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Recommended Citation Dagger, Richard. "Communitarianism and Republicanism." In Handbook of Political Theory, edited by Gerald F. Gaus and Chandran Kukathas, 167-79. Thousand Oaks: Publications, 2004.

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Communitarianism and Republicanism

RICHARD DAGGER

Communitarianism and republicanism are closely This challenge is especially daunting for related schools of thought - so closely related that communitarians, who seem to be joined more by a friend and foe alike sometimes conflate them. The common impulse or longing than by agreement on relationship is evident in their Latin roots: commu­ shared principles. As a result, as I shall explain nitarians are concerned with communitas, the com­ below, communitarians have been vulnerable to mon life of who form a , and three charges: first, that their objections to liberal are devoted to the , the good theory are largely misconceived; second, that they of the public. Of the two, however, only republi­ have no clear alternative to offer, largely because canism traces its lineage as well as its name to they fail to define 'community' in a precise or use­ ancient Rome. Indeed, scholars often look beyond ful way; and third, that the vague alternative they do Rome to the philosophers and city-states of ancient offer runs the risk of imposing stifling conformity, Greece, particularly and , for the or worse, on . There is, in addition, the origins of republicanism. For the origins of com­ embarrassment that some of the most prominent munitarianism, though, one need look no farther scholars to wear the communitarian label have back than the nineteenth century, and it is only since either abandoned communitarianism or denied that the 1980s that the term 'communitarian' has gained the label ever truly fitted them. its present currency as a result of the so-called Contemporary republicans face similar charges, liberal-communitarian debate. but they have more resources with which to meet This debate points to another way in which com­ them. To understand what these resources arc, munitarianism and republicanism are related. Both however, and to appreciate the superiority of republi­ the emergence of communitarianism and the revival canism to communitarianism, we shall need to begin ofrepublicanism in recent years stem from an uneasi­ at the beginning - before the liberal-communitarian ness with . In both cases the fundamental debate and before the republican revival of the last complaint is that liberalism is guilty of an excessive 30 years or so - with a brief account of the republi­ or misguided emphasis on the and of can tradition in the history of political thought. the that 'nurtures a socially corrosive form With that and an even briefer account of the devel­ of ' (Newman, 1989: 254). But exactly opment of communitarianism lending the necessary how liberalism has gone wrong and what should be background, we shall be in a position to assess the done to matters right are points on which commu­ merits and prospects of contemporary communitar­ nitarians and republicans disagree - not only with ianism and republicanism. each other but among themselves. Some communitar­ ians and republicans advance their theories as alter­ natives to liberalism, while others take themselves to REPUBLICANISM, CLASSICAL be restoring or reviving the concern for community or AND MODERN civic life that once informed liberal theory and prac­ tice. For contemporary communitarians and republi­ cans alike, then, the abiding challenge is to define According to the standard dictionary definition, a their position in relation to liberalism. is a with a representative 168 Handbook of Political Theory and an elected officer rather in secret but a trust or duty that 'should be performed than a . In places where the presence or under the eye and criticism of the public' ( 1991: vestiges of are not a concern, the stress is 355). But what, then, is 'the public'? And how are likely to fall on the representative aspect of republi­ its members to govern themselves? There is no single canism, as it did when distin­ republican answer to these questions. Republicans guished a 'republic' from a 'pure ' in long assumed that only citizens counted as 10 (Rossiter, 1961: 81-2). Where the members of the public and only -owning, real or symbolic power of monarchy is still a polit­ arms-bearing men could be citizens. Contemporary ical force, the anti-monarchical aspect of republi­ republicans define the public and more canism be primary - as the statements of the expansively, however, to include women and Austrahan Republican Movement and similar people without substantial property. Similar shifts groups m other indicate. 1 have occurred with regard to self-government. The same is true of and other countries in When they designed representative institutions for which the struggle between pro- and anti-monarchical the , for example, the men who drafted forces became a defining feature of the political the US knew they were departing from the culture. 2 Setting these differences of emphasis classical conception of self-government as direct aside, however, it seems safe to say that a republi­ participation in rule; yet they saw representation as can is someone who favours representative govern­ an improvement within, not an abandonment of, ment and opposes . republican practice. Whether they were right to Safe, perhaps, but neither entirely accurate nor think so, or whether they sacrificed too much especially enlightening. Whether they were Greeks participation and relied too heavily on representa­ or Romans, the original republicans did not think of tion, remains a point of contention. But it is the the republic as a form of representative government. commitment to publicity and self-government that The , at least, was that the republic would be a generates this and other intramural disputes among form of self-government in which citizens would act republicans. For republicans, the question is not and speak for themselves. Historically, moreover, whether publicity and self-government arc good republicans have been concerned less with the elimi­ things, but how best to achieve them. of monarchy than with preventing the abuse One could say the same, of course, about liberals, of power by anyone holding public office. conservatives, socialists, and others who claim to docs ask in his Republic, 'So who would call that a promote government of, by, and for the people. To republic, i.e., the property of the public, when every­ the extent that they stress the importance of public­ one was oppressed by the cruelty of a single man?' ity and self-government, however, modem political (1998: 72 [Book III, 43]). But the subsequent dis­ theories draw upon the legacy of classical republi­ cussion reveals that Cicero believed that rule by the canism. To the extent that they differ from one few and rule by the many could also be tyrannical - another - and from republicanism - it is because and therefore not republican. Like , they pursue the implications of publicity and self­ Aristotle, and , he held that there are both just government in different ways. To understand what and tyrannical forms of rule by one, by the few, and is distinctive about republicanism, then, we must by the many, and he agreed with Polybius when he examine the implications republicans draw from insisted that the surest way to prevent tyranny is publicity and self-government. through 'a carefully proportioned mixture' (1998: 21 In the case of publicity, the implications are [Book I, 45]) of these forms of rule. If Cicero and twofold. The first is that politics, as the public's other republicans have often opposed monarchy, it is , must be conducted openly, in public. The because hereditary monarchs tend to regard the second is that 'the public' is more than a group of or body politic as their property, to be disposed of as people; it is an aspect or sphere of life with its own they wish, rather than as the res publica - the claims and considerations, even if it is not easily public's property or affair. The core of republican­ distinguished from the private. Something is public ism, in short, is neither a desire for representation when it involves people who share common con­ nor to monarchy as such; it is the cerns that take them out of their private lives and that government is a public matter to be directed by beyond: as Tocqueville put it in Democracy in the members of the public themselves.' America, 'the circle of and friends' (1969: This is to say that publicity and selfgovernment 506). No matter how desirable they may seem to are the cornerstones of republicanism. By 'public­ others, neither a life of unfettered self-indulgence ity' I mean the condition of open and public nor one devoted exclusively to family and friends rather than private or personal. This is the sense in will appeal to a republican. which uses the word when he From these aspects of publicity follow the argues in Considerations on Representative republican emphases on the rule oflaw and, perhaps Government that the vote is not a right to be exercised most distinctively, civic . The public business Communitarianism and Republicanism 169

must be conducted in public not only for reasons of have possessions and harmful to those who have convenience - literally, of coming together - but nothing. It follows from this that the social state is also to guard against corruption. As citizens, people only advantageous to men insofar as they all have must be prepared to overcome their personal incli­ something and none of them has anything superflu­ and set aside their private interests when ous' (1978: 58). Equality under law is only possi­ necessary to do what is best for the public as a ble, in other words, when wealth and property arc whole. The public-spirited citizens who act in this distributed in a way that prevents some people from way display public or . If they are to bending the law to their will. Republicans, includ­ manifest this virtue, furthermore, the public must be ing Rousseau, have typically endorsed private own­ bound by the . Because it is the public's ership of property because they sec in it a means of business, politics requires public debate and deci­ fostering independence. They have been less inter­ sions, which in tum require rules establishing who ested in an to become rich, how­ may speak, when they may speak, and how deci­ ever, than in equal protection under the law and sions are to be reached. Decisions must then take equal opportunities to participate in public life. the form of promulgated rules or decrees that guide the That is why they have sometimes called for limits conduct of the members of the public. From on the accumulation of wealth, as James Harrington the insistence on publicity, the rule of law quickly did in Oceana when he advocated an 'agrarian' law follows. 4 'fixing the balance in lands' (1992: 13). (For simi­ The connection of self-government to the rule lar views in contemporary republicanism, sec of law is at least as strong and immediate. Self­ Sandel, 1996: 329-33 and Pettit, 1997: 135.) It also goveming citizens cannot be subject to absolute or explains 's complaint that the arbitrary rule, whether it proceeds from external or inferior status of women oficn compels them to cat internal forces. If the citizen is to be self-governing, 'the bitter bread of dependence' ( 1985: 158). that is, he or she must be free from the absolute or The law only ensures the citizen's freedom, how­ arbitrary rule of others, which means that citizens ever, when it is responsive to the citizenry and must be subject to the rule of law - the government when the republic itself is secure and stable enough or of laws, not of men, according to the old for its laws to be effective. Sustaining freedom formula. 5 Moreover, self-government requires self­ under the rule of law thus requires not only public­ governing. The republican citizen is someone who spiritcd participation in public affairs and a willing­ acts not arbitrarily, impulsively, or recklessly, but ness to bear the burdens of a common life - the according to laws he or she has a voice in making. civic virtue of the republican citizen - but also the 'For the impulse of appetite alone is ', as proper form of government. This usually has been Rousseau declared in the (1978: 56 some version of mixed or halanced government, [Book I, ch. 8]), 'and obedience to the law one has so called because it mixes and balances elements of prescribed for oneself is freedom'." Again, the need rule by one, by the few, and by the many. As J. G. A. for the rule of law is evident. Pocock ( 1975) and others have noted, writers from As with publicity, the republican commitment to Polybius and Cicero to Machiavelli and the self-government leads to characteristic republican American Founders celebrated the mixed constitu­ themes, such as concern for freedom, equality, and, tion for its ability to stave off corruption and again, civic virtue. Self-government is, of course, a tyranny [sec further Chapter 26]. Monarchy, aris­ form of freedom. For republicans, it is the most tocracy, and democracy, according to these writers, important form, for other kinds of individual free­ are prone to degenerate into tyranny, , and dom are secure only in a free state, under law. , respectively; but a government that dis­ Freedom thus requires dependence upon the law so perses power among the three clements could pre­ that citizens may be independent of the arbitrary vent either the one, the few, or the many from will of others. As Rousseau said in Emile: pursuing its own interest at the expense of the com­ mon good. With each clement holding enough Dependence on men ... engenders al\ the vices, and by power to check the others. the result should be a it, master and slave are mutually corrupted. If there is free, stable, and long-lasting government. To be any means of remedying this ill in society, it is to sub­ sure, republicans have sometimes struggled to stitute law for man and to arm the general wills with a reconcile their faith in with their real strength superior to the action of every particular distrust or even hatred of hereditary monarchy and will. (1979: 85) . But this struggle, as in the case of the Rousseau also knew, as he makes plain in the American Founders, has led to a reinterpretation of Discourse on the Origin oflnequalitr and Political balanced government as one that relics upon the Economy, that the law itself could be corrupted. checks and hafanccs of separated powers or func­ That is why he ends Book I of the Social Cont met tions of government. Whether mixed in the older with this note: 'laws are always useful to those\\ ho sense or balanced in the newer. though. the point is 170 Handbook of Political Theory

to resist the corruption of power by preventing its because of their conception of virtue, which allows concentration. for commerce and acquisitiveness, and their concern If the balanced constitution is the characteristic for natural rights [see also Chapters 3 and 26]. form of the republic, civic virtue is its lifeblood. Other scholars are more impressed by the conti­ Without citizens who are willing to defend the nuity of the republican tradition. Some of these, republic against foreign threats and to take an active such as Pocock (1975), trace the line of develop­ part in government, even the mixed constitution ment from the 'Atlantic republicans' of the seven­ will fail. must thus engage in what teenth and eighteenth centuries back through calls 'a formative politics ... that Machiavelli to Polybius and Aristotle, while cultivates in citizens the qualities of character that ( 1998) and others hold that self-government requires' (1996: 6). Constitutional modem republicanism derives primarily from Roman safeguards may be necessary to resist avarice, theory and practice (see e.g. Sellers, 1998). Those ambition, luxury, idleness, and other forms of cor­ who look back to Aristotle tend to stress the side of ruption, but they will not be enough to sustain free­ republicanism that calls for a life of public-spirited dom under the rule of law. Replenishing the supply political participation; those who look to Rome of civic virtue through education and other means stress the republican commitment to independence will thus be one of the principal concerns of a as freedom under the law. (See Honohan, 2002, for prudent republic - a concern manifest in the works an analysis that stresses the distinction between of writers as different in other respects as Aristotle participatory and rule-of-law republicanism.) In and Wollstonecraft. neither case, however, is there an attempt to draw a A prudent republic will also be a small one. That, sharp or significant distinction between classical at least, has been the conclusion - or presumption - and modem republicanism. To the contrary, these of many republicans throughout the centuries. 'In a scholars take the historical consciousness of large republic,' explained in The modem republicans - a consciousness reflected Spirit of the Laws, 'the is sacrificed in their tendency to look to the ancient world for to a thousand considerations; it is subordinated to exemplars - as evidence of the continuity of the except10ns; it depends upon accidents. In a small classical republican tradition. one, the public good is better felt, better known, lies Whether the camp that insists on distinguishing nearer to each citizen; abuses are less extensive and modem from or the camp consequently less protected' (1989: 124 [Book that resists that distinction is right is, of course, a VIII, ch. 16]). So widespread was this view in the contested matter. But there is no doubt that it is the late eighteenth century that the American authors of latter group that is largely responsible for the repub­ the Federalist found it necessary to point out that lican revival of recent years. Before turning to that Montesqmeu had also allowed for the possibility of revival, however, we should step back for a brief a 'federal' or 'CONFEDERATE' (Federalist 9) survey of communitarian ism, with special attention republic. Even then, the debate over the proposed to the liberal-communitarian debate [see further Constitution often turned on the question of Chapters 8 and 30]. whether the would become a 'federal' or a 'compound' republic - that is, a republic com­ prising 13 or more smaller republics - or whether it COMMUNITARIAN ISM would become a 'consolidated' republic that could not long preserve its republican character. Some scholars have taken disagreements about Longing for community is no doubt to be found in the proper size of a republic to mark one way in political thought at least as far back as the republi­ which modem republicans have diverged from the can concern for publicity and self-government. But path of classical republicanism. According to this that longing did not find expression in the word view (Pangle, 1988; Rahe, 1992; Zuckert, 1994), 'communitarian' until the 1840s, when it and com­ the truly classical republicans of munautaire appeared almost simultaneously in the saw civic virtue as desirable because it protected writings of English and French socialists [see and preserved the polis in which the highest further Chapters 28 and 29]. French dictionaries point could be cultivated: 'Wherever the genuine classi­ to Etienne Cabet and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as the cal republican tradit10n still lives, there is some kind first to use communautaire, but the Oxford English of agreement as to the supreme value of the intel­ Dictionary gives the credit for 'communitarian' to lectual virtues, and of a life spent in leisured medi­ one Goodwyn Barmby, who founded the Universal tation on the nature ofjustice, the soul, and divinity' Communitarian Association in 1841 and edited (Pangle, 1988: 61). By contrast, modern republi­ a magazine he called The Promethean, or Com­ cans, who stem from Machiavelli, are willing to munitarian Apostle. According to Ralph Waldo accept representative government and large Emerson's essay on 'English reformers', Barmby Communitarianism and Republicanism 171

advertised his publication as 'the cheapest of all the modem state, with its impulses toward centralized magazines, and the paper most devoted of any to power and bureaucratic . the cause of the people; consecrated to in In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in , and in Politics' (1842: 239). short, the longing for community took the form of a In the beginning, then, 'communitarian' seems to reaction against both the atomizing, anomic tenden­ have been a rough synonym of' socialist' and 'com­ cies of modem, urban society and the use of the munist'. While those words gradually acquired a centripetal force of the modem state to check these more precise sense in the ideological battles of the tendencies. Moreover, modernity was often linked nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 'communitar­ with liberalism, a theory that many took to rest on ian', when it was used at all, remained a vague, gen­ and encourage atomistic and even 'possessive' indi­ eral term. To be a communitarian was simply to vidualism (Macpherson, 1962). Against this back­ believe that community is somehow vital to a ground, communitariani.1m developed in the late worthwhile life and is therefore to be protected twentieth century in the course of a debate with - or against various threats. Socialists and communists perhaps within - liberalism. This debate occasion­ were leftists, but a communitarian could as easily ally took an overtly political form as various politi­ be to the right as the left of centre politically cal figures insisted on the need to defend (Miller, 2000c) [see further Chapter 1OJ. community standards and cohesion against the Communitarianism in this sense began to take onslaught of relentless individualism. Most shape as a self-conscious way of thinking about notably, Bill Clinton in the United States and Tony society and politics in the late nineteenth century Blair in Britain appealed to communitarian con­ [see Chapters 28 and 29]. According to one line of cerns as they advocated meant to give thought that developed at the time, the primary as much weight to individual responsibilities as threat to community is the centrifugal force of to individual rights. The terms of the libcral­ modem life. That is, people who moved from the set­ communitarian debate, however, were set not so tled, family-focused life of villages and small towns much by as by political philosophers. to the unsettled, individualistic life of commerce Four books published in rapid succession in the and cities might gain affluence and personal free­ 1980s - Alasdair Maclntyrc's Afier Virtue (1981), dom, but they paid the price of alienation, isolation, Michael Sandel's Liheralism and the Limits uf and rootlessness. Ferdinand Ti.innies (2001), with ( 1982), Michael Walzcr's Spheres ofJustice his distinction between Gemeinschafi (community) (1983), and Charles Taylor's Philosophical Papers and Gesellschafi (association or ), has (I 985) - marked the emergence of this philoso­ been especially influential in this regard. As phical form of communitarianism. 7 Different as they Tiinnies defines the terms, Gemeinschafi is an inti­ are from one another, all of these books express dis­ mate, organic, and traditional form of asso­ satisfaction with liberalism, especially in the form ciation; Gesellschafi is impersonal, mechanical, and of theories of justice and rights. The main target rational. To exchange the former for the latter, then, here was 's A Theory ofJustice (1971 ), is to trade wannth and support for coldness and but 's , State, and calculation. (1974), 's Taking Rights Seriouslv Concern for community took another direction in ( 1977), and Bruce Ackerman's Social Justice in the the twentieth century as some writers began to see Liheral State ( 1980) also came in for criticism. A the centripetal force of the modem state as the princi­ typical complaint was, and is, that these theories arc pal threat to community. This tum is evident, for too abstract and universalistic. In opposing them, instance, in Jose Ortega y Gasset's warnings in The Walzer proposes a 'radically particularist' approach Revolt of the Masses against 'the gravest danger that attends to 'history, culture, and membership' that today threatens civilisation: State intervention; by asking not what 'rational ... under the absorption of all spontaneous social effort by universalizing conditions of such-and-such a sort' the State' (1932: 120). 's The Quest would choose, but what would 'individuals like us for Community (1953) provides an especially clear choose, who arc situated as we arc, who share a statement of this position, which draws more on culture and arc determined to go on sharing it?' Tocqueville's insistence on the importance of (1983: xiv, 5). Walzer thus calls attention to the voluntary associations of citizens than on a longing for importance of community, which he and others Gemeinschaft. Community, on Nisbet's account, is writing in the early 1980s took to be suffering from a form of association in which people more or less both philosophical and political neglect. spontaneously work together to solve common Nor do Walzer and the others who came to be problems and live under codes of they known as 'communitarians' believe that theoretical have generated themselves. But the free and healthy indifference has merely coincided with the erosion life of community is increasingly difficult to sus­ of community that they sec in the world around tain, he argues, in the face of constant pressure from them. In various ways Walzer, Macintyre, Sandel, 172 Handbook of Political Theory

and Taylor, among others, have all charged that the understood themselves to be criticizing liberalism liberal emphasis on distributive justice and indivi­ from the outside. Taylor (1989), for instance, has dual rights works to divide the citizens of the modern argued that reasonable liberals and communitarians state against one another, thereby fostering isola­ share a commitment to 'holist individualism' - a tion, alienation, and apathy rather than commitment view that rejects ontological atomism and affirms to a common civic enterprise. Liberals responded, that individuals are somehow socially constituted, of course, and the liberal-communitarian debate on the one hand, yet also recognizes, on the other, was on. the importance of individual rights and liberties. Those enlisted on the communitarian side of the Other theorists with communitarian leanings con­ debate have pressed four major objections against tinue to regard themselves as liberals (Galston, their 'liberal' or 'individualist' opponents. The first 1991; Spragens, 1995). From their point of view the 1s the complaint, already noted in Walzer, that fundamental worry is that other liberals are so pre­ abstract reason will not bear the weight philosophers occupied with the rights and liberties of the abstract have placed on it in their attempts to ground justice individual that they put the survival of liberal soci­ and . This 'Enlightenment project' eties at risk. Whether this worry is well founded is (Macintyre, 1981) is doomed by its failure to recog­ a question that the 'liberal' side of the debate has mze that reasoning about these matters cannot pro­ raised in response to the 'communitarians'. (For a ceed apart from shared traditions and practices, each valuable, full-length survey of this debate, see with its own set of roles, responsibilities, and Mulhall and Swift, 1996.) virtues. Second, the liberal emphasis on individual Here we may distinguish three interlocking rights and Justice comes at the expense of civic duty responses. The first is that the communitarians' crit­ and the common good. In Sandel's words, 'justice icisms are misplaced because they have miscon­ finds its limits in those forms of community that ceived liberalism (Caney, 1992). In particular, the engage the identity as well as the interests of the communitarians have misunderstood the abstract­ participants .... [T]o some I owe more than justice ness of the theories they criticize. Thus Rawls main­ requires or even permits ... in virtue of those more tains (l 993: Lecture I) that his 'political' or less enduring attachments and commitments conception of the self as prior to its ends is not a which taken together partly define the person I am' metaphysical claim about the nature of the self, as ( 1982: 179, 182). Contemporary liberals are blind to Sandel , but simply a way of representing these enduring attachments and commitments, the parties who are choosing principles of justice according to the third charge, because they too often from behind the 'veil of ignorance'. Nor does this rely on an atomistic conception of the self - an conception of the individual as a self capable of 'unencumbered self', in Sandel' s terms - that is sup­ choosing its ends require liberals to deny that indi­ posedly prior to its ends and attachments. Such a vidual identity is in many ways the product of conception 1s both false and pernicious, for individ­ unchosen attachments and social circumstances. ual selves are largely constituted by the 'What is central to the liberal view,' according to that nurture and sustain them. When Rawls and other Will Kymlicka, 'is not that we can perceive a self 'deontolog1cal liberals' teach individuals to think of prior to its ends, but that we understand ourselves to themselves as somehow prior to and apart from these be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal communities, they are engaged quite literally in a is exempt from possible re-examination' (1989: 52, self-defeating enterprise. The fourth objection, then, emphasis in original). With this understood, a is that these abstract and universalistic theories of second response is to grant, as Kymlicka, Dworkin justice and rights have contributed to the withdrawal (1986; 1992), Gewirth (1996), and Mason (2000) into private life and the intransigent insistence on do, that liberals should pay more attention to one's rights against others that threaten modern belonging, identity, and community, but to insist . There is little sense of a common good or that they can do this perfectly well within their even a common ground on which citizens can meet. existing theories. The third response, finally, is to In Maclntyre's words, the conflict between the advo­ point to the dangers of the critics' appeal to com­ cates of mcommensurablc moral positions has so munity norms. Communities have their virtues, but riven modern societies that politics now 'is civil they have their vices, too - smugness, intolerance, carried on by other means' (1981: 253). The best we and various forms of oppression and exploitation can do in these circumstances is to agree to disagree among them. The fact that communitarians do not while we try to fashion 'local forms of community embrace these vices simply reveals the perversity of withm which civility and the intellectual and moral their criticism: they 'want us to live in Salem, but life can be sustained through the new dark ages not to believe in witches' (Gutmann, 1992: 133; which are already upon us' (1981: 263). Friedman, 1992). If liberals rely on abstractions and The communitarians have not all pressed all of universal considerations in their theories of justice these objections with equal force, nor have they all and rights, that is because they must do so to rise Communitarianism and Republicanism 173

above - and critically assess - local prejudices that preferences that prevail in any given community at communitarians must simply accept. any given time' ( 1994: 1767). He has, accordingly, Communitarian rejoinders have indicated their abandoned this misleading term in favour of sensitivity to this last point. Sandel, as we shall see, 'republicanism'. He persists in his criticism of lib­ has decided that 'republican' better defines his eralism, to be sure, but he apparently believes that position than 'communitarian', and Macintyre has he is in a better position to criticize as a republican denied, quite forcefully, that he is or ever was a committed to 'a fonnativc politics ... that cultivates communitarian.8 Others have embraced the com­ in citizens the qualities of character self-government munitarian label, but their rejoinders to 'liberal' requires' (1996: 6) than as a communitarian com­ criticisms stress their desire to strike a balance mitted to the prevailing values and preferences in a between individual rights and civic responsibilities given community at a given time. What counts for (Etzioni, 1996) in order to 'move closer to the ideal the republican is not community per se, but the com­ of community life' - a life in which 'we learn the munity of self-governing, public-spirited citizens. value of integrating what we seek individually with Sandcl's profession of republicanism has con­ the needs and aspirations of other people' (Tam, tributed to a revival of republican political theory 1998: 220, emphasis added). In contrast to that has been under way since at least 1975, when Macintyre, Sandel, Walzer, and Taylor, these Pocock's Machiavellian Moment called attention to 'political communitarians' (Frazer, 1999) are less the 'Atlantic republican tradition'. Pocock himself concerned with philosophical criticism of liberal­ drew on the work of other historians, such as Zera ism or individualism than with moving closer to the Fink (1945), Caroline Robbins (1959), Bernard ideal of community life by reviving civil society. Bailyn (1967), and Gordon Wood (1969), who had They hope to do this, in particular, by calling atten­ stressed the importance of republican or 'common­ tion to shared values and beliefs, encouraging wealth' themes in the political controversies and active and widespread participation in civic life, upheavals of England and America in the and bringing politics down to the local, properly seventeenth and eighteenth centuries [sec further 'human' level (Frazer, 1999: 41-2). Chapter 26]. Another source of inspiration was the The key question for these 'political' communi­ political theorist : 'Jn terms bor­ tarians is whether 'the ideal of community life' is rowed from or suggested by the language of precise and powerful enough to do the work they Hannah Arendt, [] has want it to do. To the 'political' communitarian, told part of the story of the revival in the early mod­ appealing to the 'spirit' of community holds the ern West of the ancient ideal of homo politicus (the promise of uniting people of various political incli­ zom1 politikon of Aristotle), who affirms his being nations - left, right, and centre. To others, however, and his virtue by the medium of political action' it seems that 'the communitarian political move­ (1975: 550) [sec further Chapter 23]. ment, avoiding controversial political issues in It would be unwise to say that a thinker as multi­ order to appeal to as wide a range of constituents as farious as Arendt was first, last, and above all a possible, ends up as little more than a moral appeal republican, but there is certainly a strong streak of to us all to behave better: take more responsibility republicanism in her writings (Canovan, 1992, esp. for our social environment, avoid corruption, etc., ch. 6). This streak is most evident in her recurring etc.' (Miller, 2000c: 109). Communitarianism of concern for what I have called the cornerstones of this sort may be useful as exhortation, but it is too republicanism - publicity and self-government. To vague and accommodating to succeed as a political some commentators this concern seems little more philosophy. than misplaced nostalgia for the ancient polis (e.g. O'Sullivan, 1975). But Arcndt's complaint is not so much that civic life in modern has declined dramatically from some golden age, as REPUBLICANISM REVIVED that it has failed to realize the promise of republican citizenship. Technology has cased the burdens of Whether 'philosophical' or 'political', communitar­ labour and freed us to act as citizens in the public ianism is too vague to be helpful and too accom­ realm, she argued in The Human Condition (1958), modating to be acceptable. Communities take a yet we forsake public life in favour of private con­ great many forms, including some - such as fascist sumption. We want government to provide for the or Nazi - that communitarians them­ of the citizenry, she declared in 011 selves must find unpalatable or intolerable. Sandel Rernlution, but we 'deny the very of acknowledges the point when he says, in his review public happiness and public freedom' as we 'insist of Rawls's Political Liberalism, that the 'term that politics is a burden' (1965: 273). We arc. in "communitarianism" is misleading ... insofar as short. squandering an opportunity to achieve what it implies that rights should rest on the values or the republicans of ancient Greece and Rome 174 Handbook of Political Theory

thought to be impossible - a in which the punishment (Braithwaite and Pettit, 1990). They are freedom of republican self-government is available not so united on any of these points as to warrant the not only to the well-to-do few but to almost the claim that there is a neorepublican programme for entire people. political change, but it is possible to discern four Similar worries about 'the erosion of the distinc­ broad themes on which they do agree. These are the tively political' animated Sheldon Wolin's influen­ interrelated themes of political equality, freedom as tial Politics and Vision ( 1960: 290). Like Arendt, self-government, deliberative politics, and civic Wolin's complaint is that 'the political' has been virtue (cf. Sunstein, 1988: 1548). displaced by 'the social' in the modem world. What The commitment to equality is hardly distinctive we call 'politics' is little more than the squabbling of neorepublicanism, for it is a commitment shared, of groups seeking to protect and promote their inter­ if Dworkin (1977: 179-83) and Kymlicka (1990: ests, with devastating consequences for civic life. 4-5 and passim) are correct, by every plausible 'There is substantial evidence,' Wolin remarks, that political theory. It does distinguish them, of course, from their classical forebears, whose praise of the participation in public affairs is regarded with indiffer­ equal rule (isonomia) of citizens sometimes went ence by vast numbers of members. The average citizen hand-in-hand with a defence of slavery. What seems to find the exercise of political rights burden­ makes the neorepublican position truly distinctive, some, boring, and often lacking in significance. To be a however, is the combination of a belief in the equal citizen does not appear an important role nor political moral worth of persons with the traditional republi­ participation an intrinsic good ... By reducing citizen­ can emphasis on the importance ofpolitical equality. ship to a cheap commodity, democracy has seemingly Everyone, that is, should have the opportunity to contributed to the dilution of politics. (1960: 353) become a citizen, and every citizen should stand on an equal footing, under law and in the political In retrospect, then, Pocock's Machiavellian arena, with every other citizen. Republicanism may Moment appears to have brought together and sup­ thus require steps to be taken to relieve women plied a name for two previously distinct bodies of from subjection to men, workers from subjection to scholarship: the efforts of historians to recover a employers, and the members of some racial, ethnic, form of political thought that seemed to be all but or cultural groups from subjection to others. In the lost; and the efforts of political theorists, notably traditional idiom, these steps may be necessary to Arendt and Wolin, to remind their contemporaries free some people from dependence on others. They of the value of the public life of the self-governing may also require some redistribution of wealth and citizen. Those scholars who have subsequently seen limits on the use of to obtain or exercise themselves as engaged in the republican revival political influence. Even so, neorepublicans typi­ have tried, for the most part, to combine these tasks cally take the Aristotelian view of property- private by dedicating themselves to the historical retrieval ownership for the public good - and see no point in and reconstruction of republicanism (e.g. Sullivan, 'material egalitarianism' for its own sake (Pettit, 1986; Boyte, 1989; Oldfield, 1990). So much is 1997: 161). necessary, it seems, if they are to show that the The connection of political equality to the second republican concepts and idioms of earlier eras still theme, freedom as self-government, is a close one. speak to present concerns. Thus Sandel tries in Both involve what calls 'the frankness Democracy s Discontent to devise a 'public ­ ofintersubjective equality' (1997: 64). On the repub­ sophy' for the United States by reclaiming the lican view, as we have seen, freedom is not so much republicanism of the American Founding and the a matter of being left alone as it is of living under ' of citizenship' that governed the rule of laws that one has a voice in making. American thinking about economic relationships, Republicans differ from liberals in this regard, he argues, into the late nineteenth century. according to Pettit, because 'the supreme political But that is not to say that neorepublican theorists value' (1997: 80) of republicanism is freedom have shied away from prescription as they have understood not as non-interference - the liberal explored the implications of republicanism for con­ view - but as non-domination or, in Skinner's temporary politics. To the contrary, their recom­ terms, 'absence of dependence' (2002: 18). It is not mendations range from the specific - national or interference as such that is objectionable, on this civic service programmes (Barber, 1984: 298-303), view, but its arbitrariness. The slave and the citizen campaign reform (Sunstein, 1988: 1576--8), may both suffer interference when one must bow to and compulsory (Dagger, 1997: 145-51), for the will of the master and the other must bow to the example - to such general issues as national identity law, but it is a mistake to say that they both suffer (Miller, 1995), economic arrangements that foster the loss of freedom. The master need not be con­ citizenship and strong communities (Sandel, 1996: cerned for the slave's desires or interests, but the Part II; Sullivan, 1986; ch. 7), and the justification of Jaw, at least in the ideal, must attend to the interests Communitarianism and Republicanism 175

of the citizen qua citizen even when it interferes independent selves, unencumbered by moral or with his or her activities. By protecting the citizen civic tics they have not chosen' ( 1996: 6 ). This against arbitrary power, the law is 'the non-mastering 'voluntarist' or 'procedural' liberalism, as found in interferer' (Pettit, 1997: 41) that ensures the the works of liberal philosophers such as Rawls and citizen's freedom. So valuable is this independence the decisions oflibcral jurists, has fostered a society from arbitrary power, Pettit insists, that it is a 'pri­ in which individuals fail to understand how much mary good' in the Rawlsian sense. Whatever else they owe to the community. The chief purpose of people may want, they will want to be free from the state is thus taken to be the arbitration of con­ domination because they then will have the ability flicting claims of individuals in pursuit of their dis­ to make plans, to speak with independent voices, parate conceptions of the good life. Such a society and simply to be persons: 'everyone - or at least will be self-subverting, Sandel insists, for it 'fails to everyone who has to make his or her way in a capture those loyalties and responsibilities whose pluralistic society - will want to be treated properly moral force consists partly in the fact that living by as a person, as a voice that cannot be generally them is inseparable from understanding ourselves ignored' (1997: 91). as the particular persons we arc - as members of Republican political institutions, then, must this family or city or nation or people, as bearers of ensure the political equality of self-governing that history, as citizens of this republic' (I 996: I 4 ). citizens. To this end, neorepublicans call for a more Where such loyalties and responsibilities cannot be deliberative form of politics [see further Chapters 1 I sustained, self-government cannot survive. Hence and 12]. As puts it, 'republicans will the need for a republican revival. attempt to design political institutions that promote Taken together, these four themes suggest that discussion and debate among the citizenry; they republicans today have a powerful and coherent will be hostile to systems that promote political theory - more powerful and coherent, in as "deals" or bargains among self-interested private my view, than communitarianism. But there is a groups' (1988: 1549). This is not to say that repub­ fifth theme running through the writings of the new licans believe that citizens would easily or quickly republicans, and on this point they seem to divide. come to agreement about what the common good This theme is the relationship of republicanism to requires if only government could be freed from the liberalism. In general, neorepublicans share the stranglehold of interest groups. The point, instead, communitarian conviction that many liberals give is that reviving the republican conception of politics too much attention to individual rights and too little as the public business means rejecting the 'eco­ to civic duties. This is particularly true, they hold, nomic model' of politics, according to which indivi­ of libertarians and those who maintain that liberal­ duals and groups bring their preferences, already ism must be strictly neutral with regard to compet­ fixed, to the political marketplace, where they use ing conceptions of the good [sec further Chapter 9]. their political capital and bargaining power to strike In response, some scholars with republican sympa­ the best deals for themselves. On the republican thies see a need to recall the 'civic' or 'republican' view, politics of this sort is a form of corruption elements in liberalism (e.g. Holmes, 1995; Terchck, that reduces the citizen to a consumer seeking to 1997; Spragens, I 999) or otherwise argue for the promote his or her personal interests. Steps must be adoption of republican liberalism or liberal republi­ taken, then, to limit the power of private interests, canism (Sunstein, I 988; Burtt, I 993; Dagger, to prepare people through civic education to take 1997). But others insist, with Pettit and Sandel, that the part of the public-spirited citizen, and to provide republicanism is different enough from liberalism them with arenas or forums in which they may to justify thinking of them as rival theories. By engage in debate and deliberation on the public doing so, however, they open themselves to the business. objection that Sandel has brought against those Deliberative politics will succeed, however, only liberals who have embraced the ideals of political if there is a sufficient supply of civic virtue; other­ neutrality and the unencumbered self: that they arc wise debate and deliberation will be little more than engaged in a self-subverting enterprise. Just as a a vain display that distracts attention from the 'real' liberal society must be able to count on a sense of politics of bargaining for personal advantage. This community and civic engagement, so a republican is the fourth theme of the neorepublicans: civic polity must be able to count on a commitment to virtue is necessary if self-government is to be sus­ principles generally associated with liberalism, tained. But the neorepublicans also tend to believe such as tolerance, fair play, and respect for the that civic virtue is either in decline or in jeopardy, rights of others. If their zeal for individual rights and they frequently place the blame on liberalism. and sometimes leads liberals to undercut As Sandel says, 'the civic or fonnativc aspect of their position by threatening the communal or our [American] politics has largely given way to republican underpinnings of a liberal society, so the liberalism that conceives persons as free and Pettit, Sandel, and others who oppose republicanism 176 Handbook of Political Theory to liberalism are in danger of undercutting their their classical forebears neither faced nor anticipated. position by threatening the liberal principles upon That their theory contains such resources is, in the which they implicitly rely. (See Dagger, 1999 and end, the best testimony to the importance of reviv­ 2000, for elaboration of this criticism of Sandel and ing republicanism. Pettit, respectively.)

NOTES CONCLUSION I am grateful to Terence Ball, Iseult Honohan, and David Two conclusions follow from this survey of com­ Miller for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this munitarianism and republicanism. One is that chapter. republicanism is superior to communitarianism; the other is that neither historical considerations 1 The website of the Australian Republican Movement (Banning, 1986; Isaac, 1988) nor theoretical quotes a dictionary definition of a republic as a system in prudence warrant a sharp distinction between republi­ which the people elect representatives, then adds this canism and liberalism. In developing their theory, statement: 'In particular, a republic refers to a system of though, neorepublicans continue to face difficulties government that has no hereditary monarch - a person and challenges - two of which I shall briefly discuss who holds political or constitutional office purely as a by way of conclusion. birthright' (www.rcpublic.org.au, 18 July 2002). The first challenge is to respond to those who 2 Even Sudhir Hazareesingh, who identifies the leading hold that neorepublicans can never escape the characteristics of French republicanism as '[p ]articipa­ implicit in the traditional republican ideal of tionism, perfectionism, universalism, , and the citizen as a property-owning, arms-bearing man. revolutionism' (1994: 68-9), assumes that opposition to This objection is put forcefully by Iris Marion monarchy is a defining feature of republicanism: 'None of Young, who detects a denial of '' in the central figures of the was a self-confessed republican attempts to establish a 'civic public' in republican, and France was declared a Republic only in which citizens devote themselves to the common September 1792, after the experiment of a constitutional good. 'This ideal of the civic public,' Young monarchy had been deemed a failure. The proclamation of charges, 'excludes women and other groups defined the Republic was itself accelerated by popular pressure, as different, because its rational and universal status emanating particularly from such grass-roots organi­ derives only from its opposition to affectivity, zations as the anti-monarchical clubs de quartiers' particularity, and the body' (1990: 117). ( 1994: 69). The second challenge is to demonstrate the rele­ 3 Cf. Everdell in a book entitled The End ofKings: 'The vance of republicanism in an age of globalization. essential republican principle is that no one person shall In the face of the rapid spread of global communi­ rule the community, that everyone shall have a part in the cations, the rise of the global economy, and threats public's business' (!983: 297). to the environment that respect no boundaries, 4 Cicero again is apposite: 'a public is not every kind of political theorists must think in cosmopolitan terms. human gathering, congregating in any manner, but a To a critical eye, however, republicanism may seem numerous gathering brought together by legal and to be a nostalgic form of political thinking that is so ' (l 998: 19 (Book I, 39]). See also fixed on the small-scale polities of years long past - Book III, 45 (l 998: 73): 'there is no public except when it on the Italian city-states, the Roman , and the is held together by a legal agreement'; and for analysis and Greek polis - as to be incapable of responding to assessment, see Schofield ( 1995). the challenges of globalization. 5 Historians (Wirszubski, 1960: 9; Skinner, 1998: 45) These are challenges that republicans must take trace this formula to the Roman writers Sallust, , and seriously. Indeed, they are taking them seriously, as Cicero. recent republican or 'civic liberal' responses to the 6 Note also the challenge Rousseau sets himself in the challenges of 'difference' and of indi­ Social Contract: 'Find a form of association that defends cate.9 These responses engage the four themes mcn­ and protects the person and goods of each associate with t10ned above, and they rely ultimately on the all the common force, and by means of which each one, republican commitment to publicity and self­ uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and govemment - a commitment that cannot be met if remains as free as before' (1978: 53 [Book I, ch. 6]). too much is conceded to either the politics of dif­ 7 A fifth book, Bellah et al. ( 1985), invoked communi­ ference or . There will be disagree­ tarian themes in the course of a sociological analysis of the ment, no doubt, as to the adequacy of these responses. American middle class. There should be no doubt, however, that neorepub­ 8 Note Bell (1993: 4 and n. 14) on the reluctance of hcans are capable of responding to challenges that Macintyre, Walzer, Taylor, and Sandel to admit to being Communitarianism and Republicanism 177

communitarians. See also Macintyre: 'Contemporary Canovan, Margaret ( 1992) llannah Arendt: A communitarians, from whom I have strongly dissociated Reinterpretation o(Her Political Thought. Cambridge: myself whenever I have had an opportunity to do so, Cambridge University Press. advance their proposals as a contribution to the politics of Cicero (1998) The Republic and The Laws, eds, J. Powell the nation-state' (1994: 302); 'Liberals ... mistakenly sup­ and N. Rudd, trans. N. Rudd. Oxford: Oxford pose that those [totalitarian and other] evils arise from any University Press. form of political community which embodies substantive Dagger, Richard ( 1997) Cii·ic Virtues: Rights, Citi::enship, practical agreement upon some strong conception of the and Republican Liberalism. New York: Oxford human good. I by contrast take them to arise from the University Press. specific character of the nation-state, thus agreeing with Dagger, Richard ( 1999) 'The Sandelian republic and in this at least, that modem nation-states which encumbered self'. The Review of Politics, 61 (Spring): masquerade as embodiments of community are always to 181-217. be resisted' (1994: 303); 'In any case the liberal critique Dagger, Richard (2000) 'Republicanism refashioned: of those nation-states which pretend to embody the values comments on Pettit's theory of freedom and govern­ of community has little to say to those Aristotelians, such ment'. The Good Society, 9 (3): 50-3. as myself, for whom the nation-state is not and cannot be Dagger, Richard (2001) 'Republicanism and the politics the locus of community' ( 1994: 303). See further of place'. Philosophical Erp/orations, 4 (3 ): 157-73. Macintyre (1998: 243-50). 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