CHITTAGONG PORT a STUDY of ITS FORTUNES, 1892-1912 by Mrs

A STUDY OF ITS FORTUNES, 1892-1912

Mrs. Shireen Hasan Osmany

Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. School of Oriental and African Studies, U niversity of London.

December 1978 ProQuest Number: 11015683

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ABSTRACT Chittagong Port - A Study of i t s Fortunes 1892-1912 • Mrs. Shireen Hasan Osmany

This thesis on the study of the fortunes of the Port of Chittagong from 1892-1912, tries to analyse the forces which led to its growth and development during that period, as well as the factors that were responsible for preventing its further development.

The trade of the port towards the beginning of the period under study was greatly hampered by the want of effective communications between it and its hinterland. The river Karnaphuli, on whose bank Chittagong stood, did not form a part of the river network that dissected the larger hinterland of Eastern Bengal and Assam. As a re s u lt, i t was not t i l l the construction of the Assam Bengal Railway that any significant development took place in the trade of the port. Chittagong port influenced the growth of this Railway, but the construction of the Railway determined the fortunes of the port still more decisively. While the port owed much of its physical facilities to the interest, resources and efforts of the Railway, many of the drawbacks under which the port operated can also be attrib u ted to the po licies of the Assam Bengal Railway. The p a rtitio n of Bengal in 1905, was perhaps the single most important political factor that determined the fortunes of the port. The p o te n tia litie s of Chittagong port were adduced as both an economic and administrativement argument for the partition. Partition, on the other hand, breathed a new life into the port in terms of finance and political and adm inistrative atten tio n . Trade f a c ilitie s were greatly developed during the period under study, and with the construction of four jetties for ocean-going steamers, the trade of the port took on a new dimension. The annulment of the partition in 1912, however, left the port still uncompleted and stagnant t i l l the next p a rtitio n in 1947. 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Abstract 2

Table of Contents 3

Acknowledgements 4

List of Abbreviations 5

Glossary 9

List of Graphs and Tables 10

List of Maps 11

CHAPTER I Introduction 12

CHAPTER II Communication system between 21 the Port of Chittagong and its hinterland prior to the advent of the Assam Bengal Railway

CHAPTER III The Assam Bengal Railway and 39 the Port of Chittagong

CHAPTER IV The P artitio n of Bengal and 82 the Port of Chittagong

CHAPTER V The Development of port ll£ f a c i lit ie s , 1892-1912

CHAPTER VI Chittagong Port Administration 165 and Finance

CHAPTER VII Trade: The development of 216 overseas trade and changes in the internal trade

Appendices 302

Bibliography 304 4

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis has been compiled from the records preserved in

London in the India Office Library, in the British Library, in the

Library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, and in the

Senate House Library, University of London. Source materials were

also collected in Bangladesh from the Bangladesh Secretariat Record

Room, Dacca, The Dacca U niversity Library, the Port A uthorities

Secretary's Record Room at Chittagong, the Chittagong Collectorate

Library, the Chittagong Divisional Commissioner's Library, and from

the Central Library of the Railway Board at Chittagong. Attempts

were also made in London to see the records of the Clan Line, but

unfortunately it appears that they have net preserved them.

Similarly, at Chittagong no records had been preserved for any period

by the Chittagong Chamber of Commerce or by such firms as Ralli

Brothers, James Finlay, or Burmah Oil Company, all of which had been

in operation at Chittagong during the period here studied.

In the compilation of a research work of this nature one is

indebted to many people. I would wish here to extend my thanks for

the help and co-operation extended to me by the au th o rities and the

staff of the various libraries which I used. I would also like to

thank my husband, without whose support and inspiration I would not have been able to carry out my work, to my son Saabry who had to do without my care and attention for so long, and to my parents for

their constant encouragement. Lastly, I would like to thank all my

friends and relations in London who made my stay here a pleasant one. ABBREVIATIONS

Admin. Beng. Report on the Administration of Bengal

Admin.E. B.A. Report on the Administration of Eastern Bengal and Assam

Admin.Rly. Administration Report on the Railways in India

Admin.Rept. Administration Report of the Commissioners for the Port of Chittagong

A.B.Rly. Assam Bengal Railway

A.B. Rly. Papers Papers Relating to the Assam Bengal Railways Government of India Public Works Department Railway Construction

B.D.G. Bengal D istric t Gazetteer

Beng.C.C. Report of the Committee of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce

Beng.J.E.Cttee.1934 Report of the Bengal Jute Enquiry Committee: Majority Report, Minority Report, 1934

Beng.J.E.Cttee.1939 Report of the Bengal Jute Enquiry Committee, 1939

Beng.L.C.Acts Acts of the Legislative Council of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal 1887-1890

B.N.N.R. Bengal Native Nesspaper Reports

Beng. Proc.F in .Dept. Proceedings of the Government of Bengal in (Com.) the Financial Department (Commerce)

Beng. Proc.G.Dept. Proceedings of the Government of Bengal in (Misc.) the General Department (Miscellaneous) 6

Beng.Proc.(Mne.) Proceedings of the Government of Bengal in the Marine Department V

E.B.A.Proc.P.W.D. Proceedings of the Government of Eastern (Mne.) Bengal and Assam in the P.W.D.(Marine) Department •;

V ' • E.B.A.Proc.J.D.(Pol.) Proceedings of the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam in the Ju dicial Department (Police)

E.B.A.Proc.(Legis.) Proceedings of the Legislative Council of '< Eastern Bengal and Assam ■ :

E.B.D.G. Eastern Bengal D istric t Gazetteer

Govt.of India. Government of India Proceedings of the Railway Rly.Proc.(Acc.) Department (Rly. Board) Accounts

Govt.of India Government of India Proceedings of the Railway Rly.Proc. (Const.) Department (Rly.Board) Construction

G riffith s To Guard My People. The History of the India Police, Sir P. Griffiths

G riffith s, Tea The History of the Indian Tea Industry, ] . Sir P. Griffiths

Hist.of Indian Rlys. Railway Department Government of India Railway Board: History of Indian Railways constructed and "... in progress, corrected up to 31 March 1918

Hist.of Calcutta P.T. The Calcutta Port Trust. A Brief History of F ifty Years' Work 1870-1920 V I? I.G.I.P.S. Imperial Gazetteer of India, Provincial Series. Eastern gengal and Assam £

I.T.A. Detailed Report of the General Committee of the Indian Tea Association <

I.T.E. Imperial Institute: Indian Trade Enquiry Reports on Jute and Silk 1918

M.M.P. Statement Exhibiting the Moral and M aterial Progress of India 7

Maritime Trade Beng. Report on the Maritime Trade of Bengal

Maritime Trade E.B.A. Report on the Maritime Trade of Eastern Bengal and Assam

P.L.I.G.L.B. Public L etters from India and General Letters from Bengal (Judicial and Public)

River Borne-Traffic Report on the River-Borne Traffic of the Lower Province of Bengal and on the Inland Trade of Chittagong and on the Trade of Chittagong and the Orissa Ports

Rly.Index.O.M. Assam Bengal Railway. Index to O fficial Meetings

Sea-Borne Trade Beng. Annual Statement of the Sea-Borne Trade and Navigation of the Bengal Presidency with Foreign Countries and Indian Ports

Sea-Borne Trade E.B.A Annual Statement of the Sea-Borne Trade and Navigation of the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam with Foreign Countia.es and Indian Ports

Trade by R.R.E.B.A. Report on the Trade carried by Rail and River in the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam GLOSSARY

Anna A coin worth one sixteenth of a rupee

Aratdar An Indian commission agent

Bastiwalas Slum dwellers

Bepari An Indian wholesale trad er or middleman

Bombast cloth Cotton cloth

Chamar A man of a low caste, whose business is working in hides and leather

Crore Ten m illions

Cutcha Raw, temporary, makeshift. (Cutcha bales of jute were only roughly or lightly pressed.)

Darwan A guard or watchman

Farriah A petty Indian trader

Ghee Clarified butter

Ghat A landing-place, steps on the bank of a river, a wharf where customs are commonly levied

Godown An outhouse, a warehouse, a place where house- . hold implements or goods are kept

Gola A granary, a place in which grain or salt is kept for a season

Hat A village market Lakh A hundred thousand

Manjies Boatman

Maund A weight, usually of eighty pounds

Mofussil A subordinate or separate district, the country, the provinces or the stations in the country, as opposed to the sadar, or principal station or towns

Mukhtar An attorney, as employed in legal a ffa irs he is not allowed in general to plea

Nullah A drainage channel or small stream

Palki A palanquin or litter in which individuals were carried by bearers

Pie A coin, the twelfth part of an anna

Pucca Ripe; well or solidly made

Rupee The main unit of currency in India. In the period of this study worth about 1 4d.

Ryot An Indian cultivator or peasant

Sardar A foreman

Syce A groom or stable boy

Thana A police sta tio n , one of several police jurisdictions into which a zila was divided 10

GRAPHS AND TABLES

GRAPHS Page

1. Value of the total imports of the port of Chittagong, 1892-1912. 217

2. Value of the total exports of the port of Chittagong, 1892-191-2. 226

TABLES

1. Government Grants for the Port of Chittagong, 1898-1917. 107

2. Distribution of Foreign Trade of Chittagong by 256 countries according to value 257

3. Tables giving particulars of buoys and landmarks. 277 278

4. Water on inner and outer bar 1897-1912: 279 commenced dredging August 1907. 280

5. Quantities of jute exported from the port 281 of Chittagong, 1892-1912 (cw t.). 282 283

6. Quantity of tea exported from the port 284 of Chittagong, 1892-1912 Clb.). 285 286 287

7. Figures showing the export of ric e from 288 the port of Chittagong to foreign countries 289 1892-1912 (cw t.). 290

8. Quantities of salt (subject to duty) imported 291 into the port of Chittagong, 1892-1912 (to n s). 292 293

9. Quantity (in maunds) of articles imported into 294 the Chittagong Trade Block by riv e r, r a il and 295 sea (coasting and foreign) 1910-1911. 296 297

10. Quantity (in maunds) of a rtic le s exported from 298 the Chittagong Trade Block by riv e r, r a il and 299 sea (coasting and foreign) 1910-1911. 300 301 11

LIST OF MAPS

Page

1. The fiver system of East Bengal. 32

2. The Assam Bengal Railway, 1927. 59

3. The rig h t bank of the riv e r Kamaphuli, 1904. 127

4. Lighthouses and shoals on the Chittagong . 137 coast, 1893.

5. A longitudinal section of the navigable track 147 of the river Kamaphuli, 1917.

6. The trade blocks of the province of Eastern 216a Bengal and Assam, 1907-08. 12

CHAPTER I

Introduction

Politics, economics and geography govern the life of any port, and it is the purpose of this study to trace and weigh the significance of each factor in the history of Chittagong as a port town in the years 1892-1912. Within that twenty-year span there were very dramatic shifts in the significance of all three elements, and in the importance of the port. In so far as there has been much study of the port, it has tended to give overwhelming weight to the political determinants of its fortunes, to the creation and abolition of the British province of East Bengal and Assam between 1905-1912, and to the emergence of Pakistan in 1947 and Bangladesh in 1971. It is hoped that this study will give a more balanced picture by directing more atten tio n to studying the economic and geographical aspects, the importance of which even a brief study of the history of the port will rev ea l.

Although Chittagong has by some been identified with the market town described in the Periplus of the Erythrean Sea, as on the Ganges in

"the very last land towards the East",* or as the Pentopolis of 2 3 Ptolemy, or as the Samandar of early Arab geographers, i t is quite

1 W.H. Schoff, Periplus of the Erythrean Sea, 47-48.

2 J.W. McGrindle (ed.), Ancient India as Described by Ptolemy, 195.

3 Dr. A. Karim, Samandar of the Arab Geographers, Journal of the A siatic Society of Pakistan, Dec.1963, 13. See also S.C. Das, Antiquity of Chittagong, Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, LXVII, 1898, 22. 13

clear that it was an important trading centre by the fifteenth century when Mahuan, accompanying a Chinese mission to India, refers to "Chit- le-gan" as a port frequented by Chinese trading vessels.* When the

Portuguese reached eastern India, they applied the title "the City of Bengal" to Chittagong in the reports and maps, considering i t as 2 CampQs says, as the chief port in the whole of Bengal. All the 3 Portuguese commanders that came to Bengal first entered Chittagong.

Its harbour was convenient for the comparatively small ships of the 4 day, and its position off the mouth of the Meghna river gave it easy access by water to the Bengal capital, Gaur.5 Barros, first of the great Portuguese chroniclers of Asia,described it in 1552 as "the most famous and wealthy city of the kingdom of Bengal, by reason of its port at which meets the traffic of all that eastern region". Abul

FazL in his survey of the Mughal empire wrote in similar vein of "a large city which is a great emporium being the resort of Christian 7 and other merchants". And at much the same time Caesar de Federici found more than eighteen ships anchored in Chittagong, and he wrote that from that part the traders carried to the Indies "great store of rice, very great quantities of bombast cloth of every sort, sugar, com and money g with other merchandise",

1 G. Phi lip/Mahuan* s Account of the Kingdom of Bengal’ Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, XXVII, 1895, 525. SeeaUfi s «w.Naqaviancl tf.R-Karim/'Htfknc&L of Po.ki5forv J^eoey^|?kfc.CKL l^ y ifio 3vai-'f‘IT67 ^C 2 J.J.A. Campos, History of the Portuguese in Bengal, 21.

3, Ib id .

4 C.R. Wilson, The Early Annals of the English in Bengal I, 132.-

5 Efliste-m , l^oV, %(,

6 Ib id . 7 Ib id . 8 Campos, 113. 14

According to Campos, "Chittagong was always a bone of contention between the Raj;as of Bengal, Arakan, and Tippera, who strove for supremacy over the seaport until the Mughal conquest of Bengal".*

He should have added, however, that both the Portuguese and the English fought over the town too. The Portuguese had had their eye on the port since 1517, fin a lly securing i t , and Sat goon from Mahmud Shah the ruler of Bengal, in return for helping him against Sher Shah. 2 They established a custom house and settlement there and in 1602 3 added to i t the island of Sandwip. Under the Portuguese Chittagong prospered, and acquired the title of Porto Grande, the great port, as 4 opposed to Satgaon, the Porto Pequeno, or little port. The loss of

Sandwip in. 1615, to the Arakanese/and the decline of Portuguese control from Goa of their outlying settlements ushered in a confused period when

Chittagong was as much a pirate base as a trading port.^ In 1665-6,

Shaista Khan, the Mughal Viceroy of Bengal advanced on the port and 7 took it by storm.

By that date the English East India Company had appeared in Bengal, opening their first factory at Hooghly. But they were not content for long with the position of mere traders, but aspired to secure a fortified

1 Campos, 21.

2 Campos, 26-39. See also Momtazur RahmanTalukdar, Husain Shahi Bengal, 146.

3 Campos, 67-68.

4 E.B.D.G. C hitt. 1908, 26.

5 Campos, 154-55.

6 Ib id ., 157.

7 Stewart, History of Bengal, 187-89. See alsoImperial Gazetteer of India Provincial Series Eastern Bengal and Assam 1909, 395; Campos, 164. 15

1 base of operations. The question thereafter was where to site this base. ’'Industrialism”, wrote Wilson, "would have been content to

remain at Hooghly, militarism demanded the violent seizure of 2 Chittagong now an important Mogul city". The suggestion was repeatedly voiced by the Court of Directors, and in 1685 an expedition was fitted out in England under Admiral Nicholson with instructions to 3 seize Chittagong and fortify it on behalf of the English. The expedition, however, never reached Chittagong. The fleet was scattered 4 on the way, and Admiral Nicholson found him self instead at Hooghly.

In the meantime, Job Chamock, the English agent at Kasimbazar, having fallen out with the Nawab of Bengal, had moved to Hooghly. There he came to know of the decision of the Court, and being joined by Admiral

Nicholson, started to prepare for war on the Mughals.** These preparations, « 6 as Wilson points out, were enough to alarm the country'.', and the Nawab sent a force against the English. After the skirmish that followed,

Job Chamock withdrew from Hooghly and moved to a place lower down the 7 riv e r, which la te r came to be known as Calcutta. The Court in London, however, increasingly were of the view, "that all would be well in the g Bay if they could seize upon Chittagong". In January 1689, they sent

1 C.J. Hamilton, The Trade Relations between England and India (1600-1896), 36. See also Wilson, 88-89.

2 Wilson, 91. v./uf ' A 5ia.tis^ic

4- Ib id .

5 Wilson, 94.

6 Ib id . , 96.

7 Ib id . , 99. See also, Hamilton, 57.

8 Wilson, 114. Captain Heath with a fleet to seize Chittagong. This second attempt, however, also proved unsuccessful. His reconnaissance made Heath realize, however, that "a city like Chittagong defended by some ten thousand men was not to be ’taken by the collar1, nor could it have been kept if taken".* He therefore abandoned the attempt, and sailed 2 from Chittagong after lying at anchor there for about a month.

This departure proved to be a most decisive event. Chittagong continued for another hundred years in the hands of the land-loving, and primarily, land- based power, of the Mughal rulers of Bengal. In the meantime, the English 3 having sought the pardon of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb for their past hostility, were granted a renewal of their trading privileges in 1690.

In 1698 the English secured from the Nawab, Azim-u-Shah, the Zamindari 4 rights of the three villages of Sutanati, Calcutta and Govindpur. "Less than two centuries ago", writes Prajnananda Banerjee, "the present city of

Calcutta was nothing but an ordinary rural district in the delta of Lower

Bengal - a flat rice-swamp, interspersed with patches of jungle, with a few scattered villages on the river bank. None would have ventured to forecast that a ’city of palaces’ would shortly arise here. But the ninteenth century ushered in a new era of development of trade and commerce which ultim ately made th is c ity an emporium of trade and the cap ital of an empire in the East".^

1 Wilson, 121-22.

2 Ib id .

3 ■ Hamilton, 57.

4 Sukumar Bhattacharya, The East India Company and the Economy of Bengal, 8.

5 Prajnananda Bannerjee, Calcutta and itsHinterland, 1. 17

What is of interest is that for the best part of two centuries,

Mughals, Portuguese and English had seen and coveted Chittagong as

"the City of Bengal”, the Porto Grande of the province, one of the major entrepdt? in the maritime trade of the Indian Ocean. If the

English finally settled at Calcutta, it was because they had failed: it was necessity not vision which led Job Chamock to camp there.

Chittagong evidently enjoyed real natural advantages, though the accidental growth of Calcutta would overshadow them.

One locational advantage Chittagong possessed, and of course still possesses, was its good river communication with Dacca, a natural centre fo r East Bengal and for a century the capital of Mughal Bengal.

It was a further blow to Chittagong, perhaps more important than the settlement of the English at Calcutta, that in 1704 the subahdar of

Bengal, Murshid Quli Khan, now an independent ruler except in name, decided to move his capital from Dacca to Murshidabad,* towards the more threatened borders of the province. The move westward of the capital left Chittagong remote from the centre of trade and power, and at the same time improved the competitiveness of Calcutta. Moreover, the move left Chittagong and the eastern delta much less well defended against the raid s from Arakan of the Maghs. In 1725, 1735, and again in

1740, as the English East India Company records reveal, Chittagong and its neighbourhood were plundered and raided by the Arakanese seriously

1- Sukumar Bhattacharya .? • See also, K.M. Mohsm, A Bengal District in Transition: Murshidabad 1765-1793, 1. 18 dislocating the economic lif e of the port and it s h in te rla n d .1 in 1792, Chittagong suffered from a devastating earth quake which seems to have destroyed much of the old port and town. "The great earthquake of

April 2nd 17*7 2 which raised the coast of Chedua Island 22 feet above sea- level, is said to have caused a permanent submergence of 60 square miles 2 near Chittagong". Such earthquakes seem to have taken place quite often, as recorded by Raynal. "The fortifications which (the Mughals) had begun to erect having been thrown down by frequent earthquakes (the British) 3 had taken a dislike to the place". Before the century was out, 4 moreover, two cyclones swept the Chittagong coast.

In 1760, after the deposition of Mir Jafar, the new Nawab Mir Qasim ceded Burdwan, Midnapur and Chittagong to the East India Company,^ the grant being confirmed by the Emperor Shah Alam in 1765. But by this time, English commercial interests in Calcutta were well entrenched, and English political and military attention was focused onMurshidabad and on Delhi to the west. There was little need now for the Company to pay any particular attention to a port-city geographically, politically

X Sukumar Bhattacharya, " -

2 East Pakistan District Gazetteer,,1961, 54.

3 E.B.D.G. C h itt. 1908, 26. 'East P a k ista n 4 . District Census Report Chittagong 1961, 8. Cyclones moving up the Bay of Bengal tend to swing north-east across the d elta to s trik e the Arakan coast. Besides the cyclones of 1793 and 1975, there were others in 1872, 1876, 1897, 1904 and 1905; those of 1876 and 1897 being particularly and most widely destructive.

5 Ibid.

6 District Census Report. Report on the Census of the District of Chittagong 1891, 3. 19

and economically so much on the periphery as Chittagong had become.

For more than a hundred years Chittagong port slumbered in neglect,

while Calcutta and Rangoon developed on its flanks into major

maritime centres of B ritish power and commerce.

It was the development of jute in the second half of the nineteenth

century into an economic crop, and the introduction of commercial tea

cu ltiv atio n in the province of Assam, which created the necessary

economic and commercial preconditions for the revival of interest

in the forgotten port of Chittagong. There was now a hinterland

producing goods in which European firms were in terested , and in the

case of tea, one which it was necessary to move quickly and with a

minimum of handling on the way. (There had always been some rice

handled through Chittagong, but this was a matter for local traders

using country boats.) The pressure of commercial interests, fortuitously

supported at much the same time by the administrative and political need

to partition the unwieldy Bengal presidency, thus led to the

construction of the Assam Bengal Railway to handle the new commodities.

Some development of Chittagong port, which hitherto had possessed only

a single inadequate jetty - the Sadar ghat - and no proper moorings,

no bouys, no dredged channels, and no shore f a c ilitie s worth the name

for storage and handling of goods, necessarily followed. Calcutta-based

commercial interests panicked at the possible rivalry of the port of

Chittagong for the foreign trade of the new province, and did their

•best to hinder its growth and development. But for seven years, 1905

to 1912, Chittagong port had a champion, the Government of the newly 20

created province of Eastern Bengal and Assam. Within the twenty years

1892 to 1912, therefore, whatever significant development of the port took place under British rule occurred. The annulment of partition in

1912, however, halted all progress. The fate of the port was thus sealed t i l l other p a rtitio n s occurred - in 1947, when Chittagong became the principal port of the new province of East Pakistan, and in 1971 when she became the p ort of the new Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh. CHAPTER II 2

Communication System Between the Port of Chittagong and its Hinterland Prior to the Advent of the Railway

In the nineteenth century there were only two effective gateways to the world available to Bengal and its vast hinterland: Calcutta and Chittagong. Neither was easy of access or naturally well endowed. Of the two, however, Calcutta had been early developed and its internal communications likewise, while Chittagong, situated at the extreme south-east corner of the delta region, had been neglected. There were no direct river routes to Chittagong from the main commercial hinterland, roads were so bad that no traffic of any significance could be carried on them and no effective line of railways ran to Chittagong before 1895. River transport had therefore to emerge from the East Bengal river system and negotiate the difficult coastal waters of the Bay of Bengal - particularly hazardous to the native sailing boats which carried the bulk of the commodities from the interior - to reach the ocean terminal at Chittagong. In this chapter an attempt has been made to study the conditions under which trade was carried between Chittagong port and its hinterland prior to the advent of the railway.

The commercial hinterland of the port of Chittagong - East Bengal and Assam - is formed by the Brahmaputra valley, the eastern half of the vast Gangetic delta, 25, 000 square miles of alluvial fan and the rim of eastern hills. The whole tract is laced by great rivers, all but the Kamaphuli on which Chittagong itself stands, having their source in the eastern part of the Himalayan massif. "All the snow and water falling upon the Kumaon, Nepal, Bhutan and Assam sections, finds its way ultimately into the Ganges, Brahmaputra and the Meghna and through these mighty rivers it is washed down to the sea". * The Kamaphuli has its origin in the hills north-east of the

1. N. Ahmed - An Economic Geography of East Pakistan, 11. Chittagong Hill Tracts and flows to the sea, interrupted by mild rapids, through hill-country thickly clothed with bamboos. Its main significance is in providing a deep water anchorage a few miles inland from the sea. The Brahmaputra on the other hand after its emergence from the Himalayas flows westwards through 2 an immense tract of fertile country - about five hundred miles @f the Assam Valley' - to the plains of Eastern Bengal near Maihiali in Rangpur district. Whereupon,joined by the Usta from the Jalpaiguri tea district in the north, it turns south, being known then as the Jamuna until it is joined near Goalundo by the Ganges. The two enormous rivers, the Ganges and the Brahmaputra^united at Goalundo from then on are known as the Padma. Offshoots from them, the lines of older beds and flood channels, thread the lower delta to its swampy forward edge known as the Sundarbans, a fan some 170 miles across. Further east two branches of the Barak river, the Surma and the Kusiyara,unite to form a river which is known first as the Dhaleswari and then after its junction with the Old Brahmaputra river as the Meghna. From Bhairab Bazar the Meghna runs south towards the Bay of Bengal being joined at Chandpur by the Padma. The whole vast mass of water forms 3 the Meghna estuary to the sea. It is the proximity of Chittagong to the Meghna estuary, and the access which that river gives to the whole web of rivers and their feeders just described,which made and make it so important as an ocean outlet for the commerce of Bengal.

The main crops of this hinterland of the port of Chittagong were jute, rice and tea. Jute from the jute growing areas of Dacca, Mymen* singh and Tippera was brought tc Narainganj by country boats. .

1. Nur Ahmed, ’The Kamaphuli River '} Pakistan Quarterly Review I Autumn 1959. 2. Report on the Administration of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 1905-6, 2.

3. N. Ahmed, 11-19, also Basil Greenhill 'The Boats of East Pakistan, A Preliminary Study', The Mariner's M irror The Journal of The Society for Nautical Research XLIII No. 2. May 1957, 106. 23

The cultivators generally sold their jute to a petty trader or Farriah who visited the villages and markets on boat. The Farriah in turn sold to a bepari, or middleman who either dealt directly with jute merchants at Narainganj, or through an Aratdar or broker who had advanced him money. In addition to purchasing at Narainganj ,merchants had buyers at all the important mofussil centres and "from July onwards” as B.C. Allan* wrote, "their tugs are to be seen puffing up and down the rivers towing after them 2 six or seven huge native boats”. Similarly rice was brought to Chittagong by beparis, in boats and during the cold weather whole fleets of these might be seen making for the mouth of the Karanphuli 3 from the northwest. The merchants did not buy in the mofussil but purchased from boatmen or beparis who collected the rice mainly from the different hats in Noakhali and Tippera. The supply of rice to the merchants at Chittagong therefore depended "entirely on boat traders'* so that if boatmen did not choose to come, merchants 4 were left empty-handed.

Except for the twenty odd tea gardens in Chittagong all the tea gardens of Eastern Bengal and Assam were situated in the Brahmaputra 5 and Surma Valleys. Before the advent of the railway almost all the tea from these gardens was exported from the port of Calcutta. The little tea that went to the port of Chittagong went there mainly from the tea gardens of the district. 1. Eastern Bengal District Gazeteers - Dacca 110. 2. Ibid. 110. 3. Annual General Rept. Chitt. Divi. 1872-73, Proc. of the Govt, of Beng. in the General Dept. (Misc)t 1873, August 23-24. 4. Report - On the River-Borne Traffic of the Lower Provinces of Bengal, and on the Inland Trade of Calcutta, and on the Trade of Chitt. and The Orissa Ports 1889-90, 130. 5. Out of a total of 1, 215 gardens in Assam and Bengal in 1896. 794 gardens were in Assam and 421 in Bengal. Of the 421 in Bengal 22 gardens were in Chittagong - Detailed Report of the General Committee of the Indian Tea Association 1896. 5%. 24

Before the coining of the railways the main cargo carriers for the whole area of Eastern Bengal and Assam were the country sailing boats. (The Annual Statement of \h e Inland and sea-borne trade of Chittagong even as late as 1892-93 gives no figures for streamer-borne trade, presumably because there was none of any significance)? The boats used were of varying size and type, with a cargo capacity of anything from 40 to 5, 000 maunds (roughly lj to 180 tons) though the most common range was between 100 to 500 mounds (4 to 20 tons). This shipping operated mainly within the rivers of Assam and the delta system of Bengal, including the Hooghly to which jute was carried in large quantities though some moved up the Ganges as far west as Patna or even to Mirzapur 5 and Ajudhia. The sea-going brigs and sloops of Chittagong penetrated inland as far as Brahmanbaria on the Meghna and north - 4 eastwards to Sylhet, but in general they were content with their mastery of the trade of the eastern littoral not sailing much further north than Goalundo and Calcutta, though they did work their way west across the Bay to Orissa and east down the coast to Burma. (Burmese and Arakanese shipping was also found moving west to Chittagong and even as high up the Brahmaputra as Rangpur, from which district they shipped tobacco).^

In geographical term s the river systems used by this shipping were very advantageous. "They form probably one of the finest group of natural waterways in the world", wrote P. B. Bramley, "and their commercial and strategic value can be enhanced to an indefinite extent by scientific conservation and development". But, he added, "in spite of these natural advantages trade is carried on under great difficulties. The first of these difficulties,!^ explained,

1. River Borne Traffic - 1892-93, 56. 2. P.B. Bramley, Trade Conditions and Crime on Navigable Waterways in Bengal, Assam and the United Provinces 1904-1906, 33. See also Haroun-t/r-Rashid y East Pakistan. A Systematic Regional Geography and its Development Planning Aspects, 292 3. B ram ley, 55-56.

4 . Annual General Rept. Chitt. Divi. 1892-93. Beng. Proc. G. Dept. (Misc) 1893, November, December, December 8. 5. B ra m le y , 35. 25

was that of crime. "Piracy has existed on the rivers from the earliest times, and. . .except for spasmodic efforts no real attempt has ever been made to cope with the difficulties of the situation or to deal adequately with the evil by the introduction of preventive m easures of a permanent and uniform nature. . .in fact the difficulties of the situation have been evaded rather than boldly faced". * According to his report violent crime was most prevalent on the rivers in the Dacca, Mymensingh, Bakerganj, Khulna, Tippera and Pabna districts. These were the districts of Eastern Bengal which posed a general problem of poor communications and inadequate administration the solution of which would later be sought in the partitioning of Bengal by Lord Curzon.

In the neighbourhood of Khulna the losses were usually of rice boats, the reason being, as the insurance agents Messrs. Finlay, Muir and Company explained, that it was easy to dispose of stolen rice 2 in that area. Losses of jute, as another managing agency Ralli Brothers explained, was commonest to the east and north-east of Narainganj , one of the great up-country collecting points for raw jute. Here near the great jute handling ghats and bazars there were regular bands of thieves who operated in conjunction with the 3 manjres or boatmen of the sailing boats. At this period many of these manjies were up-country men, probably driven, from the rivers of the U.P. and of Bihar by the competition of the new lines of railway up the Ganges Valley. The losses suffered by the failure of the local boat trade, together with the hardship incurred in procuring employment drove a large number of them to the commission 4 of crime. A report of the Committee of the Bengal Chamber of

1. Bramley, 47. . * _

2. M essrs. Finlay Muir and Company to Bengal Chamber of Commerce Bramley, 11. 3. M essrs. Ralli Brothers 17 May 1905, to Bengal Chamber of Commerce Bramley, 13. 4. Bramley. 35, see also Lovat Frazer, India Under Curzon and After, 375. 26

Commerce, submitted to Government in 1904 elaborated the point, recording, "IA the course of enquiry it has. .. come to light that 2, 500 criminals,residents of United Provinces^come habitually into those provinces in the guise of peaceful river traders, but really in order to commit crime, from petty theft to dacoity wherever the opportunity presents itself."^ One favourite stratagem of these manjies was to set fire to cargoes in order to conceal their theft - "the consignor not shipping the quantity mentioned in his chalan and conniving with the manjies and crew to burn the cargo at an opportune time", as M essrs. Gladstone, 2 Wylie and Company reported. The incidence of crime rose from July to March and fell off again in April, May and June each year, corresponding exactly with the fluctuation in the record of alleged losses of insured cargoes, and the annual rise and fall in the circulation of the country trade shipping.

In addition to these difficulties the problem of navigating the river Meghna and the Bay of Bengal often drove the trade of the hinterland from the port of Chittagong. Neither the river Meghna nor the Bay is easy to navigate particularly during the south-west Monsoon when the violent winds, floodsand the rough water made life and cargo insecure. In 1886-87 the export of rice from the port of Chittagong showed a decrease which amounted to 58.73 per cent on the returns of 1885-86 and to 36. 87 per cent on those of 1884-85. This decrease was mainly due to floods in the river Meghna which led to the diversion of rice from Noakhali to Brahmanbaria instead 3 of to Chittagong. Similarly as soon as the south-west monsoon set in the ryots chose the safer and longer route to Calcutta via the Sunderbans rather than the shorter and dangerous route to Chittagong.

1. , Annual Report of the Committee of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce II, 1904, See also P. Griffiths - To Guard my People, The History of the Indian Police, 393. 2. Report of M essrs. Gladstone, Wylie and Company,Bramley, 38. 3. R iver Borne T raffic 1886-87, 117. 27

The Commissioner of the Division of Chittagong made the point in 1889-90, ’’The decrease in the export of rice and paddy is very marked, . . .this decrease is entirely due to want of communications. There was a large surplus crop in the districts which supply the trade of this port, but there was also a demand for rice westwards and traders would not risk their boats and cargoes coming to Chittagong when they could get remunerative prices in Dacca, Calcutta and Murshidabad. The rice therefore did not come, though merchants were anxious to buy and willing to give good prices". *

Baled jute from Naraih^anj was forwarded to Chittagong by sailing brigs. At Chittagong it was transhipped from the brigs which lay 2 alongside the oceangoing ships. The objections to this system were its delay and its danger. The delay was at times very great. Fifteen days was the time generally allowed for the passage from Naraincjanj to Chittagong but in the south-west monsoon, vessels often took much longer so that the freighters at Chittagong were 3 delayed and demurrage incurred. The danger by the then existing route was also considerable, no less than thirty six brigs in the 4 jute trade being lost within the ten years 1878 to 1887. As a consequence importing firms had to incur considerable expenditure in the upkeep of steam tugs to tow the brigs and still more in 5 insurance. One effect of that as J.M . McNeille - Secretary to the Government of Bengal wrote was to induce the exporters of Narayanganj to send the bulk of jute by inland routes to Calcutta instead of sending it by sea to Chittagong. ^

1. River Borne Traffic, 1889-90. 130. 2. D.R. Lyall and A. F. Dowling, Notes on the Port of Chittagong, its Trade andthg Financial Prospects of a Railway to Chandpur and Silchar, 20 3. Ibid, 21. 4. Ibid, 21. 5. River Borne Traffic, 1886-87, 116. 6. Report of theCommittee of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce 1892, II, 429. 28

Constant change in the course of the various rivers of Eastern Bengal and Assam in general and of the rivers Karnaphuli and Meghna in particular, was another factor which impeded trade between Chittagong port and its hinterland. The shifting bars of the river Karnaphuli made the port of Chittagong unsuitable for vessels other than those having light draught and as a result the port was not open to all types of vessels. In 1899-1900 the tea planters of Assam, Sylhet and Cachar presented a memorial to the Government of Bengal representing the difficulties in the navigation of the Karnaphuli river. But the sum required to improve the river was considered beyond the resources of either the Port Trust or the Government of Bengal and so the matter was dropped. *

The survey of the river Meghna conducted in 1902-03 revealed that "considerable alteration had taken place in the river since the last sketch survey in 1884, . . .No deep channel was found to exist and the river was reported as dangerous for any but craft of very light draught, on acccount of strong tides, heavy bores, and 2 constant changes in the river bed". The trading community of Chittagong had from time to time urged the Government of Bengal to improve the condition of the river Meghna but to no purpose. In 1904 the Government of Bengal wrote to the Government of India, "Chittagong has complained that it has been neglected by the Government of Bengal. This is alleged to be at least equally true of the Dacca division, and the neglect in regard to both has led to this important result that little attempt has been made to improve the communication between that port and the commercial centres of the Dacca divisions. No attempt has been made to use the Meghna

1. See C hapter V. 2. Administrative Report of the Marine Survey of India 19Q2r-03, 1, 29 river,,which is the main line of communication, as a navigable channel for large ships". * During the 1880's the boat trade of Chittagong with Cox's Bazaar, Arakan and Rangoon was affected by the silting of the Mohesh Khal. As a result of the closure of the Khal (canal) boats had thereafter to accept the greater risk of coming around the sea face of the district, and so in rough weather 2- stopped coming altogether.

The silting and shifting of the rivers however posed a greater problem to the steamer companies than to the native boats. The 'Diana' had ushered in the age of steamers in the Indian sub- 3 continent on the 19th July 1823. But till the formation of the Indian General Steam Navigation Company in 1844 commercial steamers were not plying on regular routes in Bengal. Post-Mutiny days saw a growth of steamer companies, the most notable being the River Steam Navigation Company. In 1889 the two rivals the Indian General Steam Navigation Company and the River Steam 4 Navigation Company merged to form "The Joint Steamer Companies".

By this time steamer services covered Assam and Eastern Bengal, the growth of tea gardens in Assam having vastly increased the demand for their services. But all steamer services tended to converge on Calcutta port and only a fraction if any served Chittagong port. This was probably due to three major factors. When the steamer companies started operating in Bengal the heyday of Chittagong was long past. Chittagong had no port facilities and its trade did not amount to much. On the other hand Calcutta was the

1. Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India 6 April 1904, P. P 1906, LXXXI. 692. 2. ' R iver B orne T raffic, 1884-85. 98. 3. Walter K. Furminger, ’The Early Days of Steam Navigationin Indian Watersf^ Calcutta Review, CXXXI, I, July-Oct 1905, 422. See*also^^erTga^L Past and Present, Jan-June 1941, 7. 4. Basil Greenhill, *Boats & Boatmen of Pakistan^ 126-135. See also Sir P. Griffiths - A History of Inchcape Group 22-23. 30

premier port of India and could provide cargoes for the passage up-country to Assam as well as a market for the cargoes carried down. Secondly since the Joint Streamer Companies had an absolute monopoly as a commercial carrier in the inland waters of Eastern Bengal and Assam, they had no or little incentive to explore a newer and perhaps an uncertain pasture like the trade route to the fledgeling port of Chittagong. Finally the state of the river Meghna must also have discouraged the steamer companies from trading with the port of Chittagong. The Joint Steamer Companies - which from the very beginning had at their own expense carried out the task of surveying, marking and lighting the rivers, * - had made repeated attempts to induce the Government to class Waterways with Roads and itself carry out the work of conserving 2 and improving the waterways. The Government of India however, was rather reluctant to take up the work and the reply given by Lord Curzon in 1904 was typical of their attitude. "Nothing could be done without elaborate preliminary survey and great subsequent expense", he stated, "while the science of river training is one that contains so many speculative and surprising elements that Government are a little shy about spending large sums upon results so extremely problematical in character. I can assure you from my own experience that it is easy to pour a good many lakhs into a riverbed, and at the end the river, without even thanking you for your trouble, makes you look rather ridiculous by going off in some 3 entirely independent direction".

1. C.A. White - Waterways in Eastern Bengal and Assam - Preliminary Report on the Improvement for Navigation of the Most Important Waterways of Eastern Bengal and Assam, August 1909, 5. See also Basil Greenhill, "Progress in East Pakistan", Geographical Magazine 1954-55, xxi/7/ 463

2. White, 5. 3. Further Papers relating to the Reconstruction of the Province of Bengal and Assam.P. P. 1906. LXXXI. 847. 31

In the absence of any government initiative the inland waterways which might have served Chittagong remained unimproved, used mainly by the country sailing cra'ft. Nor was the opportunity subsequently created by the building of the Assam Bengal Railway to integrate the steamer services higher up the river system to the railway link with Chittagong port, taken advantage of. Had the inland river traffic been diverted "to Narainganj, Dacca and Chandpur, and even to Comilla, and many of the other stations on the Bengal-Assam Railway as far as Badarpur and Silchar, from whence there is direct Railway communication with Chittagong"* a very great enlargement of the trade of Chittagong must have followed. In fact however the vested interests of Calcutta and the Joint Steamer Companies made the latter formidable rivals to the railway and to the port which it served.

1. B ram ley, 35. 32

|g |j Old Alluvium 30-100ft iH H Land over 300 ft Much of remaining area below 30ft. — International boundaries Divisional boundaries District boundaries

m m

^opfiP r e g m a r a d

1. The river system of East Bengal 33

R oads

In the Gangetic delta of Bengal the first significant step in long distance road building was apparently taken by Sher Shah Suri. This Pathan ruler of Delhi sought to establish his control firmly over the difficult Subah of Bengal. A road system was essential for quick and safe movement of imperial troops - any advantage to commerce was only incidental. The Grand Trunk Road of Sher Shah ran down the Ganges Valley and by way of Dacca, to Chittagong. * This was the first major road link between these two cities of which there is clear written record. Efforts at connecting Chittagong by road with central Bengal however, predate Sher Shah by about four centuries. There is evidence of Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah building a military road connecting Chittagong with Chandpur 2 after his conquest of Chittagong. After Sher Shah, Shaista Khan and Shah Shuja also took significant steps in this direction. In 1666 after capturing Chittagong from the Arakanese Shaista Khan improved road communications, bridging all the 99 nullahs between 3 Feni and Chittagong, while the Arakan road leading from Chittagong to Burma was said to have been built by Shah Shuja while fleeing from the pursuit of Mir Jumla. The ftluslim conquerors of Bengal., being primarily dependent on cavalry and infantry for their military power probably saw it as both logical and necessary to develop a network of roads.

1 Eastern Bengal District Gazetteers - Chittagong, 1908, 129. 2. Bangladesh District Gazetteers Chittagong, 1975, 107. 3. Abul Khair Muhammad Farooque - Roads and Communications in • Mughal India, 49. 34

However, when the British acquired the Chittagong district in 1760, they inherited a very rudimentary road system - basically the old trunk road from Chittagong across the Feni ghat, where there was a customs post and small garrison, to Dacca and a few local seasonal tracks. With the rise of Calcutta as the capital and chief port, however, Chittagong still further declined. Ghulam Hassain Salim noted in 1786-8, "at present, since Calcutta is a large port, all other ports of Bengal have fallen into decay". * In Eastern Bengal, less and less important as a supplier of cotton goods for the export trade, the only roads required were those linking district headquarter towns with the capital. The important lines of communication were now those radiating from Calcutta, and especially those running westwards up the Ganges Valley to the strategic frontiers of Oudh, the North- Western Provinces, and later Delhi and the Punjab.

In the early years of the nineteenth century, Burmese claims upon Chittagong, the war of 1823-26, and the annexation at its successful conclusion of the coastal strip south-east from Chittagong, gave a new importance to the old line of road from Dacca - the Robertganj or Chittagong road - by way of Comilla to Chittagong, thence across the Sangur river at Chandpur Ghat and so towards Ramu and Burma. This was given a further lease of life at the time of the second Burma war in 1854-56, but the difficulties created by the series of river crossings on the route meant that it was rapidly allowed to relapse into a mere fair weather road once regular coastal steamer services had been established.

1 Gulam Husain Salim, The Riyazu-s-Salatin - A History of Bengal -(translated by Maulavi AbdusSalam). 41. 35

After the second Burmese War the Arakan road ceased to be a Government road and became no more than a District road, * maintained like the other roads in the district by the District 2 Board from local funds for local purposes only. East Bengal was indeed scarcely suitable with its meandering rivers, many of such size as to be scarcely bridgeable, for the planning of a large system of roads, and the alluvial delta was almost without durable material for road construction. Moreover the flood level in most of the plains districts was higher than the land surface, so that any permanent road had to be made on raised embankments. W.W. Oldham, the Chittagong Divisional Commissioner in 1892 described the pattern well: "By road in this Division is generally meant a high narrow bank best suited for foot-passengers, with occasional bridges rising high into the 3 air to admit of boats passing beneath without upsetting their masts" To build a major road thus involved enormous outlay on massive embankments and on bridges, both of which had to be capable of standing the battering monsoon downpour and the stress of flood waters, and had to be so aligned as to minimise the constant dangerous shifts in the course of the rivers. Equally the small- scale peasant society did not much need a major road system - or at least did not do so before the coming of the bus and lorry. V/hat was needed were fair weather feeder roads for bullock cart transport linking villages to local markets which themselves were usually served by the network of rivers and seasonal canals. Long distance transport for the bulk commodities which East Bengal produced was most readily provided by shipping - and when this was supplemented it would be by railways rather than roads.

1. W.W. Hunter, A Statistical Account of Bengal, 186. 2. ■ Govt, of Beng. Rept. on the Administration of Bengal 1911-12, 128. See also J. King, Govt, of Beng Comprehensive Rept. on Road Development Projects in Bengal, 1934, V, 6-7. 3. Annual General Administrative Report, C hitt. Division 1891-92. Beng. Proc. G. Dept. (M isc.), 1892 November-December, November 26. 36

Tea planters probably felt the need of roads more strongly than most. They had a network of roads inside their gardens, but they also needed good roads to carry tea to the nearest steamer ghats and also to bring in machinery, mate rials and food stuffs, necessary for the maintenance and running of the garden. They not only brought pressure to bear upon Government to secure improved communications, but in some instances at least they took the lead themselves in improving the roads of the districts. Thus in 1873, H. Hankey, officiating as Commissioner of the Chittagong Division wrote, "this (Arakan) road is again bridged between Mr. Windram's garden at Panee Serra and Ramoo in the Cox’s Bazar sub-division. . .A feeder line from Mutaserra to a tidal stream running direct into the Moiseal channel, and known at its mouth as the Joaria Nulla was constructed during the year by Mr. Windram at his own expense. . . This. . .being a line likely to attract local traffic, has been declared a public road at Mr. Windram's request. . .Mr. Windram has rendered very valuable assistance in the matter of roads and it is mainly owing to his presence at Ramoo that the Arracan road has been bridged and kept passable for some six miles in that quarter ".A imilar report was also made by Hankey about another planter - a Mr. Macalpine. He wrote "The Fennua or Khedda road which here branches off to Mr. Macalpine1 s tea garden (4^ miles) has been bridged and repaired at the expense of Government and Mr. Macalpine".'*'

The end product of these many factors was a very inadequate and static road system in this period. In 1898-99 of the total length

1. Annual General Report Chitt. Division, 1872-73. Beng. Proc. G. Dept. (Misc) 1873, August 23-24. 37 in the Chittagong district of 577 miles of road just one mile was metalled - the Moheskhali Strand road along the port waterfront. Even in the Dacca district matters were scarcely more advanced; for of the 548 miles of road in the District, only som e 7 j miles were metalled - the Ramna road leading to the race-course and the Narainganj road linking Dacca with its 1 2 river port. This small mileage had to provide for i,35T3,35C> inhabitants of the Dacca district and^ ,6 4 9 ,inhabitants of the Chittagong district.

The very considerable sum of Rs 300, 000 which had been spent annually on extending and improving roads and highways had evidently been spent even in Dacca upon unmetalled roads in the . 4 m ain.

Curiously enough, the first real incentive for a more active road building programme was provided by the building of the Assam Bengal Railway from Chittagong to Assam. F.H. Skrine the officiating Commissioner explained in 1896: MAt present there is hardly a single station which is provided with a feeder road. The result is heavy loss to the Company and to the districts served alike. I have impressed on District Boards the necessity of adopting a definite policy in regard to roads, giving the preference in the matter of construction and repairs to those

1. Government of Bengal P.W .D. Reviews of PublicWorks executed by District and Local Bodies, Municipalities and other Local Bodies in Bengal. 2. Census of India, 1901, VI-A, Bengal II, 16. 3. Census of India, 1901, Vl-A, Bengal II, 14. 4. "Memorandum on Results of Indian Administration during the Past Thirty Years of British rule India Office to G. G. of India, February 1888, P. P. 1889, LVIII, 23. 38

which run from east to west - at right angles to and feeding the railway line". * Several feeder roads were constructed during the following years. In 1897-98 in the Chittagong district for instance, four such roads were constructed: the approach roads to the M irsarai, to Barak Kund, Sita Kund, and Henguli Railway Stations. But there was no incentive for long distance roads. Roads were still very local, only the focal point had changed. Instead of converging on the local market or the district headquarters local roads henceforth converged on the nearest railway station.

If this period witnessed more road development, though essentially of local nature, it was because roads were built and maintained by the local authorities to serve the railway system and to make the railway economically more viable.

1. Admin. Rept. 1895-96, Bengal General and Statistical Proceedings 1896, November-December, November 23-24. 39

CHAPTER III

The Assam Bengal Railway and the Port of Chittagong

•

During the period under study the communication system between Chittagong port and its hinterland underwent an epoch making change owing to the creation of a railway network linking Assam, and that part of Eastern Bengal lying on the left bank of the river Meghna, with Chittagong. The need for such a railway to provide Eastern Bengal and the Brahmaputra valley with an ocean port had been agitating the minds of transport planners since the end of the nineteenth century. Their plans came to fruition in 1904 with the opening of the Assam Bengal Railway between the port of Chittagong and Tinsukia in Upper Assam.

As far back as 1873 the Collector of Customs at Chittagong had written, "The one thing needful, however,to ensure the prosperity of Chittagong as a first class rice port and a place of general commerce, as I have often said before, is the means of inland transit by land or water. Until this universally desired advantage is secured, there will always be more or less uncertainty in regard to full supplies for trading purposes". ^ Nothing however was done in this respect and in the meantime with the growth and development of the jute trade in Eastern Bengal from the middle of the nineteenth century, the merchants of Narainganj; began to entertain the idea of having Narainganj I declared a port.

In 1875 therefore they sent a memorial to the Government of Bengal stating, "your Honor's memorialists, in common with other

Lyall and Dowling, 10. 40 merchants and traders of Eastern Bengal, labour under the greatest disadvantage in not having a suitable port for the transit of the products of this part of the province ......

Though some of the districts are obliged to have recourse to steamer, rail, or boat to empty their traffic into Calcutta, yet the process is so tedious and costly and is fraught with such risk, that much of the traffic, and with it many of the trade resources of these districts, are compelled to lie dormant and rot for want of transport, while the rest are very unhealthily developed.

That your Honor's memorialists venture therefore to state that if Narainganj be declared a port, and steamers from London, Liverpool, Manchester and other ports of Great Britain be permitted to touch direct, the trade of East Bengal would receive ,a very great impetus, and its vast interportal and seabearing traffic would increase with the greatest rapidity.

That under the circumstances represented, your Honor's memorialists most humbly request that measures may be adopted to facilitate navigation in the Megna, and that orders be passed by Government to survey the river and declare its navigation safe, so as to enable sea-borne vessels from Indian and foreign ports to reach direct this central mart of eastern traffic". ^ A sa consequence of that memorial the Government of Bengal this year 2 ordered the survey of the river Meghna. The survey revealed

1 Memorial of J.G.N. Pogose and other inhabitants of Dacca and Narainganj to Govt, of Beng. July 1875. Beng. Proc. Mne- Dept. 1875, , November 193-1. 2 Govt, of Beng. to the Master Attendant 29 November 1875, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1875, November 193-6. 41 that for 70 miles, no vessels could be navigated drawing over 15 feet* and that the difficulties of the navigation of the river were such as would probably deter ship's from British ports from ever 2 attempting to visit Narainganj. Under those circumstances the Government of Bengal pointed out to the Commissioner of Dacca "It would seem that the facts ascertained by Mr. haycock (the surveyor) indicate Chittagong as the most convenient port for the shipment of the produce of the eastern districts, the produce being sent down the Meghna to Chittagong in flats towed by light 3 draught river steamers".

The proposal to use the port of Chittagong for the shipment of goods from Eastern Bengal seems to have been well received by the merchants as is apparent from the fact that in 1876 M essrs. David and Company asked the Government of Bengal to lend a steamer for the transport of goods between Narainganj and Chittagong. They wrote, "Owing to the difficulty in procuring a suitable steamer to run between Narainganj and Chittagong, the want of communication is very much felt, both for the conveyance of goods as well as passengers. At present the country sloops that carry the traffic for regular service cannot be depended upon, as their passages are chiefly made by dropping with the tide. . . . The Government of Bengal has however. . . several steamers available, . . .that would be suited for this service, and I am sure, if the Government would undertake to launch one of these into service here, to open the communication between Narainganj and

1 F. Laycock River Surveyor to Master-Attendant 31 March 1876 Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1876 May 36-20 2 Master Attendent to Govt, of Beng. 26 April 1976, Beng Proc. 1 Mne Dept. 1876 May 36-21. 3 Govt, of Beng. to Comm, of Dacca, 29 May 1876, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1876 May 36-22. 42

Chittagong the undertaking would, I have no doubt, in course of time, when a regular business is opened out, be attended with profitable results both to the tracfe and the public as well.

The trade is a new one, and perhaps the Government will be disposed to do what is possible within reasonable limits for the encouragement of shipment of the produce of the eastern districts via Chittagong, instead of Calcutta, and I hope it may be considered politic to meet those trading in the produce of East Bengal as far as possible. My object being to reduce the cost of conveyance of produce from Narainganj districts to a sea port... The interest ignited in the port of Chittagong by these discussions led to the revival of the question of inland communication raised by the Collector of Customs in 1873 between Chittagong and its 2 hinterland. The question was discussed and in 1881 a railway from Chittagong to Daudkandy in the Tippera district was 3 considered. When the opinion of the Narayanganj merchants were sought regarding this proposal they expressed the view that if vessels drawing 20 feet could safely navigate the Meghna to Narayanganj a railway from Chittagong to Daudkandy would not pay though otherwise it would. As no vessels drawing over 15 feet could go up the Meghna the question of the construction of a railway- 4 line from Chittagong to Daudkandy was seriously taken up.

Early in 1882 the Commissioners of both Dacca and Chittagong

1 M. David to Comm, of Dacca Division 31 July 1876, Beng. Proc Mne Dept. 1886 August 150-1. 2 Lyall and Dowling, 10. 3 ■ Ibid. 4 Ibid. 43 submitted reports strongly favouring the construction of such a railway dwelling particularly on the dangerous nature of the Bay navigation to river shipping making for Chittagong. That same year Sir Rivers Thompson,the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, expressed the opinion that a railway connecting Chittagong with its hinterland, if constructed,would be "second to none in Bengal in importance". ^ Seven years later, the Commissioner of Chittagong was able to demonstrate the validity of those assumptions: "The value of the total sea-borne trade of the port (is) . . ,Rs. 3, 16, 96, 588," he reported in 1890, "... so recently as 1876-77 the whole value of the trade of the port was only Rs 54, 39, 320 or little more. . .In these 13 years the value of the trade of the port has sextupled itself, and this with no increased facilities. When the Assam Railway is working the growth should be even faster and it is difficult to understand why,in the face of such an increase of trade,there should be any hesitation in making 2 the railway".

In the face of this demand, Government brought the construction of an Eastern Bengal Railway under their consideration. In April 1882 the Public Works Department of the Government of Bengal submitted to its financial Department a rough estimate for a capital expenditure of

Rs.93, oo., o o o for a line toDaudkandy from Chittagong, with the enquiry whether the "probable receipts from traffic are such as to warrant the Government in undertaking the works, and (2) if classed as a productive public work, whether you would advise the Lieutenant-Governor to accept the financial responsibility of the

1 Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India, 23 June 1882. Bengal Proc. Public Works Department (Railway) 1882, June-Aug, July 24. 2 River Borne Traffic 1889-90. 44 project”.* In reply the Financial Department stated: ’’This estimate takes no account of the great increase in trade which must follow upon the opening of the Da cca-Maimen singh Railway, a large part of which must, if this line is constructed, follow it to Chittagong. It also leaves out of consideration the future opening up of Sylhet, Cachar, and the hill districts, by a line of railway. . .It may be assumed that the construction of the railway would have an important effect in developing the tea industry, and that the slopes of the hills from Sylhet to Chittagong, which would be skirted by the line, would ultimately be covered with gardens. This would bring a large traffic".

"This estimate, however, deals only with the existing produce so far as it is known. It was sufficient to show that, from the outset, the undertaking would be financially a success. The railway would run from a great trade centre to a cheap and accessible port, through an expectionally fertile tract, now for the most part deprived of means of communication, and bounded on the one side by a difficult coast, and on the other by a line of low hills well suited to tea cultivation. It would appear probable that, if this line is constructed, Chittagong will become the port for the whole of Eastern Bengal. . . The ability of this Government to assume the 2 financial responsibility for the line does not admit of discussion”.

The note went on to show that the Bengal Government could safely assume responsibility for a capital expenditure of up to four crores. On receipt of the decision in June 1882 the Bengal Government sent

1 • Govt, of Beng. Financial Dept, to Govt, of Beng. PWD 31 May 1882. Beng. Proc. PWD (Rly) 1882 Jun-Aug, July 23 see also Lyall.fc Dowling^ 11-12. 2 Govt, of Beng. Financial Dept, to Govt, of Beng. PWD, 31 May 1882, Beng. Proc. PWD (Rly) 1882 June-Aug, July 23. 45 up the scheme for the construction of a line from Chittagong to Daudkandy for the approval of the Government of India, and in September of that year received sanction for the maturing of the project as well as the investigation of the extension of a line to Cachar. * Later on Chandpur was substituted for Daudkandy as it was considered "to be a better port" and also as it was 2 within four hours by steamer from Narai

At almost the same period as the need for a railway from the port of Chittagong to Eastern Bengal was beginning to be felt, the importance of opening out the Brahmaputra Valley by the building of a railway system was also being discussed by the 3 Government of India. Three options were considered. The first was the construction of a line of railway connecting the Brahmaputra Valley with the Northern Bengal Railway. But the formidable streams draining into the Brahmaputra which would have had to be bridged and trained in order to do so prevented the adoption of this plan. Next the proposal to construct a railway from a point opposite Goalundo through Dacca to Mymensingh led the authorities to assess the feasibility of extending such a Dacca-Mymensingh line across the Garo Hills 4 into the Brahamputra Valley. The third possibility was introduced by the discussion of an Eastern Bengal-Chittagong railway already noted. It was J. W. Buyers, at that time Engineer-in-Chief of the

1 Lyall &c Dowling, 12.

2 Gazette of India, 1887 ,i Sept. 10, 1208. See also Beng. CC 1892-93. 40. 3 Rept. of the Director General of Rly in India to Govt, of India P.P. 1883, LII, 14. 4 . Final Report by J. W. Buyers Engineer-in-Chief on the Survey Operation, Encl. 7. Papers relating to the Bengal Assam Railway No. 868 R.C. Govt, of India Public Works Dept. Railway Construction 1887. See also E. Davidson, Railways in India With an Account of their Rise, Progress and Construction, 214-215. 46 railway survey operations in the Brahmaputra Valley who in 1882 suggested the extension of the line from the port of Chittagong through Eastern Bengal across the north Cachar Hills into the Brahmaputra Valley. Emphasizing the importance of having direct communication between the Brahmaputra Valley and Chittagong he stated, "The claims of Chittagong may not in my opinion be so lightly set aside. . .As a port it has already made rapid progress not withstanding that it has to contend against very faulty internal communications". As a port,he pointed out, it had certain definite advantages over the port of Calcutta. He anticipated that "trade will gravitate towards Chittagong" and for that purpose considered "the connection with that seaport an important point in favour of the scheme". * It is interesting to 2 note that while the Eastern Bengal newspapers strongly advocated the Chittagong railway scheme, the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, the Trades' Association and the British Indian Association had supported the scheme for a railway line, "from Narainganj and

running through Dacca and Mymensingh to Gauhati, [ co Wn £c.t i n s ] .with the Eastern Bengal Railway at Goalundo by means of a steamer ferry". It, they pointed out, "offers the quickest means of communication between Calcutta and Assam, besides promising 3 to open up Sylhet and Cachar. " From 1882 the construction of a railway from Chittagong to Assam received the serious attention of the Government of India. Enquiries were made in 1885, 1886 4 and 1887. In the course of these investigations the advantages of connecting the Brahmaputra Valley with the Port of Chittagong

1 Final Report by J.W. Buyers - Engineer-in-Chief of the Survey Operation - Encl. No. 7. A.B. Rly Papers, 1887. 2 The Dacca Prqkash - 23 October, Bengal Native Newspaper Report 1887, 1049. Sansadhini, 23 December, B.N.N.P.! . 1888, 13. 3 . Deputation of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, the Trades' Association and the British Indian Association to Govt, of Be^g. 1881 - Beng. Proc. PWD(Rly) 1881, Oct-Dec, Oct.2. 4 Lyall & Dowling, 14. See also P.P. 1886, XLIX, 319. 47 were found to be so obvious that in May 1891 the Government of India gave sanction for the construction of a line from Upper Assam to the port of Chittagong. ^ The needs both of Eastern Bengal and 2 of Assam therefore led to the construction of the Assam Bengal R ailw ay .

J.W. Buyers, in his Final Report to the Government of India in 1887 had neatly summarised these needs. The scheme, he wrote, "is intended to open out the fertile and populous districts of Bengal and Assam, lying east of the river Meghna, and to render more accessible the distant Brahmaputra Valley, at present sparsely populated, but with rich waste land awaiting the cultivators, rich also in its undeveloped mineral resources and in the possession of an industry (tea). . . but for which it would probably have slumbered on for many years without the thought 3 even of a railway being spent upon it". It therefore follows that the railway line was constructed in response to three major considerations - to facilitate the trade of Eastern Bengal by giving it communication with the port nearest to it, to develop the valley 0 4 the Brahmaputra by making it more accessible by land; and to facilitate further development of the tea industry of the Brahmaputra Valley and of Sylhet and Cachar, by diminishing its total dependence on the lengthy water route to Calcutta.

The area lying east of the river Meghna consisted in administrative terms of the districts of Chittagong, Noakhali, Tippera, Sylhet,

1 Administrative Report on the Railways in India 1904, 180. 2 ■ Rept. of the Director General of Rlysin India to Govt, of India P.P. 1888 LXXVI, 289. 3 Final Report by J.W. Buyers Engineer-in-Chief on the Survey operation E ncl. 7, A.B. Rly Papers, 1887. 48

Cachar, Hill Tippera and the Hill Tracts of Chittagong. These districts in 1891 had a population of 5, 554, 147 and a total area 1 of 24, 090 square miles with regions rich m jute, rice and tea. But in spite of the fact that the area was populous and fertile it did not have a single mile of railway. For many years the only railway in the division of Chittagong was the tramway worked by hand which for a mile and a half traversed the portage beside the 2 rapids or falls in the Karnaphuli near Barkal. As a result, although Chittagong was the natural outlet for the produce of Eastern Bengal and Assam,there was a large amount of produce seeking a better outlet than the existing conditions allowed.

Jute was one of the main articles of export from the port of Chittagong. The exportation of jute from Chittagong began in the year 1877-78 when 130, 775 cwt , of jute, valued at Rs 7, 12, 000, 3 were exported. Over the next ten years exportation of jute 4 increased tremendously, rising tenfold to 1,416,481 cwt. However, the exporters of jute realised that if a railway line was constructed joining the port of Chittagong with its hinterland the export of jute from the port would increase still more dramatically. In 1889-90 the Commissioner of Chittagong Division voiced the opinion of many when he said, "the large figures would speedily be doubled if a railway were constructed".

"I do not use the word 'double' unadvisedly but deliberately and 5 with the full conviction that I am not guilty of exaggeration".

1 Census of India 1891 Bengal III, 35, also Census of India 1891, A ssam , II, 2. 2 ' Annual General Report of the Chitt. Division 1891-92, Admin. Beng. 1891-92, 226. 3 Lyall 8t Dowling, 10. 4 R iver B orne T raffic 1889-90, 129. 5 River Borne Traffic 1889-90, 130. 49

The reason behind such conviction was that the port of Chittagong had certain definite advantages over the port of Calcutta, which given proper communication with its hinterland would naturally attract trade to it. These were the nearness of the port of Chittagong to the area of production and consumption as far as Eastern Bengal and Assam was concerned and the consequent savings in money and time which shipment through Chittagong would effect, and the low handling costs and port dues at Chittagong as compared with Calcutta.

Chittagong was much nearer than Calcutta to the jute growing areas of Eastern Bengal* . From Narainganj, one of the important collecting points for jute for the whole region, it was only half the distance to Chittagong, the combined distances to be carried by steamer and rail being 142 miles to Chittagong, but 262 to Calcutta. * To use Chittagong would also eliminate a great deal of handling, once a through railway had been constructed* Jute for Calcutta had either to be moved in slow flats by river, or from Narainganj , to Goalundo by water and thence, after transhipment, by rail. In Calcutta the jute was discharged into godowns, and moved thence by rail to the dock side, or by lighter to ship moored in mid-streamfboth slow processes in a congested port - before the long and tricky descent of the Hooghly to the open 2 sea. Sent by way of Chittagong the jute would spend only a day between Narainganj and Chandpur the river terminal for the 3 Assam Bengal Railway and could then be moved by rail direct to loading sheds alongside the ships on the Karnaphuli. Once aboard

1 Lyall & Dowling, 19. 2 Report on the Development of the Port of Chittagong by Sir George Buchanan, 1918, 13. 3 Ibid. 50

there was only nine miles of reasonably easy navigation down river * as compared with the eighty two miles to be negotiated in the Hooghly. And not only would time and labour spent on handling the jute be sharply reduced, there would also be far less risk of loss than was faced in the passage from Calcutta to the Sandheads. The 3 Naramganj - Chandpur crossing was perfectly safe, and thereafter the jute would travel by rail to what was in effect an ocean rather than an inland terminal.

Similarly it was pointed out that if a railway line was constructed it would be able to tap some of the rice exported to Western Bengal from the districts of SylhetjNoakhali and Tippera during the south-west monsoon when the route by river and bay was closed by stress of weather. The leading Indian rice-exporting firm M essrs. Kristo Das Kundo estimated that 'if Sylhet and Tippera and the east Mymensingh were thrown open to this port, the imports would soon reach a value of a crore and a half of rupees, 4 about 75 lakhs of maunds". Likewise it was felt that the trade in the two chief imports through Chittagong - salt and kerosene oil would be benefited, by a railway.

Not only would freight be moved more quickly if sent by way of Chittagong rather than Calcutta, there would also be a clear saving in freight charges. The rate at which it paid a railway to carry jute was fixed on state railways,at \ of a pie per maund per mile. The rate for 112 miles between Chandpur and Chittagong would

1 Lyall & Dowling, 21. 2 The Calcutta Port Trust - A Brief History of Fifty Years Work , • 1870-1920. 4

3 River Borne Traffic 1886-87 , 116. 4 Lyall & Dowling, 25. In 1887-88CKi^-t/o»^ exported 15,95,494 mds of rice. Ibid. 51 therefore have been 28 pies or 2 annas 4 pies per maund. To that had to be added steamer freight from Narainganj to Chandpur which was estimated as being one third lower than the railway rates. "The freight for 30 miles would therefore" as Lyall and Dowlingheld"be 5 pies and the freight for the whole distance (i.e. from Narainganj to Chittagong) would be 2 annas 9 pies". * The rate between Narainganj and Calcutta varied. The rates of 1887 published by the Eastern Bengal Railway on 28 June 1887 were 5 annas 3 pies per maund for baled jute, 7 annas for jute in drums, and in the same notification the manager undertook not to raise the rate for drums above 8 annas 3 pies per maund for the season. ^

The two great river steamer companies advertised in the "Englishman" of 22 June 1888, that the rate for drummed jute up to 29 February 1889 would be 8 annas 3 pies from Narainganj to Calcutta, which was equivalent to about 6 annas 3 pies for baled jute. Taking only the lowest rate of 5 annas 3 pies, it was pointed out that the difference in favour of the freight to Chittagong was 2 3 annas 6 pies, or very nearly fifty per cent. The new rate, if the railway were constructed, would also have been considerably less than the existing steamer rate between Narainganj and 4 Chittagong which varied from 3 annas to 3 annas 9 pies per maund. It seemed logical to suppose, given these sharp cost advantages, that if a railway line were constructed it would encourage exporters to ship via the cheaper route.

1 Lyall &: Dowling, 22. The actual rate charged for the whole distance in 1900 was 12 annas per bale of 4001bs, or 2 annas 5 pies per maund. Of that the Steamer Companies took 4 annas for the 30 miles by water and the Railway 8 annas for the 112 miles by rail, the latter being subjected to the rebates given by the railway - Jute Traffic.Agents Letters to the Board 1900, AI/292. 2 Lyall & Dowling, 23. 3 Ibid. 22. 4 Ibid. 22. 52

The port charges at Chittagong were also much less than those at the port of Calcutta. Till 1904 steamers visiting the port of Chittagong had to pay no river dues while the river due charged at Calcutta was 4 annas. * Moreover the to.wage and mooring charges were also much less. These factors combined to convince the Government that the trade of Eastern Bengal would be benefitted if a railway were constructed connecting the port with its hinterland, and that the returns to the railway would be considerable.

Beyond the jute and rice plains of Eastern Bengal lay the Khasi and Jaintia Hills between which and the Lushai Hills on the south spread the wide valley of the Surma and its tributaries, and north of these again the five hundred miles of the Assam Valley of the Brahmaputra. In both valleys rice was cultivated, but on the hill teraces were the tea gardens, about eight hundred of them, the dominant commercial export crop of the north-east. For both valleys Chittagong was the nearest major port, yet the Surma valley mainly and the Brahmaputra valley almost exclusively used Calcutta. In part this was due to the concentration in Calcutta of the offices of the tea companies and managing agencies, the brokerage and insurance firms, as also of the jute mills on Hooghly side. But probably more significantly, it was due to the absence of a rail link between Chittagong and its hinterland in the two valleys, and to the problem for small river craft of the exposed and dangerous crossing from the Meghna estuary to the Karnaphuli about a hundred miles down the coast.

The trade of the Surma Valley, the district of Sylhet and the plains of Cachar, was largely waterborne. But the main river of the area -

1 See Chapter VII 2 Dr. Prajnananda Banerjee, Calcutta and its Hinterland - A Stud^r in^feconomic History of India, 1833-1900» 2-3. 53 the Surma and the Kushirya were both shallow so that steamers could only go as high as Phenchuganj, or at the height of the rainy season to Silchar. Both these steamer stations were at a long distance even so from the tea gardens on the hills, and were linked to them by poor roads, ill maintained and in the rains so deep in mud as to be very difficult to travel on. * (The Surma Valley is rightly described by Spate as the most amphibious part of eastern India)?' The transport of tea from the whole Surma Valley area was thus a very real problem.

The Meghna-Surma river route had also to be used to move rice and other food stuffs up into the tea districts, and all the other articles that the large body of planters needed both for the production and processing of tea and for their own use. In an address to the Viceroy^Lord Curzon,in 1901 the Chairman of the Surma Valley Branch of the Indian Tea Association pointed out the problem of communication in the Surma Valley and the need for feeder lines to the Assam Bengal Railway in the following words: "We desire to draw your Excellency's attention to the fact that the state of matters as regards road communication in these Districts is worse than in Assam proper. The almost apparent hopelessness of ever being able to construct permanent and durable roads on account of the absence of road metal and the prohibitive cost of importing it weighs heavily upon us. For a portion of the year our roads are practically impassable and such repairs as the Local Boards are able to execute from inadequate grants made to them for the upkeep of roads are of the most transient nature. With this fact in view, we look to the construction

1 Lyall & Dowling, 34.

3- • O-H-k 9p o .ie ,/ Indih a r j P a k is ta n . A G e n e r a l af'd. R e^tonoX kvj SS2. 3 54

of light feeder lines (of which there are none in either of the districts) to connect our gardens both with the main line of the Assam Bengal Railway and th*e river". ^ A further point was that labourers to work on the tea gardens were usually brought from the other more populous districts of Bengal. To reach the tea gardens the coolies had to travel under the most unfavourable conditions which led to disease and death on the way.

In 1887 the Indian Tea Association addressed a letter to the Government of India, pointing out how greatly the Chittagong- Chandpur line if extended to Silchar would benefit the tea planters of the Surma Valley. As the proposed railway line was expected to pass through tea gardens for many miles, the planters stressed that the line would both increase the labour supply and decrease mortality on the way and at the same time make the task of shipment of tea a much easier one,with Chittagong as the port to be used.^

In contrast to the tea planters of the Surma Valley those of the Brahmaputra Valley were not at first conscious of any great advantage which would ensue if Upper Assam were connected with Chittagong. They had wanted a line along the Brahmaputra Valley which would enable them to bring in labour from their traditional recruiting points in Behar more cheaply and they were in any case rather better served by existing steamer services, in the lower valley in particular,than were planters in Sylhet and Cachar. Nevertheless, the survey engineer J.W. Buyers was able to

1 Address of the Surma Valley Branch of the India Tea Association , to the Viceroy Lord Curzon. I. T. A. Rept, 1901, 346. 2 Lyall and Dowling, 34. See also Annual Reports on Labour Immigration into Assam 1896,.9. 55 report, "I have met planters. . .who have begun by saying that a railway along the valley was what was wanted, chiefly to bring cheap labour into the country, but I have not met a single one among these who,after the scheme had been explained and comprehended, did not end by giving his assent to my views”. * What an Assam-Chittagong line could do was to vastly shorten their lines of communication. The existing means of communication between the Brahmaputra Valley and Calcutta was either by steamer,.or partly by steamer and partly by rail. Thus goods went first by steamers along the Brahmaputra river and then by train from either Goalundo, Jatrapur or Sara, or direct by a much lengthier river route via Faridpur, Khulna^the Sundarbans to Calcutta. In either case the journey was a slow and lengthy one, and if made rather speedier by the use of a rail link this had the drawback of involving much more handling of the tea.

The Brahmaputra Valley, comprising the districts of Goalpara, K am rup, D arran g , Nowgong, S ibsagar, Lakhimpur and an 2 area of twenty thousand square miles, was extremely rich and fertile. But its agricultural potential was much under-exploited for lack of labour - the crying need of the region was labour. It had been estimated by the Lt. Governor of Bengal of the time that not less than nine million acres of rich and cultivable land fit for the production of rice and other cereals lay untilled in Assam 3 because of the want of cultivators. The tea industry also faced the same problem. It would have benefited from an improved supply of foodstuffs, but it also needed^plentiful supply of cheap

1 Final Report by J. W. Buyers, Engineer-in-Chief on the Survey Operation Encl. 7, A.B. Rly Papers, 1887. The Indian Tea Association from its headquarters in Calcutta however, still favoured a link at Dhubri with the Eastern Bengal State Railway. I.T.A. 1901, 323. 2 Census of India 1891, Assam I, 51. 3 President Beng. C. C. to Govt, of India 22 February, 1895, Beng. Proc. PWD (Rly) 1895, March 36. 56 labour for work on the gardens - ’'Labour’', as the President the Bengal Chamber of Commerce stated, "to harvest the leaf as well as to till the soil, without which labour the full excellence of the Indian tea crop either in quantity or in quality can never be obtained". *

It was however, not only more labour that was needed by the planters of Upper Assam, they were also interested in the cheap and expeditious export of their tea and also in the cheap import of rice and other commodities to feed and cloth their coolies,and of tools and machinery to work their gardens. The question of labour, Buyers argued, could best be solved by joining Assam - and also the Surma Valley - with an area which was densely populated. Since the immigrants by the late nineteenth century were being drawn to the districts of Nowgang,Sibsagar and Lakhimpur from southern and eastern Bengal, a railway through Eastern Bengal would obviously serve those areas particularly 2 well, providing a fast and safe line of recruitment. The exporters of tea and importers of rice in Assam were similarly interested in cheap and fast means of communication with a port. For the moment the port used was Calcutta, but were a railway to be built Chittagong would be a much more natural outlet for the Upper and Central parts of the Assam Valley. Assuming a shipment of tea from Assam to Laksham then the further stages of its movement would be as follows:

1 President, Beng. C.C. To Govt, of India 22 February 1895. Beng. Proc. PWD (Rly) 1895, March 36. 2 Final Report by J. W. Buyers Engineer-in-Chief on the Survey Operation Encl. 7. A.B. Rly Papers, 1887. 57

(a) to Calcutta m ile s Laksham to Chandpur by rail. . . . 32 Chandpur to Goalundo by Steamer 90 Goalundo to Calcutta by rail .... 152

The total distance, with two breaks of bulk 274 miles

(b) Chittagong Laksham to Chittagong by rail

Chittagong port was thus not only far nearer than the port of Calcutta but goods could reach it without break of bulk, which was particularly desirable in the case of the shipment of tea. In addition to the saving in time and in handling charges, there was obviously a very considerable saving in rail, freight 2 charges for goods directed by way of Chittagong. As a result of those advantages it was agreed by the Government that it would be in the "best interest of. . .Assam to place it in direct 3 communication with the seaport nearest to it namely Chittagong".

Thus various considerations led to the construction of the Assam Bengal Railway which,by joining the remote and rich districts with the port of Chittagong ^opened out the heart of Assam and Eastern Bengal, and greatly enhanced the commercial importance of the port of Chittagong.

Government had initiated the survey of the financial and commercial implications of constructing an Assam to Chittagong railway, and 1 Lyall and Dowling, 36. 2 Indian Jute Mills Association to Chamber, 28 March 1905, Beng. C. C. 1905, I, 382. 3 General Remarks - R.C.B. Pemberton, Colonel R.E. Secretary, 25 August 1887. A.B. Rly Papers, 1887. 58

Government carried out the route survey. When a decision had been reached to build the Assam Bengal Railway it was Government again which began its construction as a State line in May 1891. However "the visitation of famines during this decade, the urgency of building protective railways recommended by the Famine Commission", led the Government.as Capital points out,to invite pjMutvfce companies to assist in railway development. ^ In April 1892 therefore a private company - the Assam Bengal Railway Company, was formed in London which took over construction and management from Government. The status of this new Company along with other Companies which were formed, differed from the earlier Railway Companies in India in the mid fifties in that,"while the earlier Companies operated their own property, the new 2 Companies worked railways which were held to be State property".

The railway was built on the eastern side of the river Brahmaputra serving the eastern districts of Bengal and eastern and north- ■ eastern Assam. The total length of the main line from Chittagong 3 Port to Tinsukia was some 574 miles. For the purpose of construction the line was divided into three sections, each in 4 charge of a superintending engineer. The first section was from Chittagong to Badarpur. This was the main line, with branches going to the rice and jute growing areas of the region. To tap the rice grown in Noakhali therefore in 1903 a branch line running south-wards from Laksham to Noakhali was opened. Similarly branches were extended to points on the left bank of the river Meghna

1 "Fifty Years of Rail Transport in India" 1888-1938 Jubilee Number, Capital, 3 November 1938. 2 "Fifty Years of Rail Transport in India", 1888-1938 Jubilee Number, Capital 3 November 1938. 3 Railway Department Government of India Railway Board History of Indian Railways constructed and in Progress corrected up to 31 March 1918, 153. 4 Administrative Report on the Railways in India 1892-93, 24. 59

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AGARTALA LUND MAP OF ■T?g* LflKM li ASSAM BENGAL RAILWAY JESSOR 1927 REFERENCES

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CHITTAGONG CHITTAGONG^ PORTf/

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2. The Assam Bengal Railway, 1927. 60

nearest to the important jute centres of Nara i n gcm j and Bhairab Bazar on the other side of the river. Communication with Naraingan) was established by means of the branch line running westward from Laksham in the Tippera district (81 miles from Chittagong) to Chandpur. Similarly communication withBhairab Bazar was opened by the extension of a line from Akhaura- north of laksham to Ashuganj situated on the left bank of the river Meghna and opposite Bhairab Bazar. ^ This line however, in the absence of a bridge,did not prove as effective as it was hoped it would.

The second section was from Badarpur to Lumding on the edge of the Assam Valley itself and the third section was from Lumding to Tinsukia. These two sections ran along areas rich in rice and tea and were constructed mainly to promote the easy 2 transportation of those commodities.

The Assam Bengal Railway Company immediately after its formation pointed out to the Government the need for adequate and permanent landing facilities at the port of Chittagong. With this demand from the Railway authorities were set in motion forces which eventually led to the acquisition of foreshore land, the construction of jetties and other allied facilities necessary for a port to accommodate ocean-going steamers.

The Port Trust of Chittagong was formed in 1888 and although section 19 of the Chittagong Port Commissioners Act of 1887

1 History of Indian Railways 1918. 153. 2 Ibid. see also Sir Edward Gait - A History of Assam, 346. 61

invested the Port Commissioners with powers to acquire land to build wharves and jetties it was not till the advent of the Assam Bengal Railway Company, after almost four years, that the Port Commissioners, as Buchanan remarked "awoke to the fact that they had no foreshoreland on which to build sea-going jetties". * In August 1892 therefore the Trust applied to the Government of Bengal to sanction the acquisition of a plot of land on the western bank of the river Karnaphuli measuring about 3, 500 feet in length and 660 in breadth for the erection 2 of jetties and warehouses. The Commissioners pointed out however, "that the land asked for will only berth four vessels. It is now advisable to acquire without delay, an extensive river frontage for the future well being of the Port Trust".* They went on "The Port Fund cannot meet the expenses of buying land and erecting jetties and warehouses, unless Government grant a large loan. . .If the Government are unwilling to do this they might grant a loan sufficient to acquire all the land with river frontage, which will yearly increase in value. The Port Trust will then be in a position, if trade develops. . .to ask Government for a loan for jetties and warehouses and will not be obliged to pay 3 exorbitant, sums for land like the Calcutta Port Trust had to do". In the meantime the Consulting Engineer for Railways had also sent a proposal to the Government for the issue of a notice to acquire a section of foreshore land about 8, 000 feet in length and 4 1, 500 feet in width. On the receipt of information of these proposals the Government of Bengal wrote to the Port Commissioners stating that it had come to their knowledge that the Port Commissioners

1 Buchanan, 4. 2 Vice-Chmn Port Comms. To Govt, of Beng. 12 August 1892. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1892, July-December, December 45. 3 Vice-Chmn Port Comms. To Govt, of Beng. 29 November 1892. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1892, July-Dee, December 47-48. 4 Buchanan, 4. 62 wanted to acquire the same piece of land as was also required by the Assam Bengal Railway for their goods terminus* and that their object in acquiring that particular plot of land was "(1) to be able to embark and disembark their goods, and those belonging to Government, in case the railway handling charges should be too high; (2) to secure to the Port Trust the mooring fees which will not be paid by vessels entering the port if they are able to load and unload direct from the railway jetties". The letter went on to state, "There is no fear of excessive terminal charges, as Government can always control them just as it does the charges on the goods traffic on its own lines; and competition with the railway in the hope of gaining some profit 2 from the trade which the railway attracts to the port is undesirable". Nevertheless the Government of Bengal agreed to the appointment of a committee in . February 1893 to report on the most suitable arrangements to be made in Chittagong for landing and shipping 3 goods. . This Committee in May 1893 suggested that jetty room for at least six ships (500 feet for each) should be provided and that the land required for the joint needs of the Port and Railway should extend in length from the Double Mooring jetty to. the mouth of the Guptakhali Khal (a distance of 3-| miles), with a depth of 4 about 2, 000 feet.

The Government of Bengal in reporting the Committee' s findings to the Government of India expressed the opinion that the land required for the port and the Railway should be taken up at once.

1 Govt, of Beng. to Chmn Port Comms. 9 February 1893. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1893, February 45. 2 Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India, 7 February 1893. Beng. Proc. . Mne Dept. 1893, February 44. 3 Govt, of Beng. to Chmn Port Comms. 9 February 1893. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1893, February 45. 4 Meeting of the Committee on the 6 May 1893 presided by F.A. Slack - Collector of Custom Chittagong, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1893, July 53-54. 63

It also argued that the Port Trust should own the whole of the foreshore, wharves and jetties at Chittagong and s h o u l d control the warehousing and landing and shipping of goods there, providing the Railway Company with suitable access and facilities. The Government of Bengal pointed ou^however, that funds for this farsighted plan would have to be provided by the Government of India in the shape of a loan. * The Government of India while emphasizing that "it would be expedient that the whole foreshore within port limits should be owned by the Port Trust" considered that it would not be right "that the Trust should acquire more land than that which might reasonably be 2 considered to be actually required in the proximate future". The Government of India pointed out that if the Trust were to acquire all the foreshore it might not be able to pay interest on the purchase money without imposing such burdens in the way of dues as to drive trade from the port. In the event the Government of India suggested that only land likely to be 3 required within the next ten years should be acquired.

The Government of India, having agreed that foreshore lands should be acquired, though to a more limited time scale than the other two authorities had envisaged, and that the land acquired should be managed by the Port Commissioners, then proceeded to consider the question of a loan. Its decision that a special committee should be appointed to study the financial implications 4 of the plan proved, however, to be fatal to the plan itself, for

1 Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India, 28 June 1893 - Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1893, July 58. 2 Govt, of India to Govt, of Beng. 6 October 1893, Beng. Proc. ■ Mne Dept. 1894, February 3. 3 Govt, of India to Govt, of Beng, 6 October 1893, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1894, February 3. 4 Ibid. 64

the two experts appointed were J . E . O.1 Connor, Assistant Secretary in the Finance Department and J.H . Apjohn, the Vice Chairman and Chief Engineer of tiie Calcutta Port Trust. The one applied the most rigidly orthodox financial rules to the issue, while Apjohn did what he could to limit if not prevent the growth of a port rival to his own Calcutta. The two 'experts' thus reported their opinion that wharf accommodation for two vessels would be ample for the requirements of trade for at least twenty years from the opening of the railway line throughout its whole length.* (The Port Commissioners it will be recalled had asked for four berths and the Bengal Government's committee for six). They also gave their opinion against any anticipation either of a future imcrease in trade or future need for land: "It does not seem to us that. . .any appreciable portion of the trade will in the future be diverted from Calcutta to Chittagong, which will remain a port suitable only for the trade of a certain relatively small 2 part of Eastern Bengal and Assam". They therefore, went on to write "It is not expedient at present that the Port Trust should make itself responsible for the expenditure which would be involved in the acquisition of a large area of foreshore land in view to future trade requirements, or to the construction of a 3 wharf or wharves". And finally they urged that there should be divided control of such foreshore land as was acquired, for having negatived the plans for land purchase and development by the Port Trust they went on: "Meanwhile, as it is necessary that the railway should have access to the foreshore and have facilities for the landing and storage of material,the Company should be

1 M essrs. J . E . O'Connor and J . H. Apjohn <■ to Govt, of Beng. 2 December 1893, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1894, February 28-29.

2 fbid

3 Ibid. 65

allowed to acquire a piece of land extending over a length of about 1, 500 or 1, 600 feet for the construction of a pier for the landing of railway material. . ..this land should be acquired, as directed by the Government of India, with the concurrence of the Port Trust and subject to the condition that if at any time after the opening of the line the Trust considered it expedient to take over the land and the pier constructed on it, they should be able to do so on payment to the Railway Company of the cost of acquisition of the land and the value of the pier and adjuncts". * However, though they argued that "there is no necessity for acquiring land for the port" by the Port Trust they nevertheless felt that for the purpose of protecting the foreshore from erosion it was "expedient 2 to acquire ;a section of the foreshore". For the combined expenditure of the revetment work and the construction of a pier they felt that a sum of Rs 5, 53000 would be required. Of this, Rs 3, 03, 000 would be required for the purpose of revetment alone - a task which they considered should be undertaken either by the Government or the Port Trust. The Port Trust, they felt, with 3 .an expenditure which exceeded its income would not be able to m eet the charge . The sum involved would be a heavy burden on the trade of the port, which that trade could not afford, and they therefore suggested, "We cannot see how (the charge) is to be met 4 unless the local Government should assume the burden".

On the issue of railway foreshore acquisition the Government of Bengal agreed to the proposals of the O'Connor-Apjohn Committee,

1 M essrs.J.E. O’Connor & J . H. Apjohn to Govt, of Beng. 2 December 1893, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1894, February 28-29. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. The income of the Port Trust in 1892-93 was Rs 70, 000 - the expenditure on recurring charges was more than Rs 74, 000. 4 Ibid. 66

subject to certain conditions: that the land acquired should be 1, 600 feet in length along the river and 500 feet deep; that the railway should construct any jetties or piers which were required for their traffic on the foreshore; that any works which might be required for the protection of the foreshore from erosion should be carried out by the railway at their own expense; and not by the Government of Bengal and that should the Port Commissioners at any future time so require, the Railway Company should cede any land not occupied by their terminal buildings or absolutely required for the working of their traffic to the Port Commissioners on payment of actual expenses incurred, such compensation to include the cost of any jetti.es, piers or buildings erected, and also a fair proportion of the cost of revetments or other works constructed for the protection of the river bank. * The Government of India also accepted tbe Committee’s recommendations and agreed to the Railway company acquiring land but adhered to their opinion that the Port Trust should discharge all the work of landing and shipping at the port and that the piers or jetties that might be •required for general railway traffic should be provided by the Port Trust and paid for out of the Port Fund. The railway would construct only such temporary jetties as might be absolutely necessary for the landing of railway material and of any works required for the protection of the railway land and that power should be reserved to the Port Trust to acquire the land taken up 2 by the Railway Company with the pier built on it on payment.

The report of O'Connor and Apjohn was thus decisive in determining the action of the Government of India over the acquisition of foreshore

1 Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India, 13 January 1894. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1894, April 31. 2 Govt, of India to Govt, of Beng. 18 April 1894, Beng. Proc. Mne. Dept. 1894, April 48. 67

land for Chittagong port. There had been vigorous protest at the choice of Apjohn as a member of the Committee, since he was Vice-Chairman of the rival Port Trust of Calcutta. The Agent to the Bengal Assam Railway, for example, complained, "It must be considered as unfortunate that^at a time when an independent report of the prospects of Chittagong, which was then regarded as a potential and is now an actual competitor with Calcutta, was obtained, that officers entirely unconnected with Calcutta were not appointed this fatal report has, inspite of the protests of the Company,determined the policy of Government for no less than five years of the life of the railway". * Later critics, more fully aware of the ill-consequences of the appointment^fully agreed with the Agents ' complaint. Sir Francis Spring who was the Chairman and Chief Engineer of the Madras Port stigmatised the report as 2, unfavourable and short-sighted if not prejudiced;. and Sir George Buchanan the Chairman and Chief Engineer of the Rangoon Port Trust spoke in similar or still harsher terms: "In the light of events I am disposed to concur with Sir Francis Spring's remark. M essrs O'Connor and Apjohn appear to have been principally interested in proving that none of the trade going to Calcutta could 3 possibly be diverted to Chittagong". It seems only too clear that on the foreshore issue the parsimony and short-sightedness of the Government of India,and the lack of resolution of the Government of Bengal had been compounded by the positive hostility of rival interest groups in Calcutta with crippling effect.

The Government of India,having decided that the Port Trust should undertake all the works of landing and shipping at the port,informed

1 Agent A. B. Rly - To Managing Director A.B. Rly Co, 7 January 1 1902, Agents' Letters to Board 1902-04. 2 Buchanan 4. 3 Ibid. 68

the Port Commissioners to that effect. The Port Commissioners however responded by adhering to their earlier view expressed in January 1893 when they had explained, "the Port Fund has at present no funds available to meet the expenses of erecting jetties and warehouses". It seemed essential therefore "that Government should in the interests of the port advance such sum as may be necessary". * The Government of India however did not agree to a loan and stated, "Imperial Funds should not be employed in providing trade facilities at a Port, that it was the work of the trade itself to provide such facilities, and that as trade expanded 2 they would doubtless be forthcoming". While the Port Commissioners and the Government of India both held opposite views on the subject of a loan the Railway Company maintained that they should be entrusted with the work of building jetties for as they explained, "until some permanent jetty is made at Chittagong, the Railway cannot expect to attract much trade to the Port, and the interests of the Railway, the Port, and the community generally of Eastern Bangal and Assam must suffer". J This proposal of the Railway Company was quite acceptable to the Port Commissioners. Ln a note dated 21 August 1895 the Chairman of the Port Commissioners thus stated that the Commissioners "(i) are anxious for the landing and shipping facilities for the Railway to be provided in the belief that their revenue will be increased thereby (2) But the Commissioners have no guarantee for funds beyond their income and cannot speculate.

(3) They have no funds and cannot borrow at less than 4 \ p ercent. The Railway can get money on far easier terms.

1 Chmn of the Port Comms. To Govt, of Beng. 16 January 1893. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1893, February 43. 2 Agent and Chief Eng. A.B. Rly Co. to Managing Director A. B. Rly Co. 10 Jan u ary 1896. . Agent * s L etter to Board, 1896, 3 Ibid. 69

(4) The Commissioners have no Engineers or establishments. It would be wasteful for them to create such establishments to work side by side with the Railway establishments. (5) So the Commissioners would be willing to carry out the work by using the Railway's funds and Engineers and establishments on term s to be negotiated". *

The Government of India did not agree to this proposal. As a result, all progress towards the construction of the jetties at Chittagong came to a standstill.

In a letter addressed to the Railway Board their Agent and Chief Engineer J.W . Buyers wrote in frustration, "The Government of India's decision of course simply means that the construction of the jetties, the protection of the foreshore and generally the works required to make a Port of Chittagong, are to be postponed sine die* and that whatever happens,;the railway, the party most interested in the prosperity of the port, is to have nothing whatever to say in the matter". The deadlock was broken in 1896 by a telegram from the Secretary of State to the Government of India, "Bengal Assam Railway Company urge inadequacy temporary accommodation for landing sanctioned by you, and press for necessary permanent works to be entrusted to Company under clause 8 of their contract. If sanction be not accorded to this request or early construction of requisite works, Company demand arbitration to commence operations. Adequate and permanent landing facilities are in my

1 Note on Resolution 5 of the Port Commissioners'meeting of 21 August 1895 - by W.B. Oldham Chairman - 27 August 1895 - Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1895^2'38. 2 Agent and Chief Engineer to Rly Board. Agent'.s Letters to Board 1894, 70 opinion imperatively necessary and must be provided at once", Upon the receipt of this telegram* the Government.of India enquired of the Government of Bengal whether "the Government of Bengal are prepared to formulate proposals for the grant of a loan to 2 the Port Commissioners to enable them to undertake the work". The Government of Bengal however was against giving any loan to the Port Commissioners and gave the following reason for their decision. "The prospects of the Port of Chittagong are at present very uncertain. The trade may develop enormously with the opening of the Railway but this cannot be counted upon, and it may take 20 years or more to reach any large amount. Whoever therefore, makes the jetties, must take the risk of spending Rs 5., 76, 000 and getting very little for it.

It is certain that the Port Commissioners cannot afford to pay Rs 41, 000 a year for sinking funds and interest at 4 per cent, and in the Lieutenant Governor's opinion, the state of Provincial finances and the prospect before it does not warrant this Government making any grant to the Chittagong Port or undertaking any liability even to the extent of the interest charged of Rs 23, 000 on account of it. It is, moreover, quite uncertain whether the Port would be able to repay the loan within the next generation or so, and meanwhile Chittagong might be transferred to Assam and the interest of this Government in it cease." The Bengal Government however strongly recommended that the Railway Company should "make the jetties subject to the right of the Port Commissioner s .to resume them on payment of their value at some

1 Secretary of State for India to Govt, of Beng. Telegram 17 October 1896. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1897 - December 38-39. 2 Govt, of India to Govt, of Beng. 11 November 1896. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1897, December 38-39. 71

future date"! The Government of India however decided, in view of the fact that "the Port Trust can neither find the money themselves nor are they in a posi£ion to borrow the necessary 2 money" to ask the Railway Company to carry out the work on 3 behalf of, and at the cost of, the Government. The Railway on completion of the Jetties would work them as lessee under an 4 agreement with the Port Trust. Accordingly the Railway Company was approached which approving of the scheme came to an agreement with the Port Trust in June 1901. Under this agreement the Railway Company agreed to work the jetty as the agent of the Trust. All receipts were to be paid to the Port Trust and all 5 expenses met by the same body. Explaining the overall situation the Government of Bengal wrote to the Port Commissioners, "the jetty has been constructed from Imperial Funds and remains the property of Government so as to ensure its being worked in the interest of the general trade of the Port. The control of the jetty has been made over to the Port Commissioners, and they are practically in the position of agents of the Government. The working arrangements are, however, in the hands of the Assam Bengal 6 R ailw ay."

While the working arrangements of the jetties were being discussed by the Port Commissioners with the Railway Company the first jetty was 7 constructed at the Double Mooring and was opened in 1899. 1 Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India, 26 November 1896, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept, 1897, December 40. 2 Govt, of India to Govt, of Beng. 27 January 1897, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1897, December 41-42. 3 Admin Beng. 1896-97, 14. See also Note by V. Woodhead, Vice- Chmn. Port Comms. 27 January 1910. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1912. A p ril 24. 4 Admin Beng. 1897-98, Summary 16. 5 Agreement as Executed between the A. B. Rly and the Comms. of the Port of Chitt. for the working of the jetties at the Double Moorings Chitt. Beng. Proc. PWD (Mne) 1901, July 8. 6 Govt, of Beng. to Chmn. Port Comms. 19 June 1901, Beng. Proc. PWD (Mne) 1901, June 70. 7 Admin. Beng. 1900-1901, 74, One vessel used the jetty in 1899-1900 while five used it in 1900-1901. 72

With the first shipment of jute in November 1900, via the new Narainganj - Chandpur route to Chittagong, * the authorities of the railway company realised that they would be able to draw a much larger trade through that route provided the port facilities of Chittagong were able to handle it. In a letter to the Consulting Engineer to the Government of India for Railways in Assam the Agent and Chief Engineer of the Assam Bengal Railway wrote accordingly "The shipments of jute made by rail and steamer from Chittagong during the past season, prove conclusively that if reasonable facilities are afforded, the whole of the six lakhs (120, 000 tons) pressed bales now exported out of India from the Narayanganj presses will go by way of Chandpur and Chittagong and m y advices now are that a very great expansion of the trade will actually occur during the coming season.

What, however, is likely to deter shippers is the fear that owing to the very limited accommodation at. . . Chittagong, there may be Q. serious (traffic) block. . .1 am preparing plans and estimates for the duplication of the existing jetty accommodation. . .1 trust that the Government of India will give this matter an early consideration'.'. M essrs. David and Company of Narainganj in a letter to the Traffic Manager of the Assam Bengal Railway confirmed this expectation, writing, "as you know,,we are ready to ship by the cheapest route at once, . . .If you get a shed capable of holding a ship's cargo with jetties to enable a steamer to load without boating 3 I may safely say we shall ship by railway". When the proposal was placed before the Government of Bengal however, that Government with its usual parsimony and characteristic indifference stalled in

1 Traffic Manager A. B. Rly. To Agent and Chief Engineer A. B. Rly. 20 November 1900. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1901, April 39. 2 Agent A. B. Rly - To Consulting Engineer A. B. Rly 30 January 1901, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. April 41. 3 Traffic Manager A. B. Rly. to Agent A. B. Rly, 2 January 1902, Agent's Letters to Board 1902. 73

the matter and maintained that there should not be much difficulty in arranging the arrival of steamers in such a way that each might get the use of the existing jetty in turn and expressed doubt as to the necessity for any extensions. * In that decision the Government 2 of India concurred. In 1902 pressure for the construction of a second jetty was applied to the Government of Bengal by the Railway 3 authorities, by the Port Commissioners and by various firms. M essrs. David and Company wrote "If Government will not move in the matter until the Chittagong trade is developed, then 4 Chittagong will never develop". The Government of Bengal 5 finally approved of the erection of a second jetty in May 1902. £ The jjetty came into full use in 1904-05.

While the question of the construction of this jetty was being discussed,the authorities of the Assam Bengal Railway had simultaneously been trying to convince the Government of India that the ownership and control of the port jetty should be transferred to the Railway. In a letter addressed to their Agent and Chief Engineer, B.I. Milne Acting Secretary to the Board of Directors of the Assam Bengal Railway wrote, "The Board. . .consider that the jetty is the riverside terminus of the Assam Bengal Railway and that it ought to be treated as being to all intents and purposes, part and parcel of the railway undertaking and this the Board insist on. . .as they hold it to be of essential importance to the import

1 Agent A. B. Rly to Managing Director A.B. Rly, London 7 January 1902, Agent’s Letters to Board, 1902-04. 2 Ibid. 3 Firms Messrs. M. David & Co. Narainganj 2 January 1902, M essrs, Ralli Brothers 20 December 1901, Ewing & Co. Agents Nahapiet Jute Co. Ltd., 23 December 1901. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1902, March 92-96. 4 Traffic Manager A. B. Rly to Agent A. B. Rly 2 January 1902. Agent's Letters to Board 1902. 5 Govt, of Beng. to Consulting Engineer for Railways Assam, 14 May 1902. Beng. Proc. PWD (Mne) 1902, May 58. 6 Chitt. Port. Admin. Report for 1906-07, E.B.A. Proc. PWD (Mne) 1906, November 6. 74 and export trade of Chittagong and of the districts of Eastern Bengal and Assam which the railway is intended to serve that the management of the jetty and the control of the traffic to and from the railway passing over it should be exclusively in the hands of the railway company, subject only to the general control of all its transactions which is exercised by the Government of India”. * The Government of India however, maintained ”in the interest of the general trade of the port the jetty at Chittagong should be the property of Government, and that the Government of India are therefore unable to agree to the reopening of the question 2 of its ownership”. It was only when it was found in 1903 that the Port Commissioners were not in a position to pay the interest on the capital expenditure on the jetty that the Government of India agreed to transfer the jetty to the Railway Company. On 27th- March 1903 the Government therefore handed over the jetties to the railway, retaining the right to resume them. The conditions and circumstances under which they would be able to resume the jetties were laid down in the Government of India, Public Works Department, Letter No. OIR. C. dated 27 March, 1903, as quoted below: -

”3. In making this transfer of the jetties, however, the Government of India reserve to themselves the right of resuming possession should they consider such a step to be at any time called for in the interests of trade, or should an improvement in the financial position of the Port Trust give sufficient and permanent promise of its ability to meet fully the interest on the capital cost of the works.

1 Sec. to the Board of Directors A.B. Rly to Agent & Chief Engineers A. B. Rly.9 February 1900. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1900, March 65- 69. 2 Govt, of India PWD to Consulting Engineer to the Govt, of India Rly. Assam. 26 May 1900 - Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1900, June 17. 75

4. The effect of these orders is that the control of the jetties passes entirely from the Port Trust to the Railway, and this being so, I am to state. . .that the power to fix and revise rates for the future use of the jetties and their accessories can no longer be exercised by the Port Trust but devolves on the Railway, subject to the control of the consulting Engineer. This complete severance of the jetties from the control of the Port Trust appears to the Government of India to be essential to their efficient working, which any dual control would certainly tend to hamper.

5. As regards the question of surplus profits. . .it is observed that the income derived from the j etties is at present small and it seems improbable that it will improve to such an extent in the near future as to cover interest charges. Should it however do so, the Government of India will be prepared to consider any recommendation which may then be put forward for the payment to the Port Trust, either in whole or part, of such profits as may remain from the net earnings after deducting a cumulative charge for interest at 4 per cent to run from the date of the opening of the jetties for traffic, diminished by the amount of net earnings credited in the accounts of the Railway”. *

Almost simultaneously with their efforts to construct and take possession of the jetties at the port, the Assam Bengal Railway Company was trying to attract more cargo for themselves which would incidentally*in turn improve the volume of the trade of the port of Chittagong. This they did by making the railway freight charge

1 - P. C. Das Gupta, Report on accounting including costing system and general office procedure at present in force with recommendation as to improvements therein, 6. 76 more attractive to importers of jute. After the construction of the line connecting Chittagong with Chandpur in 1895 the Agent made a bid to attract the cargoes of baled jute exported from Narainganj and on the recommendation of the Traffic Manager, Assam Bengal Railway, sanctioned a reduction of the rate for pressed jute between Chandpur and Chittagong, to be provided in the form of a rebate varying with the quantity booked by each consignor, amounting, at the maximum, for quantities of not less than 50, 000 bales consigned in a single calendar year, to 2 annas per bale, or 25 per cent on the existing special rate of 8 annas per bale. * This he did^as he believed that "unless a rebate was given, only small quantities of jute would pass over this portion of the line, and I feel certain the Board will approve of the action 2 taken to bring as large a quantity as possible to Chittagong". 3 The Board approved of the action and the measure had the desired effect. Towards the end of 1900, 40, 000 bales of jute 4 were sent by railway for shipment at the Chittagong jetty. With this first shipment via the new route a satisfactory start was given to the trade of the port with, as the Agent wrote, "every reason to / 5 expect (it) to greatly increase in future years".

1 Baled Jute - Board's Letters to Agent 1900, A331. The following are the rebates that were given: bales mds Rebates For quantities not less than 20, 000 = 1, 00, 000 6 pies per bale " " " " 30,000 = 1,50,000 1 anna " " M " " 40,000 = 2,00,000 1 anna 6 pies p e r bale " " M " " 50,000 & over = 2 annas per bale

2 Baled Jute - Agent*s Letter to the Board, 1900, AL/281 3 Baled Jute - Board's Letters to Agent 1900, A331. 4 Board to Agent and Chief Engineer A. B. Rly 11 January 1901, Beng. 'Proc. Mne Dept. 1901, April 40. 5 Jute Traffic - Agent's Letters to the Board, 1900, AL/292 77

In order to encourage tea exporters to use the port of Chittagong a similar step was taken and in June 1900 on the recommendation of the Railway Board, "a rebate of 25 per cent on the Railway freight of all tea booked to Chittagong (was given) provided consignors despatched not less than 500 maunds per month". ^ Recommending the measure the Traffic Manager Assam Bengal Railway commented, "it is hoped it will prove a great inducement for the tea traffic to flow towards Chittagong a result which the 2 interests of this Company so strongly desire". In addition to the rebate,as the construction of the railway progressed into the tea gardens, of the Surma and Brahmaputra Valleys,the railway company offered to undertake,free of charge, all the agency work 3 in connection with forwarding stores from Chittagong.

However, to make the trade a really profitable one for the railway one of the essential conditions was to have good regular steamer connections between Narainganj and Chandpur on either side of the river Meghna. From 1899 to 1904 therefore the Assam Bengal Railway Company made repeated attempts to come to an understanding with the Steamer Companies to promote the trade between Narainganj and Chandpur. In 1899 a proposal was submitted by the Railway Board for the establishment of a wagon ferry between 4 the two towns. It was proposed that the task of providing and working the necessary flotilla should be undertaken by the Assam

1 Shipment of Tea Direct by the Clan Line of Steamers. Agent's Letter - Agent's Letters to Board 1900, AL/270. 2 Ibid. 3 Agent A.B. Rly to Chairman of the Port Commissioners Chitt. 29 July 1907. E.B.A. Proc. PWD (Mne), 1908, May 26. 4 Board to Agent 24 February 1899» Board's Letters to Agent A, 254. 78 Bengal Railway Company in conjunction with the different flotilla companies. *7. The Steamer Companies however were hostile to the idea of the Assam Bengal Railway developing any trade between Chittagong and the regions lying west of the river Meghna and 2 so rejected the proposal. In the years that followed^the Railway Agent made several more attempts but with no success, so that the frustrated agent is found writing in 1904 to the Board, "The Steamer Companies’ interests being to develop the traffic between Narayanganj and Calcutta, they cannot be expected to provide an efficient service between Chandpur and Naraynganj on terms that it will be undertaken by those whose interest are bound up with the latter route. . .

In practice, I doubt whether it would ever be possible to arrange matters with the Steamer Companies, even by a guarantee, since it is evident that the profits ensured by a guarantee however liberal on the capital cost of the small block required for an efficient service between Narayanganj and Chandpur would never pay them for the loss of a large traffic on the long haul all the way to Calcutta.

That it is the blocking of the traffic of the Assam Bengal Railway and not the expense of the service, which is the real impediment to a satisfactory connection being arranged through the existing steamer services, may be seen from the fact that they maintain (vide their letter of August 1899) an expensive non-paying service

1 Note by R. S. Strachey Agent A. B. Rly on the establishment of an adequate flotilla service between Chandpur and Narainganj 12 March 1904, Agent's Letters to Board, 1902, AL/543. 2 Ibid. 79

on the Khulna route from Chandpur to serve the Bengal Central Railway the route being of very little use to this railway but having the recommendation that it did no^iarm to the Steamer Companies' own traffic"* The Railway Board's proposal to develop their own flotilla for service between Chandpur and Narainganj, put to the Government of India in 1904,was turned down.

While the Railway Company could come to no satisfactory arrangements with the Steamer Companies they were,with the help of the tea planters,more successful in establishing Chittagong's direct communication by steamer with the United Kingdom. This was the direct consequence of the Company's vigorous salesmanship. On the completion of the first jetty, which was brought into use during 1900, very few steamers were found to use it, there being no organised trade in jute and little or no export of tea or other commodities to Europe to induce steamer companies either to send 2 vessels or to apply for berthing facilities. It therefore became at once evident to all concerned with the development of the trade of the port of Chittagong, that to initiate trade some special arrangement must be made to guarantee export cargo and to convince the steamer companies that a sufficient trade could be developed to warrant sending vessels to the port of Chittagong. With that object Hart, one of the Directors of the Railway Company, formed a "Combine" with a large number of influen tial tea garden owners to guarantee the shipment of their tea via Chittagong to Europe. They then approached the Clan Line with a view to inducing them to send their steamers regularly to Chittagong during the tea 3 season. The Clan Line replied that if an arrangement was to be

1 Note by Agent A. B. Rly, 12 March 1904, Agents Letters to Board, 1902, 2 Agent A. B. Rly, to Chmn. Port Comms. 2 November 1907, E . B. A. Proc. PWD Mne 1908, May 32. 3 Ibid. 80

made, they would require, "the tea shippers taking advantage of it to agree for a given term of years to supply not less than 500 tons of tea for shipment fortnightly and to pay 5 s a ton more for freight than is paid for shipment of tea at Calcutta". * The tea shippers agreed to the rates provided the Clan Line on their part would undertake a regular service of steamers at fixed intervals from Chittagong. This the Clan Line would only agree to do provided they were given a fixed berth for the accommodation 2 of their steamers at the regular dates specified. The Agent, Assam Bengal Railway approached the Port Commissioners who at that time owned the jetty with the proposal, and on 6 July 1901 the Port Commissioners resolved "the present jetty shall be kept free for the Clan Line steamers on the regular dates of their 3 arrival". Accordingly an arrangement was made with the Clan Line for a regular fortnightly service from the Port of Chittagong 4 during the tea season. The Line moreover was permitted to load at other ports, provided London was reached in a certain number of days. ^

Thus in a few years a tremendous development took place at the port of Chittagong as a result of the initiative taken by the Assam Bengal Railway Company. The advent of the railway,however,was a mixed blessing, For with the transfer of the jetties in 1903 to the Railway, the history of the port of Chittagong entered a new phase. For if the

1 A.B. Rly. Co. Ltd. to Agent and Chief Engineer, A.B. R ly - 1 January 1900, Board's Letters to Agent 1900. 2 The Agent A. B. Rly to Chmn Port Comms. 2 November 1907, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne, 1908, May 32. 3 The Chmn Port Comm, to Agent & Chief Engineer A. B. Rly, 6 July 1901, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne , 1908, May 32. (enclosure). See also E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1908. May 2. 4 The Agent & Chief Engineer, A.B. Rly. to Chmn. Port Com m s. 14 June 1901 - E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne, 1908, May 32. (enclosure) 5 The Agent A.B. Rly to Chmn. Port Comms. 2 November 1907, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1908, May 32. 81 transfer assisted the working of the railway,it was to prove very deleterious to the development of the port. The pprt of Chittagong from then on became more or less the commercial monopoly of the Railway Company, with the Port Commissioners having little or no say over its day to day operation. The Assam Bengal Railway Company was a private company.. Its interest in the development of the port of Chittagong was therefore naturally as a means to achieving its own commercial ends. As will be seen in subsequent chapters/while it found in the improvement of the port of Chittagong the prospect of a very good trade,it was quite indifferent,so long as its own interests were served, whether Chittagong developed as an ocean terminal or as a port merely serving the coastal trade. 82

CHAPTER IV

The P artitio n of Bengal and the Port of Chittagong

At the beginning of the twentieth century one of the most explosive issues in Bengal was that of the partition of the province which was finally brought about in 1905 with the creation of a new province known as Eastern Bengal and Assam with Chittagong as its main port. Though the partition was carried out during the viceroyalty of Lord Curzon the concept of a territorial redistribution of the provinces of Bengal and Assam had taken shape long before he took office. The necessity for some territorial rearrangement in Bengal for administrative purposes had been felt as far back as in 1854. * Since then the question of territorial rearrangement of the provinces of Assam and Bengal had come up from time to time in various political, economic and administrative forms. During these long debates the transfer of Chittagong from Bengal to Assam had featured regularly and prominently. In fact the idea put forward in 1892 of the transfer of Chittagong and the south Lushai Hills to Assam formed the nucleus around which the whole question of the partition of Bengal gradually crystallised over the next two decades.

The proposal to transfer the Chittagong Division to Assam was considered in term s both of administrative convenience and of commercial development. It was felt that administratively it would give relief to the Government of Bengal while helping the 2 "erection of Assam into a vigorous and self contained administration".

1. S. Ahmed, Muslim Community in Bengal, 1884-1912. 229. R tlokenjce 'All about P a rtitio n Tract Indian Politics 73; Z.H. Zaidi, 'The Political Motive in the Partition of Bengal 1905', Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society. XII, II, April 1964, 114. 2. Govt, of India to Govt, of Bengal 3 Dec. 1903 P. P I905 LVIII, 10. 83

From the commercial point of view it was considered that the port of Chittagong deserved better attention than it had hitherto received under the Bengal Government and as the condition of trade at the port affected not Assam only but the general development of trade on the eastern frontier it was felt that if "Assam would do more for Chittagong than (had) Bengal"* the transfer should take place. Moreover the future of the port of Chittagong was closely linked up with the Assam Bengal Railway. It was therefore thought that the best results were to be expected only if the railway and the port were brought under 2 one administration. It was for this reason that the transfer of other territories to Assam in addition to Chittagong came to be considered thus contributing to the pattern of partition which finally evolved in 1905.

The proposal to transfer the Chittagong Division to Assam was first put forward in a conference which met in Calcutta on the 29th January 1892. The conference had been called to consider "the administration, civil and military, of the tribes lying 3 between Bengal, Burma and Assam" a problem under discussion 4 since the middle of 1891. These tribes were then controlled by three different local administrations:the northern Lushais were under the Chief Commissioner of Assam, the southern Lushais were under the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal and the Chins were under the Chief Commissioner of Burma. In 1892 the viceroy, Lansdowne, in a letter to Cross, the Secretary of State for India, expressed the opinion that the Government of India, "ought to

1. NotebyH.H. Risley, 31 Mar. 1903, Curzon Collection, A. 29. 2. . Govt, of India to Govt, of Bengal 3 Dec. 1903.P. P.1905, LVI1 11. 3. Lansdowne to Cross, 6 Jan 1892, Cross Collection, XXXII, 2. 4. Sec of State India to Govt of India 17 Sept 1891, India Foreign Proc. (External) 1892. seP^ Conference - presided by Sir Henry Cotton, 10 Jan 1905 -"All About Partition "Tract Indian Policies, 73. C.E. Buckland, Bengal under the Lt. Governors 1854 - 1898, II, 906-8. 84

bring the greater part of these tribes under one management and that they should be either under Assam, or directly under the 1 Government of India. Bengal is already too big". At about the same time Cross wrote to the Viceroy drawing his attention to the possibility of altering the administration of the Lushai country, 2 so as to get rid of the tripartite system.

It was finally suggested that the south Lushai Hills should be transferred from Bengal to Assam as early as possible, and that if the South Lushai Hills with their avenues of access through the Chittagong district and Hill Tracts were transferred to Assam, as had been strongly recommended, it would be convenient that the whole Chittagong Division should be also transferred. It was pointed out that "an additional argument in favour of this suggestion is that the projected Assam - Chittagong Railway will then be 3 entirely in the Assam jurisdiction" and as Sir Alexander Mackenzie, Chief Commissioner of Burma pointed out, "Chittagong. . .will, with the proposed railway, be the natural 4 port of Assam".

The recommendations of the conference were considered by the Governor-General in Council and it was finally decided by Resolution of the Foreign Department of 25 July 1892 that the South Lushai country should be transferred as soon as possible to Assam and the Chittagong districts also, as soon as settlement operation there had been completed. The expediency of the transfer to Assam of the whole of the Chittagong Division including

1. t Lansdowne to Cross, 6 Jan 1892, Cross Collection, XXXII, 2. 2. Lansdowne to Cross, 19 Jan 1892, Cross Collection, XXXII, 13. 3. Military Department Letter, 21 Jan 1892. India Foreign Proc. (Extl) Sep-Dee, 1 8 9 2 , See also Bengal Legislative Council Debates, January-December 1896, 4. 4. Minute by the Chief Commissioners of Burma, 27 January 1892, India Foreign Proc. (E^ttl). September-December 1892, September 34. 85

the political charge of Hill Tippera. was reserved for further consideration. ^

The whole question of the transfer of the Chittagong Division was again raised in January 1896. The opinions of the 2 Governments of Bengal and Assam were sought regarding the transfer of the Chittagong district from Bengal to Assam or alternatively of the whole of the Chittagong Division, including 3 the political charge of Hill Tippera. Sir John Woodburn explained, MThe Government of India consider it desirable, if possible, to relieve the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal of some portion of a charge which owing to the development of the country and the growth of the population, threatens to become too large to be administered by one Government. Assam, on the other hand is the smallest province in British India for which there is a separate administration, and the addition to it of the Chittagong Division would not have the effect of throwing too great a burden .on the Chief Commissioner. The interests of that province will be materially benefitted by its being brought into direct communication with the sea, while those of the port of Chittagong are likely to receive more attention when it is annexed to Assam than can be given to it as one of several ports connecting the province of Bengal, with the sea. It is desirable that the whole of the territory through which the Assam Bengal Railway will run be 4 brought under one administration".

It is clear from this that in 1896 the transfer of the Chittagong Division to Assam was no longer a matter of tidying up an anomalous 1 Proc. Govt, of India Foreign Dept. 25, July 1892, India Foreign Proc. (Extl) Sep-Dee 1892; 2. Note by J.P. Hewett, 28 August 1902, Curzon Collection, A, 15. 3. Sir John Woodburn became member of the Council of the Governor- General on the 23 Dec 1895. He was the Lt. Gover-rxor of G'er\goX from 8 April 1898 to 1902. 4. Proc. Governor-General's Council 27 February 1896, Assam Proc. (Home) Jan-June 1897, January 43. 86 position in the L,ushai Hills, but had become part of the more pressing problem of how to relieve overburdened Bengal.

When it became public knowledge that the transfer of Chittagong Division was under consideration a large number of memorials protesting against the proposed change were submitted. Collectively their objections may be stated to be first, that the Division would cease to enjoy the privelege of electing a member of the Bengal Council. Secondly that it would be removed from the jurisdiction of the Board of Revenue. Thirdly that the Chittagong Division would come under a new set of laws and a new system of administration less advanced than those of Bengal. *

Oldham, the Commissioner of Chittagong, held that opposition to the transfer of his division was confined almost entirely to Government Officers, pleaders, mukhtears and school teachers, while the Muslims were apathetic, and employers and merchants, especially those in the jute trade showed no concern, "whatever happens, Calcutta will be the capital for them". His own opinion, however, was for a much bolder, more substantial measure, involving the hiving off of all Bengal east of the Brahmaputra 2 "with Dacca or perhaps even Chittagong as its capital".

Sir Alexander Mackenzie, now Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, put his Government*-S view which was notably cool, "a readjustment

1. From-a) Khan Bahadur Serajul Islam, President, Tippera , Hitasadhini, Saba 419. b) N.C. Der Varma-President of the Public Meeting held at the Comilla Town Hall 5th Jan 1896. 424. c) Babu Nittyanundo Roy President of the Public Meeting Chittagong 12 Jan 1896, 424. d) Babu Surendra Nath Benerjee Honorary Sec. to the Indian Association 431, Public Letters from India and General Letters from Bengal. 1897, 419-31. 2. Oldham to Govt, of Bengal 7 Feb. 1896, P. L. I. G. L. B. 1897, 403. 87

of territory has become a necessity, such, readjustment being needed, however, not in the interests of Bengal, but in those 1 of Assam alone'1. The advantages to Assam he defined to be a reasonable territorial expansion, the gain to that province of having a sea-port of its own, the convenience of placing the Assam- Bengal Railway under one administration, and the strengthening of the Assam Commission so as to make it self-contained and independent of Bengal recruitment of officials. He however stated that the transfer would admit of no reduction in either the Board of Revenue or Secretariat establishments in Bengal.

D.R. Lyall, of the Board of Revenue was as clearly approving as Sir Alexander Mackenzie was partly damning. He not only demonstrated the advantage of nearly doubling the population under the Assam Commissioner and reducing that of swollen Bengal even if only rather marginally, but pointed out the advantages of having a unified frontier administration from the sea to the Himalayan borders of Assam. He also strongly urged the advantage of giving Assam its own port. "Assam is at present what I may call a 'one horse administration. It lies out of the way and its capital is Calcutta. It has no outlet with which the administration is directly concerned. Its connection with foreign trade is entirely through Calcutta, and it will always necessarily be intimately connected with Calcutta as the natural port of one of its greatest water systems, but Assam is about to be connected with Chittagong by rail, and it will thus gain a new outlet by land.

1 am one of those who believe most thoroughly in trade facilities creating trade...

1. Govt, of Bengal to Govt, of India 13 Aug 1896, P. L. I. G. L». B. 1897, 400. See also Note by J . P. Hewett, 28 Aug 1902, 15. Curzon Collection. A. See also Kalpana Bishui, The Origin and Evolution of the Scheme for the First Partition of Bengal (1905) Quarterly Review of Historical Studies, IV-VI, 1964-67, 78. 88

The Bengal Government is. . .not specially interested in pushing the port of Chittagong.

The issam Government will, on the contrary, be greatly interested in improving the trade of the port and by doing so will increase the wealth of all the districts tapped by the railway". *

Sir William Ward, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, was against the transfer of Chittagong district alone but welcomed the proposal to transfer the whole division. This would make the creation of provincial service in Assam more of a possibility and he argued strongly that on completion of the Assam-Bengal Railway it would be to the interest of the districts traversed by the railway and of the development of the port of Chittagong that all those districts should be under one Government. He also suggested that "if additional territory is to be made over to this administration, it would be preferable, from the point of view of the enlarged province, that the Dacca and Mymensingh districts, as well as the Chittagong Division, should be included in the transfer". He pointed out certain difficulties which might result from the transfer of Chittagong Division alone. He stated the transfer of the division would throw on the Chief Commissioner and the Secretariat staff not only the work which at that time fell on the Bengal Government but also that which fell on the Board of Revenue as well. A sa result it would be impossible for the Chief Commissioner to continue to supervise

1. Memorandum of D.R. Liya 11, 20 Feb 1896, P. L. I. G. L. B. 1897, 413. 89 the details of district work in the districts of the province in the same way as before. On the other hand, the transfer of Chittagong Division alone would not be a thoroughly satisfactory means of affording relief to the Chief Commissioner, as it was doubtful whether in the province, asitnus enlarged, there would be sufficient materials for forming two new Commissioner ship. The transfer of Chittagong Division alone might not also make it possible for Assam to have separate services. To meet these difficulties he suggested that Dacca and Mymensingh districts, as well as the Chittagong Division should be transferred to, or amalgamated with the province of Assam. ^

The transfer of Dacca and Mymensingh however appears not to have been seriously considered by the Government of India at that tim e. ^

H .J.S. Cotton who succeeded Sir William Ward as the Chief Commissioner of Assam voiced a very different view from that of his predecessor on the question of the transfer of the Chittagong Division to Assam. In a note drawn up by him dated 26th January 1897, he wrote, "I am convinced that the Division of Chittagong would not gain in any respect by being transferred to Assam. It is impossible to conceive that any civilized portion of Bengal would gain by being detached from the advanced province to which it belongs and attached to a comparatively backward province. With regard to the question of separate services for

I. Chief Commissioner of Assam to Govt, of India, 25 November 1896. Assam Proc. (Home), 1897 Jan50Also see P. L. I. G. L. B. ' 1897. 449-468. 2. Assam Proc. (Home), 1897, Jan 43, Sir John Woodburn, ^ ' stated in answer to a question 'The Government of India have made no proposal that Dacca and Mymensingh should be transferred to Assam nor is such a proposal at present under their consideration'. 90

Assam he wrote that it would not be possible nor even desirable to have separate services for Assam as proposed by Sir William Ward. He added that Assam would be too small to have a self-contained service even if the districts of Dacca and Mymensingh along with the Division of Chittagong were transferred to Assam. As to the question of the transfer of Dacca and Mymensingh districts to Assam H. J.S. Cotton wrote, "The proposal, if it were made public, would excite a storm of protest, and I imagine that the Government of Bengal would be as strongly opposed to this suggestion as I am myself". ^ He however recommended the idea of transferring the South Lushai Hills to A ssam .

A sa result of the strong opposition by the Chief Commissioner of Assam and also due to the fact that the Government of Bengal felt that Bengal’s burdens would not be significantly lightened by the transfer, the Government of India determined, by the Council order of 29th April 1897, that the Chittagong Division should not be transferred though the South Lushai Hills were transferred to Assam, and that the Chief Commissioner should be consulted as to the proposal to transfer the Chittagong Hill 2 Tracts. The question of the transfer of the Chittagong Hill Tracts was further considered but the Foreign Department’s 3 letter of 17th August 1897 left the m atter indefinitely in abeyance.

When the decision of the Government of India became known there were some who expressed the opinion that, when Chittagong became the port of Assam, the question would have to be reconsidered.

1. ’ Note by the Chief Commissioner of Assam 26 January 1897 Assam Proc. (Home) 1897, Jan 54, See also P. L .I. G. L. B. 1897., 449-468. 2. Note by J.P. Hewett, 28 August 1902, Curzon Collection, A. 95. See also Broomfield,“The Partition of Bengal: A Problem in British Administration, 1830-1912* Indian History Congress Proceedings of the Twenty-third session Aligarh, I960. Ill, 13-24. 3. Note by J.P. Hewett, 28 August 1902, Curzon Collection, A. 95. 91

Thus Sir Edwin Collen while agreeing that the transfer should not be made immediately, argued that when the Assam Railway was opened throughout its entire length, Chittagong would become the port of Assam and expressed his belief that before many years the question would be again revived and the Chittagong 2 Division separated from Bengal.

The question of the redistribution of territories featured prominently again in 1901 in connection with the substitution of Uriya for Hindi as the court language of the district of Sambalpur. This change of language suggested the transfer of Orissa to the Central Provinces and that in turn led to the examination of various new proposals for the redistribution of existing provincial jurisdictions. While these discussions were in progress the Government of India acquired permanent administrative control over Berar. That led the Government to consider further the whole question of territorial redistribution in India, on even more comprehensive lines. In 1902 Curzon noted "I suggested in council that we should take up the question of readjustment of boundaries all round. It concerns (1) Assam -is Assam to have a maritime exit - i.e. shall we transfer Chittagong? (2) Bengal - is Bengal overswollen i.e. shall we 3 cut off Chittagong and O rissa?”

The question of redistribution once opened again became the subject of much discussion and consideration. H.H. Risley in

1. Member Governor-General's Council. 2. Not by J.P . Hewett, 28 Aug 1902, Curzon Collection, A. 96. 3. Notes Public A 1903, Curzon Note of 24 May 1902, Curzon Collection, A. 90. 92

a note in 1903 while giving his support to the transfer of Chittagong to Assam wrote, "The real justification of the transfer is to be found in commercial and to some extent, financial considerations, touched upon but lightly in these papers which affect not Assam only but the general development of trade on the eastern frontier and the direct interest of the Government of India, in the working of the Assam Bengal Railway". * He pointed out that if the Assam Bengal Railway line was ever to prosper it could only do so through its connection with the port of Chittagong since an improved port would bring more business to the railway. He argued that owing to the conformation of Assam the province required two lines of communications: for places on and near the Brahmaputra that waterway with its lines of steamers running to Calcutta would always be the natural outlet, but the rest of Assam, out of reach of the river, would best be served by the railway. But in order to perform this service effectually the railway itself needed an outlet which would bring it into direct communication with Europe. He was therefore in favour of the transfer of the Chittagong Division from Bengal to Assam, believing that "Bengal is not greatly interested in enabling Chittagong to 2 compete with Calcutta, and Assam is".

A few months earlier the Chief Commissioner of Assam, Bamfyled Fuller, writing to the Government of India, had expressed similar views. It was to the interest of the tea industry, he wrote, that the control of the port of Chittagong should be in the hands of that Government which was directly interested in the promotion of its welfare. "The facts that Assam is largely dependent upon its tea industry, and that the prosperity of the

1. Note by H.H. Risley, 31 Mar 1903, Curzon Collection, A. 28. 2. Ibid. 28. See also L. Frazer, 370. the tea industry hangs upon the facilities afforded for export seem to constitute a special reason of much force for giving the province an opening to the sea coast". * He pointed out, however, that it was "doubtful whether the extension of the provincial border to the littoral of the Bay of Bengal would ever 2 have been advocated by the Assam administration" had it not been for the construction of the Assam-Bengal Railway. That railway, he stated^now was a factor of immense importance in the economic situation of Assam as it offered the tea-growers in both the Brahmaputra and the Surma Valleys a means of placing their produce direct upon the London market. He believed that, if possible, each province should have a sea port of its own, and that Chittagong was likely "to fare better as the sea-port of the province of Assam than as a competitor with 3 Calcutta for the attention of the Bengal Government".

SirA .H .L. Fraser, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, writing in March 1903 also gave his strong support to the transfer of the Chittagong Division: "I need hardly say that I thoroughly agree with the proposal to transfer the Chittagong Division from Bengal to Assam. This seems to me to be expedient in the interests of Chittagong, to be practically necessary in the interests of sound administration in Bengal and to be also practically necessary with the view to making Assam large enough for efficient administration

1. Chief Commissioner of Assam to Govt, of India, 30 Jan 1903, Curzon Collection A. 134. 2. Ibid. 134. 3. Ibid. 135. 4. ' Notes Public - A. 1903. Territorial Changes in India - Note by A.H.L. Fraser, 28 March 1903, - Curzon Collection A. 26 94

While in 1896 the transfer of Chittagong Division to Assam had been agreed on administrative grounds, by 1903 the commercial significance of the change was beginning to be felt with greater magnitude. The economic potential of Chittagong port was becoming one of the significant factors in the arguments which eventually culminated in the partition of Bengal in 1905.

On 3 December 1903, the Government of India wrote to the local Governments concerned suggesting a further territorial redistribution* "In the opinion of the Government of India", their letter stated, "the time has come when the relief of the Bengal Government must be regarded as an administrative necessity of the first order and that relief can be afforded, not as has been suggested on several previous occasions by organic changes in the form of Government but only by actual 2 transference of territory".

In the interest of both Assam and the Chittagong Division the Government of India was of the opinion that the transfer of the Chittagong Division to Assam was most desirable. It was felt that Assam required an impetus in various directions particularly a maritime outlet in order to develop its industries in tea, oil and coal.

Chittagong port on the other hand needed to be taken out of the shadow of the port of Calcutta as it was not "easy for a Local Government dominated by the interests of a great port like

1. Govt, of India to Govt, of Bengal, 3 Dec 1903, P.P. 1905, LYIII, 3. 2. Govt, of India to Govt, of Bengal, 3 Dec 1903, P. P. 1905, LVIII, 3. 95

Calcutta, to do much towards promoting the advancement of a humbler rival1'. * If Chittagong were added to Assam, it was argued, that drawback would disappear since there would be "every inducement to the Local Government to develop the port, since the entire interests of the province, financial, industrial and commercial, would be involved in its welfare". Even if Chittagong did not become the cold weather headquarters of the Chief Commissioner, it would necessarily receive a great deal of his attention and time.

The Assam Bengal Railway ran from Assam to the port of Chittagong. When the section between Badarpur and Lumding was finished the oil wells of Digboi and Makum, the coal-mines of Margharita and the tea plantations of the Upper Brahmaputra, would all be placed in unbroken connection by rail with Chittagong port. As the Government of India pointed out, if the heavy expenditure incurred on the line was to be justified, if its mountain sections were to be really utilized in the exploitation of the country, it could only be by a fusion of interest between the upper and lower portions of the line and to that a single administration would powerfully contribute, since it was only then that the railway would'be used with a full regard to the interests of the province.

The Government of India in its letter of 3 December 1903 made clear their strong expectation that transfer would lead to growth: "Chittagong if transferred to Assam will find a great future awaiting it, and the port will gain equally with the internal industries of 2 which it is the maritime outlet".

1. Govt, of India to Govt, of Bengal, 3 December 1903, P.P. 1905, LYIII, 10. 2. Ibid. 11. 96

The Governor-General in council, however, was of opinion that the transfer of Chittagong alone would not be sufficient to give relief to the Government of Bengal or to provide Assam with a self-contained and independent provincial services. The Government of India therefore suggested the incorporation with Assam of the further districts of Dacca and Mymensingh. * To this both the Leiutenant-Governor of Bengal and the Chief Commissioner of Assam gave their approval.

When the decision of the Government became public it brought . . 2 forth a storm of opposition. The opposition was more or less in the lines of that voiced in 1896, but a remarkable feature in 3 1904 was that the opposition took an economic turn. It was found that the business community in Bengal, particularly in Calcutta, took serious exception to and presented a strong front against the partition.

Previous to the opening of the Assam Bengal Railway Calcutta met most of the overseas trading needs of Assam and Eastern Bengal the import and export trade of Chittagong being meagre. This was a time-consuming process but it provided useful profits for the merchants and brokers of Calcutta. At the opening of the twentieth century more promising attempts were made to trade directly with the port of Chittagong. M essrs David Bros for example began importing Hamburg salt direct to Chittagong with 4 the intention of ousting Calcutta from the trade and London firms owning tea gardens in Sylhet and Cachar similarly were

1. Ibid. 12. 2. ’ L.J.L . Dpnad Earl of Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon II, 323. ^ Protest of the National Congress held at Madras - Report of the Proceedings of the Nineteenth Indian National Congress, 128-133 The Moslem Chronicle, 9 Jan 1904, 25. The Friends of India and S tatesm an - 28 Jan 1904, 17; B engalee, 15 Dec 1903, 3. 3. L. J . O’Donnell ’The Indian Budget’ - The Westminster Gazette, 14 July 1906, 4. 4. Note by H.H. Risley, 31.3.03 - Curzon Collection, A. 28. 97 beginning to export direct from Chittagong . These tea firms found that it was cheaper to pay higher freights from Chittagong to London then to send their tea for sale to Calcutta, where the landing and shipping charges were heavy and brokerage was high.

This development of a direct trade in tea had already alarmed the River Steamer Companies and the Calcutta tea brokers who foresaw that when the Assam-Bengal Railway was completed tea from Upper Assam which was intended for sale in London would go to Chittagong where the railway undertook agency free of cost and the tea was railed direct to the jetties and thus underwent less handling than it met with in Calcutta. To meet this challenge an attempt was made in Calcutta, to cut out shipments from Chittagong by reducing both landing charges and the amount of handling at Calcutta by building tea warehouses at 2 Kidderpore.

The direct export and import of tea and salt respectively were however not the only items that were causing concern in Calcutta. At much the same time Messrs. Bullock Bros, who were agents for a Burma Oil firm, had begun to construct tank storage at Chittagong with the hope of undercutting the Russian and American oil then being imported from Calcutta, and of dividing the Assam market with the Margharita company near 3 Dibrugarh. In addition to this, attempts were also made in Chittagong to complete the cycle by the supply of piece-goods and rice to Upper Assam.

1. Note byH.H. Risley, 31 March 1903, Curzon Collection, A, 28. 2. • Ibid. 28. 3. Ibid. 28. See also Chapter V 98

Till 1904 however the merchants of Calcutta did not fear any serious competition. They were however greatly disturbed when it became known that the Government of India was contemplating the transfer of Chittagong and.other districts from Bengal to Assam. They felt that if Chittagong was placed under a different Government the drawbacks from which it was suffering would be looked into and with its development would come much more serious inroads upon the trade of the port of Calcutta. Thus the Bengal National Chamber of Commerce wrote "Chittagong has some undoubted natural advantages over Calcutta but if over and above these natural advantages Government creates advantages and facilities for and forces them upon the former, it will do so at the expense of the latter, for to the extent Chittagong prospers and develops Calcutta will suffer; in fact the prosperity of the port of Chittagong can only be fostered at the sacrifice of that of Calcutta". ^ The Calcutta based newspapers also expressed similar apprehensions. Thus the Naya Jug wrote "Calcutta has been the metropolis of India because it has been a great centre of trade and commerce. With the raising of Chittagong to the position of a large port, it is not idle to suppose that Calcutta may lose its importance as a 2 commercial centre".

Most of the jute from the jute growing areas of Mymensingh, Dacca, Narainganj, Tippera, Chandpur and Madaripur used to find its way from Eastern Bangal to Calcutta. The same was the case with rice, which was sent to Calcutta from Bakarganj. With the opening of the Assam Bengal Railway the quantity of tea

1. - Bengal Nat: n a l Chamber of Commerce to Govt, of Bengal, 3 Feb 1904, P.P. 1906, LXXX1, 7 16. 2. Naya Jug, 9 January 1904, B.N.N.R. 1904, 68. 99 that was being sent out to the port of Calcutta from the Brahmaputra and Surma Valley decreased considerably. The merchant community feared that "with tea gone or about to go, with jute and rice of the eastern districts threatened deportation to Chittagong, with collieries of Ranigunge, Burrakar and Chota Nagpur awaiting competition from the yet not fully developed coal field of Assam proper there will not be much of export trade left to sustain the prosperity of this port". *

Their fear was not confined to the export trade of the port of Calcutta alone. They pointed out that, "export and import are inseparably connected together, wherever there is a large export, 2 import follows as a matter of course". This apprehension was led by the fact that the ships chartered by M essrs. Ralli Brothers and M. David and Co. for shipping jute from Chittagong for want of sufficient imports for Chittagong used to carry ballast from Calcutta. The merchant community apprehended that, "once the export trade in Chittagong is fully developed, once the large European firms are firmly established there, the import of salt, piece-goods, kerosine oil, corrugated iron sheets and a number of other articles necessary for the proposed new province, that is for Assam and Eastern Bengal, will follow there as a matter of course. In fact, the whole supply of Eastern Bengal and Assam, so far as the above imported articles of commerce are concerned, will a few years hence, be met through the Chittagong Port and not through this port. Theoretically it sounds well that Chittagong being the natural outlet for the export and import trade of Assam

1. Bengal National Chamber of Commerce to Govt, of Bengal, ’ 37 Feb 1904, P. P1906, LXXXl, 716. 2. Ibid. 100 and East Bengal, in the interest of these parts the port of Chittagong should be fully developed, but the committee apprehend that the equipment and development of that port and the enforced annexation of the jute-growing districts to it will be the ringing of the death-knell of the Calcutta port". *

There was another cause for apprehension. The business class feared that with the development of the export and import trade . of the port of Chittagong it would not be many years before "mills and presses will be set up on the banks of the Karnafuli River". This they felt would be "dealing a death-blow particularly to the 2 numerous mills and presses, and the carrying companies" of C alcu tta.

With the exception of two or three European firms the shippers and mill-owners of Calcutta did not as a rule buy jute in the interior, but had to depend on the middlemen, European or native, who supplied the Calcutta market from the principal m arts in East Bengal and so far as the native middlemen were concerned, they were also residents of that part of the country. The whole of the very extensive jute trade carried on at the inland trading centres of Hatkhola, Ultadingi, and Chitpur as well as the rice trade of Baliaghatta and Kumartally were almost exclusively in the hands of East Bengal merchants and traders. Taking Hatkhola as an instance it was pointed how large a loss of business the merchants there would suffer if the trade in raw jute and rice ceased to flow westwards but turned south east instead to Chittagong port made accessible to large cargo ships by the

1. • Bengal National Chamber of Commerce to Govt, of Beng. 3 February, 1904, P.P. 1906, LXXXI, 717.

2. Ibid. 101

dredging of the bars. The middlemen would be faced either by a loss of business or by the need to transfer their main agencies to Chittagong. * The merchants and traders therefore pointed out that since they had from generation to generation been carrying on business in Calcutta and were firmly established there as a result of having invested capital in property and business and being dependent on and assisted by the European merchants there, it was to their interest that their connection with Calcutta should continue.

The Government of Bengal in their effort to find out whether the proposed transfer of certain districts from Bengal to Assam would divert the trade of Bengal from the port of Calcutta to the port of Chittagong sought the opinions of several commercial associations. In their reply the commercial associations led the Government of Bengal to understand that the transfer of certain districts from Bengal to Assam would not divert the trade from the port of Calcutta to the port of Chittagong provided other factors remained constant. An imaginary line dividing the districts into separate provinceswould not led . to the diversion of trade. But if that division lead to the improvement of facilities for the trade of the port of Chittagong as for example the bridging of the River Meghna and the connection of the Dacca-Mymensingh section of the Eastern Bengal State Railway with Chittagong trade would flow to it. ^

1. Note by H.H. Risley - Reconstruction of the Province of Bengal and constitution of a new Province to be called the North Eastern Province, 7 Feb 1904, Curzon Collection. B.2. 2. Bengal Chamber of Commerce to Govt, of Bengal, 19 Mar 1904, > 704. Calcutta Baled Jute Association to Bengal Chamber of Commerce, 27 Jan 1904, 705. Indian Jute Mills Association to Bengal Chamber of Commerce, 29 Jan 1904, 705. P. P. 1906 LXXX1, 704-706. 102

How the Calcutta merchantile class reacted to these possibilities is rather nicely illustrated by a quotation taken from A.H.L. Fraser!s Among Indian Rajas and*Ryots. He wrote, "I cannot but recall a conversation which I had with a highly esteemed Indian friend, who was one of my colleagues on the Bengal Council. He was an Indian merchant of considerable distinction. . .He made a public attack on the partition scheme. . .1. . . explained to him his mistake. He expressed himself fully satisfied. . .1 suggested to him that perhaps he might withdraw his remarks. He replied that he could not do so, as he was in full sympathy with the opposition to the partition. I asked him what were his grounds for his opposition. He said that he was perfectly sure that one result of the partition would be very much to develop the port of Chittagong, and that this could not be done without injuring the port of Calcutta. I asked him whether he really believed that the drawing of an imaginary line between the two provinces and the declaration that the districts on the one side of that line were under the Government of one province and those on the other side under that of another would really divert the course of trade? 'No1, he said, 'but Chittagong will be under the Government of the new province; efforts will be made to improve it, the natural communications between the transferred districts and Chittagong will be developed and trade will therefore take its course to Chittagong which is the natural port for that part of the country'. I pointed out that this surely meant that trade would be bene fitted by the change; and I asked him whether he would not state that view in public. He said he would not, because he was a Calcutta man and he himself would be injured. I pointed out to him that Government must take a higher view than that, and must consider the general interests of the country. His reply was characteristically honest, but at the same time very discouraging. He said, 'I do not blame you for supporting a 103 measure which undoubtedly appears to be to the advantage of the districts concerned, but I am bound to fight for my own interest'. •

... a measure may be sound, but it may be influentially opposed by those who believe that their own private interests are at stake". *

Popular feeling in Chittagong as already noted, was opposed to the idea of the transfer of Chittagong to Assam. However, as the scheme of a separate province began to take shape with Chittagong as its chief port, and possibly as its capital, opinion began to change though there were still some interested parties who continued to oppose it. They were mainly the Zamindars, the subordinate Government officers (Indian) and people with business 2 interest in Calcutta.

That opinion on the question of partition was gradually becoming divided in Chittagong becomes apparent from the fact that on 15 3 December 1903 Maulvi Sirajal Islam Khan Bahadur stated that while the people of Chittagong were not in favour of the transfer of Cliittagong alone to Assam they were not totally averse to the idea of being transferred to Assam along with Dacca and Mymensingh.

1. A.H.L. Frazer - Among Indian Rajas and Ryots, 325. 2. Notes Public A. February 1905, Curzon Collection B, 1-6. See also Transfer of the Chittagong Division to the Province of Assam, General. Curzon Collection A, 107. 3. . Maulvi Serajul Islam Khan Bahadur represented the Chittagong Division in the Bengal Legislative Council. 4. W.C. Macpherson officiating Chief Secretary to the Govt, of Bengal. To Govt, of India 6 April 1904, P.P. 1906 LXXXI 689. 104

W. C. Macpherson commenting on this letter wrote, "In this note there is no doubt that the Honourable member expressed his own views. . . but at the same time ttie Lieutenant Governor found 1 that a large number of persons held precisely the same views”. The 'Jyoti' which had previously opposed the transfer of Chittagong 2 to Assam wrote when it was rumoured that the Government was contemplating the creation of a new province, "If the Chittagong Division is amalgamated with Assam and placed under a Lieutenant Governor, the dismemberment, although painful at first, will in the end be conducive to health. Many people are sorry that the slight relationship which has been established between the inhabitants of Calcutta and Chittagong. . .will be put to an end. . .But this sorrow is only a sentiment. We are constrained to say that Calcutta people have very little sympathy with the people of East Bengal. . .Many people fear that the proposed dismemberment will if carried out, ruin many traditions. But there is, as a matter of fact, hardly any work of the Chittagong people which will be seriously affected by the change. If Chittagong is any day made the capital of a province, that day will be the most auspicious to its inhabitants. We pray to God that Chittagong may shake off the slavery of Bengal and become prosperous".„ 3

1. W.C. Macpherson to Govt, of India, 6 April 1904, P.P. 1906, LXXXI, 722. 2. The 'Jyoti' was a Bengali weekly published from Chittagong. The Jyoti of 29 January 1903 wrote 'the transfer of the Chittagong Division from Bengal to Assam. . .will cut off the millions of residents of the Division from the advanced society of Bengal. . .and send them back to the backward society of A ssa m ". - B.N.N. P.R. 1903, I, 117. 3. t Jyoti, 10 December 1903, B.N.N.P.R. 1903, I, 1075. 105

In 1905 the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was formed with Dacca as its capital and Chittagong as its main port. Thus began the most significant period in the history of the port of Chittagong since it had come under British control. The last decade of the nineteenth century had found Chittagong port in a rather stunned condition as a consequence of a couple of centuries of indifference and stagnation coinciding with the advent of British power in India and the rise of the port of Calcutta to the position of principal port and centre of commerce and industry. The subordinate status of the port of Chittagong had largely determined the resources and attention that the Governments of Bengal and India were willing and able to spare it. There is evidence of a measure of indifference, may be even perhaps deliberate neglect on the part of the Government of Bengal towards the port of Chittagong.

Help, when it came, flowed from the decision to partition Bengal and from the need to win support for that move, or at least to disarm opposition. This need to sugar the pill of partition, bitter as it was to some, seems to have been the motive for Curzon’s speech, delivered on 14 February 1904 during his visit to Chittagong. The Port Commissioners in their address to the Viceroy had dwelt upon the financial needs of the port and its past neglect. Curzon was half ready to admit that Chittagong had been neglected by the Government of Bengal and that the difficulties the Commissioners had experienced in developing the trade of the port sprang from their lack of funds. But, he claimed, ’the Government of India have on many occasions since I came to India, done their best to lend a helping hand to the port* - 'the principal outlet of the trade of Eastern Bengal and Assam’ - and he promised more substantial support in the future. But - and here the motives for his tour were most clearly exposed - that support would be 106 tied up with acceptance of partition and the new role for Chittagong which that implied. "If the present people of Chittagong", he wondered out loud, "refuse the chance that is now offered to it of becoming the principal port of a new and powerful administration, possessing a considerable claim upon the time, attention and purse of the head of that administration, not overshadowed by any great and potent rival, but capable of developing its own individuality on its own lines, (may not) their successors come to some successor of mine in the future with. . . complaints of the shortsightedness of an earlier generation". *

Curzon then proceeded clearly to define the size and nature of the carrot being offered to the people of Chittagong in the following terms, "The Government of India have, therefore, decided in the present favourable state of their finances, which admits of a generosity that is not always possible, to help you in the following ways. We will write off the unpaid balance of more than one lakh of the Gekko loan. We will undertake, subject to the advice of engineers, to help you in the matter of a dredger to clear your bars for larger vessels, and also to pay for the revetment of the right bank; and we will lend you money on reasonable term s to provide the requisite wharves and warehouses for the anticipated 2 development of trade". Financial fortune, for the first time smiled on the port of Chittagong with the partition of Bengal. The following table clearly shows the flow of capital fundsfor the development of the port of Chittagong coincided with the duration of the separate province of Eastern Bengal and Assam. This capital expenditure was apparently among the material costs of the partition of Bengal which the Government of India felt obliged to b e a r.

1. Lord Curzon*s address at Chitt. 14 February 1904, P.P. 1906 LXXXI, 845-46. See also The Pioneer 20 February 1904, Englishman, 16 February 1904.

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Even here, however, the neglect or even ill will of the Government of Bengal was manifested, for the detailed figures for the revetment of the river barlk which the Port Commissioner had submitted to that Government for transmission to the Viceroy, was suppressed by the Bengal Government, * The Port Commissioners always believed that had the figures been presented the grants which were eventually made would have been 2 much more adequate than they were.

The promises of Curzon materialised in the precise form of a grant of Rs 10, 00, 000 from the Imperial budget for the development of the port facilities (other than jetties which were . 3 funded from (Railway development budget). The Port Commissioners pleaded for more generous grants and their cause was very earnestly pleaded by the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam but the Government of India did not in the event agree to increase the size of their commitment, observing "it cannot be reasonably expected that the whole cost of an improvement. . . should be thrown on Imperial Revenues nor is it ordinarily the case that such improvements are entirely financed from general revenues whether Imperial or Provincial. The resources of the port itself should. . . 4 be made to bear at least a fair share of the burden". Having failed to persuade the Government of India to increase the size of the grant, the Lieutenant Governor of the new province was unable to offer m ore from local funds, though he declared to the port authorities, "I share with you the anxiety which the recent reply

1. Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt. ofE.B.A., 11 April 1906, E.B.A. Proc. PWD. Mne, 1906, May 23. 2. Ibid. 3. Note by J.R. Bell, Chittagongs Port Conservancy Inspection. 21 "24 February 1906, E.B.A. Proc. PWD (Mne) 1906, May 27 See also Govt, of E . B. A , to Govt, of India 1S April 1906, E_. B. A .

Proc. PWb 4. Govt, of India to Govt.Govt. ofE.B.AofE.B.A. 15 September 1 9 0 6 , L > * L A - i Proc. I'Wl) (Mim) 1907, April 5. 109 of the Government of India to our application for more funds has created. But when all is said and done > I am in their hands and if they will not foot the bill, the progress and prosperity of this great province will be seriously retarded". * Public demand for more funds for overall improvement of the province was not stilled, however, by these refusals. In 1909 for example Moulvi Syed Shamsul Huda in the debate upon the Eastern Bengal and Assam financial statement for 1909-10 vigorously pressed the case for Government assistance "We have inherited a heritage of the accumulated neglect of years and cannot be blamed if we require large sums to put our house in order. We have largely contributed towards the creation of the port of Calcutta out of which the 2 Government of Bengal now derives a considerable income". Clamour for further grants from the Imperial budget continued 3 unaltered until 1910 when Rs 5, 50, 000 was made available - a sum 4 which was quickly absorbed by the fast developing port.

The Government of the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam gave due importance ot its principal port and matched their interest in and enthusiasm for the development of the port with substantial funds from their own resources. They made the following financial commitments in 1907: a) Half the cost of revetment, from 1907 onwards, to a maximum of nine lakhs in all, (this upon an estimated total outlay of thirty lakhs on revetments and dredger combined). Should the final

1. Reply to address by Lancelot Hare. Lt. Gov. ofE.B.A. 10 Dec 1906, Ordinary Meeting of the Port Commissioners 1907, 222. 2. The Eastern Bengal and Assam Financial Statement 1909-10 - 14 March 1910, Eastern Bengal and Assam Legislative Proceeding ■ 1910, 7. 3. Eastern Bengal and Assam Financial Statement 1909-10, 14 March 1910. E.B.A. Leg. Proc. 1910, 10. 4. The Eastern Bengal and Assam Revised Financial Statement 1911-12, 13 March, E.B.A. Leg. Proc. 1911, 46. 110

total exceed thirty lakhs then proposals for increased provincial aid would be favourably considered. b) An annual provincial grant of up to Rs 59, 624 a year for five years to cover the operating costs of the dredger. *

The new Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam did not confine their support for Chittagong to financial aid. The port Commissioners had always held that it had been the failure of the Bengal Government to finance the building of the first jetty, or to agree to deferred terms of repayment which had led to the transfer of the jetties and management to the Assam Bengal Railway Company, with all the ill effects that followed from it. After partition the new provincial Government tried to break the stranglehold of the railway by restoring ownership and control to the port authorities. Writing to the Government of India they stated that the Lt. Governor "agrees with the Commissioners in thinking it a matter of the highest importance that the Commissioners should retain and recover full control of the bed of the river and of the 2 foreshore in so far as covered by the railway jetties".

The Government of India in an uncompromising refusal wrote, "There can be no question of transferring the jetties to the Port Commissioners, as the latter are not in a position to meet the charges on the capital cost of the works. The jetties must therefore remain the property of the Railway Company, and the latter cannot 3 be deprived of the right to manage their property". Nevertheless,

1. Proceeding of the 223 Ordinary Meeting of the Port Commissioners of Chitt. 1 February 1907, O.M. P. C. 1907, 107. 2.’ Govt. ofE.B.A. to Govt, of India, 13 January 1911, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1912, April 26. 3. Govt, of India to Govt. ofE.B.A. 10 May 1911, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1912, April 38. I ll

the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government continued to press the port authorities case with an obvious desire to be seen to be doing all they could for them, with an almost crusading zeal and though the Government of India remained firm in general it did promise - 10 May 1911 - "to issue directions to the Railway Board that they obtain the views of the local Government when any increase in the rates and charges is proposed. . . *

The Eastern Bengal and Assam Government also consistently used their influence and authority to discourage the attempts of the Railway to develop a coastal trade with Calcutta.

The Railway authorities, after their failure to come to an understanding with the steamer companies and their further 2 failure to establish a flotilla of their own which could link Narainganj and Chandpur and so open up the jute areas west of the river Meghna - there being no talk of a bridge between Bhairab- Bazar and Ashuganj which might have served the same purpose, had decided in 1904 to enter into negotiations with the Steamer Companies to develop the coastal trade between Calcutta and Chittagong as an alternative. Thus the agent of the Assam Bengal Railway in 1904 had written, "to expect that the Steamer Companies would or could co-operate with this Company to develop an export and import trade via Chittagong and Chandpur, as an independent company would do is, I believe, to expect the impossible. I may add however that there would be no reason why the Steamer

1. Govt, of India to Govt. ofE.B.A. 10 May 1911, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1912, April 38. 2. Note by R.S. Strachey, Agent A. B. Rly upon the establishment of an adequate flotilla service between Chandpur and Narainganj 12 March 1904. AL/543. Agents letter to Board 1902. Reason for their failure could not be found. 112

Companies and the Assam Bengal Railway should not come to some understanding with one another regarding the great traffic which must continue between Calcutta and the districts served by the Railway". * In persuance of that policy J. Stuart the Traffic Manager of the Assam Bengal Railway Company in July 1905 had approached the Calcutta Port Commissioners with a proposal 2 to stimulate coastal trade between Calcutta and Chittagong. He proposed that the river dues at Calcutta should be reduced from 4 annas to 1 anna a ton on general cargoes and to l | annas per ton on coal and manganese ore shipped to and from Chittagong. He also proposed the reduction of the all round rate for unloading and re shipment of jute brought by steamer from Chittagong to the Kidderpore Docks and their trans-shipment into other vessels 3 from the same berth from 4 annas to 3 annas.

The Hnance Committee of the Calcutta Port Trust, which considered the proposal, was not in favour of the reduction of the river dues observing that the Assam-Bengal Railway should 4 reduce its rate if it wished to attract more trade. The Bengal Chamber of Commerce however, on being informed of this refusal wrote to the Port Commissioners of Calcutta urging the Port Commissioners Committee to reconsider their decisions and advised it to use all legitimate means in its power to capture the

1. Note by R. S. Strachey, Agent, A.B. Rly, upon the establishment of an adequate flotilla service between Chandpur and Narainganj - 12 March 1904, AL/543, Agent's Letters to Board 1902, see also E.B.A. Proc. 1906, April 36. 2. 214 Ordinary Meeting of the Port Commissioners of Chitt. 4 May 1906, E.B.A. Proc. PWD (Mne), 1906, April 37. 3. Chmn. Port Comms to Govt. ofE.B.A. 7 May 1906, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne, 1906, April 36. 4. ' Ibid. 113

ocean trade of Eastern Bengal so as not to allow Chittagong to rise in status over that of a coasting port. They argued that if the Assam-Bengal Railway were not permitted to secure an increased traffic in co-operation with Calcutta, the company would obtain it without such assistance and to the loss of Calcutta. ^

When the proposal became known in Eastern Bengal and Assam it brought forth a storm of opposition. The Port Commissioners stated, "This is a matter of great regret, as it shows that it is possible for the Assam Bengal Railway Company to be inimical 2 to the true interests of this port". The Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam declared, "a policy which would aim at rendering Chittagong a feeder port to Calcutta would inevitably retard the attainment by Chittagong of its proper position as an ocean port, and would indeed be inconsistent with the views that have led to the expenditure of large sums of money in facilitating the use of the port by ocean steamers. . .the future of the railway is bound up with the development of an import trade at Chittagong and (the Lieutenant Governor) would be very unwilling to see a policy adopted which would injuriously affect the prospects of Chittagong as a receiving port of ocean traffic. The Lieutenant Governor is convinced that to give a special stimulus to the coasting trade with 3 Calcutta would have this effect". The opposition did not seen to have had any effect however, for the Assam Bengal Railway Company

1. Chmn. Port. Comms. to Govt. E.B.A. 7 May 1906, E . B. A. Proc. PWD Mne 1906, April 36. 2. Ibid. 3. Govt, of E.B.A.to Govt, of Beng. 22 May 1906, E . B.A. P ro c . PWD (Mne) 1906, April 39. 114 entered into an arrangement with the British India Steam Navigation Company and the Asiatic Steam Navigation Company for through booking of goods to aijd from Calcutta via Chittagong. Frustrated in this effort the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam sought to develop the trade of the port by improving its communication with those areas of the province lying to the west of the river Meghna, the major jute and rice producing areas of Dacca and Bakarganj. In August 1910, they secured the sanction of the Government of India to construct a branch railway from Bhairab Bazar opposite Ashuganj which was the terminus of the Akhaura-Ashuganj branch of the Assam-Bengal Railway to Tongi, a station on the Dacca-Mymensingh Railway. * This line would have connected major jute growing areas by railway to Chittagong. However, the partition was annulled in 1912, the impetus given by the Eastern Bengal and Assam Government was 2 lost and the branch line was not completed until 1916. In the meantime the Government of Bengal secured for the port of Calcutta a much more convenient and direct railway connection with the jute growing areas of Dacca and Mymensingh by constructing in 1915 the Sara or the Hardinge bridge (the lower 3 Gangesat Paksey). The bridge which would have served Chittagong's interests - that connecting Bhairab-Bazar and Ashuganj though 4 considered between 1908 and 1909 was not constructed till 1937.

The annulment of partition of Bengal signified the reversion of the port of Chittagong from the position of principal port of a large

1. From Secretary of State for India to Govt. ofE.B.A. 8 July 1910. Govt, of India Rjy Proc. (Const) October 1910. October 4, see also Proceedings of the 263 Ordinary Meeting held on Friday, the 9 September 1910, para 20. O.M.P.C. 1909-1911, 592. 2. Railway Department Govt, of India Rly Brd. History of Indian Railways Constructed and in progress corrected up to 31 March 1918, 153. 3. Malik, 86. 4. Ibid., 87. 115 and developing province to that of being a m ere second best to Calcutta under a Government which put the interests of the latter port always to the fore. The table at page. 107, earlier in this chapter*,shows how abruptly the flow of G overnm ent funds for the development of Chittagong port ceased with the abolition of the separate province of Eastern Bengal and Assam. The growth of railway communications with places on the west side of the river Meghna slowed to a halt, the plans for seven jetties drawn up in 1906 were abandoned - no new jetty was built after the fourth one until 1947. Not until the new partition of 1947 was Chittagong port rescued from neglect and subordinations and its full potential exploited. CHAPTER V

The Development of Port F acilities*1892-1912

In the last decade of the nineteenth century Chittagong, the port that Marco Polo had seen six centuries earlier so flourishing was in rather a pathetic condition. This was a consequence of two centuries of neglect and dereliction coinciding with the advent of British power in India. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Calcutta had gradually developed into the premier port of Bengal while Chittagong had found itself relegated to the secondary position of a feeder port. The net result of this relative shift in importance and government attention was evident in the singular absence of any significant port facilities in Chittagong when the Port Trust came into being in 1888. And since it is the quality and number of a port’s facilities which largely determine the current volume of trade and future prospects of development Chittagong Port was ill placed to generate either the interest or the income necessary to make much progress.

It was the needs of the Assam Bengal Railway and of the tea planters of Assam and Sylhet which broke the vicious circle of poor facilities and poor prospects. Their demands led to an awareness of the pitiful condition of the port facilities at Chittagong, and their pressure reinforced by the financial and commercial interests of the Imperial power which persuaded the Government of India to invest in the development of the port. These developments can be studied under a number of broad headings: Landing, shipping and storage facilities, navigational aids, river conservancy and the supply of labour together with health and other support services.

1. Nur Ahmed, Some glimpses about the Origin and Location of Chittagong Port and Chittagong Town Port of Chittagong Quarterly October 1962. 117

In 1893 the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division reported "there are no facilities for landing and storage of railway construction material at Chittagong. The Port Commissioners own only one jetty for passengers and a few small jetties for landing salt. They have no pontoon and no crane. They have no storehouse, even for their own material much of which lies in the open. .It was expected that the Railway Administration would procure a pantoon to form a temporary wharf and a crane, but they have not done so. . . There are no wharves, public or private at Chittagong". *

The single passenger jetty referred to by the Commissioner was 2 the old iron jetty at Sadar Ghat built in 1879. It was practically unused and earned no revenues as it did not extend into a sufficient depth of water to be used by ocean-going vessels, or even coasters. The four salt jetties, built in 1891, were opposite the Government Salt Golas or storehouses. They were very minor works and had cost only Rs 7, 600 for the lot, though even so they represented a great gain. The Vice-Chairman of the Port Commissioners had claimed of their construction, "It will. . .be a great boon to all people interested in the landing and shipping of salt as at present the persons so engaged have often to wade up to 3 their waists in mud when landing or shipping salt". There had been pressure to extend the iron jetty and to dredge the river so as to allow coaster vessels to lie at it, but when the Commissioners made his report the jetty was still being used by passengers only.

1 Comms. Chitt. Div. To Govt of Beng, 17 August 1893, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept 1893, September 11. 2 Admin Rept. 1895-96, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1896, August- . December, September 24-25. 3 Vice-Chmn Port Comms. to Govt, of Beng. 25 June 1891, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1892, January to June, February 225. 118

At the time of the formation of the Chittagong Port Trust in 1888 it had been pointed out that the principal improvements required in the port were the lighting, the Approaches to the port and the removal of the Ring buoy shoal; the acquisition of the foreshore land and the construction of a strand road; the establishment of telegraphic communications with the mouth of the river and the provision of a steam tug, and finally the appointment of medical staff and increased hospital accommodation to serve the port. *

From this list - or its .^.mission - it appears that the Government of Bengal then proposed to develop the port of Chittagong only as a minor coastal port. No reference was made to the construction of jetties or to the dredging of the inner and outer bars which were the great obstacles to the navigation of the river Karnaphuli. Removal of the Ring Buoy shoal was indeed proposed, but the ring buoy was up-stream near the Sadar Ghat jetty which was then not even fit to handle coastal vessels. It was the need of the Assam Bengal Railway for a port capable of handling ocean-going steamers which finally changed the situation, for the Railway as has been seen in chapter three, pressed persistently for the building of an appropriate number of jetties. The first jetty was constructed by the railway as agent of the Fort Trust. The work being completed by 1899 the construction of a second jetty was taken up 2 and completed by 1904. It was however soon found that two jetties were not sufficient to meet the trade demands of the port. In a letter to the Consulting Engineer to the Government of India for Railways, the Agent, Assam Bengal Railway, emphasizing the need for a third jetty wrote, ’’During the coming season one jetty

1 Govt, of Beng. Municipal Dept, to Govt, of Beng. Legislative , Dept. 4 July 1886. Beng Proc. Mne Dept 1887, Januarv-March March 3-35. 2 Di scussed in Chapter HI. 119

will of course be fully occupied by the Clan Line Steamers, and for the second jetty M essrs. David and Company alone have already chartered four steamers which will practically occupy this jetty with its entire shed accommodation for two months.

There will certainly be other chartered jute steamers which it will be difficult to accommodate during this period whilst any salt, rice or general cargo steamers that might require a berth must be excluded". * As a scheme for five jetties in all was already .2 under the consideration of the Government of India the construction of the third jetty was sanctioned and constructed as a railway work 3 in 1906-07. Later however, the Board of Directors felt that f i v e jetties would be insufficient for the port and agreed that seven 4 jetties in all would be required, and the Agent put up a plan to build up to the latter number, not at once, but as the growth of 5 traffic required. In the meantime the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam had come into being. The Government of the new province accepted the proposal of the Railway Board and to meet the coastal demands sanctioned the construction of the fourth jetty. ^ A sa result of the support given by the Government

1 A gent, A.B. Rly to Consulting Engineer to the Govt, of India for Rlys. Assam, 21 July 1904. Govt, of India Index to the Proceedingsof the Railv/ay Dept. (Rly Board) Construction, February-March, 1905, March .98 1 2 Consulting Engineer to the Govt, of India for Railway Assam - to Govt, of India, 31 August 1904, Govt, of India Rly Proc. (Const) February-March, 1905, March 98. 3 Note by V. Woods Agent A. B. Rly, 20 August 1909, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept 1912, April 24. 4 Board of Directors A.B. Rly, to Agent, A.B. Rly, 22 Ju ly 1904, A506, Govt, of India Rly Proc (Const), February-March 1905, M arch 98 T 5 Commissioner Chitt. Division to the Govt. ofE .B .A ., 31 January 1906 E.B.A. PWE Mne Proc. 1906, August 16. 6 Govt. ofE.B.A. to Rly Board, 1 September 1906, E . B. A. PWD Mne Procl907, January 10. 120 of the new province land for the seven jetties had been purchased by 1908*. By 1910 however the need for still more jetties again was beginning to be felt. The Agent Assam Bengal Railway that year wrote to his Board, "At the close of the busy season 1908- 1909 the steady increase of exports from Chittagong, the establishment of a new direct B. 1. service from London, and the fact that during that season vessels were shut out to some extent for want of jetty accommodation pointed to the necessity of further jetty extension. The Port Commissioners also strongly supported the proposals for an additional jetty in their 2 Resolution No. 17 of a meeting held on the 5 March 1909". However, the Railway Board was of the view that there were other more important works which were more urgently required and that available funds could be spent more usefully on the construction of branch lines to the Assam-Bengal Railway system 3 so as to bring more traffic to the system. It was therefore suggested that to meet the trade demand jetty number four should be used for ocean-going steamers, instead of for the coasting 4 steamers for which it had originally been built. Nevertheless, the question of the construction of a fifth jetty again came up in 1911-12. It was felt that on the completion of the Bhairab-Tangi extension of the Assam-Bengal Railway, the connection of the port

1 Report of the Committee appointed in Eastern Bengal and Assam to enquire into the State of Affairs as regards the Railway and District Police at Chittagong and to suggest improved arrangements, 26 May 1908. E.B.A. PWD Mne. Proc. 1909. February 75. 2 The Agent A.B. Rly to the Rly Board, 24 May 1910. Govt, of India Rly Proc (Const) May 1910, May 136. 3 A gent A.B. Rly to Rly Board, 24 March 1910, Govt, of India Rly Proc. (Const) May 1910, May 136, see also Comms. Chitt. ' Div. to Govt, of Beng. 11 November 1913, Beng Proc. Mne Dept. 1914, February 44. 4 Ibid. 121 by railway with the important jute growing districts of Dacca and Mymensingh would contribute largely towards the increased import and export trade of the port which would necessitate additional jetty accommodation for the increased shipping, * forif the port was, "then found unprepared to cope with the increased trade, that trade will almost certainly be diverted and the result will be a serious set back to the prosperity of the p o rt" .^

It was pointed out that the shipping facilities of the port should be well ahead of the demands upon it and as the four jetties were "only just sufficient for accommodation of ocean-going steamers" the construction of the fifth jetty should be taken up immediately. In support of this argument the following table, showing the gradual increase in the trade of the port and the number of days steamers had to wait for berths since 1903,was submitted.

Taking one jetty Taking one occupied one steamer waiting No. of day as one one day away b erths unit number from a jetty as Total available of jetty one unit number Im ports each days in of waiting days Im E x & y ear each year in each year p o rts p o rts E xports Tons Tons Tons 000 000 000 omit omit omit ted ted ted 1903-04 2 272 37 7 82 89 1904-05 2 338 31 30 88 118 1905-06 2 384 46 30 108 138 1906-07 3 508 110 77 110 187 1907-08 3 670 84 82 112 194 1908-09 3 642 105 55 138 193 1909-10 3 348 11 53 97 149 1910-11 4 406 4 47 94 141 1911-12 4 563 15 82 113 195 1912-13 4 717 20 90 131 221 1 Admin.Dept. 1911-12 Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1912, September 59. 2 Govt, of Beng. to Rly Brd. 27 January 1914, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1914, February 45. 3 Ibid. 122

However the annulment of the partition of Bengal in 1912 and the gradual deterioration in the condition of the river Karnaphuli due to silting took much of the wind out of the sail of this argument. . No further jetties were constructed till the creation of Pakistan in 1947.

Almost simultaneously with the request for more jetties for the general trade of the port, demands were also made for a special salt jetty. As the trade of the port increased it was found that more and more ships loaded with salt had to be diverted to Calcutta for the want of jetty accommodation at the Port of Chittagong. Thus in 1904 the Jetty Superintendent is found writing, "owing to the Clan Ferguson being at the jetty. . .we shall be unable to worlds.S. Hechheimer which is expected towards the close of the present month with a full cargo of salt (3, 500 tons). This is not the first or second instance in which we have had. to refuse cargoes with salt". ^ Around 1906 a scheme was submitted 2 to the Government for the provision of a salt jetty. But in 1909 the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam decided not to 3 sanction its construction. Commenting on the Government's decision, J.R. Bell wrote, "I want to say that I view with some dismay the conclusion that a separate jetty is not to be sanctioned . If so, use must continue to be made on odd days of any railway jetty that happens to have room. . .1 cannot refrain from expressing a fear that the attempt to do without a special salt jetty will prove a hinderance to the trade of Chittagong and to the development

1 Jetty Superintendent A.B. Rly to the Agent A.B. Rly, 23 Jan u ary 1904. Govt, of India Rly Proc (Const). February-March 1905 M arch 9_8 3 2 Report on the Maritime Trade of Eastern Bengal Assam 1906-07, 8 3 Reso. No. 17. of the meeting of the Port Commissioners of Chitt. 5 March 1909, Govt, of India Rly Proc (Const). May 1910. M ay 136 1 123 through it of the new Province and the Railway'1.

In the absence of source materials the only reason that can be deduced for the salt jetty not being constructed is that its construction would have affected the trade interests of the Port Commissioners for in the absence of a salt jetty at Double Moorings small salt steamers unloaded at the Port Commissioner's salt jetties at Sadarghat. These jetties brought in a small income to the Port. It was therefore probable that the Port Commissioners were not too keen to have their income reduced and indeed to see enchanced the income of the Railway Company at their expense which would have followed from the construction of such a jetty.

The four new jetties which were constructed at the port of 2 Chittagong had a total jetty frontage of about 2, 300 feet. The first jetty was carried out into the river channel to a distance of some 100 feet from high flood water line and gave an average depth of 27 feet at low water along the face of the jetty. The 3 succeeding jetties were built in the same line of front.

However, while jetties were being built for steamers engaged in foreign or oceanic trade, no jetty was constructed for coastal

1 Inspection Note by J.R. Bell Consulting Engineer A.B. Rly. Ordinary Meeting Port Commissioners 1909. 2 Economic Progress of East Pakistan, 39.

3 ■ Responsibility for dredging River Bed off the Faces of Rly. Jetties - Statement of case for orders of the Rly Board by V. Wood Agent A. B. Rly. 31 October 1913. Govt, of India Rly Proc (Const) November 1914, November Sl_ 1 124 trade during this whole period so that the port, as the Government of Bengal pointed out "was far behind other ports in the matter of landing arrangem'ents which are, except for those made by Messrs. Turner Marison and Company, primitive in the extreme". * The general practice for handling goods 2 carried in coastal shipping was to load and unload in the stream. As far back as 1904 J.R.Bell the consulting enginner along with the majority of the Port Commissioners had agreed that the Sadar Ghat pier should be extended into water where coasting and river steamers could come alongside for the use of both passenger and cargo. They had also argued that such a jetty should be under the control of the Port Commissioners. Considerable differences of opinion rose around this question and the proposal was strongly protested against, both by the Agents 3 of the Railway Company and by the Agents of the coasting steamers. The other Port Commissioners were equally divided for and against a proposal to build a Trust jetty for landing passengers only, but they were solidly in favour of one for both passengers 4 and goods. The Agents of the Railway Company opposed this because they wished to have all the steamer trade brought to their jetties at the Double Moorings. The Agent of the coasting steamers on the other hand did not wish to have to take their steamers alongside any jettys, preferring to load and unload in the stream and to thus avoid the payment of fulJ jetty dues, while continuing

1 Note on letter No. 204 Mne, by Govt, of Beng. 19. January 1915, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1915, July 74. 2 Comm. Chitt. Div. to Govt, of Beng. 28 July 1904, E.B.A. Proc. Mne Dept. 1906, April 30. 3 Comm. Chitt. Divi to Govt, of Beng. 28 July 1904, E.B.A. P ro c . Mne Dept. 1906, April 30. 4 , Buchanan 23. 125 to make considerable profits from the shipping and landing charges between the vessels and the shore. *

The idea of a coasting jetty constructed by the Port Commissioners was eventually dropped in view of the anticipated delay in dredging 2 the ring bars. Nevertheless the question of improved arrangements for coasting jetties was again opened by a letter dated 28 July 1913 from the Indian Merchant’s Association, 3 Chittagong to the Port Commissioners. Again, however, the Government of Bengal turned down the proposal: ’’The Governor -in Council considers that the time has not yet come for the construction of jetties by the Port Commissioners. It is more important that the Commissioners should devote their funds to the improvement of the River Karnafuli by dredging than that they should embark on anecpensive scheme of constructing jetties for the coasting trade. The proposed jetty scheme must, 4 therefore remain in abeyance for the present". None was constructed in our period or for many years thereafter.

Just as there was no proper jetty at the port in the later half of the nineteenth century similarly the moorings at the port too were in very poor conditions. In 1893, there were in the port of 5 Chittagong two sets of fixed and nineteen of swinging mooring . In 1896 the Commissioners of the Port of Chittagong addressed

1 Comm. Chitt. Div. To Govt. ofE.B.A . 28 J u ly 1904, E . B. A. Proc. Mne Dept. 1906, April 30. 2 Comm. Chitt. Div. to Govt. ofE.B.A . 31 January 1906, E . B. A. Proc. Mne Dept. 1906, August 16, 3 Note on letter No. 204, by Govt, of Beng. Mne Dept, 19 January 1915, , Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1915, July 74. 4 Govt, of Beng. to Chmn Port Comms. 15 May 1915, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1915, July 77. 5 Inspection Report for 1893 by the Port Officer 2 February 1893. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1893, April 38-39. 126

Government on the subject of the renewal of the moorings of the Port, explaining that the moorings were not adapted for the larger class of vessels coming to the port the anchors and chains not being heavy enough.^ The previous autumn, when several large sailing vessels chartered for the jute trade were moored in the river a cyclone had struck the port. Every one of the ships had broken her moorings and dragged her anchors. As a result the ships captains had threatened that unless the Port Commissioners improved the moorings and so ensured the safety of vessels in port they would urge their owners not to send them in future to Chittagong. ^ The Port Commissioners, reporting to Government announced that unless heavier moorings were used they would not feel inclined to permit vessels exceeding 1,400 tons burden to use the port. The Government of Bengal that year sanctioned the purchase from England of five new mooring buoys with chain 3 anchors complete which were received from England that year 4 and were laid in continuation of the fixed moorings. All the 5 old moorings were also lifted and relaid. As a result of all these changes the Commissioners were able to state towards the end of the year that the moorings were "now believed to be trustworthy and capable of accommodating the largest class of vessels visiting the port".^

Once the main jetties had been constructed and the flow of trade had increased a whole series of further facilities became necessary

1 Admin. Beng. 1896-97, 14. 2 Agent and Chief Engineer to Managing Director A. B. Rly, 10 January 1896. Agent's Letter to Board 1896, AL/90. 3 Admin. Beng. 1896-97, 14. 4 Admin. Beng. 1896-97, 109. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. c l a . C: 128

sheds and warehouses, railway sidings, fire hydrants, water points and electricity. Till 1908 however, very little progress was made in providing these, and the .port had to make do with transit sheds, and even these with poor fire fighting apparatus.

In 1905 F. Palmer and F.G. Pumayne in their report had stated that transit sheds should only be used for the collection of goods intended either for vessels actually at a berth or for the next one to follow, and on no account should they be used for storing goods for lengthened periods. * In spite of that report however, 2 no storage sheds were constructed till 1908, when a single storage shed was built. By 1909 however, three storage sheds had been 3 constructed. The transit sheds previously in use had been constructed of steel framework with corrugated iron walls and 4 roofs. The sheds had no boundary wall round them to prevent access by unauthorised persons. They were so constructed that anyone could enter them from the river side and also from underneath the front sheds from the river. The floor of the 5 front godown were of wood instead of the cement used in Calcutta. The three great fires of November 1906, October 1907 and December 1hcJ 1907 revealed^the sheds were not only ill constructed but were also

1 Report by Messrs F.G. Dumayne & F. Palmer Vice-Chairman St Chief Engineer to the Calcutta Port Trust on the Proposals for extending jetty accommodation at the Port of Chittagong for ocean-going steamers, 1905, para 22. 2 253 Ordinary Meeting 5 November 1909. OMPC 1909, 462, See also E . B. A. Proc. Mne 1909, February 75. 3 253 Ordinary Mee ting 5 November 1909, OMPC 1909, 462. 4 Report on the Transit Sheds at Chitt. Jetties - by F. Palmer. Chief Eng. to the Calcutta Port Trust - 16 February 1908 - ' E-B.A.Proc. PWD Mne Dept. 1909. February No. 57. 5 Calcutta Fire Insurance Agent’s Association to the Agent A.B. Rly. 13 November 1907, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne Dept. 1909, February 1. 129 supplied with an insufficient number of fire extinguishing appliances. After the third fire the Port Commissioners wrote, "the fire of the 16th November 1906 found the'Railway Company entirely unprepared with any kind of fire extinguishing appliance that could be worked. The fire of the 12th October 1907 found them equally unprepared At the fire of Christmas Eve last they had two short hoses, 2 j " in size, which were attached to the hydraulic crane mains, and one of those hoses was defective and worked intermittently (vide Mr. Rivett Carnac’s evidence). There were also a few bottles of extincters but they were of no practical use". ^

The fires brought the railway administration of the jetties under heavy criticism. An enquiry committee was appointed which found the three sheds to be individually too large for the storage of jute and which recommended the division of the sheds into compartments by brick and fire proof partitions so that no compartment should contain more than 7, 000 bales of jute; a considerable increase in the number of hydrants around the sheds in connection with the scheme of fire protection sanctioned and ordered from England; the utilization of the hydraulic pressure mains as an auxilliary to the water mains in connection with the fire engine and the installation of sprinklers in the sheds, and the provision of a permanent unclimWible fence with guards around the y ard .

In addition to these measures the Committee, agreeing with the Insurance Company, recommended that the portion of the shed

1 Memorandum by the Commissioners on the Chittagong Jetty - Fire of 24 December 1907. E.B.A. Proc. Mne Dept. 1909, February 52. 130

floor decked with timber should be cased or made pucca. The Committee also proposed that all the exterior shed walls except those on the jetties should be of brick, with doors which overlapped the opening by at least nine inches on either side. The steel pale fencing when installed should be supported throughout its length on a masonry wall to prevent access by burrowing underneath it. The Committee also proposed that all the Company's servants be provided with a distinguishing uniform or badge. * The Railway Board acting on these criticisms and suggestions instructed their Agent to prepare without delay, in consultation with the Port Trust and the Fire Insurance Association, a thoroughly comprehensive scheme of protective measures against fire at the Company's 2 jetties. In 1908 a scheme was submitted and sanctioned by the Railway Board. However when the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam expressed the view that the proposed scheme was insufficient to meet the demands of the port the whole proposal was revised and a more comprehensive scheme adopted. According 3 to the new scheme a complete hydrant installation was provided. Sprinklers were placed in the transit sheds No. 1 to 4 and storage sheds A, B and C. and on the recommendation of the Fire Insurance Association sprinklers were also placed in the verandahs 4 of the sheds. In place of the small fire engine previously sent out from England provision was made for a thousand gallons hydrant

1 Finding of a Joint Enquiry held at Chittagong on the 24 and 30 December 1907 and 2 and 4 January 1908 into the Fire at No. 3 Berth on Tuesday 24 December 1907. E.B.A. Proc. Mne Dept. 1909, February 60. 2 Rly Board to Chitt. Port Trust, 21 January 1908 E.B.A. P ro c . PWD Mne 1909, February 50. 3 Chief Engineer A. B. Rly, to the Agent A. B. Rly 29 September 1909, Govt, of India Rly Proc (Const) January 1911, January 9.6 6 4 Agent A. B. Rly to Managing Director A. B. Rly 3 May 1910. Govt, of India Rly Proc (Const), January 1911, January 99 1 131

pump and a much larger storage tank than the one in use was provided. * These measures proved effective and there was no further fire, during the period under study except for a small 2 one in 1909 when these improvements were being carried out.

Besides these sheds separate arrangements were made for the storage of kerosine, oil and salt. Arrangements for the storage .3 of kerosine oil was made at Guptakhali and of salt in the Government Salt Golas or sheds at Sadarghat. Prior to the construction of the bulk oil installation in 1903 the import of 4 kerosine oil had been very small, only 245, 255 gallons in the 5 year 1892-93, mainly for local consumption. With the increase in its import, nearly nine folds by 1900, the need began to be felt for storage accommodation at Chittagong and the Burma Oil Company, the principal oil supplying firm at Chittagong, approached the Government of Bengal and secured in 1903 permission to erect a bulk oil installation at Guptakhali. ^ Soon however, this oil installation proved insufficient to hold the oils imported, so that in 1908 the installation had to be extended by the addition of a new oil tank. ^

Salt was stored in the salt golas . located at the end of the Strand Road. However, arrangements at the golas were in much need of

1 Chief Engineer A. B. Rly to the Agent A. B. Rly 29 September 1909, Govt, of India Rly Proc (Const) January 1911, January 9j6 6 2 Admin. Rept. 1908-1909, O.M.P.C. 1910, 506. 3 Govt, of Bng. to the Comm. Chitt. Div. 15 April 1903, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1903, April 64. 4 , Annual Statement of the Sea-Borne Trade and Navigation of the Bengal Presidency with Foreign countries and India Ports 1895-96, 41. 5 Lyall and Dowling, 19. 6 Sec Govt, of Beng. to Comm, of Chitt. Divi. 15 April1903, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1903, April 64. 7 Board's Letters to Agent, 31 July 1908. 132 improvements. According to the existing practice in the absence of a salt jetty large salt steamers unloaded at the railway jetties at Double Moorings. * From ther& the salt was sent to the golas by rail. At the golas there were no covered sidings from which the salt could be unloaded for carriage to the golas. As a result 2 during the rainy season there was much inconvenience and delay. Not only was the condition at the salt golas poor the same poor conditions existed at the station at the Strand Road. The railway siding which extended from the jetties to the Sadarghat did so along the Strand Road. This Strand Road siding was a single line of railway, with most of the leading merchant premises tucked in between it and the river and many go downs on the other 3 side of the Strand Road also. This siding did not have any proper goods station. The station which was known as the Strand Road Station - to quote from the report of the enquiring Committee - was "not a station at all, as goods cannot be loaded 4 and unloaded at it". Instead the existing system was to load 5 from the side of the railway wagons in the siding. There were moreover, no goods sheds^ along the sidings which meant that a constant clutter of bullock carts and piles of jute bales was found along the line which added to the confusion, particularly as the 7 "line ran along the busiest street in Chittagong".

1 Comm. Chitt. Divi. to Govt, of Beng. 28 July 1904, Beng. Proc, Mne Dept. 1906, April 30. 2 Ibid. 3 Rept. of the Cttee. appointed to enquire into the State of Police at Chitt - 14 March 1909 - E.B.A. Proc PWD Mne 1909, February 75. 4 Ibid.

5 Ibid. 'wir'ww 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. In 1906 however, the defective arrangement at the salt Golas was remedied and arrangements weye made to erect shelters where wagons could be unloaded. * Similarly in 1911 steps were taken to improve the condition at the Strand Road by removing the station to a more suitable location to the north of the junction of 2 the Strand Road siding.

As the increase in the trade of the port demanded sufficient number of jetties and sheds it likewise demanded that night work should be done. From as far back as 1902, therefore, the Railway Agent had begun to press for facilities which would make night working possible and safe. As the Railway Agent wrote, "night work must be done and the danger incurred in burning oil pressure lights, such as ’Wells lights', altogether prohibits 3 their use especially when loading jute". He asked therefore for the installation of the new electric lighting. For once no objections were raised. In April 1902 the Government of India sanctioned Rs 18, 900 for an electric light installation at the 4 Double Moorings. In 1905 sanction was given for a separate dynamo for No. 2. jetty and for electric light fittings for the number 5 5 sheds. In 1908 capital was sanctioned by the Railway Board for lighting Chittagong yard, goods sheds and station buildings. ^

1 Comm. Chitt. Divi to Govt, of Beng. 28 July 1904, Beng. Proc. PWD (Mne) 1906, April 30. 2 Sec. A.B. Rly Co. Ltd., to Agent A. B. Rly. 14 July 1911, Govt, of India Rly Proc (Const), 1911, September/October, October 276. 3 A gent A.B. Rly to Consulting Engineer to the Govt, of India for Rly Assam. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept 1902. 4 Govt, of India to Consulting Engineer to Govt, of India for Kiy Assam. 30 April 1902, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1902, February 54. 5 Board's Letters to Agent 1905. 6 General Schedule B. Re so. No. 54. Capital sanctions by the Rly Board to Agent A. B. Rly Assam Bengal Railway Index to Official Meetings 1908. 134

The railway however, was not the only owner of landing and shipping facilities at Chittagong, for in the absence of railway or other public jetties, shipping lines had had to make provision of their own for carrying on their trade. With the permission of the Port Commissioners* certain firms which had been established at Chittagong for many years provided themselves with the moorings, p ntoon landing stages, shed accommodation, offices and the like needed for coastal trade-subject to the condition that they would be removed when required by the Port T ru st. ^

As in the case of jetties and moorings so in that of more general facilities Chittagong Port lagged behind requirements. Till 1892 she had very little to offer to ships visiting her port: no hospital of her own for the sick, whether passengers or seamen and no workshop or dock for repairs.

1 Such permission was given in 1892 to few firms. There were Messrs. Ralli Brothers Agency, Babu Nittya Nanda Ray, Rai Abhoy Chandra Mittra Bahadur and Haji Nasoo Malum - Admin. Rept. 1891-92 Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1892, October 32-33. Permission was later granted in 1905-06 to Messrs. K risto Das Nittya Nando Ray to erect two temporary jetties in front of their own godown and warehouses and to Messrs. T u rn er, M arrison and Co. to erect a pontoon landing stage and to lay moorings for the accommodation of the steamers of the Asiatic Steam Navigation Company and the Retriever Flotilla Co. at a ground rent payable to the port fund of Rs 200 a year. Should the Commissioners order their removal within three years, they would take over the moorings at a valuation. Admin Dept. 1905-06 ' - E.B.A. Proc. PWD (Mne) 1906, 1 October. 2 Admin Rept. 1891-92, Beng Proc. Mne Dept. 1892, October 32-33. 135

The want of proper medical men and sufficient hospital accommodation for the shipping at the port of Chittagong had long been felt and had been the subject of complaint. At a meeting convened by the Commissioner of the Division on 3 December 1884, and attended by the Captains of ships at the Port and representative of the leading firms it was unanimously agreed that a separate hospital should be provided for seamen} Nothing however was done and the Municipal hospital continued to be used for the treatment of seamen till 1892. That year however, with the outbreak of cholera and small-pox epidemics at Chittagong, the Municipal Commissioner pointed out the necessity of having another hospital for the treatment of patients, specially for Europeans as the Municipal hospital ward for Europeans and contagious diseases were not only unfit for the reception of European seamen but was also inadequate for the number of 2 cases being admitted. The subject was discussed by the Port Commissioners who were unanimously of opinion that since the site of the municipal hospital was "objectionable and the accommodation insufficient" the Rangm hal Hill should be acquired and the bungalow on it converted into accommodation for European seamen. The Commissioners considered that a suitable hospital 3 for Indian patients should also be erected on the hill. In view of the need it was agreed that the hospital port due which had 4 ceased to be collected in 1891 should again be re-imposed. Accordingly Government was moved and sanction was secured for 5 the reimposition of hospital port dues.

1 Govt, of Beng. to Chamber 14 August 1889, Beng. C. C. 468. 2 Admin. Rept. 1892-93. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1893, October 33-34. 3 Note by E. Good, Special Officer, 17 September 1902, Beng. - Proc. PWD Mne 1902, December 45. 4 Vice-Chmn of the Comms. to Govt, of Beng. 2 June 1892, Beng. Proc PWD Mne. 1892, July-December, November 64-65. 5 Notification No. 83 Mne 20 September 1892, Beng. Proc. PWD (Mne) 1892 - July/December, November 72. 136

In February 1893, on the completion of the hospital on the Rangmahal Hill the Civil Surgeon of Chittagong was appointed Surgeon to the Port Commissioners. He was also given an Assistant Surgeon. 1

All repair work for the port of Chittagong before the purchase of 2 the Port's two vessels the S.L. A ctive andS.T. Gekko had been 3 done in Calcutta. After the purchase of those vessels their engine room staffs were employed, when their vessels were not working, to execute all petty repairs in the Port Commissioners 4 Workshop at Sadarghat. Beside this Port Commissioner . Workshop the Assam Bengal Railway Company had their own 5 workshop at Pahartali.

There was no dry dock in Chittagong and so the dredger boats and flats had all to be sent to Calcutta for survey. ^ This involved great expense and loss of time which in turn affected the dredging work in the river KarnapKuiL Before 1893 there was not even a mud dock at Chittagong. In that year however, the Commissioners proposed the cutting of a dock on port land capable of handling the

1 Admin. Rept. 1892-93 - Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1893, October, 33-34. 2 See Chart appended. "Vessels belonging to the port of Chittagong". 3 Admin Rept. 1895-96, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1896, October, 24-25. 4 Ibid. 5 Loco Requirements at Pahartali Shops 27 February 1911, Rly Index OM 1911. 6 Vice-Chmn to Govt, of Beng. 21 December 1893, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1894, February 1. itw fn o h ohoijfib^

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Gekko and other craft. * What was proposed was a mud dock with an earthen bund or embankment in place of gates, in length about 130 feet, breadth on top 60 fo 80 and at the bottom about 2 25 feet and 16 to 18 feet deep. The natural entrance of the mud dock was the salt golah creek. The Government of Bengal 3 approved of the idea and that year sanctioned the proposal. But although a mud dock was built the absence of a dry-dock during the period under study was much felt by shipsvisiting the port, particularly as the approach to the river Karnaphuli and the river itself was not free from shaols and bars.

The marking of these hazards to navigation was another task which was only slowly completed. Between the river Karnaphuli and the south end of the .Mohesh Khal were located several shoal patches. 4 These were the Dolphin Shaol, the North Patch and the South Patch. The Dolphin Shoal was to the north of the Kutubdia. Island while the North Patch was to its south. The South Patch lay further south still, near the Mohesh Khal Island and was about 40 miles below the entrance to the river Karnaphuli. Although both the Dolphin Shoal and the North Patch was marked by buoys the Port Officer always found it very difficult to mark the shoal in the South Patch. In October 1892 after a buoy that marked that place had broken adrift a second class conical black buoy was placed in position. This buoy too broke adrift in December 1894. A temporary buoy

1 Vice-Chmn of the Comms. to Govt, of Beng. 21 December 1893. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1894, February 1. 2 Ibid. 3 Govt, of Beng. to Chmn Port Comms. 24 January 1894, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1894, February 2 - Rs 2, 036 was sanctioned. 4 A.G. Findley Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal Directory, 1095. 5 Admin. Rept. 1892-93 - Beng. Proc. Mne Dept, 1893, October 33-34. 6 Admin Rept. 1894-95, Beng Proc. Mne Dept 1895, October 12-19. 139

as an experiment was laid in February 1895. But as a result of the cyclone of October 1895 that buoy too disappeared.

•

The necessity for providing a lightship for the South Patch shoal, so amply demonstrated by the repeated failure to fix any sort of buoy, was more than once brought to the notice of the Government. In 1884 the m asters of the vessels then lying in the Port of Chittagong submitted a memorial on the subject. They were unanimously of opinion that a lightship should be placed on this dangerous shoal, and that this would render the approach to Chittagong both safe and easy. ^ But as the Port Fund was unable 2 to bear such a charge nothing was done. When the Port Trust was formed the Commissioners took up the question again, but 3 owing to the want of funds they too were unable to provide a vessel on the Patches. They therefore requested the Commissioners of Chittagong Division to lay the whole matter before the Government. It was however not before February 1906 that a lightship named the Sarsute was procured from the Government of Bengal (the cost to be debited to the accumulations of the 4 Chittagong pilotage funds) and stationed at the South Patches, thus making the approach to the river Karnaphuli both easy and safe.

Once the shoal and the patches were passed a ship upon entering the river Karnaphuli was faced with further difficulties for though

1 Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India, 23 February 1888. Govt, of Beng. PWD Mne Port Trust 1888, April 2. 2 Ibid. 3 , Ibid. 4 Admin Rept. 1906-07, E.B.A. Proc. PWD (Mne) 1907, November 6 . 140

the navigation of the river was neither very difficult nor dangerous as compared with the Hughli navigation leading to Calcutta still the channel could not be said to have been totally free from dangers. This was mainly due to the fact that at the commencement of our period no proper attention had been given to keeping the port abreast of the growing needs of its users. There were thus, no 2 correct charts of the river, as many changes had occurred 3 since the last survey was made in 1883. There were several bars which required great caution in the absence of proper marking. There was further no effective lighthouse to mark the approaches nor were there any proper navigational lights on the river. Until the purchase of the Gekko there was not even a tug in the port and till 1906 there was no telephone connection between the port and its outer approaches . Such being the condition of the port, the Port Officer was surely justified in stating in 1889 'I do not think there is another port so isolated and wretchedly furnished with means of assisting vessels in 4 distress as Chittagong1 . During the period under study however, these drawbacks were remedied to a certain extent and the river was made navigable both during night and day.

The inadequate lighting of the whole Chittagong coast was a great problem to ships entering the river Karnafuli from the sea. The

1 Hist. Calcutta P.T. states "there is not an experienced seaman who will not class it (Hooghly) as one of the most difficult within his knowledge". 10. 2 Admin. Beng. 1900-1901, 16. 3 Agent and Chief Engineer A. B. Rly to Govt, of Beng. 19 January 1901, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1901, March 5. 4 Port Officer to Port Comms. 1889, Port Trust Proc. K.W. 141 existing lighthouses, the Kutubdia and Norman's Point, were of doubtful utility to ships coming from a distance, being ill sited, ill equipped and ill maintained.

In 1890 the Norman's Point Lights consisted of two lamps, each with four single flat wick kerosine burners. "The lamp d 'tto quote the Port Officer of Calcutta, "are placed at all sorts of angles the light from one lamp throwing it upwards and that from another throwing it to close down, so that the light directly seaward is still lessened by this arrangement. The ventilation at the western light is hardly considered but at the eastern light it is entirely blocked out. . .the lights are ill-adopted even for the requirements 1 2 of an anchorage light". In 1891 the Norman's Point Light House 3 was rebuilt on its old site by the Public Works Department. A fifth order dioptric accutling port light - installed some fifty-five feet above sea level, visible in clear weather at a distance of ten 4 miles was exhibited from the 1st April 1892.

While the Norman Point Light House was being improved even more radical changes were made at Kutubdia. The height of the lantern was increased from 110 to 121 feet and the old light which was fitfully visible only at a distance of 14 miles was replaced by a first class revolving white light visible for over twenty miles out

1 Govt, of Beng. to Chmn Port Comms. 28 May 1890, Port Trust Proc. 1890, K.W. 2 Admin. Rept. 1891-92, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1892, October 32-33. 3 Ibid. 4 . M. A. Bary, Sixty-Six years of the Port of Chitt. 1888-1954, Monthly Bulletin of the Port of Chitt. February I960. 10. 142 to sea, with much more powerful burners of 772 candle power. * The lighthouse was handed over by the Divisional Executive Engineer to the charge of its lighthouse keeper, and the new light 2 was first displayed on 1 January 1893.

Besides the two lighthouses on the coast, marks were provided at 3 the mouth of the Chittagong river. In 1892, the Patunga Point on the north bank was marked by a rigged iron mast 105 feet high 4 with a triangle at the mast-head while the south bank was marked 5 by a flagstaff. In 1906-07 to enable vessels to enter or leave the port at night two leading-lights were erected at the outer and inner bars.k These were provided by the Government of Bengal (the cost 7 to be debited to the pilotage fund) at an estimated cost of Rs 4, 275.

In order to show the rise and fall of water a tide guage was erected off J u.ldia Hill in May 1869./ 8 Four new automatic tide gauges were

1 descriptive Rept on the Kutubdia Light House, giving a brief account of the original as well as the new light of the operations connected with its erections of optical adjustments, as also of the necessary alteration to the Tower by J.H. Toogood - Executive Eng. Special Duty Kutubdia Light House, 7 February 1893 - Beng. Proc. Mne Dept 1893, May 1-2. See also in Port Trust Secy's Record Room (Chitt) a separate report. 2 Ibid. 3 A.G. Findley- Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal Directory, 1095. 4 See Table Appended - of Tables giving Particulars of buoys and landmarks - 1897. 5 A.G. Findley, Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal Directory, 1095. 6 Note by Port Officer Chitt. 2 May 1913, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. • 1913, May 55. 7 Admin. Rept. 1905-06, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1906, October 1. 8 Tables giving Particulars of Buoys and Landmarks on the Coasts and in The River and Harbours of Bengal also of the Floating Light Vessels. Hooghly River Approaches 1897, See Table Appended. 143

erected between 1906-1908. These tide gauges were placed at 2 Sadarghat, the jetties, the Gupta Khal and Juldia. Probably at about the same time an Anemometer was placed at Gupta Khal to give 3 the direction and force of wind.

4 River survey work at Chittagong was done by the S. L. Active 5 built and sent from Calcutta in 1884. The Port was also in 6 possession of a gig, built in Chittagong in 1879. This latter had been employed a great deal in taking soundings;after 1884 it 7 was replaced by the Active.

Till 1883 the port of Chittagong did not have the service of any g steam tug. Since the want of a tug was seriously felt by the steamers visiting the port the Commissioner of the Division that year came to an understanding with the Bassein Tug Company whereby they agreed to send one of their tugs to Chittagong but Q during the jute season only (during the cold season) . This

1 Note on revised estimate for revetment of River Karnafuli at Erosion A. by W.H. Neilson Port Engineer, 2 December 1908, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1909, October 1. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Chmn. Port. Comms. To Govt, of Beng. 14 November 1890, Beng. Proc. Mne (P. T), April, 5-6. 5 Admin. Rept. 1892-93, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1893, October, 33-34. 6 Chmn. Port. Comms. to Govt, of Beng. 14 November 1890, Port Trust Proc. 1890, April 5-6. 7 Ibid. 8 ■ Note by D.R. Lyall - Comm. Chitt. Divi. Steam Tug for the Port of Chitt - 15 June 1890, K.W. Notes. Port Trust P ro c. 1890, June 1, 9 Ibid. 144

arrangement proved very unsatisfactory as not only was the tug not permanent but it also remained anchored in the port and a ship visiting the port had generally to anchor and signal for the tug to get up steam. ^ In 1884, therefore the Port Officer of Chittagong addressed the Government strongly recommending the purchase of a steam tug for the port. He wrote, "I would beg to point out for the consideration of Government as to whether 2 the port itself might not be allowed to undertake this work”. At a later meeting of the local mercantile community a resolution was unanimously passed that the port should have a steam-tug 3 of its own. However, it appears that nothing happened till 1888 when with the formation of the Port Trust the Port Commissioners approached the Bassein Tug Company with the proposal that they should have a vessel permanently stationed at Chittagong. The Company was willing to do this provided their operation was subsidised. This the Port Commissioners were quite prepared to do, but the terms the Bassein Company asked could not be entertained, as they were deemed exhorbitant. Moreover, they only wished to place a small tug the Albert, built in 1877 for towage only - a tug ■which was without any appliances 4 for mooring works and had neither fire nor salvage pumps. In June 1889 therefore the Port Commissioners submitted an application to the Government for a loan of Rs, 1, 45, 000 the then estimated cost of constructing and bringing out a tug to Chittagong from England. The loan was eventually raised to Rs, 2, 00, 000 and the tug Gekko reached Chittagong on 29 June 1892. ^

1 Vice-Chmn, Port Comms, To Messrs. A.R. Price and Co. Ship-owners London 15 April 1893. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1893, Septem ber 30 and 31. 2 Note byD.R. Lyall Comm. Chitt. Division, Steam-Tug for the Port of Chitt 15 June 1890,K. W. Notes, Port Trust Proc. 1890, June 1-2. 3 Ibid. 4 Admin. Rept. 1892-93, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1893, October 33-34. 5 Admin. Rept. 1891-92, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1892, October 32-33. 6 Admin. Rept. 1892-93, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1892 October 33-34. 145

"The Gekko",to quote the Port Commissioners was a "powerful steam- tug (twin screws) fitted with complete fire and salvage gear for the help and assistance of vessels visiting Chittagong". It was, "a most powerful and useful boat and thoroughly efficient for any work, or to cope with casualties happening to vessels". ^ For the first few years however it was found that the Gekko had great difficulty in breaking the monopoly of the Bassein Tug Company's tug Mary on account of the commission of 10 to 15 per cent paid by that tug to the m asters of ships visiting Chittagong port and using 2 it. In 1893 the Vice-Chairman of the Port Commissioners addressed a letter to A.R. Price and Company - Ship-owners enquiring, "whether shipwoners usually allow their commander this commission. . . (and) if you will. . . obtain the opinion of other ship-owners", on the subject as, "the services of the port tug are not taken, owing to their being debarred from returning 10 to 15 3 per cent commission on the towage to the ship master". In reply the ship owners stated, "Our desire, as ship-owners, is to get our towage done on the lowest possible scale, and to prevent, as far as possible, any return commissions to the masters of our ship. . .and as the Port Commissioners' tug seems to be by far the most powerful vessel, we are quite disposed to do everything we can to divert business to it. . . (we) trust that the method adopted 4 will put an end to the system of taking illicit commission". A sa result of this measure by 1895 the Gekko did secure all the towage 5 of the port. The Gekko unlike the previous tug which used to tow

1 Vice-Chmn. Port Comms. to Messrs. A.R. Price & Co. Ship owners London, 15 April 1893. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept 1893, September 30-31. 2 Ibid. see also Admin. Rept. 1893-94, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1894, October 38-39.

3 Ibid. 4 Messrs. R. Price & Co. Ship-owners to E. Good Vice-Chmn. 10 May 1893, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1893, September 30-31.

5 Admin. Rept. 1894-95, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1895, October 12-19. 146 vessels from their mooring buoys to the outside Bar buoys and then cast off, towed a vessel (in the absence of a favourable wind) down off the Kutubdia Light House twenty-two miles from the Bar. ^ Besides towage the Gekko also took stores to the lighthouses and performed other works for the port like heaving up, shifting, and overhauling the fixed and swinging moorings. This last act was a saving on the port fund as the cost of hire of the Calcutta Port Commissioners’ anchor boat and expense of towage to and 2 from Calcutta was saved.

In 1891 the Port Officer of Chittagong pointed out to the Commissioner, Chittagong Division that a telegram line or telephone between Chittagong and Joaldia was a "matter of 3 great importance" since the signal-staff from the station of Juldia at the mouth of the river nine miles from Sadarghat could 4 not be seen m hazy weather. No action however was taken "in view of the numerous charges falling on the Port Fund. ” In 1906-07, a telephone exchange system was established by the Telegraph Department in the town of Chittagong between several important Government offices, banks and mercantile firms. The Railway Department and the Commissioners of the Port of Chittagong both took advantage of the new communication system. The Port Commissioners installed a line to their office on 5 payment of Rs 150 a year and in 1911-12 the Juldia telephone line

1 Vice-Chmn Port Comms. to Messrs. A.R. Price and Co. Ship Owners London, 15 April 1893, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1893, September 30-31. 2 Admin. Rept. 1893-93, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1893, October, 33-34. 3 Port Officerto Port Comms. 1891, Port Trust Proc. 1891.

4 Admin Rept. 1906-07, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1907, November 6 .

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was extended from the Harbour M asters' Office to the Senior Harbour M asters' house and thence to the new Port Office with • i switches at the two first-named places. The Railway authorities took four connections to the Head Office, at Chittagong 2 Station, at the jetties, and at Pahartali. Further internal links 3 were sanctioned in November 1910, and by 1912 private short distance telephone links had been established between the jetty superintendent's room, the assistant Jetty Superintendent's room the Chief Clerks Room and the offices of the four main sheds or godowns at the jetties, and the hydraulic machinery 4 foreman's office. This installation was erected by the Locomotive 5 Department with an exchange in the Jetty Superintendent's Office.

The absence of navigational aids at the beginning of the period under study had been all the more keenly felt due to the presence of bars in the river Karnaphuli. The Karnaphuli river due to the nature of its catchment basin and the practice of 'slash and burn* on the hills cultivation - carried a considerable quantity of silt and consequently no permanent deep water channel could exist without artificial means like dredging. Moreover the banks of the river particularly at the location of the port installations were not stable so that river protection works were needed. From time to time the question of river improvement was taken up, though without much result. River

1 Admin Rept. 1911-12, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1912, September 26-30. 2 Board's Letter to Agent 1905, 32. 3 Agent's Memo 5 November 1910, Rly Index P.M . 1910. 4 Jetty Superintendent's Letter No. 1901, 29 February 1912, Rly Index P.M . 1912. 5 Ibid. 149

improvement had first been considered indeed, as early as 1893. In that year J.H. Apjohn submitted a report drawing attention to the serious erosion in the great bend and advocating immediate protective measures, * but unfortunately no action was 2 taken. In August 1900 J.H . Apjohn made another study of the 3 Port of Chittagong, and stated most forcibly that it would be useless to attempt any improvement of the Port without first taking steps to stop further erosion of the right bank below Chittagong and thereafter to remove the bars by a combination of dredging and river training. His estimate for the complete project was ten lakhs of rupees, but such an outlay was far beyond the resources of the Port Commissioners or the willingness to act of the Government of Bengal and the matter was again dropped. In November of the same year M essrs. Sir. A. Rendel and Company Consulting Engineers to the Assam Bengal Railway and Company advocated experimental dredging of the bars at a cost of Rs 60, 000 5 to Rs 80, 000 but nothing followed.

In the meantime the London Tea Companies and the Indian Tea Association began to exert pressure "to induce the Government of Bengal to make such improvements at the port of Chittagong as will enable full-sized ocean-going steamers to call there with ease and

1 J.H. Apjohn 1 s note on the erosion of the right bank of the river Karnaphuli, 7 December 1893, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept, 1894, February 28-29. 2 Ibid. 3 Report dated 14 September 1900 on measures that might be adopted for the improvement of the Port of Chitt. by the removal of the bars from the Karnaphuli River by J.H . Apjohn, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1900, October 112. 4 Buchanan, 22. 5 Ibid. 150

safety”. The steamer companies were also not idle and in 1902 a firm of solicitors on behalf of the shippers wrote, "As you are probably aware, a service of steamers arranged for under the auspices of our clients has been running from Chittagong. . .

Only steamers of an extremely special design however, combining large carrying capac tty with a minimum draught can carry on this service, and the number of these available is necessarily small. The port is still therefore practically closed to steamers of the necessary capacity of ordinary construction and normal draught and although for the moment the service of steamers mentioned above suffices to meet the requirements of traffic it will be otherwise when the Assam-Bengal Railway is opened to the Brahmaputra Valley (which will be in about a year’s time) and the volume of produce coming down to Chittagong is (as we are informed will be the case) increased three or perhaps four 2 fold". Again however, nothing ensued. It was thus not until 1904 and the Visit by the Viceroy Curzon to the port, when political as well as economic motives for improvement came into play, that anything positive was done. For then, it will be recalled the Viceroy offered Government assistance to the 3 work of river training and dredging.

After Lord Curzon’s promised financial assistance to the Port of Chittagong J.R . Bell was deputed by the Government to report

1 Direct Shipment of Tea from Chitt. to London Rept. Indian Tea Asso. 1900. 30. 2 Messrs. Sanderson, Adkin, Lee, and Eddie Solicitors to Govt. , of Beng. 20 December 1901. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1902, April 36. 3 See Chapter IV 151

on the whole question of conserving and improving the navigation tv 1 of the Karikhuli. Bell in his report advised that 4, 000 feet down • z to the Kumar Khal should be revetted in the next two years, and that the cost of another 6 , 0 0 0 feet of revetment should be provided in the budget for though he hoped that revetment down to Kumar Khal might prove to be sufficient.

Bell had put the total cost of both revetment works at five lakhs of rupees of which he thought half should fall on the Railway budget 3 and half on the contemplated Imperial Grant. The Commissioners accepted the united opinion of M essrs. J.H . Apjohn and Bell that the revetment of the cutting bend below the Double Moorings to Kumar Khal should be carried out at once, any further extension 4 depending upon the experience gained. In the event however, about 1, 000 feet of the first 4, 000 feet, i.e. down to Mohesh Khal, was later appropriated by the Railway Company for the erection of 5 their third jetty for which they assumed responsibility. By 1906- 07 a length of about 5, 700 feet on the right bank of the river below the railway terminal jetties had been revetted, and in the light of the experience gained it was decided to extend the revetment to a 3 ^ distance of about 3 4 miles or 19, 150 feet, from just below the 7 railway jetties to the oil tank at Gupta Khal.

1 J.R. Bell's Memorandum 12 August 1904, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1904, September 22. 2 As Bell thought that it would not be possible to procure stone easily. 3 Buchanan, 24. 4 Buchanan, 25. 5 Chmn. Port Comm s. to Govt, of E.B.A. 11 April 1906, E . B. A. Proc. PWD Mne 1906, May 30.

6 Admin. E.B.A. 1906-07, See Admin Rept. 1906-07, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne,, 1907, November 6 . 7 Port Officer's note on revised estimate for revetment for River Karnafuli at Erosion A ,11 March 1909 - E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1909, October 4. 152

By October 1912, only about 1, 600 feet remained to complete the revetment to the Burmah Oil Company terminal at Gupta Khal. ^

•

Revetment might take care of the swinging, cutting action of the river and protect the shore line on which the port was built, but it could not deal with the second action of the river, the depositing of large quantities of silt, and indeed the building of jetties and embankments in some cases led to the unwanted shoaling of the river or diversion of the deep water channels. It was necessary therefore to take the dredging of the river in hand, no less than its training.

The main obstacle to the accessibility of the Port at all seasons of the year lay in the river bars. These till 1910 were three, the 2 inner bar, the outer bar, and the ring bar, but in that year the 3 Gupta Crossing bar made its first appearance. The Outer bar was at the entrance of the river Karnaphub'from the sea. The inner bar was situated below the junction of the Patunga and 4 Juldia channels. The ring bar was above the railway jetty but 5 below the Sadarghat jetty.

Just how much of a barrier to navigation these bars formed is made clear by the figures for the depth of water in the river

1 Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India, 8 October 1912. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1913, June 12. 2 Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt, of Beng. 15 May 1900, Beng. Proc Mne Dept. 1900, July 42. 3 Buchanan - 22. 4 Ibid. 5 Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt, of Beng. 15 May 1900, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1900, July 42. 153

established by survey in 1900. Thus at the outer bar the water shoaled from thirty, to twenty four and finally to as little as twelve feet across a two hundred and fifty feet wide bar. Inside the bar there was at least twenty foot of water as far as the black buoy marking the inner bar, a much larger shoal stretching some

3 , 0 0 0 feet up the river over which the water shallowed to as little as eleven feet. Above the inner bar there was again twenty foot of water or more, except at the Gupta Khal crossing where the depth was two or three feet less. * The ring bar was an uneven shoal and had at places only twelve feet of water, but as this bar was above the railway jetty and the Double Moorings, it 2 was not of such importance as the other two. Since the rise of tides varied greatly during the year, during neap tides no vessels 3 drawing more than 18' 6 " could safely enter or leave the harbour and it was imperative after October for steamers and ships

drawing over 2 0 feet draft to complete their loading outside the bar

In 1905 after Curzon's promise of help the Port Commissioners in 5 consultation with the Port Engineer and the Public Works Secretary to the Government of Bengal recommended the purchase of a combined suction and ladder bucket dredger. This was £ subsequently sanctioned and the dredger Karnaphuli I arrived 7 at Chittagong on 5 M arch 1907. One d red g er w as soon found to

1 Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt, of Beng . 15 May 1900 - Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1900, July 42. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 M essrs. M. David & Co. Narayanganj - to Govt, of Beng. 30 January 1903 Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1903, May 6 . 5 Buchanan, 34.

6 Ordinary Meeting of the Port Comms. 6 April 1906 - E.B .A . Proc. PWD Mne 1906, August 28.

7 Admin. Rept. 1906-07, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1907, November. 6 . 154

be insufficient to tackle both the main bars particularly in view

of the fact that from 1 9 0 8 some shoaling was discovered at the jetties which also required periocfic attention from the dredger. To make matters worse in December 1909 M essrs. Bell and Neilson reported that the Gupta Chur Channel over towards the left bank of the river, opposite the jetties, was cutting and deepening itself thus reducing the efficiency of the main river. To deal with this development, probably caused by the jetty building and river training, the Government of E. B. and Assam applied to 2 the Government of India for assistance in closing the bye-channel. 3 This was refused and in the end the local Government had to ask the Port Commissioners to carry out the work on the Gupta Chur from the revetment grants, with a consequent curtailment "in the current year’s Revetment programme to provide for the 4 increased expenditure".

But while one problem was thus being dealt with, the Port Officer of Chittagong had reported in 1911 on the total inadequacy of the single dredger. "For any permanent improvement on either bar," he wrote, "the dredger must work whole time on one or the other. But as the jetties are found to be shoaling rapidly she will be obliged to work at the jetties when vacant and if the dredger has to be laid up for any length of time, all the improvement made might be undone in the course of a few months. Under the circumstances, I think one dredger is not sufficient to tackle both the bars and I 5 consider a second dredger is urgently required". On the suggestion

1 Inspection note by J.R. Bell - Consulting Engineer 6 D ecem ber 1909, E.B.A. Proc PWD Mne 1910, January 38. 2 Govt, of E.B.A. to Govt, of India, 17 January 1910,E.B.A. Proc. ' PWD Mne 1910, January 40. 3 Govt, of India to Govt. of E.B.A ., 16 February 1910, E.B.A . Proc. PWD Mne , 1910, January 46. 4 Govt, of E.B.A. to Chmn Port Comms. 20 April 1910,E . B. A. Proc. PWD Mne , 1910, January 50. 5 Report of the Port Officer Chittagong on the dredging for the year 1911-12, 26 September, Appendix V, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1912. 155

of J.R . Bell a special committee was appointed, which reported in June 1912 recommending that a turn screw sea-going suction dredger should be bought with hoppers of 2 , 0 0 0 tons capacity and capable of dredging to a depth of 40 feet. ^ The report of the 2 Committee was sent to Bell but unfortunately with his death and the annulment of the partition of Bengal the whole matter was dropped. The Government of Bengal took its revenge upon Chittagong, refusing, in a letter to the Government of India, to make any provision for a second dredger which was in fact a reversal of that followed by the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam, Mit does not appear to His Excellency in Council that the direct Provincial interests in the development of the Chittagong Port are sufficiently strong to justify him in devoting for its upkeep at the expense of the rest of the province so large a proportion 3 of the recurring surplus revenues". Towards the end of 1913 the question of a second dredger was again opened, the twin issues discussed and rediscussed being whether Chittagong required a second dredger and if so, what type of dredger, 4 but without coming to any decision. In 1915 the Bengal Government reported to the Government of India, "From the trade statistics. . .the Port of Chittagong has shown up to the year 1913-14 a remarkable tendency towards expansion. Since then, however, there has been an equally remarkable set back. To a certain extent this may be due to the war, but it is due even more to the fact that the Port Commissioners have been unable with the single dredger at their disposal to keep open the entrances of the 5 port". The Government of Bengal however, made clear that it

1 Buchanan - 35. 2 Buchanan - 35.

3 Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India 8 October 1912, Beng. Proc. • Mne Dept. 1913, June 13. 4 Buchanan, 36. 5 Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India 17 September 1915, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept 1916, June 13. 156

would not give more than the Rs 1, 50, 000 which had been sanctioned by the Government of India * for the purpose but that it was to the interest of the Government of India to improve the condition of the river: MThe Assam Bengal Railway involves the Government of India in a net annual loss of about 30 lakhs of rupees and that unless a second dredger be obtained at a very early date, there is every prospect that this annual loss will 2 increase instead of diminish1’. While the two Governments wrangled over the apportionment of costs, however, the condition of the river went from bad to worse and the authorities of the Assam Bengal Railway Company saw their Chittagong trade vanish 3 before their eyes.

The last major problem which Chittagong faced as a growing port and railway terminus was one fundamental of course to all ports - the provision of an adequate supply of skilled and unskilled labour. This problem was particularly severe in Chittagong, because of the economic condition of the people of the district and region. B. Foley in a report on labour in Bengal explained, ’’The whole of the districts included in the Province of Eastern Bengal are non recruiting districts, the natives of these districts are too prosperous

1 Govt, of Beng. to India 17 September 1915, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept 1916, June 13. Govt, of India on the 9th April 1913 had informed the Government of Bengal that ’’Govt, of India are anxious that the interests of the Port should not suffer by the disinclination or inability of the Local Govt, to provide the necessary fund.. .they have decided therefore to make an assignment of Rs 75, 000 annually for five years to Provincial revenues. With effect from the year 1913-14 on the understanding that a subsidy to the over and above (i.e. another 75, 000) this amount. . .(which) may be necessary must be found from Provincial revenue". Govt, of India to Govt, of Beng. 9 April 1913, Beng. Proc. MneT.913, April 13. ^

2 Ibid. 3 A second dredger was not obtained before 1928, Bary. 157

(to leave their homes in search of work). . .and in many of them the more arduous cultivation work is performed by imported labour". * This was true for the districts of Noakhali, Chittagong and Tippera 2 to a lesser or greater extent, the most acute shortage of labour being felt in Chittagong. Where good crops and brisk trade 3 maintained the people in prosperity. That being the case the sort of wages payable in East Bengal for jetty and railway works did not attract them. Those who did need to seek paid labouring jobs, or a supplement to their income from over-small land holdings?found their most profitable outlet either in permanent or more usually in temporary employment in Burma, a very under-populated area where rice cultivation was rapidly being expanded. All through the cold weather thousands of reapers travelled overland to harvest the rice and usually could afford to return by steamer from Akyab at the end of the season. The Burma census tables for 1891showed as many as 58, 740 men and 16, 273 women, who were born in Chittagong living in that 4 province. To meet the labour problem in Chittagong labour had 5 therefore to be imported mainly from Bihar and Oudh. The great

1 B. Foley - Report on Labour in Bengal, 38. 2 In Noakhali the labour problem was less acute. As it was the 'poorest district of the division1, (Beng. Admin. 1892-93, 345) "the offer of 5 and 6 annas a day attract a sufficient amount of local labour". But even in Noakhali it appeared that there was a small scale eflux of labour to Arakan and to Bakarganj for the harvest season. Beng. Proc. G. Dept. (Misc) 1893 Nov-Dee,Dec 8 . Tippera - In Tippera there was a fair supply of labour. But this supply was mainly due to the presence of gangs of up-country la b o u re rs. 3 Beng. Admin - 1892-93, 345. 4 Census of India, 1891» 81. 5 Foley, 38, 43. 158

majority of these immigrants were employed on work involving hard physical labour, such as earth-work and road construction, or as porters orpalki-bearers. * Cleaners and sweepers were also imported from up country to maintain the sanitation of the towns 2 and cities, by the Municipalities.

These coolies and labourers were recruited by the recruiting officer who gave them an advance on their being recruited and sent them to Chittagong from the recruiting district accompanied by a Sardar or headman. These labourers were generally easy 3 to manage, steady and hard working. While labourer had usually to be imported from outside Bengal to meet the need of the port a lesser problem was faced in getting local people to accept the

better paid jobs of darwans (guards) and clerks and till 1 9 0 6 m o st 4 of them were found working sidy by side with the up-countrymen. That year however Robinson the new Jetty Superintendent on one pretext or other dismissed these local men and replaced them by up-country men mostly recruited from Calcutta. Himself being 5 an ex-Kidderpore-dockyard employee he seemed to have been biased against the local people and believed that, "it is not possible to get local men who are sufficiently trustworthy". However later events suggest that his own honesty was questionable, and that of the men he had recruited, too. He had to admit that seven of the new durwans had to be prosecuted for theft.^

1 Census of India 1901, VI, 142. 2 Ibid. 3 Foley, Appendix 4. See also H. Mukherjee, The Early History of the East India Railway 197. 4 List of staff whose services have been dispensed with from October 1906. Filed by Robinson, Jetty Superintendent 2 January 1908. E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1909. February 60. 5 Proceedings of the Joint Enquiry into the Fire at No.Ill Jetty held on the 18/30 December , 2 & 4 January 1908, Mr. Robinson recalled 2 January 1908, E.B.A. Proc. PWD (Mne) 1909, February 60.

6 Ibid. 159

The difficulty in getting reliable darwans remained in Chittagong and for a time Pensioners were tried. But they were found too old for their job and even then dicf not stay long at their job. *

In the Railway workshop at Pahartali most of the skilled men employed 2 were up-country men. These men, as well as the darwans in the jetties lived in the workshop and jetty premises, as did the other staff whose presence was required near the jetty. However, the quarters built for them were insufficient and were purely temporary. In 1907 therefore the Commissioners are found pointing out to the Railway authorities that staff quarters "are urgently required as it has been found absolutely necessary with the growing demand for night work for steamers to have the staff at hand and on the 3 spot”. In 1910 therefore it is found that sanction was given for the 4 erection of permanent quarters.

The questibn which naturally arises at this point is to what extent these imported workers permanently settled in Chittagong. In Bengal as a whole the census returns show that the extent to which permanent settlement took place varied a great deal according to circumstances and to the caste to which the migrants belonged. Brahmans and Rajputs who came chiefly as priests, constables, jail-warders, zamindars or sweepers, peons and the like, very seldom settled in Bengal. Earth-workers, palki bearers, syces,

1 Note on Joint Enquiry into fire at No.Ill Jetty by Agent A. B. Rly. 5 February 1908. E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1909, February 62. 2 Loco Superintendent to Agent A. B. Rly 27 February 1911, Rly Index P.M . 1911. 3 .Extract of Port Comms. Reso. 17, in Agent’s Letter to Govt, of E.B.A . 16 September 1907, Govt, of India Rly Proc (Const) 1908, January 58 3 4 Chief Eng. to Agent 30 May 1910, Rly Index O. M. 1910. See also B. L. C. Johnson ’Site and Urban Regions of Chittagong: Oriental Geographer, 1957, 123. 160

and mill hands also as a class seldom settled in Bengal. Amongst up-country men who came for domestic service or as petty shopkeepers the number who became domiciled in Bengal was larger. Chamars and s,weepers as a rule were imported by municiplaities with their families. The pay they got was good and there was no inducement for them to return to their old homes. *

But generally it was found that though the struggle for existence was far harder,up-country than in Bengal Proper, few if any, of the people who came in search of work did so with the intention of settling permanently. The reason for this was that the people who came from Bihar and the United Provinces were Hindus. If they m arried abh©ad they were in danger of finding themselves looked upon as a sort of lodfccast and of being debarred from intercourse with their own people. Moreover the sole object of those labourers was - to make money with which to eke out the family income at home. Once they had sufficient money they cherished the hope of 2 spending the rest of their life in their native village. The coming of the railway merely added to their ability to return. It seems to have been the case in Chittagong, however, that the skilled workmen at Pahartali brought their families with them, and therefore 3 probably settled in the town.

While the labour for low paid jobs was recruited from outside Chittagong,mainly from the Ganges Valley, the higher paid posts were all held by Europeans. The post of Port Officer, the most important official in the administration of the port, was reserved by

1 Census of India 1901? VI, 1, 142-4. 2 ■ C ensus of India 1901, VI, I, 142-4. 3 Loco. Superintendent to Agent A. B. Rly. 27 February 1911, Rly Index, P.M. 1911. 161

the Government of India from 1908 onwards for officers of the Royal Indian Marine. Prior to 1880 the pilot establishment of Chittagong had consisted of Indians only. Gradually, however, their place 1 .... 2 was taken by Europeans. Justifying this policy it was stated that the ignorance of the English language among the Indian pilots, who did not have much education, was considered a constant source of difficulty and inconvenience to the m asters of vessels using the port. Moreover it was stated that since the tonnage of the sailing ships and steamers visiting the port was yearly increasing men of more nautical skill and Europeans, were necessary to 3 manoeuvre them in the confined w aters of the K arnaphuli. Similarly when a dredger was purchased for the port it was resolved that all the dredger staff should be European. Europeans 4 were also appointed in the lighthouses. The first jetty was not

constructed till 1 8 9 9 so that there was no native staff to draw on to man the cranes and so on. The senior staff who were taken on, however, were all Europeans and it was ohly from the poat of Shed Officer downward that any Indians were employed.

The policy of Europeanization of the port services was said to have been aimed at getting better quality officers. But to secure those officers the authorities had to pay quite high wages. Perhaps if that same pay had been offered to Indians it would not have been difficult to find qualified men. It might seem appropriate here to quote the following lines from the newspaper Jyoti: "As regards employment

1 See Chapter VI 2 Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India, 12 March 1886, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1887, January-March, February 3-8. 3 Note by E. Good Vice-Chmn Chitt. Port. Trust 26 June 1895- ’ Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1895, November 51-52.

4 Admin. Kept. 1891-92, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1892, October 32-33, Footnote -"it was found necessary to dispense with th$ services of the Assitant Light-keeper Mobabuth Ali. . .& one R. S.N. Sevami," as a "more educated man has been placed in (their) stead". 162

under the State, natives naturally have a prior claim, to foreigners. But our English rulers act as though this were not the case. There are five native pilots for the Chittagong port, with a European Superintendent. The highest pay for the natives is Rs 100, while the superintendent gets Rs 400 and yet there is nothing to show that the European works harder than the natives, or that the natives cannot do the work done by the European. The Superintendent is soon going to have European Assistant on Rs 250 to Rs 300. Might not a native have been selected at a gain both of economy and efficiency?"^ The following lines from a note of E. Good Port Officer of Chittagong may be quoted in support of the statement made by the Jyoti. E. Good wrote in connection with the employment of pilots in 1895 "I. . .beg to point out that it is extremely unlikely that men in the coasting trade would leave their vessels to engage as leadsmen at Chittagong, on Rs 20 a month which at the present does not represent the value of the wage of a seacunic or tindal in any of the coasting steamer services, where the usual pay is Rs 30 to 40 a month and rations found. In the small native coasting vessels serangs get from Rs 25 to 30 per m ensum . . .1 would suggest that in future the pilots for this port should be recruited from Europeans serving in the mercantile marine. . .1 opine it will not be feasible to get such men under Rs 150 2 per mensum rising to Rs 300".

In concluding it can be remarked that Chittagong port generally lacked a definite development policy or the requisite financial backing to carry one out. The port of Chittagong during the period

1 Jyoti 14 July 1904, B.N.NR. 1904. 2 Note by E. Good Vice-Chmn, 26 June 1895, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1895, November 51-52. 163

under study came under three different Governments, the Government of India, the Government of Bengal and the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam who'se various attitudes towards the developments of the port differed enormously. The Government of Bengal held that "the maintenance of the Port of Chittagong is a matter of comparatively minor interest to the greater part of Bengal". * To the Government of Eastern Bangal and Assam, "the improvement of Chittagong port is an important factor in the 2 development of this Province". But it was the Government of India which held the real key to the development of the port and that showed itself more or less indifferent to its fate, refusing "to undertake an unlimited liability on account of the improvement 3 to the Chittagong Port".

The development of Chittagong was not a technical problem but a matter of will. As Sir George Buchanan pointed out in his report "there is no engineering difficulty in making the Karnaphuli river fit for navigation by the largest class of vessels but that it will be necessary to face a considerable expenditure". Before venturing on such a work he felt that the Government must be clear in its policy towards the port of Chittagong, for, "if it is decided to make Chittagong a first class port, arrangements may be made for 4 carrying out this work and procuring dredging plant".

1 Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India 8 October 1912, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1913. June 13. 2 Govt, of E.B. & Assam to Govt, of India, 17 January 1910, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne. 1910, January 40. 3 Govt, of India to Govt, of E.B. A.. 20-21, March 1906, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1906, April 5. 4 Buchanan. 39. 164

In the twenty years from 1892, the port of Chittagong was transformed from a port with no facilities to a port able to accommodate ocean going steamer. But the transformation had been a slow, grudging andpiece-mea! one, brought to an abrupt halt, moreover3once the backing of the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was lost by the annulment of Partition. Had that political revolution not occurred it might well have been the case, as Sir George Buchanan and Sir Francis Spring were to hold, that with a steady progressive policy "Chittagong would today have been in the same rank as Calcutta and Rangoon". ^

* Buchanan 13. Sir Francis J.E. Spring - was for over ten years a member,Madras Legislative Council and was connected for 15-j years with*cieveloprnent and management of the Port of Madras as Chairman and Chief Engineer of the Port Authority. He was also the consulting engineer of the Port of Chittagong. ’ Sir George Buchanan was the Chairman and Chief Engineer of the Rangoon Port Trust for fourteen years from 1901. He received the gold medal from the Institution of Civil Engineers in 1 9 1 6 . 165

CHAPTER VI

Chittagong Port Administration & Finance

PORT ADMINISTRATION

The basic objective of the administration of any organisation is to secure and deploy all the resources necessary and available for achieving the given task in such a way so as to maximise the cost- effectiveness and efficient use of the resources. Such a definition of administration necessarily presupposes unity of purpose, good planning and a goal-oriented deployment of resources in accordance with the plan. Over and above these purposes in the case of a public utility organisation like a port, the total benefit to the society being served by it should naturally be one of the overriding considerations in working out the cost benefit balance sheet. Chittagong port being the natural gateway for the external trade of Eastern Bengal and Assam should have been developed and administered in a way designed to bring optimum benefit to the economy of this area. But except for the years between 1905-1912, that is during the existence of the separate province of East Bengal and Assam, during the entire period under study Chittagong Port was treated merely as a feeder and subordinate port of Calcutta. Since in the scheme of things neither the Government of Bengal nor the Government of India perceived any more important role for Chittagong than that of a subordinate port, its administration suffered from a measure of neglect. The analysis that follows in this chapter serves to confirm that other considerations were given priority over the economic and social benefits which an efficient port of its own would have given to East Bengal and Assam and that sufficient importance was not accorded to the growth and proper administration of the Port of Chittagong. The fact that there was not a single study of the administration of the port during the whole period between 1 8 9 0 - 1 9 1 2 further goes to confirm the ignorance and neglect from which the administration of the Port suffered. There seems ample basis for 166

the observation made by Sir George Buchanan in 1918, "Under an administration such as has obtained for the last 25 years at • 1 Chittagong no port could flourish".

The first attempt to develop an administrative and policy making system for the port of Chittagong was taken in 1887 as a response to a sudden and almost accidental growth in the volume of trade passing through it, and took the form of the creation of a Port Trust under the Chittagong Port Commissioners Act of that year. Summarising the rationale for the establishment of a Port Trust the Municipal Department of the Government of Bengal wrote in 1885 "a Port Trust could provide proper towage and other conveniences for the port, . . . could acquire landed property and deal with other questions which are considered beyond the scope of a Government Department. It is therefore thought advisable to take measures for 2 the establishment of a Port Trust". After a false start in 1887 the Port Trust was lawfully constituted by Bengal Government 3 notifications Nos. 35 and 36 Marine of 15 May 1888 for the 4 management of the affairs of the Port.

1 Buchanan 16. 2 Govt, of Beng. Municipal Dept, to the Govt, of Beng. Legislative Dept. 21 December 1885, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept 1887, January- March, March 3-24. 3 W. C. to Govt, of Beng. 20 September 1886, Port Trust Proc, October 1889, K.W. Proc. 4 The first notification appointing the Commissioners,made on 7 , September 1887, was not legal as the law itself did not come into force in the absence of a statutory notification (section I of Act IV B.C. of 1887, lays down that the Act shall come into force on such date as the Local Govt, may by notification d ire ct it to bring into force Admin. Rept. Port Trust Proc, 1890, October 3-4. See also Beng. Leg. Council Debate 1886, 112, 115-120. 167

The Chittagong Port Commissioners Act of 1887 provided for nine Commissioners, six to be nominated by the local Government and three to be elected by a nominated electorate consisting of local firms nominated by the Bengal Government with the previous sanction of the Governor General in Council. * Commissioners served for a term of two years. During the deliberations prior to the establishment of the Port Trust, the Commissioner of Chittagong Division had written in 1884, "We cannot expect the smaller native merchants to take much interest in projects that are for the benefit 2 of European Shipping". He had correctly guaged both the priorities of the colonial power and the reactions of Indian firms: the Chittagong Port Trust inevitably developed as an instrument for the promotion and preservation of the interests of European shipping and commercial concerns. The composition of the first board of Commissioners emphasised the point: all six nominated members were 3 Europeans, the three elected members were Indians. The gomposition of the board changed considerably over the years, in part because of the introduction of more officials into the group of nominated members, but the European dominance remained unchallenged and indeed was strengthened by changes in the electorate nominated by

1 Act No. IV of 1887 - The Chittagong Port Commissioners' Act 1887, Acts of the Legislative Council of the Lt. Gov, of Beng. 1887 to 1,890, 18-19. 2 Comm. Chitt. Div.. to Govt, of Beng. 20 October 1884, Beng Mne Proc. 1887, March 3-20. 3 The first board of nominated Commissioners was formed of the following persons: (l) D.R. Lyall, Esquire (Divisional Commissioner, Chitt. Chairman, (2 )E. Good, Vice-Chairman; (3) W. Warden, (4) J.L . Willcox, (5) C. Gairdner, ( 6 ) C.A. Mills. The elected Commissioners were, (7) Babu Nittyananda Ray, ( 8 ) Babu Durgadas D as, (9) H ajee N asoo M alum . B ary, 1. 168

Government. The first electorate consisted of eleven firms of which four were Hindu, four Muslim and three European firms. Such an electorate could not have \ieen expected to and did not in fact return any European elected Commissioner. As a result the Lieutenant Governor made efforts to influence the voting pattern. He “ ordered that so far as was legal each section of the electors should be given the opportunity of selecting a representative, each elector being given a number of votes equal to the number of vacancies to be filled, which votes might be plumped all on one candidate or distributed. He further ordered that two of the six Government nominees should be Europeans, so long as two at least of the elected 2 members were "natives". Government’s anxiety to promote European commercial interests in the administration of the port became even more obvious with the gradual introduction of more and more European firms into the extended list of electorates. By

1 (l) Messrs. Bulloch Brothers, rice exporter, and jute importer (2) M e s s rs M. David & Co. jute ex p o rter (3) M essrs. Ralli Brothers, jute exporter (4) M essrs Krist Das Kundu, salt importer, rice exporters and brig owners (5) Babu Raj Chandra Sen - salt importers (6 ) M essrs. Haji Masu Malum Co, Rice exporter and brig owner (7) M essrs. Essah Sali Mahamed & Sons, rice exporter (8 ) Messrs Visram Ibrahim Co, rice exporter and kerosese oil im p o rte rs (9) Babu Kristo Kumar Ghosal, salt importers and brig owner (10) M essrs. Ram Kamal Ram Ballabh Saha, salt importers and general merchants (11) Haji Abdul Malum, brig owners Comm. Chitt. Div. to Govt, of Beng. 9 May 1904, Beng. Proc. Mne 1904, June 70.

2 Comm. Chitt. Div. to Govt, of Beng. 6 January 1893, Beng. Proc. Mne 1893, January 46. 169

1904 out of the fourteen electors a majority were Europeans. Electorates were so successfully manipulated that in 1908 only one 2 • Indian member was elected.

All six nominated members of the Trust were Europeans throughout 3 the period under study. Initially one or more was taken from the European firms based at Chittagong but over the years the domination of Government Officials became more complete.

With the formation of the Port Trust in 1888 the Commissioners were gradually entrusted with the management of the different departments of the port, though the full application of the Act was delayed until 1889. Thus in April 1889 the Port Commissioners were appointed to

1 List of Electors (1) M essrs. Bulloch Brothers, rice and jute exporters (2) The British Indian Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. (3) The B urm ah Oil Co. (4) M essrs. M. David & Co. , jute exporter and salt importer (5) The Asiatic Steam Navigation Co. (6 ) M essrs. Ralli Brothers, jute, and cotton exporter (7) M essrs. Finlay Muir & Co., general merchant and shippers (8 ) The Clan Line Steamer Co. (9) The P la n te rs 1 Stores and Agency Co., mercantile agents (10) M essrs. Krishna Das Nityananda Rai, salt importers and brig owners (11) M essrs. Ram Kamal Ram Ballabh Saha, salt importers and general merchants (12) M essrs. Krishna Kumar Ghosal & Co, salt importers and brig ow ners 2 The three elected members of the Port Trust were: (1) J.L. Brown, Esq., Manager, Messrs. Bulloch Brothers & Co. (2)A.R. Leishman, Esq. Agent M essrs. Finlay Muir & Co., Agent Clan Line (3) Babu Nil Krishna Roy, member of the firm of M essrs. Krishna Das Nittyananda Roy, merchant - Notification by the Govt, of E.B. and Assam 27 July 1908 E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1909, Sep. 35. 3 Curiously enough initially Babu Nityanando Roy was made the Vice- President of the first Board, but for reasons that could not be discovered his appointment was declared nul and void on legal grounds. He was not included even among the ordinary nominated members. Keep with Office Note 1890, July - Port Trust Proc. 1890 . 170 perform the duties of conservator of the port under Sec. 7 of Act X of 1889, * and in May they were given power under the same Act to 2 collect and administer the port dues. On 6 May 1889 they were further entrusted with the management of the Pilots and Pilotage 3 F und s.

In the discharge of these duties the Commissioners proved quite efficient. They effectively reduced the port dues - which had been higher than in any other port in India and therefore detrimental to the interest of the trade of the port of Chittagong. They also compelled the Local Government to make a larger contribution from the Pilotage 4 Fund to the Port Fund, and as conservators secured the financial help of the Imperial Government for dredging the river Karnaphuli 5 and carrying out revetment works. Nevertheless, since many of the

members respresented commercial firms whose interests at times clashed

with the larger interests of the port, at the end of the day it was the

port that suffered materially.

Moreover, the authority given to the Port Commissioners was very limited. Sir George Buchanan, in his 1918 report on the development of the port of Chittagong notes "The policy of Port Administration adopted in India is similar to that in other parts of the Empire, viz, the creation of corporate bodies with functions and powers granted

1 Admin Dept. 1901-02, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1902, November 52. - Footnote - It is significant to note here that the full operation of . the law was delayed by one year and during this period the Port Trust could not be fully operational. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Discussed later on in the chapter. 5 See Chapter V 171

by legislation, who are permitted to work out their own salvation, " But that salvation in practice was a narrowly circumscribed one. The legislation from which the Chittagong Port Trust derived most of its powers and functions was not very condusive to the rapid development and efficient administration of the Port. The Chittagong Port Commissioners Act of 1887, which created the Port Trust for the management of the affairs of the port, gave only limited powers to the Commissioner while placing the Trust under the dual administrative and financial control of the Government of India and the Government of Bengal (or for a while in 1906-1912 the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam). Thus according to section

6 6 of the Act the Port Commissionericould undertake new works only up to a limit of Rs, 5, 000. For estimated costs exceeding Rs 5, 000 the work could not be undertaken without the prior sanction of the Local Government and where the estimate exceeded Rs 10, 000 the work could not be commenced without previous sanction of the 2 Government of India. Under Sec.5, three of the nine Port Commissioners were elected, but the Local Government required the previous sanction of the Governor General in Council in appointing the electoral body, which thus suffered from a double measure of official control. Every change in the electorate due to resignation or other causes needed to be approved by the Governor General, yet the Government of India being so remote was not likely to have detailed information either about the aptitudes of candidates or of the special needs of the port and its administration. Without any close understanding of what was a minor port the Government's intervention could contribute little positive while ensuring financial uncertainty and inevitable delay. Similarly, the local Government also exercised certain powers which it seems could

1 Buchanan 2. 2 Rules.Bye- laws,Regulations and Notification Relating to the Port of Chittagong - 1896 - 33, see also Port. Comms. Act 1887, 39. 172

only retard the development and hindered the day to day administration o£ the port. The Port Commissioners were precluded . r by Sec. 62 from employing any servant (except artisans, porters and labourers) without the previous sanction of the Local Government. * Under Sec. 12 previous sanction of the Local G overnm ent w as req u ire d to purchase, sell or lease any movable 2 or immovable property. All acts and proceedings of the Commissions were subject to the approval of the Local Government 3 who could cancel, suspend or modify any act or proceeding . All these restrictive provisions reflect adversely on the confidence of the Government in the ability and competence of the Port Trust. Such refusal to delegate power and authority to a body directly in charge of the administration of the Port must obviously have hindered the administrative initiatives and development plans of the Port Trust.

Thus the delay in sanctioning the construction of the first jetty was attributed by the Assam Bengal Railway to "the custom of consulting the Local Government", and "the delays that ensued before the Local Government could be induced to recommend the 4 construction of new works". In similar vein, after a jetty fire in December 1907 the joint enquiry noted that delay in setting up fire prevention arrangements was "largely due to the number of authorities who have to be consulted before any work can be 5 undertaken".

1 Port Comms. Act 1887, 38.

2 Ibid. 21

3 * Ibid- 34* 4 Agent A. B. Rly to Comm. Chitt. Divi. 5 February 1904, Curzon Collection, B. 302. 5 Port Comms. Memorandum on the Chitt. Jetty Fire of 24 December 1907, 20 January 1908, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1909, February, 52. 173

How the financial and administrative constraints imposed by a double layer of government controls acted to discourage initiative and delay improvement is splendidly demonstrated in the history of the construction of jetties for the port. Docks or jetties are one of the most important if not the most important element in the effective working of any modern port — an integral part of any port fs facilities. Yet Chittagong, during the period under study, provided an astonishing example of a port authority operating without any jetty of its own capable of accommodating ocean going steamships, having been forced, by Government inaction to give away under various constraints those rights to acquire, construct and administer jetties on foreshore areas under its legal jurisdiction which the 1887 Act had granted to the Port Commissioners. How little importance was attributed to the provision of the jetties for the port of Chittagong by the authorities either of the Government of India or of the Government of Bengal is clear from the fact that construction of even one jetty was not undertaken for many years after the formation of the Port Trust and even then, as has been seen, it was the Assam Bengal Railway Company which had to point out the need. Astonishingly,in 1895,when the line connecting Chittagong with Chandpur had been opened,"no land for jetties at the port had been acquired, nor had any jetties been sanctioned". * The effect of this was that Chittagong did not start operating as a port for regular ocean going steamers till the beginning of the twentieth century.

Then, when the need for at least one jetty was recognised - the 2 first jetty was sanctioned in 1897 - delay in starting work was

1 The Agent A. B. Rly to Comms. Chitt. Divi. 5 February 1904, Curzon Collection B. 302.

2 Agent A. B. Rly to Board - 6 May 1898, Board's Letters to Agent 1898, A .211. 174

compounded by Government's refusal to make the necessary financial advances to the Port Commissioners so that in 1903 work on and administration of the jetties had to be transferred to the Assam Bengal Railway company. Though the Railway strongly disputed this,there were obvious disadvantages in handing over the management of the only jetties which were capable of handling ocean-going vessels to one of the users of the port's facilities, that is the Assam Bengal Railway. For as Messrs. F. G. Dumayne and F. Palmer;Viee- Chairman and Chief Engineer Respectively of the Calcutta Port Trust;said in their report in 1905, the port Commissioners ought to have had "the whole management of the Port. . .because consideration has to be given to the requirements of traffic in general, and while the Railway Company may be deeply interested in rail borne traffic, the Commissioners have in addition to foster and develop the water-borne traffic". * The interests of the Railway and those of the Port were not necessarily co-terminous and it was therefore very much on the cards that the administration of the jetties by the Railway would not serve the best interests of the Port and its other users. In fact that was not intended. Apparently the basic consideration that led the Government of India to hand over the administration of the jetties to the Railway was their anxiety to ensure the recovery of the very large investments they had made in the construction of the Assam Bengal Railway system. The Railway management took advantage of this anxiety to secure and maintain their own administration of the jetties, to the detriment of the general 2 interests of the port. The real objective of the Railway in claiming

1 Report by Messrs. F. G. Dumayne and F. Palmer, Vice-Chairman and Chief Engineer to the Calcutta Port Trust on the Proposals for extending the Jetty Accommodation at the Port of Chittagong for Ocean-going Steamers 1905, para. 42.

2 As an example we find that when a proposal was made for a coastal shipping jetty at Sadarghat the Railway Company expressed its opposition to "any cargo jetty not part of and controlled by itself" - For detail see Chapter V. Though the net earnings of the Railway increased from a deficit of Rs 8047 in 1895 to a surplus of Rs 17, 29, 637 in 1912 the profits were never sufficient to pay the Government guaranteed interest of 3 per cent on the capital subscribed by the Railway Company (£1, 500, 000). This may probably be attributed to the absence of a bridge over the River Meghna and to the fact that during this period not all the branches of the Railway were opened. 175

a continued hold on the administration of the jetties was revealed

during the consideration of its proposal submitted in 1 9 0 6 for stimulating coastal trade between Chittagong and Calcutta. The • Assam Bengal Railway, the Calcutta Port Trust and the coasting steamer companies were all in favour of the scheme, * though this would divert attention and resources away from the development of Chittagong as an ocean terminal. The Port Commissioners very properly made the point that, "for the sake of some present gain to the Assam-Bengal Railway Company and to those engaged in the coasting traffic (we) are not prepared to do anything to jeopardise the future trade of this port, so that it may be a mere auxiliary 2 to the port of Calcutta". But their view went unheeded by the Railway Company. Moreover management of the jetties by the Railway was seen in practice to favour a particular shipping line to the exclusion of others and to that extent the trade of Chittagong port seems to have been adversely affected. The Divisional Commissioner of Chittagong observed in 1906, "At present one line, the Clan Line, practically has preference for one jetty berth and other liners will not come for jute if they have to take their chance of waiting out in the 3 stream". Continued allegations during this period by various other 4 agencies tend to confirm the suggestion of a special relationship between the Railway and the Clan Line which apparently adversely affected the general interest of the Port. The Agent of the Assam Bengal Railway in his capacity as a member of the Port Trust was reluctant to admit other lines of steamers on the same basis as the 5 Clan Line. The Port Commissioners in para 11(b) of the minutes

1 ; Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt, of E.B.A. 7 May 1906, E . B. A. Proc. PWD Mne 1906, April 36. 2 Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt, of E.B.A. 7 May1906, E . B. A. Proc. PWD Mne 1906, April 36. 3 C om m . Chitt. Div. to Govt, of E.B.A. 31 January 1906, E . B. A. Proc. PWD Mne 1906, August 16. 4 American Shipping lines, Resolution of Port Comms. and letters of the Govt, of Eastern B e n g a l and Assam. E.B.A. Proc PWD Mne 1908, May 12-14. 5 A.B. Rly to the Managing Director, A.B. Rly London, 19 June 1907, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne, 1908, May 6 . figspypgiy 176

of th e ir 2 2 6 th meeting recorded in 1907, Mthe Agents of the American and Indian line who ship between 20 and 25 per cent of the jute exported from Chittagong* complain of the delays caused by excluding their vessels from the jetties, though there is cargo ready for them in the sheds, in favour of other vessels for which there is little or no cargo". * It was felt by other prospective liner firms "that unless arrangements were improved 2 most of the American cargo would be shipped from Calcutta. By transferring the management of the jetties to the Railway the Government of India completely reversed their earlier policy and damagingly divided the overall management of the Port of Chittagong. The role of the Port Trust was reduced practically to that of an agency required to provide limited services like maintaining the navigable channel and providing other navigational 3 facilities. With the sole management of the jetties the Railway had monopolistic control over the volume, content and direction of the overseas trade from Chittagong and appeared to have used it largely to foster its own limited commercial interests. The Port Trust was left to manage the iron jetty at Sadar Ghat and some small salt jetties up river, with consequent partial influence on coastal and inland trade. But the use of even these jetties was not compulsory so that some coastal shipping companies remained outside the effective control of the Port Trust in landing and loading goods. It is obvious that the Port Trust had very little administrative influence over the growth or direction of either trade.

The Port Trust was directly under the Local Government and in certain matters the decision of the Government of India was also

1 Memorandum - by Agent A.B. Rly attached to letter dated 9 April 1907 to Board, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1908, May 6 . 2 Chmn Port Comms. to Agent, A.B. Rly 22 July 1907, E . B . A . P ro c . 1908, May 12. 3 Buchanan 16. 177

necessary. On the other hand the Railway was under the direction of the Agent in India for the Company in London and under the final control of the Government of India exercised in part through their consulting engineer. The management of the jetties was a major element in the overall pattern of the port administration yet the final result of the Government of India's policy was to prevent any single authority assuming the responsibility for planning the operation of the port and to subject the Port Trust and Railway to control by two governments which did not always see eye to eye on policy. Indeed after the creation of the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam it was often the case that the Port Trust and the Local Government were in direct conflict with the Railway Company and the Government of India over the administrative control of the port. No arrangement could have been more damaging. A good example of the conflict and confusion which ensued is provided by the debate involving the right of the Railway Company to alter the rate of jetty dues or to grant a monopoly right of use of the jetty to a particular shipping line. The Port Commissioners objected to the changes made in the jetty charge for the handling of tea introduced by the Company in May 1907 and insisted that they had a right to be "notified of any proposed change of either rules for control or rates for charges at the jetty". * Dwelling on this theme the Vice-Chairman of the Port Trust wrote, "the Port Commissioners desire to be consulted beforehand on all questions involving change of management of the jetties, in which they have a residual interest and in the effective working of which they are as the Port Trust, immediately interested". V. Woods the agent of the Assam Bengal Railway rejected the assertion that Port Trust had any right to be "consulted beforehand" and in favour of his interpretation of the

1 ' Vice-Chmn. Port Comms. Chitt. to Agent A.B. Rly, 31 May !9°7, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1908, May 7. 2 Ibid. 178

formal position he quoted the Government of India’s letter No. 01RC dated 27 March 1903. ^ This in paragraph 4 stated that the control of the jetties passed entirely from the Port Trust to the Railway, and that being so, he argued, the power to fix and revise rates for the future use of the jetties and their accessories could no longer be exercised by the Port Trust, but devolved on the railway, subject to the control of the Consulting Engineer. This complete severance of the jetties from the control of the Port Trust^as the Government of India had pointed out, appeared to be essential to their efficient working, which any dual control would tend to 2 hamper. To this it might be replied that the interest of the Port Trust in the jetties had not been completely excluded by the Government of India’s letter for that laid down under what circumstances the Trust was entitled to resume control of the jetties and the Trust also had a claim to the surplus profit from the jetties after 4 per cent interest on the capital cost had been earned.

The Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam supported the interpretation of the Port Trust and in a letter addressed to the Railway Board explained that it was important to maintain a balance between the two conflicting interests in the development of the Chittagong port. The local Government also required the Railway Board to "refrain from taking action in such matters without 3 the prior approval of the Government”. However, as already stated the Port Trust was not able to regain the control of the jetties, the Government of India pronouncing against them.

1 See C hapter III 2 Agent A. B. Rly, to Chmn Port Comms. 10 June 1907, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne , 1908, May 7. 3 Govt, of E.B.A. to Rly Board, 11 June 1907, E . B. A. Proc. PWD Mne , 1908, May 4. 179

The legal and Administrative confusion created by the Government of India in 1903 by transferring the management of the two jetties for ocean-ships to the Railway Company was further confounded in 1905. A question then arose regarding the applicability of Port laws and bye-laws in respect of those jetties which in practice had become the private jetties of the Railway Company. In order to enable the Railway Company to levy tolls and fees for the use of the jetty and to have legal control over the ships alongside their jetties the Government of Bengal by their notification No. 41 (Marine) of 31 March 1905, excluded those jetties and surrounding waters from the operation of the Ports Act. ^ The legality of this transfer of jurisdiction became a matter of controversy and finally the Government of India admitted in 1909 that, "the legality of the transfer of the jetties to the Railway Company has been brought to the notice of the Government of India. The Government of India understands that counsel, whose opinion was obtained in this matter by the solicitors to the Railway Company, have advised that the land on which these jetties are constructed cannot be divested from the Port Commissioners by a notification altering Port limits, that the jetties consequently remain vested in the Port Commissioners and that the rights of property conferred on the Port Commissioners can only be transferred to the Railway Company by fresh 2 legislations". Therefore it is seen that while amending the Chittagong Port Act of 1887 in 1914, the Government of India by the Chittagong Port Act of 1914 legalized the transfer of the jetties 3 to the Assam Bengal Railway Company.

One thing is quite clear at this point that the working relationships between the Port Trust and the Railway Company were none too

1 Note by Vice-Chmn. Port Comms. on the Railway Terminal Jetties at Chitt. 27 January 1910, Beng. Proc. Mne 1912, (enclosure) April 24. 2 Govt, of India to Govt, of E.B.A. 20 A ugust 1909, Beng. P ro c . Mne 1912, April 21.

3 Bary - 7. 180

happy both at the policy and the field level. The Railway Agent, in his capacity as a Commissioner of the Port Trust, was in a particularly ambivalent position, Itorn between the interests of the Port and those of the Railway. The continued tension between the Port Trust and Railway Company, reflected inter alia in the tug of war between the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam and the Government of India, could scarcely help to establish efficient and beneficial administrative arrangements at the Port of Chittagong.

The day to day administrative arrangements of the port,like the longer term policy making previously discussed, were much bedevilled by the division of authority between the Port Trust, responsible for the conservancy of the river and movement of shipping, and the Railway Company in charge of the jetties of ocean going vessels and the foreshore facilities. They were also seriously hampered by the presence on the Port Trust board of so many members who could not devote much time and energy to its a ffa irs. The Chairman of the body of Port Commissioners who were

responsible for the running of the Port Trust was the Divisional Commissioner of Chittagong, , a man, the multifarious nature of whose work demanded that the day to day administration of the port be left to someone else. Under such circumstances the man who had the most say in the everyday administration of the Port was the Port Officer.

Prior to the formation of the Port Trust in 1888 the administrative work of the port of Chittagong was carried out by an officer who

1 Buchanan, 15. 181 was both Customs Collector and Port Officer. Afterwards he 2 was given an assistant, who was his assistant in both capacities. In 1879 the two appointments were separated. A certain Mr. Warden was appointed as Customs Collector and Shipping Master 3 and E. Good as Port Officer and Registrar of Shipping. With the formation of the Port Trust a good many of the duties of the 4 Port Officer were taken from him, and in November 1887 the Chairman of the Commissioners of the Port of Chittagong therefore proposed to the Government that the Port Officer should henceforth also be appointed an Officer of the Port Trust. He pointed out that there was not work enough for a Port Officer and a working Vice- Chairman and he urged therefore that both posts should be held by 5 one man. In 1889 Good, the Port Officer was duly appointed Vice- Chairman of the Port Commissioners. ^ However, with the increase in the trade of the port it was found necessary, the retirement of Good in 1898 providing the occasion, to separate the two posts, the District Magistrate thenceforth being appointed ex-officio as Vice- 7 Chairman. Ten years later, in 1908 the Government of India, recognising the growing importance of the port sanctioned the reservation of the post of Port Officer for officers of the Royal Indian Marine. The appointment was classed as a 4th class port g appointment to be ordinarily held by a third grade Commander.

1 Ordinary Meeting of the Port Comms. 7 June 1888, Port Trust Proc. 1890, K.W. January 1. 2 Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt, of Beng. 9 November 1887, Port Trust Proc. 1888, K.W. September.

6 W.B.B. to Joint Sec. 13 April 1889, Port Trust Proc. 1889, K.W. July. 7 B ary 1.

8 Chmn. Port Trust to Govt, of E.B.A. 6 June 1908, E.B.A. P ro c . PWD Mne 1909, May 1. 182

As no adverse criticism was directed against the Port Officers during the period under study it can be assumed that they were efficient in their work.

The Port Officer was in charge of the establishment of pilots who were responsible for handling inward and outward bound vessels, for notifying the customs inspectors if ships were from dutiable ports and the Port Officer if there was epidemic disease abroad. The pilot was also responsible for seeing that no vessel went to sea without an order signed by the Port Officer and custom clearance. Prior to 1880 the pilot establishment of Chittagong consisted of seven 2 Indian pilots and one apprentice. The pay of the pilots being very 3 poor it did not attract very efficient men. With the growth of the port need began to be felt for more efficient pilots. In 1879 it was therefore resolved by the Commissioner that in order to improve the efficiency of the pilotage European or Eurasian pilots should be appointed and that to secure a better class of Indian pilots, a better 4 scale of pay than was being paid should be offered. That year therefore a European or Eurasian pilot on a pay of Rs 150 a month and an increased scale of pay for the Indian pilots whose number was reduced to six with two apprentice was sanctioned. The total cost 5 of the establishment under the revised scale was Rs 475.

1 Rules, Bye "Laws, Regulations and Notification relating to the Port of Chittagong - 1896, 'Rules for Pilots in the Port of Chitt. as sanctioned by the Noti. of the Govt, of Bengal General Mne Dept. 31 October 1884, amended by Noti. No. 35. Mne, 18 March 1889. 2 Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India, 12 March 1886, Beng. Proc. Mne 1887 January-March, February 3-8. 3 Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India, 12 March 1886, Beng. Municipal ’ Proc. Mne , 1887, January-March, February 3-8. 3 Pilots at Rs 40, 4 Pilots at Rs 30, 2 apprentice at Rs 15, total Rs 255. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 183

In 1905-06 in order to provide appointments carrying sufficient pay to attract Europeans the services of Harbour masters and Pilots were combined. ^ Previously there had been one European 2 Pilot doing the work of Pilot and Harbour Master. By 1912 3 there were three European Pilot-cum-Harbour Masters. Thus during the period under study the pilotage administration was strengthened and re-organised.

Before 1905 the port of Chittagong was without an engineer of its own, and as a result whenever necessary the Assam Bengal Railway provided necessary assistance. The visit of Lord Curzon and his financial help infused new hope for the future of the Port and in April 1905 J.R. Bell (a re tire d P.W.D. Officer) was appointed consulting Engineer to the Port. In March of that year moreover, a Mr. Blabers was appointed as the Port Engineer. Previously Blabers had been an Executive Engineer 3rd grade in the Public 4 Works Department. Soon the need began to be felt for an acting E ngineer and in 1907 A.O. Drehler was appointed on a temporary 5 basis. The port engineer of Chittagong was appointed to manage "the works of improvement" and was mainly concerned with the revetment and dredging operations. ^ The Port Officer however was in administrative charge of the dredger and all returns of work done went from the Port Engineer to him. The programme of work of the dredger was laid down by the Port Commissioners at 7 8 each monthly meeting. The dredger was worked by a European crew.

1 Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt, of E.B.A. 21 September 1907, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne , 1908, July 4. 2 Chmn. Port. Comms. to Govt, of Beng. 19 May 1904, Beng. Proc. Mne 1904, June 27. 3 Admin. Dept. 1911-12, Beng. Proc. Mne , 1912, September 26-30. 4 Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt, of E.B.A. 30 August 1907, E . B. A . Proc. PWD Mne , 1908, April 52. 5 Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt, of E.B.A. 19 January 1907, E . B. A . Proc. PWD Mne 1908, April 58.

6 Ibid. 7 Port Comms. Ordinary Meeting 10 April 1907, OMPC, 1907.

8 Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt of E . B. A. 30 August 1907, E.B.A. Proc. JPWD Mne. 1908. August 28. ______184

Those areas of port administration which were the sole concern of the Port Officer seem to have been handled with fair efficiency but the management of the jetties by the Assam Bengal Railway Company left much to be desired. The Assam Bengal Railway Company, like the other railway companies in India, was till 1905 under the Railway Branch of the Central Public Works Department. From that year the Railway Branch was replaced by a Railway Board, Ma body of practical businessmen entrusted with full authority to manage the railways of India on commercial principles". * The man at Chittagong who was under the Board of Directors of the Assam Bengal Railway Company at London was their Agent. The Agent for the Railway was a Commissioner of the Chittagong Port Trust, but in administering the jetties from day to day the authority was delegated to a Jetty Superintendent, with his assistant, appointed by the Railway. Other officials so appointed were the hydraulic machinery foreman, the; shed officer, the chief clerks, the tally clerk* the watchmen and the shunting staff. In addition there was also an assistant engineer who was in charge of jetty construction and repairs. 2

The administration of the port of Chittagong by the Railway Company 3 showed a marked want of administrative capacity. The authorities 1 G.S. Khosla, Railway Management in India 15-17.

2 To be found in the February proceedings of 1909. E . B. A. Proc. PWD Mne , 1909. The duties of the assistant Jetty Superintendent was to exercise general outdoor superintendence. The shed officers were subordinate to him but worked independent of one another. Previously, their job was done by a Jetty Foreman who controlled all the outdoor staff. The foreman was replaced by two shed officers in 1907.. 3 This was due to a certain extent to the number of authorities who as already notedhadto be consulted before any work could be carried out. Thus as G.S. Khosla pointed out, "the centralisation of control. . .resulted in a growing tendency towards greater bureaucratic and departmental administration and even trivial matters were referred to Government Cases of differences from the Central Secretariat and the Railway administration, went up to the Viceroy. All this resulted in marked ■ deterioration and delay in the disposal of important m atters and the administrative machinery was clogged by unnecessary attention to minor details". Khosal 16. See also J.N. Sahni, Indian Railways 100 Years, 1853-I~953, 29. 185 seemed too preoccupied with getting control of the jetties and other privileges to appreciate the need for proper day to day administration. There were thus.apparently no formal rules or regulations to cover the appointment and employment of jetty staff, ^ it being generally left to the Jetty Superintendent to select and appoint men of his choice. Under these circumstances a great deal depended upon the character and quality of the Superintendent, and it is apparent that one choice of Superintendent at least was very ill advised - that of W. W. Robinson who took 2 office in 1907. Robinson was an irresponsible and headstrong officer who seemed more interested in hunting than looking after the administration of the jetty. After his appointment two fires broke out at the jetties,one in October,the other in December 1907. On both occasions Robinson was away hunting. At the time of the third fire by what was surely more than coincidence, he had gone away to hunt without informing anyone, even though he knew that the assistant jetty superintendent was away on leave. Excusing his action at the time of the enquiry he stated that he had not informed anybody as he had not been able to make up his mind about 3 going till the last minute. The enquiry revealed that on his appointment his first step had been to discharge all the existing 4 staff on one charge or another, - the men discharged being 5 Hindustani up country men. He then had Mukund Singh who had served under him at the docks in Calcutta, pick up a staff of darwans in Calcutta^* most of whom, it appeared, had been deserters 7 from the Patiala battalion retiming; to the Punjab. Later many of

1 Finding of the Joint Enquiry on the jetty fires held on the 28-30 D ecem ber and 2, 4 January, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1909, February 60. 2 Ibid.

3. Ibid. W.W. R obinson 1 s Evidence 4 Port Comms. Memorandum on the Chitt. Jetty Fire of 24 December 1907, 20 Jan u ary 1908, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1909, February 52.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 186 these darwans were found to have been involved in illicit activities in league with local bastiwalas or slum dwellers.* What is apparent is that no senior railway official had made any check of Robinson’s activities or of the men he was recruiting. Robinson in his evidence stated that it was the general practice at the port of Chittagong to get the jemedars or labour foreman to pick up the 2 darwans needed. What is certain is that the Company had no 3 system of records of addresses or references for their darwans.

Once recruited the darwans were slackly controlled and supervised in their work as gate and door keepers on the jetties. There were no such printed schedules of duties and responsibilities of the shed officers at Chittagong such as were used in the port of Calcutta. When asked about this the shed officer replied, "I understood my duties to be the same as in Calcutta". One of those duties, however, was that of seeing personally to the opening and locking of the doors of the sheds. The investigation of the third fire of 24 December 1907 showed however that the shed doors had not been locked. Moreover Robinson in h is evidence stated that he had p assed no o rd e rs a s to the custody of the keys and that the keys were kept in the office, but no check was exercised over the number of keys brought in by the 4 5 darwans. When there was night work an officer was always present, and the Jetty Superintendent also went around the jetties at such times. ^ There was however no check on the night watchmen by a superior officer. ^

1 Port Comms. Memorandum on the Chitt. Jetty Fire of 24 December 1907, 20 January 1900 E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1909, February 52. 2 Ibid. 3 Report of J. T.R. Carnac, Deputy Inspector General of Police, 17 May 1908, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne , 1909, February 76. 4 Finding of a Joint Enquiry on the Jetty fires, 1907 - Robinson's Evidence (recalled), 2 January 1908, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1909, February 6 . 5 Ibid.

6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 187

It might be argued that the Railway Company were just unlucky in their choice of Robinson, who certainly at this distance appears to have been a complete rogue, But no one in the Company seems to have been surprised or to have felt any need for an investigation of Robinson's curious knack of being out hunting whenever a fire broke out. Nor did anyone in the Company seem to have felt any urgency in improving fire precautions on the jetties. No attempt was made to install unclimbabUrfences round the sheds or to supply proper fire fighting apparatus. * Nor, it seems, was much attention paid to the evidence that the first fire had been deliberately started. The Englishman on 14 October 1907 stated in its editorial, "The line of fire was far too systematic to suggest an accident, and I understand that an anonymous letter had been received some 2 months back threatening the destruction of the jetties", - yet neither after this firev nor that of December was any police enquiry instituted by the Railway Company. The Commissioner of Chittagong Division, if a hostile was not an unfair critic when, after the third fire he declared, "if the management was not able within 14 months to arrange somehow for the putting up of an unclimbable fencing round the sheds abutting on three continuous jetty berths,a work which a Calcutta firm would have carried out in about three months, the 3 management is admittedly not efficient".

The jetty fires caused considerable destruction to property and, "retarded temporarily the development of the trade of the port". Confidence must certainly have been destroyed as well as property, for the police investigation after the third fire revealed "organised

1 See Chapter V. 2 Big Blaze at Chittagong, The Englishman October 14, 1907, 3 Comms. Chitt. Divi to Govt, of E.B.A. 23 May 1908, E . B. A. Proc. PWD Mne 1909, February 74. 188

fraudulent misappropriation of the Company's jute" in which the Railway's employees had been involved, and which found that the second and third fires had been deliberately started to conceal shortage of stock in the shed. One welcome outcome of the third fire and subsequent enquiries however, was that the Company was jolted from its lethargy. In 1908 the Agent Assam Bengal Railway informed the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam that, "the superior staff and to a large extent the subordinate staff, at the jetties have been reconstituted and increased". * By 1910 steps had also been taken to further strengthen the administration by framing 2 new rules for the jetty.

The other major consequence of the series of fires was that a radical overhaul of the policing of the port was set in motion. The free flow of trade either by land or water demanded a police force capable of giving protection to the traders in the province. In Eastern Bengal and Assam the general police force, as R. Nathan explained, was not only "inadequate and ill organised" but "its strength was far below that which was considered necessary in 3 other provinces of India". As a result there was great disturbance to trade particularly that borne by the waterways. As has already 4 been mentioned, "dacoities and robbery on the rivers of the Lower Provinces had been endemic from time immemorial" but "it was not until the twentieth century that a serious and sustained effort was made to tackle this evil". ^ Police reports^ and reports of

1 Agent A.B. Rly to Govt of E.B.A. 30 July 1908, E . B. A. Proc. PWD Mne , 1909, February 79. 2 Port Comms. Ordinary Meeting 10 July 1910, OMPC 1910. 3 E.B.A. Revised Financial Statement 1911-12, Revenue & Expenditure -Police explained by R. Nathan 13 March 1911, E.B.A. Proc. Legis. 1911, 37. 4 See Chapter II. 5 Sir Percival Griffiths, To Guard My People, The History of the Indian Police, 392.

6 Conference of police officers in December 1900. Report of Inspector Amdad Ali 1902. Bramleys Report 1904. 189

Police Commissions of 1902 continuously pointed out this danger

to trade but it was not till 1 9 1 1 ^ that a system of river police was 2 approved by the Secretary of State and brought into operation. Although the River Police which was thus introduced was effective in making trade comparatively safe - the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division reported in 1913, "no cases of river dacoity 3 were reported. . . and that theft decreased” - its jurisdiction did not extend to Chittagong District. Just why was explained by E.C.S. Baker: "The district of Chittagong is bounded on the west coast by the Sandip channel which is practically open sea and is beyond any River Police jurisdiction. In the interior of the Chittagong district, with the exception of the Feni river which forms its northern boundary and has already been dealt with in considering the needs of Noakhali, there remain only two rivers of any importance, the Karnafuli and Sangoo.* Neither of these rivers require to be brought under the River Police. Crime is practically non-existent upon any portion of them, and their size and character are such that they can be easily controlled by the 4 District Police". In Chittagong therefore, beside the District and Town police and the Railway Police the only special police force in existence was the Port Police.

1 Griffiths 392. 2 Ibid. 394. Under the scheme twenty-seven thanas were to open and a force of 342 officers and men with 36 launches were to be employed. The main feature of the scheme was a series of floating thanas. Its operations were eventually to include all the principal waterways of the province from Dhubri to the Bay and from the Bengal boarder to the east of Sylhet. The whole system was to be under the Superintendent of Police whose headquarters were to be at Narayanganj - Admin. Beng. 1911-12, 160. Admin. Beng. 1912-13, 17. 3 Admin. Beng. 1913-14, 16. 4 Report on the proposal of a River Police force in Eastern Bengal and Assam by F. C. Stuart Baker, Deputy Inspector General of Police in charge of the Criminal Investigation Dept and Railway and River Police. 10 July 1909, E.B.A. Proc. Judicial Dept - Police, 1910, October-November, November 23. 190

From the foundation of the Port Trust in 1888 till 1907 the Port Police consisted of one European constable* under the control of 2 the District Superintendent of Polfce. Though he was paid from the Port Fund his boat and crew of four men were paid by the police department. There was an understanding however that in 3 case of need the District and Town Police would give assistance. In 1906, the Port Commissioners took up the question of reorganising the Port Police without waiting for the general reorganisation of 4 the River Police of the Province as a whole to come into effect. By 16 September 1907 they had secured the sanction of the Local Government for an increase in strength of the Port Police to two sub-inspectors, one European constable, six Indian constables 5 and a steam launch with a crew of five men. The jurisdiction of this Port Police was confined to the river Karnaphuli and the foreshore and did not extend to the railway terminal jetties which were under the Railway Police.^ Proceedings of a meeting of the Port Commissioners of 16 December 1910 approving a definition of the jurisdiction of the Port Police which included the warehouses and jetties suggest however, that the Port Police had taken over control from the Railway Police, except for the Double Mooring station which 7 was reserved to them.

1 Rept. of the Committee appointed to enquire into the state of the Rly and Dist. Police at Chitt. and to suggest improved arrangements 14 March 1908, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1909, F e b ru a ry 7 5. 2 Comm. Chitt. Divi. to Comms. Port Trust, 3 February 1888, Port Trust Proc. 1888, February 24-25, K.W. 3 ept of the Cttee. on the Rly and Dist. Police at Chitt. 14 March !908, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne, 1909, February 75. 4 Ibid. 5 Rept of the Cttee.on the Rly and Dist. Police at Chitt. 14 March 1908, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne , 1909t February 75.

6 ' Ibid. 7 Port Comms. Ordinary Meeting 16 December 1910, OMPC 1910> 625. 191

In the Autumn of 1912, after the annulment of the partition of Bengal the Government of Bengal ordered a drastic reduction in the Port Police force'*’ exhibiting another example of the seemingly deliberate destruction by that Government of all that had been achieved under the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam.

The Railway Police at the time of the constitution of the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, in October 1905, consisted of one Inspector, two sub-inspectors eleven head constables, and forty 2 seven constables. In August 1907 the Local Government with the concurrence of the Agent Assam Bengal Railway, sanctioned an increase to the full cadre allowable under the Secretary of State's previous orders. Accordingly the force was increased to two Inspectors, eight Sub-Inspectors, eighteen head constables and 3 seventy constables. Before this increase the Chittagong Railway Police thana which was under the Railway Police, had consisted of one Inspector and four constables. The number of cases handled by this small force was excessive^specially as besides the local cases of which criminal information was lodged at the thana they had to deal with cases reported from the rest of the thana up to 4 Hinguli. As a result it was found that in 1907 out of 178 investigations only two had resulted in a conviction while twenty 5 four cases were still pending final disposal in March 1908. In 1907 when the increase in the Railway Police was sanctioned the

1 Port Comms. Ordinary Meet ing 11 October 1912, OMPC 1912, 102. 2 Ibid.

3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Rept. of the Committee on the Rly and Dist. Police at Chitt. 14 M arch 1908, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne , 1909, February 75. 192

Chittagong section was rather more than doubled. The jurisdiction of this thana included the terminal jetties and extended to Hinguli, 43 miles above Chittagong. * It irifcluded the railway lines except 2 the Strand Road sidings which was under the District Police. Even this force however did not prove sufficient to deal with the law and order situation at the jetties. In 1908 therefore it is found that as a result of widespread crime on the waterways, repeated complaints by the Chittagong Chamber of Commerce and Indian Merchants Association regarding the state of law and order, and the three great fires on the railway jetties several investigations took place into police administration of the province of Eastern 3 Bengal and Assam. These investigations revealed that the police administration required total overhauling, that the railway employees were in collusion with local people in carrying out theft, and that the existing condition of the Port encouraged theft. J.T.R. Carnac the Deputy Inspector General of Police, believed that there was an, "organised fraudulent misappropriation of the Railway company’s goods and that its employees were in collusion with the local people in carrying out theft." In his report he argued that the fires had been an attempt to conceal shortages in the goods in their care. He believed that the jute stolen, other than that which was broken up and disposed of locally in and around Chittagong, was sent back by brig or country boat or by other means to Chandpur 4 and was there resold and shipped to Calcutta for export. Similarly "tea so stolen was sent by Baksi Bazar firms to Dacca and elsewhere, while other consignments, undoubtedly from the same source, were 5 sent to Rangoon by other receivers". Such an unfortunate situation

1 Rept. of the Cttee. on the Rly and Dist. Police at Chitt. 14 March 1908, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1909, February 75. 2 Joint Enquiry on Jetty fires E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne;, 1909. February 60.

3 J . T.R. C arn ac 1 s Rept.;E. C. Stuart Baker's Rept., Rept. of the Committee, 1908. 4 Rept. of J.T.R. Carnacs - Dept. Inspector General of Police, 17 May 1908, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne , 1909, February 76. 5 Ibid. 193

was due mainly to the fact that the Railway Police was terribly understaffed and because there was no fixed rule for employing ft the railway servants,whose antecedents were not verified. In such a situation it was just too tempting for the dishonest employees that the jetty yard was neither properly fenced nor guarded. Most of the cases of dishonest short loading appear to have been from the Strand Road sidings and this was again due to the fact that there was no proper station or shed at the Strand Road.*

In August 1908 to remedy this state of affairs the Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam sanctioned an extensive addition to 2 staff of the Assam Bengal Railway Police. According to it a second inspector who was to be in charge of the line north of Hinguli was appointed, as was also appointed a special Sub- Inspector to conduct the prosecutions in Railway cases. In view of the great development of the trade of the port an independent outpost at the jetties with a staff of one Sub-Inspector,one head constable 3 and six constables was also established. In addition the Railway authorities on their part also took measures to prevent and discourage thefts from the trains and the jetties. From that year wagons loaded with goods were provided with locks and trains were not run on the port line after dusk, except when absolutely necessary. The jetties were also safeguarded by the erection of 4 a fence around them. A sa result of these measures the Inspector General of Police was able to report in 1908 that, "As a result

1 Rept. of the Committee on the Rly and Dist. Police at Chitt. 14 March 1908, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne , 1909, February 75. 2 Report on the Police Administration of the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 1908, 12. 3 P olice A dm in. 1909, 12. 4 P olice Adm in. 1908, 13. 194

partly of these various measures thefts on running trains have practically ceased and crime connected with the Railway and • 1 Jetties in and around Chittagong has been reduced".

1 Police Admin, 1908, 13. Port Administration - Chittagong O i i— ■xJ -> + pj H • CQ rH 4) a fd co CO * d rt ♦H P $ 4 P 'T -4J p. rH K H • P • H P H • o P * * m ■*-* •*-* o +-> -> + -M ■*-> < >S O i o aj a o h -- o W) u o O 4) t“H H > h +, CQ nJ

195 196

PORT FINANCE

The most inauspicious aspect of the birth of the Chittagong Port Trust was perhaps the absence of any fairy godmother to provide it with suitable capital endowments and assurances of capital finance. The Government of Bengal and India appear to have thought their duty was done by presiding at the birth of the child, and that neither gifts - nor wet nurse - were needed by the sickly infant that the Port Trust was in 1888. The financial predicament of the ill-endowed new Port Trust was compounded by the fact that it could not attract loans, at least not during its early years, either from Government sources or from the money market because its income was not sufficient to guarantee the payment of interests, not to speak of the repayment of the principal. * The vicious circle was completed by the fact that since the Port Trust did not manage a port with the required facilities for a major ocean terminal it could not earn sufficient to finance its day to day administration let alone invest in further development. Right from the outset the Chittagong Port Trust thus found itself in a sort of 'poverty trap' . The complexities of the financial situation were to an extent accentuated by the competing commercial interests of

1 In 1895 the Commissioners stated that they not in a position to raise a loan as they "have no guarantee for funds beyond their income and cannot speculate" - Note on Re so. 5. of the Port Comms. meeting 21 August 1895, Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1895. October 30-31. 197 of the Assam Bengal Railway, which saw in the port, particularly the jetties, an assured source of income and an instrument of control over trade to be used to augment earnings from the newly formed Railway network. The interests of European companies at Chittagong^particularly the coastal shipping companies, several of whom were nominated to seats on the Port Trust Board, seem also to have interfered adversely with the development of the revenue earnings of the Port. Since Calcutta based firms* and organisations, including the Calcutta Port Trust, were also unwilling to see a rival flourish at their expense and pursued policies which destabilised the prospects of the Chittagong port still further, Chittagong's financial difficulties proved long lasting and damaging to its growth.

In 188 8 , the Chittagong Port Trust found itself confronted with an enormous task of building a port very much from scratch as there were no jetties for ocean going vessels nor were there other facilities normally required of any port worth its name. The scale of investment involved in such an undertaking was evidently beyond the scope of the meagre financial resources of the Port Trust. The natural sources of capital of the required size were the Government of Bengal and the Government of India. Both the Government of Bengal and the Government of India may have had their own priorities and rationale (if there were any) for withholding capital funds and for giving capital aid at the time and in the way they did. But the logic of their actions was not easy to discover,

1 The Bengal Chamber of Commerce asked anxiously at the time of the consideration of the question of the formation of the Chittagong Port Trust in 1886 about, "the character and cost of , the improvement of the port to be undertaken", and argued that it would not be advisable to expand a large amount of capital in improving the port. Beng. Chamber of Commerce to Govt, of Beng. 14 May 1886, Beng. Proc. Municipal Mne 1887 January- March, March 3-34. 198 as the Agent of the Assam Bengal Railway declared in 1896, "I must confess I am unable to understand the force of the argument which would deny the employment of Imperial Funds in providing trade facilities at a Port, and yet allow them to be employed in the construction of a Railway". *

Some of the reluctance of the Government to provide capital funds can possibly be explained in term s of the status of the Chittagong 2 port, since it remained a'minor port 1 till 1 April 1928. But it is difficult to understand the virtual absence of any substantial establishment and fund at the creation of Chittagong Port Trust while the Government provided generous funds and established substantial facilities at the creation of other port trusts. On the formation of the Bombay Trust in 1873 Government properties were handed over to it valued at more than two and a half crores of rupees of which some forty-two lakhs were an outright grant and the rest repayable on easy terms over ten years. Madras Port Trust received a loan of over forty lakhs repayable over a period of forty years. Later they were given another loan of forty lakhs repayable in sixty years at 4% interest. Karachi Post Trust received seven lakhs on the formation of the Trust in 1886 and fifteen and a half lakhs later, both repayable in thirty years at an interest of 4-|% . The Calcutta Port received loans both for extension of port facilities and for dock works, their combined total amounting to no less than three and a half crores of rupees, with interest of 4%and 4f% repayable over a maximum period of 3 forty six years. The plight of Chittagong port in 1888 can be

1 Agent and Chief Engineer, A. B.Rly to Managing Director A. B. Rly 10 January 1896, Agent's Letter to Board 1896. 2 . Administrative Report of the Comms. for the Port of Chitt. 1928-29, 4, see also Bary 8 . 3 Port Comms. Ordinary Meeting, 5 April 1907, OMPC 1907. 199 understood when these figures are set against the total non availability from Government sources of any capital funds whatsoever in the early years. D*R. Lyall, Commissioner of Chittagong Division, wrote in 1888, "I believe almost every other port in the empire has obtained some help from the public funds to a larger amount in the case of some port and to a smaller amount in that of others, but still aid has been given while Chittagong has obtained no such aid". *

One explanation of the reluctance of the Government to provide capital funds may possibly be that in their scheme of things Chittagong at the initial stages of its development, was conceived of only as a feeder to the port of Calcutta and not a port to be developed in its own right, to accommodate large ocean going steamers. Thus it will be recalled that at the time of the creation of the Port Trust the improvements demanded of the port were not those required by an ocean terminal. And when Apjohn in his reports of 1893 and 1900 urged the need for jetty construction and river conservancy at Chittagong Government gave no financial assistance.

The construction of the railway and the erection of the first jetty changed the prospects of the port of Chittagong, however, and as the Traffic Manager Assam Bengal Railway wrote, "the potentialities of the Port were fully realised by those who are in the best position to judge. Everyone in any way connected with this Port, even if they never realised before the possibilities of increased trade here, 2 are now unanimous in believing that a great future lies before it".

1 Comm. Chitt. Divi. to Govt, of Beng. 17 February 1888, Port Trust Proc. 1889, June 1-2 K.W. 2 Traffic Manager A. B. Rly to Agent A.B. Rly 2 January 1902, Agent* s Letter to Board, 1902. 200

In 1900 for example the tea planters of Assam, Cachar and Sylhet sent a memorial to the Government of Bengal representing the great importance of the port and urging the necessity of improving the entrance so that large steamers could enter and discharge cargoes at all times of the year. * Yet despite the evidence of increasing traffic and the enthusiasm of the railway and of the Assam planting community, the Government of Bengal remained quite unwilling to help the port. They replied to the planters 1 memorial with a letter expressing their sympathy but refusing their aid, declaring that the sum, required to improve the condition of 2 the river was beyond the means of that Government. The plaint of the Port Commissioners in May 1902, "that in order to increase the trade of the port and remedy its indebtness, it is indispensably necessary that a loan should be granted by Government. The policy of small loans to meet occasional debits is unsatisfactory, and a loan should be granted to Chittagong in the same way as was done for 3 Calcutta", was met witha similar direct refusal; In the meantime to make m atters worse, the Government of India had proposed in

1901 that the income derived from the working of the jetties at Chittagong should be credited to the Government of India. ^ (This despite the series of substantial budget surplus of the Indian .5 Government from 1898-99 to 1904-05^) The commissioners strongly protested against the proposal and stated, "If the profits of the jetty are taken from the Port Commissioners, the Government of Bengal must be prepared to face a still greater annual deficit in connection with the Port. The transfer involved, according to the current budget, an immediate difference of income to the extent of

1 Memorial of the tea Planters of Assam, Cachar and Sylhet, 8 February 1900, Beng. Proc. Mne 1900, March 5. 2 Buchanan, 5^6. 3 Port Comms. Ordinary Meeting, 7 May 1902, OMPC 1901-1907. 4 Port Comms. to the Govt, of Beng. 16 September 1901, Beng. Proc. PWD Mne , 1901, October 18. 5 P.J. Thomas, The Growth of Federal Finances in India, 258. 201

15, 000. At present even with this help, the Port Commissioners cannot meet their liabilities, far less contemplate much needed improvement”. * They pointed out that the Government should rather "waive their claim to any profits on net earnings of the jetty in order to place the funds of the Port Trust on a more substantial footing and to relieve them from the hand-to-mouth 2 policy hitherto forced upon them by the want of funds". They further suggested that the Government of Bengal in order to increase the facilities of the port should grant to the Port Trust 3 a special loan of twenty lakhs and take over the debt incurred in constructing the existing jetty and "guarantee the interest to the 4 Imperial Government". The Government of Bengal in reply stated that every item of possible revenue should be carefully scrutinised by the Port Commissioners with a view to increase the revenue and that if the scrutiny revealed that, "there are reasonable prospects of their position being financially sound within the next three years, this Government is prepared to assist the Commissioners with a contribution to the extent of Rs 10, 000 annually for that period, and to ask the Government of India to allow the repayment of the Government loan. . .being deferred for the same period, charging 5 interest only on the outstanding balance ". The Chairman of the Port Commissioners however informed the Government that "there is no prospect of their being able to undertake the payment of interest charges, which on the capital cost of the jetty buildings up to 30th June 1902. . . amount to Rs 80, 000 without the aid of a Government loan or grant much more liberal than that offered.

1 Chmn Port. Comms. to Govt, of Beng. 9 June 1902, Beng. Proc. PWD Mne 1903, January 73. 2 Chmn. of the Port Comms. to Govt, of Beng. 16 September 1901, Beng. Proc. PWD Mne 1901, October 18. 3 Govt, of Beng. to Chmn Port Comms. 13 September 1902. Beng. Proc. PWD Mne 1903, January 74. 4 Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt, of Beng. 9 June 1902, Beng. Proc. PWD Mne , 1903, January 73. 5 Govt, of Beng. to Chmn. Port Comms. 13 September 1902, Beng. Proc. PWD Mne., 1903, January 74. 202

They considered it undesirable at present to increase the charges of the Port, and would point out that it is not sufficient only to consider the receipts and expenditure of the next three years but / to provide for the improvements and extensions"* required for the future. To this appeal the Government of Bengal replied by declaring that in view of the financial condition of the Port Trust they would approve the Government of India's decision to transfer 2 the jetties to the Assam Bengal Railway Company and that they 3 had so informed that Government. They continued sanctimoniously to urge upon the Trust that an effort should be made to improve the financial condition of the Port and to voice the hope "that the Commissioners will now clearly understand that they must not consider the Provincial Revenues as a convenient reserve fund from which any deficit that may occur may be met, but that the trade of the port must pay for facilities provided and improvements made 4 for its benefits". So ended in failure all attempts by the Port Commissioners to secure the help of Government. In fact the Government had gone completely against all established policy, as Buchanan pointed out*, “in the matter of finance it is universally recognised that the capital cost of a port cannot in its earliest stages, be wholly paid out of charges imposed, and that the State or other controlling power must, in the general welfare make up the part of a 5 permanent debt". The policy of the Government of Bengal not to extend any financial help to the port seems all the more strange as the financial condition of the province during that period,as is apparent from the following table, was generally sound and as its

1 Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt, of Beng. 13 October 1902, Beng. Proc. PWD Mne 1903, January 82. 2 Govt, of India to Govt, of Beng. 28 April 1902, Beng. Proc. PWD Mne 1903, January 71. 3 Govt, of Beng. to Chmn. Port Comms. 18 December 1902 - Beng. Proc. PWD Mne 1903, January 85. 4 Ibid. 5 Buchanan 16. 203

budget from 1893-1903 showed a continuous surplus . In fact from

1 8 9 8 its finance received a further boast when as a result of 'heavy 2 3 surpluses' 'year after year' in the Government of India's budget on account of the stabilization of the rupee and the growing demand for opium in China, that Government was, "able to make generous grants to the provinces for education, public works, police reform 4 and other purposes".

Financial Condition of Bengal 1893-1903 - Annual Surpluses and Deficits

1893-4 1894-5 1895-6 1896-7 1897-8 Rs Rs Rs Rs Rs

+ 36, 887 + 1, 69,796 + 1,49,808 -1 ,8 6 ,5585 - 3 4 ,3 4 ,937 6

1898-9 1899-1900 1 9 0 0 - 1 1901-2 1902-3 1903-4

+ 2 1 ,0 3 ,6607 +7, 01,8998 + 3,13,524 + 4 ,7 7 ,096 9 +6,23, 640 +87,23,496 10

The financial position of the port of Chittagong till 1904 was fairly summarised by an editorial in The Pioneer on 20 February 1904: "As we have frequently pointed out Chittagong has received anything but fair treatment in the past, and it is high time her interests were

1 Except for 1896-7 and 1897-98 - the years of the famine. 2 P.J. Thomas - Federal Finances in India, 261. 3 Ibid. 4 P.J. Thomas - Federal Finance in India, 261.

5 Ibid. 258.

6 Admin Beng. 1897-98, 277. 7 Admin Beng. 1898-99, 241.

8 Admin Beng. 1899-1900, 164. 9 Admin Beng. 1901-2, 284. 10 Admin Beng. 1903-4, 115. 204 considered on their own m erits alone, and without reference to the jealousy of her great rival across the Bay. The Local Port Trust in their address to the Vice'roy Curzon pointed out, more in sorrow than in anger, that for the last twenty-five years the Bengal Government had only given Chittagong free grants of money aggregating Rs 30, 000 whereas the Trust had been obliged to spend two lakhs on a single lighthouse alone. A loan of Rs 2, 33, 000 had certainly been forthcoming from Bengal;* but with a stationary income of Rs 70, 000, out of which the whole port had to be equipped, this did not afford much relief, and a balance of a lakh 2 still remained to be paid off".

It was not until 1904 that fortune smiled on the port of Chittagong for the first time when Lord Curzon promised financial help to the 3 port. Even then this help sprang rather from a desire to sell the idea of the partition of Bengal and to get a return on the money spent on the Assam Bengal Railway than from a direct concern for the port of Chittagong. This Curzon made clear in his speech on the opening of the Assam Bengal Railway: "When the Government of India started some twelve years ago upon the task of constructing the Assam Bengal Railway. . .they little dreamed that. . .before the end had been reached the bill would have been swollen to a sum of more than nine millions sterling. . .if any one were to tell me that nine millions might have been spent to greater advantage elsewhere, 4 I might not perhaps be disposed to contest him". And to drive the point home Curzon continued in his address at Chittagong to confirm

1 This was for the purchase of the Tug Gekko. 2 The Pioneer 20 February 1904, see also ’Address of the Port Commissioners' - The Englishman 16 February 1904. 3 See Chapter IV. 4 A Short Account of the Construction of the Assam Bengal Railway 1904, 7, see also The Pioneer, 18 February 1904. 205

that having spent "enormous sums" on the railway, "from the strictly business point of view the best chance of getting a due return for our outlay is to provide the proper facilities for the trade which it is in a position to create". ^ Any plan for Chittagong was therefore subordinated to political considerations or the needs of the railway. Events from 1904 to 1912 combined fortuitously to give a brief relief to the port and when these 2 special conditions were removed it again sank back into oblivion.

Unaided by Government the Port Commissioners had to make the best use they could of the resources they themselves commanded. Till 1904 the main sources of income of the Port were its port dues - on the tonnage of vessels entering the Port, and mooring fees for vessels. Other income was received from services rendered and included receipts for water supplied, jetty hire, sale proceeds of stores, recoveries for services rendered to other department, fines, sale proceeds of promisory notes, contributions from the pilotage fund, fees for licensing passenger and cargo 3 boats and fees for the use of the port tug. But the receipts from all these sources of revenue did not amount to much and certainly were not sufficient to meet the full requirements of the port. In 1901 the Sub-Committee appointed to consider and report upon the landing and shipping of goods recorded, "we find that the Port working shows an annual deficit, amounting to approximately Rs 7, 000,

1 Viceroy's Address at Chitt. 14 February 1904, P. P. 1906, LXXI, 845.

2 Except for Rs 3, 25, 000 for revetment work, Rs 8 , 00, 000 for the purchase of a second dredger, 30, 000 for pilotage and Rs 10, 00, 000 to the Port Fund mainly for construction work, no further grant was made to the port at least until 1944-45. Admin Rept. . . 1944-45, 21. 3 Chitt. Port Trust Ordinary Receipts and Expenditure 1905-06, E.B.A. PWD Mne 1906, October 1. 206

the average expenditure for the last three years ending 31

March showing an income of Rs 6#6 , 000 against an expenditure of Rs 73, 000. Apart from this, the Special Officer points out that. . .additional expenditure is necessary". ^ The Government of Bengal in order to balance the account, had from time to 2 time made grants to the port from Provincial revenues. In 1900 however, the Government stated "this arrangement cannot be allowed to continue, and it is imperatively necessary for the Commissioners to take steps to make the Trust self-supporting."' It then proceeded to outline how this self sufficiency might be achieved either by imposing new charges or by increasing existing rates. A Sub-Committee of the Trust was thereupon appointed to work out the details of a possible financial scheme, and in due course it set out a series of possibilities. One was merely to increase existing charges, but it also suggested thatincome could be enlarged by making pilotage compulsory, by ensuring that the jetty was fully utilised by sea-going vessels, by maintaining the Kutubdia lighthouse from the coast light dues, by increasing the contribution from the pilotage fund to the port 4 fund, or by imposing a river due.

1 Proceeding of a meeting of the Sub-Committee appointed. . .to consider and report upon the landing and shipping of goods in regard to weekly cargo steamers - 4 May 1901. Beng. Proc. Mne 1901, September 2 6 . Footnote - The Additional expenditure were for coastbuoys, mooring buoys, heave-up boat, conical river buoys, can river buoys, half inch chain and new mooring chains and anchor needing a total of Rs 34, 030. 2 Resolution by the Govt, of Beng. Marine Dept. 13 March 1900. Beng. Proc. Mne 1900, March 78 . 3 Ibid.

4 Rept. of the Sub-Committee on the Port Finance 6 June 1900, Beng. Proc. Mne 1900, October 102, see also Govt, of Bent, to Chmn. Port Comms. 18 December 1902, Beng. Proc. Mne 1903, January 85. 207

These proposals were received with mixed feelings. The idea of compulsory pilotage and compulsory use of the jetties by all vessels foreign and coastal, was 'opposed by the Port Commissioners^ some of whom were owners or agents of coastal 2 shipping lines. The Government of India being addressed on the subject of compulsory pilotage, expressed the opinion that it was desirable that a system of compulsion should be based on grounds other than improvement of the financial position of the Trust, and that it should be shown that compulsory pilotage was necessary 3 in the general interests of public safety. The Lieutenant Governor of Bengal visited Chittagong in 1903 and after enquiries stated that 4 compulsory pilotage was not essential to the Port of Chittagong. The question of compelling vessels to come alongside the jetties had been brought up from time to time without any results. In 1903 the Government of Bengal accused the Commissioners of not using their powers in that respect and stated "It has been brought to the notice of the Government that the Port Commissioners by a majority, recently refused to pass a resolution to exercise the powers conferred on them by section 22 of Act IV of 1887 and ordered all seOL-going v e s s e ls to com e alongside the jetty if there 5 is room". The opposition of the Commissioners can be attributed to the fact that many of the Commissioners in the early years of the Port Trust were also ship owners and merchants whose trade would have been effected by the imposition of new rates. However when in 1911 the question of compulsory use of the jetties came up the owners and agents of the coastal steamer companies gave a variety of reasons for opposing the measure.

1 Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt, of Beng. 18 December 1902, Beng. Procl Mne 1903, January 85. 2 Messrs. M. David &: Co. Narayanganj, Messrs. Finlay Muir & Co. 3. Govt, of Beng. to Comms. Chitt. Divi, 25 February 1903, Beng. Proc. Mne 1903, October 47. 4 Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India, 20 May 1903, Beng. Proc. Mne. 1903, October 50. 5 Govt, of Beng. to Chmn, Port Comms. 18 December 1902, Beng. Proc. Mne , 1903, January 85. 208

Thus they then argued that the shipowners had no voice in the management of the Railway Company's jetties, neither as regards the rates to be paid nor as regards their allotment, working arrangement and administration. The Railway Company was bound to regard their own carrying trade as of first importance. Under those conditions the ship owners were afraid that "The convenience and interest of the ship owner must be sacrificed to those of the Railway Company". * A second point which they made was that the coasting steamers had had to make their own provision for carrying 2 on their trade before the construction of railway jetties. Compulsory use of the railway jetties would mean that the capital sunk in land, offices, godowns, pontoons, boats and cooly lines by the coastal steamer companies would be thrown out of 3 employment. Finally they argued that Calcutta, Rangoon, Bombay and Karachi were essentially terminal ports for coasting vessels where they landed and received the bulk of their cargo and stores. Chittagong on the other hand was only a port of call, of which there were many on the coast where earnings were very small - out of all proportion to the increased charges to be borne under the compulsory 4 sections of the proposed new Port Trust Act. During the period under study the use of jetties was therefore not made compulsory.

The proposal of the Sub-Committee, that the Kutubdia lighthouse should be maintained from the Government Coast Light Dues did not meet with the approval of the Government of Bengal. The Sub-

1 Messrs. Turner, Marrison & Co. to Govt. ofE.B.A. 18 February 1911 - & Fr. Messrs. Bulloch Brothers & Co. Ltd. Agents British India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. to Govt, of E. B.A. 31 Jan u ary 1911 -E.B. & A. PWD Mne 1912, April 31, 32. 2 See Chapter V. 3 Bullock Brothers &: Co. to Govt. ofE.B.A. 31 January 1911, E . B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1912, April 31. 4 Note on proposed new Port Trust Act - by G. Scoones Chitt. 27 July 1911, Beng. Proc Mne , 1912, April 45. 209

Committee had proposed that as the Kutubdia lighthouse was 22 miles away from the port of Chittagong and as other lights at Akyab and elsewhere which were nearer*to their ports and more indispensable to them were kept up from the coast light dues, the port of Chittagong had a claim at least to assistance in the upkeep of the Kutubdia lighthouse. * To this the Government of Bengal replied that for them to maintain the lighthouse would require the levy of light dues, which would result in the increase of the charges of the port, "this", the Government pointed out, "in the present condition of the trade to the Port was undesirable as any increase in the charges of the port in the initial stage of its development would adversely effect its trade ':1 The proposals to impose a river due and to increase the contribution from the pilotage fund to the port fund however, received the approval of the Commissioners and of the Government of Bengal. In December 1902 the Government of Bengal proposed that a river due of four annas a ton should be levied from the commencement of 3 the next financial year. The Port Commissioners agreed to the 4 levy of a river due but disagreed as to the amount to be levied. It was finally settled that a river due of two annas per ton should be levied on all goods landed from or shipped into any sea-going 5 vessels within port limits.

Another resource of the Port Trust might have been an improvement in the earnings of the jetties, for it will be recalled that at the time of the transfer of the jetties it was laid down that the Port Trust

1 Vice-Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt, of Beng. 15 June 1900, Beng. Proc. Mne, 1900, October 102. 2 Govt, of Beng. to Chmn. Port Comms. 5 September 1900, Beng. Proc. Mne 1900, October 105. 3 Govt, of Beng. to Chmn. Port Comms. 18 December 1902, Beng. Proc. Mne 1903, January 85. 4 Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt, of Beng. 13 October 1902, Beng. Proc. Mne 1903, January 82. 5 Govt of Beng. to Chmn. Port Comms. 25 June 1903, Beng. Proc. Mne 1903, August 152. 210

would be entitled to the surplus profits after four per cent interest on the capital cost had been earned. The jetties, however, as the Vice-Chairman of the Port Commissioners pointed out, "have shown no profit for several years". ^ This may be attributed to the fact that since the use of the jetties was not compulsory only steamers engaged in foreign trade used them, coastal steamer companies having already provided for their own landing and shipping facilities. As a result the earnings from the use of the jetties did not increase, especially since charges were by the ship handled, and the number of ships visiting the port did not grow significantly. Moreover, the four jetty fires destroyed many articles of export and import affecting not only jetty earnings but saddling that head with expenditure on new sheds, heavier sleepers and new fire prevention apparatus.^

The other charges levied at the port were the hospital dues, the port dues, and the charges levied for pilotage.

The Pilotage Fund formed part of the Provincial Revenues of the Government. Although it was administered by the Port Commissioners, its accounts were kept separate from the Port Fund under orders contained in the Bengal Government PWD letter No. 981 Mne, dated 3 16 May 1889. Judging from the practice in other ports the Sub- Committee found that the pilotage account was not debited with certain charges which were fairly debitable to it. The Port Commissioners had for years urged that the annual contribution from

1 Note by Vice-Chmn. Port Comms. on the Railway Terminal jetties at Chitt. 27 January 1910, Beng. Proc Mne 1912, April 24. 2 Admin Railway 1912, Appendix 9, 242. 3 Budget Estimate for the year 1908-1909, E.B.A. P ro c . PWD Mne 1908, June 1. 211 the Pilotage Fund to the Port Fund for work done to improve the port had been insufficient. With difficulty they secured an increase from Rs 1, 000 to Rs 1, 200 in 1892; from Rs 1, 200 to Rs 2, 500 in 1903; and from Rs 2, 500 to Rs 4, 000 in 1906. * The result was that the Port funds suffered to the benefit of Provincial revenues. In 1908 relief however, was extended to the Port Fund when the Government of India on 14 February declared that the old Pilotage Fund was to be converted into a separate fund called "the Chittagong Pilotage Fund", administered by the Port Commissioners as at 2 Bombay, Madras, Karachi and Rangoon. The Chittagong Pilotage Fund was therefore opened in 1 April 1908 with a balance of 3 R s 6 , 604. 12-9, and various charges formerly debited to the Port Fund were thereafter set against that fund. These were half share of the Port Officer's salary; and of the charges for the Port Office and Semaphore establishments, and half of the expenditure from the Port Fund for printing, advertising and stationery, municipal assessment, office expenses and furniture, postage, telegrams, 4 telephones and for petty construction and repairs.

As a result of this measure the income of the Pilotage Fund by 1912 was "just sufficient to meet the ordinary recurring expenditure". It however did not leave any balance required for the purchase of appliances e.g. a strongly built wooden cutter of modern type estimated to cost Rs 50, 000 proposed to replace the old Pilot cutter „ 5 now m use".

1 Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt. ofE.B.A. 21 September 1907, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1908, July 4. 2 Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt. ofE.B.A. 1 August 1908, E.B.A. Proc. PWD Mne 1909, April 1. 3 Budget Estimate 1909-10, E.B.A. Proc PWD Mne 1909, April 27. 4 Budget Estimate 1908-09, E.B.A. Proc PWD Mne 1908, June 1. 5 Admin Rept. 1911-12, Beng. Proc Mne 1912, September 26-30. 212

Thus it is found that beside the river due of 2 annas no addition was made to the Port revenues in our period though the creation of the Chittagong Pilotage Fund dfd give a certain amount of relief. This increase in revenue however was more than balanced when from 1906 the Port Commissioners set about reducing various port charges instead of increasing them.

One of the leading policies of the Port Commissioners had always been that, "none of the charges (at the Port of Chittagong should], if possible be higher than at Calcutta". * Justifying this policy, the Chairman of the Port Commissioners wrote, "From conversations which I have had from time to time with merchants and sea-faring men, I know that the smallest differences in the 2 charges at the different ports are keenly considered by them". They further felt that higher charges than at other ports would also be suicidal in the initial stage of the development of the port. In 1906 the Port Commissioners made concrete efforts to reduce dues the rates of which were higher than those in the port of Calcutta. These were found to be in hospital dues, and port dues.

Hospital port dues were levied on all ships, whether manned by European or Indian crews. Till 1906 the rate was one anna per ton for each arrival while a compound rate of two annas per ton a year was levied on all vessels calling at fixed intervals and on regular 3 line steamers trading with the Port of Chittagong. From 1 July

1 Port Comms. Ordinary Meeting, 1 June 1906, E . B.A. P ro c. PWD Mne 1906, September 28. 2 Chmn. Port Comms. to Govt, of Beng. 9 June 1906, E . B.A. . Proc. PWD Mne 1906, September 27. 3 Notification by the Govt. ofE.B.A. 10 M ay 1906, E.B.A. P ro c . PWD Mne 1906, September 24. 213

1 9 0 6 therefore the hospital port dues at Chittagong were reduced to the existing rates at Calcutta, then fixed at 9 pies per ton for

each trip and 1 anna 6 p ie 3 for thd compounded rate. * It was

further reduced to 6 pies moreover, when the hospital port due 9 at Calcutta was further reduced from 9 pies to 6 pies a ton. This reduction however did not affect the finances of the port as the hospital due fund was a separate "excluded Local Fund", th® fees from which were not credited to the Port fund.

The first schedule of the Indian Ports Act X of 1889 provided that the maximum rate of port dues was to be four annas a ton for Calcutta, Madras, Bombay and Karachi. The maximum leviable 4 at Rangoon under that schedule was six annas a ton but the rate 5 actually charged was less than 4 annas a ton. When a comparative statement was called for by the Local Government it was found that port dues at Chittagong at four annas six pies a ton, levied under Act No. XXXV of 1857,were higher than in any other port in India. The Port Commissioners in 1906 therefore, pointed this out to the new Government of Eastern Bangal and Assam: "It is most detrimental to the interest of Chittagong that the port dues here should be levied at a higher rate than at any of the other ports mentioned, and the Commissioners beg. . .His Honour the Lieutenant Governor. . .to direct the reduction of the Chittagong port due to 7 ' annas 4 a ton". From 1 July 1906 the port dues at Chittagong were thus reduced and the exiguous revenues of the port declined accordingly.

1 Notification by the Govt. ofE.B.A. 10 May 1906, E.B.A. P ro c. PWD Mne 1906, September 24. 2 Port Comms. Ordinary Meeting 1 June 1906, E.B.A. P ro c. PWD Mne 1906, September 28. 3 Ibid. 4 Acts of the Govt, of India 1854.57 - Act No XXXV of 1857. 5 Port Comms. Ordinary Meeting 1 June 1906, E.B.A. P ro c. PWD Mne 1906, September 18.

6 Index to the Acts of the Govt, of India 1854-57. Act No. XXXV of 1857. 7 Port Comms. Ordinary Meeting 1 June 1906, E.B.A. P ro c. PWD Mne 1 9 0 6 , September 28. 214

Thus it is found that during the period under study there was no substantial increase in the revenue of the Port. It may be argued that the increase in trade must necessarily have led to an increase in port dues and mooring fees. The receipts of the port however did not increase in proportion to the rise in value of the foreign trade. * Mooring fees and port dues depend on the number and tonnage of the ships visiting the port. It will be seen from the following table of vessels visiting the port that except for the year 1906-07 when the rice trade enormously increased the traffic and receipts of the port, the number of ships and the total tonnage increased very little in spite of the enormous increase in the value of the foreign trade carried in them.

1903-04 1904-05 1905-06 1906-07 1907-08

Ships 354 339 337 341 370

Tonnage 2, 85, 773 3, 04, 216 3, 26, 725 4, 36,477 4, 8 8, 387

1908-09 1 9 0 9 - 1 0 1 9 1 0 - 1 1 1 9 1 1 - 1 2

Ships 394 384 378 388 Tonnage 4, 37, 331 3, 73, 770 3, 55, 293 3,62,993 - 9

The explanation is that previously vessels that came to the port of Chittagong left with their holds unfilled. As the trade expanded the same vessels were able to carry more and more cargo to and from

1904-5 1906-7 1901-10 1910-11 1911-12 Rs Rs Rs Rs Rs

Mooring fees 15,684 2 8 ,509 2 1 , 6 0 9 20,413 26,774 P o rt Dues 49, 232 65, 613 49,983 38,567 52,860 River Dues 31,176 51,838 29,011 29,177 41,482 Govt, of Beng. to Govt. of India, 8 October 1912, Beng. P ro c . Mne 1913, June 13.

2 Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India, 8 October 1912, Beng. Proc. Mne 1913, June 13. 215

Chittagong without there being any necessity for more vessels. A sa result although the vessels were carrying more cargo they were not paying higher mooring fees or port dues than before. *

The financial stability of a port as Buchanan pointed out, depends on its block value, its annual revenue and expenditure and its reserve funds. The total value of the block of the port of Chittagong in 1911-12 was Rs 17, 56,952. And since the capital expenditure with small exceptions was not directly revenue producing 2 it was a dead weight on the trade of the Port. As for the revenue and expenditure of the port it was found that in 1911-12, the Port Fund had an income of Rs 1, 44, 250 and an expenditure of 3 Rs 2,30,932, a deficit on the year 1 s working of Rs 86,682. The pilotage fund was self-supporting but the Dredger and Revetment 4 Fund required an annual working expenditure of Rs 75, 000 apiece. Moreover the port lacked ciny substantial reserve fund from which to meet depreciation and to deal with major replacements or additions 5 such as a dredger, or to cope with any marked fall in income.

By the end of 1912 therefore, the port was faced with the necessity of meeting a recurring deficit cf at least one and a half lakhs without there being any possibility of corresponding increase to its•f income. * 6

1 Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India 8 October 1912, Beng. Proc. Mne 1913, June 13. 2 Buchanan - 9.

3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Buchanan 10.

6 Govt, of Beng. to Govt, of India 8 October 1912, Beng. Proc. Mne 1913, June 13. 216a (3, Map showing the Trade Blocks of the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam 1907-08

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BLOCK I - Upper Assam: Darrang (Sadr subdivision), Sibsagar, Lakhimpur, Naga H ills BLOCK II - Lower Assam: Garo H ills, Goalpara, Kamrup, Darrang (Mangaldai (subdivision) BLOCK III - Surma V alley: Sylhet, Cachar, Manipur, Khasi and Ja m tia H ills, Lushai H ills BLOCK IV - Bakarganj: Bakarganj, Faridpur BLOCK V - Rajshahi: Dinajpur, Rajshahi, Rangpur, Bogra, Pabna, Jalpaiguri, Mai da BLOCK VI - Dacca: Dacca, Mymensingh BLOCK VII - Tippera: Tippera (including Hill Tippera) , Chittagong (excluding Port and Town), Noakhail, Chittagong Hill Tracts BLOCK VIII - Chittagong Port: Chittagong Port and Town CHAPTER VII 216

Trade-Development of Overseas Trade and Changes in the Internal T rade

During the years 1892 to 1912 the trade of Chittagong port registered a clear-cut overall increase. Perhaps the performance of the port fell short of the expectations of its patrons but under the circumstances already described, the port authority may be thought to have done quite well. There were sharp fluctuations in the figures for both imports and exports between 1892 and 1905, but once the first jetty had been brought into use and the main structure of the Assam Bengal Railway was in operation, a pretty constant rise began of impressive proportions: in the decade 1902-1912 exports rose by 250 per cent and imports by 300 per cent. The erratic nature of the movements registered in the dozen years after 18 9 2 may be seen as an indication of the lack of development of the port and its hinterland, which made it very vulnerable to shifts in the outturn of one or two major crops and to the seasonal uncertainty of navigation by small sailing crafts of the hazardous Meghna estuary and exposed coasting run to Chittagong. After about 1905>however, aided by the government of the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, the port secured an effective command over a much wider hinterland and began the process of attracting ocean-going shipping. The changes in the pattern of trade which followed from these developments form the subject of this chapter.

A simple definition of the hinterland of a port, given by B. Nagorski, is 'the area which is using the port for its overseas trade'

1 B. Nagorski^ Port Problemain Developing countries Principles of Port Planning and Organization, 277. I

217 218

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jo srvsj 7 7/« 219 Unfortunately, for quite half our period, there is little or no statistical evidence on which to define the hinterland of Chittagong, for it was only after the creation *of the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam that a tolerably effective record was made of the total trade of the port. Before the opening of the Assam Bengal Railway the trade from Chittagong into the interior was effectively limited to coastal shipping which linked the port with the vast river network of Bengal. * Prior to August 1901 there was an inland traffic registration office under the supervision of the Custom Office at Chittagong at which the traffic entering or leaving the 2 port by country boat used to be registered. But as the Government of Bengal recognised this provided a very inadequate guage of the total trade - 'The registration work now done at the Buxi 's Hat Station consists of only those goods that are landed at the Chaktai Khal which is the sole approach to the office from the river. Most of the country boats that carry on the inland trade of the district on that side discharge their cargoes below the Sadarghat Jetty where merchants buy up the large quantities of grain imported, thus giving no opportunity to the inland registration clerk to deal with the vessels". What is more, the Director went on,"the figures which are supplied by the merchants to the registration office are, it is believed, totally untrustworthy and valueless. These vessels come from no declared port, and are, therefore, without Customs papers and are not obliged by any law to notify their arrival and departure to the Customs Officer. A considerable quantity of trade in other articles also, it is alleged, escapes registration owing to the fact that the khal is now impassable at certain times. Moreover a large portion of the trade has been diverted by the opening of a

1 See Chapter II 2 Director of Land Records and Agriculture E.B.A. to Comms. Chitt. Port Trust, 19 July 1906, Govt, of Beng. Financial Dept. (Commercial), 1914, February 2-9, K.W. P roc. 220

railway which carries the daily bazar articles from places lying adjacent to the line, besides a very large quantity of rice and paddy from the Noakhali district! There is reason to believe that not even 5 per cent of the traffic is registered at Buxi's Hat Office, and that the figures annually given by the office are quite unreliable and do not give the real value of the trade". *

So unreliable indeed were the statistics thus collected at the Buxi's Hat that on the recommendation of the Chittagong Port Officer and with the approval of the Government of Bengal the registration office 2 was abolished from August 1901. Thereafter there are no detailed Customs figures at all from which to trace the evolution of the trade of the port until 1909. Once the Assam Bengal Railway was completed in 1904 it is possible to use the figures in the Rail and River Borne Trade of Bengal, but only in respect of goods carried by rail. On the constitution of the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, the Provincial Director of Land Records and Agriculture had suggested to the local Government that since the Port of Chittagong would increase in importance every year, it might usefully be made for statistical purposes into a separate trade block, the trade entering or leaving it by all routes being recorded as in the case of the Calcutta block. This proposal was accepted by the Government in their reply of 29 March 1906, and a system was introduced for the registration of the trade of the Chittagong 3 Port block by all routes from 1 February 1909. The figures,

1 Director of Land Records and Agriculture to Comm. Chitt. Port Trust 19 June 1906, Beng. Fin. Dept (Com) 1914, Feb 2-9, K.W. P ro c. 2 Director of Land Records and Agriculture E. B.A. To C om m s. Port of Chitt. 14 July 1906. Beng. Fin. Dept. (Com), 1914, February 2-9, K.W. P ro c. 3 Abolition of the Chittagong Port block as a special separate block, A Note by R.K.M. and L.D'Santos, 5 November 1912, Beng. Fin. Dept. (Com), 1914, February 2-9, K.W. P ro c. 221

excluding those for road traffic the registration of which was subsequently abandoned, were published for the first time in tables VI and VII of the rail and river borne trade of the province for 1909-10. * It is thus only for the last two or three years of this study that a reasonably complete record of the trade of the port is available. It is within these limitations that an attempt has therefore to be made to trace the growth of trade at Chittagong and define the hinterland of the port.

One marked feature of Chittagong's hinterland, which after the opening of the railway included most of East Bengal and Assam, was that it was also the hinterland of the port of Calcutta, so that over the years there was a constant tug of war between the two ports for the trade of the region. In some products Chittagong was able to secure a significant share of the trade, in others, however, it could make but little impact upon the established dominance of its great rival.

One,perhaps the major, item in the market economy of Eastern Bengal and Assam was the cultivation of jute. Jute had long been grown in the region and since at least as early as the eighteenth century jute cloth had been the common wearing apparel of the 2 people of North Bengal. Moreover in 1906 of the total of 3, 500, 000 acres of jute growing land in Bengal, 2, 700, 000 were to be found 3 in Eastern Bengal and Assam, mainly in the Dacca and Tippera blocks. Nevertheless, till very late, the flow of jute from this

1 Abolition of the Chittagong Port block as a special separate block, A Note by R. K. M. and L. D'Santos, 5 November 1912, Beng. Fin. Dept. (Com), 1914, February 2-9, K.W. P ro c. 2 Report of the Bengal Jute Enquiry Committee - Majority Rept. Minority Repts. 1934, 1, 9. 3 B. C. C. 1914, Appendices 187. 222 whole region was to Calcutta not Chittagong.

One obvious reason for this was that Calcutta was not only a port early equipped to handle exports by ocean-going vessels to Europe and America but was also a centre of jute manufacture. The first power driven jute mill in Bengal was established at Serampore in 1855. * With its establishment was hastened the total extinction of the indigenous handloom jute industry in Bengal the decadence of which had in fact started with the establishment 2 of jute mills at Dundee in 1835. After the establishment of the first mill in Bengal others followed rapidly till to quote Sir George Watt, "the banks of the Hughli literally teemed with their smoking 3 chimneys. " The first Bengal mill had been opened in 1855, by 4 1 8 9 1- 9 2 , there were twenty six mills, by 1 9 0 1 - 0 2 thirty six 5 and by 1911-12 fifty nine. The rapid growth of the jute industry was the indirect result of the Crimean and the American Civil Wars. The former by shutting off Russian supplies of flax and the latter by depriving the manufacturers of cheap American cotton for bags, ensured the pre-eminence of jute as the best and cheapest packing medium of the world. ^ In the years that followed the export of Indian jute products, mainly gunny bags going to Australia, the U.S.A., U.K., and Chile and gunny cloth going in

1 Sir George Watt, The Commercial Products of India, 423. 2 B.J.E. Cttee, 1934, 7 5. 3 G. W att, 423. 4 Ibid. 423. 5 Ibid. , See also Statement Exhibiting the Moral and Material Progress and Condition of India, 1911-12, P.P. Accounts and Papers, 1913, XLVI, 823. White 53. The figures for 1901 to 1912 are for the mills in the whole of India but as the M.M.P. stated "Practically all the mills are in Bengal in the neighbourhood of Calcutta, in 1911-12, the only mills outside Bengal were two in M a d ra s" .

6 B.J.E. Cttee, 1934, I, 76. 223

large quantity mainly to the United States increased by leaps and bounds. Thus from 1885 to 1895 exports of bags rose from 64 million to 168 millions and exports of cloth from 7 million yards 2 to 114 million yards, with "the United States easily the best customer". By 1894 the jute mills in Bengal were so firmly established and they expanded their scale of operations to such an extent that they began to compete effectively with the Dundee mills in the markets 3 of the United States of America. The following table will show the increase in the export of jute manufactures from India to the United States.

Imports of Jute Manufacturers into the United States (£ 0 0 0 )

1897 1907 1913

F ro m the United Kingdom 1, 641 1, 785 1, 525 F ro m India 786 5, 385 7, 159 4

And more significantly for Chittagong, by 1913 the exports of jute products had made such rapid progress that their exports were 5 only a little lower in value than those of the raw material. Since

Chittagong was not able to participate in this industrial revolution 7 lacking the easy access to coal fields that Calcutta enjoyed, and lacking 7 too>entrepreneurs and capital to establish jute mills, she was forced to rely upon the raw jute trade, either with Europe or with C alcutta.

1 S.B. Saul, Studies in British Overseas Trade 1870-1914, 192. See also M.M.P. 1911-12, 279, G. Watt, 425. 2 Saul, 193. 3 B.J.E. Cttee. 1934, I, 78. 4 Saul, 193. 5 Saul, 192. 224

The first commercial consignments of raw jute from India to Europe commenced in 1828 though from 1795 onwards sample bales from Calcutta had been forwarded to Dundee for experimental purposes. * Large scale consignment however began with the establishment of jute 2 mills at Dundee in 1835. This was brought about as a result of the demand for cheap sacking and packing materials in the nineteenth century following the enhancement of manufacturing enterprise in 3 Europe and the demand for foreign food supplies. The largest purchaser of raw jute from India was the United Kingdom followed 4 by Germany and the United States. Jute as the cheapest fibre in 5 the market was at first used for the making of packing cloth, bags 6 and heavy carpet backing. Later on it was used for making 7 carpets and rugs.

Though the export of jute from India began in 1828 it was not till 1877-8 that export from Chittagong began. This export, almost the result of an accident, was brought about when the jute firm Messrs. David and Company^was compelled by the high rates charged by the Eastern Bengal Railway on the route to Calcutta to ship their jute instead from Narainganj to Chittagong for re shipment abroad. The venture proved so profitable that another jute firm, Messrs. Ralli Brothers,followed suit and continued the 9 practice all through the period under study. Jute from the port of

1 B.J.E. C ttee. 1934, 9. 2 Ibid, 75, see also G. Watt, 423.

3 G. W att, 411. 4 Imperial Institute - Indian Trade Enquiry Rept. on Jute and Silk 1918, 3-4, see also P.P. A & P 1913, XLYI,836, M.M.P.1911-12, 292. 5 M.M.P. 1911-12, 292, see also P.P. Afo P 1913,XLVI, 836.

6 Saul 192.

7 M.M.P. 1911-12, 292, see also P.P. A k P 1913, XLVI, 836.

8 M.J. Seth, Armenians in India from the earliest times to the Present day 575. 9 Lyall & Dowling, 20. 225

Chittagong was mainly sent to Britain but a small quantity was also sent to the United States of America. * This exportation, in^pite of the fact that jute products were one of India's major 2 exports; was confined almost exclusively to raw jute. Explaining the situation the Director of Agriculture thus wrote, "There is . . . scarcely any production of gunny in this province, for there is no power loom and the weaving of gunny on hand looms is an industry 3 now almost defunct".

Jute was grown in the main in three districts, Dacca, Mymensingh and Tippera, of which the principal centres were Narainganj, 4 Bhairab Bazar and Chandpur, respectively. At each of these, numerous jute baling establishments were created, pressing the raw jute fibre either into the lightly pressed cutcha bales of 3^-4 maunds destined for the Calcutta mills or the pucka bales, more tightly pressed and weighing about 5 maunds,which were the standard unit of the export trade to Europe and to America. By 1910, for example, there were seven European and two Indian jute baling firms at work 5 at Chandpur.

Originally Chittagong participated in the export trade in jute by using country craft and coastal vessels to bring the baled jute by river to the port. In 1891-92 some 13, 00, 000 m a u n d s^ w ere thus collected for export. With the coming of the railways, however, this pattern largely changed, though in the absence of any registration

1 See Table 3.

2 Saul, 192-3. 3 Report on the Trade carried by Rail and River in the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 1907-98. 4 N.C. Choudhury, Jute in Bengal, see also E . B. D. G. Dacca V III, B.D.G. Mymensingh 5 N.C. Choudhury, Jute and Substitutes 121, see also Jute in Bengal.

6 River Borne Traffic 1891-92.. 6 6 . 226 of imports by river into the Chittagong block before 1909-10 it is not possible to quantify this. However the figures for 1910-11, when the new pattern of registration of*imports by all routes was in its second year and presumably reasonably effective, it is found that the movement of jute to Chittagong by river, whether by steamer or country craft, was negligible, * - consisting in effect of some thousand maunds from Tippera. By that date the movement of raw jute to Chittagong was mostly by rail.

But, as has already been seen, the Assam Bengal Railway was unable in this period to establish an effective link with Narainganj and the Dacca district, thanks to the opposition of the steamer companies and the lack of any bridge over the Meghna river. Most of the jute grown in the Dacca block which was linked by its own railway system with Calcutta, continued therefore to pass by rail or steamer service to Calcutta. In 1910-11 only 1,40, 000 maunds 2 reached Chittagong by all routes from Dacca, while 33, 80, 000 maunds 3 went to Calcutta. Mymensingh jute, concentrated at Bhairab Bazar, could also pass by steamer link to Narainganj or by the Eastern Bengal State. Railway and in the absence of any Assam Bengal Railway link, that too flowed to Calcutta, the figures for the district being merged with those for Dacca district in the overall statistics of the Dacca Block. It was therefore on the jute production of Tippera that Chittagong could most readily draw, for though Chandpur was connected by daily steamer service with Narainganj it was also

1 See table appended on 'Quantity (in mds) of articles imported into the Chittagong Trade Block by River, Rail and Sea (coasting and foreign) in 1 9 1 0 - 1 1 . 1 2 Rept. on the Trade carried by Rail and River in the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam 1910-11, Table V and VI 3 Trade by R.R.E.B.A. Table II, 56-57. 227

th e terminus o f the Laksam-Chandpur branch o f th e Assam Bengal

Railway from 1895 onwards. In 1906-07 of the total quantity of ■ jute brought down to Chittagong, some 2,182,000 maunds, no less than 1,575,000 maunds were from the Tippera block.*

It should also be noted that as Calcutta overhauled Dundee as the world centre of the jute industry an increasing percentage of all the raw jute produced passed to Hooghly side. The exports of jute from Chittagong, though they may have grown quite markedly within this period, were destined increasingly to go by coaster to Calcutta rather than to Europe and the wider world - a shift actively encouraged, as will be seen later, by the Assam Bengal Railway. The following figures show the fluctuations in the movement of jute from Chittagong to Calcutta, due mainly to the unsteady arrangement that existed between the Railway Company and the coastal steamer companies.

1902-3 1903-4 1904-5 1905-6 1906-7 1907-8 1908-9 1909-10 1910-11 1911-12

cwt. cwt. cwt. cwt. cwt. cwt. cwt. cwt. cwt. cwt.

411 528 6792 255,966 75,762 11,307 7 89 49,516 5,1543

1 Trade by R.R.E.B.A. Table V, 74.

2 Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1906-07, Table 9.

3 Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1911-12, Table 9, 53. 228

With the opening of the Assam Bengal Railway jute slowly gave way to

tea as the leading article, in all but the odd year, in the list of • exports from the port of Chittagong. The export of tea from India in

sufficient quantities to justify its being recorded separately commenced

in 1864.* From that year the export of tea steadily increased, from

2,800,000 lbs. then, to 24,360,000 lbs. in 1875-76.2 By 1886-87 Indian 3 tea had begun to replace China te a , which h ith erto had had a complete monopoly o f the B ritish market. The market in China had suffered from the increasing political instability of that country: China tea faced 4 an export duty of thirty-five per cent, from which Indian tea was free: and the ability of British merchants to exercise a strong control over methods of production and sale of Indian tea did much to displace China 5 tea on the B ritish market.

1 S ir George Watt, The Commercial Products o f India, 241. In 1788 Sir Joseph Banks suggested the desirability of cultivating tea in India. Little was accomplished, however, until Lord William Bentinck became Viceroy in 1834, when a Committee was appointed to enquire into the possibility of cultivating tea in India. In 1835 the government established experimental gardens, first at Lakhimpur, and later, after its failure, at Jaipore. The Jaipore garden was sold to the Assam Company in 1840. This, the f i r s t tea company, was established about 1839. By 1859 many gardens had been established in different districts. The first public sales of Indian-grown tea took place in Calcutta during 1841, when 4,613 lbs. were sold. A sample of Indian-made tea had, however, been sent to England a few years earlier (1838). Ibid., 239, The Tea Cyclopaedia 9-11.

2 G. Watt, 241.

3 Sir Percival Griffiths, The History of the Indian Tea Industry, 124. See also I.T.A. , Rept.1898, statement showing English consumption of Indian and China tea .

4 Ibid., see also I.T.A, 1898, 179.

5 Saul, 197. 229 The early profits made in Indian tea encouraged a large increase in

production. Between 1885 and 1901 the area under tea expanded by

85 per cent, and output by 167 per cent. This great rise in the supply,

unaccompanied by an equal expansion in the market for Indian tea,

involved the industry in great difficulties.'*' As a result, the Indian

Tea Association became ’’much alive to the need for capturing foreign 2 markets". The Chairman of the Indian Tea Association in his speech a t

the Association's annual meeting in 1897, expressed the anxiety of that

Association when he referred to the need to produce tea suited to the 3 Russian ta s te , and so to capture th a t market from China. However, in

1901, 92 per cent of the tea from India s t i l l went to the United 4 Kingdom. In 1903, therefore, with the object of promoting the

consumption and sale of Indian te a, a small duty was imposed by the Tea

Cess Act on Indian tea exported from India to provide a fund from which

to promote the sale of Indian tea in other markets.*’ The effort proved

a modest success at least with regard to Russia, where the export increased

from 1,625 lbs. in 1901-2 to 26,414 lbs. in 1911-12. On the whole, however, the export of Indian tea remained mainly confined to the United 6 Kingdom.

1 M.M.P., 1901-02, 231.

2 Griffiths, Tea, 128. See also I.T.A. Rept. 1901, 3, 85-89.

3 Griffiths, Tea, 128. See Also I.T.A. Rept. 1901, 14.

4 M.M.P., 1901-02, 231.

5 S.M. Akhtar, The Growth and Development of the Indian Tea Industry and Trade 1834-1932, 211. See also Review of the Trade of India 1905-06, 24, M.M.P., 1911-12, 276.

6 M.M.P., 1911-12, 276. 230

While in the late nineteenth century rapid strides were thus being made in the export of tea from India and new markets were being sought,

Chittagong secured scarcely any share in the trade. Until the opening of the Assam Bengal Railway, the effective hinterland of the port was limited to the tea gardens of Chittagong district, and the vast output of Assam and

Sylhet was carried by steamer to Calcutta for export. Thus in 1890-01, out of the total export of 1,235,488 lb. of tea, only 54,445 lb. were moved through Chittagong, the rest all passing through Calcutta.'1' But once the

Assam Bengal Railway was extended through Sylhet and Cachar to the Assam

Valley, the picture was entirely changed. During 1905-06, tea and jute came to constitute 89 per cent of the whole external trade of the port, or 97.6 per cent of the export trade with foreign countries. The export of tea alone was valued at Rs.156 lakhs that year, and that of jute at 2 Rs.126 lakhs * From then on the export of tea from the port of Chittagong was to increase steadily. Thus, as H.A. Antrobus wrote: nThe completion of the Assam Bengal Railway came as a great boon to the industry, not only by reason of the accelerated communications it provided within the province itself and with Calcutta, but the opening of Chittagong as a seaport for direct shipment of teas to London was a big step promtly taken advantage of by tea in te re s ts , and in 1904 the whole of the Assam

Company’s produce, except the gardens of the Rookung Division, Mahakutie,

Doomur, Dullong and Koomtai, who continued to use the riv e r service to 3 Calcutta, were despatched by this new route".

The railway, once established as a link with Assam, cut time, costs and excessive handling. U ntil plywood came into regular use for making

1 Admin.Rept. 1890-91, Beng.C.C. 1891-1892 II, 429.

2 Admin. E.B.A. 1905-06, 1 5 0 .

3 H.A. Antrobus, The History of the Assam Company 1839-1953, 91. 231

tea chests the ordinary wooden chests were easily damaged, especially where the tea they contained was very fine and the contents of the « chest correspondingly heavy. The use of the railway route to Chittagong where tea could be put directly on board the steamer for Europe, reduced handling to a minimum, and this was a considerable advantage, and boosted Chittagong as a tea port.'*'

With the construction of the jetties and the establishment of communication with the United Kingdom by steamer, the export of tea went up further. Thus it is found that after the construction of the 2 first jetty and its coming into full use in 1902-03, the export of tea from the port went up from Rs.61,000 in 1899-1900, to Rs.75,000,000.

Similarly, when the second jetty came into full use in 1904-05, the export 3 increased to Rs.14,062,918, and when the third jetty came into use in

1907-08, it was Rs.15,899,363. At the time when the fourth jetty 4 was completed in 1910-11, the figure had swollen to Rs.26,141,705.

The railway provided the easiest means of transport for much of the

Assam te a , e sp e c ia lly th at from the tea areas o f Kamrup, Darang, .Nowgong,

Lukhimpur and Sibsagar. The railway also served the Surma Valley tea admirably, for the line ran for some hundred and twenty miles, from

Kasimnagar in the southwest comer of the district to Badarpur, through

1 The establishment of direct steamer routes from Assam via the Sunderbans to Calcutta, though taking much more time by similarly eliminating handling of tea at transhipment points served the same end on the Calcutta route. White 47.

2 Admin Rept. 1906-07. E.B.A. Proc.P.W.D. (Mne.) 1907 Nov.6

3 Ibid.

4 See table on the Export of Tea from Chittagong, p 232

or close to the tea gardens. It soon attracted a considerable portion of their crop.'*' During the five years ending in 1905-06, which saw the rail links established, the movement of tea to Chittagong went up by

300 per cent, and in that year nearly 42,000,000 lbs. of tea was exported by way of Chittagong, all but the 17,000 lbs. produced in 2 Chittagong district being from Assam and the Surma Valley. By 1910-11 3 the total quantity had increased to 53,000,000 lbs.

By 1908 the export of tea from the port of Chittagong had increased to such an extent that the Director-General of Commercial Intelligence was able to report, "Five years ago Calcutta shipped 94 per cent of the entire tea exports of India. Last year she did only about 75.4 per cent of the total, while Chittagong in the same time has raised her percentage 4 from 8.2 to 18".

Tea from Chittagong was mainly to the United Kingdom, a sm all quantity was also exported to New South Wales, South Australia and Victoria.

Not all of this growth in the use of Chittagong had been at the expense of Calcutta, for the total export of tea from Bengal and Assam had been

181,000,000 lbs. in 1901, 223,000,000 in 1906 and 267,000,000 in 1911.5

1 Assam District Gazetteer Sylhet II, 181-182.

2 Eastern Bengal District Gazetteers, Chittagong 1908, 123.

3 See Table on the Export o f Tea from Chittagong

4 Review of the Trade of India in 1906-07, P.P. 1908 LXXV 750.

5 Beng.C.C. 1914, Appendices 194. 233

(Chittagong's larger tea exports, in other words, were partly-

accounted for by the expansion in the total exports from the region.)

In 1905-06 Calcutta, despite the fact that her "percentage of the

total exports shipped....(had) decreased in each of the last five

years, chiefly on account of the larger proportion shipped from

Chittagong", still handled about four-fifths of the tea export trade.*

Calcutta's dominance obviously rested on a number of factors, not least

being her institutional maturity in terms of banking, insurance and

managerial skills. Jn some cases, however, the choice of Calcutta was

the outcome of the interlocking of interests within particular managing

agen cies. Thus Messrs. M acneill and Company and Begg Dunlop and

Company, who were tea garden owners on a considerable scale, also had an 2 in te r e st in the Rivers .Steam Navigation Company. I t was natural for

them to send their tea to Calcutta by steamer rather than to Chittagong

by rail. Again for certain grades of tea the choice of port for

despatch turned upon the prices current in alternative markets. The

lighter flavoured tea of Cachar went to Calcutta when prices were high

in the Persian Gulf markets which Calcutta served, to London when prices were higher there, and in that case through Chittagong. The quality of

of Upper Assam teas on the other hand, were such as to suit the taste

of the British public and the bulk of Upper Assam production therefore 3 was normally shipped through Chittagong to London.

1 Admin.Beng. 1905-06, 74.

2 Sir P. Griffiths, A History of the Inchcape Group., 16-17. See also I.T.A. 1896, 288.

3 Agent;.to Board, 7 January 1902, Agent*s Letter to Board 1902 AL/283. 234

The development of Calcutta as a tea market in its own right (as opposed to its function as handling agent for tea destined for the

London tea market in Mincing Lane), also reinforced Calcutta*s leading position - and reflected it. "Although the earliest tea sale in Calcutta was held as far back as the year 1841", S.M. Akhtar n o tes, "the importance of this market grew with the importance of other consuming countries than the United Kingdom. By the end of the century a respectable proportion of the crop was being offered at Calcutta annually. During the early years of the 20th century a number of foreign agency houses established themselves in Calcutta".* No such market was established at Chittagong. Nevertheless, Chittagong was able to compete effectively for a share in the tea trade in the twentieth century, as the table of exports to foreign countries clearly demonstrates.

It should be noted, too, that Chittagong handled smaller but substantial quantities of tea moving in the coasting trade to other parts of India, mainly to Bengal and Burma. The quantity going to other ports in Bengal remained fa ir ly constant at about the one m illio n pound mark, but tea exports to Burma grew over the years to something under 100,000 lbs. in 2 1902-03, the peak year.

The third bulk component in the export trade of Chittagong, rice, did not increase in the way tea did during this period but rather declined, though rice in normal years always figured as a substantial item. Rice

1 S.M. Akhtar, The Growth and Development of the Indian Tea Industry and Trade 1834-1932, 205.

2 Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1906-07, I I , Table IX, 49. See also Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1911-12, i I, Table IX, 59. 235

was grown universally in Bengal though the greatest concentration was found in the active, fertile, deltaic districts of Bakarganj, Faridpur,

Noakhali and Chittagong i t s e l f , in Dacca and Tippera, and also in

Sylhet.* Rice was exported to the United Kingdom and many European 2 countries, to the Americas, and, as the Imperial Gazetteer put it, 3 "to any region to which the Indian or Chinese coolie finds his way".

The rice exported to Europe was mainly used in starch or for distilling, while that exported to Asian countries was meant for food consumption.^

The foreign trade in rice handled by Chittagong port in the nineteenth century was very considerable, amounting in 1873, according to Customs’ records, to some thirty lakh maunds of rice and paddy (rather under

100,000 tons).5 With the opening of regular river steamer services between

Calcutta and Eastern Bengal, a considerable part of this trade was diverted to Calcutta. Nevertheless, until the end of the century rice figured prominently in the export trade of Chittagong, and given that the rice was moved by country boat and that Chittagong port was almost unprovided with modern facilities, the scale of the traffic in the 1880's was really very considerable. For the six years 1883-84 to 1888-89, exports to countries outside India in round figures totalled 34,000,

20,000, 32,000, 14,000, 32,000 and 19,000 tons.^ In the next decade

1 Agricultural Marketing in India. Report on the Marketing of Rice in India and Burma, 7.

2 S.A. Latif, Economic Aspects of the Indian Rice Export Trade, 28-29. Saul, 196; G. Watt, 841.

3 Imperial Gazetteer 1907 III, 284-5, See also G. Watt, 841 .

4 Latif, 29; Saul, 196.

5 Maritime Trade E.B.A„ 1911-12, 8.

6 Sea Borne Trade Beng.1892-93, I 48. 236

rice exports declined steadily, however, the low point being 1892-93

when only 9,000 tons or so was shipped abroad.1 This was attributed

by the Collector of Chittagong to the cyclone of 1892 and high prices 2 ruling in the past year in internal markets. But the downward movement

of the foreign trade in rice persisted with no more than an occasional

comeback as in the exceptional year 1899-1900, when 17,000 tons were

exported owing to a good harvest coinciding with the opening of the Assam 3 Bengal Railway. From 1906-07 to 1911-12, however, total exports never reached even 3,000 tons a year.

The coastal trade in rice was always more: significant than shipments to

foreign countries - indeed, rice was the most important single item in

Chittagong's coastal traffic. Madras was the division to which shipments 4 were usually made, followed by Bombay, other ports in Bengal and Burma.

The amounts involved in the coastal trade varied considerably, depending on the out-turn of particular harvests.^ Thus, in 1898-99 exports had been about 10,000 tons, while in 1899-1900 they shot up to some 47,000 tons, sent mainly to Ceylon, Madras and Bombay.^ (This was a bumper year for rice exports to foreign countries, some 17,000 tons being shipped out.)

1 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1892-93, I 48.

2 Ib id .

3 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1899-1900, I,.58.

4 Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1906-07, II, Tablx IX, 44. See also Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1911-12,

5 The rounded figures for the years 1892-93 to 1899-1900 are as fo llo w s: 1892-93 10,000 1893-94 3,000 1894-95 25,000 1895-96 19,000 1896-97 1,500 1897-98 3,000 1898-99 10,000 1899-1900 47,000 6 Sea Borne Trade, Beng.1899-1900, I, 58. 237

On the other hand, in a scarcity year, rice was moved internally from

one trade block to another and little was exported, and in the near

famine years of 1896-97,1 1897-98,2 1905-06 and 1906.07,^ rice was

largely imported from Burma. Thus the Port Commissioners noted in their

1906-07 Report "The main feature of the coasting trade was the large

im portation o f ric e from Burma, which rose in value from 15.15 lakhs o f

rupees in 1905-06 to 246.40 lakhs of rupees in 1906-07. This was on

account of the scarcity in Eastern Bengal and Assam from the shortness

of the crops there during the last two years. Usually rice is exported 4 from Chittagong in considerable q u a n tities" .

In the first twelve years of the twentieth century, if the scarcity years

are to some extent discounted, the overall trend in the coastal trade

seems to have been downwards.

There have been various explanations for the overall decline in the

coasting and export trade in rice handled by Chittagong port. The coming

of the Assam Bengal Railway, improved access to rice growing areas in

Sylhet, Tippera and Noakhali may at times have helped move stocks down to Chittagong, but it also made it easier to move rice from the northern hinterland districts of the port up into Assam, just as the growth of steamer services made it possible to divert stocks to Calcutta or the western districts. And the railway, of course, provided no link with the

1 River Borne T raffic 1896-97, 57.

2 River Borne T raffic 1897-98, 68.

3 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1906-07, 2.

4 Admin.Rept. 1906-07, 7 June 1907, E.B.A. Proc.P.W.D. (Mne) Nov.6 . 238

towns of Bakarganj and Rajshahi lying west of the river Meghna.

The almost total failure of Chittagong to attract rice from these

districts is vividly demonstrated in the statistics of the rice trade

for 1910-11. In that year 2,000,000 maunds of rice went from

1 2 Bakarganj .to Bengal, 2,000 maunds to Chittagong, and 1,000,000

maunds went from Rajshahi to Bengal, and nothing to 4 Chittagong. Over ninety-eight per cent of all the rice brought into

Chittagong block by rail or water, husked or unhusked came from Tippera

block.^

A more positive factor at work to produce the decline in rice export was

often thought to be the growing popularity of jute among East Bengal

c u ltiv a to r s. From the end o f the nineteenth century, as ju te became

increasingly rewarding economically to farmers, they put more and more

land under jute. The result, so the Annual Statement of Sea-Borne Trade and Navigation for 1892-3 argued, was that "a large amount of cultivation, which had formerly been devoted to rice, had been devoted to jute".^ Fears were expressed that Bengal’s self-sufficiency in food was being endangered.

1 Trade by R.R. E.B.A. 1910-11, Table 11,24. See also E.B.A. Proc. (Leg) 1911, 4.

2. Ibid,, Table VI, 98-101.

3 Trade by R.R. E.B.A. 1910-11, Table I I , 24.

4 Ibid., Table VII, 98-101.

5 Ibid., Table V, 72.

6 Sea Borne Trade Bengal 1892-93, 108„ 239

A leader in the Hitavadi in 1892 m^de this point: "The extensive scale

on which jute cultivation is carried on in East Bengal is doing a good

deal of injury to the country. It is true that the cultivators have now more money in their hands than they ever possessed before, but properly

considered, their condition has at present become worse than when they

devoted themselves to the cultivation of paddy Jute cultivation is responsible for the fact that the cultivators instead of growing paddy

even for home consumption, grow jute and purchase paddy; and this leads

to the scarcity of rice in the country Jute is enriching foreigners

at the expense of the Indians".* It has been vigorously argued since

then that the allegation that rice land was being taken up for jute were not true, or not in the way the Hitavadi presumed. N.C. Choudhury has argued that though jute certainly was very popular with cultivators because of the high prices which it fetched, and the cultivation of jute in Bengal and Assam did expand rapidly, the total area under jute nevertheless did not come to exceed more than 6 per cent of the total cu ltiv a ted area in the two provinces o f Bengal and Assam. On the other hand, "the area under rice, which [was] between 60 and 65 per cent

[of the cultivated area] does not appear to have been reduced to any 2 extent". What can properly be inferred then seems to be that while the area under rice was not reduced, it was also not increasing to any significant degree. (Yield per acre was not improving either in the period here under consideration.)

1 Jute Cultivation in East Bengal, Hitavadi, 15 September 1892, (a Calcutta weekly), B.N.N.R.R. , 1892, 956.

2 N.C. Choudhury, Jute in Bengal, 1-2, see a lso N.C. Choudhury, Jute and Substitutes, 4. 240

RICE IN BENGAL : ACREAGE AND YIELD

1891-92 1894-95 1897-98 1900-01 1903-04 1906-07

39,552,008 38,639,500 39,549,500 36,013,900 34,931,500 40,612,000

284,804,161 416,857,200 398,142,000 311,508,600 316,669,700 317,938,2001 Cut

However, figures of output and demand for rice in India show that the quantity grown in India was not sufficient to meet the demand for consumption inside India itself - as for example, in the period 1911-15 when 2 the average output was 28.38 million tons and the estimated consumption 3 33.51 million tons. Moreover, in this period while the Indian population as a whole was growing quite slowly, that of East Bengal and Assam 4 increased by 8.5 per cent in the decade 1891-1901, and by 11.5 per cent between 1901 and 1911,^ a significant element in that increase being provided by immigration of labour to the plantations and more locally to railway construction sites. The surplus available for export was thus steadily being eaten away by rising home consumption. It must be noted too that East Bengal could not, or did not, aim at the quality market.

There were no modern rice mills in the hinterland of Chittagong,^ the

1 N.C. Choudhury, Jute in Bengal, 193.

2 L a tif, 13.

3 Ibid., 10.

4 Census of India 1901, II, 10.

5 Accounts and Papers 1912-13, CIII, 277, 581.

6 N. Ahmad, 220. 241

prepared r ic e which was exported had been hand pounded and was c e r ta in ly no match for the milled rice from Burma, for example. This the

Commissioner of Chittagong frankly acknowledged: "Husked rice is brought for sale, but the husking is not well done in the villages, this rice therefore does not command the position in the European^which it might, and is disposed of in Indian ports or sent to Mauritius".^

The falling off of rice exports, caused by the erosion of the exportable surplus, if it limited the trade in Chittagong in normal years did mean business for the part in years of poor harvest when it handled imports of

Burma rice. There was always some movement of superior grades of rice from India to the outside world and some movement o f cheaper and in fe r io r 2 rice from Burma. But besides this regular importation, Burma, supplied

India with rice whenever there was famine or serious short-fall in the

Indian ric e crop, Burma thus became a reserve granary from which any large and unexpected demand in India could at once be supplied.

There were two other exports in Chittagong of some significance, cotton and co a l. Cotton was grown in the Chittagong H ill Tracts and in the Tippera H ills, and it had figured in the trade of Chittagong from 4 Mughal days. But the cultivation in the hills was on a small scale and it was Assam where the bulk of the cotton was grown. In the

1 Commissioner Chittagong Div. to Govt, of Bengal, 11 Feb.1882, Beng. Proc. P.W.D.(Rly) 1882, April-May, April 14. The first power-driven mill was built in Rangoon in 1861. By 1881 there were 48 mills in Burma. Cheng Siok-Hwa, The Rice Industry of Burma 1852-1940, 78.

2 Latif, 32. See also Siok-Hwa, The Rice Industry of Burma 1852-1940, 315.

3 StoK-fa/a.,211. See also G. Watt, 841.

4 A.M. Serajuddin, The Revenue Administration of the East India Company in Chittagong 1761-1785, 168. 242

Brahmaputra Valley and the h ills which bordered it, cotton weaving was at best a minor home industry carried on by women. Even in the Surma

V alley and Eastern Bengal where weaving was on a large s c a le , i t never became more than a cottage industry.* Most o f the cotton was th erefore exported unginned from the province. The firms which exported cotton from Eastern Bengal and Assam were Abdul Gaffur Saudagar, Krishna Das

Nityanando Roy, Har Mullick Amlok Chand Roy Murwari, Ralli Brothers, and Naju Mia. Of the fiv e firms Abdul Gaffur Saudagar, Naju Mia and Har

Mullick Amlok Chand Roy Marwari used to send unginned cotton to Calcutta.

Ralli Brothers used to send unginned cotton to their ginning factory at

Narainganj, while Krishna Das Nityanando Roy, having started a ginning 2 factory at Chittagong in 1905-06, sent his cotton there. Though the 3 factory was new and reportedly not "under sufficient expert management", it was successful in a modest way. In the first year some 24,000 maunds 4 of cotton was sent to the new factory, and in subsequent years the movement of cotton to Chittagong by rail and river steadily increased. In

1910-11 some 40,000 maunds came in by rail, 167,000 maunds by river, and 56,000 by coasting steamers.**

Assam also possessed a number of coalmines, twenty-one in the Khasi H ills, two in Sibsagar and the Naga H ills , two in Lakhimpur and two in the Garo

H ills, of which the two most important were the Barapani coalfield with an annual output of about 470,000 tons, and the Moosanram field which

1 G.N. Gupta, A Survey of the Industries and Resources of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 1-5.

2 Ibid., 5.

3 Ib id .

4 Trade by R.R. E.B.A. 1907-08, Table V, 70.

5 Trade by R.R. E.B.A. 1910-11, Table VII, 70. 243

produced 63,000 tons a year.* Most of the coal from the Assam fields

was taken up by the steamer and the Assam Bengal Railway Trading.Company 2 3 for their own use. Some, however, was sent by rail to Chittagong

for bunkering and other purposes, though the amount was never large.

During the development o f the port Assam was a lso drawn upon for

supplies of stone for the harbour and river training works. An attempt

was initially made to bring stone from the upper reaches of the

Kamaphuli river, but the supply was quite insufficient. Then Rajmahal

was tried, in Western Bengal, but the initial cost and high freight

charges proved prohibitive. It was therefore from the Jettinga Valley

in Assam that the stone for the revettment work at Chittagong was 4 drawn from 1905-06 onwards, by way of the Assam Bengal Railway. From

just over one lakh cubic feet in 1905-06, the quantities moved grew

to over ten lakhs a year in 1909-10, and 1910-11 when the port works programme was at i t s , h eig • , h t„ 5

One of the major imports of Chittagong port was also the product of the

development of the port and of the Assam Bengal Railway - that is iron

and steel fabrications. Of the goods thus imported the Assam Bengal

Railway and Chittagong port itself were major consumers. Railway engines,

1 M.K.U. Molla, The New Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 154.

2 White, 58.

3 Trade by R.R. E.B.A. 1906-07, Table V, 69.

4 Chmn. Port Comms. to Agent A.B.Rly., 6 January 1909, E.B.A. Proc. P.W.D. Mne. 1912, Feb.8.

5 Admin,Rept. 1911-12, Beng.Proc.Mne. 1912, Sept.26-30. 244

and rolling stock, rails and fish plates, bridges and signalling equipment, ironwork for the jetties, cranes, and so on, were major items in the machinery, iron and steel import of the period, together with some timber from Sydney, '*’ and railway sleepers from Western Australia,

2 3 in 1905-06, and New South Wales in 1908-09 . But as the railw ay system expanded, tapping more and more of the tea garden areas in Sylhet and

Assam, it also met other demands. The imports of iron, for example, rose from 6,213 cwt. in 1902-03^ to 185,000 in 1911-12.^ Much of this iron was in the form of corrugated iron sheeting. Initially imported to serve the railway and port goods sheds, station canopies, latrines and the like, it was increasingly used by the tea and other industries, as the Collector of Customs explained in his report for 1909-10: "The large increase in imports of this metal is principally due to the price of corrugated iron having fallen which induced buyers to purchase largely for building purposes".^

By 1911-12, the continuing low prices had given a further impetus to the import trade in corrugated iron sheeting, it was reported, as the wealthier classes started to use it in preference to thatch for roofing 7 their houses. The growth in imports of machinery and mill works also marked the tapping of the tea estate market by the railway, though in

1 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1905-08, 3.

2 Sea Borne Trade Bengal 1905-06, I, Table XVI , 85

3 Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1911-12 I , Table XVI, 39.

4 Sea BomeTrade Bengal 190 2-03, I, Table XVI, 82.

5 Sea Bom Trade E.B.A. 1911-12 I , Table V, 8.

6 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1909-10, 5.

7 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1911-12, 5. 245

1906-07 the figures were boosted by machinery imports for a cotton gin and

in 1907 and 1908 by machinery for the construction of a cotton mill in

Chittagong.* From as early as 1909 there was also a large increase in the importation of such articles as "pruning knives, hoes, etc., for use 2 3 in the tea gardens", " d irect from Europe in stead o f from C alcutta", 4 such items standing at over one lakh a year by 1911-12. Tin was another import of the tea gardens^ and of the Burma Oil Company^ which used it for soldering its oil tins manufactured in Chittagong; tin imports rose 7 8 from two cwts. in 1898-99 to 49 cwts. in 1911-12. The rise reflect the beginning of a shift of trade from Calcutta to Chittagong and a growth in the two industries in the years before the outbreak of the first World

War. A similar trade was that in imported tea chests - Indian woods were often too scented and green to use - which was quite substantial, being worth nearly eight lakhs in 1911-12.

The development of the port and of the railway system also altered the pattern of trade in consumer goods - salt, sugar and cloth for example.

Many items previously imported and distributed by way of Calcutta began

1 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1907-08, 3.

2 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1909-10, 5.

3 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1910-11, 5.

4 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1911-12, 4.

5 Maritime Trade E.BoA. 1907-08, 3.

6 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1906-07, 3.

7 Sea Borne Trade Bengal 1898-99 I,

8 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1911-12, 4.

Ib id . See also P. Gaswami, The Economic Development o f Assam with Special Reference to the Twentieth Century, 226. ’ 246

to be imported direct to the port of Chittagong. Hardware and cutlery, nearly all from the United Kingdom, reached a total value in 1896-97 of Rs.51,242* and provisions for the Europeans in the port and districts, and on the tea gardens, earlier mainly brought from Calcutta by rail and steamer, were also tried out as a direct import - a tiny quantity 2 Rs.3,500 worth in 1892-93. The results were promising, and in 1907-08 the figures had risen to Rs.56,398 - an increase attributed, as the

Collector of Customs notec?, "To larger importations of condensed milk, 4 bacon and ham, etc., direct instead of via Calcutta".

In 1911-12 a further impetus was given to this import by the formation of "co-operative stores at Chittagong", and their "obtaining their supplies direct from Europe". As with provisions, so with liquor - also imported almost exclusively from the United Kingdom - there was a steady shift to the use of Chittagong as the point of entry. By 1908-09 merchants had found it to their advantage to import wines, spirits and beers for Eastern Bengal and Assam through Chittagong, it being "cheaper to import direct from Europe instead of obtaining these requirements by rail from Calcutta".^ Sugar was another commodity which had not normally been imported, most of the area's requirements being met from the United

Provinces, Bihar and Madras, and foreign sugar coming in through

1 Sea Borne Trade, Beng. 1896-97 I, Table 9A, 49

2 Sea Borne Trade, Beng. 1892-93 I, Table 8A, 40

3 Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1911-12 I, Table V, 7.

4 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1907-08, 3.

5 Maritime Trade 1911-12 , 5.

6 Maritime Trade 1909-lQ , 6. 247

Calcutta.* In 1905-06, however, "a cargo of 600 cwt. was specially 2 imported from China as an experiment”. In 1906-07 there was a

trial of German beet sugar, and in 1907-08 some 999 cwt. were imported

from Java. This last proved a much more successful experiment, and

formed the first of steadily increasing shipments to Chittagong of Java 3 sugar, which was then invading the Indian market thanks to greater

technical efficiency.

Much the same pattern can be seen in the trade in piece-goods. The

Commissioner of Chittagong noted in 1884-85, "there is a very large

trade in piece-goods and yarns. . . . .these are imported entirely from 4 Calcutta", whence they were distributed to consumers throughout the districts. Only a small proportion of these imports were re-exported 5, from the district, the neighbouring areas of Noakhali, Tippera and

1 G.N. Gupta, 66.

2 Maritime Trade 1906-07, 4.

3 Java under the Dutch planters had long been supplying sugar to America and Japan, but the closure of these markets to this sugar in the late 19th century - resulting from the importation of Cuban sugar in America and the development of a sugar industry by the Japanese in Formosa, led the Dutch to turn towards India. C.N. Vakilr S.C.Bose, P.V.Deolalkar, Growth of Trade and Industry in Modern India: an Introductory Survey, 82.

4 River Borne T ra ffic 1884-85, 96.

5 Ann.Gen.Rept.Chitt.Div.1880. Beng.Proc.G.(Misc.) Dept.1880, Aug.38.15. 248

Dacca usually receiving their supplies from Calcutta. 1 By 1893-94,

the beginnings of direct importation of piece-goods can be seen,

however, in the annual statistics, and with the opening of the Assam

Bengal Railway and the establishment of more regular steamer communication

with Great Britain, a direct trade gradually grew up. By 1907-08, as

the Collector of Customs noted, imports of piece-goods formed nearly 2 ten per cent of all the foreign imports of Chittagong port, while the 3 value of the goods rose from some Rs.50,000 m 1893-94, to nearly 4 R s .6 ,000,000 in 1911-12. The bulk of the trade was with the United

Kingdom, with small consignments from Belgium, Holland and Austria.

There was also a very small, but quite rapidly expanding, importation of

made-up cottons - sarees, scarves, dhutis and so on - "distinct signs",

as the Chittagong Commissioner pointed out, "of growing prosperity". **

(These were good years for the tea industry, as Griffiths has pointed

out,^ and as Bagchi records, "The jute industry had an almost unbroken 7 record of prosperity from 1895 onwards".

Of much greater significance, however, than any of the consumer items

so far discussed, were salt and kerosene.

IV-LVWJ. IIV 1 A WXJ.J.V j

Admin.E.B.A. 1907-08, 58.

River Borne Traffic, 1895-96, 31.

Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1911-12 , 5.

5 Admin.E.B.A. 1910-11, 37.

6 Griffiths, Tea, 142.

7 A.K. Bagchi, Private Investment in India 1900-1939. 249

For centuries salt had been produced in the coastal areas of Chittagong,* but during the British rule a heavy duty was imposed on the country-made 2 salt, and as a result the industry died off completely. Foreign salt 3 for private sale in Bengal began to be imported at some time around 1835.

The bulk of the salt imported through Chittagong in the eighteen eighties 4 was chiefly consumed in the town and district of Chittagong itself,

smaller quantities going to Narainganj and Noakhali.**

Salt was mainly brought to Chittagong in the ships visiting the port to pick up export cargoes of jute and rice.6 Until 1896-97 Chittagong’s

salt trade was almost entirely with the United Kingdom. In 1889-90 and .7 again in 1892-3, a cargo of salt was brought from Hamburg, but the salt was not received favourably, the Commissioner of Chittagong arguing that,

"The people have now acquired a taste for this kind (Liverpool) of salt, and the consequence has been that no other kind of salt is now g imported". However, in 1897-98 Hamburg salt was again imported, and this

1 G.Plowden, Rept. upon the Manufacture and sale of and tax upon salt in British India, P.P. 1856, XXVI III, 142.

2 District Census Report, Chittagong 1961, 23.

3 Salt Rept. by G. Plowden, 151.

4 L y a l l , 16.

5 Ibid., 17.

6 Beng.C.C. 1891-1892 II, 429.

7 River Borne Traffic 1892-93, 33.

8 Ann.Gen.Rept.Chitt.Div. 1880’. Beng.Proc.G.Dept. (Misc.) 1880, Aug.38-15. See also C.N. Vakil, S.C. Bose, P.V. Deolalkar, Growth of Trade and industry in Modern India, 86 .' 250

time economic considerations prevailed over personal likings, for it is

found that from that year Hamburg was one of the major exporters of

salt to Chittagong.* The success of the export of Hamburg salt was due to 2 !,the high price of Liverpool salt". Salt from Aden to the port of 3 Chittagong made its first appearance in 1902-03, and from 1905-06

onward there were larger exports of salt from Aden to Chittagong (except 4 for the year 1910-11) than from the United Kingdom, the shift again

being due to the price advantage enjoyed by the new competitor.** From

1907-08 Spanish salt also began to be imported through the port of

Chittagong. Its import from then on was almost equal to that imported

from the United Kingdom. 5

One important point about the growth of the salt trade in Chittagong, as

in the whole of India at the beginning of the twentieth century, was the

impetus given by the successive reductions of salt duty** from Rs.2-8

1 River Borne Traffic 1897-98» 69.

2 River Borne Traffic 1896-97, 57.

3 S ee T a b le .

4 S ee T a b le .

5 The average market prices of salt during the years 1911-12 are given below : Liverpool Panga Rs.90 per 100 mds. Hamburg 90 " Spanish 80 11 Aden 70 " Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1911-12, 5.

6 See Table on the Import of Salt from Foreign Countries. 251

and Rs.2 per maund in 1902-03, to Rs.l in 1907-08, and as it fell

consumption and imports rose - at Chittagong imports almost doubled.

This reduction was brought about under the pressure of nationalist

politicians and under the advantage of several successive surplus

b u d g e t s .*

The growth in salt imports at Chittagong also owed something to the better

port facilities at the port, but it would have been much larger if there

had been a separate salt jetty at Chittagong. As has already been 2 explained, the absence of a separate jetty for salt led very often to

the diversion of salt steamers to the port of Calcutta, especially when

the movement of rice through Chittagong was heavy.

The development of an import trade in kerosene, used as an alternative to vegetable oils as an illuminant, and of smaller quantities of oil for machine lubrication - and in Bengal for ’batching' jute during its manufacture - was a feature of the 1880's. At that date, output within

India from the small oilfields of Baluchistan, the Punjab, Assam and

Burma^was very l i m i t e d , 4 so that almost the whole demand was met from abroad. Until 1886, America as the leading producer of oil in the world, was the principal supplier, the bulk of the sales being of kerosene.**

1 C.N. Vakil, et a l., Growth of Trade and Industry in Modern India, An Introductory Survey, 82. 2 See Chapter V. ~

3 From 1886 to 1936,. Burma was a d m in is t r a t iv e ly a p a r t o f In d ia .

4 Sir George Watt, The Commercial Product of India, 873-75. The total output of the oilfields in the Punjab and in the U.P. in 1903 amounted to 1,793 gallons, and in 1906 to 871 gallons. In Assam the output of the Assam Oil Company in 1902 was 1,756,759 gallons.

5 B. Dasgupta, 2, 17. 252

Chittagong at that time received its share of American imports by coaster, either direct from Calcutta or via Narainganj.* It also drew 2 a small amount of kerosene from Burma, though at that time the Burmese oil industry was still in its infancy, with production mostly from

3 indigenous hand-dug wells. Then from 1884-85 a complete change m the course of trade at Chittagong occurred with oil to the value of just over 4 two lakh rupees coming from Boston and New York direct. With that shipment began a rapid increase in the consumption of American oil until it drove out the Burmese oil to a considerable extent. The direct movement of American kerosene also checked the imports into Chittagong fromboth

Calcutta and Narainganj , the movement by country boatfrom Calcutta falling from 38,000 to a mere 4,000 maunds between 1889-90 and 1890-91, while in the latter year Chittagong, instead of receiving kerosene from Narainganj, even exported some to it.

In 1885-36 for the first time a cargo of Russian oil^was imported, and in the next year the cheapness of this oil enable it to capture the market at 7 Chittagong despite a brief revival of the American trade. Then from the opening of the twentieth century, the market came to be dominated by

1 River Borne Traffic 1884-85, 99.

2 Ib id .

3 B. D asgupta, 17.

4 River Borne T r a f f ic 1 8 8 4 -8 5 , 99.

5 River Borne T r a f f ic 1 8 9 0 -9 1 , 99.

6 Russian supplies were nearer to hand than American, especially after the opening of the Suez Canal to oil tankers in 1892. Production costs were lower, and kerosene could be sold cheaply as there was little internal Russian consumption.

7 B. D asgu p ta, 14. 253

imports from Burma, where the opening up of major European-managed o i l

fields had followed the conquest of Upper Burma in 1886. At Chittagong

imports from Burma from 1901 onwards took never less than 94 per cent

of the market, and in many years as much as 98 per cent. Oil thus

disappears from the foreign trade tables of Chittagong and appears

instead under the heading of internal coastal trade. "The trade in oil

from abroad f e ll off by 32.7 per cent, and is now tr if lin g " , the

Collector of Customs recorded in 1906-07, "the fall being specially in

kerosene oil, as the supply is now received from Burma".*

The shift was in part the result of the low output costs in Burma and the 2 low transport costs to Chittagong, in part the result of the tariff

protection which Burmese oil enjoyed while Burma was part of India, and

m part the result of agreement between the major oil firms. 3 As

Dasgupta re la te s , from 1897 there had been a vigorous price war between

the major international firms for the control of the markets in India,

South-east Asia and China, which was finally settled in 1905 by the

division of the eastern market between the Burmah Oil and Asiatic Oil

Companies. The agreement which was drawn up recognized the "superior

geographical claim" of Burmah Oil in eastern India, and stipulated that

the Burmah Oil Company should be allowed to market a maximum of 100,000 4 cases per week (or 195,000 tons per year) of kerosene in that area.

1 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1906-07, 4.

2 B. Dasgupta, 2 1.

3 Ib id ., 17.

4 Ibid., 21-22. 254

In terms of quantity imports were growing sharply and fa irly consistently

throughout the period, and was the result of greater consumption brought

about by the introduction of cheap German lamps specially designed for

service with mineral o il .1 Chittagong figures rose during the period

from 1 million gallons in 1898-99, to 3 million in 1902-03, to 6 m illion 2 3 in 1907-08, and 8$ million gallons in 1911-12. The other aspect to be

noted is the establishment of a factory for making kerosene tins in the

port - which explains the growth in tin imports in the period.

Both s a lt and kerosene were re-exported to Chittagong's hinterland, local

consumption being only modest. Salt was sent by coasting boats to

Narainganj, Noakhali and Tippera and by railway to other parts of the province of Eastern Bengal and Assam. The s a lt, stored at Chittagong 4 in private and public salt golas, was despatched under bond to bonded

warehouses of which there were twenty-eight in Eastern Bengal and Assam

5 6 in 1906-07. Most of these were on river sites and presumably fed by river steamers or boats, but in 1906-07 when salt began to be carried

from Chittagong to Assam by rail a private warehouse was licensed at 7 Balaganj in Assam to Messrs. Turner Morrison and Company.

1 Watt, 812.

2 Admin.Rept. 1907-08, Beng.Proc.Mne. Dept.1909, March 1^9.

3 Admin.Rept. 1911-12, Beng.Proc.Mne. Dept.1912, Sept.26-30.

4 Rules and N otification Under the Sea Customs Act 1878 now in force at the Ports in Bengal with Appendix and Index corrected up to 31st July 1912-13. Transhipment of salt at Chittagong.

5 Admin.E.B.A. 1906-07, 64.

6 Comm.Chitt.Div. to Govt.of E.B.A. 31 J a n .1906, E.B.A. Proc.P.W.D. June 1906, Aug.16.

7 Admin.E.B.A. 1906-07, 63. 255

Kerosene, too, was sent inland both by river and rail, by the former route to Narainganj for d istrib u tio n in the Dacca Block, and by r a il to the Tippera, Surma Valley and Upper and Lower Assam Blocks. Since on average only about 6 per cent went by riv e r, i t is clear th at the area west of the Meghna continued to be in the marketing area of Calcutta 2 rather than of Chittagong.

In the coasting trade from Chittagong to other p arts of India and

Burma, excluding Calcutta, raw or roughly cured tobacco was perhaps the largest item, small quantities moving sporadically from Chittagong to 3 Burma, but much larger quantities in normal years moving in the opposite 4 direction - as much as 130,000 lb. in the peak year of 1912. From

Bombay there was a miscellany of minor items, such as fishmaws, cotton seed, betel nut and metals, and from Madras some refined sugar and ghee.'*

The trade to and from other ports of Eastern Bengal was far more important than any of these areas except Burma, however. Among these ports Narainganj and Barisal were much the most important, though statistics appear under a variety of forms: for example, Narainganj was treated as

1 Trade by R.R.E.B.A. 1910-11, Tables V and VI.

2 See Table appended on Chittagong’s tradewith its hinterland by all routes, 1910-11.

3 Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1906-07 II, Table 9, 43; and Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1911-12 II, Table 9, 51.

4 Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1906-07 II, Table 7, 23: and Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1911-12 I I , Table 7, 27.

5 Ibid. W

cl a ti O H P P < 1 B £.-i 5 S e, ’"' lJ-i^2 i-s: P '*' f

p-r-cs L_i < distributed. wns countries foreign with, port tliis of trodc tlio how shows tnblo following Tho I s O" co B r/3 P OQ R. P o »-i

L/ I

' u GJ’ M itiuin f oeg Tae f htaog y countries by Chittagong of Trade Foreign of Distribution

g © £ £

tO • • • M w M • • - a C/1 • -M O 00 t£ ± tO Cl h-» ft Ol Cl QOjC w CO Mf o h-* o O “-1 O H o% Cl o o> CO CO tO QOCJCr o Q > CO COh-** CO LO © LOCI WO S 0

to cn 03 . . ro to w p W ci o *-* co- i to T-i & 5 Cl IOi I-* to o < o o >>- to co O 00 H. Cl t» o to oi »-• w --i o to to to

t o •M CO * * M O fO cn • t o o m h ^*- jo I 5> 0 0 t/J CO C> " l*CO *-1 Cl *t>fc o C l c,o CO O CO 0*1 CO C l c o t o Cl l O OiCiCJO © MO)S

to ■

M 03 according c»: o ; o w to co cj I P ' CO ■ t ^ y j oi jf« © to j o P3 c;t o CO OOOi CO 03 ” o *-r ^ r Ol C.I IO *-* o oj oi H O C l H

to to to Cl c CO to: JO 00

W . i CO to o> po V") -‘7 O C O **ci * O IO h-* o« I-* Cl C O C 3 C O oi ©

CO C» O O N O O ^H O I^OOOMO o MSM o> o© o© f*

6 . . «> « O © >t-» C) t o DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN TRADE OF CHITTAGONG BY COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO VALUE

The following table shows how the trade of this port with foreign countries was distributed

Percentage which the total of each coun Im p o rt. E x p o rt. • try bears to the w hole. I 1909-1910. 1910-1911. 1911-1912. 1909-1910 1910.1911. 1911.1912. 1950-1811. 1911-1912.

Its. R s. R s, R s. R s. R s. 13riti«h possessions — • United Kiugdom 44,52,311 44,74,160 49,58,737 3,80,70,249 3,69.96.668 4,40,93,689 82-7 81-96 C eylon 481 20,101 30 86,974 8,360 1,60,482 •25 A aen 2.01,778 1 * 79,847 1,42,120 0-2 *24 Swetlienham (Federated ... 100 Malay States). Straits Settlements ... 0,087 8,707 63,197 COO ■09 M aU rttius 1 11,000 •02 JNcvr Z ealand ... 1.225 1,470 Austrulia ...... 3,18 i 93,925 3 s i , 897 948 1,373 1,565 0 2 •66 Maldjres ... 64 ...... ••

T otal 46,63,908 46,76,740 64,86.204 3,81,6>J,398 3,70,06.396 4,42,68,706 831 8 3 1 2 - 7o reicn c o u n trie s—

S w eden ... 8,436 ... •01 Portugal ... • •0 ... • •• i 2,600 •2 ... 'Germany ... 1,28,661 74,074 2,51,014 30,28,934 44,15,710 48.97,405 8-9 8-60. F ra n c e ...... 6,288 6,250 6,440 3.53,685 13,8-*,877 *26,14,729 2-7 4-38 ■Belgium ...... 1,82,079 86,218 39,807 1,09,150 67,000 1,24,206 0-3 •27 Holland ... 2,7**139 1,69,971 4,18,369 • •• 39,500 ... 0-4 •70 Austria ...... 144 164 ... »•« J a p a n ...... 7 ... * • • • ......

J a v a ...... 1,68.016 1,18.573 1,GO,739 ... • • • ... 0-2 •27 S p ain ... 62,305 64,786 84,622 ...... 0-1 •14 United States of Ame 841 < 665 16,93,840 20,67,799 14,96.875 4-3 < 2-60 rica. Russia ...... OCtt « • « 98,760 Mf • • • ...... iNorway (Christiania)... M. • • • ...... E g y p t ... • 0* ...... 3,194 ... •01 Italy ... .« 1,122 1,610 1,683 • •0 ...... Port Ssid ...... j 74,481 ...... 387 ......

T otal 9,01,969 5,12,181 9,70,174 62,84,369 79,77,773 91.35,409 17-0 16-88

G band T o ra n 65,65,875 61,87,921 64,66,465 4,34,43,756 4,49,84,169 6,33,94,115 io o -i 100-00

cpppjwyi 258

a port for the collection of statistical information until May 1906,1 but thereafter only as port for coasting trade, while Barisal was not 2 recognized as a port until the last year of this period.

Three features stand out in the overall picture of the trade of the port of Chittagong in our period. One was the continued dominance of

Great Britain in the export and, to a lesser degree, the import trades,

the pattern being one of exports of foodstuffs and raw materials to

B ritain and the import of machine-made manufactures. The second was the overall expansion of Indian trade in the period, in which Chittagong shared.

The third was the success of Chittagong in proportionally enlarging her

share of the total trade, most notably on the import side, though of course even in 1912 Chittagong still ranked as a very minor port in 3 comparison with the giants Calcutta and Bombay, as the following table

makes clear.

Imports Exports 1901-02 1911-12 1901-02 1911-12 per cent per cent per cent per cent

Calcutta 40.1 37.5 43.2 37.7 Bombay 34.7 35.6 30.5 27.7

Karachi 7.9 9.5 7.1 10.8 Rangoon 7.4 8.3 6.5 8.9 Madras 7.4 6.7 3.6 3.1

Tuticorin .7 .8 1.7 2.3

Chittagong .1 .5 1.2 2.3

Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1906-07, 9.

2 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1911-12, 13.

3 M.M.P. 1911-12, 285. 259

Of Chittagong’s total foreign trade at the beginning of the period under

study, that is in 1892-93, less than five per cent by value consisted of

imports - indeed the town, district and wider hinterland of Chittagong

depended almost totally for their import needs on Calcutta. Whereas

a substantial foreign export trade from Chittagong dated back to the

1 2 mid-1870's, the import trade was of Ma comparatively recent date".

With the opening up by rail of the Assam Valley as an effective hinter

land to the port, and the construction of port facilities capable of handling

ocean-going vessels, however, the growth of imports developed well. The movement of materials for the construction of the Assam Bengal Railway

gave an early boost and by the end of the period, in 1912, the percentage

of imports in the total trade Chittagong handled had risen to 13 per cent.

At the same time, while all-India export and import figures (bullion 3 excluded) had grown from 1700 m illion rupees in 1892-3, to 3661 m illion 4 in 1911-12, those for Chittagong had risen from 9 m illion rupees in

1892-3 to 60 million rupees in 1911-12. The growth of India's trade as a whole has been attributed to the ’opening-up' of inland areas by the transport revolution initiated by the railway and the appearance of the

steamship, especially after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869.^

1 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1911-12, 2.

2 Admin.Beng. 1891-92, 118.

3 Review of the Trade of India, 1892-93, 1.

4 East India (Trade) Review of the Trade of India 1911-12, Accounts and Papers 1912-13, LXII, 975.

5 V. Anstey, The Trade of the Indian Ocean, 5. 260

The growth of Chittagong can be seen as very specially dependent on th e se two f a c to r s .

The development of trade through Chittagong port closely mirrored that of

India as a whole in one other aspect, as will already have been noted in the detailed analysis of trade in particular commodities. It was dominated by the relationship with Great Britain. Between 75 and 81 per cent of the export trade of Chittagong was with Great Britain. Until

1906-07 America occupied second place as a recipient of goods exported from Chittagong - in that year the percentages were Great Britain 79.3 per cent: America 11.9 per cent: France 4.6 per cent: and Germany

3.2 per cent. Thereafter Germany came to take second place. Thus in

1911-12, while Great Britain's share had risen almost to 82 per cent,

Germany took 8.6 per cent, France 4.2 per cent} and the United States

2.5 per cent. The^pattern of the export trade to foreign countries at the beginning, middle and end of our period was as follows:

1895-6 1905-6 1911-2 fi/a . Ho Jute 7,141,842 12,517,862 24,882,101 Rice 588,589 589,270 166,170 Tea 63,140 15,578,512 27,778,604 Tobacco 749 19 - Other articles 1,939 82,836 567,240 TOTAL 7 ,7 9 6 ,2592 28,768,499^ 5 3 ,3 9 4 ,1154

1 See Table, Foreign Trade of Chittagong by Countries.

2 River Borne Traffic 1895-96, Appendix G, 268.

3 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1906-7, 4.

4 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1911-12, 6. 261

Just as in the export sector, so Chittagong’s import trade was

dominated by the United Kingdom. In 1905-06 the Commissioner of the

Chittagong Division wrote, "Imports from the United Kingdom represented

about 80 per cent of the total import trade of Chittagong during the

year, imports from other European countries about 7 per cent and imports

from Australia about 3 per cent of the whole. The remainder is divided

between America, Africa and other countries in Asia".1

There were three main reasons for this British dominance; the one was

Britain’s early lead, not yet fully overtaken, in many factory-produced

consumer goods - cotton or woollen textiles for example - the second was

that many imports of capital goods were made under government contract, 2 and as S.B. Saul notes, "tenders were only invited from British firms", and the third was the close interlocking of British business interests 3 in the Presidency towns, commercial, banking and transport. The few 4 partial exceptions he pointed out, were Belgium, France and Germany.

Belgium by the mid-’90's was the largest exporter of steel to India.

France supplied about £600,000 worth of silks, apparel and wines.

Germany’s main exports were railw ay m aterials and cheap woollen goods.

Germany’s seeming break-through in these fields, Saul argues, was a very minor one, "German manufacturers entering the market only for such orders when British suppliers were so busy as to be forced to quote long delivery

1 Admin. E.B.A. 1905-06, 150.

2 Saul, 198.

3 V. Anstey, The Trade of the Indian Ocean, 10.

4 Saul, 198. 262

1 dates". Thus it is found that though railway materials fo r th e construction of the Assam Bengal Railway and the jetties were almost exclusively imported from the United Kingdom, imports were at times also made from Belgium, Germany and Austria-Hungary. The ’topping-up’ nature of such imports is apparent from the figures themselves - Rs.194,000 2 on railway locomotives and engine parts from Germany in 1903-04, ; materials worth only some Rs.10,000 and Rs.6,000 from Belgium in 1908- 3 09 and 1909-10, and in that last year some Rs.228,000 worth of rails 4 and railway fishplates from Austria-Hungary. As Lehmann has shown, the

British locomotive manufacturers made sure that even the modest German sales of 1903-04 were not repeated, by imposing their own locomotive d esign s, with India O ffice backing, on .the Government o f In d ia .**

Notwithstanding the quite promising performance of Chittagong port in the twenty years here studied, the expectations of those who originally championed its development, or of those who used its potential as an argument for the partition of Bengal, or indeed of the government of that new province, were not really fulfilled. It had ranked seventh among

Indian ports at the turn of the century, and at the end of our period, in 1912 still did so, though on the export side it shared sixth place with

T uticorin. I t certa in ly had not shown the same dynamism as Karachi,

1 Saul, 200.

Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1906-07, I, Table XVI, 36.

Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1911-12, I» Table XIV, 38.

Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1910-11, I, Table XVI, 38.

5 F.Lehmann,* Great Britain and the supply of railway locomotives o f India: A Case Study o f Economic Im perialism 1, Indian Economic and Social History Review II, 4, 1965, 297-305. 263

though as Feldman's study of Karachi and its Chamber of Commerce shows,

that port was in many ways an interesting parallel to Chittagong, - over shadowed by an established major rival at Bombay, the ae&t of the

Presidency, dependent on railway construction to tap the potential of its hinterland, and, as the Chamber thought, shortsightedly starved of capital at every point. It is perhaps worthwhile therefore briefly to review the main reasons for Chittagong's slower growth.

The most obvious reason for Chittagong's relatively poor performance was that it had to share much of its hinterland with Calcutta. As Apjohn points out, "the trade of the eastern districts of Bengal for a long time centred in Chittagong",1 but from the early eighteenth century and more quickly after Plassey, trade was diverted to Hooghly, until the whole of Bengal became the hinterland of Calcutta. Apart from the Assam

Bengal Railway, a late arrival on the scene, the whole communication system of the Presidency converged upon Calcutta - railways, river 2 steamer lines and roads. The Assam Bengal Railway from its birth found itself in competition with the Eastern Bengal Railway and with river steamer companies and coastal shipping lines with already existing and close ties with Calcutta, whose vested interest it was to limit the effective competition of the newcomer. Their success in preventing the establishment of a bridge across the Meghna which would have opened the

1 Report by O'Conner and Apjohn, 2 D ec.1893: Beng.Proc.Mne.1894, Feb.23-48.

2 Karachi, too, saw hinterland in Rajasthan, in the Doab and in the Punjab threatened by the growth of the rail system running northwards from Bombay, but its own rail links to the Punjab at least were established at much the same time as those of Bombay. 264

rich rice and jute growing areas of Bakarganj, Faridpur, Dacca and

Mymensingh to th e Assam Bengal Railway was a case in p o in t.

Another example of the same process of stifling competion can be seen in the case of steamer services from the United Kingdom to Chittagong.

As has already been seen, the Assam Bengal Railway Company in order to establish the export trade of the port of Chittagong, had arranged in

1901 for the Clan Line to visit Chittagong. At that time, however, no corresponding attempt was made to promote Chittagong's import trade, although the Clan Line from time to time, as cargo offered, had sent steamers direct from Glasgow and Liverpool to Chittagong.'*' The arrangement was clearly inadequate, and so as the third jetty neared completion, both the Port Commissioners and the Chittagong Chamber of Commerce began to exert pressure on the railway for the improvement of the situation. In their Annual Report for 1906, the Chittagong Chamber of Commerce expressed the following view: "The foreign import figures emphasize Chittagong's principle need at present, which is regular direct communication from

London. U ntil th is desideratum i s arrived a t, the large hinterland o f which Chittagong is a natural port, must continue to supply its requirement from the distant market of Calcutta, and Chittagong . foreign trade will 2 show progress in the export direction only". The Commissioner of

Chittagong Division had also stressed the point in a letter of 31 January

1906 to the Government o f Bengal, in which he wrote; "The great need is

1 Managing Director A.B. Rly. to Agent A.B. Rly. 19 July 1907, E.B.A. Proc. P.iV.D. Mne. 1907, May 32.

2 Ordinary Meeting Post.Commns. 14 Sept. 1907, E.B.A. Proc. P.W.D. Mne. 1907, May 32. for the development of general imports direct from England an arrangement with another line of ocean-going steamers should include a provision for regular and direct sailing from England (preferably

London)” . *

Under this pressure the Assam Bengal Railway Company entered into an agreement with the Clan Line for the through-booking of goods from Europe 2 to sta tio n s on th e ir railw ay lan es, with e ffe c t from 1 July 1908. They further came to an understanding with the Clan Line by which that line agreed, for a period of two years, to maintain throughout the year a regular two-monthly service (as the minimum) by way of the Suez Canal and

Bombay between the West Coast ports of the United Kingdom and Chittagong.

The Port Commissioners, however, were not satisfied by these arrangements

They maintained the view, which they had earlier voiced, that an arrangement with another shipping line should also be made by the railway

They wrote: "The Port of Chittagong has become very nearly the monopoly of the Clan Line. Not only is the Clan jetty berth preferentially reserved for Clan vessels, but many other Clan steamers come here which are berthed at other jetty berths. This would not be objectionable if 4 they would bring imports frequently". The Port Commissioners went on:

1 From the Comm.Chitt.Division to the Govt, of Beng. 31 Jan.1906, E.B.A. Proc. P.W.D. Mne. 1906, Aug 16.

2 Through Booking of Goods by Clan Line from Europe to Assam Beng., Assam Bengal Railway. Index to Official Meeting 1908.

3 From the Managing Director, A.B. Rly. to Agent A.B. Rly. 19 July 1907, EoBoA. Proc. P.W.D. Mne. 1908, May 32.

4 Chinn. Port Trust to Govt, of E.B.A. 26 September 1907, E.B.A. Proc P.W.D. Mne. 1907, May 32. 266

"With three full-sized jetties, it^ would be possible to secure the admission on similar preferential terms of another company which would bring imports more regularly than the Clan Line now contemplate doing”.

With this the Assam Bengal Railway Company did not agree. "Until at least one more jetty has been added to the very limited berthing accommodation at Chittagong", they wrote, it would not be possible for them to do more than what they already had done.'*' The Port Commissioners replied: "The Railway Company are not justified in postponing the consideration of the question on the admission of another line on 2 preferential terms as to berthing until the fourth jetty is completed", and accused the Railway Company of sacrificing the interests of the port for their own interest and convenience. The Chairman of the Commissioners wrote: "It may appear at first sight that the Assam Bengal Railway

Company should know their own business best, but it has to be remembered that this Company are scarcely working on commercial lines. The interest on the capital is guaranteed by Government, and there is, it is understood, no immediate probability of the profits earned being sufficient to cover that interest. In the circumstances, the Assam Bengal Railway Company are inclined to take matters leisurely, and do not seem as much alive to the necessity of the development of the traffic as they would if the interest on the capital were not guaranteed. It is a comfortable arrangement for them to keep Chittagong practically a port for the Clan Line only, but this is not altogether in the true interests of the development of the 3 trade of the Province".

1 Managing Director A.B. Rly. to Agent A.B. Rly., 19 July 1907, E.B.A. Proc. P.W.D. Mne. 1907, May 32.

2 Chmn. Port Trust to Govt, of E.B.A, 26 September 1907, E.B.A. Proc. P.W.D. Mne. 1907, May 32.

3 Chmn. Port. Comms. to Govt. E.B.A., 26 September 1907, E.B.A. Proc. P.W.D. Mne. 1907, May 32. 267

Whether the reluctance on the part of the Assam Bengal Railway to make arrangements for another steamship iine to use the port, whose

jetties they controlled, was due to the existence of an undisclosed understanding with the Clan Line, assuring them o f a monopoly is not known. It does not seem u n lik ely , however. Part o f the published agreement entered into with the Clan Line for a regular two monthly sailing from the UK to Chittagong had been a guarantee by the Railway

Company that "during its continuance the Clan Line w ill have the carriage of all railway stores despatched from West Coast ports at fixed rates".*

There is, moreover, an instructive later chapter to the story of the

Port Commissioners’ attempts to secure regular visits by other shipping lines. The Commissioners persisted in their pressure upon the Railway

Company after their rebuff in 1906, and on 5 August 1909 an agreement on the same terms as those enjoyed by the Clan Line was made by the Assam 2 Bengal Railway with the British India Steam Navigation Company whereby

"that Company which has hitherto carried Chittagong cargo from London by transhipment from Calcutta", agreed to "give direct delivery at 3 Chittagong" sailing every six weeks outwards from Middlesborough and

London to Chittagong via Port Said, Port Sudan, Suaken, Malabar Coast 4 ports and Madras. The Port Commissioners seemd to have won a notable victory. But the history of the shipping lines, as George Blake has set

1 Managing Director A.B.Rly. to Agent A.B.Rly. 19 July 1907, E.B.A. Proc.P.W.D. Mne. 1907, May 32.

2 Messrs, Bullock Brothers and Company to Port Officer Chittagong, 1 Feb.1909, O.M.P.C. 1909, 366.

3 Messrs. Cayzer Irvine and Company Ltd., to A.B.Rly., 29 Dec.1908, O.M.PoC. 1909, 366.

4 Messrs. Bullock Brothers and Company to Port Officer Chittagong, 1 Feb.1909, O.M.P.C. 1909, 366. 268

out in his B.I. Centenary 1856-1956, was more often of agreements to share out the market under control arrangements than of vigorous, competition. Part of the 1909 agreement thus laid down that the

B.I.S.N.C. would not ship cargo out of Chittagong,* thus respecting the established interest of the Clan Line in the export trade.of the port. When the new line began its operations, it was found that not enough freight was available at the listed ports, and the B.I.S.N.C. therefore extended their route to take in Zanzibar and other East African 2 ports. As a consequence, goods shipped from England by that line took 3 over two and a h a lf months to arrive at Chittagong. Since Chittagong firms could not use British India to ship return cargoes outwards, the new service proved something of a fa ilu r e . The C ollector o f Customs summed up, "the advention of the new steamship service has not, as was expected, benefited the trade of Chittagong”. He went on, "It would be interesting to know the compact arrived at between the Clan Line and the newcomers, which induced the latter not to make a bid for a share in the 4 foreign export trade of the port”.

It should be noted that Clan Line not only prevented the effective operation of the steamship lines at the port, but had driven a hard bargain before it would itself serve the port. The port authorities to secure regular Clan sailings had been obliged to allow much higher

1 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1909-10, 2.

2 Ibid., 2.

3 Ib id .

4 Maritime Trade E.B.A. 1909-10, 2. 269

freight rates on goods imported or exported from Chittagong than were

current at Calcutta. The rates charged by the Clan Line appear in 1908

to have been "2s. 6d. a ton above current rates at Calcutta for exports

and 10 per cent above for imports".* The regular call of Clan Line ships

at Chittagong had thus only been secured at the cost of blunting the

competitative edge of the port. In 1908 the Port Commissioners pointed

out that "in view of the improved facilities being provided at Chittagong,

especially as regards warehouses, accommodation and discharge", "the rate of freight should be the same for both inward and outward cargo at

Chittagong as at C alcutta to or from the United Kingdom, Europe and

America, for steamers enjoying a monopoly of accommodation at the 2 jetties". The Clan Line defended the continuance of the higher rate on the ground that Calcutta provided full cargoes and Chittagong did not. 3 But to this the Port Commissioners made the obvious rejoinder, that it was the high rate charged at Chittagong which was upsetting the balance of freight availability at the two ports. The Assam Bengal Railway supporting the Port Commissioners, related that since "regular sailings between

Chittagong and the United Kingdom have been instituted, the difficulty of obtaining full or, at all events, paying cargoes for that port must be greatly aggravated by any discrimination in favour of Calcutta, and that, in their opinion, if the rates, as between the two ports, were placed on a footing of equality, there would be such an increase in the volume of traffic to and from Chittagong as would, in any event, more than 4 compensate for the reduction in the Chittagong rate".

1 Ordinary Meeting Port Comms. 4 September 1908, O.M.P.C. 1908, 313.

2 Ib id .

3 Secretary A.B. Rly. to Agent A.B. Rly., 24 January 1909, O.M.P.C. 1909, 388.

4 Ibid. 270

The logic of the argument seemed to have had the desired effect, and it

is found that in 1910 Messrs. James Finlay and Company Ltd., intimated

that the Clan Line owners had decided to adopt the Calcutta tariff for

Chittagong, Mfor all cargo with the exception of iron and steel joists

which at present to Calcutta are at exceptionally low rates". The offer

was less generous than might be thought, for as the Agent, the Assam Bengal

Railway pointed out, "if the intention of the Clan Line owners is to exempt

all classes of iron from the reduction in freight, then the concession loses

much of its value as a very large proportion of the imports of Chittagong 2 from Great Britain consists of articles manufactured from iron".

Nevertheless, the reduction was a step forward in promoting the trade of

the port, perhaps induced by the bright future which then seemed probable.

But this bright prospect was short-lived, and gradually faded away when a

second dredger was not procured to dredge the river Kamaphuli and make it, 3 as Curzon had promised, f i t for larger v e s s e ls . Instead, by 1912, as the

Indian Tea Association in their meeting of the General Committee pointed

out, "There was no prospect at present of any other line going to Chittagong.

One reason for this was believed to be that only light draught vessels such

as the Clan Line boats could berth at Chittagong and that several of the

Conference Lines would have to build special vessels if they wished to 4 compete with the Clan Line there". .

1 M essrs. James Finlay and C o.L td., Agent Clan Line to Port Commns., 8 June 1910, O.M.P.C. 1910, 557.

2 Agent A.B. Rly. to Board, 6 Sept. 1910, O.M.P.C. 1910.

3 Address at Chittagong by the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, 14 Feb. 1904, P.P. 1906, LXXXI, 845.

4 Meeting of the General Committee Indian Tea Association, 27 Feb, 1912, Statesman, 15 March 1912. 271

This was due to the fa c t th a t, "the only two months in which the depths on the bars at high water neap tides exceeded 24 ft. 2 ins. were July and August".*

Thus Chittagong Port remained a monopoly o f the Clan Line and with large steamers not being in a position to come up to the jetties, the trade of the port stagnated. The highest trade figure was reached in 2 1913-14 when its export turnover was valued at Rs.48,486,941, and its 3 import at Rs.13,928,864. Thereafter, under wartime conditions, which made any improvement of the port impossible, the turnover of the port 4 fell away very sharply indeed.

The poor performances of the foreign import trade is linked with another aspect of the history of the port and of the railway to which its success was closely tied. The commercial interest of the Assam Bengal Railway was independent of the origin or the destination of the goods which it carried.

What was important to the railway was the availability of freight, and in sufficiently large and regular supply, to make both up and down traffic profitable. To this extent the interest of the railway and that of the port as a would-be ocean terminal were not necessarily coterminous.

The railway in their effort to develop a down trade from Assam and Eastern

Bengal to Chittagong and so to make operations profitable in both

\ directions were quite happy to see the goods shipped on to Calcutta,

1 Proceeding No.6, 1912-13 of the Indian Tea Association, 3 May 1912, O.M.P.C. 1912, 801.

2 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1913-14 I , Table IVA, 19.

3 Ibid., Table IIIA, 17. 4 In 1914-15 the value of its exports dropped to Rs.33,406,135 and in 1917-18 to Rs.22,983,348. In the same years its imports dropped first to R s.9,540,385 and then to R s.4,070,988. Sea Borne Trade Beng.1914-15 I , Tables IIIA, IVA, 18-20. Sea Borne Trade Beng.1917-18 I, Tables IIIA, IVA, 15-16. 272

especially if they could also control the movement of the return cargo

from there. The commercial logic of their operations as a railway thus

led them to make persistent efforts to promote the coastal trade to

Calcutta, though this relegated Chittagong to the position of a feeder

port. Thus in 1905n06, they entered into an arrangement with the

B.I.S.N. Company and with the Asiatic Steam Navigation Company to develop

the coasting trade to Calcutta,* which did in consequence receive a

considerable boost. As the Chittagong District Gazetteer noted, "The

coasting trade of Chittagong with Bengal - which was mainly with

Calcutta - after falling off continuously with the opening of the Assam 2 Bengal Railway increased.„ in 1905-06". The main revival was due to

the export of raw jute brought down to Chittagong by the railway and thence

shipped to Calcutta. After a trial of several years, the contract was

ended. The Managing Agents, Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Company, explained

the failure: "In their desire to increase the traffic on their system, and

attract additional cargo to and from Calcutta and stations on their line

the Railway some years ago approached us we lent our support and

assistance, which resulted in a working arrangement for a time. After

giving it a thorough trial, however, we found our share of the earnings so

small that it would not pay us to continue, as we were better off without

it, and in course of time after trying certain modifications the scheme 3 lapsed". (The date on which the scheme was terminated is not known, but the

coasting trade figures suggest that it may have been in 1908-09.) Despite this set-back, however, the Assam Bengal Railway proceeded to negotiate an agreement with a newly-formed steamer company, that o f Andrew Yule

1 Memorandum regarding coasting trade jetties at Chittagong by J.L.Brown, Manager M essrs.Bullock and Co., 2 Aug.1905, Beng.Proc.Mne.1912, Apr.48.

2 East Bengal District Gazetteer, Chittagong 1908, 124.

3 Messrs. Turner, Morrison and Co. to Govt, of East Bengal, 18 Feb. 1911, Beng.Proc.Mne. 1912, Apr. 32. 273

and Company, under which the latter agreed to ship coal purchased by the railway from Calcutta to Chittagong and at the same time to carry back wards and forwards any other cargo which the railway could control.^- The trade figures suggest that this scheme did work, for a few years at least.

But the final point that needs to be made in seeking for an explanation of

Chittagong port’s rather modest performance, even after the partition of

Bengal, is that her lack of development merely reflected the lack of development of the province which formed her hinterland. Commenting on the industrial state of Eastern Bengal and Assam, G.N.Gupta wrote: "And even for India, as far as industrial progress is concerned, this province is perhaps one of the least advanced of all the larger provinces. With the exception of the factories for the manufacture of tea, and the oil and the coal factories at Digboi and Margharita, there are no.large . centralized industries in the provinces. There are no cotton weaving mills worthy of the name, no cotton-spinning m ills, there are no jute manufacturing mills, no wool or paper mills, glass factories or pottery works. There are 2 no large industrial centres like Bombay, Madras, Cawnpur or Calcutta".

The reason for the industrial backwardness was that European capitalists were strongly entrenched at Calcutta and saw little need to encourage rivals in Eastern Bengal. Those Indian inhabitants of the new province who had capital were landlords, many of them absentees who "preferred 3 to live, work and invest in industrial and trading activities in Calcutta".

1 Messrs. Turner and Morrison and Co. to Govt, of East Bengal, 18 Feb. 1911, Beng.Proc.Mne. 1912, Apr.32. See also Admin.E.B.A.1910-11, 36.

2 G.N. G upta, 102.

3 Q.K. Ahmed, The Economy o f E ast P ak istan a t P a r titio n , 31. 274

The paradoxical-seeming situation thus obtained that while 83 per cent of the jute grown in India was grown in Eastern Bengal and Assam, not one of the thirty-seven Bengal mills was found in the new province. There were eighteen European and two Indian firms baling raw jute for the Calcutta mills at Narainganj* - but why, it was asked, was there no mill at

Narainganj. "There are several reasons", Gupta was told, "which make the establishment of jute mills at a place situated as Narainganj impracticable. The chief obstacle is the fact that it is absolutely essential for the satisfactory conduct of a jute mill, for the conductors to be in constant and immediate touch with the market. The market for gunnies is concentrated at Calcutta and the mill-owners at Narainganj would thus be handicapped from the very start. Another obstacle is the question of labour. Even a moderate-sized jute mill employs about 4,000 hands. The whole of this labour would have to be imported if mills were established at Narainganj Further as stated above, that there is no market for manufactured jute in or near Narainganj, it would be necessary to transport all manufactured jute to Calcutta for sale, and as the shortage occurring in the process of manufacture is estimated at only 5 per cent, the saving in freight for the consignment of manufacturedas opposed to raw jute would be inconsiderable, even if the actual running of mills here were possible. And as an offset to whatever small saving might be made in this way shall be placed the great cost of import of coal and mill stores from Calcutta, with the additional disadvantage arising from the absence from Narainganj of large engineering firms capable at a moment's 2 notice of carrying out extensive repairs and alterations of machinery".

But, as Gupta argued, not all the points made were valid for Narainganj,

1 G.N. G upta, 63.

2 Ib id . 275

and still fewer for Chittagong. Thus it might be true that because there was little weight loss in the course of manufacture, the difference in freight of raw and manufactured jute in transit from East Bengal and

Calcutta would not count for much, but that is to ignore the fact that jute pcxssing through the mills at Calcutta had thereafter to be sent down river for export. If these latter charges were included, then the cost advantage of having the mills and export houses at Chittagong or Chandpur rather than at Calcutta, would be very considerable. Nor, since much of the Calcutta work force was imported labour, did it seem likely to be difficult to attract labour to healthier East Bengal towns.'*' What was really needed then, was either private entrepreneurial initiative - which 2 seemed unlikely - or the backing of the government.

Before the creation of Eastern Bengal and Assam, the whole eastern region had never received the undivided or serious attention of any government.

Certainly there had been no planning for economic development there until the prospect of partition had made it politically desirable to propose it.

Within a year or less of its creation, however, the Eastern Bengal and

Assam Government had ordered a survey of the industries of the province, and by 1909 had taken steps to improve its industrial position by the creation of a Department of Industries. The object of the Department was to start pioneering factories so as to introduce improved processes in sugar and hand-loom weaving factories; to demonstrate the use of small engines in factories, such as rice mills; to introduce industries new to the locality, for example lac, and to improve the organization of home 3 industries, especially weaving.

1 G.N. G upta, 64.

2 N. Ahmad, 217. See also G.N. G upta, 101.

3 Bengal D istrict Administration Committee Report 1913-14, 184. 276

All these ventures were to be managed on commercial lines. The manufacture of sugar, leather and vegetable oil was to be investigated with a view to the establishment of small factories. The Dacca Tanning

Company (which was defunct) was to be helped financially and used as a training and demonstration centre; and the Rangpur Tobacco factory

( s ta r te d by a J o in t Stock Company) was to be helped and encouraged.*

The Secretary of State in a despatch of 19 January 1912, approved 2 generally of the proposals. But by that date the annulment of the partition was already in preparation, and after its announcement in

April 1912, the Home Government wrote to say that the proposal would need 3 to be recast, "in view of the annulment of the Partition'*. But with that annulment the initiative for industrial change was lost. The industries of the region remained either stillborn or weakly: raw materials such as jute, sugar, leather and cotton continued, therefore, to flow towards the mills and factories of Calcutta, and Chittagong port stagnated with the hinterland it should have served.

1 Bengal D istrict Administration Committee Report 1913-14, 184. See a lso G.N. Gupta and N. Ahmad.

2 Ib id .

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CM •J4 00 O' Water on Inner and Outer Bar 1897 to 1914'.Commenced Dredging August 1907

^4 rH 00 t*- 00 9061 o o i—4 00 r«4 o o rH O 00 rH o o o o Month 1899 1900 1902 1903 1904 1905 1907 1910 1911 1912

ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in i—4 O O O' O' CO 03 00 O' O'O O ' ' • CO . • CO O' rH . 'O rH o O' COO' rH rHr-H rH rH 00 o o ' loo o l 1 O' o ! o • o o o r r rH O' rH O' O O' o rH * O * * H O ' ' O O O O O O O O O' O' O' O O O O' O' H H H H H H rH rH rH rH rH rH rH ' ' O O O ' ' O O ' CO O' CO CO O' O' CO oO CO O' O' H H i1 — rH H rH rHrH i—1 rH H i—t r-H O O O ' (M O' O O' CO . co cO O' H O' CO r cO Q rococo O O O O cO O 'O r r O rH OOO O O rH rH rH r-H O r-H rH rH O rH rH O rH rH rH ri O rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH rH ' ' ' O ' O C cO CO O' O O' vO O' O' O' M C M C CM 'O O O O O rH CM «-H H H H H H H H H H rH rH rH rHO'' rH rH rH rH rH rH OoOO' OvOO' CO co O 'O O O v 'O 'O O O o 'O 4 O O O H H CO M rH rH O O O' O' M1 * O O' O O O COM4 O O v O H H H — r r rH rH rH I—i rHrH rH rH rH 0 O v O v O O O O 00 O O O O —l»•“Hi—lr-4r-4i—4 —If-lCV]Cn » 0 0 C O cO CM CMCCO OcOCMCM rH rH O'O' i—1C M(M I—1CM rHrHrHrHrHf-H r—IfH rH H rH rH rH H rH H pH H CMCMlOCMCOrHO'OOrHrH o ' o o v o o v o o o m rH rHCOCOCOCOCOrHOOrHOrHfM rH m rH rH o rH rH v rH rH o rH rH rH O O O O O ' O vOCO vO CO CO CO O O' CO O O O * o o o o O * O O• • • > * O' O' • • O' O' O' • • • • • O'• • * r r4 — * 0 0s 0s * * •—4 r-4 rH * * *

January H H H rH rH rH rH rH rH O O O vO vO \0 O CO CO. O O O CO O' O' CO CO CO co

F ebruary O' O' O O' co . CO . .

O' — r r r r rH rH rH rHr—t rH M arch O' O' O' CO 0s O' ' ' O O O

- r rH rHi-H O ' O O O O CO CO CO sO vO O'CO

A pril • « • • • O' O O O ' O ' O ' O ' O O May O O O O C ' O O ' O ' O

June

July CO

August O' COO' Septem ber October N ovem ber

D ecem b er

279

rH o in O' CO to O' rH 01 6 o O' '0 rH CM rH rH A verage 00 10 4 10 1 10 2 10 0 10 0 11 1 11 1 11 4 12 0 Outer Bar

—1 I— O' O CM vO 1 6 0 6 rH o O' m i-H O' o H i-H 1897 1898 1 9 0 0 1 9 0 1 o 1899 1903 1904 1907 1908 1 9 1 0 1911

ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in ft in 1 ' ' O ' O CO CO O' CO O' O' O O v ' O O ' CO O' O O' • O' ‘ O O H H H rH rH rHrH - —1 H r H r 1 i— i-H O ' O O ' ' CO O' O' CO CO O' vO CM CM CM *-H *-H COOO O O H1 - - H r H r H r H r H r H r I-H H r I-H 1 rH H H - iH - r r C ( (M (M CM rH rH i-H i-H rH i-HrH - iH - r r r r iH — i-H i—t i-H rH rH rH rH i-H i-H i-H O' - rH - iH - »H fH »-H r-H i-H r-H r-H r-H M O M C C C O C IH CM I-H CM O CM CM CM * CM CO CM ' O O ' O O O O ' fO O' CO CO CO CO O' CO CO O' I-H O M M M O O ' • * O' ‘ CO cO CM CM CM CO O C C C C C C O C CO CO O CO CM CO CO CM CM * CO O ' O O O O O CO CO CO CO CO CO O' CO O O O O O ' O ' O CO CO O' CO O' CO CO CO CO CO I-H M^vOrorocMi—i i M c o r o r O v ^ M m O O O v O ' M M O H M — O iH - CM r-H i-H O r—l (M rH CO CM CM n i ' O O O O O i-irH - H H M M M n c M C H r O H - i M C M C H - i ‘ CMCM CM i-HrH It-Hi-Hi— li— r rl H H rH rH rH r-l rH —I i —l i —l i H - i H - —I t i H r H - , H r O M < H r H r O c M C M c o c O O c O v O v O O O O O O c ' C O O ' H - . H - . M I M < M C M C M C M C O v O O ' O ' O O v O O O O O i—l —Ir-1 rH CM i-H i rH O —I O O i O O o H O O r v O v H O v —I O r i c O H O - i H r H r H r COO * ' i—t rH * O' ‘ * O O C •

J J a n u a ry • • • •

' ' O ' O' O' CO O'O' — iH - r i-H rH I-H O O' i-H i-H O O * * *—1 o O O ' O O CO CO CO O' CO CO O' rH • • * F e b ru a ry » • O O H H rH rH rH H - r rHi-Hi-Hi-Hi-H r-H rHrH OCOCO O C O C rO cOOO 1 O O O O O C O C ' O O C O C O v i p 1 — r i1 rH i—1 rH i—1 —1 — 1 r-H —1i—l i H - H H

M a rc h COO' COCO CO O' i i H - -H • • ♦ • A p ril O' ‘ •

H - iH - r iH i-H i-H rH r-H i-H r-H rH • M rH CM cO i — H - r H - i H - i H - r H - i H - r H - i—l i O O s O O O O O c O M ay H -

O ' O f t ' O v ' O O i 1 H - * - I-H I-H—* * Ju n e * H rH rH H r | _ r cO i H -

J u ly fMrHi-HrHrH ‘ • • • • o c o r o c o r o H H H rH rH rH rH O O I-H (M O O' O ' O ' O ' O ' O O 1 i 1 - r rH rH i-H —1 H - i A u g u st - h i cm 1 i H - i O O < — rH i—1—< • • O H - S e p te m b e r —I

i cm —I i

O c to b e r —I n in on o o H r H - r i i —1 i H r H - -H(M

N o v e m b e r O i I D e c e m b e r -H

i-H o m rH o o H r CO CO i-H i-H p t— CM CM i-H CM H rH rH rH o A v e ra g e 9 1 0 11 4 10 8 H 12 6 12 9 14 4 11 1 1 11 8 11 2 280

Admin Rept. 1913-14. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept. 1914. December. 41. Quantities of Jute (free of duty) exported from the Port of Chittagong, 1892-1912 (cwt.)

1892-931 1893-942 1894-95'

To U nited Kingdom 797,668 615,168 537,405 Spain: Barcelona 60,875 -- USA: New York 92,450 - 55,482 Boston - - 61,868 Egypt: Port Said - 60,068 - Germany: Hamburg -- 93,136 950,993 675,236 747,891

1895-964 1896-975 1897-981

U nited Kingdom 669,346 278,022 572,539 Germany: Hamburg 33,993 48,804 64,393 USA: New York 199,218 78,743 - Egypt: Port Said - 232,164 - France: Dunkirk -- 95,343 902,557 637,733 732,275

1 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1892-93 I, Table XXIII.

2 . Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1893-94 I, Table XXIII.

3 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1894-95 I, Table XXIII.

4 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1895-96 I, Table XXIII.

5 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1896-97 I, Table XXIII.

6 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1897-98 I, Table XXIII. Jute: Countries -• ? to which exported 1898-1899 1899^1900

To U nited Kingdom 521,914 299,290 Germany: Hamburg 105,157 44,154 Egypt: Port Said - 85,286 USA: New York - 45,204 627,071 473,934

1901-023 1902-034 1903-045

U nited Kingdom 760,379 504,247 969,636 France: Boulogne 43,143 USA: New York 106,864 92,850 128,661 Boston 65,475 35,336 25,239 France: Dunkirk 97,807 6,250 Germany: Bremen 893 Hamburg 41,568 975,861 730,240 1,172,247

1904-05 1905-06 1906-076

U nited Kingdom 834,185 897,926 1,049,590 Russia: Southern 1.786 P o rts Germany: Free P o rts 83,036 77,433 75,720 Belgium 2,500 893 France 80,728 1.786 111,518 USA 77,486 323,184 345,809

1 ,077,935 1,303,028 1,582,637

1 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1898-99 I, Table XXIII.

2 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1899-1900 I, Table XXIII.

3 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1901-02 I, Table XXIII.

4 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1902-03 I, Table XXIII.

5 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1903-04 I, Table XXIII.

6 Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1906-07 I, Table XVII. 283

Jute: Countries * , to which exported 1907-08 1908-09 1909-10

U nited Kingdom 829,812 1,182,491 806,823 Germany 150,580 201,918 202,264 Holland - 3,896 1,071 Belgium 12,643 3,178 4,017 France 115,964 176,801 14,879 Spain - 49,032 - R ussia - - 4,465 USA 381,122 361,072 135,117 1,490,121 1,978,388 1,168,636

1910-11 1911-122

U nited Kingdom 567,788 876,916 Germany: Free P o rts 255,272 239,584 H olland 893 - Belgium 4,465 7,142 France 67,546 162,148 Spain -- Russia - - USA 145,286 113,660 1,041,250 1,405,450

Sea Borne Trade E .B.A. 1911 -12 I , Table XVII (3)

2 Ib id . 284

Quantity of Tea exported from the Port of Chittagong, 1892-1912 (lb.)

1892-93* 1893-942 1894-953

U nited Kingdom 87,858 453,392 118,495 M auritius 1 0 0 -- South America Montevideo 500 New South Wales 6,280 900 South Australia 3,735 - 2,445 Victoria 4,895 6,430 6 , 8 6 8 Egypt - 35 - Maldives (including Minicby) 40 103,368 460,807 127,848

1895-964 1896-975 1897-986

To U nited Kingdom 119,466 68,275 204,618 New South Wales 600 1,215 - V ic to ria 2,580 3,150 3,384 Maldives (except Minicay) 40 s ’ 122,646 72,810 208,002

1 Sea Borne Trade Beng.1892-93 I, Table XXIII.

2 Sea Borne Trade Beng.1893-94 I, Table XXIII.

3 Sea Borne Trade Beng.1894-95 I, Table XXIII.

4 Sea Borne Trade Beng.1895-96 I, Table XXIII.

5 Sea Borne Trade Beng.1896-97 I, Table XXIII

6 Sea Borne Trade Beng.1897-98 I, Table XXIII 285

Tea: C ountries , ~ , to which exported 1898-99 * 1899-1900 1901-02

U nited Kingdom 85,683 J10,941 14,789,009 New South Wales 810 - 405 V ic to ria 7,075 8,415 4,945 New Zealand 1,080 1,104 - Tasmania - - 412 Turkey in Europe - 570 USA: San Francisco - 1,465 - West Indies:Grenada 500

94,648 122,495 14,795,271

1902-03 1903-04 1903-044 Black tea Green tea

U nited Kingdom 19,993,446 26,082,462 2,68,243 V ic to ria 3,715 6,754 270 New Zealand 1,170 2,082 - Germany: Hamburg - - 80

19,998,331 26,091,378 2,268,513

1 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1898-99 I, Table XXIII.

2 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1899-1900 I, Table XXIII.

3 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1901-02 I, Table XXIII.

4 Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1906-07 I, Table XVII (3). 286

• Black te a 1904-05 1905-06 1906-07 1

British Empire: U nited Kingdom 37,490,963 40,246,207 41,336,072 V ic to ria 4,770 5,160 1,920 New Zealand 2,280 Ceylon 2,500 Foreign countries 50 37,495,783 40,251,367 41,342,772

Green tea 1904-05 1905-06 1906-07

U nited Kingdom 1,110,007 1,283,543 698,837 Other countries 960 1,110,007 1,284,503 698,837

Black tea . 1907-09 1908-09 1909-10

British Empire: U nited Kingdom 42,391,827 45,567,322 51,617,569 Ceylon - - Straits Settlements - 2 0 - Fed.Malay States 38 - - Victoria 2,630 3,570 1,920 New Zealand - 2,250 2,450 Foreign countries: Germany: Free ports 250 Egypt Uruguay - 150 - 42,394,495 45,573,312 51,622,189

Green te a 1907-08 1908-09 1909-1C?

British Empire: UK 530,148 556,920 226,954 USA 1,440 530,148 558,360 226,954

1 Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1906-07 I ; Table XVII (3 ).

2 Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1911-12 I, Table XVII (3) Waste 1907-09 1903-09 1909-10

U nited Kingdom - 6,491 57,701

Black te a 1910-11 1911-12

British Empire: U nited Kingdom 52,218,132 54,356,363 Ceylon - 175 Straits Settlements - - Fed.Malay States -- V ic to ria 1 , 8 8 8 2,504 New Zealand - 2,240 Foreign Countries: Germany: Free Ports - - Egypt - 2 0 0 Uruguay 52,283,020 55,555,705

Green Tea 1910-11 1911-12

U nited Kingdom 881,490 1,194,223 USA 30,350 - 911,840 1,194,223

Waste 1910-11 1911-12

U nited Kingdom 64,914 46,624

1 Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1911-12 I, Table XVIII ( 3 ) 288

Figures showing the 'export of rice from the port of Chittagong to Foreign Countries, 1892-1912 (cwt.)

Rice: Countries i ? z a to which exported 1892-93 1893-94 1894-95 1895-96

U nited Kingdom . 10,018 7,287 Eastern Coast of A frica - - -- M auritius 59,568 77,301 90,740 44,887 Reunion 8,839 --- West Indies 80,565 20,625 140,212 73,479 Ceylon 22,734 - 15,685 6,136 Other Foreign 615 - 4,275 1,465 C ountries 172,321 97,926 260,930 133,254

1896-975 1997-986 1898-997 1899-1900'

U nited Kingdom 3,104 Eastern Coast of Africa - - 1,029 - M auritius -- 30,305 - Reunion - -- 53,488 West Indies 20,375 11,643 28,847 26,927 Ceylon 748 28,340 3,189 234,262 Other Foreign 1,625 - 43,901 21,590 C ountries 22,748 39,983 107,271 339,371

1 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1892-93 I, Table XXIII.

2 Sea Borne Trade Beng, 1893-94 I, Table XXIII.

3 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1894-95 I, Table XXIII.

4 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1895-96 I, Table XXIII.

5 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1896-97 I, Table XXIII.

6 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1897-98 I, Table XXIII.

7 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1898-99 I, Table XXIII.

8 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1899-1900 I, Table XXIII 289

Rice: Countries , to which exported 1901-02 1902-03 1903-04

To United Kingdom 8,544 24,983 59,185 Eastern Coast of Africa: Mauritius, including 5,864 51,749 111,500 S eych elles Reunion - 85,747 113,553 Mombasa, Zanzibar - , 1,352 and Pemba West Indies: Trinidad 25,094 37,112 17,446 Cuba - : 15,005 Aden - 3,5322 Ceylon . 64,797 24,444 165,874 Maldives 6,197 Arabia - other 1,492 s ta te s ______105,796 224,035 493,644

1904-05 1905-062

To United Kingdom 54,818 5,999 Mauritius, including .Seychelles = 15,196 10,105 Reunion 140,395 1,616 West Indies: Trinidad 26,798 58,598 Cuba - - Aden 4,180 - Ceylon 229,578 43,657 Maldives 2,439 -

474,104 119,975

1 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1901-02 I, Table XXIII.

2 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1906-07 I, Table XVII (3 ). 290

• Rice: Countries 1906-071 1907-08 1908-09 to which exported

B ritish Empire To United Kingdom - 26 461

Ceylon 7,880 10,361

Mauritius Dependencies - - 5,729

Foreign Countries: Egypt - - - USA 79 10 79 7,906 16,561

1909-10 1910-11 1911-122

B ritish Empire To United Kingdom 939 752 2,124

Ceylon 10,588 1,134 22,102

M auritius and -- 1,621 Dependencies

Foreign Countries: Egypt - 63 216 USA 11,527 1,949 26,063

1 Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1906-07 I, Table XVII (3)

2 Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. 1911-12 I , Table XVII (2) 291

Quantities of Salt (subject to duty) imported into the Port of Chittagong, 1892-1912 (tons)

Exporting Country 1892-931 1893-942 1894-953

United Kingdom 12,859 13,301 10,142 Germany: Hamburg 1,346 --

14,205 13,301 10,142

1895-964 1896-97 1897-98

United Kingdom 13,564 1,988 22,217 Germany: Hamburg - - 1,924

13,564 1,988 24,141

1 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1892-93 I, Table XXII.

2 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1893-94 I, Table XXII.

3 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1894-95 I , Table XXII.

4 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1895-96 I , Table XXII. 292

Exporting Country 1898-99^ 1899-1900^ 1901-023

United Kingdom 12,198 6,243 8,981 Germany: Hamburg - 2,594 1,284

12,198 8,837 10,265

1902-034 1903-045 1904-05

B ritish Empire: United Kingdom 6,850 2,837 19,083 Aden 4,243 3,714 9,188 Foreign Countries: Germany: Hamburg 5,679 6,994 Free Ports - - 7,717

16,772 13,545 25,988

1905-06 1906-076

B ritish Empire: United Kingdom 2,986 6,5?6 Aden 16,454 9,437 Foreign Countries: Germany: Free Ports 4,395 6,228

23,835 22,191

1 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1898-99 I, Table XXII.

CM Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1899-1900 I , Table XXII

3 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1901-02 I, Table XXII.

4 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1902-03 I , Table XXII.

5 Sea Borne Trade Beng. 1903-04 I, Table XXII.

6 Sea Borne Trade E.B.A. I, Table XVI. 293

Exporting Country 1907-08 . 1908-09 1909-10

B ritish Empire: United Kingdom 14,089 1,853 7,609 Aden 16,636 21,154 16,275 Foreign Countries: Germany 572 1,971 2,716 Spain 8,000 9,680 5,044 Egypt (Port Said) - - 6,537

39,297 34,658 38,181

1910-11 1911-121

B ritish Empire: United Kingdom 8,890 7,668 Aden 5,867 10,125 Foreign Countries: Germany 3,598 4,555 Spain 5,858 6,209 Egypt (Port Said) 1,616 -

25,829 28,557

1 Sea Borne Trade E.B.A 1911-12 I, Table XVI (1) TADL3 VII,— Quantity {in mannils) of articles imported into the Chittagong Trade Block by River, Rail, and Sea (coat ling and Foreign) in 1910-1911.

Total Trado by all Ivoatos. Total Articles. Dy Beat. By inlnnc By Bail. By eoa Indian By noa etosmor. ooastin Trado. (Foroign). Quantity. Valaa.

1 2 3 4 5 C 7 8 0

No. No. No. No. No. N o. No. Bs. Animala— . „, (1) Horned cattlo* othor than Bhoop 72 C 0 •*% 87 . «. 87 9,480 and goats. (2) Horsos ponios and mnlos ...... 4 14 ' 18 ... IS 3,924 (3) Siioop and goats ... .1,235 0 204 ... 1,533 • 1,538 8,459 (4) Othor kinds ... .- 21,502 ... 19 24,521 24,532 ! / / / 11 11,540 Has, Has. Hds. Hda. Hda. Hds. Hds. i Apparel, including drapoiy, haber- ... 170 1,450 1,G32 ...• 1,032. 4,17,921 dimhcry, millinory,. uniforms, accoutromonts, hoots and Bhoos. T o>v» Cbomionls excepting saltpotro . ... - 1,--- 1,700 ...• 29,22 ...• 2,922 \ 1,01,280 Coal and coko— t (1) For Bailway purposes • ... 230 ... 00,833 47S.370 539,1C4 10,993 550,402 ' 1,77,25 (2) For othor purposos ... 4G1 - 3,315 ... 4,37u ... 4,370 ■ 2,401 Cotton— * Eaw ...... 107,032 41,243 50,43 G 204,319 ... 254,819 23,54,109 1 53

Manufactured— (1) Twiat and yarn, foroign 05 2,3! 7 2,513 4 4.902 9 4,971 3,31,103 (2) Ditto, Indian 01 1,352 3,330 7 4,800 4.S00 1,85,517 (3) rioco-goods, foroign ... 8,Cl 5 9,313 ...• 18,594 ...<* 13,594 22,15,939 (4) Ditto, Indian ... w 270 3,861 ...• 4,:;v3 i 4,308 2,72,003 (5) Otkors m...... 121 97 ...• 21S ...• 218 1,1 ^,2 *j*> Drugs—

(2) Non-intoxicating— ... . (a) Hodiernal preparation ... 1 C05 054 ...• 1,270 1,270 3,83,013 (1) Othora ...... 27 S79 2,211 2,017 ...• 2,517 29,117 Dyoa and tans—

(2) Cutch ...... 74C 113 512 1,401 ... 1,101 24,959 V (3} Indigo ... C 1 ... 7 ... \ 7 £93 o*,o (-1) Myrohalans ...... 210 0 ... £12 ... 214 (5) Tanning barks ... 1,135 ... 1,263 ... 1,235 2,203 (C) Turmoric 7 430 043 8,505 4,338 4,333 N 2,32,070 (7) Othora ... 405 i 20 192 G21 w. 021 12,000 Fodder— (1) Ilay, Gtraw and graas 2,301 1,217 2,055 ... 5.CCC 5,000 3.817 (2) Oil-cako ...... 1,100 ' 70 2,050 8,902 10,SCO 10,800 13,751 Fruits and vogotaLloo, froih ... 20,1 SI 5,055 20,403 «„• 45.931 ,„a 43.9S1 3,45,015

Grain and puloo— i (1) Gram and pul so ...... 2,312 10,500 00,007 20,205 73,873 ... 73,870 2,53,5i'0 (2) Jo war and bajra ...... 13 ...... 1G ... 10 i'l (3) Itico in tho huBk 152,725 100 233 23,193 17o,2G3 ... 170.203 3,50,719 (I) Bico not in tho bask 2i,7CG 75 27,192 457,243 505,2S1 ... 5,00,231 4,40,325 (3) Whoat — ...... 91 1 75 1C7 ... 107 01?

* TiiJ trade by non in this articlo is uoi rocerdud in nuuuda. 'ilio vauio jy included in thu loui vaiuo. T ab le F I/.— Qnaulihj (in maunds) o f articles imported into the Chittagong Trade Bloc River, Rail, and Sea {coasting and Foreign) in 1010-1911—continued.

Total Trade by t Boutos. Total Articles. By Boa i. By inlan 1 By Dai] By sea Indian By son BLeamcr (Coasting ). Trado. (Foreign . \ Quantity Valm N

'l 2 3 4 5 C 7 8 9

\ Mds. Mds. SIda. ilds. Mds. Mds. Mds. B Groin and Puleo— concld.

(C) Wheat dour ...... 0,370 1,435 30,14? 40,053 ... 40,033 l.T) (7) Others ...... 1,0: S 235 20 ... 1,300 ... 1,309 f 0 Hemp and other fibres (excluding 317 ... 10,030 ...» 20,247 ...» 20,247 07 juto). Hide* and skins— (I) IIidea of cattlo—,

(0) Raw „. 20 2 333 • 113 473 ••• 473 18 (t) Dressed or tanned 2.S40 ...... •«. 2,840 ... 2,840 1,64 (?) Skins at sheep ' and other animals—

(a) ROW ...... 5 ... 5 ... 5 (1) Dressed or tannod 203 ...... 205 455 600 18. Ilorna 23 4 41 ... CS ... 03 \ Jute—

(1) Daw 32S ... 1,CSS,455 33 1,035,818 1.C85.81S 1.04.17, (?) Gunny bags and cloths 1.21C 4C7 4,001 ...• C,584 ...» 0,584 1,13, I

Lao ... 15 ... 15 15

Leather— 1 ■ | 1 (2) Wrought, excepting boots and ... 6 40 ...• 55 ...» 55 8,i shoes.

Liquors— (1) Alo and boor ... « 40 374 7 430 9 430 20,1

(2) Wines and spirts, of nil kinds ... 100 493 43 722 500 1,288 93,1 including country spirit. Jlotols—

(1) Brass, nnwronght .• ... 103 . 77 ... ISO ISO ■ 30,123 30,30j 08,2

(2) Brass, manufactured ... 3C 1,020 C77 5G 2.0S9 - 2.GS0 1,43,8 l (3) Coppor, unwrought... 34 4 •M 20 5S 58 8,0

(4) „ mnnufacturod ... 2 02 ISO 2 2S5 3 283 10,5 (3) Iron and stool— (0) Unrrrought (dust, slag, pig . 10 410 10,707 SOS . 11,015 24 11,030 50,2 and old for romanufaoturo). (b) Wrought— (i) Barp, Rhccts and girders 5S 2,S?5 0,472 10.S21 ’ 20,170 48.3SS 08,5 C4 ' 21,00,3: and other commercial forms of iron and steol. (ii) JIachinory and mill work 10 57 2,409 ...• 2,530 •... 2,530 4,80,1:

(iii) Othor_ mannfactnro, in 27 5,043 8,312 «... 13,417 •... 13,417 7,15,0; cluding hardwaro and cutlory.

(7) Others ... €£C 607 3,0-10 10,722 ■ 22,055 110,213 S.2,273 2,73,?:

* Tho trade by 50a in thi,s arfciclo is nob rocordod La maunds. Tho yoIuo ia inclndod in tho total valao. 296 T a b le VII.— Quantity [in mannds) of articles im ported into the Chittagong Trade Block by River, Rail and by Sea [coasting and Foreign) 1910-1911—continue!.in

Total Trado by all Boutos, By Total By F

1 2 3 4 5 c 7 9 8 1

lids. lids. Hds. . Hda. Hd*. Mda. Hds. £a. 1 Hincral substances— (1) Chalk and lima ... ••• 1,411 850 49,717 ■ 2,958 54,930 - 54,930 17,861 (2) Harblo and stono ... 17,248 • 35 3,34,097 1,503 333,768 ... 353,78S 1?,?65 (3) Others ...... 15 ... 17 ... 15 45

Oil*— (1) Castor ...... 157 31 154 342 ... 312 5,519 (*) Cocoanut ••• ••• 761 178 3,57) ’4,309 ... 4,309 1,14,733 (2) Kerosene 752 £39 070,3)5 G77,G9G ... 677,093 ' SO,70,898 (4) Eapo and mustard... . 383 4, T 2 ’ 2.4S7 2,572 10.1C9 ... . 10,ICO 1,59,878 (5) Othora ... ' ... 1,503 1,151 2,2ol 8,049 12,970 434 13,434 3,10,453

Oil seeds—

(2) Ground nut* ... 305 ... 10,256 10,511 ... 10,541 4,012 (3) Linscod... — ... 3 9 ... 12 ... 12 92 (4) Poppy ...... 151 ...... 151 ... 151 1,129 (5) Eapo and mustard ... . 3,207 402 19,°25 ICO 2°,933 . .« s ’.rci 1,80,835 (C) Sosatnum (till or jinjili) 1S.S42 ... 13.C29 ... . 3?,471 ... 3',471 2.G1.070 (7) Others ...... ••• 292 C 10 S 2,093 2.3S9 ... 2,589 14,192 Opium ... ••• ••• ... - 720 ... 720 720 2,15,2S0 Papor and paste board ...... 1,019 S31 1,850 1,850 - 43,354

Provisions— (1) Dried fruit* and nut* 2?,731 G15 ;C,339 105 29,813 74 29.887 4,17,031 (2) Ghi ...... 9 2.0C0 , 272 2,4 85 ... 4.S2C 2,17,0S2 (3) Othor* ... ••• ••• ’, 22,100 8,755 100,800 <5,37.2 133,022 1.7SC 134,803 11,7C,C75

Rnilwny plant and rolling stock— (1) Corringci* nad trucks and parts ... 13 5 •>.. 18 •... 18 3,07,953 thcrouf.

«... (2)'Locnmnti7n IltiplnoR nrd tend- - ■ £20 52) •... £2) • 2,01,073 ors and parts thoroof. i

(3) Matorip.lfi— (a) Sle,'p nrs and toys of stool ... 4,481 4,434 22,341 2C,S03 IjOCjIol) and Cast iron. (b) Stcol rails and dsh-plato3...... 3.803 3,805 ... 3.S05 14,614 . \ (c) Others ...... 23,598 2C,598 5,°0) ■ 81,807 ' 1,02,1)71 8alt ••• ...... 738 839 1,039 2.CCG 419,417 422,113 . 2V,15,093

galtpjtro and other salino substances— (l| Saltpotro ... 223 37 ... SCO ... SCO 1,833 (2) Other salino substances ...... 61S 179 t3,2C4 4,231 ... 4,231 12,933

B ilk - liaw— (1) Foreign ■ ...„ ...... •• ...... (2) Indian ... ■ 4 221 20. ... s c ; 4,210 TABLE T IL — Quantity {in mauttds) of articles imported into the Chittagong Trade Bloch 5 /^ ^ River, R ail, and by Sea (coasting and Foreign) I910-i911—concluded. in '

Total Trade by all ' Eoutcs. Total A rtldas. By Boat. By inland By Rail. By soa Indian By sea Btoamor. (coasting.) Trade. (Foroign.) Quantity. Value. ■ V . \ . ' * * 1 2 3 4 5 5 7 8 \ ° ------1 \ Mds. Mds. Mds. Mds. Mds. Mds. Mds. Es.

Piece-goods— / m M (1) Foroign — ...... •... 1,150

(2) Indian ... •a* ... 41 •... 4* 3,240 Spices— (1) Botolnut* ... • M 17,03*1 948 3,179 14,139 35,950 434 86,390 2.75,973 (2) Cardamom* ... ••• ... 48 5 53 ... 53 5,726 (3) Chillies ... 8,875 2,225 2,1 :o 3G4 13.574 ... 13,574 1,59,! 8? (4) Ginger ...... 509 C 3 - cos: — G08 2,5 *9

(5) Popper — ... 925 8C 9,698 10,709 49 10,758 I 26.953 (C) Others ... US 1,524 1,381 ' E5 ■' 3,108 3,108- 89,507 Sugar— (1) Unrefined— (a) Cur, rai>, jaggory,btc. 20,971 5,214 20,i d 55,329 55,329 8,70,597 i

(b) Sugar ... 247 , 4.G33 9.050 17,796 31,720 81,726 1,00,94G

(2) Itefinod or crystallised, includ 6,71 C 10,779 31,352 48,847 16,338 63,185 ' 5,14,797* ing sugarcaudy. Tea— <1), Foreign — ... 2 • #* 1 3 1 4 J42 i (2) Indian ...... 9,038 110 653,521 ’ 11 602.720 •*» 602,780 2,25.32,86? ( i , Tobacco— (1) Unmanufactured ... aa* 2,917 1,850 15,CCG 1,590 22,029 ••• 22,029 1,80.103 (2) Manufactured— (a) Cigars ...... 220 4 803 530 173 . 703 19,816

(b) Other Borts ...... 235 275 311 21" 842 " 59 901 29,551 W ood— (1) Timber, unwrought ... 118,427 42 2,7G0 121,229 •... 121,229 3,40,361.

(2) Manufactured a** 1.59C 511 8,55? •... 10,059 »... 10,659 8,20,251 Wool— Eair ...... 40 ...... 40 ... 40 1.053

Manufactured— (1) Carpots and rugs ...... 2 ... 2 ... 2 191

t2) rioco-goodB, Foroign ... 4 1 H* •... 5 #..l 5, 3,175,

(3) Ditto, Indian...... 19 *... 39 #.. 19 17,706

#... 17.746 (4) Othor sorts of manufacturo ... - Cl 39 300 •... 100

All other articloa of merohandieo ... 118,891 10,513 132,4G0 •... 201,373 #... 201,673 13,60 3G7

Treasure— Oz. Oz. Oz. Oz. Oz. Oz. Oz. 2,C34 G.009 - ... ' 0,009 3,83,019 (1) Gold coin and bullion •V - ... ■ 3,375

4,02,007 (2) Silver coin (Govornmont rnpoos) ... • 4,380* . 143,SS0 ... ■ 153,260 ... , 153,200

• Tho Trado by soa in this artiolo >8 not recordod in mannds. Tho value is includod in tho total vnluo. T a b le VIII.— Quantity (in mannds) of articles exported^ from lU ChittagongTrade IHoet' ly Jiiver, Hail and Sea (r.oavliny and Foreign') 1910*10il. .

Total Trado by all Ruutoa, By Totat By so a . By Soa, Articlos. By Boat. inland By Rail. (coasting). Indian (Foroign). stoamar. TruUe. / Quantity. Valuo.

1 * 1 o 3 4 8 C 7 8 0

No. N o .. No. , ■ No. No. fro. • Nd. R s . Animals— -

(1) ITornod cattlo othor than shoop 150 4 80 eft . . . MS 190 7,600- ‘ and goats.

(2) Hor6os, ponios and muloB ••• 147 ... 1 9 157 - 157 20,500

(3) Sheep and goats 309 ' 14 M. - 383 2,105-

(4) Othor kinds ...... 393 1 s i t 45,234 45^628 45.C28 25,141 '

Mds. Mds.. Mds.- Mds. . Mds, Md*. Mds. • •

Appnrol, including dr-pcry, habcr- 394 72 161 s.. 627 627 1,42,750- oanlicryi millinery, uniforms, ao» coatrcnioutB, boots and shoos. Chomicals, oxcopting ealtpotro ... $78 39 1,028 1,745 1,745 5,375' Coal and colco— •

(1) For Railway purpoeos ... 165,903 ... 1C5,9C1 ... 165,961 v43 15 51,863 ’ (2) For other purposes ...... 8,475 2 28,110 .1 . . 36,537 644 87 l3l 19,814

Cotton —

Raw ...... 354 31,472 110 02,740 124,C26 ... 124,626 17,98,509 Manufactured—

(1) Twist and yarn, Foroign 1,272 4° 2l4 ass 1,914 ... 1,914 , 1,3?,637

(2) Ditto, Indian 87 sS« 261 9 357 .j. 357 14,218 '

(3) Pioco-goods, Foroign ... 2,724 12 270 3,00G • . . . • 0,006 2,95,772

(4) Ditto, Indian ••• ... 1,330 ... 1,141 , 2,077 •... 2,377 . 1,Cl,824

(5) Others ...... 1 11$ s... 117 117 7,139- ( Drugs—

(1) Intoxicating othor than opium ...... 18 . . . • 18 • ' . . . ‘ 540 • . 18

'2) Non-iutoxicating— ‘

(a) Modicinal preparations ... 8 42 304 *... 351 354 107,430

(b) Othors ...... 295 120 e 421 •... 421 4,631..

Dyos and tanB—

6C7 ... (2) Catch »• ...... 90 it* 1 463 14 567 ’ : ' 8,4?8

(4) Myrobalans ...... 1 .M ... Mi / 1 ... 1 1

(5) Tanning harks ...... "71 19 90 ... 1*2 \ 90 (C) Turmorio ...... 92 1 52 145 MS '145 1,957'-

(7) Othors ...... 1 2 3 . . X3 55 ' 1 ,M \ I Foddor—

(1) Hoy, Btraw and grass .« 1,921 IM 652 ••• 2,473 • •• 2,473 1,933

(2) Oil-cako...... 954 1.. MS 954 Sts 954 1,C71

Fruits and vcgotahlos, fresh ...' 4,384 110 81$ •... 4,810 4,810 88,910 Grain bnd pulso—

<1) Gram and pulso ...... 5,108 85 8,809 4,399 13,401 • SI 1,3461 29,378

(2) Jowar and bajra ...... •ft 2 9 til 2 5-

(3) Rico in tho husk ... 24.0S4 07 4,433 1,750 30,413 ISS 30,413 61,119

(4) Rico not in tho husk ... 98,492 1,172 60,0G8 1,4S2 101,214 294 161,508 . C.G3.411

* I ho trado by sob la this artiolo is not tocordod in maunds. Tbo valuo is inoludod in tho total valuo* • 9 TADLR YIII,— Quantity (in maunds) of articles exported from, the Chittagong Trade Blochly 299 {Jttver,-flail and Sea {coasting and lforciqn) inlDlO-1911—continued. t |

------‘T-~ --- j r t r .— r r . A • ’ „ ■ • Total Trade by nil Eoutos. By i By sea Total By Sea Artlces. By Boat. inland By Eidl. ,(00011 ting) Indian steamer. Trado, (i'oroigu). "r ' ' I „ ■ 1 Quantity Value. .■■'J ;, ’ 1.

: ' > 2 3 4 “5 6 7 8 9

- 1 aids. Mds. Mds. Mds. Mds. Mds. Mds. Ea.

t r :i, . \ ■ : i *' 1 i Grain and pnleo—cetwdd— h (5) Wheat ... ! ... *•0 93 19 2 - 117 ... 117 • ' 409 2,079 (0) Ditto flour «. 1,033 145 402 . 8 3 2,079 • •• 13,823 (7) Othors ... 2,324 ' 52 •••’** ... - ,0 ‘37C 2,370 29,512 *" • i Hemp and, othor fibres (excluding jnto) 07 ftft» . 43 ft... 145 .145 2,45,714

Hides and skins— ! * j !- ; , 1 ... • .. f (1) Hides of cattle— (a) Haw • ; ... • 90 - 5,5?1 4,050 2,043 12,214 12,214 ' 5,09,743

(!>) Drossod or tanned •5* . . 13 ’... •ft ft ■ 13 ... 13 741

f. Skins ef sheep end other animals— , ..

». (o) Haw j Ml 843 67 183 1,098 Ml 1,093 C8.7CC (b) Dressed or tanned ...... ••• 3 3 ... 3 300 Horns ‘ »...... 91 31 223 355 »• 335 2,537 • *• Juio— ,

. -(1 (1) Eayr ...... ftftO 4 ... 336 CV22 69,CCS 1,457,730 1,527,41? 1,80,79,570

(2) Gunny bags ... 24 4.1 CO «... 4,311 4,311 09,974 * 113.

Lao ... h...... 54 - 54 • •• 54 1,393

Liquors— 1 i

t-'q (1) Ale and beer — Mft 2? 143 • •• 1C5 - 1C5 5,353

(*) Wines and spirits of all kinds, IS ••• 503 9 C17 ... G17 31,197 including country spirit. 1 1 1 (5) All othor sort*, including toddy • M 30 SO ... ” 30 241 and formontod liquor other than ~ . ale and boor. . Metals— 1

‘ (1) Brass, unwronght ... «•« 115 222' ... . 14 331 ... 351 15,522

(2) „ mannfactarod • Oi ■-10- 1,173 — V \ r * ... 1,27 . 77,402 (3) Copper, unwrought ... 53 22C ... ' ••• 279 ... 279 15,41* (4) Ditto, manufactured .... 121 .24 1 143 «M 140 10,817 (3) Iron and steel— •• (a) Un wrought (dnst, sing, pig sod 10 •M • M 2,590 1.C00 1,000 1.4S9 old for romanufacturo). (b) Wrought-

(i) Bars, shoots and girdors and 12,340 733 120,035 12 141,229 • aft 1,41,229 9,07,717 otlnr coinmorcial fum e of iron and stcol. <

(ii) Machinery and mill work • ft. 112 Ml 0,479 ft... 8,591 #.s. 8,591 C,45,359 •... (iii) Other mnnnfactnros, including 273 350' 30,595 40,213 •a.ft 40,218 15,77,812 hardware and cutlory. i •; 1

(7) Othors...... 35 11,691 1,C93 13,409 13,4l’9 1.3.1,949 Minoral eubfctinoea—

(1) Chalk and limo ... •ft. 4,505 75 3,931 551 9,20? • •ft <• „ 9,202 3,270 O (2) Marblo and stona ... ••• 14,SCO ICO 295 5 14.9C0 14,900 003 (3) Othora ...... ••ft 15 •»* V. 13 ... 15

• Tho trado by uca ia this arlido ia so t recordod ia inaaada. Ths Yaluo io inoladed iu tbo total value. 300 T a b l e F I/I.—r Quantity (in maunds) of 'articles' exported from the Chittagong Trade Blockl y 1 liiver, Rail and Sea [coasting and Foreign) 1010-1‘Jl in l —continued.

Total Trado by all lioutoa. Totnl . By Sea By Sea Articloa. By Boat. inland By Bail. (coautiug). Indian atoumor. Trado. Quantity.

« . 1 . 3 . . 4 5 ■ 6 8 9

' 'Uda. • Mds. Mds. Mds. Mds. Mds. Mds. Ea. Oils—- (1) Castor , ...... 1 1 1 (2) Cocoanut ...... , ... ' 1,5)3 * 170 7 2,021 . 2,021 44,030 (3) Kcrosino ...... ff3 C11.S44 JOS 053,800 053,600 I8,4i,0C7 (■1) Er.po ond mustard ... - ... 4,813 SCO • ' 1,080 A + 0,275 6,275 9,78,590 (5) Othora ...... < 745 . 6S3 1,533 - 147 3,358 3,353 S3,483

Oil-eccda— • (1) Ground nnta ... ' ... 21 — 1 25 35 30 (2) Rnponnd mustard ...... 2,302 . 1C3 870 2.S11 2,641 23,144 * * * (3) Scsanium (t/i or jin jili) ... ' 41 - 2,173 5u,50o 55,7S3 55,783 : • 3,99,983 (4) Othora ...... * 12 1 01 70 18,250 18,420 18,429 89,691

I*apor and pasto board ...... CO 102 801 (23 523 Provision— (1) Dried fruits and nuts ... 1J.126 ' 14 14 847 11,501 11,501 * 1,55,074 (2) GLi • ...... ” 1,011 ' 11 ' CO ' 50 1,141 1,141 50,507

(3) Othora ...... 7.760 327 4,<131 86,510 43,283 ' : ' 6.95,678

Rahway plant and rolling stock—

: 8,030 6,CM 1,05,933 (1) Cnrri.vjo, and tracks and parts ... V •... ' 8,030 thcroof. 3,Oil 8,011 3,Oil . 83,051 (2) Locomohivo onpinoa and tondorg ... - •... and parts thereof

(3) Materials— 1,43,479 (a) Sleepers and keys of etocl and .M 52,200 ... 53,200 59,200 cast iron. , 57,523 (5) Stool rails and fUh platoa ...... »** i 10.795 10,795 10,735 5,85,456 (c) Othors ...... M. ••• 147,233 - 147.2S9 147,!S9 10,13.053 Balt ... 100,100 . 21 491,072 / 1,797 593»590 1593,590 : • i Ealtpclro and othor ealino BubatanCoa— i ' 3.849 (1) Saltpetre ...... ‘ 193 : 207 IM 4C0 ' <400 . • : ■> 1,189 (2) Othor aalino substances ... J ICO ■ ’ 12 114 250 y 250 Silk— Jlnw— 3 480 (I) In linn ...... 3 ••• ...• ... 3 rioco-^oodH— • 81 9,910 (1) Foreign ... V 20 5 »*♦ «... *1. • *4o 1,440 (2) Indian ... ’ 1 1 *... 2 Spices— 71,173 8,14,13S (1) Bctelnuts...... 1C, 71-1 1 480 C81 ' 53,202 ! 71,173 4 407 (2) Cardamoms ... 4 ; ...... 4 t » 5.C81 04,733 (3) Ciiillioa... , ...... : 1,283 207 : 1,S3I ' 1,030 ' 5,0S1 19 5 5 (4) Cinder ... 3 ' 2 • •'* CC7 . 7.9S0 (5) l’oppor ... 333 ; ... 31 1 TC7 14,162 1,130 1,130 (C) Olliera ... 700 112 221 ' 1 ■

Tho trado by eta in thia article iu not recorded in maunds. Tho valuo is inC idod in tho tcn

Total Trnlo by all lioutorf. Total Py Inland By sea Tty roa Articles. Dy boat. By tali. Dxli m (Foreign). Htoamor. (co-ting). Trade. Qnuntity. Vn-tuo,

■ 2 4 5 .. c 7 8 ( 9 . \ J ' ’ " 3

\ ■ Mde. luils. 11 -la. Md a. ,SId». lids. Mda. Ea. ■ Segur— j . (1) UnroCnoJ—*

1,57,833 ( 4,013 4,648 35.015 {I) h'cgur ••• ••• ?,C32 C3 1,078 0 i sJ ... •

1,17,011 . (2) Eoflnod n? cryinclud 12,121 3 S2fi 114 13/MO ... 13.3-10 ing sugar latuly. Tea— 4 004,194 2,70,40,013 Indian ... , ...... 0 ... m 2,1-10 1,570 «%C13 • Tobacco— (1) Unmanufactured ...... 4,723 10 373 5.35G « 5.3SC . -15.7C3 .‘ (2) Manufactured— (a) Cigar# ...... 24 23,403 • (I.) Other sorts «* 705 ... 785 7 35 2-1,035 Wood— ' (1) Timber, nnwronffht 40,3-11 23,75? 73 3 93 73,303 , 1.23.4C3 (2) Manufactured ... . -• 3, ISC 573 C3,S17 €7,312 C7.51? 2,0-11,313

; w ool— ilnnafaetnred— (1) rioco-gooi'o, foreign *. D-i 3 ... o 43 4? 23,575 ^2) Ditto, Indian n *»» ... *.w 11 11 10,992, (3) Othor sorts of mnofivuturcs ...... 42 Go 107 107 ' 11,510 All othor articles of racrcaandiaa ... 43,1 CS .2,283 1,

r O s. Treasuro — Os. 0 2 . O z . 0». Oz. Os. Oz. Silvor bullion ...... ' ... .••• 1,071.010 7.07-?, 510 ... 1.071,510 25,20,587 __ ...... 1 ... 1

Tho trado by tea ia this article Is m>t recorded in suuuuds. Tho valoa is iuoln Jjil in tho toUil w.'to. 302

Navigable rivers, khals and canals in the Province of Bengal

j Length of Navigable Channels Navigable Channels I in miles i r f j! !P erm an e n t T em p o rary (all the (only during P e rm a - T em p D ivision S.R D istric t y ear round rains) Total nent o ra ry Total

1 Raj shahi j 9 11 20 216 253 469

2 Dina j pur j 2 5 7 78 2 1 2 290

Raj shahi 3 Rangpur ! 4 2 6 305 105 410

4 B ogra ! 10 14 24 253 2 1 0 463

5 Pabna ; 8 11 19 2 0 2 141 343

TOTAL ! 33 43 76 1, 054 921 1,975

1 D acca 32 42 | 74 374 319 693

2 M ym ensingh 18 30 1, 203 458 1 , 661 Dacca 12 i 3 F arid p u r 6 7 13 178 62 240

4 61 Nil 61 782 Nil 782 Bakargah’O ■

TOTAL i 117 61 178 2, 537 839 3, 376 i

1 Chittagong 9 4 13 228 ! 17 245

2 j 8 Chittagong T ippera 12 2 0 I 485 | 392 877

3 N oakhali j 3 15 | 71 | 442 314 j 12

TOTAL ! 20 28 48 785 I 651 1,436

Bramley, 74 303 Assam Beng. Rly (3* 3 11 gauge) - Progress in Openings^

Date of Grand Sections of railways Opening M iles Total Total Remarks 1 2 3 . 4 5 6 Main Line - 3 .1 1 ^ 5Chitt. Port to Chittagong.3 .1 1 ^ 5Chitt. 1.73 Chittagong to F en...... i 1 .7 .9 5 55.90 *Of this 3 miles Feni to Comilla...... 1 .7 .9 5 35.10 between Comilla to Akhaura...... 1 .1 .9 6 19.41 Kathichara Akhaura to Karaiganj 4.12.96 114.00 Damehara were Karinganj to Badapur 4.12.96 12. 00 reconstructed Badarpur to Damehara.. . 2 3.4 09 *13.53 in 1915. Darriehara to Lumding .. .1.12.03 +100. 29 Lumding to N azira...... 1.1.01 141.87 ■f _ „ . . _ i Nazira to Lakwa...... 15.11.01 10.71 Of this, 7j Lakwa to B h a jo...... 1.2. 03 12.72 miles, between Bhajo to T in su k ia...... 1 .3.03 41. 53 Damehara 573.79 Langting were Branches - reconstructed Naokhali Branch - in 1915-18 b Laksum to Noakhali 15.5.03 30. 46 30.46 1916-17 Chandpur Branch - Laksam to Chandpur .... 1.7.95 31. 62 ^ Tangi Branch- Akhaura to Ashuganj on the left bank of Meghna . . 1.4.10 19. 05 Ashuganj junction Wagon ferry...... 1.4.15 0.80 Bhairab Bazar to Danlot K andi...... 1.9.16 2. 25 Danlot Kandi to Tangi. . .. 1.7.14 39. 07 Sylhet Branch - Kulaura to Fenchuganj Ghat ...... 16.4. 12 15. 10 Fenchuganj Ghat to Kusi yara...... 0. 95 Kusiyara to Sylhet...... 1.4.15 Silchar Branch - Badarpur to Katakhla . 13.6.98 yj/ • on6 t Katakhal to S ilch a r...... 8.11.98 12. 35 Gauhati Branch - Gauhati Ghat to Gauheti . .,1.1.97 1. 32 Gauheti to Jamunamukh . , . 1.1.97 74. 11 Jamunamukh to Lanka . . . 2.1.99 19.11 Lanka to Lumding (temporary station)...... 1. 3.99 15. 55 Lumding (temporary station) to Lumding...... 20. 2. 00 3. 44 Dikhow Extension Sibsagar Road to B elhubar...... 9. 13 6. 74 Naginimara extension- Bihubar to Naginimara. . . 1.9. 17 2. 29 Grand Total

1. Railway Dept. Govt, of India Rly. Board. Hist, of India Rlys constructed and in Progress corrected up to 31 March 1918. The following statement shows the number and description of vessels belonging to the port of Chittagong:- , 304

W here & Age when built Con N am e Y ears or received Wood or iron dition R em ark s Port Officers gig. 13 1879 Teakwood cop Good In commission Chittagong per fastened, metalled bottom Port ballam dues 4 1889 Teakwood cop Do it boat Chittagong per fastened, metal sheathed P ilot cutter jolly- 7 1885 Teakwood & Do it boat No. I . Calcutta metalled bottom P ilot cutter jolly- 7 1885 Teakwood met Do Painted, caulked, new boat No. II. C alcutta alled bottom row lock plates given Port Comm's S.L. 9 1884 Iro n Do Has been docked & A ctive Calcutta thoroughly overhauled dockyard in July 1892. .In com m ission Water-boat formerly 18 1875 Teakwood, iron V ery In commission Pilot cutter Spy fastened sheat fair hed m etal cond ition Pilot cutter Pilot 18 1875 Teakwood, iron V ery ii fastened metal fair Heave-up boat Not 1881 Iro n F a ir ii N o.I. known Heave-up boat 3 1891 Iron Good it N o.II Heave-up boat 12 1880 Teakwood m et Bad Has been repaired tender Chittagong alled bottom from time to time is still serviceable Harbour m aster’s Not 1884 Teakwood, cop Bad Has received extensive boat gig known England per fastened, repairs; is serviceable metal sheathed Water-boat's 13 1880 Teakwood, cop Do Has had extensive re jolly boat per fastened, pairs, the ribs knees metal sheathed & top-side planking all teakwood broken is still service able now under repair Old jolly boat 18 1875 Teakwood U nser■ Condemend, will be Calcutta vice sold able Harbour Masters 1 1892 Teakwood, cop Good Received in March hawser-boat C alcutta per fastened last now in commission metal sheathed Intended for the harbour m aster's use instead of a gig S.L. Active jolly about 1892 Teakwood, cop Do Bought locally, is used boat 6 Calcutta per fastened, as tender to the launch y e a rs sheathed metal Active S. T. Gekko one 1892 Steel Do 1 Arrived from England y ear F alm outh on the 29 June & was taken over by the Port Comms on 3 July 1892 New gig not 1894 Teakwood Do known Admin Rept 1891-92. Beng. Proc. Mne Dept 1893, Oct 33-34. BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Unpublished Official Records India Office Library volume or call mark* A. Government Proceedings

1. Government of India Foreign proceedings (External) 1892 4185 Foreign Proceedings (Internal) 1892 4189 Railway Proceedings (Construction) 4154-t> 1891fcl912 8982 Railway Proceedings (Accounts) 1905-06 7085

2. Government of Bengal General Proceedings (Miscellaneous) 159, 1476, 1873, 1880, 1893 4324 General Proceedings (Statistical) 4323, 4727, 1893, 1895, 1896 4936 Marine Proceedings 270 875, 115.' 1873-75, 1876-77, 1878, 1881tol916 1631t»9895 Municipal Proceedings (Marine) 2939 January-March 1887 Public Works Proceedings (Railway) 1638-2022: 1881-1883; 1898-1908 5396-7786

3. Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam Judicial Proceedings (Police) 1905W1916 P .I. XI Public Works Proceedings (Marine) 1906-1912 7725t9362

4. Government of the Chief Commissionership of Assam Home Proceedings January-June 1897 5092

B. Other Unpublished Records India Office Library or British Library 1. Government of India Public Letters from India and General L/PJ/3/93 Letters from Bengal"(Judicial and Public) Papers re la tin g to the Bengal Assam B.L. I S’ 180/9 Railway, Public Works Department Government of Bengal Bengal Native Newspaper Reports, 1887, L/R/S/13, 14, 1888, 1892, 1903 18, 29 D istric t Administration Committee Report (19) 3785 1913-14 (C alcutta, 1914).

*The call marks are those of the India Office Library and Records, unless preceded by B.L. - B ritish Library I. Unpublished Official Records (cont'd) India Office Library volume or call mark C. India Office Records: Private Papers Cross C ollection : L etters from the Marquis MSS.EURF.243/32 o f Lansdowne, Viceroy o f India, January-August, 1892 - Curzon C ollection : P a rtitio n o f Bengal MSS.EURF 111 247/A Curzon C ollection : Reconstruction of the MSS.EURF 111 247/B Province of Bengal and Constitution of a New Province to be called the North Eastern Province

D. Records Consulted in Bangladesh* Bangladesh Secretariat Record Room, Dacca Bengal Financial Proceedings (Commerce) 1914 Bengal Marine Proceedings (Calcutta Port Trust) and attached Keep Withs 1888, 1889, 1890

Port Authority Secretariat Record Room, Chittagong Proceedings of the Ordinary Meetings of the Port Commissioners 1888-1902; 1905-1917 Descriptive Report on the Kutubdia Lighthouse, giving a brief account of the original as well as the new light and the operations connected with its erection and optical adjustments, as also of the necessary alternation to the tower (J.H. Toogood, 1893) Report on accounting, including costing system and general office procedure at present in force with recommendation as to improvements therein (P.C. Das Gupta, 1934) Report on the proposals for extending the jetty accommodation at the Port of Chittagong for ocean going steamers (F.G. Dumayne and F. Palmer, 1905)

Railway Board Central Library, Chittagong (Assam Bengal Railway Records) A gent's L etters to Board 1894-1897; 1902-1904 Board's Letters to Agent 1898-1900 Index to O fficial Meetings 1893-1917 The Assam Bengal Railway Company Ltd: A Short Account of its Construction, 1904

Divisional Commissioner's Library, Chittagong Report on the Improvement for N avigation o f the most important Waterways in Bengal (C.A. White, 1909)

District Collectorate Library, Chittagong Rules, Bye-Laws, Regulations and Notifications relating to the Port of Chittagong, 1896 The Calcutta Port Trust. A Brief History of Fifty Years' Work, 1870-1920

*The Bangladesh records all lack call marks. Published official Records India Office Library 1. Government o f India volume or c a ll mark Administration Report of the Marine Survey of India 1902-03 BL IS68 Administration Report on the Railways in India 1892 to 1912 (Calcutta to 1912, Simla 1913) R2, 1 Agricultural Marketing in India. Report on the Marketing of Rice in India and Burma (Simla 1941) V 1411 Census of India, 1891. Assam I Report (Shillong, 1892) Census of India, 1891. Assam II'Tables (Shillong, 1892) Census of India, 1891. Bengal III Report (Calcutta,1893) Census of India 1901, I-A India, Part II Tables (Calcutta, 1903) Census of India 1901, VI, The Lower Provinces of Bengal and their Feudatories, Part I, Report (Calcutta, 1902) Census of India, 1901, VIA, The Lower Provinces of Bengal and their Feudatories, Part II, Tables (Calcutta, 1902) Gazette of India, Supplement July-December 1887 (Calcutta, 1887) V /ll/9 1 History of Indian Railways, constructed and in progress corrected up to 31 March 1918 (Simla, 1919) BL IS 177/3 Imperial Gazetteer of India, Provincial Series, Eastern Bengal and Assam (Calcutta, 1909) Index to the Acts o f the Government o f India 1854-57 (Calcutta, n.d.) V/8/35 Review of the Trade of India 1892-93, 1901-02, 1905-06 T.l Gen.(1) Statement E xhibiting the Moral and M aterial Progress of India, 1901-02, 1911-12 Government o f Bengal Acts of the Legislative Council of the Lieutenant- Governor of Bengal, 1887-1890 V/8/126 Administration Report of the Commissioners for the Port of Chittagong, 1918-19, 1931-32, 1944-45 (Chittagong, annually) P5 VIIB Annual Statement of the Sea-Borne Trade and Navigation of the Bengal Presidency with Foreign Countries and Indian Ports 1890 to 1916 (Calcutta, annually) BL IS BE 97 Legislative Council Debates, 1925 (Calcutta, 1926) V/9/1227 Proceedings of the Council of the Lieutenant- Governor of Bengal for the purpose of making Laws and R egulations 1884 to 1887(Calcutta, 1888) v/q/ //tf-S- Report on the Administration of Bengal, 1885, 1889-1916 (Calcutta annually). BL ISBE 1 Report of the Bengal Jute Enquiry Committee: Majority Report, Minority Report (Alipore, 1934) (25) 5674 Report of the Bengal Jute Enquiry Committee (Alipore, 1939) V .1252 Report of the Committee to Enquire into the Existing Facilities of the Port of Calcutta (Calcutta, 1914) BL ISBE 4/3 Report on the Maritime Trade of Bengal, 1905-06, (Calcutta, annually) BL ISBE 97/2 3 o S

II. Published Official Records (cont'd) India Office Librai volume or call mark Government o f Bengal (cont'd) Report on the River-Borne Traffic of the Lower Provinces of Bengal and on the Inland Trade o f C alcutta and on the Trade o f Chittagong and the Orissa Ports, 1884fel905; 1912£>1916 (Calcutta, annually) BL ISBE 99 Report on the Trade carried by R ail and River in Bengal 1905-06 (Calcutta, 1907) BL ISBE 95 Reviews of the Public Works executed by District and Local Boards, Municipalities and other Local Bodies in Bengal 1897^1899 (Calcutta, annually) BL ISBE 85 Tables givin g p a rticu la rs o f Buoys and Landmarks on the Coast and on the Rivers and Harbours of Bengal, also of the Floating Light V esse ls, Hoogly River Approach (Calcutta, 1898) BL ISBE 294

3 Government of Eastern Bengal and Assam Annual Statement of the Sea-Borne Trade and Navigation of the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam with Foreign Countries and Indian Ports, 1906^1912 (Shillong, annually) BL 80/3 District Census Report on the Census of the District of Chittagong (- 1891) BL ISBE 14/2 Eastern Bengal District Gazetteer, Chittagong (Calcutta, 1908) Eastern Bengal District Gazetteer, Dacca (Allahabad, 1912) Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Eastern Bengal and Assam 1906L1912 (Shillong, Annually) V/9/1349 Report on the Administration of Eastern Bengal and Assam, 1906^1912 (S h illo n g , annually) BL ISA 51 Report on the Maritime Trade of Eastern Bengal and Assam 1906fe,1912 (S h illon g, annually) BL ISA 80/2 Report on the Trade carried by Rail and River in the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam 1906U912 (Shillong, annually) BL ISA 82 Rules, Bye-Laws, Regulations and Notifications relating to the Port of Chittagong 1891, 1901, 1904 (C alcutta) (56) 2095

4 . Government o f the C hief Commissionership o f Assam Annual Report on Labour Immigration in to Assam 1892^1896 (Shillong, annually) BL ISA 63

5. Government o f Pakistan Economic Progress of East Pakistan (Karachi, 1956) 3 ^

II. A. Published Official Records (cont'd) India Office Library volume or c a ll mark 6 . Parliamentary Papers East India (Reconstitution of the Province of Bengal and Assam): Papers relating to the Reconstitution of the Province of Bengal and Assam, 1905 LVIII 201- BL East India (Reconstitution of the Province of Bengal and Assam): Further papers relating to the Reconstitution of the Province of Bengal and Assam, 1906 LXXXI 633- BL East India (Trade) Review of the Trade of India 1911-12, 1912-13, LXII 963- BL Memorandum on some o f the R esults o f Indian Administration during the past Thirty Years of British rule in India 1889 LVIII 1- BL Report of the Commissioners appointed to enquire into and report upon the Manufacture and Sale of and Tax upon Salt in British India, and more especially upon the practicability of substituting for present arrangements a system of Excise in the Presidencies of Bengal and Madras (G. Plowden, Commissioner of Enquiry on Salt) 1856, XXVI 142- BL

B. Published Official Records Consulted in Bangladesh Bangladesh District Gazetteer Chittagong 1975 East Pakistan D istrict Census Report, Chittagong 1961 East Pakistan District Gazetteer, Chittagong 1961

C. Non-Official Publications Detailed Report of the General Committee of the Indian Tea Association 1896, 1898, 1900, 1901, 1902, 1905 (Calcutta, annually) MSS.EURF 17* Report of the Committee of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, 1890-91, 1891-92, 1896-97 (C alcutta anually) (65) 401

D. Published Official Records Listed under Author Bramley, P„B.; Trade Conditions and Crime on Navigable Waterways in Bengal, Assam and the United Provinces 1904-06 (a paper read before the Bengal .-: Chamber o f Commerce) (Calcutta, 1907) BL ISBE 70/6 • Buchanan, Sir G . : Report on the Development of the Port of Chittagong (Simla, 1914) 8 () 4067 Das Gupta, P.C.: Report on accounting, including costing system and general office procedure at present in force with recommendation as •/. to improvements therein (Calcutta, 1939) V Dumayne, F.G, § Report on the proposals for extending the Palmer, F.: jetty accommodation at the Port of :;\ Chittagong for ocean-going i earners (- 1905) Foley, B. : Report on Labour in Bengal (C alcutta (1906) .BL ISBE..: i i D. Published O fficial Records Listed under Author (cont'd) India Office Library Gupta, G.N.: The Survey of the volume or call mark Industries and Resources of Eastern Bengal and Assam for 1907-08 (Shillong, 1908) P/W 133 King, A.J.: Comprehensive Report on Road Development Projects in Bengal 1935 (Alipore, 1938) (4) 5858 L yall, D.R., § Notes on the Port of Chittagong: Dowling, A.F. : Its trade and the financial prospects o f a Railway to Chandpur and Silchar (Calcutta, 1888) Tracts 974 Toogood, J.H. Descriptive Report on the Kutubdia Lighthouse, giving a brief account of the original as well with its erection and optical adjustments, as also of the necessary alteration to the tower (- 1893) White, C.A. Report on the Improvement for Navigation of the most important Waterways in Bengal (- 1909)

Printed Books

Ahmad, N.: An Economic Geography of East Pakistan (London, 1958)

Ahmed, S . : Muslim Community in Bengal -384-1912 (Dacca, 1974)

Anstey, V.: The Trade o f the Indian Ocean (New York, 1928)

Antrobus, H.A.: The H istory o f the Assam Company 1839-1953 (Edinburgh, 1957)

Bagchi, A.K.: Private Investment in India 1900-1939 (C.U.P., 1972)

Bannerjee, P.: Calcutta and its Hinterland: A Study in the Economic History of India 1833-1900 (Calcutta, 1975)

Basil, G. : The Boats and Boatmen o f Pakistan (Newton Abbott, 197!)

Bhattacharya, S. The East India Company and the Economy o f Bengal (London, 1954)

Blake, G .: Bo I. Centenary 1856-1956 > (London, 1956) V\

Printed Books (cont’d)

Campos, J .J .A .: History of the Portuguese in Bengal (London, 1919)

Chaudhury, N.C.: Jute and S ubstitutes (Calcutta, 1933)

M Jute in Bengal , (Bengal, 1908)

Choudhury, S .: Trade and Commercial Organization in Bengal 1650-17' (Calcutta, 1975)

Dasgupta, B.: The Oil Industry in India (London, 1971)

Davidson, P.E.: Railways of India with an Account of th e ir Rise, Progress and Construction (London, 1868)

Faroque, A.K.M.: Roads and Communications in Mughal India (Delhi, 1977)

Feldman, H .: Karachi through a Hundred Years. The Centenary History of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry 1860-19d0 (London, 1960) - } Findley, A.G.: Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal Directory (London, 1882) '

Fraser, A.H.L.: Among Indian Rajas and Ryots: A Civil Servant’s Recollections and Impressions of Thirty-Seven V Years of Work and Sport in the Central Provinces and Bengal (London, 1911)

Fraser, L.: India under Curzon and After (London, 1911)

Gait, Sir E.: A History of Assam (Calcutta, 1967)

Griffiths, Sir P.: A History of the Inchcape Group (London, 1977)

u The History of the Indian Tea Industry (London, 1967)

it To Guard My People. The History of the Indian Police (London, 1971)

Hamilton, C.J.: The Trade Relation between England and India:, (Delhi, 1975) 1 3/2-

Printed Books (co n t’d)

Hunter, W.W.: A Statistical Account of Bengal, VI (London, 1876)

Khosla, G.S.: Railway Management in India (Bombay, 1972)

L a tif, S.A.: Economic Aspects of the Indian Rice Export Trade (Calcutta, 1927)

Malik, M.B.K.: Hundred Years o f Pakistan Railway (Karachi, 1962)

M allick, A.R.: H istory o f the Freedom Movement III, Part I (Karachi, 1961)

McGrindle, J.W. (ed.): Ancient India as described by Ptolemy (London, 1885)

Mohsin, K.M.: A Bengal D istrict in Transition:Murshidabad 1765-17 (Dacca, 1973) P f \ L L ftfcout Poj't h C d U c m tn /9fl5) Misra, B.R.: Indian Federal Finance (Bombay, 1954)

Nagorski, B.: Port Problems in Developing Countries: Principles of Port Planning and Organization (Tokyo, 1972)

Rashid, H.: East Pakistan: A Systematic Regional Geography . and its Development Planning Aspects (Lahore, 1965) r

Sahni, J.N.: Indian Railways: One Hundred Years 1853 to 1953 (New Delhi, 1953)

Salim, G.H.: The Riyazu S Salatin: A History of Bengal (trans. by M.A. Salam) (Delhi, 1975)

Sarkar, Sir J .: History of Bengal, II (Dacca, 1943-48)

S au l, S.B.: Studies in British Overseas Trade 1870-1940 (Liverpool, 1960)

S ch off, W.H0: Periplus of the Erythrean Sea :* (London, 1912)

Serajuddin, A.M.: The Revenue Administration of the East India Company in Chittagong 1761-1785 (Chittagong, 1971)

Shah, K.T.: Sixty Years of Indian Finance (Bombay, 1927) r 3 > j? > r

Printed Books (cont'd)

Siok-Hwa, Cheng: The Rice Industry of Burma 1852-1940 (Singapore, 1968)

Spate, O.H.K.: India and Pakistan. A General and Regional Geography (London, 1954)

Stewart, C.: History of Bengal: From the first Mohammedan Invasion until the virtual Conquest of that by the English A.D. 1757 (London, 1813)

Tarofdar, M.R.: Hussain Shahi Bengal (Dacca, 1965)

Thomas, P.J.: The Growth of Federal Finance in India (Madras, 1939)

Ukers, W.H.: A ll About Tea (London, 1936)

V akil, C.N., Growth o f Trade and Industry in Modem S.C. Bose and India: An Introductory Survey P.V. Dealalkar: (London, 1931)

V akil, R.M.: The Oil Industry in India (Bombay, 1921)

Watt, Sir G.: The Commercial Products o f India (London, 1908)

W ilson, C.R.: The Early Annals of the English in Bengal (London, 1865)

A rticles

Ahmed, N .: 'Some Glimpses about the Origin and Location of Chittagong Port and Chittagong Town' , Port o f Chittagong Q uarterly, October 1962

Ahmed, N .: 'The Kamaphuli River' , Pakistan Quarterly Review ! No.3, Autumn 1959, ppl4-17„ .

Bary, M.A.: 'Sixty-six Years of the Port of Chittagong, 1888-1954' , Monthly Bulletin of the Port of Chittagong, February 1960, p. 10. /; 3 Ik

Articles (cont'i

Bishui, K.: 'The Origin and Evolution o f the Scheme for the first Partition of Bengal, 1905’, Quarterly Review of Historical Studies, November 1965-66, pp. 78-96

Broomfield, J.M,: 'The Partition of Bengal: A Problem in British Administration, 1830-1912', Indian History Congress Proceedings of the twenty-third Session, Aligarh Part III, Modem India 1960 (Calcutta) p .13-24.

Das, S.C.: 'Antiquity of Chittagong', Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, LXVII Pt. I, 1898 (Calcutta), p.2O^JLV

Firminger, W.K. ' The Early Days o f Steam N avigation in Indian Waters', The Calcutta Review, CCXLI, July 1905, p.4:

Greenhill, B.: 'Progress in East Pakistan, Geographical Magazine XXVII, May 1954-April 1955, pp.457-68.

Karim, A .: ' Samander o f the Arab Geographer', Journal o f the Asiatic Society of Pakistan, December 1963, pp.13-2

Lehmann, F.: 'Great Britain and the Supply of Railway Locomotive of India: A Case Study of "Economic Imperialism1* Indian Economic and S ocial H istory Review I I , No.4, October 1965, pp.-297-305.

Mathur, D.B.: ' Lord Curzon and the P o litic o Surgery o f Bengal The Modem Reviewc^*bctober 1963.

N ajavi, S.H.H., and 'Historical Background of the Port of Chittagong'v’, • R afiul Karim, H.: Pakistan Geographical Review, XXII-XXIII, 1967-68, July 1967, pp.36-94.

Philip, G.: 'Mahuan's Account o f the Kingdom o f Bengal' , Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great : Britain and Ireland, XXVII, Art.XIV, 1895, pp.523-3 ■ ( t Sen, S.N., "’Steam” Johnston' , Bengal Past and Present: Journal of the Calcutta Historical Society, LX, i January-June 1941, pp.6-18. :v

Z aidi, Z.H. : 'The Political Motive in the Partition of Bengal V ,' 1905' , Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, XII, part I I , A pril 1964, p. 113^. Newspapers

Bengalee, 15 December 1903 (Calcutta)

C ap ital, 3 November 1938 (Calcutta)

Englishman, 16 February 1904, 14 October 1907 (Calcutta)

Friend of India and Statesman, 28 January 1904 (Calcutta)

Moslem Chronicle, 9 January 1904 (Calcutta)

Pioneer, 18 February 1904, 20 February 1904 (Lucknow)

Statesman, 15 March 1912 (Calcutta)

The Westminster G azette, 14 July 1906 (London)

See also Bengal Native Newspaper Reports, 1887, 1888, 1892, 1903

Theses PhD

AHMAD, Q.K. The jute manufacturing industry of Bangladesh, 19'47-7 A. London 1977

Akhtar, S.M.: The Growth and Development of the Indian Tea Industry, London, 1932

Ghosh, B .: The Indian Salt Industry Trade and Taxation 1756-1932, London, 1933

Goswami, P .: The Economic Development of Assam with Special Reference to the Twentieth Century, London, 1959

Hwa, S.So: The Rice Industry of Burma 1852 to 1940, London, 1963

Mulla, M.K.: The New Province of East Bengal and Assam, 1905-1911, London, 1965.

Mukherjee, H.: The Early History of the East Indian Railways 1845-1879, London, 1966

Zaidi, Z.H.: The P artitio n of Bengal and it s Annulment: A Survey of the Schemes of Territorial Redistribution of Bengal 1902-1911, London, 1964.

Dissertation MA

Dacca University, Georgraphy Department Library: Dissertation by Md. Rafiqul Karim, The Port of Chittagong: A Geographical Study , 1967