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Master Author Index to Volumes 1–12 Issues 1–24 Prepared by Chris Matthew Sciabarra

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Master Author Index to Volumes 1–12 Issues 1–24 Prepared by Chris Matthew Sciabarra The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 2 (Issue 24) 289 Master Author Index to Volumes 1–12 Issues 1–24 Prepared by Chris Matthew Sciabarra. This index is organized alphabetically by author in the following format: Volume . Number . Issue Number . (Date) : Page Numbers. For example, an article published in Volume 1, Number 1, Issue 1, Fall 1999, pp. 1–26 is rendered as: 1.1.1 (Fall 1999): 1–26. No references to abstracts or biographical entries are included. Multiple author references are organized chronologically. Symposia contributions are noted by symposium title in brackets. Books reviewed are noted in brackets after article titles, where appropriate. ALTICK, JOHN. Reply to Graham and Nobis: Putting Humans First? YES! 8.2.16 (Spring 2007): 317–30. ARMSTRONG, ARI. A Direct Realist’s Challenge to Skepticism [Skepticism and the Veil of Perception by Michael Huemer]. 5.2.10 (Spring 2004): 421–40. Rejoinder to Huemer: Direct Realism and Causation. 7.1.13 (Fall 2005): 239–45. AUNE, JAMES ARNT. Reply to Yeager: Rhetorical Incorrectness? 4.1.7 (Fall 2002): 231–34. BARR, EMILY J. Sex and the Egoist: Measuring Ayn Rand’s Fiction Against Her Philosophy. 12.2.24 (December 2012): 193–206. BASS, ROBERT H. Egoism versus Rights [Symposium: A Dialogue on Ayn Rand’s Ethics]. 7.2.14 (Spring 2006): 329–49. 290 The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 2 (Issue 24) Rejoinder to Cathcart and Campbell: Defending the Argument [Symposium: A Dialogue on Ayn Rand’s Ethics]. 7.2.14 (Spring 2006): 371–81. BEADLE, RON. Rand and MacIntyre on Moral Agency. 9.2.18 (Spring 2008): 221–43. On Human Capability [co-author: Dyer-Smith, Martyn]. 3.1.5 (Fall 2001): 1–27. BEITO, DAVID T. Isabel Paterson and the Idea of America [The Woman and the Dynamo: Isabel Paterson and The Idea of America by Stephen Cox]. 8.2.16 (Spring 2007): 261–69. BELL-VILLADA, GENE H. Nordau’s Degeneration and Tolstoy’s What Is Art? Still Live [The Aesthetics Symposium]. 2.2.4 (Spring 2001): 291–97. Reply to Johnson: Nabokov and Rand: Kindred Ideological Spirits, Divergent Literary Aims. 3.1.5 (Fall 2001): 181–93. BERNSTEIN, ANDREW. Reply to Minsaas: On the Ayn Rand CliffsNotes. 3.2.6 (Spring 2002): 349. BISSELL, ROGER E. Music and Perceptual Cognition. 1.1.1 (Fall 1999): 59–86. Rejoinder to Vacker: Rockin’ with Rand: Sailing the Turbulent Seas of the Objectivist Aesthetics. 2.1.3 (Fall 2000): 221–27. Critical Misinterpretations and Missed Opportunities: Errors and Omissions by Kamhi and Torres [The Aesthetics Symposium]. 2.2.4 (Spring 2001): 299–310. Reply to Long: Mistaken Identity: Long’s Conflation of Dialectics and Organicism. 3.2.6 (Spring 2002): 351–57. The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 2 (Issue 24) 291 A Neglected Source for Rand’s Aesthetics. 4.1.7 (Fall 2002): 187–204. Art as Microcosm: The Real Meaning of the Objectivist Concept of Art. 5.2.10 (Spring 2004): 305–63. Langer and Camus: Unexpected Post-Kantian Affinities with Rand’s Aesthetics. 7.1.13 (Fall 2005): 57–77. Ayn Rand and “The Objective”: A Closer Look at the Intrinsic- Objective-Subjective Trichotomy. 9.1.17 (Fall 2007): 53–92. Mind, Introspection and “The Objective”. 10.1.19 (Fall 2008): 3–84. Will the Real Apollo Please Stand Up?: Rand, Nietzsche, and the Reason-Emotion Dichotomy [A Symposium on Friedrich Nietzsche and Ayn Rand]. 10.2.20 (Spring 2009): 343–69. The Logic of Liberty: Aristotle, Ayn Rand, and the Logical Structure of the Political Spectrum. 12.1.23 (August 2012): 5–75. BLOCK, WALTER E. The Libertarian Minimal State? A Critique of the Views of Nozick, Levin, and Rand. 4.1.7 (Fall 2002): 141–60. Ayn Rand and Austrian Economics: Two Peas in a Pod [Cente- nary Symposium, Part II: Ayn Rand Among the Austrians]. 6.2.12 (Spring 2005): 259–69. Ayn Rand, Religion, and Libertarianism. 11.1.21 (July 2011): 63–79. BOETTKE, PETER J. Teaching Economics Through Ayn Rand: How the Economy is Like a Novel and How the Novel Can Teach Us About Econom- ics [Centenary Symposium, Part II: Ayn Rand Among the Austrians]. 6.2.12 (Spring 2005): 445–65. 292 The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 2 (Issue 24) BOSTAPH, SAMUEL. Ayn Rand’s Economic Thought. 11.1.21 (July 2011): 19–44. BOWMAN, DURRELL. Reply to Sciabarra: To Rand or Not To Rand: Neil Peart’s Varied Influences [Symposium on “Rand, Rush, and Rock”]. 5.1.9 (Fall 2003): 153–60. BOYDSTUN, STEPHEN. Universals and Measurement. 5.2.10 (Spring 2004): 271–304. BROOKS, DEAN. Rebuttal Witnesses [Facets of Ayn Rand by Mary Ann Sures and Charles Sures]. 5.1.9 (Fall 2003): 97–103. BROWN, DAVID M. Questions About Answers [Ayn Rand Answers: The Best of Her Q&A, edited by Robert Mayhew]. 7.2.14 (Spring 2006): 473–82. BROWN, SUSAN LOVE. Essays on Ayn Rand’s Fiction [Essays on Ayn Rand’s Anthem; Essays on Ayn Rand’s We the Living, edited by Robert Mayhew]. 8.1.15 (Fall 2006): 63–84. Society: Toward an Objective View. 9.1.17 (Fall 2007): 113–38. BROWNE, GREGORY M. Reply to Long: The ‘Grotesque’ Dichotomies Still Unbeautified. 8.1.15 (Fall 2006): 123–42. BUBB, FRANK. Reply to Mack: Did Ayn Rand Do the Shuffle? [Symposium: A Dialogue on Ayn Rand’s Ethics]. 7.2.14 (Spring 2006): 257–86. The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 2 (Issue 24) 293 CAMPBELL, ROBERT L. Ayn Rand and the Cognitive Revolution in Psychology. 1.1.1 (Fall 1999): 107–34. A Veteran Reconnoiters Ayn Rand’s Philosophy [Ayn Rand by Tibor R. Machan]. 1.2.2 (Spring 2000): 293–312. Rejoinder to Shedenhelm, Thomas, and Vacker: Implied Epistemology, Epistemology of the Implicit. 2.1.3 (Fall 2000): 211–19. Can Academics Learn from a Mere Clinical Psychologist? [The Art of Living Consciously: The Power of Awareness to Transform Everyday Life by Nathaniel Branden]. 3.1.5 (Fall 2001): 125–43. Goals, Values, and the Implicit: Explorations in Psychological Ontology. 3.2.6 (Spring 2002): 289–327. Reply to Bass: Altruism in Auguste Comte and Ayn Rand [Symposium: A Dialogue on Ayn Rand’s Ethics]. 7.2.14 (Spring 2006): 357–69. The Peikovian Doctrine of the Arbitrary Assertion. 10.1.19 (Fall 2008): 85–170. The Re-Writing of Ayn Rand’s Spoken Answers. 11.1.21 (July 2011): 81–151. CAMPOS, ANDRE SANTOS. Ayn Rand Shrugged: The Gap Between Ethical Egoism and Global Capitalism. 12.1.23 (August 2012): 77–116. CATHCART, CHRIS. Reply to Bass: Egoism and Rights [Symposium: A Dialogue on Ayn Rand’s Ethics]. 7.2.14 (Spring 2006): 351–56. CHAMPAGNE, MARC. Some Convergences and Divergences in the Realism of Charles Peirce and Ayn Rand. 8.1.15 (Fall 2006): 19–39. 294 The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 2 (Issue 24) What About Suicide Bombers? A Terse Response to a Terse Objection. 11.2.22 (December 2011): 233–36. COX, STEPHEN. Outsides and Insides: Reimagining American Capitalism. 1.1.1 (Fall 1999): 27–57. The Art of Fiction [The Art of Fiction: A Guide for Writers and Readers by Ayn Rand, edited by Tore Boekmann]. 1.2.2 (Spring 2000): 313–31. Having Your Say [The Art of Nonfiction: A Guide for Writers and Readers by Ayn Rand, edited by Robert Mayhew]. 3.2.6 (Spring 2002): 339–47. Completing Rand’s Literary Theory [Centenary Symposium, Part I: Ayn Rand: Literary and Cultural Impact]. 6.1.11 (Fall 2004): 67–89. Merely Metaphorical: Ayn Rand, Isabel Paterson, and the Language of Theory. 8.2.16 (Spring 2007): 237–60. DAVIS, WAYNE A. Reason, Emotion, and the Importance of Philosophy. 4.1.7 (Fall 2002): 1–23. DEGUTIS, ALGIRDAS. Deconstructing Postmodern Xenophilia. 8.1.15 (Fall 2006): 49–62. DEN UYL, DOUGLAS J. Individualist Ethics and the Welfare State [A Life of One’s Own: Individual Rights and the Welfare State by David Kelley]. 3.1.5 (Fall 2001): 109–15. Reply to Vedder: Defending Norms of Liberty [co-author: Rasmussen, Douglas B.]. 10.1.19 (Fall 2008): 235–38. DENT, ERIC B. Objectivism and Christianity. 11.2.22 (December 2011): 189–213. The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 2 (Issue 24) 295 DIPERT, RANDALL P. The Puzzle of Music and Emotion in Rand’s Aesthetics [The Aesthetics Symposium]. 2.2.4 (Spring 2001): 387–94. DOLLING, LISA M. Ayn Rand: A Feminist Despite Herself? [Feminist Interpretations of Ayn Rand, co-edited by Mimi Reisel Gladstein and Chris Matthew Sciabarra]. 1.2.2 (Spring 2000): 263–81. DOUGHNEY, LACHLAN. Ayn Rand and Deducing ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’. 12.1.23 (August 2012): 151–68. DWYER, WILLIAM. Do Knowledge, Ethics, and Liberty Require Free Will? [Initiative: Human Agency and Society by Tibor Machan]. 3.1.5 (Fall 2001): 83–108. Rejoinder to Lyons and Machan: Free Will and Determinism. 4.1.7 (Fall 2002): 221–30. DYER-SMITH, MARTYN. On Human Capability [co-author: Beadle, Ron]. 3.1.5 (Fall 2001): 1–27. DYKES, NICHOLAS. Ayn Rand in the Scholarly Literature IV: Ayn Rand in England. 5.2.10 (Spring 2004): 365–400. The Facts of Reality: Logic and History in Objectivist Debates about Government. 7.1.13 (Fall 2005): 79–140. EDITORS, THE. Introduction: The Aesthetics Symposium. 2.2.4 (Spring 2001): 251–52. 296 The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 12, No. 2 (Issue 24) ENRIGHT, JOHN. Art: What a Concept [The Aesthetics Symposium].
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