Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst

BI-WEEKLY BRIEFING VOL. 16 NO. 11 04 JUNE 2014

Contents'' ' Analytical'Articles' ! CHECHEN'UNITS'DEPLOYED'IN'EASTERN'UKRAINE' ' ' ' '''''3!' Emil!Souleimanov! ! SHANGHAI'SUMMIT'MARKS'DEEPENING'' CHINA?KAZAKHSTAN'ECONOMIC'TIES 7 Richard!Weitz! ! CHINA'LAUNCHES'CAMPAIGN'AGAINST'UIGHUR'MILITANCY' ' ' '''11! Jacob!Zenn! ! REFORMING'’S'POLICE'IN'THE'POST?SAAKASHVILI'ERA' ' '''14! Erica!Marat!and!Deborah!Sutton! ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' Field'Reports' ' RIOTS'IN'’S'GBAO'RAISES'FEARS'' OF'BROADER'DESTABILIZATION' ' ' !!!! ! ! ! !!!18! Kirgizbek!Kanunov! ! KYRGYZ'GOVERNMENT'APPROVES'CUSTOMS'UNION'ROAD'MAP' ' !!!21! Arslan!Sabyrbekov! ! ELECTION'OBSERVERS'SENTENCED'IN'AZERBAIJAN' ' ' !! !!23' Mina!Muradova! ! SCO?CSTO'MERGER'RAISED'AT'DUSHANBE'CONFERENCE' ' ' !!25' Oleg!Salimov! THE CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASS ANALYST

Editor: Svante E. Cornell

Associate Editor: Niklas Nilsson

Assistant Editor, News Digest: Alima Bissenova

Chairman, Editorial Board: S. Frederick Starr

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is an English-language journal devoted to analysis of the current issues facing Central Asia and the Caucasus. It serves to link the business, governmental, journalistic and scholarly communities and is the global voice of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. The Editor of the Analyst solicits most articles and field reports, however authors are encouraged to suggest topics for future issues or submit articles and field reports for consideration. Such articles and field reports cannot have been previously published in any form, must be written in English, and must correspond precisely to the format and style of articles and field reports published in The Analyst, described below. The Analyst aims to provide our industrious and engaged audience with a singular and reliable assessment of events and trends in the region written in an analytical tone rather than a polemical one. Analyst articles reflect the fact that we have a diverse international audience. While this should not affect what authors write about or their conclusions, this does affect the tone of articles. Analyst articles focus on a newsworthy topic, engage central issues of the latest breaking news from the region and are backed by solid evidence. Articles should normally be based on local language news sources. Each 1,100-1,500 word analytical article must provide relevant, precise and authoritative background information. It also must offer a sober and analytical judgment of the issue as well as a clinical evaluation of the importance of the event. Authors must cite facts of controversial nature to the Editor who may contact other experts to confirm claims. Since Analyst articles are based on solid evidence, rather than rumors or conjecture, they prove to be reliable sources of information on the region. By offering balanced and objective analysis while keeping clear of inflammatory rhetoric, The Analyst does more to inform our international readership on all sides of the issues. The Editor reserves the right to edit the article to conform to the editorial policy and specifications of The Analyst and to reject the article should it not be acceptable to our editorial committee for publication. On acceptance and publication of the edited version of the article, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of The Johns Hopkins University-The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies will issue an honorarium to the author. It is up to the individual author to provide the correct paperwork to the Institute that makes the issuing of an honorarium possible. The copyright for the article or field report will reside with the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. However, the author may use all or part of the contracted article in any book or article in any media subsequently written by the author, provided that a copyright notice appears giving reference to the contracted article’s first publication by the "Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies."

Submission Guidelines: Analytical Articles require a three to four sentence Key Issue introduction to the article based on a news hook. Rather than a general, overarching analysis, the article must offer considered and careful judgment supported with concrete examples. The ideal length of analytical articles is between 1,100 and 1,500 words. The articles are structured as follows: KEY ISSUE: A short 75-word statement of your conclusions about the issue or news event on which the article focuses. BACKGROUND: 300-450 words of analysis about what has led up to the event or issue and why this issue is critical to the region. Include background information about the views and experiences of the local population. IMPLICATIONS: 300-450 words of analysis of the ramifications of this event or issue, including where applicable, implications for the local people’s future. CONCLUSIONS: 100-200 words that strongly state your conclusions about the impact of the event or issue.

Field Reports focus on a particular news event and what local people think about the event. Field Reports address the implications the event or activity analyzed for peoples’ lives and their communities. Field Reports do not have the rigid structure of Analytical Articles, and are shorter in length, averaging ca. 700-800 words.

Those interested in joining The Analyst’s pool of authors to contribute articles, field reports, or contacts of potential writers, please send your CV to: and suggest some topics on which you would like to write.

Svante E. Cornell Research Director; Editor, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University 1619 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, USA. Tel. +1-202-663-5922; 1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785 ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 3!

CHECHEN UNITS DEPLOYED IN EASTERN UKRAINE Emil Souleimanov

News has recently spread of the involvement of Chechens in the Ukraine crisis. According to numerous eyewitnesses, members of Chechen elite units, commonly known as kadyrovtsy, were spotted in the eastern Ukrainian city of Donetsk where they were reportedly deployed in combat against local Ukrainian troops. Soon, sources in Chechnya started informing of dozens of corpses of Chechens being transported from Ukraine back to this North Caucasian republic. The participation of the kadyrovtsy units in military operations outside the North Caucasus indicates a novel trend that could have broad security implications transcending the region’s borders.

BACKGROUND: In fact, began informing that dozens of corpses kadyrovtsy were deployed to Ukraine of kadyrovtsy were being transported to even before the fighting in the the republic. According to the Caucasus country’s east started a few weeks ago. Knot, only in the period of May 28-29, According to various sources, Chechen between 35 and 45 dead Chechens who units were part of the Russian troops reportedly participated in the fighting that took control of Crimea's strategic in Eastern Ukraine were brought to crossroads in March. Back then, their native towns and villages and kadyrovtsy were predominantly buried without much publicity. stationed in the eastern Crimean town Chechnya’s President Ramzan of Feodosia, with some detachments Kadyrov’s behavior deserves particular being spotted in various other locations attention. He has on several occasions across the peninsula. Yet, owing to the distanced himself from news that non-violent occupation of Crimea, Chechens are involved in the Ukraine Chechen units saw no combat in March crisis, but has nevertheless repeatedly and the recent fighting in the Donetsk asserted that should the circumstances province was a milestone in this regard. necessitate it and Putin give an explicit Allegations that Chechens are involved order, Chechens would readily in clashes in eastern Ukraine have volunteer to Ukraine to fight “fascists recurred frequently, though they were and banderovites.” In a manner typical never confirmed by independent of him, Kadyrov has boasted that sources. Yet the involvement of should the Chechens have been Chechens in the Donetsk province deployed in the Ukraine crisis, they became obvious a few days ago. Firstly, would have “long conquered Kyiv.” Ukrainian authorities claimed to have destroyed a group comprising dozens of Some sources suggest that Chechen Chechens in fierce clashes around authorities have exerted immense Donetsk International Airport on May pressure on Chechen youngsters within 27. Soon, various sources in Chechnya Chechnya and in cities of proper to volunteer to Ukraine. Chechen ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 4!

commentators pointing to the “uncontrollability” of kadyrovtsy are naive at the best. In fact, the kadyrovtsy are strictly subordinated to the Chechen authorities in general and to Kadyrov in particular. Secondly, due to their reputation as fierce and ruthless warriors, the deployment of Chechen

units is having a strong psychological authorities have allegedly gone so far as impact on and beyond the battlefield, to open recruitment centers in Grozny, while their extensive experience of Achkhoy-Martyan, Znamenskoye, and fighting small wars is in stark contrast Gudermes, while those resisting to the hitherto unconvincing recruitment have been deemed performance of the inexperienced “cowards.” Caucasian Knot also quotes Ukrainian troops. The kadyrovtsy a local source according to which, in constitute a significant force of around order to encourage recruitment to the seven thousand and if deployed in Ukraine battlefield, which is rather eastern Ukrainian battlefields in large unpopular among Chechens, authorities numbers, they could significantly promise around US$350 a day to any influence the course and outcome of the Chechen volunteering to the Ukraine ongoing conflict. conflict. Still, upon to the arrival of dozens of bodies of slain Chechens in Depending on the kadyrovtsy’s the republic, Kadyrov has somewhat performance in the Ukraine conflict, modified his rhetoric, mentioning on the Kremlin may increasingly seek to May 31 that 14 natives of Chechnya deploy them in the most controversial were deployed to Ukraine, of whom operations both within and outside one was killed and four injured. Chechnya and the North Caucasus. Nonetheless, Kadyrov maintained that Moscow is apparently distancing itself rumors of kadyrovtsy units being from straightforward interventions deployed to Ukraine are “absolutely outside Russia’s borders. Instead opting untrue,” and that armed Chechens for “masked occupation” techniques, located in the republic are mere the deployment an experienced, volunteers. reputed, devoted, yet presumably “informal” paramilitary-style force in IMPLICATONS: The deployment the form of kadyrovtsy is well suited to of Chechen units in the Eastern the Kremlin’s strategy and rhetoric. Ukraine clashes has engendered both discomfort and concern among By using the kadyrovtsy, the Kremlin Ukrainian authorities and troops. can claim it has nothing to do with Understandably, this deployment is a their deployment, pointing to their strong indicator of Moscow’s direct “uncontrollable” volunteering to involvement in Ukraine’s internal conflict zones. The Kremlin can assert conflict. The assertions of some that Kadyrov as a local strongman and ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 5! the head of a “subject of the tolerance if not encouragement of Federation” has his own agenda for Kadyrov’s often extravagant and ill- which it should not – and cannot – be bred behavior; and for Kadyrov’s held accountable. Accordingly, Moscow remaining in his Grozny office against can downplay controversial operations all odds. Kadyrov can be considered as a in the conflict zones – including the paramilitary version of Vladimir intimidation and blackmail of the Zhirinovsky, who figures as Putin’s internal opposition, journalists, and evil alter ego in that he explicitly voices international observers, practices in what many Kremlin hawks think but which the kadyrovtsy have rich hesitate to say openly. In contrast to experience – as the “autonomous” Zhirinovsky and his rhetoric, Kadyrov activities of Chechen volunteers. appears to be a “man of deeds.” The Instead, Moscow can point to the mere threat that the Kremlin might “cultural peculiarities” of the “Chechen deploy Kadyrov and his armed way of warfare,” an argument associates in the service of their episodically utilized by pro-Moscow Moscow overlords can serve to observers and officials to explain the intimidate potential opposition to Putin massive use of violence by kadyrovtsy in the North Caucasus as well as in against the relatives of local insurgents. Russia proper and beyond. While Russian secret services have CONCLUSIONS: It would be naive frequently used these intimidation- to think that Kadyrov pursues his own based strategies in both Crimea and policy in Ukraine. After devastating eastern Ukraine to silence internal counterinsurgency campaigns that have opposition to the Russian occupation, left thousands of fellow Chechens the fact that “Chechen butchers” are injured, humiliated, and dead, and their deployed in the fighting might render houses burned, Kadyrov has acquired their psychological impact even scores of enemies in blood feud in stronger. Symptomatic in this regards Chechnya. While the insurgency is Slovyansk’s self-styled pro-Russian movement has dwindled to dozens, in mayor Vyacheslav Ponomaryov’s large part due to Kadyrov’s cruel yet recent assertion that the Chechens, effective policy of liquidating “non-Slavic resistance fighters” who insurgents’ relatives and supporters, have “ignored [his order] not to go much larger numbers of ordinary anywhere for a week,” are to be blamed Chechens have postponed retaliation for the recent disappearance of the for better times. Should Kadyrov be OSCE monitors in the Luhansk ousted – and lose the backing of both province. Moscow and his kadyrovtsy units – The deployment of kadyrovtsy units is then his days, as well as those of his also an important explanation for the close relatives, would most likely be significant autonomy that Putin has numbered. allowed Kadyrov in Chechnya and the After the liquidation of most of the North Caucasus; for Moscow’s Yamadayev brothers several years ago, ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 6! the disbanding of the Yamadayevs’ Vostok battalion, which seems to form the cornerstone of the kadyrovtsy units now deployed in eastern Ukraine, showed the relative ease by which yamadayevtsy incarnated into kadyrovtsy. This move demonstrated the troops’ main desire to save their own lives as well as those of their family members. Kadyrov, vitally, needs to show his unwavering support for Putin, advocating the deployment of kadyrovtsy in zones of ongoing and prospective conflicts as a sign of his loyalty and devotion. The Kremlin appears increasingly eager to take advantage of this support and defiance stemming from among Crimea’s Tatar community presently appears to be the closest candidate for new deployments of kadyrovtsy. AUTHORS’ BIO: Emil Souleimanov is Associate Professor with the Department of Russian and East European Studies, Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic. He is the author of Understanding Ethnopolitical Conflict: Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia Wars Reconsidered (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) and An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective (Peter Lang, 2007). He can be reached at [email protected].

! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 7!

SHANGHAI SUMMIT MARKS DEEPENING CHINA- KAZAKHSTAN ECONOMIC TIES Richard Weitz

The recent signing of the Eurasian Union Treaty between Russia and several other former Soviet republics, combined with Russian actions in Ukraine and the massive Sino-Russian gas deal finalized during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to China, risks obscuring the continuing growth of Beijing’s influence in Central Asia, especially with Kazakhstan. When President Nursultan Nazarbayev conducted a state visit to China from May 19 to 22, he met with President Xi Jinping for the seventh time in less than a year. Although grassroots ties remain weak, energy and other economic ties between the two countries are booming.

BACKGROUND: Bilateral trade China-Kazakhstan Pipeline, over 14 between Kazakhstan and China percent more than the previous year. continues to grow. According to When in Shanghai, Nazarbayev said Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Economy and that if oil production at the massive Budget Planning, in 2013, bilateral trade Kashagan field reaches the planned 40 reached US$ 22.53 billion, with million tons each year, the two Kazakhstan exporting more than US$ countries may need to build another oil 14.334 billion while importing US$ 8.193 pipeline to send the oil to China. billion. China’s General During Nazarbayev’s visit, he and Xi Administration of Customs estimates formally launched a US$ 100 million bilateral trade at US$ 28.5 billion, an 11.3 project to construct a 21.6-hectare joint percent rise over 2012. The customs full-service logistics terminal project in agency calculates Kazakhstan’s exports Lianyungang City. Xi signed an to China at US$ 16 billion, a 14 percent agreement establishing this terminal increase, and imports at US$ 12.5 during his September 2013 visit to billion, a 9.3 percent rise from the Kazakhstan. Located in eastern China’s previous year. Despite the different Jiangsu Province, Lianyungang is one figures provided by the two of the world’s largest and busiest ports. governments, both agree that Kazakhstan sees this terminal as a Kazakhstan runs a multi-billion dollar gateway for cargo trade throughout the surplus due to China’s purchasing large Asia-Pacific region. The port has rail volumes of Kazakhstan’s energy and links with other large Chinese ports other natural resources. In 2013, China such as Qingdao, Tianjin, Dalian and imported a record high level of 11.85 Shanghai as well as maritime million tons of crude oil through the connections with Japan’s port of Osaka ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 8!

develop relations in the oil and gas sector and the mining industry. Nazarbayev told the press that Chinese investors would also participate in projects to produce glyphosate in the town of Taraz, build a power plant in the Kostanay region near the Turgay coal deposits, and manufacture nitrogen fertilizers in the Aktobe and and South Korea’s port of Busan. Mangystau regions. Thanks to the Kazakhstan Temir Zholy (KTZ) is surge in Chinese foreign direct partnering with the city government of investment (FDI) in Kazakhstan since Lianyungang to construct the logistics 2008, the value of Chinese FDI in terminal. In February 2014, KTZ and Kazakhstan now exceeds US$ 17 billion, Lianyungang Port Company making it one of the top 20 sources of established a joint venture, the FDI in Kazakhstan. The government “Kazakhstan-China International would like to see more Chinese FDI in Logistics Company of port sectors critical for Kazakhstan’s future Lianyungang,” to manage the facility. economic development, such as During a March 2014 visit to China, chemicals, electronics, mining, and KZT CEO Askar Mamin said that the mechanical engineering. company planned to increase its export IMPLICATIONS: One reason for and transit container transport through China’s growing presence in the port to 250,000 twenty-foot Kazakhstan is the country’s enormous equivalent units by 2015 and double this financial resources. Chinese banks capacity by 2020. During Nazarbayev’s marked Nazarbayev’s visit by visit, Xi said that China would announcing two large loans to welcome Kazakhstan’s participation in Kazakhstan. The Export-Import Bank the Shanghai Free Trade Zone. of China will give the Development A number of major investment Bank of Kazakhstan (DBK) (a agreements worth some US$ 10 billion subsidiary of the Baiterek holding were announced during Nazarbayev’s company) a US$ 1 billion loan to visit. The KazMunayGas National Oil modernize the Shymkent oil refinery Company and the China National on preferential terms offered fellow Petroleum Corporation signed an members of the Shanghai Cooperation agreement to construct a US$ 150 Organization. The refinery intends to million plant to manufacture oil and use the fund to increase its annual fuel gas pipes in the Almaty region. production to 6 million tons. The Kazakhstan’s Samruk Kazyna China Development Bank also Sovereign Welfare Fund and the China presented DBK with a US$ 500 million International Trust and Investment credit line to finance joint projects Corporation (CITIC) signed a outside the natural resource extraction memorandum of understanding to sector. One candidate area might be ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 9! developing Kazakhstan’s civil aviation and President Xi’s “Chinese Dream” industry. After meeting with and other development and reform Nazarbayev in Shanghai, the president programs. of the Aviation Industry Corporation A persistent challenge has been that of China (AVIC) said that Nazarbayev societal links between their societies wanted to sign a contract later this year have been lagging behind their growing with AVIC, which established a joint commercial ties. In 2011, Nazarbayev venture, Otan Avic, in April, to told visiting Chinese President Hu produce medium-sized aircraft in Jintao that both sides should expand Kazakhstan using Chinese their humanitarian ties. The following technologies. In February 2014, the year, the Kazinform News Agency China Development Bank gave signed a cooperation agreement in the KazTransGas a US$ 700-million 15-year field of electronic information with the loan to complete Kazakhstan’s Beyneu- Chinese People’s Daily newspaper, Bozoi-Shymkent pipeline. With the followed by similar agreements with construction of the 311-km Beyneu- the Xinhua and Tianshannet news Bozoi line and the Karaozek agencies. In March 2014, Kazinform compressor station in the Kyzylorda News Agency launched a Chinese region, the pipeline’s capacity will rise language website to coincide with its to 10 billion cubic meters annually. existing offerings in the Kazakh, In September 2013, Xi made a state visit Russian, and English languages. CEO to Kazakhstan and delivered a speech at Dauren Diyarov said that the new Nazarbayev University in which he website “would make a significant proposed building a “New Silk Road contribution to the development of [that] will serve as an economic belt of political, economic, social and Eurasia … connecting three billion humanitarian ties between our two people from the Pacific to the Baltic Sea countries.” The PRC Ambassador to with Kazakhstan as a key partner along Kazakhstan, Le Yucheng, agreed that the way.” Kazakh officials have “cooperation between China and embraced Xi’s proposals as harmonious Kazakhstan in various areas is with their “Kazakhstan – New Silk inseparable from understanding and Road” program. In addition, Xi signed support of our people. To do this, the 23 documents whose value Foreign media of the two countries should Minister Erlan Idrissov later estimated create conditions for the improvement at more than US$ 30 billion. Idrissov of public opinion in favor of deepening has described deepening relations with the strategic partnership between China China as an important element of and Kazakhstan.” When Nazarbayev Kazakhstan’s new foreign policy was in Shanghai, the Xinhua news concept for 2020 and its long-term agency conducted an online Kazakhstan-2050 Development conversation between him and Chinese Strategy. The Chinese and Kazakhstani Internet users. Xinhua then published officials and media have noted his responses to some of the more than similarities between these strategies 1,000 questions asked him. ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 10!

Yet, popular contacts would increase if perhaps other barriers between China China would include Kazakhstan in the and Kazakhstan. 45 countries whose tourists can visit AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Richard Beijing, Shanghai Guangzhou, and Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Director other large Chinese cities for 72 hours of the Center for Political-Military without a visa. So far, only a few Analysis at Hudson Institute. Chinese localities, notably the town of Tacheng in Xinjiang’s northern Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, have established such a special visa regime.

In 2013, more than 10,000 Kazakh tourists visited Tacheng through the 3- day visa-free regime. Tacheng authorities would like Kazakhstan to introduce a similar 72-hour visa-free regime for Chinese nationals who stay at the popular tourist attraction of Lake Alakol in East Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan has entered into visa-free agreements with several more countries in recent years, but not China. CONCLUSIONS: While in China, Nazarbayev expressed interest in pursuing Xi’s “Silk Road Economic Belt” initiative and reconfirmed the mutual goal of raising bilateral trade to US$ 40 billion by 2016. Yet, additional progress is needed in developing the transportation infrastructure connecting the two countries, overcoming unsupportive visa policies, and in combatting illegal commercial practices. Kazakhstan’s close economic ties with Russia have also disrupted China-Kazakhstan economic ties. For example, Moscow has tried to prevent the smuggling of cheap Chinese goods into Russia through the Russia- Kazakhstan-Belarus Customs Union by pressuring Astana to tighten controls at the border between Kazakhstan and China. The newly launched Eurasian Union could erect further economic and ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 11!

CHINA LAUNCHES CAMPAIGN AGAINST UIGHUR MILITANCY Jacob Zenn

Recent terrorist attacks in China show that international jihadists have infiltrated or influenced the Uighur nationalist cause. The increasing frequency of car-bombings and suicide bombings in Xinjiang and cities in eastern China attest to the use of al-Qaeda’s tactics, which militants in China may have learned from training with Central Asian jihadists in Pakistan, Afghanistan or Syria or seeing videos that militant groups disseminate on the Internet or through underground Islamist networks in China. In May 2014, China launched a one-year campaign to crack down on terrorism intended to uncover terrorist networks and extremist groups. However, the crackdown may also alienate Xinjiang’s Uighur population and boost recruitment into militant groups if the new counter-terrorism measures are perceived as over-reaching or invasive.

BACKGROUND: Since the July Tiananmen Square, Beijing, killing 2009 riots in Urumqi, Xinjiang’s themselves and several tourists in a capital, in which more than 200 ethnic subsequent explosion. Then, in March Uighurs and Hans were killed, al- 2014, a group of Uighur militants Qaeda and other militant groups, such stabbed to death 29 pedestrians in a as the Uighur-led Turkistan Islamic train station in Kunming, Yunnan Party in Pakistan (TIP), have Province after the group was reportedly increasingly incorporated “East rejected from crossing Yunnan’s border Turkistan” into their vision for an with Laos in order to reach Malaysia Islamic Caliphate. At the same, in and possibly then to Turkey. In April China mistrust between Hans and 2014, two suicide bombers (or militants Uighurs has increased as a result of the with explosives in their briefcases) riots, even though Urumqi returned to detonated their explosives at the train stability and normalcy by mid-2010. station in Urumqi, killing themselves Nonetheless, attacks in Xinjiang and injuring dozens of civilians. In a increased in 2011, with several mass- possible “copycat” of the Kunming stabbings or car-rammings of Han attack, on May 6, 2014, a small group of Chinese pedestrians and clashes Uighurs carried out another stabbing at between Chinese security officers and a train station in Guangzhou, injuring Uighurs. several civilians. Finally, in the largest Since October 2013, the violence has of all attacks, on May 28, several escalated in several ways. First, on Uighur militants in cars drove down a October 31, 2013 an Uighur family of market street in Urumqi, throwing three crashed a car into a gate in explosives and detonating bombs, ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 12!

local intelligence officials, “foreign militants along with their families have taken refuge in recent years, including Chechens, Uzbeks, Chinese, Turkmen, Tajiks and Uighurs.” This likely included TIP camps, which have gained notoriety for featuring women and pre- teenage children in propaganda videos engaged in militant training with killing themselves and more than 30 rocket launchers and AK-47s in the civilians. mountainous areas of the Afghanistan- IMPLICATIONS: This most recent Pakistan border region. attack in Urumqi prompted President China’s new crackdown on terrorists is Xi Jinping to announce a one-year having a wide impact on various sectors counter-terrorism crackdown. There is of society from schoolchildren in already palpable evidence of the Xinjiang to commuters in Beijing, but crackdown on the streets in Urumqi, will likely have the most significant – with armed personnel carriers but least visible – impact on Uighurs in patrolling major intersections and small towns and cities throughout groups of uniformed soldiers with Xinjiang. This is where Chinese machine guns visibly carrying out soldiers will be searching for bomb- patrols. Moreover, schools now have making equipment and propaganda several security personnel with non- materials that encourage violence of lethal weapons, such as clubs, outside of extremism. In Xinjiang, China’s the entrance and are carrying out anti- crackdown is likely to be “offensive,” terrorism drills to prepare for the which, according to Chinese reports, possibility of a terrorist attack. In other resulted in the discovery of 1.8 tons of cities, such as Beijing, there are now 30- explosives in Hotan, southern Xinjiang minute lines to enter the subway and the break-up of a “terrorist gang” because of new stricter security checks, planning attacks in Xinjiang. while in Yili, northwestern Xinjiang, During Xi Jinping’s visit to Xinjiang – the Chinese government held a mass which coincided with the attack on trial in a stadium on May 28, in which Urumqi’s train station and the separate 55 people were sentenced to prison, beheading of three Chinese police including three to the death penalty. officers in Korla – he emphasized in a Outside of China, it also appears that conversation with ethnic Han Beijing has leveraged its influence on schoolteachers that they should learn Pakistan for the country to crack down some Uighur language. Though some on the TIP and other Central Asian people interpreted this to mean that militants on its territory. On May 23, they should learn Uighur to better Pakistan began shelling villages near teach Uighur children Mandarin Miranshah in North Waziristan along Chinese, it also likely represented Xi’s the Afghan border where, according to ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 13! recognition that communication is a territory, has the capacity to counter key obstacle to stable relations between such networks. This makes the SCO Hans and Uighurs in Xinjiang. The and CICA more important for language barrier is one factor that leads coordinating regional security and to the existence of separate Uighur and training and will likely lead to a more Han Chinese neighborhoods in prominent role for such institutions in Xinjiang, which undermines China’s the near future. mantra of a “harmonious society,” and CONCLUSIONS: The increase in also makes it more difficult for Han sophistication and likely also Chinese security officers to gain internationalization of Uighur knowledge about grassroots Islamist militancy has led China to reassess its networks in Xinjiang when patrolling counter-terrorism strategy. The success in local villages. Therefore, if the or failure of this new strategy – judged crackdown leads to a renewed effort at in terms of whether attacks continue or improving communication between the decrease – will likely shape the legacy security forces and Uighurs, as well as Xi Jinping’s first term in office and more generally between Hans and force China to recalibrate its relations Uighurs and other minorities, it could with neighboring countries in Central also improve the overall security Asia and regional institutions, such as environment in Xinjiang. the SCO and CICA, to ensure their Outside of China, a key aspect of participation in the crackdown on China’s counterterrorism strategy is militancy. The stakes will be high for coordination with neighboring China, as the country can ill afford countries, such as Pakistan and more instability on its western front , and regional institutions, while relations with Vietnam, other such as the Shanghai Cooperation South China Sea countries, Japan and Organization (SCO) and Conference the Koreas on the eastern front are also on Interaction and Confidence Building becoming more volatile. Measures in Asia (CICA). CICA held AUTHOR’S BIO: Jacob Zenn is an its summit in Shanghai at the time of analyst of Eurasian and African Affairs the May 28 multiple car-bombing attack for the Jamestown Foundation and in Urumqi, marking yet another non-resident research fellow of the terrorist attack in Xinjiang that Center of Shanghai Cooperation undermined a major political event for Studies (COSCOS) in Shanghai. He Xi. The transnationalization of testified before the U.S. Congress on terrorist networks in Xinjiang Islamist Militant Threats to Central necessitates that China improves Asia in February 2013. intelligence-sharing and military preparedness with other countries. While Pakistan appears to be responsive to Chinese pressure, it is unclear whether Kyrgyzstan, which has seen Uighur militant networks on its ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 14!

REFORMING GEORGIA’S POLICE IN THE POST-SAAKASHVILI ERA Erica Marat and Deborah Sutton

The reform of Georgia’s police, starting from 2004 under former President Mikheil Saakashvili, represents an unprecedented success in the post-Soviet region. Corruption among rank-and-file police personnel was largely defeated, and the police in general became more professional in responding to citizens’ concerns. However, the reform proceeded without public oversight and participation of the parliament, leading to a politicization of the security sector. In the 2012 parliamentary elections, the Georgian Dream opposition coalition pledged to open the security sector for public input. After a brief period of openness to external oversight in 2013, the window of opportunity for public- police collaboration is again closing.

BACKGROUND: Georgia interior minister and Saakashvili. The represents a unique example of interior minister, who must by law be a Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) civilian, took strategic and operational reform as a result of broader political decisions without public input or change. After the 2003 Rose Revolution, parliamentary review. Post-reform, President Saakashvili together with a parliamentary oversight of the MIA’s small group of close confidants work remained weak, and the MIA advanced a broad range of reforms that arguably became the most powerful made Georgia one of the most structure in the country. Westernized post-communist states. Because reforms were conducted Reforms focused on eradicating the without public oversight, public influence of organized criminal groups suspicion about high-level corruption in in the capital, Tbilisi, and across the the MIA mounted. Just two weeks country. Police reform was only part of before the October 2012 parliamentary a broader agenda to transform public election, videos appearing to document administration, fight corruption, and cases of torture and rape in the Gldani improve the rule of law. prison were leaked to the Internet, Unfortunately, the MIA’s reform raising widespread concerns about efforts were imposed top-down by human rights abuses in detention powerful state officials, without public facilities. Georgian Dream’s leader accountability or debate. Under the Bidzina Ivanishvili came to power in constitution, the parliament is given October 2012 promising to depoliticize formal authority over the MIA, but in the country’s security apparatus by reality police reform took the form of a separating national security services private collaboration between the from the MIA, opening up for public ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 15!

announced Alexander Tchikaidze as his replacement as interior minister. Widely unknown and very young at only 28, Tchikaidze became the head of the MIA only six years after joining it as a police officer in 2008. It seems that Garibashvili has been highly influential in all steps towards Tchikaidze’s early rise to prominence and power. input and oversight, and eradicating Together, Garibashvili and Tchikaidze corruption at the top political level. In have resurged efforts to prosecute effect, the changes were to catch up on previous government officials from the the democratic aspect of the police current main opposition party, reform and reinforcing the including Tchikaidze’s predecessors on independence of the judiciary, which the post, Vano Merabishvili and remained largely unreformed during Bachana Akhalaia, on charges of abuse Saakashvili’s reign. of power, torture, and fabrication of The changes were indeed significant in evidence during their terms. The chief the first year following the elections. prosecutor was forced to resign after a Ucha Nanuashvili, a renowned human criminal history and proof of abuse rights activist with years of experience, during office were leaked. was appointed as the new Public IMPLICATIONS: Since his Defender (Ombudsman). Furthermore, appointment, Tchikaidze has taken a civil society activists and journalists proactive role in anti-corruption were allowed access to prisons and reforms of law enforcement agencies, police facilities. Two nongovernmental the MIA, and the government as a organizations, Georgian Young whole. More severe laws against Lawyers Association (GYLA) and organized crime have been passed, Transparency International (TI), led especially targeting trafficking in drugs the efforts to draft the new law on the and humans, while crime-fighting police. Although included in the coalitions have been built with other lawmaking, GYLA and TI were given governments. Finally, a Tbilisi insufficient time to conduct a detention center was remodeled and comprehensive review, thus the NGOs expanded, showing the new minister’s were only able to review 40 percent of commitment to criminal prosecution. the bill before it went onto the Yet, critics of the new leadership argue parliament floor. Nevertheless, the new that the government’s openness to police law was adopted in October 2013 public input is temporary and is rapidly as a result of the first successful NGO- waning. According to one former MIA collaboration in Georgia’s history member of the Saakashvili of independence. administration, “The government was In November, the then-Prime open the first year because it lacked Minister-designate, Irakli Garibashvili, ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 16! confidence.” According to this view, The report commends the MIA for its the ministry is more interested in efforts to destroy unlawful recordings prosecuting its opponents than of citizens’ personal lives after the improving respect for human rights illegal surveillance project was leaked to among police personnel and opening up the public earlier that year. However, to public oversight. the report also noted the state’s Furthermore, critics argue that the frequent failure to ensure the right to ministry relies on the success achieved assembly and religion, its unlawful by the previous leadership and has done suspension of public servants, its unjust little to introduce new innovations that treatment of citizens by police would continue to transform the authorities, its over-tolerance of country’s police. Most changes in the violence against women and children, post-October 2012 period were of a and its lack of healthcare and programs populist, not reformative, nature. for the disabled. Likewise, NGOs have Examples include the popular decision repeatedly raised concerns about cases to decrease traffic fines and expand the of alleged ill-treatment of citizens in academic curriculum at the Police police custody and violence Academy. implemented by representatives of police and penitentiary institutions. Finally, complaints from NGOs about the MIA’s transparency issues Furthermore, TI confirmed that the increased again in late 2013 and 2014, MIA has ministry officials positioned voicing dissatisfaction with the new in both the Georgian Public government’s approach to Broadcaster and the Georgian National depoliticizing the police. According to Communications Commission, in GYLA, measures to reduce the ability violation of Georgian law. Two of incumbent political leaders to use the directors of the television station police against opponents are Channel 25 reported that they were insufficient. The new police law unlawfully detained, threatened, and continues to allow the deputy interior pressured by ten members of the Chief minister to belong to a political party, Prosecutor’s Office to release false sending signals about his political testimonies to officials in order for the loyalty further down the chain of Ministry to fabricate a criminal case command to regular police officers. against high level officials in the former Human Rights for Georgia also government. reported that the MIA continues to Finally, the parliament continues to be monitor 21,000 cell phones every day weak in its oversight of the MIA and despite its claim to end massive the Prime Minister. The parliamentary surveillance methods exercised by the committee on legal issues assigned to previous government. deal with the MIA reform is the In December 2013, the Public Defender strongest committee in the parliament, released a report on human rights and yet it has little leverage over the freedoms in Georgia for the year 2013. government. This is largely due to the ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 17!

Georgian Dream favoritism seen in the appointment of government and parliamentary positions. Ivanishvili’s closest allies occupy top government posts, including in the security sector, while the parliament is populated by the coalition’s less influential members. In sum, after a brief period of openness to external oversight in 2013, the window of opportunity for public- police collaboration seems to be closing again. CONCLUSIONS: Georgia’s case of police reform demonstrates the difficulty of shedding post-Soviet legacy, as even democratically elected political incumbents will be tempted to rely on the police’s loyalty rather than the law. Despite a strong civil society and political opposition, it is easy for political incumbents to expand the police’s functions in order to intensify their political influence. Georgia has made some positive steps towards opening the MIA to public oversight. Yet, there is still a long way to go before police become accountable to the public rather than the political brass. The country’s NGOs and MIA officials must continue to look for ways to establish venues for constructive collaboration. A successful public- police dialogue is indispensable for Georgia’s democratic development. AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Erica Marat is a Nonresident Research Fellow with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center and a Visiting Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Deborah Sutton is a research assistant at the Woodrow Wilson Center. ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 18!

RIOTS IN TAJIKISTAN’S GBAO RAISES FEARS OF BROADER DESTABILIZATION Kirgizbek Kanunov

On May 21, 2014, a shooting incident with the Kremlin, hinted of Western occurred in Khorog, the capital of involvement in the Khorog unrest. Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Prior to the incident in Khorog, a Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), message from an anonymous source, involving local residents and law claiming to be a resident of Khorog by enforcement personnel. As a result of the name Shakarmamadov, was the shooting, three people were killed, disseminated in social networks and including a law enforcement officer, media collaborating with the Tajik and several were wounded. special services. The message According to witnesses, the incident mentioned a meeting between began when three residents of Khorog Muhammadbokir Muhammadbokirov, were shot at in their vehicle, a local leader and former opposition presumably by officers of the Special warlord, and representatives of the Police Force (OMON). However, the Delegation of the EU, accusing them of official statement of the Tajik Interior destabilizing the situation in GBAO, in Ministry claims that the police officers a fashion similar to what recently took wanted to detain suspected criminals place in the Ukraine. Simultaneously, whom they believed were in the the influential MP and former State vehicle, and that the police officers had Advisor of the President of Tajikistan to use force because the driver and Amirkul Azimov openly accused the passengers resisted arrest. EU and NATO of attempting to Concurrently, it was reported on May destabilize the situation in Khorog. 20 that Taliban insurgents took over the Yet despite open accusations of the EU county of Yamgan in the Afghan and the U.S. being involved in the province of northern Badakhshan Khorog unrest, Tajik authorities across the river from Khorog. officially demonstrate support for their The developments in Khorog beg the policies in the region. For example, on question of whether they were the June 3, the Deputy Minister of Foreign result of a localized confrontation Affairs and daughter of Tajikistan’s between law enforcement and the President, Emomali Rahmon Ozoda, public or part of a larger destabilization who leads the annual review of political of GBAO, and perhaps of Tajikistan consultations between the Tajikistan more broadly. It is important to note and the U.S., emphasized the U.S.’s that even before the details of the role in the international coalition incident were confirmed, the Russian against terrorism in Afghanistan and media, including one influential its impact on security in Central Asia Internet source presumably associated as a whole. She also praised the work of ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 19!

USAID in Tajikistan. It is notable that Russia, where they face arbitrary law USAID, along with the Soros enforcement and violence from Foundation, is a frequent subject of nationalist groups such as skinheads. criticism in Tajikistan’s state media. In light of this bleak socio-economic According to observers, individuals situation in the region, the potential for directly connected with the secret public protest is growing. The same services created social media accounts, sentiment exists in other regions of particularly on Facebook, prior to the Tajikistan and analysts claim that some incident in Khorog and initiated radical forces in Tajikistan are even discussions aiming to discredit Tajik considering the possibility of opposition leaders and former warlords cooperating with the Taliban. in GBAO. Some analysts are pessimistic about the A full-scale military operation prospect for dialogue between the involving all Tajikistan’s law government and protesters in Khorog. enforcement agencies took place in According to Tajik journalist Marat Khorog on July 24, 2012, which resulted Mamadshoev, Tajik authorities are not in numerous victims among the civilian ready for dialogue with civil society as population. Until now, according to they consider any concessions as a sign Tajik human rights activists and local of weakness. “Other regions of residents, the authorities have failed to Tajikistan face similar problems. Tajik carry out an objective investigation into authorities are unwilling to set a the 2012 incident. Locals believe that the precedent, by agreeing to the wishes of officials responsible for the deaths of residents of Khorog, in fear of the so- civilians have not been punished. On called domino effect” says the contrary, many civil society Mamadshoev. activists taking part in peaceful Nevertheless, following talks between demonstrations during the 2012 incident the government and protesters a joint have since faced continuous harassment commission was set up, including and prosecution in spite of an government and civil society agreement between security forces and representatives, to investigate the civil society representatives in 2012 recent events, and an agreement promising all protestors amnesty. between the government and protesters Observers argue that no major social in Khorog was signed on May 31. The issues have been resolved in GBAO in authorities recognized 7 out of 9 of the the last two decades. Since protesters’ demands. However, the key independence, the state has not created points demanding the resignation of a single company in the region and the security officials and an amnesty for small number of industries established rioters still hovers in the air, and the there during Soviet times have possibility of a new escalation cannot declined. In the context of the general be ruled out. unemployment rate, young people are The decision of the Tajik authorities to forced to leave GBAO to work in make partial concessions to the ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 20! protesters could either mean that they are seriously concerned over stability in the country, or as another tactical maneuver in order to gain time and gradually neutralize the protest and opposition sentiment in the area. The most recent incident in Khorog took place shortly ahead of the withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan and Tajikistan’s 2015 parliamentary elections, both of which heighten the risk of destabilization in Tajikistan. ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 21!

KYRGYZ GOVERNMENT APPROVES CUSTOMS UNION ROAD MAP Arslan Sabyrbekov

On May 12, after many rounds of Customs Union. Within its negotiations, the Kyrgyz government framework, parliamentarians should has approved the road map to join the adopt around 100 new legislative acts Russia-led Customs Union. According and only then a special treaty indicating to Kyrgyzstan’s Minster for Economy, concrete terms of entry with all the Temir Sariev, the document was preferences will be developed.” The submitted to the parliament to be Kyrgyz Prime Minister did not exclude thoroughly reviewed and debated by its the possibility of asking for extra time committee on international affairs and for preparations before assuming full fiscal policies. In the meantime, the membership in the Union. According Kyrgyz public is still engaged in heavy to local analyst Azamat Akeleev, discussions with some approving the Moscow might support this request, decision and others disapproving it. “due to its heavy geopolitical interest in Indeed, over the past couple of years, expanding the Customs Union but there has been a fierce debate on might not find full support among its Kyrgyzstan joining the Customs Union other members.” In one of his with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, interviews, Kazakh Vice-Prime with which Kyrgyzstan conducts more Minister Bakytjan Sagyntaev stated than 40 percent of its external trade. that is asking for too many The terms of the country’s accession to preferences, which according to him the Union was negotiated at numerous “are not in the competency of the occasions and none of the road maps Customs Union” and suggested that presented earlier satisfied Bishkek’s Kyrgyzstan should instead join the preferences. This time, the sides have directly. managed to reach an agreement and the On May 29, upon the invitation of his Kyrgyz government approved the Kazakh colleague, President presented terms of entry into the Atambayev took part in the Astana Union. meeting of the Eurasian Economic According to state officials, the Council. The presidents of Russia, approval of the road map does not mean Kazakhstan, and Belarus have signed an that Kyrgyzstan is already a member of agreement on forming the Eurasian the Customs Union. The recently Economic Union. The Russian side nominated Kyrgyz Prime Minister expressed its readiness to assist the Djoomart Otorbaev stated that “the Kyrgyz Republic in carrying out all the road map forms a legal basis for preparatory procedures necessary to harmonizing the country’s legislation join the Customs Union and later the in accordance with the terms of the EEU as well. For these purposes, the ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 22! presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Russia have issued a joint statement criticizing reached an agreement to form a joint the government’s failure to launch a “Development Fund,” with a capital of wide public discussion on the matter. US$ 1 billion. Additionally, Russia has Activists called on the country’s promised to transfer US$ 200 million authorities to adhere to democratic on a grant basis. This money, according principles, carry out public dialogue, to Minister for Economy Sariev, will be and to undertake a thorough analysis of used “to implement the recently the presented road map and its concrete approved road map.” impact on various sectors of After the approval of the road map, Kyrgyzstan’s socio-economic life. heavy discussions started in the Indeed, the question of joining the parliament, with its factions making Russia-led Customs Union has divided varying remarks. The Social Democrats the Kyrgyz public. Lacking detailed welcomed the government’s decision to information on the consequences of approve the road map and prepare to joining the Customs Union, people join the Customs Union, which they have come to perceive the matter as a consider to be in line with the country’s question of being pro or anti-Russia. economic as well as geopolitical The Kyrgyz public TV channels tend interests. According to them, to feature experts delivering one-sided Kyrgyzstan cannot abstain from pro-Customs Union views. Thus, at integration processes taking place this stage, the call from civil society among its geopolitical and strategic activists is justified and the government partners. Yet opponents of the Customs should do a better job at explaining to Union, the independent MPs Ravshan the public of what awaits them in the Jeenbekov and Omurbek future. Abdrakhmanov have once again warned the government of the negative consequences of this decision, naming high inflation rates, price increases for many commodities, as well as the loss of sovereignty for Kyrgyzstan. The MPs described the government’s decision as “unconstitutional,” meaning that discussions in the country’s legislature is taking place only after the road map was approved, in conflict with the principles that “underlines the very core of the parliamentarian republic.” In the meantime, civil activists and prominent members of the Supervisory Councils under a number of ministries ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 23!

ELECTION OBSERVERS SENTENCED IN AZERBAIJAN Mina Muradova

On May 26, Azerbaijani authorities founders and members of the EMC sentenced the Election Monitoring and then established a new organization – Democracy Studies Center (EMDSC) EMDS. Despite two appeals to the Chairman, Anar Mammadli, to five- Ministry of Justice, the government and-a-half years in prison on highly “illegally and groundlessly” refused to questionable charges ranging from tax recognize the union, Mammadli said. evasion and illegal entrepreneurship to Isabel Santos, the chair of the OSCE abuse of office. The authorities also Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee convicted the organization’s executive on Democracy, Human Rights and director, Bashir Suleymanli, to three- Humanitarian Questions, expressed and-a-half years and the head of a concern on May 28 that Mammadli’s partner NGO called International “only crime” may have been his work Cooperation of Volunteers, Elnur to defend the rights of his country’s Mammadov, who got a two-year voters. “The Azerbaijani government’s suspended sentence. Addressing the systematic targeting of civil society has judge, Mammadli expressed his opinion reached a new low with the sentencing on the sentence by saying: “Just abuse of Anar Mammadli,” Santos said. “His Femida and let's get this over with.” conviction and sentencing represents an Prior to the verdict, Mammadli affront to OSCE values in the sphere of delivered his closing speech and said: human rights and democratic “Azerbaijan will chair Council of commitments.” The U.S. Embassy in Europe’s Council of Ministers for the Azerbaijan termed the convictions “a next six months. Atletico Madrid major setback to Azerbaijan’s carries an ‘Azerbaijan Land of Fire’ sign democratic development.” on their T-shirts. These could be good Oktay Gulaliyev, head of the Public promotions for our country. However, Alliance “Azerbaijan without political unfortunately, our country is to be prisoners” noted that the recent known not as a ‘land of fire’ but as a repressions against journalists and civil ‘Land of political prisoners’ instead.” society activists proves that the Mammadli was accused of engaging in authorities have intensified the illegal entrepreneurship without repression against alternative voices. creating a legal entity, while he stated Apart from three election observers, that he was acting as an individual there were recent arrests of journalist taxpayer. On May 14, 2008, the court and bloggers, youth activists and annulled the registration of human rights defenders. In early May, Mammadli’s first organization - the the Baku Court of Grave Crimes Elections Monitoring Center. The sentenced eight young Azerbaijani ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 24! activists, most of whom were members election. The Centre’s statement on of the NIDA civic movement that election noted extensive violations promoting democracy, human rights, of fundamental freedoms and a range of and rule of law, to between six and other shortcomings in the electoral eight years of imprisonment. In 2013, process, many of which were also they were involved in a series of observed and reported by the OSCE. peaceful protests against the deaths of Mubariz Gurbanli, a senior figure in young soldiers in non-combat the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan party, could situations. not see any connection between According to the Committee to Protect Mammadli’s activities and his arrest Journalists, there are 10 cases of soon afterwards. “This case should not journalists in detention or prison on be politicized. Elections in Azerbaijan “politically motivated” charges in were transparent, free and democratic Azerbaijan. In addition, five bloggers … This court case was pursued because are currently behind bars. the [EMDS] organization broke the “The number of political prisoners in law,” he told RFE/RL. Azerbaijan is so great that they have Azerbaijan’s President , been sorted into groups: prisoners of commenting on the issue during a visit ‘hijab’, prisoners of ‘Eurovision’, etc.” - to NATO headquarters in Brussels last Gulaliyev said during a June 4 January, reiterated his position that no conference on the problem of political political prisoners exist in his country. prisoners in Azerbaijan. The number of He said that a resolution on the prisoners with politically-motivated existence of political prisoners in charges is assessed to between 150 and Azerbaijan was voted down by a 170. majority of the Council of Europe's “Unfortunately, Mr. Mammadli's Parliamentary Assembly last year and detention adds to the concerning noted that neither the Council of human rights backdrop for the OSCE Europe nor the European Parliament Parliamentary Assembly’s annual has yet agreed on the definition of a session in Baku next month. I hope that political prisoner. our presence there will encourage the judicial system to take a hard look at its record on OSCE commitments and signal that these violations will not go unnoticed,” Santos said. The 23rd Annual Session of the OSCE PA will take place in Azerbaijan’s capital from June 28 to July 2, 2014. Mammadli was a key speaker at briefings for the OSCE PA’s observation delegation in October 2013, on the eve of Azerbaijan's presidential ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 25!

SCO-CSTO MERGER RAISED AT DUSHANBE CONFERENCE Oleg Salimov

This year, Tajikistan presides over the the CSTO, which he presented as being Shanghai Cooperation Organization of key importance to regional security (SCO). The center of strategic research and stability. under the president of Tajikistan held a The statement was a preceded by a conference titled “SCO and the meeting of the executive deputies of the provision of regional security: problems Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the and perspectives” in mid-May, 2014. Commonwealth of Independent States The conference was devoted to (CIS), the CSTO, and the SCO on expanding the SCO’s ability to provide April 24, 2014 in the CSTO Moscow regional security, and the merger of headquarter. For the most part, the four SCO and the Collective Security organizations unify former Soviet Treaty Organization (CSTO) was a republics and are commonly seen as primary topic of discussion. alternatives to Western international Aside from issues pertaining to trade organizations. The attendees of this and infrastructure, the conference meeting discussed means for improving focused on new threats and challenges coordination and interaction in to regional security and the conditions of growing international implications of the U.S./NATO confrontation, with reference to the withdrawal from Afghanistan. The current Ukrainian crisis and regional SCO’s members presented a declaration and global security threats. The containing provisions on increasing the CSTO’s Secretary General, Nikolai organizations’ security potential, Borduzha, announced that the CSTO including integrated security measures has halted its contacts with NATO as a for all states based on a common result of NATO’s position on the crisis interpretation of current realities; a in Ukraine, and will instead search for strategy for the SCO’s development partners in the Asia-Pacific region. In and influence in the international particular, the CSTO will seek closer arena; the development of regional ties with the SCO and its partners, infrastructure, industry, transportation, particularly China and Iran. Hence, the and trade; and the expansion of SCO; recent SCO conference in Dushanbe all aimed to increase the SCO’s became a platform for further probing political weight in the world. into the possibility of merging the SCO The most notable statement at the and CSTO. conference was made by the host The calls for such a merger highlight country’s representative, Khudoberdy the growing rift between the West and Kholiknazarov, who called for a Russia. The members of these consolidation and merger of SCO and organizations have either expressed ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 26! their support of Russia’s position on the CSTO decided to stop its contacts with crisis in Ukraine, like Kazakhstan and NATO. ; made ambiguous statements, Russia holds leading positions in the like China; or refrained from defining SCO and CSTO and could extract their position at all, like Tajikistan and substantial economic and political Kyrgyzstan. Some long-term Central benefits from the merger. Russian Asian leaders, who observed the influence would be multiplied by the toppling of Ukraine’s former President inclusion of China, as a member of Viktor Yanukovych, will welcome the SCO, into the CSTO with the extra security measures that can be imposition of certain obligations which employed in case of democratic extend beyond political or diplomatic upheavals after the proposed SCO – support and require direct military CSTO merger. Although the CSTO’s assistance. The widely discussed main provision guarantees an embattled natural gas deal recently concluded member military support from other between Russia and China bear the members in case of external aggression, characteristics of leverage in Russia’s the 2010 additions to the agreement attempt to convince China on a SCO– allow military assistance in cases of CSTO merger. In part, it explains the militant attacks, illegal armed forces, rapid conclusion of a gas deal that took and other internal conflicts which can 10 years to negotiate. include democratic protests. Russian officials, particularly The expansion and improvement of Gazprom’s CEO Alexei Miller, are transportation and communication unwilling to reveal the conditions or infrastructure and logistic hubs pricing policy of the 30-year gas deal. discussed during the SCO conference Even if the effect of the U.S. and EU are consistent with the needs of the economic sanctions urged Russia to CSTO, which focuses on creating conclude the agreement, the actual effective military forces that can reasoning behind the move was to rapidly be deployed and moved around secure China’s support on the the region. One of the CSTO’s main international arena. China has declared tasks is the creation of an previously expressed support for Russia integrated military system in Central on Syria, and sought a middle ground Asia, which will include air defense, between Russia and the West on intelligence information gathering, Ukraine. An SCO-CSTO merger could railroad protection and supply. form the next step in this relationship. The merger discussions follows on the The obvious losers in this development statement by NATO Deputy Secretary are the people of the Central Asian General Alexander Vershbow on May SCO and CSTO members, whose 1, 2014, that Russia is now considered interests will hardly be considered in less as a partner and more as an the bargaining between Russia and adversary, which in turn came after the China, and who will become even more dependent on their powerful neighbors. ! Central!Asia,Caucasus!Analyst,!04!June!2014! 27!

The exit of the U.S. from the regional political arena after the withdrawal from Afghanistan leaves Central Asian countries no other option than to conform to the powers filling up the political vacuum. The SCO conference in Dushanbe potentially marks the start of this process. While an SCO–CSTO merger could potentially give rise to an extremely powerful international organization and an outright rival of NATO and the EU in the Eastern hemisphere, Russia and China still have a number of conflicting interests that they need to work through, including territorial disputes, rivaling claims to dominance in Central Asia, and Russia’s effort to balance between China and Japan. The intensified appeals for an organizational merger would also require Russia to increase its dependence on China in an attempt to exclude the U.S. and EU from its historical zone of influence. Hence, it remains to be seen whether the SCO– CSTO will move beyond political rhetoric.