DOCSLIB.ORG

Freedom Under the Law: Right and Revolution in Kant's Theory of Justice

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Freedom Under the Law: Right and Revolution in Kant's Theory of Justice The London School of Economics and Political Science Freedom Under the Law: Right and Revolution in Kant‘s Theory of Justice Alison Mallard A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, December 2011 1 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 78, 673 words. 2 Acknowledgements First and foremost I would like to thank Professor Katrin Flikschuh, who has given me unfailing guidance and support in my navigation of Kant's thought, and in my development and completion of this thesis. In her own academic work she has given me both inspiration and aspiration. My thanks also to Dr. Alex Voorhoeve for his advice and guidance, and for helping me find confidence in my writing. I am also grateful for the support and contribution of the Government Department Political Theory group, and in particular, Drs Camillia Kong and Katy Dineen. They have been colleagues and companions in my struggles with Kant, and friends in everything else. My thanks also go to the Economic and Social Research Council, for their financial support of this thesis, and to the London School of Economics and Political Science for its additional aid. Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Sally and Peter, and my sister, Rosemary, without whose support and understanding I would not have been able to complete such a project. Also to Richard, for living through the struggles of this last year with me, and reminding me that there is life beyond the PhD. They all believed in me, and in this thesis, and in doing so, helped me to believe in it too. 3 Abstract This thesis addresses the "air of paradox" that continues to plague Kant's absolute prohibition of revolution. In seeking to identify the source of this contention, I investigate a possible inconsistency within Kant's Doctrine of Right as a doctrine of external freedom. Taking my lead from Christine Korsgaard's idea of ―perverted justice‖, I explore the idea that states can exist that undermine their own purpose, in their denial of the freedom which is their end. Establishing the possibility of perverted justice takes us into an inquiry into the nature of Kant's moral theory as a theory of freedom, and specifically, the particular kind of freedom that Right takes as its end. I take the contrast between the ethical and juridical domains as my point of departure, defending Kant's strict division between the two domains. In doing so I defend the moral status of Right against commentators who exclude it on grounds of its external nature, arguing for a conception of practical freedom that is broader than the internal freedom of autonomy, and hence can include Right under its scope. From this I offer an account of external freedom as acting in accordance with the Universal Principle of Right, which is nothing more than the constraint of one's choice under universal law. In conclusion, I argue that Right (justice) cannot be frustrated in the way that Korsgaard's idea of perverted justice suggests, due to the formal nature of external freedom. Obedience to positive law cannot deny external freedom in the way she suggests; rather, our constraint under law is constitutive of our freedom as the end of political society. There is therefore no inconsistency to be found within Kant's Doctrine of Right between the idea of external freedom as the end of Right and his absolute prohibition of revolution. 4 Abbreviations CF The Contest of the Faculties CPR Critique of Pure Reason CprR Critique of Practical Reason IUH Idea for a Universal History G Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals ML Lectures on Metaphysics MM The Metaphysics of Morals PP Toward Perpetual Peace (‗Perpetual Peace‘) R Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (‗Religion‘) RS Review of Schulz TP On the Common Saying: ‗That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice‘ (‗Theory and Practice‘) WIE An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? (‗What is Enlightenment‘) Full details of editions used are listed in the Bibliography 5 Contents Page Introduction page 8 1) Setting up the problem 10 2) Kant‘s prohibition of revolution 16 3) Challenges to Kant‘s position: his philosophy of history and his conception of 25 law 4) The argument of this thesis 30 Chapter 1: Korsgaard’s argument for taking the law into our own hands 35 and the idea of perverted justice 1) Korsgaard‘s argument for revolution 37 2) Resituating the idea of ―perverted justice‖ in the juridical domain 49 Chapter 2: Kant’s Doctrine of Right and external laws as laws of freedom 60 1) The ethicisation of Kant‘s doctrine of morals 62 2) Defending the morality of Right: incentive and freedom in Kant‘s doctrine of 71 morals 3) Defending the morality of Right against the Groundwork‘s morality 82 Chapter 3: "Merely" practical accounts of moral freedom 95 1) Kant‘s two concepts of freedom 96 2) Korsgaard‘s purely practical account of moral freedom 103 3) Practical freedom as spontaneity in Henry Allison's "merely practical" 115 account 4) Critiquing Allison's account: the insufficiency of his Incorporation Thesis as a 128 ground for Kant's critical moral theory Chapter 4: Practical freedom as acting on principle 141 1) Freedom as spontaneity and the imputability of evil acts: Beck‘s account of 143 practical freedom 2) Paul Guyer‘s interpretation of practical freedom as acting on principle 155 3) Finalising a picture of practical freedom as acting on principle 165 6 Chapter 5: External freedom and the morality of Right 179 1) The universal principle of Right and man‘s freedom of choice 181 2) substantive versus formal interpretations of external freedom 187 3) The interpersonal nature of external freedom 196 4) External freedom as law-governed action in accordance with the universal 209 principle of Right Chapter 6: A re-examination of perverted justice and the case for reform 214 1) The nature of Right and its contrast to ethics 215 2) Perverted justice and the formal nature of Right 219 3) The relation of Right to Politics and the actualization of freedom: history, 228 practice and reform in Kant‘s political philosophy Concluding remarks 251 Bibliography 253 7 Freedom under the Law: Right and Revolution in Kant’s Theory of Justice Introduction Kant‘s position on revolution is given in no unclear terms. It is in ―the highest degree wrong‖, treason that ―must be punished by nothing less than death‖. Its prohibition is absolute, and stands even in cases of the ―unbearable abuse of supreme authority‖ (PP 8:382; MM 6:320). He retains this prohibition across all his works on political philosophy, from the pre-critical historical essays to his main systematic treatment of Right in the Metaphysics of Morals. However, despite the apparent strength and consistency of Kant‘s arguments, many commentators nonetheless see a need to challenge Kant‘s absolute prohibition.1 John Stuart Mill offers some insight into our dissatisfaction with Kant‘s position, writing against philosophies of absolute obedience that such a policy ―would often protect pernicious institutions against the only weapons which, in the state of things existing at the time, have any chance of succeeding against them‖.2 Mill expresses the common concern that an absolute prohibition of revolution puts the weight of advantage on the side of despots and tyrants, and deprives people in the most oppressive and tyrannical states of their only means of protecting themselves. This concern is still prevalent in contemporary thought on revolution. As J. Angelo Corlett argues, while very few people would unconditionally support a right to political violence, many still believe it to be an important limiting condition on the 1 Hill, T., ―Questions About Kant‘s Opposition to Revolution‖ in The Journal of Value Inquiry 36: 283–298, 2002, p. 283 2 Mill, J.S., Utilitarianism (2nd edn.). (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2001), p. 44 8 power of authoritarian and oppressive regimes. 3 Even those who are wary of overly permissive arguments in favour of political violence nonetheless warn that ―[i]t would be just as wrong, however, to interpret revolution too restrictively‖.4 These authors represent a general trend within liberal political theory to oppose an absolute prohibition of revolution in protection of basic rights and freedoms. This trend has led a number of commentators to reject Kant‘s position on grounds of a purported inconsistency between his absolute prohibition on the one hand and his commitment to freedom on the other. The suspicion is that a theory of justice as freedom must somehow make allowance for violent action against the state, at least in certain extreme cases. Commentators have therefore explored all different parts of Kant‘s writings—his Doctrine of Right, his ethics, and his philosophy of history— in seeking to identify the precise nature of this inconsistency, and find a more moderate view on revolution.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The "Urgrundrecht'?: Human Dignity, Moral
    IS THE RIGHT TO LIFE OR IS ANOTHER RIGHT THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT – THE “URGRUNDRECHT”?: HUMAN DIGNITY, MORAL OBLIGATIONS, NATURAL RIGHTS, AND POSITIVE LAW Josef Seifert Abstract: Moral obligations and basic human rights must be distinguished from each other and from positive rights and laws. Ethics and basic human rights rest on human dignity. The right to life is shown to be a natural and “absolute right,” but it is also in a certain sense the absolutely foundational concrete human right (Urgrundrecht) grounded in ontological dignity: all other human rights presuppose necessarily human life while human life has no more fundamental foundation in other goods but constitutes their ground. Other ideas about the most foundational right (such as the habeas corpus) are less foundational for the reason that they are more insignificant, can be suspended, are not immune to emergency states, such that their violation is not under all circumstances a grave violation. Moreover, they presuppose the right to life. These rights also refer only to a small sector of humanity, not applying to babies or comatose patients. The right to life is held by all human beings without exception, it is unrenounceable. For these and many other reasons the right to life is in an important sense the most fundamental right, in accordance with the first point of view for determining which is the most basic human right: Which right refers to the most basic good that is the condition of all others? However, there are two other points of view to determine the most basic right: The second point of view is expressed in the question: “Which human right is the most universal and comprehensive one and includes all others?” This is not true of the right to life which does not say anything about any other right.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy of Natural Law
    4YFPMWLIHMR-RWXMXYXI W.SYVREP7IT PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL LAW Justice K. N. Saikia Former Judge Supreme Court of India. Director General National Judicial Academy By philosophy of law, for the purpose of this article, is meant the pursuit of wisdom, truth and knowledge of law by use of reason. In other words, philosophy of law means the ratlonal investigation and study of the basic ideal and principles of law. The philosophy of natural law is the subject of this article. Longing for a Higher Law - In the human bosom there has always been a longing for a higher law than those made by the community itself. The divine theory of law, the theory of natural law, and the principles of natural justice are some theories or notions found in fulfilment of this longing. Divine laws are those ascribed to God. Divine rights of kings were supposed to have been derived from God. Laws which are claimed to be God-made, may not be amendable by man; and their reasoning and provisions also not to be ques- tioned by man. Greek thinkers from Homer to the Stoics, and reflections of Plato and Aristotle mainly provide the beginning of systematic legal thinking. In Homer, law is embodied in the themistes which the kings receive from Zeus as the divine source of all earthly justice which is still identical with order and authority. Solon the great Athenian lawgiver appeals to Dike, the daughter of Zeus, as a guarantor of justice against earthly tyranny, violation of rights and social injustice. The Code of Hamurapi was handed over by the Sun god.
    [Show full text]
  • Kant on Obligation and Motivation in Law and Ethics
    University of Nebraska - Lincoln DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy Philosophy, Department of 1994 Kant on Obligation and Motivation in Law and Ethics Nelson T. Potter Jr. University of Nebraska - Lincoln, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/philosfacpub Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Legal History Commons Potter, Nelson T. Jr., "Kant on Obligation and Motivation in Law and Ethics" (1994). Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy. 15. https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/philosfacpub/15 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Potter in Jarbuch für Recht und Ethik (1994) 2. Copyright 1994, Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg. Used by permission. Kant on Obligation and Motivation in Law and Ethics Nelson Potter I. There is a passage in Immanuel Kant's general introduction to both parts of Die Metaphysik der Sitten that deserves more attention than it has received. I plan to build the present paper around the implil:ations of this passage: In all lawgiving (Gesetzgebung) (whether it prescribes for internal or external actions, and whether it prescribes them a priori by reason alone or by the choice of another) there are two elements: first, a law, which represents an action that is to be done as objectively necessary, that is, which makes the action a duty; and second, an incentive, which connects a ground for determining choice to this action subjectively with the representation of the law.
    [Show full text]
  • Chastity As a Virtue
    religions Article Chastity as a Virtue Hwa Yeong Wang College of Confucian Studies and Eastern Philosophy, Sungkyunkwan University, 25-2, Seonggyungwan-ro, Jongno-gu, Seoul 03063, Korea; [email protected] Received: 26 April 2020; Accepted: 18 May 2020; Published: 21 May 2020 Abstract: This paper analyzes two philosophers’ views on chastity as a virtue, comparing Song Siyeol, a Korean neo-Confucian philosopher of the east, and David Hume, a Scottish philosopher. Despite the importance in and impact on women’s lives, chastity has been understated in religio-philosophical fields. The two philosophers’ understandings and arguments differ in significant ways and yet share important common aspects. Analyzing the views of Song and Hume helps us better understand and approach the issue of women’s chastity, not only as a historical phenomenon but also in the contemporary world, more fully and deeply. The analysis will provide an alternative way to re-appropriate the concept of chastity as a virtue. Keywords: chastity; Song Siyeol; David Hume; virtue; gender; Korean neo-Confucianism 1. Introduction Chastity, understood as a commitment or disposition to remain innocent of extramarital sexual intercourse, has been considered a virtue among human beings for a long time, not only in traditional societies but in contemporary societies as well.1 The value of chastity has been recognized since very early times and regardless of geographical location; it was an important virtue in ancient Greece and China, for example. This duty of chastity remains widespread in contemporary societies, which, in general, take monogamy as the moral standard regarding intimate human relationships. In a number of countries, the violation of chastity is recognized as unlawful and has consequences within the penal system.2 The virtue of chastity, however, has been discussed one-sidedly and almost always as “female” chastity.
    [Show full text]
  • Outstanding Universal Value Standards for Natural World Heritage
    Outstanding Universal Value Standards for Natural World Heritage A Compendium on Standards for inscriptions of Natural Properties on the World Heritage List IUCN Protected Areas Programme - World Heritage Studies About IUCN IUCN, International Union for Conservation of Nature, helps the world fi nd pragmatic solutions to our most pressing environment and development challenges. IUCN works on biodiversity, climate change, energy, human livelihoods and greening the world economy by supporting scientifi c research, managing fi eld projects all over the world, and bringing governments, NGOs, the UN and companies together to develop policy, laws and best practice. IUCN is the world’s oldest and largest global environmental organization, with more than 1,000 government and NGO members and almost 11,000 volunteer experts in some 160 countries. IUCN’s work is supported by over 1,000 staff in 60 offi ces and hundreds of partners in public, NGO and private sectors around the world. www.iucn.org This study is produced as part of IUCN’s role as advisory body to the UNESCO World Heritage Convention on natural heritage. IUCN Programme on Protected Areas Rue Mauverney 28 CH-1196 Gland Switzerland www.iucn.org/wcpa The designation of geographical entities in this book, and the presentation of the material, do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IUCN concerning the legal status of any country, territory, or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily refl ect those of IUCN. Published by: IUCN, Gland, Switzerland Copyright: © 2008 International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources Reproduction of this publication for educational or other non-commercial purposes is authorized without prior written permission from the copyright holder provided the source is fully acknowledged.
    [Show full text]
  • ATINER's Conference Paper Series PHI2012-0180 Kant and The
    ATINER CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES No: PHI2012-0180 Athens Institute for Education and Research ATINER ATINER's Conference Paper Series PHI2012-0180 Kant and the Categorical Imperative William O’Meara Professor of Philosophy James Madison University USA 1 ATINER CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES No: PHI2012-0180 Athens Institute for Education and Research 8 Valaoritou Street, Kolonaki, 10671 Athens, Greece Tel: + 30 210 3634210 Fax: + 30 210 3634209 Email: [email protected] URL: www.atiner.gr URL Conference Papers Series: www.atiner.gr/papers.htm Printed in Athens, Greece by the Athens Institute for Education and Research. All rights reserved. Reproduction is allowed for non-commercial purposes if the source is fully acknowledged. ISSN 2241-2891 13/09/2012 2 ATINER CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES No: PHI2012-0180 An Introduction to ATINER's Conference Paper Series ATINER started to publish this conference papers series in 2012. It includes only the papers submitted for publication after they were presented at one of the conferences organized by our Institute every year. The papers published in the series have not been refereed and are published as they were submitted by the author. The series serves two purposes. First, we want to disseminate the information as fast as possible. Second, by doing so, the authors can receive comments useful to revise their papers before they are considered for publication in one of ATINER's books, following our standard procedures of a blind review. Dr. Gregory T. Papanikos President Athens Institute for Education and Research 3 ATINER CONFERENCE PAPER SERIES No: PHI2012-0180 This paper should be cited as follows: O’Meara, W.
    [Show full text]
  • Why Deontologists Should Reject Agent-Relative Value and Embrace Agent-Relative Accountability
    ZEMO (2020) 3:315–335 https://doi.org/10.1007/s42048-020-00084-2 SUBMITTED PAPER Why deontologists should reject agent-relative value and embrace agent-relative accountability Rudolf Schuessler Published online: 28 October 2020 © The Author(s) 2020 Abstract This paper claims that deontological and consequentialist ethics are best distinguished with reference to different assumptions concerning moral account- ability and accounting. Deontological ethics can thereby be defended against the accusation of inordinate concern with the moral purity of agents. Moreover, deon- tological ethics can and should reject being based on the concept of agent-relative value. Even under the assumption that deontological ethics can be consequential- ized, agent-relative value need not play a fundamental role. This is not the same as denying agent-relativity a key role in deontological ethics. Deontological moral accounting of universal value should be regarded as agent-relative, whereas conse- quentialist accounting assumes a shared moral account of all moral agents. Keywords Deontology · Consequentialization · Agent-relativity · Agent-relative value · Accountability In recent decades, it has become commonplace to characterize deontological ethi- cal theories as agent-relative (or agent-centered).1 But from whence does the agent- relativity of deontology2 or its moral reasons arise? The present paper claims that 1 See Ridge (2017). On the difficult business of delineating what makes ethics deontological, see Alexan- der and Moore (2016), Gaus (2001), McNaughton and Rawling (2007). For helpful comments and suggestions, I am grateful to Vuko Andric,´ Jonas Franzen, and the participants of the conference “Spheres of Morality” (Bremen, August 2018). Many thanks also to two anonymous referees who pressed me on important questions.
    [Show full text]
  • Delahaye Vidal
    UNIVERSAL ETHICS: ORGANIZED COMPLEXITY AS AN INTRINSIC VALUE Clément Vidal Jean-Paul Delahaye Center Leo Apostel & Centre de Recherche en Informatique, Evolution Complexity and Cognition, Signal et Automatique de Lille (CRISTAL) Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Université de Lille 1 [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT: How can we think about a universal ethics that could be adopted by any intelligent being, including the rising population of cyborgs, intelligent machines, intelligent algorithms or even potential extraterrestrial life? We generally give value to complex structures, to objects resulting from a long work, to systems with many elements and with many links finely adjusted. These include living beings, books, works of art or scientific theories. Intuitively, we want to keep, multiply, and share such structures, as well as prevent their destruction. Such objects have value not because more information (in bits) would simply mean more value. Instead, they have value because they require a long computational history, numerous interactions for their construction that we can assimilate to a computation, and they display what we call organized complexity. To propose the foundations of a universal ethics based on the intrinsic value of organized complexity, we first discuss conceptions of complexity, and argue that Charles Bennett’s logical depth is certainly a first approximation of what we are looking for. We then put forward three fundamental imperatives: to preserve, augment and recursively promote organized complexity. We show a broad range of applications with human, non-human and non-living examples. Finally, we discuss some specific issues of our framework such as the distribution of complexity, of managing copies and erasures, and how our universal ethics tackles classical ethical issues.
    [Show full text]
  • Kreitzer Formatted Dec 09
    © Currents: New Scholarship in the Human Services, 2006 _____________________________________________________________ Social Work Values and Ethics Issues of Universality Linda Kreitzer Introduction The question of whether the social work profession has a set of values that can be claimed by all social workers around the world has been and continues to be an important issue in a growing interdependent world. With the increase in global cooperation and collaborative projects between social work programs worldwide, the similarities and differences in social work values should be explored. Core social work values in nonwestern countries reflect societies in which the importance of community, spirituality, traditional beliefs, social justice/action and economic circumstances are emphasized. In western countries social work values are more concerned with individualism, objectivity, discrimination issues, self-realization and democracy. The purpose of this article is to examine the definition and layers of values, the emergence of social work values, the relationship between social work values and their social context and whether or not it is possible to have universal social work values. It will use the works of Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor as well as other social work authors and writings concerning values. In particular, it will examine cross- cultural studies that have been conducted concerning western social work values and their relevance in non-western countries. Lynne Healy (2001) states, “there is considerable agreement that some level of universality exists” (p. 165), but draws attention to the difficulties in identifying values that are used and interpreted in a similar way. Codes of Ethics are discussed in relation to values and their universality with practical examples of various countries indigenizing their Code of Ethics.
    [Show full text]
  • Law and Morality: a Kantian Perspective
    Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 1987 Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective George P. Fletcher Columbia Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Law and Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 533 (1987). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1071 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LAW AND MORALITY: A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE George P. Fletcher* The relationship between law and morality has emerged as the cen- tral question in the jurisprudential reflection of our time. Those who call themselves positivists hold with H.L.A. Hart' that calling a statute or a judicial decision "law" need not carry any implications about the morality of that statute or decision.2 Valid laws might be immoral or unjust. Those who resist this reduction of law to valid enactments sometimes argue, with Lon Fuller, that moral acceptability is a neces- sary condition for holding that a statute is law; 3 or, with Ronald Dworkin, that moral principles supplement valid enactments as compo- 4 nents of the law. Whether the positivists or their "moralist" opponents are right about the nature of law, all seem to agree about the nature of morality. We have to distinguish, it is commonly said, between conventional and critical morality.
    [Show full text]
  • Natural Law and Positive Law Harold R
    Notre Dame Law Review Volume 23 | Issue 2 Article 1 1-1-1948 Natural Law and Positive Law Harold R. McKinnon Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Harold R. McKinnon, Natural Law and Positive Law, 23 Notre Dame L. Rev. 125 (1948). Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol23/iss2/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NOTRE DAME LAWYER A Quarterly Law Review VOL. XXIII JANUARY, 1948 No. 2 NATURAL LAW AND POSITIVE LAW* N American jurisprudence, natural law is both a founda- tion and a stumbling block. It is a foundation, because it lies at the root of our juristic tradition. It is a stumbling block, because it is rejected by the prevailing philosophy. The result is a legal system which is actually shaped in large part by a doctrine which in the formal treatment of the subject is vigorously denied. And what is more, this re- jection of the doctrine in many cases comes from those who in the administration of our legal system often apply the doc- trine with confidence and satisfaction. The lesson is clear. What the law mot needs today is to reexamine its parentage. The philosopher must reexamine it, to find what is truly ultimate in law. The practitioner must reexamine it, so that he will know the meaning of the instrumentalities with which he deals.
    [Show full text]
  • An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values Shalom H
    Unit 2 Theoretical and Methodological Issues Article 11 Subunit 1 Conceptual Issues in Psychology and Culture 12-1-2012 An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values Shalom H. Schwartz The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, [email protected] Work on this article was partly supported by the HSE Basic Research Program (International Laboratory of Sociocultural Research). Recommended Citation Schwartz, S. H. (2012). An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values. Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, 2(1). https://doi.org/10.9707/2307-0919.1116 This Online Readings in Psychology and Culture Article is brought to you for free and open access (provided uses are educational in nature)by IACCP and ScholarWorks@GVSU. Copyright © 2012 International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology. All Rights Reserved. ISBN 978-0-9845627-0-1 An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values Abstract This article presents an overview of the Schwartz theory of basic human values. It discusses the nature of values and spells out the features that are common to all values and what distinguishes one value from another. The theory identifies ten basic personal values that are recognized across cultures and explains where they come from. At the heart of the theory is the idea that values form a circular structure that reflects the motivations each value expresses. This circular structure, that captures the conflicts and compatibility among the ten values is apparently culturally universal. The article elucidates the psychological principles that give rise to it. Next, it presents the two major methods developed to measure the basic values, the Schwartz Value Survey and the Portrait Values Questionnaire.
    [Show full text]