members, including local notables, armed faction representatives, local council members and prominent local activists.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 5 the SG in late 2017, the MLAS declared it held authority over all local councils, which were hitherto expected to function according to MLAS policy. Though many local councils ignored this declaration, those in areas where HTS was dominant largely complied. Among those that complied with the shift, the following changes have been observed. First, Shura councils were dissolved or marginalized, and the MLAS assumed local oversight roles. Shura councils were excluded from informing the formation, monitoring, and decision-making processes of local council activities. In some cases, as in al-Dana, Shura councils dominated by NLF-affiliated actors were dissolved entirely. Second, local councils were stripped of any decision-making power in the fields of electricity and water, and all revenue generated from these activities was transferred to the MLAS through the Electricity and Water directorates. Large projects concerned with the restoration of water or electricity services now reportedly require approval from the directorate responsible for the administration of that service under the MLAS. Thirdly, and despite the aforementioned changes, most local councils retain some level of autonomy. Indeed, in most cases, neither the MLAS nor any other SG ministry has altered council structures or membership, neither have they interfered with project proposals, needs assessments, or relief activities.

Following the January 2019 conflict, the MLAS sought to expand its authority over the local councils that ignored its earlier policy declaration in December 2017. In an effort to allay concerns of MLAS overreach, a delegation from the SG and its Establishment Committee (EC) visited several prominent noncompliant local councils to discuss current and future coordination. The delegation reportedly encouraged local officials to continue their usual activities, and stated the MLAS had no intention of instituting drastic changes. Despite these assurances, the reaction was overwhelmingly negative. Atareb’s local council elected to dissolve itself given it had been highly independent, enjoyed strong civilian leadership, and was strongly opposed to HTS and the SG.4 This prompted the MLAS to announce the formation of a temporary local council (see Annex IV). The local council, which had been closely linked to Ahrar al-Sham, also took the step of dissolving itself. Unlike in Atareb however, no temporary substitute council has yet been announced. The outcome in Ma’ret An-Nua’man was somewhat different given the local council has been a source of intense local competition amongst armed factions. Though it has published a statement reaffirming its independence, local reports indicate it has privately agreed to follow MLAS policy (see Annex V).

Service Provision

Prior to July 2017, service provision in northwest Syria was overseen by local councils and NGOs either independently or in coordination with service provision administrations. Amongst these administrations, the Ahrar Al-Sham-affiliated General Commission for Service Management (GCS) and the Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham General Administration for Services (GAS) were those most concerned with major revenue generating services, including electricity and water. Conversely, the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and Aleppo and Idleb Provincial Councils were largely restricted to revenue neutral and loss-generating services, including education and health. Meanwhile, the administration of sanitation, bakeries and civil and land registries was mixed. These services variously generate revenue or losses, and depending on the community in question, their administration was overseen independently by local councils and NGOs, or by the GAS-, GCS- or SIG-affiliated bodies. With the SG now having succeeded the GAS and the GCS, it has continued to focus primarily on revenue-based services, displaying only limited interest in revenue-neutral and cost-generating services.

Electricity and Water: Control over public electricity services, i.e. electricity provided through the existing national grid, was the focus of significant competition between the HTS and Ahrar al-Sham. In early 2017, Ahrar al-Sham

4. This prompted the SG to summon the former head of the local council to the SG police station in Atareb for unknown reasons.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 6 reached an agreement with the Syrian government to supply opposition-controlled areas of northwestern Syria with national electricity provided opposition factions allowed 40% of the electricity to reach Aleppo.5 Local, privately-owned generators also agreed to purchase national grid supplies from either HTS and Ahrar al-Sham. Moreover, as electricity is necessary for the provision of a wide range of essential services, local councils were happy to receive electricity national grid supplies administered HTS or Ahrar al-Sham in exchange for some degree of influence over council affairs. As such, public electricity provision not only served as a significant source of revenue for the two groups, it also supported their expanded influence across northwest Syria. The importance of the industry was a key factor in the HTS-Ahrar al-Sham conflict in July 2017, which was largely prompted by disagreements over the distribution of electrical power, pricing and revenue sharing in June of that year.6 Ahrar al- Sham affiliated administrations were subsumed by HTS’s GAS as a result of this conflict, meaning the GAS became the main provider of public electricity. This status has since been handed to the SG’s MLAS Electricity Directorate. On the ground, local communities and essential services were not adversely affected: locals continued to pay approximately 1500-2000 SYP per hour to owners of private generators, who would in turn share 70% of their revenue to the SG’s Electricity Directorate.

Public water supply is not a major revenue-generating service in northwest Syria. The vast majority of in the region are reliant on well water, which makes it relatively expensive to extract and difficult to monopolize. Moreover, the sector has historically received significant humanitarian support. Though some local councils and local businessmen have found ways to generate revenues from the distribution of well water, humanitarian support has allowed many to receive water for free. Although the SG’s Water Directorate collects revenues from local councils that oversee public water supply, the sector has not witnessed a great deal of interference, humanitarian activity in the sector has largely been uninterrupted, and there have been no significant.

Wheat: Prior to the July 2017 HTS campaign, the HTS, Ahrar al-Sham and the SIG, as well as independent wheat traders, were all involved in the provision of wheat. Similar to the system adopted by the Government of Syria prior to 2011, the SIG sought to purchase wheat crop, store it, and later re-market it at a subsidized price. Alternatively, HTS and Ahrar al-Sham, through the GAS and GSC respectively, would purchase wheat crop, store it, and sell it for a profit. While all three actors competed in this area, farmers prefered to sell crops to the SIG and Ahrar al-Sham given both were willing to pay a higher price, approximately $265 USD per ton. HTS reportedly paid $220 USD per ton at this time.

Following the July 2017 conflict, HTS seized GSC wheat silos in southern Saraqab, Saraqab subdistrict, and , subdistrict. These were then administered by the GAS until being turned over to the SG MoE Grains and Supplies Directorate in early 2018. Later, in November 4, HTS seized the SIG General Directorate for Cereals five main wheat storage facilities in Idleb.7The move led to the suspension of support for the SIG’s General Directorate for Cereals, and forced all mills and bakeries in receipt of SIG support to cease operations. Following the seizure, the SG’s Grains and Supplies Directorate established a committee to record the contents of the five facilities and, with support from HTS, it confiscated all SIG General Directorate for Cereals funds kept in local hawala offices. To date, the SG has yet to provide an explanation for the seizure of the facilities and funds.

Civil and Land Registries: Prior to the July 2017 HTS campaign, civil and land registry offices functioned across several networks. In Idleb and Aleppo, two separate provincial civil registry directorates oversaw approximately a dozen civil registry offices. While both directorates received external support which allowed them to operate

5. Of note, as the agreement was aimed at providing electricity to hospitals, schools and public services, this agreement is known locally as the humanitarian power line. 6. Of note, local sources reported that Ahrar al-Sham proposed 1000 SYP per amp while HTS imposed 2500 SYP. 7. The five SIG General Directorate for Cereals facilities seized were the Idleb grains center, Ra’a grains center, Ma’arrat Tamasrin mill, Kafir bakery, and the general directorate headquarters in Idleb city.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 7 largely independent of any service provision administration, the directorates frequently cooperated with the Idleb and Aleppo provincial councils, Idleb and Aleppo Free Syrian Police commands, and various non-HTS courts. That said, individual provincial civil registry directorate offices were frequently the subject of competition between the GSA, GCS, and SIG (depending on community dynamics in a given area). During this period, HTS also operated nearly half a dozen civil and land registry offices, either as standalone offices or out of HTS courts. Several civil and registry offices were also managed independently, and continued to coordinate with the Government of Syria upon issuance of civil registry documents.

In late 2018, and after months of pressure from HTS, the Idleb Provincial Civil Registry Directorate was integrated into the Directorate of Civil Registries within the SG MLAS. Following integration with the SG, civil registry offices were forced to implement several changes. First, all office documents and stamps were rebranded to reflect their affiliation with the SG. Second, all offices were forced to require or increase fees for services rendered. For example, the fee for registering a power of attorney was raised from approximately $15 USD to approximately $100 USD. And finally, all offices were required to send all revenues to the Directorate of Civil Registries, which in turn supports office operating costs.

Education Services: As a largely revenue neutral or loss-generating service, the SG’s interference in education has largely been limited to the higher education sector. INGOs, NGOs, and the SIG Ministry of Education have therefore been able to continue providing support to schools in northwest Syria without any significant interruption. The SG has even allowed teachers to receive salaries from the GoS Ministry of Education, and some schools are permitted to teach a modified GoS curriculum.8 In higher education however, the SG has taken a number of steps to direct university activities. For instance, shortly after it was formed, the SG ordered SIG-affiliated Free Aleppo University to place itself under the authority of the SG’s Idleb Higher Education Council.9 After the Free Aleppo University refused, HTS forcibly closed the university’s headquarters in al-Dana and an associated institute in neighboring . The Free Aleppo University subsequently moved its headquarters to al-Atareb and resumed normal operations.

The conclusion of HTS’s January campaign has witnessed the renewed application of pressure on the Free Aleppo University and other higher education institutions by the SG. First, on January 12, the Idleb Higher Education Council issued a directive suspending exams at all unlicensed private universities, including the International Rescue University, al-Rayan International University, Aram University of Science, Syrian Medical University, and the Sun of Hearts University (see Annex VII). A week later, the Council went a step further, requiring the immediate closure of all universities operating outside of SG administrative structures in a directive issued on January 20. Then, on January 22, the council unilaterally issued a directive stating that the Free Aleppo University and affiliated institutes were now part of the SG-affiliated Aleppo Al-Shahba University. The Free Aleppo University’s administration and student union refused to comply with the directive, and announced their intention to continue normal operations. The twin refusals were reportedly formulated following several meetings between SIG leadership, Free Aleppo University administrators in Al-Atareb and Bashaaqteen, and staff and students at Free Aleppo University institutes in Al-Anjara in Aleppo, and Kafr Takhareem and Ma’rat Al-Numan in Idleb.

Health Services: INGOs, NGOs, and the SIG Ministry of Health have been able to continue providing support to clinics and hospitals in northwest Syria without any significant interference. That said, the SG Ministry of Health (MoH) has focused on regulating pharmacies. In November 2017, the MoH issued a directive requiring all unlicensed pharmacies to register with the ministry (see Annex VIII). Since this directive was issued, the MoH, with

8. Most schools in opposition-controlled northwest Syria use the modified-GoS curriculum developed by the SIG’s MoE. 9. In addition to two main public universities in opposition-controlled northwest Syria, there are more than By January 27, the Idleb Higher Education Council issued another directive requiring the immediate closure of all unlicensed private universities operating outside of SSG administrative structures while referring its staff to judiciary procedure.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 8 HTS enforcement support, has reportedly closed more than 100 pharmacies for noncompliance. Local sources report that, in addition, to being closed temporarily, noncompliant pharmacies are required to pay a $500 USD fine (in addition to standard registration fees).

International donors have suspended support for the health directorates in opposition-controlled northwest Syria following the conclusion of the recent HTS campaign. The number of hospitals and medical centers for which support has been suspended is estimated as numbering 33 in Idleb, 9 in Hama, and 11 in western Aleppo. Moreover, several humanitarian organizations, including SAMS and Syria Relief have reportedly suspended support for numerous medical points, including the Ma’rat al-Nu’man Health Center, which serves more than 10,000 people.10

Security and Judicial Entities

Prior to July 2017, security and judicial entities were overseen by various bodies. Given security services were operated by HTS, NLF, the Free Syrian Police (FSP), and local security battalions, the courts and other judicial entities were administered through two parallel systems: the Ahrar Al-Sham-affiliated Islamic Commission, and the HTS-affiliated Dar Al-Qadda’. Generally, the presiding security or judicial body in a given area was determined by the most influential armed faction, but in communities where armed faction competition was especially high, such as Saraqeb, Ma’ret An-Nua’man and Kafer Nobul, several competing security services and judicial bodies were often present. Though more mixed pictures often made it difficult to determine local dynamics and influence, it provided humanitarian and stability actors scope to avoid interaction with HTS in the event of security incidents or a need for judicial recourse.

Following the July 2017 HTS campaign, HTS immediately suspended Islamic Commision courts. While most remained closed, a few were reopened and integrated into the HTS-affiliated Dar Al-Qadda’ court system, which itself became a fundamental part of the SG’s Ministry of Justice. Ahrar al-Sham security forces were also expelled from many areas, and FSP stations throughout Idleb and Aleppo also came under increased HTS pressure, forcing some stations to suspend operations. With the SG’s Ministry of Justice having consolidated control over both the judiciary and the security apparatus, several important changes have been observed. First, funding for the judicial system has been reduced significantly. This has led to a decrease in the number of courts, with now only one court present in each district, as well as lower staff salaries, which have dropped by as much as 30% in some locations. Second, there is greater centralization, as small cases are overseen by district courts, while larger cases are increasingly referred directly to the central court in Idleb city. Third, trained judges have increasingly been replaced by Sharia judges. Fourth, court enforcement officers have been incorporated into the SG’s Ministry of Interior, with the majority of orders now carried out by SG police.

Movement and Trade Routes Prior to the July 2017 conflict, both HTS and Ahrar al-Sham operated crossings in areas under their control. However, whilst Ahrar Sham had de facto control over international crossings with Turkey, including the commercial crossing at Bab al-Hawa and humanitarian crossings at Atma and Khirbet al-Jawz, HTS oversaw the majority of cross-line crossings and smuggling routes with neighboring GoS areas.

10. Of note, GIZ, the German development agency, temporarily suspended its support to health services in the northwest. This support was restored in mid-Feburary 2019.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 9 Control over these crossings changed as a result of HTS’s July 2017 campaign, which led to the expulsion of Ahrar al-Sham from Bab al-Hawa, Atma, and Khirbet al-Jawz. The three crossings in these locations nevertheless maintained much the same civil administration, which remained in close contact with their counterparts on the Turkish side. Indeed, HTS’s retention of the civil administration at international border crossings is regarded as a key factor in Turkey’s decision to keep the crossings open. Meanwhile, in early 2018, NDZ established two cross- line crossings with GoS- and Euphrates Shield-held areas in Aleppo, namely in al-Ghazaweyeh, in Daret Azza subdistrict, and al-Mansoura, in Jebel Seman subdistrict.11 The subsequent flow of fuel and gasoline through the al-Ghazaweyeh crossing quickly triggered a significant price reduction across the northwest, bringing NDZ into increasing conflict with HTS.12 After several attempts to seize control of NDZ-administered crossings, HTS finally succeeded in taking these sites in its recent January 2019 campaign.13

At present, northwestern Syria has operational and financially lucrative cross-border and cross-line trade routes. Markets in Idleb are functional, local procurement for humanitarian interventions remains feasible, and there is a robust and largely independent local business community. Despite an increase in cross-line points across the opposition-controlled northwest, commercial and humanitarian access flows primarily through the Syria—Turkey Bab al-Hawa border crossing. Bab al-Hawa is currently controlled by HTS, and permits humanitarian access, commodity trade, and limited civilian transit. Taxes and fees are imposed on commercial shipping. Of important note, by late September 2018, the SG’s Prime Minister announced that taxes imposed on trucks transporting humanitarian commodities were to be suspended from 1st October 2018 (see Annex IX). It is understood that this initiative reinforced serious concerns among humanitarian agencies and donors using the Bab al-Hawa border crossing for relief shipments. However, to better understand the taxes removed by SG, it is important to understand the difference between taxes imposed on commercial trucks and these which were imposed on humanitarian ones.

Commercial trucks are taxed in two ways: 1) a custom tax, imposed by the Customs Department of Bab al-Hawa and valued according to the type and quantity of commodities; 2) a shipping tax, imposed by the Maktab al- Dor office (roughly, Office of Line Coordination). These fees are imposed on the shipping company contracted by the relevant trading company, with tax costs reportedly ranging between 5 to 25 USD, depending on the destination. Though Humanitarian agencies have been exempt from paying any tax or fees at the border, shipping companies continued to pay the shipping tax regardless of the type of the shipment (commercial or humanitarian) until a decision was made by the SG to cancel the shipping tax for trucks carrying humanitarian commodities.14 It is important to mention that shipping taxes were imposed prior to HTS control of Bab al-Hawa in 2017 and also known to be used in other border crossings such as Bab al-Salama in northern Aleppo countryside.

11. Al-Ghazaweyeh cross-line in Afrin subdistrict established in late March 2018 and used for civilian transit and commodity trade, including fuel and gasoline towards NDZ areas in Daret Azza subdistrict. al-Mansoura cross-line, established in July 2018 based on an agreement between GoS-affiliated businessmen and NZD to allow factory workers to cross to factories in al-Mansoura area. 12. The price of diesel fuel has reportedly fell from 600 lira to 350 SYP per liter. 13. HTS launched a military campaign against NDZ in late February 2018 that lasted for 100 days before both parties signed a ceasefire agreement. 14. removing shipping taxes for humanitarian trucks believed to be is reflected in a lower shipping cost for humanitarian commodities.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 10 Recommendations AA Implement additional research and vetting procedures for partners, service providers, hawalas, and vendors that include contextual and relational assessments before engaging in defined financial transactions. Such measures will help to ensure that none of the individuals or organizations with which NGOs enter financial transactions are ineligible or prohibited by the US, UK, EU, UN, and other governments.

AA Recognizing differences in modalities, it is necessary to conduct market chain assessments for both locally procured and cross-border assistance to ensure that taxes and fees aren’t paid to HTS. This will include analysis of border crossings, trade routes and checkpoints, as well as the relationships of hawala agents, and commodity sellers.

AA Ensure needs assessments, beneficiary lists, and on-site distribution monitoring are conducted by direct staff members, partners, or third party monitors.

AA Ensure that all staff and partners are aware of, and abide by, security and protection protocols to prevent and mitigate any potential risks. Additionally, ensure that NGO and INGO incident reporting mechanisms and security coordination bodies are carefully maintained, both inside and outside Syria.

AA Apply additional caution when implementing programs in order to avoid disputes that would require adjudication. In the event of a dispute, adjudication should ideally take place at the most local level possible, for instance, through independent community notables.

AA Continue humanitarian aid and services to opposition-controlled northwest Syria as long as the measures above are taken.

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 11 Annex I:

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 12 Annex II:

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 13 Annex III:

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 14 Annex IV:

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 15 Annex V: Annex VII:

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 16 Annex VIII:

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 17 Annex IX:

MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 18 CONTACT MALCOLM SAVAGE Humanitarian Access Team [email protected]

Contributing information sources to this document include public and nonpublic­ humanitarian information provided by local partners, UN Specialized Agencies, INGOs, non­state actors, and sources on the ground. The content is compiled by Mercy Corps, is by no means exhaustive, and does not reflect Mercy Corps’ position on the aforementioned subjects. The provided information, assessment, and analysis are designated for humanitarian purposes only. Mercy Corps and its Humanitarian Access Team will continue to closely monitor the evolving situation on the ground and inform accordingly.

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MERCY CORPS Preliminary Impact Assessment: Consolidation of Salvation Government’s Control in Opposition-Controlled Northwestern Syria A 19