REGIONAL RESPONSES TO INTERNAL WAR The Fund for Peace “Building Peace in the 21st Century”

NUMBER 4, SEPTEMBER 2002 conference will focusonsimilarissues,with perspectivesfrom regional opinionleadersinEurope. and viewsexpressed are solelytheresponsibility ofTheFundforPeace.program’s next York andisbeingcarried withtheStanleyFoundation.Thestatementsmade outinpartnership The RegionalResponsestoInternal War program isfundedby theCarnegieCorporationofNew M ILITARY C P ONFERENCE ERSPECTIVES FROM F F I P R ON NTERVENTION A S UMMARY SIA EPORTS FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS

ADVISORY COUNCIL REGIONAL RESPONSES TO INTERNAL WAR PROGRAM

Chair: Major General (retired) William L. Nash Council on Foreign Relations

The Honorable Morton Abramowitz Lt. General (retired) Nicholas Kehoe The Century Foundation Board of Trustees - The Fund for Peace

Elizabeth Andersen Susan King (ex officio) Human Rights Watch Carnegie Corporation of

Kenneth Bacon Dr. Robert Legvold

Nina Bang Jensen Dr. R. William Liddle Coalition for International Justice Ohio State University

Elizabeth Becker The Honorable Princeton Lyman New York Times The Aspen Institute

Roberta Cohen Susan Collin Marks The Brookings Institution Search for Common Ground

Karen DeYoung The Honorable Robert B. Oakley National Defense University

Stephen J. Del Rosso, Jr (ex officio) Dr. Michael O’Hanlon Carnegie Corporation of New York The Brookings Institution

Dr. Francis Deng The Honorable Thomas Pickering The City University of New York Former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Dr. William J. Durch John Prendergast The Henry L. Stimson Center International Crisis Group

Dr. Donald Emmerson David Shorr Stanford University The Stanley Foundation

Michele Flournoy The Honorable Richard H. Solomon The Center for Strategic & International Studies Institute of Peace

Dr. Allan E. Goodman Dr. Frederick S. Tipson Institute of International Education Markle Foundation

Dr. Louis W. Goodman Kenneth D. Wollack American University National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

The Honorable Lee Hamilton Casimir Yost The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Georgetown University

The Reverend J. Bryan Hehir Dr. I. William Zartman Catholic Charities USA School of Advanced International Studies

The Honorable H. Allen Holmes Georgetown University FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1 SOVEREIGNTY IN THE EAST ASIAN CONTEXT 3 MOVING TOWARDS ACCOUNTABILITY 3 INTERNAL CONFLICT IN THE REGION 4 POWER POLITICS 5 CRITERIA 6 MILITARY INTERVENTION FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES 7 HARD CASES 11 MULTILATERALISM ENVISIONED 13 US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE REGION 15 CONCLUSION 17

INSERTS

REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 2 WHO GETS THE CREDIT FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION IN EAST TIMOR? 5 ASEAN VISION 2020 14 CONFERENCE SUMMARY 18 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 20



MISSION STATEMENT

The mission of The Fund for Peace is to prevent war and alleviate the conditions that cause war.

The Fund promotes education and research for practical solutions. It is a consistent advocate of promoting social justice and respect for the principles of constitutional democracy. FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS

INTRODUCTION A sense of dynamic change and an evolving value Events of the past decade are obliging Asian system does not translate, however, into enthusiasm for governments to address the tension between regional military intervention in humanitarian emergencies, norms of sovereignty and calls emerging from their according to the group. In fact, in a “Conference 2 citizens and the international community for action Summary” at the end of their deliberations (see page to respond to humanitarian crises, according to a 18), they pointed out that “military intervention by group of distinguished Asian opinion leaders. The outside forces in an internal humanitarian crisis is behind-the-scenes pressure put on the Indonesian considered an extraordinary and exceptional response government during the East Timor crisis belies the in East Asia.” Quiet diplomacy and non-military official mantra of non-interference in the internal measures are the preferred ways of addressing domestic affairs of sovereign states. The region’s cooperation strife that may threaten regional peace and security. with the United Nations to bring stability to Throughout the conference, the group worked Cambodia, at the time a neighbor to the Association with a keen awareness of geopolitical realities and of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),1 is also a regional diversity. The region is one in which the source of some regional pride. Moreover, Asian interests of four major powers – China, Japan, Russia, governments are coming under increasing pressure and the United States – form a complex and ever- from their own publics to pay greater attention to new changing backdrop to regional and national norms of individual rights that bump up against the developments. Another theme that colored the values of order and stability so prized in official circles. meeting was a recognition of the diversity of the These were the conclusions and challenges posed region. It has a great mix of government systems by a three-day conference sponsored by The Fund and economic approaches, with a myriad of ethnic for Peace and organized by the Regional Responses and religious identities. In fact, some questioned to Internal War program that took place July 13-16, whether The Fund’s definition of East Asia (the 2002 at Airlie Conference Center near Warrenton, stretch of countries from the Korean peninsula and Virginia. The group had convened under the Fund’s southwards encompassing Southeast Asia as well as auspices to discuss the difficult issue of regional Australia and New Zealand) is a region at all, arguing criteria for military intervention in humanitarian crises. that it is simply too diverse in peoples, culture, and The event brought together opinion leaders from history to be defined as such. government, academia, the military and civil society At the outset, the group voiced the desire to to address the difficult question of how to protect ground the discussion of criteria for military civilians when massive suffering takes place behind intervention in concrete regional examples, citing the the curtain of state sovereignty. Participants from unique security environment in the region and the twelve countries of Northeast and Southeast Asia different political dynamics of each of the region’s struggled with the tension between a strong regional adherence to the principle of noninterference and 1 See Regional and Subregional Organizations insert, page 4. 2 growing pressures on some of the region’s Participants in The Fund’s previous conferences have governments to respond to potential humanitarian articulated their views in differing formats: the African participants issued a “Conference Statement” and the Americas crises if they were to occur in nearby countries. conference produced a “Conference Highlights.”

1 FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS cases. As a result, participants tackled selected and raise prospects for increased cooperative scenarios in North Korea, and Indonesia, responsibility.” As part of their insistence on a where some argued humanitarian crises already exist pragmatic rather than an abstract approach, or where violence could conceivably escalate. The participants expressed concern that any criteria for group did not advocate military intervention in any of military intervention in humanitarian emergencies not the current situations that were discussed; they much be seen as a rigid checklist. They preferred to offer a preferred a sustained effort to engage and quietly seek set of guidelines to be considered if a question of reform in the troubled countries. But the three cases intervention arose. Thus, the conference wrapped and other emerging transnational threats to security up with the group crafting a conference summary that – ranging from the illegal drug trade to terrorism – outlined regional guidelines for military intervention, clearly worried participants who saw them as underlying should it be considered. risks to the region’s future peace and prosperity. The Fund for Peace conducts a number of In the end, on the issue of military intervention, programs in the areas of conflict prevention, human the group “recognized the value of discussing rights and justice, and peace-building. With the guidelines that could help establish regional norms Regional Responses to Internal War program, The

REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

ASEAN ARF The Association of Southeast Asian Nations The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was (ASEAN) was established on 8 August 1967 in created in 1994. It draws together twenty-three Bangkok by the five original member countries: countries that have an impact on, or are involved Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and in, the security of the Asia Pacific Region. ARF . Five additional countries have membership comprises the ten member states of subsequently joined: Brunei Darussalam (1984), ASEAN as well as Australia, Canada, China, the Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997), and European Union, India, Japan, Mongolia, New Cambodia (1999).1 Zealand, North Korea, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea and the United States.3 ASEAN Plus Three ASEAN invited China, Japan and Korea to APEC participant in the Second ASEAN Informal Summit Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was in Kuala Lumpur in 1997. The ASEAN+3 process established in 1989 to promote open trade and was further strengthened in 1999 with the issuance practical economic cooperation. The twenty-one of a Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation by members of APEC are currently Australia, Brunei the ASEAN+3 leaders. The statement committed Darussalam, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong the thirteen countries to strengthening cooperation (China), Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and collaboration in the areas of economics and Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, finance.2 Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, the United States and Vietnam.4

1 http://www.aseansec.org/menu.asp?action=2&content=2 3 http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/arfintro.html 2 http://www.aseansummit2001.org.bn/org/as2001/asean+3.doc 4 http://www.apecsec.org.sg/

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Fund is probing ways in which regions agree and view that East Asian states are now enjoying a much differ in their approach to the difficult problem of greater capacity to govern, manage national resources how to react to internal conflicts when diplomatic and maintain political autonomy than at any other and other non-military measures have failed to deter time in the past hundred years. The region’s history imminent or ongoing mass killing of civilians. Since of colonialism, foreign occupation and outside the Regional Responses program’s creation in March interference has given way to a consolidation of the 2001, The Fund has organized and hosted similar nation-state with many countries benefiting from conferences of high-level opinion leaders from Africa remarkable economic growth. Increased state and the Americas. capacity has also allowed governments the freedom For the Asians, the conference allowed to cooperate in the economic arena in order to respond participants to explore a critical issue that, up until more effectively to the demands of their own societies the recent past, has been largely outside the region’s and the global economy. conventional political discourse. The most important Participants identified a gap between official task posed by the Fund’s conference, as expressed rhetoric on matters of state sovereignty, and the by one of the participants, was for the group to “think pragmatic steps that governments are taking, even through what is possible; to ask what are the in authoritarian political systems, to respond to limitations, and to determine how to overcome them their societies’ demands for greater domestic to create a more stable region.” accountability and more openness to an After the closed sessions at Airlie Center, the increasingly interconnected world. This openness, group participated in an Open Forum at the Carnegie according to some participants, has allowed new Endowment for International Peace in Washington norms and values to foster the debate over whether DC on July 16, 2002. Members of the policy and how to respond to mass atrocities in other community, as well as the press and academic experts, countries. As a result, according to participants, were invited to exchange views with the participants. while military intervention for humanitarian purposes The discussions at Airlie Center were off-the-record, is a “Western, superpower concept,” recent events while the Open Forum was on the record. The Open have reintroduced the issue as one that cannot be Forum was followed by a private lunch with high- dismissed as irrelevant to Asian governments and level U.S. policymakers. their regional organizations. This report is based on the proceedings of the entire three-day meeting as well as on a lengthy MOVING TOWARDS ACCOUNTABILITY questionnaire completed anonymously by conference Participants emphasized the dynamic nature of participants. The words and the attitudes they reflect the relationship between governments and societies are the participants’ own. Interpretations of them in in the contemporary East Asian setting. As one this report and the analysis of their collective impact participant stated, “The traditional value system is belong solely to The Fund for Peace. under serious review.” Drawing out the causes of this dynamism, another participant explained, “Asia SOVEREIGNTY IN THE EAST ASIAN CONTEXT is not immune to the thinking and influences of The conference opened with a near consensus elsewhere.” The group agreed that the flow of

3 FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS information and ideas stemming from increased “unwillingness to take national risks for regional global connectedness has raised demands on stability” and seventy percent chose “low level of governments to be more transparent and more national interest” as important factors. In addition, at accountable to their citizens. least eighty percent felt that “lack of financial resources” The group then debated the proposition that and “lack of troops” were important constraints. the increased vigor of civil society and the growing However, such an appraisal of the current role of domestic and international non- situation did not diminish the sense that new demands governmental organizations (NGOs) has created for increased accountability of governments to their new pressures on governments to help prevent people was creating potential for a more stable region. mass killings in neighboring countries. A gap Summing up what was seen as a consensus in the between government policy and public sentiment group, one participant pointed out that, in some Asian surfaced in the summer of 1999, for example, when societies, domestic constituencies are building the Chinese citizens criticized their Ministry of capacity to engage governments and to demand that Foreign Affairs for not responding to abuses of they deliver on their responsibilities to citizens – a ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. In that situation, development that many hoped would prevent the according to one participant, the principle of need for intervention in the future. noninterference was “questioned as to whether that kind of concept serves the national interest and INTERNAL CONFLICT IN THE REGION the interest of human beings.” That example The group explored the causes of conflict facing provoked some alarm in the group, leading one the region in the recent past. At the core of the participant to wonder whether the Chinese people exchange was the view that most of the causes were would have felt the same way if those being rooted in the nation-building process and that conflict persecuted were not ethnic Chinese. The exchange potential was mostly present in those few states that provided an example of the complexity of the issue had not yet fully consolidated this process or were of military intervention in a region where many undergoing political, social or economic transitions. people fear that major powers with the will and A list of causes of internal conflict included: resources to intervene could conceivably use a deteriorating humanitarian situation as a pretext to • National identity pursue aggressive national goals. • Minority aspirations to self-determination Ultimately, governments were seen as constrained • Discontent with regime type by power politics, limited resources, and a desire not • Ethnic and religious strife to get involved in difficult situations that do not • Government repression directly affect their own citizens. Participants were • Civil war asked in a confidential Fund survey to identify the • Unequal distribution of economic and social most important factors preventing regional and goods resulting from industrialization subregional organizations from using their members’ • Social unrest resulting from processes of armed forces to stop mass killing in the region. democratization and modernization Seventy-five percent of respondents cited • Resource-based competition

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The discussion of these causes produced a somber states.” Major power dynamics dominate acknowledgment of several instances of recent and relationships in Northeast Asia and there is no country ongoing violence. These included killings in parts in the region that has remained untouched by major of Indonesia (Aceh, East Timor, Maluku), massive power calculations. Strong militaries in China, North loss of life due to starvation in North Korea (1995- Korea, South Korea, and Vietnam complicate the 1997), and starvation and suffering in Myanmar under picture, as do the presence of nuclear weapons in the a repressive military junta. All are considered internal region. Ultimately, the group concluded that any conflicts, but many have cross-border impacts due current or potential humanitarian crisis would also to refugee flows, rebel incursions, and illegal have a security component. trafficking in humans and drugs. Another characteristic of the region, especially in Northeast Asia, is the existence of strong bilateral POWER POLITICS alliances that contribute to regional security or, in Perhaps more than any region in the world, the opposite view of some, perpetuate great power according to participants, “history is of fundamental tensions. Both the U.S.- Japan alliance and the U.S.- importance to Northeast Asia in relations among South Korea alliance are seen as defensive by the

WHO GETS THE CREDIT FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION IN EAST TIMOR?

In assessing the factors that led to the popular said that he was halting military assistance to referendum in East Timor and later to the military Indonesia and implicitly threatened suspension of intervention to stop the violence and mass killings, IMF loans, which were much-needed in the wake it is difficult to say whether one party deserves more of the Asian financial crisis, until the violence in East or less credit than the others. It seems clear that Timor ended. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan laid the Ultimately, the International Force in East foundation for further international initiatives. Timor (INTERFET) was under unified Australian After the referendum on August 30, 1999, as militia command and was comprised of some 5400 violence increased and threats of invading the UN Australian troops and 4500 from other countries compound in Dili, the East Timor capitol, were including Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, made, the Secretary-General publicly urged the Malaysia, South Korea, and New Zealand. Indonesian government to accept offers of Indonesian political leaders deserve credit for international assistance. making the right choices under difficult By exercising pressure behind the scenes, circumstances. They heeded the advice of the ASEAN countries played an important role by international community and their concerned making offers of assistance that were more regional neighbors. The cross-pressures and acceptable than Australia acting alone would have nationalistic sentiment that had to be overcome been. The Indonesian government specifically should not be underestimated. requested, on several occasions, “substantial In the end, of course, it was the East Timorese participation” from ASEAN countries. themselves who have pulled together to build a The United States became a factor as the crisis nation that formally gained its independence on was coming to a head. At the APEC leaders’ May 20, 2002. meeting in September 1999, President Bill Clinton

5 FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS allies themselves, but China regards them warily. ultimate legitimacy of the United Nations. As a result, One participant warned that military action by these the discussion of who can authorize a military alliances, beyond their expressed purpose of self- intervention centered on obtaining UN Security defense, would pose questions of both legality and Council authorization. In its absence, participants legitimacy, especially if the action were taken outside supported pursuing a “Uniting for Peace” vote in the 3 of a UN or regional framework. UN General Assembly. Questions were raised as to Participants said that the region still suffers from what to do if neither of these mechanisms worked. “a history of colonialism, regional hegemony, and Regional organizations were seen as having a degree clashes over territory and resources.” Memories of of legitimacy although their charters currently do not Japanese occupation and a concern about Chinese authorize the use of force. A minority among the domination are still strong and the region continues participants, however, expressed the fear that giving to experience disputes over territorial and maritime regional organizations the authority to approve boundaries, especially in places endowed with military intervention might open the door to abuse. significant amounts of natural resources. As a result, In response to these concerns, the group discussed Asian governments have found it difficult to narrowing the scope of when regional military action cooperate on security issues. The demands of global would be considered. They also discussed the economic integration, however, as well as the region’s lack of a military capacity to undertake a challenges of new transnational threats to security military intervention. In the end, the group outlined have prompted governments to slowly reassess their what would be required for regional organizations suspicion stance and begin to pursue more to act in the future: an evolution of the region’s sense cooperative strategies. of responsibility and the development of greater institutional capacity. CRITERIA Once the group was satisfied that it had expressed In the discussion on criteria for humanitarian the region’s concern with questions of legitimacy, intervention, participants were asked to grapple with they then considered which events would prompt UN core questions confronting the decision to use force and regional action. They agreed that genocide and for humanitarian purposes: massive loss of life clearly justified military intervention. Participants also expressed their • Who can legitimately authorize military disapproval of waiting until “too many had already intervention? died” and felt that a credible threat of imminent mass • When is intervention justified? killings would justify military intervention. It was • Who should contribute troops to the also agreed that a threat to regional security should intervention? prompt action. For many, such a threat might take • How should the intervention be carried out?

3 First adopted in November 1950 in the context of the Korean Participants exhibited a clear preference for War, the Uniting for Peace Resolution authorizes the UN approaching the issue of military intervention from General Assembly to consider security matters when the Security Council fails to act because of a lack of consensus an international legal framework premised on the among the permanent members.

6 FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS the form of massive flows of refugees across borders. settlement in Cambodia from October 1991 to Already, hundreds of thousands of refugees and September 1993.4 Both operations received UN displaced persons from North Korea and Myanmar Security Council authorization and were undertaken threaten regional stability, in the view of some with the consent of the incumbent government participants. (although Indonesia gave consent under considerable The discussion of which troops could legitimately duress from both the international and regional intervene reflected the region’s preference for UN communities). In The Fund’s survey, seventy-five action. The group strongly felt that an intervening percent of participants indicated that they trusted the force needed to be acceptable to the citizens of the UN to be successful in stopping mass killings in the country in which the intervention is taking place. A region. No other organization or actor, regional or geographically balanced force, which is drawn from global, received higher than forty percent. Even when the largest possible number of countries worldwide asked to rate the potential of various actors to stop and mindful of historical resentments, offered the best mass killings five years from now, the only actor hope for a successful mission. A coalition of the besides the UN (which received sixty percent) to willing was acceptable to the majority of the group, receive higher than a thirty-five percent confidence provided that it was properly authorized. rating for a “good” or “excellent” chance of success In order to be successful, a military intervention was the United States, which received forty-five must have a clear mission and purpose, as well as percent. achievable and time-limited objectives, the group Discussion of the cases of East Timor and stated. And since the group questioned whether a Cambodia revealed conflicting views of the region’s military intervention would take place for purely future capacity and willingness to embark on military humanitarian purposes, they felt that the interests of interventions. For optimists, the mission in East all intervening parties should be publicly Timor demonstrated the successful application of acknowledged at the outset. Moreover, an ASEAN’s preference for quiet diplomacy in intervention would only achieve lasting success if it addressing the internal problems of one of its were part of a broader plan for a political settlement, members. They argued that encouragement and including state institution-building and social and subtle pressure helped persuade Indonesia to allow economic development, according to participants. self-determination elections in East Timor. In the They felt that governing responsibility should be end, such pressure was also instrumental in getting shifted as quickly as possible to national authorities. Indonesia to “invite” international intervention when pro-government militias, at times with the support MILITARY INTERVENTION FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES of Indonesian security forces, launched a campaign Once a problem reaches the point of crisis and of violence, looting and arson against the pro- military intervention is being considered, Asians independence East Timorese. Australia led the UN- expect the United Nations to help. Their touchstones are the Australian-led INTERFET mission in East 4 The UN Advanced Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) was Timor from September 1999 to February 2000, and deployed in October 1991 and subsequently was absorbed by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in March UN efforts following the peace 1992. UNTAC’s mandate ended in September 1993.

7 FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS authorized mission with regional troop contributions Cambodia. The UN’s peacekeeping mission assigned from South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the to assist in the implementation of the Paris talks, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. In the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC),6 aftermath, China contributed policemen to assist in included all six of the ASEAN member states at the domestic security. Japan, in addition to contributing time, along with regional actors such as Australia, US$100 million to the UN Trust Fund to support Japan and New Zealand.7 INTERFET, sent Self-Defense Forces (SDF) A subsequent political crisis in Cambodia - Prime peacekeepers to East Timor as part of the UN Minister Hun Sen’s exile of co-prime minister Prince Transitional Administration in East Timor Ranariddh in 1997 in advance of national elections - (UNTAET), which replaced INTERFET in February triggered ASEAN to call on three esteemed regional 2000.5 Several participants felt that the intervention diplomats to mediate. The Troika, the term given to in East Timor signified the positive direction that East the diplomatic mechanism when it was formally Asia was moving toward in addressing its own recognized by ASEAN in 1999, was aided by Japan, problems. As one participant explained, “the regional Cambodia’s largest donor, and an informal diplomatic response to the situation in East Timor demonstrates grouping called the “Friends of Cambodia,” which that the values about military intervention have included countries that had been involved in the Paris evolved significantly in the past twenty to thirty talks.8 Ultimately, Prince Ranariddh was allowed to years.” return to Cambodia and the elections went forward When asked in The Fund survey to assess how without crisis. Participants said that both the region justified the Australian-led intervention was, eighty and the international community shared credit for percent responded positively, with fifty-five percent helping Cambodia to rebuild its civil society. One of respondents rating the mission “completely” participant characterized the region’s efforts in justified and twenty-five percent choosing “probably” Cambodia as demonstrating that “the Asian region justified. Only five percent of the group deemed the is developing toward a situation where static values intervention “not justified.” When asked if the with respect to sovereignty are being redefined.” mission was effective, the positive responses totaled However, some participants saw both the East seventy-five percent. Thirty percent of respondents Timor and Cambodian cases as less shining examples rated the mission “completely” effective and forty- of regional cohesion. According to this view, the five percent marked “probably” effective. No one two cases demonstrated the limits of regional rated the mission “not effective.” 5 Cambodia represented what participants saw as Since February 2002, Japan has dispatched ten members of its Self-Defense Forces headquarters staff and 680 engineer unit another largely successful example of regional personnel, first to UNTAET’s Military Component and then to involvement in pursuing internal stability. The Paris UNMISET’s Military Component. It represents Japan’s largest commitment so far of SDF units to UN peacekeeping operations. Peace Process for Cambodia, which took place from 6 UNTAC’s mandate ended in September 1993 with the 1989 to 1991, demonstrated that ASEAN countries, promulgation of the Constitution for the Kingdom of Cambodia and the formation of the new Government. along with Japan and China, were willing to get 7 At the time, ASEAN included Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, involved diplomatically to resolve problems arising Thailand, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam. 8 The “Friends of Cambodia” include Australia, Canada, China, in the political aftermath of the civil war in the European Union, Japan, Russia and the United States.

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Opposite page from top left: Ms. Alma Evangelista; Ambassador Chan Heng Chee and Major General (ret.) Bill Nash; Mr. Ok Serei Sopheak and Dr. Wu Xinbo; Ms. Luan Thuy Duong and Dr. Chu Shulong; Ambassador Yasushi Akashi

This page from top left: Dr. Samsu Rizal Panggabean; Ambassador Roland Eng, Mr. Stanley Loh, and Dr. Chung Oknim; Ms. Maureen Aung-Thwin; Dr. Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Dr. Muthiah Alagappa

10 FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS capability as well as an underlying regional thankful that the four Cambodian factions did not hesitancy to let sovereignty be trumped by the need see this,” the participant said. to protect lives. While acknowledging the efforts of regional diplomacy on the issue of East Timor, HARD CASES one participant reminded the group that the The group also discussed current and future intervention occurred only because Indonesia’s scenarios in which humanitarian crises might reach President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie had agreed a threshold that would prompt the consideration of to allow it to be discussed at the APEC meeting in military intervention. Two themes dominated the New Zealand in September 1999. discussion. Participants found it difficult to envision “If he had not wanted it discussed, ASEAN a humanitarian crisis that was not dominated by countries would not have discussed it. This was security considerations involving one or more major Indonesia exercising its sovereignty to say we are powers. A number also insisted that even in the face willing to do this. Indonesia accepted this only if of humanitarian crises, the institutional and military the intervention came with UN [presence] and UN strength of their governments could make it endorsement,” this participant observed. extremely difficult to rescue the populations. The With respect to ASEAN’s role in INTERFET, group ultimately concluded that military intervention another participant faulted certain governments’ was only a real option in instances of failed states or extreme reluctance to contribute troops. collapsed governments; and practically, political “The world saw ASEAN as an organization that engagement was the only way to deal with a still- failed to respond on East Timor,” another participant functioning regime to help improve the humanitarian bluntly declared. situation. They defined a failed state as one that had Participants also acknowledged that the region become “out-of-control” and threatened to spill did not respond to the Cambodian genocide while it conflict beyond its borders and destabilize the region. was happening. It took a unilateral military “North Korea and Burma show the limits of intervention by Vietnam to stop the slaughter. Many humanitarian action when you have a regime of a certain years passed before the belligerent parties indicated character that is opposed to openness and contacts with their preference for a peace settlement to which the the outside world,” one participant remarked. international community finally responded. One In the case of North Korea, participants found participant criticized the operational aspects of it difficult to imagine a forceful regional response. UNTAC, citing its weak and slow deployment as Outside the realm of what one participant called the evidence that Asian militaries lack the logistical “highly imaginative” hypothetical, all recognized that infrastructure to project forces that might be needed military intervention was inconceivable, even though in emergency military operations. it is estimated that a million people have already died “The forces came in trickles with no coordination. of famine and related illnesses. North Korean The UN sent twelve battalions from thirty-five military power precludes it. Neither could the countries. The battalions came in slowly because of participants anticipate an internal uprising to logistical limits. Was there a credible military overthrow the repressive regime. Some recounted intervention in Cambodia? No! We should be the astonishment of humanitarian workers, allowed

11 FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS to deliver food aid, at the durability of the social Sudden openness will be suicidal. [North Korea must structure despite an ongoing and massive learn] how to institute gradual changes without humanitarian crisis. Instead, participants argued that endangering its own survival,” another participant “the great powers will take care of it” if violence added. breaks out or if a new famine results in massive The discussion of Myanmar was shaped by the refugee flows. Already, there are some 300,000 North May 2002 release from house arrest of opposition Koreans who have crossed into Chinese territory. leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Participants agreed that They are not recognized legally by China as refugees, the regime continued to commit serious human rights so they remain unprotected and intentionally left abuses. For example, it continued to imprison outside the scope of international conventions. China hundreds of members of the opposition National resists refugee classification because it fears a League for Democracy (NLD) party and it had not massive exodus of North Korean immigrants fleeing punished the perpetrators who had raped large numbers into China if those already there are seen as faring of women from the Shan state, the largest of the seven better than those who remain home. ethnic minority states. However, the scope and The discussion of North Korea was not, however, magnitude of the crisis as well as the significance of without a glimmer of hope. North Korea joined the the political progress being made following Suu Kyi’s ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)9 in 2000, opening release were disputed by participants. itself up to the group’s “quiet diplomacy.”10 While participants did not see ASEAN Conference participants insisted that efforts to engage intervening militarily in Myanmar, they expressed the North Koreans, such as the Korea Energy optimism that the regional organization could Development Organization (KEDO), had made some increasingly exert a moderating influence on the junta. progress and should be continued. Several believed Several participants said that Thailand was taking that the cooperation of China, Japan, South Korea the brunt of Myanmar’s internal problems. and the US to engage Pyongyang in dialogue on Approximately 800,000 persons have crossed the various levels had not received adequate publicity in border separating the two countries and have spread the United States and that the significance of these out into Thailand. They are considered illegal contacts should not be underestimated. Most immigrants by the Thai government. In addition, participants felt that incrementally increasing more than 200,000 persons are currently living in engagement through cooperation on social, cultural refugee camps that line the Thai side of the border. and economic matters as well as military officer The determination of the government of Myanmar exchanges might go some way toward persuading to put down resistance of minorities on the country’s the North Koreans to break away from their isolation. borders has created a security problem for Thailand. “This regime has been caged for fifty years. It Myanmar has threatened to pursue the rebels that the will not fly out of the cage if you open it. They will stay in the cage because it feels secure. You have to 9 See Regional and Subregional Organizations insert, page 4. hold their hands,” one participant said. 10 Two weeks after The Fund conference adjourned, North “China has tried very hard to make the North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun and US Secretary of State Colin Powell met, informally, over a cup of coffee at the Korean regime more open and reform-minded. 2002 meeting in Brunei.

12 FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS government says constantly cross back and forth into action in Indonesia spurred a lively exchange: Thai territory with impunity. Communications “The hallmark of ASEAN is the ability to have between the two governments have broken down over one’s house in order. All you have in Indonesia is a the issue and could deteriorate further. failed state. I don’t see the Indonesian government Participants outlined the need to address being able to do anything throughout the Myanmar’s underlying ethnic tensions as well as its archipelago,” one participant said. “Why not look at increased involvement in various modes of Indonesia as a failed state and think about the transnational crime, especially trafficking in possibility of intervention?” methamphetamine drugs.11 The lack of accurate This question prompted two strong responses. information about the humanitarian situation, “ASEAN governments recognize the territorial especially in the rural areas, was identified as a major integrity of Indonesia,” said one. obstacle to effective action. Recommendations for “Indonesia splitting up would set a dangerous addressing the situation in Myanmar included a precedent,” said another. region-wide effort to constructively engage the junta Still another participant argued that an and a widening of foreign initiatives including intervention in support of a group seeking territorial dialogue with the full range of ethnic and political secession as opposed to one to stop mass killing actors in the country. One participant argued that “would have a ripple effect through the region,” the ASEAN Troika had worked well in Cambodia worsening tensions in the Indonesian provinces of and might be an option that the regional organization Maluku, West Irian, and East Kalimantan as well as should explore in the case of Myanmar, especially in in the Southern Philippines. The majority of the the increasingly heated dispute with Thailand. participants clearly opposed any use of force in In the case of Indonesia, participants expressed Indonesia, but they also advocated that ASEAN move dismay that there are currently no UN aid or beyond its current hesitancy to push for dialogue and monitoring agencies in Aceh, Papua, or Maluku.12 to encourage Indonesia to accept third party Indonesia’s repression of independence movements assistance. has led to thousands of internally displaced persons who are dying from starvation and lack of medical MULTILATERALISM ENVISIONED attention. With prevention in mind, participants Throughout the conference, the group repeatedly urged international and domestic NGOs to be present returned to the potential of its regional organizations on the ground to serve as the region’s “eyes and ears.” to create a more stable and secure East Asia. Indonesia is in a situation in which the participants “In ASEAN we are all guilty of one thing or felt ASEAN could be very useful. The organization another, so that we don’t want others telling us what should develop more flexible definitions of sovereignty to be effective in cases like Indonesia’s, 11 It is estimated that 700 million tablets of methamphetamine one participant argued. That way, ASEAN could are smuggled annually across the Thai border. provide support for dialogue between secessionist 12 In January 1999, violence erupted between the Christian and Muslim populations in the Maluku province. Over the groups and the central government. following three years, six thousand people died as a result of Whether the region should take more forceful the sectarian conflict.

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to do,” one participant said, going on to describe justified.” Likewise, seventy percent felt that a adherence to the principle of non-interference as a majority vote would be at least “possibly” justified.13 convenient excuse for overlooking bad governance Asia does not possess a continent-wide in fellow member nations. organization, such as the Organization of American Despite constraints, several participants argued States (OAS) or the African Union (formerly the that the regional organizations will be and should be Organization of African Unity). The region is unique asked to do more in the future to address humanitarian in that it has chosen to build on a subregional crises in the region. In The Fund survey, when asked organization to create larger regional organizations. how justified the ARF would be to intervene in order to ASEAN now has two derivative organizations that stop mass killing, fifty percent of respondents indicated are more inclusive: ASEAN Plus Three and the 14 “completely” justified and twenty percent selected ASEAN Regional Forum. None of these “probably” justified. Only five percent of participants organizations has a written mandate to discuss or act rated the action “not justified.” Given, however, that on internal security issues even when regional the ARF works on consensus and the government stability is at stake.15 In addition, the Asia Pacific committing the mass killings could block action, it Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum assembles is significant that seventy percent of respondents nations around the rim of the Pacific Ocean.16 It is indicated that the ARF would be at least “possibly” justified if the action were taken based on a majority 13 Participants were given the option of choosing “completely vote. The numbers were similar for subregional justified,” “probably justified,” “possibly justified,” “not organizations such as ASEAN. Sixty-five percent justified” or “no opinion.” 14 See Regional and Subregional Organizations insert, page 4. of respondents indicated that a unanimous vote by a 15 Among regional organizations, only the African Union created subregional organization would be “probably” or in 2002 includes a provision that allows the organization to authorize military intervention in internal conflicts. “completely” justified, with no one marking “not 16 See Regional and Subregional Organizations insert, page 4.

ASEAN VISION 2020

Some participants pointed to the ASEAN Vision • more economically integrated, which requires 2020 statement as a window of opportunity for civil a leveling of the divide between the first six society to press ASEAN governments to live up to members and later four (Cambodia, Laos, the forward-looking principles laid out in the 1997 Myanmar and Vietnam) through greater pledge made in Kuala Lumpur. The document harmonization of trade practices, investment outlines the future of ASEAN as “a concert of laws, monetary policies, and customs Southeast Asian nations, outward looking, living regulations. in peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together • a community of caring societies, which in partnership in dynamic development and in a recognizes its diversity, provides for greater community of caring societies.” By the year 2020, political participation, respects the rule of law, if its goals were realized, the region would be: promotes and protects human rights, and addresses social problems of its citizens. • a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality as well • committed to an open regionalism that is as a nuclear weapons-free zone. outward looking and embraces the larger region.

14 FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS primarily organized for the consideration of economic joint exercises to standardize law enforcement issues. Participants, however, were quick to point methods. In addition, proposals have surfaced for out that discussions of pressing security and an ASEAN center on transnational crime to be located humanitarian issues have been discussed “on the in the Philippines. sidelines” of these political and economic meetings. In addition to the pressure put on Indonesia during US FOREIGN POLICY IN THE REGION an APEC meeting to allow UN intervention in East The group was asked to assess the role and impact Timor (see page 5), participants cited as another of US foreign policy towards the region. Participants example the anti-terrorism statement issued at the expressed concern that the US war on terrorism, if APEC meeting immediately following the September pursued single-mindedly, would sideline the region’s 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. One other security challenges. They underlined the participant seemed to capture the sentiment of the sentiment that the US should remain engaged in the group in saying that the region has sufficient numbers region, economically, militarily, and politically. of organizations and that energy and resources should Points that were reiterated by participants included: be placed in strengthening them, especially the ARF, which has the broadest membership. The US should increase its support for the Two areas were identified as having potential for region’s efforts at multilateral cooperation and significant advancement: military cooperation and augment its engagement with regional responses to transnational security threats. In one organizations. positive example, in 2000, the Thai Army Chief Throughout the conference, participants initiated annual meetings of all of the commanders- expressed hope that the region’s organizations would in-chief of the ASEAN armies. The following year, increasingly examine security threats and develop the meeting issued an extensive action plan aimed at permanent cooperative frameworks for future peace addressing drug trafficking, international crime and and stability. terrorism in the region. ASEAN’s navies have “Multilateral cooperation on security matters is subsequently adopted the mechanism and also meet the future,” stated one participant. annually to discuss coordinating the region’s efforts At the policy lunch, several Asian participants to respond to natural and humanitarian disasters. urged US officials to work through multilateral “If ASEAN or ARF ever contemplate a military institutions rather than through ad hoc means or intervention, knowing that ASEAN wants to take care bilateral alliances. of its own affairs, (this) is a significant step forward,” Participants lauded the United States for playing one participant stated, putting these initiatives in a supportive role in the Cambodia peace settlement context. and in the intervention in East Timor. For several ASEAN has also made progress on managing participants, these examples demonstrated the transnational crime, according to participants. The manner in which the US should work constructively pursuit of those engaged in money laundering, piracy, in the region. human trafficking, and drug smuggling has required Moreover, participants called for the US to ASEAN countries to share information and conduct increase dialogue on security issues of mutual

15 FFP REPORTS MILITARY INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL WARS importance to the US and the region. This would those objectives to the governments and people of help lessen divergences of perception that lead to the region. Some expressed concern that an increased tension and potential conflict. One way to achieve emphasis on US contacts with the region’s militaries this would be to incorporate the perspectives of had the potential to aggravate already fragile civil- regional players into the development of US policy military relations, particularly in Indonesia. towards the region. One participant urged the US Combining military training with institutional reform, “to look at China through the eyes of other regional mandatory human rights instruction and severe players” and called for the US to go through a punishment for human rights abusers in the armed comprehensive process of evaluating its view of forces were paramount in preventing the emergence China in consultation with Asian countries. of a newly aggressive and arrogant military in Another concrete example of successful Indonesia. In addition, some participants said they engagement on a multilateral basis was the Asia- needed to be convinced that an increased US military Pacific Security Study Center. The Center, affiliated emphasis in the region was not intended to serve as with the US Pacific Command, is located in Hawaii a foundation to gain advantage in a struggle with and provides training for mid-level Asian military China for influence. officers. In addition, the Center organizes regional Several participants from countries with large conferences on important security issues. Muslim populations urged the United States to Participants praised the center for “building a security increase contacts with Muslim leaders and community in the region” as well as “being a bridge organizations to dispel any notion that the war on between the US and Asian militaries.” terrorism is a war against Islam. Lastly, participants On the other hand, participants were critical that noted that the US should be sensitive to the fact that progress on the Korea Energy Development its war on terrorism could stymie the ongoing process Organization (KEDO) had stalled due to its negative of nation-building if legitimate dissent is repressed reputation among key policymakers in the Bush in the name of fighting global terrorism. Administration. They urged that KEDO not be abandoned because it is a mechanism that tempers The US should pay more attention to the North Korean regime and, in their view, nontraditional security threats in the region contributes to a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. flowing from transnational crime, drug trafficking, the smuggling of illegal immigrants, The US should be careful not to see all of East piracy and kidnapping. Asia’s internal conflicts through the filter of its Several participants expressed unease that the own war on terrorism. US’s overriding concern with traditional security Several participants were concerned that threats, such as those associated with Taiwan and terrorism would replace the Cold War as the North Korea, will continue to blind the US to the simplistic and distorting lens through which all ongoing threats to stability posed by nontraditional disputes and conflicts would be viewed in the region. transnational security issues. Especially for the They hoped that the US would develop clear countries of Southeast Asia, security concerns have objectives and make a concerted effort to articulate broadened to include various types of trafficking in

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illegal goods, fragile civil-military relations, piracy, The group frankly acknowledged that civilians in the corruption, and problems of the rule of law. One region had indeed suffered and died in the last thirty participant pointed to the past decade in years from causes such as starvation, ethnic violence, as an extreme example of a country left alone to fester genocide, government repression and acts of in the mixture of its own internal conflict and the terrorism. Participants also admitted that in many of new transnational flows of drugs, laundered money, these cases, nothing had been done. In future cases of and weapons. In Afghanistan, the participant humanitarian crises, the response might still have to be maintained, a weakened state structure allowed limited to quiet diplomacy, depending on political transnational crime and international terrorism to will, logistical capacity, and power relationships. flourish and draw on mutual networks. It is those But this pragmatism was matched by a desire to same new security threats, the group seemed to ask more of their governments and of their regional agree, that pose the greatest danger to the stability organizations. Participants called for more creative of East Asian states. diplomacy and preventive mechanisms to be developed in the region. For many, the source of this call is the In the Fund survey, fifty-five percent of growing interest in exploring new values, norms, and respondents rated US concern about security mechanisms that have been created by the global problems in the region as either “good” or spread of information and a more active civil society. “excellent,” but sixty-five percent of respondents Participants recommended that East Asian nations rated US efforts at solving previous security problems strengthen their capacity to engage politically with in the region only “fair” or “poor.” Moreover, sixty governments and all significant political actors in percent of respondents felt that US understanding of conflict zones in the region. the region’s security and US willingness to help solve Addressing the audience at the Open Forum, one regional security problems was “fair” or “poor.” participant commented, “In Asia, we understand time Finally, eighty percent of respondents also felt that quite differently from the rest of the world. We only the US had done only a “fair” or “poor” job of trying move forward when it is imperative and critically to avoid dominating political activity in the region. important to move forward. It tends to be crisis that When asked to identify the preferred role of the serves as our impetus. The development of ASEAN US in an international or regional effort to stop mass Plus Three, in response to the Asian financial crisis, killings in East Asia, four options received the highest demonstrates this behavior.” ratings, in declining order: provide financial support, The intervention in East Timor moved the region provide logistical and technological support, provide forward in its thinking. This was clear. Its success, intelligence and communication support and, finally, participants concluded, may also serve as the impetus send military troops. to begin the slow process of developing new norms and institutions to better protect the people of the CONCLUSION region. As the conference was concluding, one participant said he was struck by the coexistence of Conference summary prepared by pragmatism and idealism in the group’s discussion. Mary Locke and Jason Ladnier

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CONFERENCE SUMMARY

East Asia* is a dynamic and diverse region with great cultural, religious and political differences. In the past, the value system has ranked order, stability and serenity as high-level priorities. That is still the case. However, globalization, the information revolution, and a more active and vocal civil sector have created growing interest in exploring new values, norms, and mechanisms to address humanitarian crises. In some countries, pressures are increasing on governments to respond to gross violations of human rights and to be more accountable to their own people. Internal conflict and dissension have existed in East Asia for many years. Conflicts of national identity, minority aspirations for self-determination, ethnic and religious tensions, social unrest, and civil war are still part of East Asia’s challenges. Other sources of conflict include competition over resources and resulting disputes over the distribution of social and economic goods. Geopolitical competition and rivalry are still a feature of the region. Major powers have both diverging and converging security interests. Their ability to develop consensus and cooperate on outstanding security issues is the canvas on which questions of regional stability will be painted. Even among non-major powers, suspicions linger from a history of colonialism, regional hegemony, and clashes over territory and resources. In addition, weapons of mass destruction further complicate the picture. East Asian governments and existing regional organizations hold firmly to principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. No organization has a mandate to act on internal security issues even if they have an impact on regional stability. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) work on political and security issues. ASEAN plus 3 and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum are primarily organized for the consideration of economic issues. However, the latter two have provided an opportune venue for discussing difficult humanitarian crises. Military intervention by outside forces in an internal humanitarian crisis is considered an extraordinary and exceptional response in East Asia. The region has used and still prefers quiet diplomacy and non- military means to influence internal situations. While hesitant to bind themselves to criteria that would require military intervention, the group recognized the value of discussing guidelines that could help establish regional norms and raise prospects for increased cooperative responsibility. In the end, the group offered the following considerations for military intervention:

− When a genocide is taking place − When there is massive loss of life or when there is a credible threat, independently verified, of imminent mass killings due to: 1) a failed state 2) a state abusing its own citizens 3) a state that is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens − When there is a massive displacement of persons or flow of refugees − When it is the ultimate resort after all reasonable non-military options have been weighed − When there are systematic and gross violations of human rights

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− When the countries concerned appeal for assistance − When the consent of the country concerned is sought − When an international crisis represents a threat to international peace and security

Military intervention may be authorized, in order of preference, by: − The United Nations Security Council − The United Nations General Assembly by a 2/3 vote in a “uniting for peace” resolution − In extreme situations, relevant regional organizations**

Military intervention can legitimately be carried out by troops: − That are organized and commanded by the UN, are geographically balanced, and are from the largest possible number of countries − From a coalition of the willing − Acceptable to the citizens affected

A military intervention must: − Have a clear mission, purpose, and achievable and time-limited objectives including acknowledgment of the interests of intervening parties − Be part of a larger plan for political settlement, state institution-building, and social and economic development − Have more benefits than costs − Shift governing responsibility quickly to national authorities − Have a robust capacity and sufficient financial resources to succeed

To avoid the need for military intervention, more creative diplomacy and preventive mechanisms need to be developed. For example, in Southeast Asia, the troika that ASEAN used in 1998 in the Cambodian case is one such device. The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue is a further example. Some participants recommended that East Asian nations should strengthen their capacity to politically engage governments and all significant political actors in conflict zones in a way which improves their responsiveness to the needs and aspirations of their own citizens. East Asian nations should also have the capacity to provide “good offices” to facilitate dialogue among disparate parties in internal disputes and organize monitoring teams to improve information gathering in conflict zones. Such teams could be comprised of a mix of representatives from civil society and regional organizations with appropriate security protection. And, finally, in addressing the full gamut of threats to human security, East Asian nations should strive individually and collectively to address such problems as poverty, transnational crime, human trafficking, HIV/AIDS, and the illegal drug trade.

* For the purposes of the Regional Responses to Internal War program, East Asia is defined as Northeast and Southeast Asia. ** Reservations were expressed by some members of the group that this formulation would open the door to abuse because it gives authority to entities that do not have a legal mandate to act.

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CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

CO-CHAIRS Dr. Nono Anwar Makarim (Indonesia) The Honorable Chan Heng Chee Founder and Chief Executive Board Member Ambassador from Singapore to the United States Aksara Foundation Major General (retired) William L. Nash Mr. Ok Serei Sopheak Director, Center for Preventive Action Coordinator, Cambodian Center for Peace Council on Foreign Relations, USA and Development Mr. Masahiro Omura PARTICIPANTS Director of Research Coordination, Japan Institute of International Affairs The Honorable Yasushi Akashi Chairman, Japan Center for Preventive Diplomacy Dr. Samsu Rizal Panggabean Program Director, Center for Security and Peace Studies Dr. Muthiah Alagappa (Malaysia) Gadjah Mada University, Indonesia Director, East-West Center Washington, DC Dr. Seongho Sheen (South Korea) Ms. Maureen Aung-Thwin Research Fellow, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis Director, Burma Project/Southeast Asia Initiative Open Society Institute General (ret.) Teerawat Putamanonda Former Director General of Defense Policy and Planning Dr. Greg Austin The Ministry of Defense of Thailand Visiting Fellow, Graduate Program in Public Policy Australian National University Lieutenant General (ret.) Ismael Z. Villareal Former Vice Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Mr. Umej Singh Bhatia of the Philippines Alternate Representative of Singapore to the United Nations Security Council Dr. Wu Xinbo Professor, Fudan University, China Dr. Clarita R. Carlos Professor, Department of Political Science Dr. Zakaria Haji Ahmad (Malaysia) University of the Philippines Professor of Southeast Asian Studies, Ohio University Dr. Chu Shulong Senior Fellow, China Institute of Contemporary CROSS-REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES International Relations The Honorable Paul Heinbecker Dr. Chung Oknim Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Research Fellow, The Sejong Institute, South Korea Nations The Honorable Roland Eng The Honorable Cheick Oumar Diarrah Ambassador from Cambodia to the United States Ambassador from Mali to the United States Ms. Alma Evangelista The Honorable Juan Gabriel Valdés Peace and Development Advisor Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations United Nations Development Program - Philippines The Honorable Joris M. Vos Colonel Guo Xinning (China) Ambassador from the Netherlands to Portugal Associate, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Georgetown University THE FUND FOR PEACE STAFF Dr. Carolina G. Hernandez (Philippines) Founder and President, Institute for Strategic and Dr. Pauline H. Baker, President, The Fund for Peace Development Studies USA Mr. Stanley Loh Ms. Mary Locke, Program Director, Regional Responses Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Singapore to the to Internal War Program, USA United States Mr. Jason Ladnier, Program Officer, Regional Ms. Luan Thuy Duong Responses to Internal War Program, USA Deputy Director, Southeast Asian Studies Institute of International Relations, Vietnam Krista Hendry, Hanseul Kang, Caroline Rabb

Note: Affiliations are listed for identification purposes only. Participants attended as individuals rather than as representatives of their governments or organizations.

20 THE FUND FOR PEACE REGIONAL RESPONSES TO INTERNAL WAR PROGRAM PERSPECTIVES ON WHO, WHEN, WHERE AND WHY

Military interventions in internal conflicts raise legal, moral, and practical questions that the international community is still struggling to address. The United Nations and other actors in Africa, Asia, , and the Americas have had uneven success in dealing with internal disputes and self-determination conflicts that threaten regional stability. Some interventions have conformed to, and reinforced, existing international law and procedures while others have been more ad hoc in nature. Some interventions have been successful while others have been deeply flawed. Still others that, on hindsight, might have been successful in saving thousands of lives never materialized at all. The program is probing regional views on military intervention criteria, regional capabilities, and international assistance in dealing with internal war. It identifies areas of convergence as well as divergence within regions, drawing comparisons between regions to explore the unique mix of cultural, political, and security issues that are influencing decision-making. The program is focusing particularly on the experiences of the last ten years and how they have influenced opinion. This program is intended to enrich the global debate on the issue by providing new insights into the trend toward regional responsibility in peacekeeping, with a focus on where the crises have been occurring. The program is also assessing the implications of these findings for the United States as it debates its own foreign policy role and responsibilities in addressing humanitarian crises and self-determination disputes. Specifically, The Fund for Peace is probing regional views on five unresolved sets of issues:

! LEGITIMACY AND AGENCY: Should there be new criteria and agents or organizations to authorize legal military intervention? How would emerging norms relate to current international law and how would new agents work with the United Nations? ! HEGEMONY: How are norms of intervention affected by the dominance of one or two powers in a region or by concerns about an emerging power with regional ambitions? ! CHANGING SOVEREIGNTY: Has the question of military intervention to protect abused minorities and stop widespread violation of human rights created new concepts of sovereignty? Do these concepts differ among regions? ! RESOURCES: What resources in each region are available or allotted to intervention? Are new mechanisms needed to increase capability and allocate resources in a more effective and equitable way? ! REGIONAL ROLE: Can and should regional actors and multilateral institutions play a more significant role in responding to internal wars? How do uneven capabilities among regions affect the ability to act?

The program is sponsoring one more regional conference in Washington, D.C. that will bring together some 35 participants from Europe to discuss views on military intervention. The program will organize an Open Forum where conference participants can exchange views with American experts and practitioners. It will also work to bring the complex components of this difficult issue before the American public.

Regional Responses to Internal War Program Program Director: Mary Locke Program Officer: Jason Ladnier [email protected] Ph: x212 [email protected] Ph: x235 The Fund for Peace 1701 K Street, NW – 11th floor Washington, DC 20006 Phone: (202) 223-7940 FAX: (202) 223-7947 www.fundforpeace.org