The Transnational and the Local in the Politics of Islam

Delmus Puneri Salim The Transnational and the Local in the Politics of Islam The Case of West Sumatra, Indonesia The Transnational and the Local in the Politics of Islam Delmus Puneri Salim

The Transnational and the Local in the Politics of Islam The Case of West Sumatra, Indonesia

123 Delmus Puneri Salim The State Islamic College STAIN Manado Manado Indonesia

ISBN 978-3-319-15412-1 ISBN 978-3-319-15413-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15413-8

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Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com) Acknowledgments

This book is based on my Ph.D. thesis at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Sydney. Credit is due to Springer and the reviewers for recommending and publishing this book and making it available to a wider audience. Chapter 2 of this book has been published in the Journal of Indonesian Islam, the State Islamic University (UIN) Sunan Ampel Surabaya entitled ‘Islam, Politics and Identity in West Sumatra’. Many people have contributed to this book along the way. I owe a great debt of gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Michele Ford. Without her commitment, guidance and deadlines, the completion of this manuscript would not have been possible. She has asked many questions and offered many insightful comments, and helped me with the editing of the manuscript. I would also like to express my gratitude to my associate supervisor, Professor Adrian Vickers, whose historical insight has been very beneficial, to Dr. Novi Djenar, who advised me on critical discourse analysis, and to Dr. Keith Foulcher, who went beyond the call of duty in his copyediting and proofreading of the text. I would also like to express my great appreciation to Dr. Minako Sakai, Dr. Nadirsyah Hosen and one anonymous reviewer of my thesis. My thanks, too, to my colleagues and friends in the Department of Indonesian Studies, Dr. Tiffany Tsao, Iskandar Nugraha, Thushara Dibley, Wayne Palmer, Martin Sirait and Elizabeth Kramer, and to the library staff, who helped me access the materials I needed for finishing the manuscript. I owe a debt of immense gratitude to my beloved wife, Lies Kryati, who has supported me in every way possible. I also need to mention my daughters, Chal- ifaturrahmi and Kharissa, who gave me renewed energy when I was tired of writing and my brothers and their families, who have given me the strength to finish the manuscript. Finally, I wish to express my sincerest gratitude to my late father, Sarwan Salim, and my mother, Suriati, whose love of education has motivated me

v vi Acknowledgments to pursue my studies. My father passed away in the early month of my doctoral study in 2008. He had always reminded me, a village boy, that education would change my life. He was right and I hope he would have been proud of my work. I dedicate this manuscript to him.

February 2013 Delmus Puneri Salim Abstract

Since the implementation of decentralisation, local governments in majority Muslim regions across Indonesia have begun to promote, and in many cases, pass regulations that mandate forms of social or economic behaviour seen to be com- patible with Islam. This book situates the political construction of Islamic behaviour in West Sumatra and in Indonesia more generally within a historical context in which rulers have in some way engaged with aspects of Islamic practice since the Islamic kingdom era. Its main concern has been to show that while formal local Islamic regulations of this kind constitute a new development, their introduction has been a product of the same kinds of interactions between international, national and local elements that have characterised the relationship between Islam and politics through the course of Indonesian history. In doing so, the book challenges the scholarly tendency to over-emphasise local political concerns when explaining this phenomenon, arguing that it is necessary to forefront the complex relationship between local politics and developments in the wider Islamic world. Using detailed case studies of four domains of regulation (Islamic finance, zakat, education, and behaviour and dress) in a number of local government areas within the province, the book traces the contours of this relationship as expressed in public discourse and policy-making, as represented in the local press. This analysis reveals that although local factors have been stronger than the influence of global Islamic networks in some domains, in others, models offered by the Middle East have been as, if not more, influential. In all cases, however, political motivations have been an important driver of Islamic regulation, ultimately eclipsing the social and economic motivations of regional governments’ engagement in these domains. As this book shows, these political ends are not driven by an ideological commitment to Islamisation, but rather by a much more mundane concern with garnering and maintaining political power in the context of decentralisation, albeit in some instances with increasing emphasis on the forms of religious expression promoted transnationally by the Arab states.

vii Contents

1 Introduction...... 1 Islamic Regulation in the Regions: A Review of the Literature ...... 4 Islamic Regulation as Social Product ...... 7 Transnationalism ...... 9 The Social and Economic Meanings of Islamic Regulation ...... 11 Methodology...... 12 Case Study Location ...... 12 Documentary Analysis ...... 13 Interviews and Observer-Participation...... 14 Book Outline ...... 15 References ...... 17

2 Islam, Politics and Identity ...... 21 West Sumatra, the Malay World and the Coming of Islam ...... 22 The Arrival of Sufism ...... 25 The Coming of Syaria-Oriented Islam ...... 26 The Regulation of Islam Under the Dutch...... 28 Nationalism and Islam ...... 30 The Rise of Political Parties ...... 32 Legacies of the Japanese Occupation ...... 33 Islamic Politics After Independence ...... 34 A West Sumatran Perspective ...... 37 Islam and Politics in Suharto’s Indonesia ...... 40 Islam and Identity Since Suharto ...... 44 Conclusion: The Assertion of Islamic Identity in West Sumatra ...... 46 References ...... 47

ix x Contents

3 Islamic Finance ...... 53 The Religious and Social Meanings of Islamic Finance ...... 54 Modern Islamic Banking ...... 56 Islamic Financial Institutions and Products ...... 58 Assessments of Modern Islamic Banking ...... 60 Islamic Finance in Indonesia ...... 61 Hiccups in the System ...... 63 Islamic Banking Products Offered in Indonesia ...... 65 Islamic Finance in West Sumatra ...... 67 The Public Discourse of Islamic Finance ...... 67 Local Government Policy on Islamic Finance ...... 72 Conclusion ...... 75 References ...... 75

4 Zakat ...... 79 The Religious and Social Meanings of Zakat...... 79 Zakat as Taxation ...... 82 The Administration of Zakat in Modern States ...... 82 Transnational Zakat Mechanisms ...... 85 Zakat in Indonesia ...... 86 Developments in the Post-Suharto Period ...... 88 Zakat in West Sumatra ...... 93 The Public Discourse of Zakat ...... 94 The Regional Regulation of Zakat ...... 97 Conclusion ...... 99 References ...... 100

5 Islamic Education...... 103 The Origins of Islamic Education...... 103 Global Perspectives on Islamic Education ...... 104 The Development of Islamic Education in Indonesia ...... 107 Islamic Education in West Sumatra ...... 112 The Public Discourse of Islamic Education ...... 116 Policies Promoting Islamic Education...... 119 Conclusion ...... 122 References ...... 123

6 Behaviour and Dress ...... 127 The Religious and Social Meanings of Behaviour and Dress ...... 128 Behaviour and Dress in the Islamic World ...... 131 Behaviour and Dress in Indonesia ...... 136 After Independence ...... 136 Increasing Legal and Social Control...... 140 Contents xi

Behaviour and Dress in West Sumatra ...... 143 The Public Discourse of Behaviour and Dress ...... 145 Local Government Policy on Behaviour and Dress ...... 149 Conclusion ...... 151 References ...... 151

7 Conclusion...... 155 Transnational Factors ...... 157 National Factors ...... 158 Local Factors ...... 159 The Politics of Islam in West Sumatra ...... 161

Appendix A: Newspaper Articles ...... 163

Appendix B: Islamic Laws and Regulations ...... 167

Abbreviations and Glossary ...... 169 Chapter 1 Introduction

Abstract This chapter examines relationship between Islam and identity in West Sumatra. It traces the impact of Islam’s long-standing place in Minangkabau history and identity politics and the intersection between developments in the province and trends at the national and international levels. The chapter demonstrates that local power-brokers engage to a greater or lesser extent with the ﬂow of ideas within the transnational community of Muslim believers and the institutions that seek to formalise that transnational community. The chapter argues they have a pragmatic approach and are motivated by the desire to gain and maintain authority. They engage with Islamic concepts in public discourse and by their targeting of particular areas of social and economic life for regulation rather than promoting the comprehensive adoption of Syari’a.

Keywords Transnationalism Á Local politics Á Islamic regulations

The year 1998 marked an important shift in the social, economic and political history of Indonesia. The devaluation of the Indonesian rupiah during the Asian Financial Crisis which began the previous year led to a general slump in the Indonesian economy which weakened the Suharto regime and ultimately developed into a major political crisis. In May 1998 that crisis precipitated the end of Suharto’s New Order regime.1 The collapse of the New Order, which had ruled Indonesia for more than three decades, unleashed forces that resulted in political and social transformation. After a short period during which the Suharto loyalist, B.J. Habibie, served as president—a period in which deep changes were made to Indonesia’s political culture—in June 1999 Indonesians participated in Indonesia’s ﬁrst democratic legislative election since the mid 1950s. The most signiﬁcant initiative of the government of Indonesia’s next president, Abdurrahman Wahid, was the implementation of decentralisation in January 2001.2 One consequence of decentralisation has been that regional governments now have the authority to create local laws pertaining to a wide range of matters,

1 Scholars have written extensively on the crisis. See, for example, Aspinall, Feith and van Klinken (1999), Singh (1999) and Forrester and May (1999). 2 For a discussion of the Wahid presidency see, for example, Liddle (2001) and Barton (2002).

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015 1 D.P. Salim, The Transnational and the Local in the Politics of Islam, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15413-8_1 2 1 Introduction including local culture. Although Law No. 22/1999 concerning Regional Auton- omy puts religion—along with defence and security, foreign affairs, the judiciary and monetary policy—under the administration of the central government, many regional governments adopted the view that everyday manifestations of Islam are a necessary part of local culture, and thus fall under their jurisdiction. Consequently, there has been a rapid spread of attempts to mandate an ‘Islamic approach’ to various aspects of social and economic behaviour, both through discourse and social expectations, and also through local regulations (peraturan daerah). Within just a few years, regional governments in as many as 24 of Indonesia’s 33 provinces had passed local regulations seeking to encourage or impose some aspect of ‘Islamic’ practice (Lindsey 2008; Crouch 2009). Concerned with the impact of these regulations and their encroachment on central jurisdiction, the central government tried to limit their proliferation through Law No.10/2004 concerning the Formation of Legislation, which reaffirmed that religion is a national matter and decreed that lawmakers must respect diversity and equality under the law.3 However, local Islamic regulations continued to emerge on a broad range of issues pertaining to public order and social relations such as modesty, prostitution, the use of alcohol and drugs, the payment of alms (zakat), religious instruction and Qur’anic education (Bush 2008; Crouch 2009; Salim 2007). According to the Indonesian government, in January 2010 there were 82 local Islamic regulations, excluding those of Aceh (where syari’a has been formally introduced), 21 of which were in force in ten districts of West Sumatra (Kemen- kumham 2010). A report issued in the same year by Human Rights Watch stated that more than 200 Islamic regulations existed across Indonesia. These numbers are, however, disputed. Buehler (2008: 255) argues that it impossible to provide a definitive figure since districts do not report all local regulations to the central government. Similarly, Bush (2008: 179) acknowledges the difficulties of sourcing accurate figures, but estimates that there were 78 such regulations in 2007. Lindsey (2008: 206) and Crouch (2009: 59) suggest that there were 160 local Islamic regulations in 2009, of which 40 had been passed in West Sumatra, the most in any province.4 It appears that the passing of local regulations that promote Islamic behaviour has wide support in much of the community. In a poll conducted in 2002, 71 % of

3 In 2010, the central government nominated a list of local Islamic regulations it considered problematic, but took no action to rescind them. Note that there is some disagreement among scholarly observers about the legality of these regulations. Hooker (2008) agrees that Islamic regulations are problematic and unconstitutional since regional autonomy does not transfer authority over religion to regional government. However, Parsons and Mietzner (2009) suggest that the national legislative framework provides some room for regional governments to regulate religion since most Islamic regulations do not refer explicitly to Islamic norms and when they do, it is in the context of educational goals or customary law, areas over which local governments have jurisdiction. 4 Buehler (2008: 256) claims that South Sulawesi has the highest number of districts with Islamic laws in Indonesia. 1 Introduction 3 respondents agreed that the state should require Muslims to abide by Islamic laws (Mujani and Liddle 2004: 113). At the regional level, according to a poll conducted in 2007 by the Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, LSI), in West Sumatra’s capital, Padang, two-thirds of those surveyed were in favour of their implementation (Indrizal 2007). There is some controversy about the implications of such surveys. Pringle (2010: 181) has argued that the results suggest that Indonesian Muslims want to be faithful to the tenets of Islam with the assistance of the state but without state enforcement. Hosen (2007: 96) doubts that the majority actually supports the introduction of Islamic regulations at all, since Islamic parties that promoted recognition of the Jakarta Charter5 in 2002 received only 12 % of the vote in the 1999 national elections. Nevertheless, the rapid growth in the number of local Islamic laws is an important development—and one that is unprecedented in two important ways. First, although the Indonesian state has a long and complex relationship with Islam, Indonesia is not an Islamic state. Although not strictly secular, it recognises six religions, of which Islam—the religion of over 88 % of the population—is just one. Moreover, despite Suharto’s increasing appeals to the Islamic community in the second half of his 32 year presidency, when his government passed a number of laws that dealt with Islamic concerns, overall the New Order regime was intensely suspicious of Islam, seeing it as a threat to its ‘modern’ developmentalist agenda. Indeed, it is only since the fall of Suharto that increasing community religiosity has again translated into a serious political presence at the national level (Fealy and White 2008; Hefner 2011). Second, although there are historical precedents for local adoption of Islamic practices in the pre-independence period, the post-Suharto era constitutes the first period in Indonesia’s national history in which regional governments have had any kind of substantive regulatory power, the mechanism that has enabled them to give a local flavour to the regulatory mix. It is, however, a development that—while much written about—is still relatively little understood. A significant literature has developed around the increasing influence of Islam in post-Suharto Indonesia and its impact on the political system (both national and local) and in the public and private sphere (see for example Hooker 2003; Hosen 2007; Fealy and White 2008; Buehler 2008; Parsons and Mietzner 2009; Crouch 2009). But there remains few detailed case studies of the way local governments have harnessed Islamic discourse in their attempts to maintain power and to promote regional development. Local Islamic regulations are often perceived to be a form of symbolic opposition to secular governments, and sometimes also a form of opposition to the West. In some cases, this is true, but it is necessary to interrogate such claims by examining the political and economic micro-practices of those who favour these regulations—and representations of those practices in the public domain—if we are to understand their broader implications.

5 The Jakarta Charter, which proposed that that all Muslims be required to observe Islamic law, emerged in the constitutional debates that followed independence. See Chap. 2 for further information. 4 1 Introduction

Such an interrogation confirms that while local Islamic regulations are sometimes religiously motivated, they are almost always driven by more worldly concerns, whether it be to attract community support by demonstrating their proponents’ political commitment to local identity, or to channel resources to Islamic groups with the hope of gaining support at the ballot box, or to generate alternative resources for regional development. It also suggests, however, that it is necessary to look beyond the local, and even the national, to truly understand the framing of those regulations. This book begins to address this lacuna through a detailed examination of the relationship between Islam and identity in West Sumatra, tracing the impact of Islam’s long-standing place in Minangkabau history and identity politics and the intersection between developments in the province and trends at the national and international levels. The book demonstrates that while local power-brokers are, in the main, not primarily motivated by religious concerns but rather by the desire to gain and maintain authority (apragmatic approach evidenced by the way they engage with Islamic concepts in public discourse and by their targeting of particular areas of social and economic life for regulation rather than promoting the comprehensive adoption of Syari’a), they nevertheless engage to a greater or lesser extent with the flow of ideas within the transnational community of Muslim believers and the institutions that seek to formalise that transnational community. In order to demonstrate this, the book presents a close analysis of four key focus of contemporary regulation (legal and social) in the province, namely Islamic finance, zakat, education and, finally, behaviour and dress.

Islamic Regulation in the Regions: A Review of the Literature

The design and implementation of local Islamic regulations, and the extent to which increasing religiosity has been inspired by groups in other countries, has excited the curiosity of scholars of Indonesian Islam and Indonesian politics. A major focus in the literature on the inﬂuence of contemporary transnational Islam in Indonesia has been on global Islamic networks from Arabia and South Asia that are said to have legitimised radicalism (Abuza 2003; Eliraz 2004; Fealy and Borgu 2005; Hasan 2005b, 2006, 2007; Van Bruinessen 2002).6 Van Bruinessen (2002) argues that the thinking behind these networks of people, money and ideas—particularly interpretations imposed by religious authorities in Saudi Arabia and adopted by Indo- nesians of Arabian origin, many of them heads of militant groups—has encouraged Indonesian Muslims to be violent. Similarly, Hasan (2005a) suggests that a decree

6 Note that the terms ‘terrorism’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalism’, and ‘fundamentalism’ are used by scholars to describe acts of violence committed by Islamic groups while ‘Islamism’ refers mainly to the approach adopted by Islamic political parties. Islamic Regulation in the Regions: A Review of the Literature 5

(fatwa) issued by Middle Eastern scholars was used to justify religious violence in the province of Maluku.7 Other studies of transnational Islam focus on the historical legacies of global networks of Islamic scholars, which played an important role in the transformation of Indonesian Islam in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries (Azra 2004). These networks, which were created by students who had studied in the Middle East and maintained ties to their schools and teachers, were significant for a number of reasons. First, they connected Indonesia to Arabia, Islam’s place of origin, providing a source of information and discussion about Islam for Indonesian students. Secondly, they enabled these Arabic-speaking Indonesians to communicate with their teachers in Arabia and develop a closer understanding of Islamic practices, since those practices are conceptually couched in the Arabic language. Finally, the networks were used by Islamic scholars in the Middle East to issue decrees regarding Indonesian Muslim affairs (Azra 2004; Hasan 2005a). As Azra (2004) has pointed out, these networks not only had religious significance, but also economic, social and political implications. They enabled Indonesian Muslims to participate in the trade of the Muslim world, creating direct relationships between them and Muslim traders from other regions, as well as with political authorities in the Middle East. Similarly, networks with Egypt before the end of the nineteenth century promoted Islamic modernism in Indonesia, motivated by perceptions of the backwardness of Islamic communities compared to the West (Eliraz 2004). Indeed, Laffan (2003) argues that the experiences of Indonesians living in Cairo turned them into both reformists and nationalists. Indonesian nationalism was also influenced by the pan-Islamic movement of the early twentieth century (Reid 2006: 226). One of Indonesia’s two long-standing mass religious organisations, Muhammadiyah, which follows the modernist-scripturalist interpretation of Islam, emerged as a result of this movement.8 Some scholars argue that local Islamic regulations are manifestations of contemporary forms of cooperation between radical and conservative Islamic organisations and regional governments (e.g. Fealy and Borgu 2005; Hefner 2011; Millie 2009).9 However, little consideration is given by authors concerned with the explosion of local Islamic regulations to contemporary transnational social-cultural and financial networks. While it is true that Islamic regulations have in some cases

7 Scholars have also noted that this is not a new trend. According to Fealy and Borgu (2005), violence has been used for religious purification and expression for more than 200 years, while Eliraz (2004: 57) has tracked the association of religion and violence from the early eighteenth century, citing examples such as the Paderi War, the Aceh Wars and the Darul Islam movement. See Chap. 2 for details of these historical events. 8 According to Muhammadiyah, Islamic jurisprudence should be based on current interpretations, instead of relying on those of traditional ulama. For example, the organisation argues that the beginning and the end of Ramadan, the month of fasting, should be based on hisab, the calculation of the appearance of the moon, rather than ru’yah, the actual sighting of the moon. 9 Some observers, including Pringle (2010), Salim (2007), Bush (2008) and McGibbon (2006), also link regional Islamic regulations with the regions where the Darul Islam movement occurred. 6 1 Introduction drawn on ideological developments in the wider Islamic world, socio-cultural exchanges and the prospects of opportunities for economic development through foreign (Islamic) investment are significant drivers of the attempts by regional governments to manage cultural expression and to attract investment by implementing Islamic regulations within their jurisdiction. Moreover, contrary to interpretations that position Islamist groups as the primary actors in the introduction of Islamic law, most local Islamic regulations, as Pringle (2010) has noted, have been introduced not by Islamic parties, but by their secular counterparts. Furthermore, according to Millie (2009), where regional governments do cooperate with radical Islamic groups, they remain in control over the relationship and pick and choose between the kinds of Islamic regulations advocated by those groups. The observations of Pringle and Millie form something of a bridge between studies that are primarily interested in the influence of transnational Islam and those concerned primarily with the ‘Islamic factor’ in local politics. A major focus in the contemporary literature on local Islamic regulations, and the growing Islamisation of local politics more generally, has been on the motivations behind regional elites’ increasing public performance of religious identity. As Bush (2008) and Millie (2009) have argued, Islamic regulations help regional governments to establish their Islamic credentials in response to the general increase in religiosity and the demands of voters seeking Islamic solutions to social ills. Buehler (2008) argues that motivations behind the implementation of Islamic regulations include the desire for revenue-raising measures, while Hefner (2011: 307) asserts that Islamic regulations are necessary in a time of ‘severe economic downturn, communal violence, and in urban areas, a pervasive fear of extortion, harassment, or violence at the hand of preman (gangsters). Meanwhile, McGibbon (2006) argues that Islamic regulations enable regional governments to overcome challenges to their legitimacy posed by activities such as corruption and rent seeking.10 There is some cross-over between these approaches, but studies that regard local Islamic regulations as a product of local politics in the regions seldom seriously consider transnational influences and vice versa. Studies that focus on the role of Islam in local politics seldom seriously consider influences from ‘outside’, while those that focus on then impact of transnational phenomena such the Wahabi movement in Indonesia tend to overlook the influence of local Islamic groups. Also, among scholars concerned with influence ‘from outside’, little attention has been paid to the role of central government institutions such as the Ministry of Religion and the government-sponsored Islamic organisation of scholars, the Council of Indonesian Ulamas (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), which have been extremely influential in some areas of regulation.11 In an attempt to fill this gap, this book combines a consideration of economic and cultural exchanges in the Islamic world,

10 Another strong focus in the scholarship has been the negative impact of local Islamic regulations on women and religious minorities. See, for example, Hooker (2008) and Crouch (2009). 11 Bush (2008) does, however, argue that local Islamic regulations are a response to the failure of successive central governments to implement Islamic regulations at the national level. Islamic Regulation in the Regions: A Review of the Literature 7 the application of national Islamic regulations and local factors in a particular region in its assessment of the development and application of local Islamic regulations in West Sumatra.

Islamic Regulation as Social Product

This book takes as its starting point the argument that, since transnational Islamic ideas interact with local politics in predominantly Muslim regions, both local and transnational factors need to be systematically identified and analysed when considering the emergence of Islamic regulations in the regions. It may seem obvious that it impossible to formulate an accurate assessment of the processes through which such regulations come to be passed or of their impact on politics or society without considering both factors; however, most discussion of local Islamic regulation within the Indonesian literature on local politics pays little systematic attention to transnational factors. It is true that the proponents of local Islamic regulations are local, but local elites are influenced by the global movement of ideas and by contact with Muslims living in other societies. Conversely, while it is right to say that transnational Islamic movements influence local Islamic regulations, it is important not to downplay the role of local elements in seeking to introduce Islamically-inspired regulations, and to interrogate their motives for doing so. A second element of the approach adopted in this book that departs from the bulk of the existing literature is its interrogation of the nature of the Islamic regulations passed in West Sumatra. In much of the literature, there is an assumption that syari’a is a legal code that remains frozen in the form it took in the Middle Ages, and that it has little to do with contemporary law (e.g. Crouch 2009; Parsons and Mietzner 2009). It is true that Islamic regulations reflect aspects of syari’a, but they are social constructs that vary in meaning, form and perception over time and place in Islamic communities (Beckford 2003). Many scholars assume that Islam and local culture are static, and see local Islamic regulations as necessarily clashing with local customs. This interpretation is at odds with the findings of historical studies of the accommodation of Islam in Indonesia, which show that the development and implementation of Islamic regulations in the archipelago has been characterised by flexibility and the construction of new interpretations over time in dialogue with local customs, which are also flexible and constructed (Abdullah 1966; Hefner 2011).12 Equally importantly, they tend to overlook the extent to which regional governments discriminate between elements of the Islamic legal code and reinterpret Islamic legal principles when invoking them, in order to

12 In the West Sumatran context, many studies of Islam begin from an assumption of conflict between Islamic laws and adat, local customs, in which the Paderi War becomes central. Yet as the respected Minang scholar Taufik Abdullah (1966), argues, there were many factors in the conflict between the two elements in the region. Similarly, Christine Dobbin (1983) concludes that the conflict was caused by change of trading patterns, rather than an Islamic movement in the region. 8 1 Introduction achieve specific aims. Outside Aceh, no Indonesian jurisdiction has introduced syari’a as an overarching legal code.13 However, many local governments have selectively introduced elements of Islamic law. For example, a local regulation on zakat in South Sulawesi obliges Muslims to pay infaq and sadakah, alms described as voluntary in the Qur’an (Buehler 2008). In Bengkulu, the use of alcohol in adat rituals, religious ceremonies and for health reasons is allowed under a local Islamic regulation on alcohol in the district (Crouch 2009: 67). Including in this approach, there are many ways to interpret Islam that has a long-established tradition of disputation and disagreement that started during the time of the Prophet (el-Fadl 2001). The selective implementation or reinterpretation of syari’a through local Islamic regulations indicates that these regulations are products of complex social and political negotiations and not simply a matter of religion. Thirdly, this book recognises that while the particular circumstances that have led to the explosion in local Islamic regulations are unprecedented, government engagement with, and implementation of, elements of Islamic jurisprudence is not. A number of scholars have described the introduction of local Islamic regulations as an entirely new phenomenon (e.g. Bush 2008; Buehler 2008; Crouch 2009). While true on one level, such assertions ignore historical examples of regional manifestations of Islamic regulation before independence, or more recently through other instruments such as Letters of Instruction and through the decrees of local offices of national institutions such as the Ministry of Religion and MUI. The book builds on the predominantly political science analyses of earlier accounts written from the ‘local factors’ perspective by introducing a focus on the social and economic meanings of Islamic regulation within the province of West Sumatra, and their production and utilisation within the political sphere. An integral part of this analysis pertains to the contribution of transnational networks (both ideological and socio-economic) to the construction of those meanings, not only within Islamist organisations but also through community expectations. The book demonstrates that, once established in community expectations, the influence of these international networks has implications for the attempts by secular power- holders to maintain their authority and legitimacy at the local level. In order to avoid the problem of ahistoricism or other forms of decontextualisation, both these elements (the transnational and the local) are considered in their historical context at the provincial, national and international levels. In short, this book privileges neither the local nor the transnational, but rather explores the interactions between the two in policy-making in the particular locality of West Sumatra.

13 Shari’a was introduced in Aceh by the national government as an effort to sideline the separatist movement (Salim 2008: 224−228; Arﬁansyah 2009). Transnationalism 9

Transnationalism

A relatively new term in the social sciences, ‘transnationalism’ refers to global networks, structures and activities that cross national boundaries (Portes 1999; Vertovec 1999, 2001). It is widely used in studies of migration and diaspora, environments in which identities and relationships are formed across borders and ethnic boundaries (Werbner 2002). In this sense, the concept of transnational Islam refers to how Islam functions across boundaries of states, communities and ethnic groups. In some ways, the concept of transnational Islam is an extension of umma, a term associated with the imagined Islamic community (Mandaville 2001; Schmidt 2005; Hasan 2008). Schmidt (2005), for example, sees umma as the transnational communal experience of being Muslim, giving the example of the shared experience of discrimination after 11 September 2001, when Islamic terrorists flew two commercial aeroplanes into New York’s World Trade Center. More commonly, however, studies on transnational Islam describe it in ‘post- and bi-nationalist’ terms (Haynes 2001; Vertovec 1999). For example, the term transnational Islam can refer to travelling and migration (Eickelman and Anderson 1990; Mandaville 2001). Eickelman and Anderson (1990) argue that religiously-motivated forms of travel, such as pilgrimage, have important economic and political consequences, as the experience of travel heightens Muslims’ feelings of being part of a transnational Islamic community as they meet other Muslims around the world. They also note there are many forms of travel with religious purposes other than pilgrimage, such as learning, exile and labour migration, that shape the Islamic imagination. According to Vertovec (2001), all Muslims who move to the West carry with them a form of transnational Islam, regardless of their primary reasons for travel. In a slightly different but related vein, Grillo (2004) argues that transnational Islam describes the practices of Muslims who live in two or more countries. With the growth of economic development in the West, many Muslims keep a passport from their country of origin while living and working in a Western country. Within such contexts, transnational Islam can involve the maintenance of cultural identity within the diaspora, including the preservation of ties with the homeland (Grillo 2004). As part of this, some Muslims choose to move to the West specifically for religious purposes—for example, individuals sent by Middle Eastern Islamic institutions to the West to advise Muslims on how to purify their practices (Werbner 2003). In other cases, members of political Islamic movements may be forced to abandon their homelands and establish a base in a Western country, while remaining deeply involved in the politics of the homeland, as is the case with the Muslim Brotherhood in Europe (Laurence 2006). According to Bowen (2003), however, transnational Islam is not only about migration and cultural identity. It also refers to the formation of a global Islamic public sphere. Bowen argues that Muslims around the world are trying to answer the question of how to be a Muslim by attending conferences, searching the internet, travelling and contacting Muslims in other countries. This endeavour has been greatly helped by advances in communication technology and the creation of 10 1 Introduction new media, and the growing ease of transportation. This global connection has led to a never before experienced intensity of interaction among Muslims across borders. Mandaville (2001) argues that the global Muslim community is in fact constituted via the internet, satellite television, migration and other modes of social, economic and political connection across borders, a process which embodies the concept of translocality as a new form of political space. As noted above, transnational Islam in this more global sense is not simply about the transfer of ideas. Von der Mehden (1993:17−37) shows that the transfer of resources from Middle Eastern countries to Southeast Asia has been occurring since the 1950s. The wealth generated by the exploitation of oil reserves in the Middle East has been an important factor in this aspect of Islamic transnationalism. From the 1970s, oil money has not only dramatically increased the geo-political importance of the Middle East, it has also funded activism in Islamic communities around the world. Mosques and Islamic centres have been established and Islamic teachers have been trained and sent abroad. The rising prosperity of the Middle East has also funded the development of private and intergovernmental Islamic organisations such the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Established in 1969, the OIC is made up of 57 countries, making it the world’s second largest intergovernmental organisation after the United Nations. Other key global networks include the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (ISESCO), the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and the Islamic Solidarity Fund (ISF). Another important driver of transnational Islamic endeavours was the 1979 Iranian revolution, which has been perceived as a model for symbolic opposition to secular governments and the West (von der Mehden 1993:72–78). The collapse of the pro-Western Pahlavi regime is generally seen as the beginning of a new era in the implementation of Islamic regulations in Muslim-majority countries. Other more recent geo-political events developments, such as reaction to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the prohibition of certain forms of Islamic dress in France and elsewhere, have also contributed to the growing perceptions in the Islamic World of Islamic regulation as a symbolic form of protest against secular governments and the West. The book adopts and recognises the strengths of all these definitions in its conceptualisation of Islamic transnationalism, which is clearly something that is both ideational and material. In line with Bowen’s(2003), Mandaville’s(2001) conceptions, it privileges understandings of Islamic transnationalism as a process through which dynamic interpretations of Islam available in global Islamic sphere are translated in local political contexts. Statements endorsing the Islamic regulations passed by regional governments in Indonesia clearly reflect discourses that emerged in the Arab World. At this level, the influence of transnational Islamic networks as a source of ideas is undeniable. However, importantly, local power- brokers are not passive recipients of these influences. As the West Sumatra case clearly demonstrates, the implementation of Islamic regulations is a tool that enables regional governments to exploit religious identity as a way of gaining and maintaining power, but it is also a means of developing their networks with the wider Muslim world. The Social and Economic Meanings of Islamic Regulation 11

The Social and Economic Meanings of Islamic Regulation

In addition to the need to pay attention to the role of transnational Islamic networks, the study of Islamic regulations in Indonesia also needs a focus on particular local contexts, because Islamic regulations are perceived differently over time and from place to place. It is true that Islamic regulations are based mainly on Islamic scriptures: the Qur’an and the Hadith, but they have different social meanings in different Islamic communities (Beckford 2003:11−29). In other words, Islamic regulations have become significant in particular social and economic contexts. The 1997–98 financial crisis was a crucial reference point for regional governments’ engagement with Islamic regulations, particularly as the crisis increased support for Islamic financial systems, which had been emerging since the early 1990s. In this climate, the momentum for the introduction of Islamic regulations; Islamic banking, Islamic micro-finance and state-sponsored zakat was given a decisive boost. The freer expression of both people and media in the post Suharto era has also been a factor influencing support for Islamic regulations. Emerging regional media have focussed on perceptions that public immorality, especially displays of sexuality, is a ‘foreign’ or Western import that leads to other social problems at the regional level. These social pressures have in turn created support for implementation of Islamic education, the encouragement of appropriate Islamic behaviour and the wearing of Middle-Eastern style headscarfs (jilbab) in the regions. The introduction of these Islamic regulations is seen as a way of applying new ethical standards in financial systems, providing an instrument for reducing poverty and addressing what is perceived to be growing immorality in society at large. Support on such grounds has come not only from Muslims affected by financial pressures and social problems, but also by regional governments attempting to improve their financial systems, make a success of their anti-poverty programs and limit social problems.14 Importantly also, however, as pointed out by scholars like Bush (2008) and Millie (2009), regional governments see Islamic regulations as contributing to their efforts to maintain political and ideological legitimacy. In short, the social and economic factors contributing to the endorsement of Islamic regulations have enabled regional governments to conflate their political interests with an increased level of religiosity in Indonesian society as a whole. This is certainly the case in West Sumatra, where local governments’ engagement in Islamic law-making has contributed to everything from the establishment of new financial institutions and mechanisms for the collection of zakat to the imposition of more Syaria-oriented forms of Islamic dress. At one level, these initiatives have been driven by a desire on the part of local governments to show their commitment to regionalism by identifying with ‘local culture’ (which is

14 Similar religiously-inspired solutions have been advocated in Bali and in predominantly Christian provinces, suggesting an overall increase in religiosity in Indonesia. 12 1 Introduction strongly tied to the Islamic identity of the Minangkabau people).15 On another level, they have constituted a means of addressing the social and economic challenges faced by the region, either by moderating behaviour or by presenting the kind of image and developing the kind of infrastructure required to attract investment from Islamic sources. While some local politicians are motivated by their personal commitment to an Islamic society, the regulations that have been passed are not rooted in a quest to introduce Syari’a to the province; rather, they constitute an overwhelmingly pragmatic response to contemporary circumstances, both political and economic, as local politicians seek to maintain their power.

Methodology

This book seeks to build on, but move beyond, religious, political science and legal approaches, in order to provide a more comprehensive picture of regional governments’ engagement in Islamic law-making in West Sumatra. In order to do so, it draws on methodologies associated with the disciplines of history, linguistics and sociology, state of the art, within an approach that falls into the broad category of qualitative political sociology.

Case Study Location

I selected West Sumatra as my research setting because it has a majority Muslim population and has implemented more local Islamic regulations than any other region in Indonesia. Administratively, West Sumatra consists of 19 sub-units below the provincial government, among them 11 districts (kabupaten) and seven cities. Other than the Mentawai Islands, the population of all districts is predominantly Muslim. The province has a population around four and half million, the majority of whom are ethnic Minangkabau (BPS 2011). Minangkabau culture is deﬁned mainly by matrilineality, in which inherited lands and houses are transferred from mothers to daughters. Minangkabau men, on the other hand, are well known for their culture of circular out-migration (merantau), a practice which has engendered a culture open to the exchange of ideas and dynamic social relations in West Sumatra. Geographically, West Sumatra is dominated by the Bukit Barisan mountain range, which deﬁnes the boundaries of its cultural heartland. The highlands of West Sumatra are called darek (literally, the land as opposed to the sea or coast), centred

15 The former has included the passing of regulations that have initiated various kinds of Islamic activities, from Islamic cultural ceremonies to Islamic holidays. In some instances, these initiatives have helped build bridges between Muslims from modernist and traditionalist backgrounds by providing an alternative focus to identification with Muhammadiyah or the traditionalist mass organisation, Nadhlatul Ulama. Methodology 13 historically in the village of Pariangan in the district of Tanah Datar, which is considered the cradle of Minangkabau culture. In the coastal areas, called the pesisir or more broadly the rantau, meaning the regions outside of the highlands, there is a long history of intermarriage with traders and other sojourners brought to West Sumatra by ancient trading systems that linked the regions to India and the Straits of Malacca, and through which gold and then cultivated coffee were traded between the fourth and the nineteenth century (Summerfield and Summerfield 1999: 31). This trade played an important part in the introduction of Sufi Islam into the region from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century (Dobbin 1983), from which time Islam has been an important part of Minangkabau identity. The relationship between Minangkabau culture and various forms of Islam has been marked by both accommodation and tension. When Islam became established in the region in the seventeenth century, mosques became a part of the local political system (nagari). As will be discussed in the following chapter, tensions arose with the emergence of the Paderi movement in the early nineteenth century, which, under the influence of Wahhabism, challenged the principles of matrilineality and the heterodoxy of Sufi Islam. When Indonesia’s Dutch colonisers lined up on the side of traditional culture (adat), they paradoxically increased the importance of Islam as an element of regional identity. From this time, a tension between Islam and adat remained part of the region’s political and cultural dynamics. This history makes the province an ideal field site for a study that examines the uses of religious discourse in the post-Suharto period.

Documentary Analysis

Government regulations and internal documents published by regional governments were collected in order to document the myriad local Islamic laws in West Sumatra, information that is not readily available in collated form. Analysis of the extent and ways in which they were informed by claims about Islam was conducted primarily on the basis of 3 years of local press coverage (2008–2010), which provided insight both into the public presentation of Islam as a motivator of policy-making by politicians and into the way that community figures harness Islam in their responses to that process. These textual sources were analysed in order to reveal the religious, social and political constructions employed when seeking to introduce and validate particular Islamic regulations, with the aim of understanding the ways in which public figures use the language of Islam to maintain and construct Minangkabau identity, and equally the ways in which Minangkabau identity is mobilised in order to justify the use of Islam as an argument for the introduction of new forms of social control. The analysis was carried out using techniques associated with critical discourse analysis, which seeks to produce insights into the way discourse reproduces or 14 1 Introduction resists social and political inequality, power abuse and domination.16 Analysis of emphasis, the use of metaphors and the choice of particular words all reveal officials’ attempts to position the government and other social actors—local, national and transnational—in the practices of local Islamic regulation in West Sumatra and resistance to that process. Techniques of over-wording and the identification of experiential, expressive and relational values were used to identify categories, themes, ideas, views and roles. Over-wording refers to ‘an unusually high degree of wording, often involving words which are near synonyms’, which indicates a focus of ideological struggle (Fairclough 1989: 115). An experiential value is ‘a trace of and cue to the way in which the text producer’s experience of the natural or social world is represented’; an expressive value is ‘a trace and a cue to the producer’s evaluation of the bit of the reality it relates to’; a relational value is ‘a trace of and a cue to the social relationships which are enacted via the text in the discourse’ (Fairclough 1989: 112). Experiential and expressive values provide insight into the understanding and opinion of the speaker while relational values can be used to identify reciprocal social relationships. Together, these elements made it possible to piece together the puzzle of how claims pertaining to Islam have been used to justify policy development in the four thematic areas examined.

Interviews and Observer-Participation

The systematic examination of policy documents and regulations and structured textual analysis of newspaper articles was complemented by insights from observation and semi-structured interviews during two discrete periods of fieldwork. My own subjectivity was an important element in the fieldwork process. Although I live and work in Manado, I am of West Sumatran origin. I was born in the village of Lintau Buo in the district of Tanah Datar, and I attended secondary school in Padang Panjang, around 80 km from my village, before moving to Jakarta for my tertiary education at the Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University. As a result of my long periods of residency outside my homeland, my position as a researcher approaches observer participation rather than participant observation. Nevertheless, my cultural roots and on-going connections with the region have clearly influenced the research process. Interviews were conducted mainly in Padang, the capital city of the province, but also in some smaller centres, from September to December 2008 and from November to December 2010. A number of secondary interviews were also conducted in Jakarta in November 2010. In West Sumatra, respondents were drawn from key stakeholder groups, such as state officials, members of the local parliaments, formal and informal Islamic leaders and ordinary Muslims. Forty-six people

16 For an overview of critical discourse analysis see Fairclough (1995) and Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000). Methodology 15 identified through purposive sampling techniques were interviewed. Interviews with regional government officials from municipal and district executive governments, and politicians from diverse political parties, focused on their support for and contribution to the formulation and implementation of local Islamic regulations. Interviews with informal Muslim leaders focused on their role as advocates for Islamic regulations and/or their responses to those regulations. Interviews with members of the community, which focused on the impact of local Islamic regulations, provided supplementary data for the study. These interviews were supplemented by my observations during fieldwork of the impact of local Islamic regulations in West Sumatra and my reflections on my experiences as an observer-participant in conferences, seminars, visits to official institutions, including the local parliament, and attendance at ceremonies. I participated as a speaker at an international seminar on Local, Regional and Global Edu- cation in West Sumatra at the Teacher Training College (Sekolah Tinggi Pendidikan Guru Republik Indonesia, STPGRI) in Padang in September 2008, and also acted as a teacher in a Pesantren Ramadan program in Padang in the same month. I attended a seminar on Global Islamic Education organised by the State Institute for Islamic Studies (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN) in Padang in November 2010 and a Minangkabau Culture Congress (Kongres Kebudayaan Minangkabau, KKM) in the same city in December 2010. (This congress was organised by Gebu Minang, the Minangkabau migrant organisation centred in Jakarta.) Finally, I engaged in participant observation in the Sydney Minangkabau organisation, Minang Saiyo, from 2008 to 2011, the period during which I was student at the University of Sydney.

Book Outline

Following this chapter’s discussion of transnational and local factors influencing the introduction of Islamic regulations in West Sumatra, Chap. 2 contextualises these recent developments in a brief historical overview of the relationship between Islam and local identity in the province. The analysis then moves to a series of detailed case studies of recent examples of Islamic regulatory practice. In Chaps. 3–6 the discussion begins with a brief account of the religious and social meanings of these particular examples of Islamic regulations, describing their evolution in the wider Islamic world and at the national level. The later sections of each of these chapters then focus in more detail on how these regulations have been constructed locally. Each chapter ends with a close analysis of regulations and policies that have been issued in particular local government jurisdictions since the policy of decentralisation was introduced in 1999. Chapter 3, the first of these chapters, examines regional governments’ engagement in the promotion of Islamic finance. It describes in detail the emergence of a new understanding of the utility of Islamic financial systems on the part of regional governments, which, under the pressures of decentralisation, have become much more involved in revenue generation and management than in the past. The chapter 16 1 Introduction argues that the primary aim of regional governments’ engagement in Islamic banking is strongly influenced by the expectation that it will help facilitate, and allow the provincial government to control, development-related investment and other financial flows from Islamic countries. By contrast, other Islamic financial practices, including Islamic micro-finance, have been developed in response to community pressure on local elites, serving also as a mechanism through which to build networks with Islamic groups. Chapter 4 then examines regional governments’ attempts to stimulate and regulate the payment of zakat. It argues that while zakat institutions are very much local, regional governments’ policies on zakat are largely a response to the impact of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and ongoing concerns about social security. Chapter 5 focuses on Islamic education for public school students. It demonstrates the ways in which regional governments have positioned Islamic education as the answer to community concerns about lapses in public morality, but it also shows that local administrations have been divided over the kinds of education that best meet this need. In some cases, officials have turned to long-standing Sufi traditions. In other cases, however, they have developed new modes of education that draw on Middle Eastern models. Finally, Chap. 6 examines local governments’ attempts to regulate behaviour and dress. This chapter argues that the very Middle Eastern forms of behaviour and dress promoted at the local level provide regional governments with a relatively easy way of demonstrating to the public that they are acting to address the public’s concerns while obviating the need to develop structural solutions. A theme running through these chapters is the question of how extensively attempts to introduce Islamic regulations have been connected in public discourse to Minangkabau identity. Chapter 3 shows that the concept of Islamic financial systems is strongly associated in public discourse with Minangkabau identity, even though Islamic financial institutions are relatively new in the region and, indeed, in Indonesia as a whole. Similarly, Chap. 6 demonstrates that even though attempts to regulate behaviour and dress are strongly influenced by contemporary Middle Eastern practice, in public discourse, these initiatives are justified by references to Minangkabau cultural identity. In the case of education, Chap. 5 demonstrates that the strong discursive links drawn with the regional culture of West Sumatra are to some extent based on historical fact, but that the discourse also retrospectively credits Islamic education for aspects of Minangkabau identity that were actually developed through the colonial education system. Notably, Chap. 4 demonstrates that, in contrast to these domains of regulation, public statements about regional governments’ attempts to generate and control the payment of zakat make no direct appeals to regional identity. The book concludes by revisiting the findings of the earlier chapters. It argues that the interaction of local, national and transnational Islam in the regulation of social and economic practice is not a uniform phenomenon. In some areas of practice, local factors have been stronger than the influence of global Islamic networks, while in others, models offered by the Middle East seem to have been as influential, if not more so, than local factors. Also, significant differences can be found in the Islamic regulations that have emerged in different local government areas within the province. In all cases, political motivations have been an important driver of the processes of negotiation around different modes of Islamic regulation. Ultimately, the Book Outline 17 religio-social and economic aspects of regional governments’ engagement with these regulations have been subordinated to their political ends. However, these political ends have been reached by local political actors using a variety of religious concepts and practices available to them in the global Islamic sphere.

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Abstract The chapter, by examining the history of Islam, shows interplay between localism and transnationalism in the local dynamics, which is largely ignored in analyses of the contemporary politics of Islam. Yet the Islamic regulations in contemporary West Sumatra would not be possible without the interaction of local and transnational actors and ideas. The regional governments’ engagement with Islam have an historical perspective. The institutionalising the tenets of Islam dated back to the royal courts of the pre-colonial Islamic kingdoms and the colonial government’sOfﬁce for Native Affairs even though it has only become possible to pass regional laws (peraturan daerah, perda) in the post-Suharto era. This chapter argues that the relationship between a global Islam and a local identity was simultaneously accommodating and contested, as indeed it is today. In doing so, the chapter examines a brief historical overview of Islam in West Sumatra from the advent of Islam in the Malay world to its role in the post-Suharto era. The chapter seeks to contextualise the key phases in West Sumatra’s history in the broader history of the archipelago and the Malay world, and to show how key events in West Sumatra and at the national level set the parameters for later debates about Islam and identity in the region.

Keywords Global Islam Á Local politics Á Identity

One of the deﬁning debates in the literature on Islam and local politics in Indonesia over the last decade has been over whether the inspiration for Islamic regulations passed at the local level is transnational and global or whether it is fundamentally local. One camp focuses on the global rise of Wahhabism and its impact on regional Islamic awareness, arguing that increasing piety has driven this phenomenon (see, for example, Hasan 2007). For the other camp, which is concerned primarily with the dynamics of local politics, the key question concerns the extent to which local elites have used Islamic regulations to position themselves to gain access to and remain in power (see, for example, Buehler 2008). Related to this second approach

This chapter of this book has been published in the Journal of Indonesian Islam, the State Islamic University (UIN) Sunan Ampel Surabaya entitled ‘Islam, Politics and Identity in West Sumatra’.

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015 21 D.P. Salim, The Transnational and the Local in the Politics of Islam, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15413-8_2 22 2 Islam, Politics and Identity is the broader debate on whether decentralisation would undermine national cohesion and, if so, what role religion would play in that process. For van Klinken (2001, 2002), New Order repression, combined with religious and regional tensions, was a key driver in the local politics of the post-Suharto era, leading, for example, to serious violence in Maluku in the period between 1999 and 2002. Aspinall and Fealy (2003), too, emphasise the role of communal and ethnic dynamics in the quest for local political power and economic resources, which has led putera daerah (lit. sons of the region) to seek control over local government and local economic resources. The interplay between these two impulses, towards globalised piety on the one hand and local dynamics on the other, is largely ignored in analyses of the contemporary politics of Islam, as are their historical roots. Yet the Islamic resurgence would not be possible without the interaction of local and transnational actors and ideas. Moreover, an understanding of the contemporary phenomenon of regional governments’ engagement with Islam requires historically informed research. Without an historical perspective, it appears that the current trend towards Islamic regulation has no precedent in Indonesia’s regions. Yet while it is true that it has only become possible to pass regional laws (peraturan daerah, perda) in the post- Suharto era, regional governments have a long history of institutionalising the tenets of Islam, dating back to the royal courts of the pre-colonial Islamic kingdoms and the colonial government’sOfﬁce for Native Affairs. This chapter provides a brief historical overview of Islam in West Sumatra from the advent of Islam in the Malay world to its role in the post-Suharto era. In doing so, it seeks to contextualise the key phases in West Sumatra’s history in the broader history of the archipelago and the Malay world, and to show how key events in West Sumatra and at the national level set the parameters for later debates about Islam and identity in the region. The chapter argues that now, as in the past, the relationship between Islam, a global religion, and Minangkabau culture was simultaneously accommodating and contested, as indeed it is today.

West Sumatra, the Malay World and the Coming of Islam

The term ‘Minangkabau’ initially referred specifically to people who originated from the mountainous inland region of what is now the province of West Sumatra. According to the Minangkabau historical chronicle, the tambo, the first Mina- ngkabau settlement was in Pariangan, Padang Panjang (Batuah and Madjoindo 1956: 19, 20). The tambo describes this settlement as the first nagari, a term that means both village and state. Without providing details of historical events, the tambo explains that a king from the southern part of West Sumatra came to Pari- angan, married the sister of a local leader, and then was himself appointed as the new leader (Manan 1999: 48). The king, whose name was Sang Sapurba, then installed pangulu, or head officers, and built a council hall from which to govern the people. West Sumatra, the Malay World and the Coming of Islam 23

The Minangkabau created new settlements, called rantau (Batuah and Madjoindo 1956), which became a source of revenue for the royal family (Manan 1999: 49). This is how the term ‘rantau’ came to mean ‘outside the Minangkabau heartland’. There are two terms that describe the areas and communities of the inner highlands of Minangkabau, namely darek (darat in Indonesian), which describes the Minangkabau heartland geographically, and alam, which describes it philo- sophically. Although the meaning of rantau is now much broader, in the past, it referred to the coastal areas of Sumatra and the areas downstream and to the east of the highlands (Kato 1980: 731). As a verb, merantau means to leave one’s nagari or village, a concept traditionally applying primarily to the practices of young men who left the homeland in search of wealth, knowledge and skills before returning to establish a family (Manan 1999: 46). Women, meanwhile, remained in the heartland, living in their family homes and tending to crops and engaging in trading and other kinds of economic activities. The Minangkabau people are a matrilineal society in which ancestral property such as land and houses is passed down from mothers to daughters. Kinship is also based around the female line. Each elite woman owns a ‘big house’ (rumah gadang) and rice lands or other ancestral property. In the past, these women controlled land, labour and subordinate kin and held power not only within households and rice land but throughout the village (Blackwood 2001: 132).1 In terms of belief, a mixture of animism and mysticism dominated this community before a South Indian version of Hindu-Buddhism was brought to the region by Indian merchants in the third and fourth centuries (Manan 1999: 50). The temple of Muara Takus in Jambi is evidence of the extent to which ancestor worship became linked to the adoption of Hinduism in the region in this period. At this time, Sumatra was very much part of the Malay world (alam Melayu). That world was based around the powerful and prosperous Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms of Srivijaya, based in Bukit Seguntang in Palembang, and Melayu, which was associated with the Batang Hari River in Jambi in the seventh century (Andaya 2001: 31). In the eleventh century, after the collapse of Srivijaya, and in a period when international trade between India and China through the Straits of Malacca came to be dominated by the Cholas of India, the term Melayu referred to interior areas in Jambi (Andaya 2001: 31). In the fourteenth century, Melayu appeared in Javanese literature, where it referred to an area that extended to other territories such as Lampung, Pattani in modern Thailand, Kelantan in Malaysia and the Minangkabau region of West Sumatra (Reid 2001). In that same century, Malacca, a region made prosperous by its position at the centre of key trading routes, emerged as the new centre of the Malay world. With the establishment of the kingdom of Malacca, the name Melayu and its deﬁning characteristics such as dress, language and religion became associated with Malacca Malays (Andaya 2001: 33). Thus, when Malacca became a powerful Muslim state in the same century, Islam came to be identiﬁed

1 For a discussion of the farming practices of women in contemporary West Sumatra, see Blackwood (2008). 24 2 Islam, Politics and Identity with Malay culture. It was this connection that began the association of Islam with the Malay people (Utrecht 1984: 31). And while a Hindu-Buddhist Minangkabau kingdom was established in 1347 by Adityawarman, a prince from the post-Srivijaya kingdom of Dharmasyraya who was raised in the Javanese kingdom of Majapahit (Colombijn 2006: 55), those living in the coastal areas of West Sumatra identified themselves as Malays rather than Minangkabau, as a result of the influence of the Malaccan Malays (Drakard 1990: 11). After the Portuguese conquered Malacca in 1511, a series of powerful sultanates appeared in the Malay world, including Aceh, which, by the seventeenth century was among the wealthiest and most powerful states in the region. Although Islam began to take root in the Malay world in the thirteenth century, along with the adaptation to local conditions of Islamic thought and concepts relating to politics, jurisprudence, and Sufi ideas and practices (Azra 2002: 103). In this period, Islam became important for economic and political reasons, enabling Malay Muslim kingdoms to participate intensively in Indian Ocean trade and establish contact with Muslim traders and political authorities in the Middle East (Azra 2004: 9). Aceh itself established strong connections with the Ottoman Empire in Turkey (Reid 2005:69–93), a connection that influenced the development of Islam in the Malay world. Scholars have proposed a number of theories in their attempts to explain the conversion of the Malay world to Islam. Al-Attas (1969) argues that Islam was introduced directly by Arabs to Malay Sumatra in the seventh century, citing a Chinese report of the existence of an Arab settlement in East Sumatra in 674, the earliest known record of probable Muslim settlement in Malay Sumatra. Others argue that Islam came to the Malay world from India in the twelfth century, citing the existence of international maritime trade routes, the commonality of schools of jurisprudence and the similarity of gravestones and literary styles and themes between India and the Malay world as evidence for this theory (Meuleman 2005: 24). Others say that Islam came from India to Sumatra at the end of the thirteenth century through the kingdoms of Pasai and Perlak (Alatas 1985: 168; Andaya 2001: 36). What is clear is that in the fourteenth century, the laws of Malacca (Undang- undang Melaka) used the term ‘Kanun’ (Arabic qanun) meaning administrative law, as used in the Ottoman Empire, and the Pasai chronicle of Aceh also frequently invokes both the terms ‘adat’ (from the Arabic ada), meaning customs, and ‘Kanun’ (Milner 1981: 47). Importantly also, merchant Arabs from the Hadramaut (now Yemen and Oman), who had visited and settled in Malay Sumatra before the seventeenth century, settled in the Straits of Malacca and what is now South Sumatra, from the late seventeenth century (Roff 1967: 81). Many reformist Muslims in the Malay world, such as Nuruddin Al-Raniri and Sayyid Abd Al-Samad Palimbani, were of Hadramauti descent (Azra 2002: 139). This contact continued into the early twentieth century, when Ahmad Surkati taught Islam at various schools in Batavia (Jakarta). By the early twentieth century, there were more than twenty thousand Hadramauti Arabs in the archipelago (Reid 2004: 230). West Sumatra, the Malay World and the Coming of Islam 25

The Arrival of Suﬁsm

Sufism, which came to Malay Sumatra via the trading routes between various parts of Asia and the Middle East, was an important element in the introduction of Islam to the Malay world. Sufi Islam is described as ‘the apprehension of divine realities’ (Nicholson 1914: 1). According to Trimingham, Sufi Islam emphasises the belief that it is possible to have direct experience of God or direct communication with God under the guidance of charismatic leaders (Trimingham 1998: 1). The mystical expression of the Islamic faith has both an intellectual dimension, consisting of Sufi teaching, and an organisational dimension called tariqa (tarekat in Indonesian), or brotherhood (Voll 1998: vii).2 Sufi traders used Islam as a means of establishing cooperation with local chiefs and the merchant class (Federspiel 1970). Because of the dominance of trade in the region, the centres of religious power were at the same time centres of economic power.3 As Utrecht (1984: 33) points out, Islam took hold fastest among the trader class. Wealthy merchants had the means to fund the education of their children and to fulfil the religious obligation to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca, which consequently brought them into closer contact with Islam (Federspiel 1970: 7). Sufism was, however, subsequently transmitted through other channels, as Sufi teachers married the daughters of Malay Indonesian nobility, which mean that their children had royal blood and therefore were well-placed to spread Islam (Johns 1961: 17). The nature of Sufism played an important role in the acceptance of Islam in Malay Sumatra. Johns (1961: 15) argues that the Sufis who preached Islam in the region ‘were prepared to preserve continuity with the past and to use the terms and elements of pre-Islamic culture in an Islamic context’.AsSufi Islam did not challenge local animist beliefs, it could penetrate the Malay world in a peaceful way (Snouck Hurgronje 1906). At the same time, however, some scholars argue that Sufi Islam created a new identity in the Malay world (Utrecht 1984; Woodward 1989), serving as ‘a liberation creed’ against the feudalism of the Hindu society and caste system imported from India and institutionalised under the Hindu kingdoms (Utrecht 1984: 30). Islam also provided local rulers with a consensual basis upon which to engage with Muslim merchants in coastal towns (Kahane 1980: 130). According to Woodward (1989), the majority of the population, notably the lower classes in urban centres, were eager to liberate themselves from the caste system, quickly embracing the idea of equality before God and Sufism’s emphasis on merit instead of inherited status. However, as other scholars have pointed out, the ruling

2 Howell (2001: note 2) argues that the term Sufi has many different meanings. It can be associated with devotional practices and religious concepts that are quite separate from Sufism’s common association with mysticism. 3 Kahane (1980), among others, has pointed out that economic interests, not purely religious motives, enhanced the spread of Islam into the Malay archipelago. 26 2 Islam, Politics and Identity classes did not only convert to Islam themselves, but also encouraged the general populace to do so as well (Johns 1961). Sufi Muslim merchants from Gujarat and Persia began visiting West Sumatra in the thirteenth century, establishing trade links through the gold industry. Gold traders from both the west and east coasts of Sumatra carried Sufi Islam with them to the Minangkabau highlands and the centres of the gold trade became the first to be converted to Islam (Dobbin 1983: 119). Three centuries later, one of the Minangkabau kings converted to Islam (Hadler 2008a: 977). Conversion took place on a large scale in the seventeenth century, when a Sufi centre was established in Ulakan in the district of present-day Padang Pariaman (Hadler 2008a: 977). Syaikh Burhanuddin, known as the Tuanku (religious leader) of Ulakan, was the first Sufi teacher of the tarekat organisation, Syattariyah, in Ulakan (Abdullah 1966: 8).4

The Coming of Syaria-Oriented Islam

The hold of Sufism in West Sumatra was not to go unchallenged. Changes in the wider Islamic world and their continuing impact on Malay Muslims gradually affected the form of Islam in the region. The modern reform movement only became influential in the nineteenth century, but Syaria-oriented Islam began infiltrating Sumatra as early as the seventeenth century. The first Syaria-oriented Muslim preacher in Malay Sumatra was Nuruddin al-Raniri, from Randir in Gujarat, who had studied Islam in Mecca before travelling to Aceh in 1637 (Azra 2004). Raniri favoured the Syaria-oriented Islam that he had learned in the Middle East over the Sufi mysticism that had its roots in India, and he set about spreading the teachings of a more Syari’a-oriented Islam (Azra 2004: 63). As a result of the efforts of Raniri and others, by the nineteenth century, Islamic practices associated with the Middle East were more visible in Malay Sumatra than in Java. Islam had a significant role in community affairs and in the private lives of individuals in Sumatra, whereas in Java most were purely nominal Muslims (Snouck Hurgronje 1906). As the Syaikh of Islam, the highest position below the Sultan of Aceh, al-Raniri issued a fatwa condemning the Sufi doctrine of wujudiyah as heretical. In response, the seventeenth century Sultan of Aceh, Iskandar Thani, ordered the killing of all Sufi adherents who refused to recant their belief in the doctrine (Azra 2004:63–64).5 In the late eighteenth century, the Wahhabist movement, which declared that belief in God was not enough to make one a Muslim and that one must worship God purely and exclusively because worship of

4 There is some disagreement on this. According al-Attas (1969), the Acehnese Syaikh Abdullah Arif, Sheikh Burhanuddin’s teacher, introduced Islam into Padang Pariaman in West Sumatra in the seventeenth century. 5 Wujudiyah is the cyclic ontology of divine self-manifestations. For example, the universe is seen as ‘a series of neo-platonic emanations’ and each of these emanations is considered as an aspect of God himself (Azra 2004: 53). West Sumatra, the Malay World and the Coming of Islam 27 any being other than God is idolatry (shirk) (Commins 2009: x), had reached the Malay world. Wahhabism not only obliged all Muslims to observe the practice of daily prayers and fasting, but also attacked popular religious practices that positioned holy men as intercessors with God (Trimingham 1998: 105). According to van Dijck (1984: 8), the introduction of Syaria-oriented Islam into the Malay world marked the beginning of a new chapter in the relationship between Islam and the state, in which Islam became a considerable source of social tension, ranging from dissatisfaction with indigenous symbols, rebellion against local rulers, to all-out war. The most important of these conflicts in West Sumatra was the Paderi war, which took place between 1803 and 1837. It was initiated by West Sumatran pilgrims returning from Mecca, who sought to implement the principles of Wah- habism they had encountered in Saudi Arabia over the way Islam was practised their homeland. The term itself was derived from Pedir or Pidie, the part of Aceh where Malays set out on and returned from the pilgrimage (van Dijck 1984: 10). The Paderi war exploited changing economic and social relations among the Minangkabau (Dobbin 1974, 1977, 1983). The collapse of the existing cash economy, which had been based on gold mining, led to the emergence of a new system based on the cultivation of coffee, which transformed economic and political relationships between and within villages. The wealthy were thrown into turmoil by the collapse of the gold industry at precisely the same time that it became possible for those at the bottom of the economic ladder to cultivate coffee in the hills on common village lands without the need for large investments. This gave rise to a group of ‘new rich’ farmers eager to challenge the economic order (van Dijck 1984: 9). Before the Paderi war, an emerging leader of this group, Tuanku Nan Tuo, had taken steps to secure trading routes by promoting Islamic regulations and con- fronting those responsible for robberies and other forms of misconduct (van Dijck 1984: 10). According to Dobbin (1983: 127–128), the introduction of Islamic regulations also made it possible for leaders such as Tuanku Nan Tuo to claim the land necessary for coffee cultivation from traditional landholders, thus further cementing the new economic order. The Paderi movement emerged in these newly rich coffee villages. It sought to challenge the entrenched positions of wealthy traditional leaders, aiming to replace what its followers perceived to be a corrupt traditional order with the laws of Islam (van Dijck 1984: 10). The movement’s most prominent leader was Peto Syarif, who became better known as Tuanku Imam Bonjol. Establishing a fortress in Bonjol, the Paderi movement flourished for 35 years, before the Dutch, acting in support of the traditional order, finally took full control of the Minangkabau heartlands in 1837. The Paderi leaders were subsequently captured and exiled (Dobbin 1983: 193–206), bringing the Paderi movement to an end. However, some Paderi leaders joined the tarekat Naqsabandiyah, which later attacked the Sufi tarekat, Syatariyah (Abdullah 1972: 203). By attacking the authority of traditional leaders, the Paderi movement also attacked an interpretation of Islam, since customary law (adat) and Islam had influenced one another for centuries, and both had come to incorporate elements of the other (van Dijck 1984: 11). West Sumatra’s adat leaders were also Muslims, 28 2 Islam, Politics and Identity albeit superficial and heterodox in the eyes of the Paderi movement. Indeed, the complexities of the Paderi war point to the fact that adat and Islam may be interpreted differently, and each may be used for political or economic gain (Biezeveld 2007).

The Regulation of Islam Under the Dutch

The Dutch, who had an interest in gaining control over the coffee trade, sided with traditional adat leaders against the Paderi movement (Biezeveld 2007: 208). They continued to favour the adat leaders, promising them taxation concessions in the 1833 Long Declaration (Plakat Panjang), which abolished a cultivation system in favour of a direct tax (Kahin 1999: 25). This enabled the Paderi movement to identify adat leaders as friends of the enemy. Indeed, the term ‘Adat Basandi Syarak’ (local customs are based on Syari’a), among the Minangkabau of West Sumatra, was coined by Tuanku Imam Bonjol during the Paderi war specifically in response to the Dutch positioning of adat as a superior source of authority over Islam (Hadler 2008a: 986).6 Similar policy decisions subsequently led to the Aceh war, which took place between 1873 and 1912. When the Dutch chose to support the traditional Acehnese figures of authority (uleebalang) over Muslim administrators, Islamic leaders such as Tengku Cik Di Tiro and Muhammad Saman declared a holy war against the colonial ruler.7 After an extended period of fighting, Islamic leaders including Tuanku Mahmud, Tuanku Raja Kumala and Teuku Polem initiated a peace settlement with the Dutch in 1909 (Alfian 2006: 114). It was during the Aceh war that the Dutch established an Office of Native Affairs charged with studying Islam and local culture to provide advice to the Indies government. The office was assisted by the Islamic scholar, Ch. Snouck Hurgronje, who had been Consul in Jeddah before becoming Advisor on Native Affairs to the Netherlands Indies government. Snouck Hurgronje went on to play important role for the Dutch in improving military tactics and winning the war in Aceh (Benda 1958: 340).8

6 ‘Adat basandi Syarak, Syarak basandi Adat’was widely accepted as a form of compromise between Islamic and adat leaders by 1837 (Hadler 2008b: 29). 7 Islam was constructed as the source of a common identity in the fight against the Dutch, in which the Dutch were described as infidels and even Jews (Aspinall 2009: 25). 8 The Dutch engaged in a number of other attempts to control Islam around this time. Among other measures, the colonial authorities forced pilgrims to obtain a passport in order to travel to Mecca between 1825 and 1852. In order to do so, each pilgrim was required to obtain a certificate from his district head vouching for his financial capacity to make the return journey and provide for his dependents at home. Arab migrants were also required to live in special cantonments in the main towns and to apply for a pass every time they wished to leave their place of residence (Reid 2005: 231). The Regulation of Islam Under the Dutch 29

These wars were just two of many instances in which the Dutch prioritised adat over Islam in the nineteenth century. In 1847, the Dutch appointed adat leaders in West Sumatra as colonial agents charged with collecting the coffee harvest through forced cultivation, in order to improve the collection and delivery of this crop. At that time, the new position of ‘traditional leader responsible for forced labour’ (panghulu suku rodi) was created to implement the government’s coffee policies in many nagari, with the salaries attached to the positions being a percentage of the coffee production of their areas (Kahin 1999: 26). When the Dutch introduced the Ethical Policy at the end of the nineteenth century, local Muslims interpreted it as not only being linked to the Dutch support for adat, but also as part of the effort to undermine Islam and strengthen the position of Christian missionaries (Benda 1958: 339). In 1914, the Nagari Ordinance was passed with the aim of re-establishing West Sumatra’s autonomous village communities and recognising the right of adat leaders to hold authority in the nagari (Kahin 1999: 26). The Dutch also attempted to codify adat in 1929, using information gathered from native customary law tribunals, the opinions of chiefs and elders who were consulted by van Vol- lenhoven and other adat scholars (Jaspan 1965: 252). The key issues at stake were those of marriage, divorce, and inheritance, issues over which there was a real competition between adat and Islamic law. In the early twentieth century, attacks on traditionalist Islam in West Sumatra were coming from the proponents of both secular modernity and modernist Islam. In 1906, Datuk Sutan Maharaja established a movement that promoted education for women on the basis of their status in Minangkabau culture. In order to improve their position, he established 12 schools for women and a feminist newspaper, Sunting Melayu (Malay Ornament), which was edited by his daughter, Ratna Djuita and later by Rohana Kudus, the ‘Kartini of West Sumatra’ (Abdullah 1971:12).In 1910, he went on to establish the Minangkabau Union (Minangkabausche Bond) to unite all Minangkabau people living in the darek and the rantau including Aceh and Negeri Sembilan. At the same time, Muslim reformists led by those who had been students of Syaikh Achmad Khatib in Mecca, such as Djamil Djambek in Bukittinggi, Haji Abdullah Ahmad in Padang, Haji Rasul in Padang Panjang, and Taib Umar in Batu Sangkar, among others, not only challenged the adat-oriented interpretation of progress favoured by Datuk Sutan Maharaja, but also attacked the heterodoxy of the Sufi orders and the Minangkabau matrilineal inheritance system, arguing that the former two ideas were heretical and the latter was an infringement of Syaria (Abdullah 1985: 141). Reformist Muslim ideas had spread in Indonesia after the opening of Suez Canal in the nineteenth century, which saw an increasing number of pilgrims travelling from the archipelago to Mecca and Egypt. As Laffan (2003) has demonstrated, these connections were crucial to the Indonesian nationalist movement because they provided an alternative model to Europe for modernising intellectuals (see also Azra 2004). Influenced by the Young Turks movement in the Ottoman Empire, a group of reformist Minangkabau Muslims called the Kaum Muda (Group of the Young), set themselves up in opposition to the Kaum Tua (Group of the Elders), a term they used to refer to the Sufi orders (Abdullah 1971: 16). As in other parts of the Malay 30 2 Islam, Politics and Identity world, the reformists attacked Sufi heterodoxy, urging a return to the Qur’an and the Hadith. They also denounced Islamic practices which they saw as heterodox, for example the way in which the Prophet’s birthday was celebrated. In the case of the matrilineal system, however, the Kaum Muda compromised by suggesting that inheritance be divided into two categories, ‘high inheritance’ (pusaka tinggi) or ‘ancestral inheritance’ (harto pusako) and ‘low inheritance’ (pusaka rendah)or ‘individual inheritance’ (harta pencaharian). The first category would continue to be distributed according to the matrilineal line, while the second category was to be transferred in accordance with Islamic inheritance law (Abdullah 1985: 143).9 The division in the inheritance system shows how firmly Islam had become part of Minangkabau identity.

Nationalism and Islam

In the early twentieth century, an anti-Dutch rebellion broke out in Minangkabau after the 1908 introduction of direct taxation by the Dutch, a policy that disregarded the promises made to adat leaders in the Long Declaration. Uprisings ensued in many parts of West Sumatra, led by both Islamic and adat leaders. Cooperation between the Islamic and adat leaders marked the genesis of nationalism in the struggle against the Dutch in West Sumatra (Kahin 1999: 27). The same year saw the establishment of Budi Utomo in Java, an event now commemorated as marking the beginnings of the Indonesian nationalist movement.10 Among the ﬁrst organisations to campaign for an improvement in the social and economic conditions of indigenous people in the Indies was the Islamic League (Sarekat Islam). Established in 1912,11 Sarekat Islam was initially concerned with protecting indigenous batik merchants against ethnic Chinese domination (Willmott 2009: 26) but, as it expanded throughout the archipelago it joined the growing call for political reform in the interests of the indigenous population as a whole. From 1919, Sarekat Islam struggled over ideological divisions between its Muslim and communist leaders (Kahin 1999: 27). This division emerged after the Dutch granted limited expression to Indonesian people through the establishment of a People’s Council (Volksraad) in 1918 (Vickers 2005:77–78). This council, which served as a forum for the expression of social grievances, was supported by leaders

9 See Chap. 6 for further discussion of this issue. 10 In West Sumatra, early stirrings of nationalism were apparent in Abdul Rivai’s appeal for kemajuan, the notion of social progress, in 1904. A Minangkabau student in Holland and the Malay editor of Bintang Hindia (Star of the Indies), Abdul Rivai stressed the importance of social development within an Indies nation state (Abdullah 1971: 12). 11 There is some controversy about the beginnings of Sarekat Islam. According to Shiraishi (1997: 76), the organisation was established under that name in 1912, replacing an earlier organisation, Rekso Roemekso, which was founded in 1911. However, according to McVey (1965: 8), Sarekat Islam was established in 1911 as the Islamic Commercial Union in Surakarta. Nationalism and Islam 31 of Budi Utomo and some moderate members of the Sarekat Islam but not by the younger, radical members of Sarekat Islam such as Semaun, who later became the first chairman of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Kahin 1999: 27). After violent incidents involving attempts to rebel against colonial rule, the Dutch security body accused the League of harbouring a group of violent subversives. In the ensuing internal debates, moderate elements in the leadership, including a number of Minangkabau politicians, staged a walkout, leading to a split in the organisation in 1919 (Vickers 2005:78–79). Meanwhile, in West Sumatra, tensions between the Kaum Muda and Kaum Tua were initially reduced with the emergence of the nationalist movement. The vehicle for reconciliation was the establishment of a branch of Sarekat Islam in Padang in 1915 by two Kaum Tua leaders, Haji Achmad, a local Muslim merchant, and Syaikh Chatib Ali, a Kaum Tua leader. A number of Kaum Muda followers joined the organisation (Abdullah 1971: 24), but the truce did not last long. 5 months later, the Padang branch of Sarekat Islam split into two opposing groups, the White Card (Kartu Putih) faction established by the Kaum Muda and the Red Card (Kartu Merah) faction aligned with the Kaum Tua. The more left-wing Red Card faction was recognised by Sarekat Islam in Java because of its opposition to Dutch colonialism while the White Card faction had the approval of the Dutch (Abdullah 1971:25–26).12 Muhammadiyah also came to play an important role in the Kaum Muda movement. Founded by K.H. Ahmad Dahlan on 18 November 1912, Muham- madiyah was, like Kaum Muda, a reformist organisation that supported the opening up of the process of interpretation (ijtihad), setting aside the interpretations of institutionalised scholars for a fresh look at religious sources. Muhammadiyah was also concerned that Muslims were preoccupied with such things as superstition and heretical practices, and sought to purify the faith from those practices (Dhofier 1982).13 Ahmad Dahlan had been educated for several years in Mecca, where he studied the Qur’an, theology, astronomy and religious law, along with the writings of the Egyptian reformist Muhammad Abduh. This experience greatly affected his approach to Islamic thought, particularly in regard to the need to correct false doctrine and to unite Muslim countries politically so that they could fight against the domination of Western colonialism (Palmier 1973: 17). The name ‘Muham- madiyah’ reflected the goals and objectives of the organisation, which were to realign Islamic practices with the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad.

12 Datuk Sutan Maharaja responded to the establishment of the West Sumatran Sarekat Islam by forming a Minangkabau Adat party called the Adat Association of the Minangkabau World (Sarekat Adat Alam Minangkabau, SAAM) in September 1916. Most of the party’s members were local panghulu and their adat staff. Datuk Sutan Maharaja not only cooperated with the Dutch but also formulated his own explanations for the relationship between adat and religion, in which adat was positioned as being in line with Suﬁ Islam, and tasauf (a personal approach to God). His rejection of the idea that adat should be directly based on Islamic laws, as was claimed by Kaum Muda movement, led him to cooperate with the Kaum Tua (Abdullah 1972: 230, 232). 13 For a discussion of Muhammadiyah’s position on education, see Chap. 5. 32 2 Islam, Politics and Identity

Muhammadiyah was introduced to West Sumatra in 1925 by Abdul Karim Amrullah, also known as Haji Rasul, a strident opponent of communism who had spent time in Java. By 1927, one-ﬁfth of the whole population of his nagari of Sungai Batang, Maninjau, around 2,440 people, had joined the organisation (Abdullah 1971: 78). From Maninjau, Muhammadiyah subsequently established branches in Padang Panjang in 1926, Bukittinggi in 1927, Padang and Batusangkar in 1928, where it provided a base for West Sumatrans who sought to distance themselves from the revolutionary communists who dominated the local branch of Sarekat Islam (Abdullah 1971: 71, 84–90).14

The Rise of Political Parties

From the 1920s to the1940s, a range of political parties emerged in Indonesia as the level of political activism increased. At the national level, the Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) was established in 1927, while leftists within Sarekat Islam established the Islamic League Party (Partai Sarekat Islam, PSI), which later became the Indonesian Islamic League Party (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, PSII) in 1929.15 In the same year, Tan Malaka also established the Republic of Indonesia Party (Partai Republik Indonesia, Pari) (Kahin 1999: 58). In West Sumatra, the Kaum Muda established a politically-oriented socio-economic organisation, the Association of Indonesian Muslims (Persatuan Muslim Indonesia, Permi) in 1930, which became a political party in 1932 (Noer 1973: 50). The Kaum Tua established the Association of Islamic Schools (Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, PTI) in the same year (Abdullah 1971: 135). A local branch of the PSII was established in 1930, while a local branch of the PNI was established in 1932 (Abdullah 1971: 110, 183). In 1932, Permi proclaimed itself as a revolutionary and non-cooperative party by refusing to hoist the Dutch ﬂag during religious celebrations (Abdullah 1971: 176). In 1933, Kaum Tua, Kaum Muda, Muhammadiyah and the local branch of PSII also began to adopt a revolutionary stance.16 In response, in 1933 the Dutch imprisoned the leaders of Permi and the PSII, including Rasuna Said, Rasimah Ismail, Datuk Singo Mangkuto and Djamaluddin (Kahin 1999: 56). In 1938, the colonial authorities established the Minangkabau Council (Dewan Minangkabau) in an attempt to control increasingly radical local political organisations (Kahin 1999: 90).

14 Kahin (1999: 84) argues that West Sumatran society at this time was plural and the categor- isation of society into adat, Islamic and communist blocs is unhelpful (Kahin 1999: 84). 15 After the collapse of the Islamic Caliphate in Turkey and the failure of the Islamic World Congress in Mecca planned in 1927, the PSII and its successor emphasised Indonesian nationalism rather than Pan-Islamism (Abdullah 1971: 122). 16 Divisions between Islamic organisations also emerged. For example, Permi accused Muham- madiyah of being too close to the Dutch while Muhammadiyah accused Permi activists of not being motivated by Islam (Noer 1973: 264). Nationalism and Islam 33

Legacies of the Japanese Occupation

The arrival of the Japanese in 1942 increased enthusiasm for the cause of independence. The Japanese not only put an end to Dutch power but also promoted nationalist and anti-Western sentiments in the country (Vickers 2005:86–87). Japanese troops arrived in Padang in March 1942 and the local Dutch commander surrendered ten days later (Kahin 1999: 95). West Sumatra was then managed by the Department of Military Administration (Gunseibu) of the 25th Army in Singapore, one of three Japanese military commands in Indonesia; other two being the 16th Army in Java and the Navy in the eastern islands and Kalimantan (Vickers 2005: 88). A year later, the 25th Army headquarters moved to Bukittinggi, from where it administered the whole of Sumatra (Kahin 1999: 95). The Japanese had been in contact with Islamic leaders in Indonesia and West Sumatra for a short period of time prior to the occupation (Kahin 1974: 79). The study of Islam had been significant in Japan since the 1920s and the Japanese Islamic Association (Dai Nippon Kaikyo Kyokai), established in 1938, had invited Muslims to attend an Islamic exhibition in Tokyo in the same year. No Indonesian Muslims attended (Benda 1958: 105–106), but in 1941, just before Japan entered the Second World War, Japanese agents had contacted Indonesian Muslim organisations such as Sarekat Islam (Benda 1958: 105). In January 1942, shortly before the fall of the Dutch administration, Japanese agents had met Chatib Suleiman, a member of the Dutch-sponsored Minangkabau Council, and organised a secret organisation centred in Padang Panjang (Oki 1978: 206). After seizing power, the Japanese rulers allowed the Islamic flag to be raised on Islamic holidays and established the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Masyumi), which after independence became a major political party until it was banned in 1960. In their management of Islam, the Japanese continued the Dutch Office for Native and Religious Affairs by establishing the Religious Affairs Office (Shumubu) at the end of March 1942 (Benda 1958: 111). The Minangkabau reformist, Abdul Karim Amrullah, was appointed as an advisor to this body in 1942. In 1943, the Japanese also established and trained Islamic militias, which were later the nucleus of Islamic militancy during the Darul Islam and PRRI/Permesta rebellions. In West Sumatra, the Japanese established a People’s Committee (Komite Rakyat) to succeed the Dutch Minangkabau Council, along with an organisation called Greater Japan Youth (Pemuda Nippon Raja) led by Chatib Sulaiman. However, after the Japanese consolidated their authority in the region in late 1942, all organisations were banned from political activities (Kahin 1974:79–80). After suppressing political organisations, the Japanese authorities sought to play a role both within adat and Islam. At the supra-village level, they favoured Islam, for example, by sending Islamic leaders from West Sumatra to a Malay Islamic conference in Singapore and establishing the Minangkabau Supreme Islamic Council 34 2 Islam, Politics and Identity

(Majlis Islam Tinggi Minangkabau) in 1943 (Oki 1978). At the village level, on the other hand, local adat leaders were given power through the maintenance of the Dutch administrative apparatus (Kahin 1999: 106).

Islamic Politics After Independence

When the Japanese surrendered to the Allies on 15 August 1945, Sukarno, his West Sumatran born Vice President, Muhammad Hatta, and a number of other leaders were reluctant to proclaim independence because they felt time was needed for planning and to set up new institutions. Their hand was forced by radical youth associated with a group known as Menteng 31, who kidnapped Sukarno and Hatta and forced them to proclaim independence on 17 August 1945. The proclamation of independence, the arrival of British troops charged with disarming the Japanese and repatriating Dutch prisoners of war, and signs that the Dutch were preparing to reassume management of their colony led to revolution in many parts of the country. During the revolution, the Dutch were aligned against the military and diplomatic efforts of the newly-proclaimed Republic of Indonesia. As a result, Indonesia was divided between the Republic and Dutch-controlled areas, with the Republic only in control of small areas of Sumatra and Java (Vickers 2005:97–99). One of the tasks undertaken in the lead-up to the declaration of independence was the design of a constitution. A key debate in that process occurred over the status of Islam in that document. On 22 June 1945, the Preparatory Body for Indonesian Independence (Badan Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, BPUPKI) proposed that Indonesia be established as an Islamic state, or at the very least, that Islam be made the state religion (Hosen 2007: 62). Known as the ‘Jakarta Charter’, this proposal included the stipulation that all Muslim citizens be required to observe Islamic law and fulﬁl the obligation to pray, fast and pay zakat (Van Bruinessen 1996: note 5). Opponents to the Jakarta Charter, who included Sukarno and Hatta, were concerned that its inclusion in the Constitution would lead to the secession of non-Muslim areas of Eastern Indonesia. Ultimately, on 18 August 1945, one day after the proclamation of independence, the motion was defeated.17 Some prominent Muslims argued that the omission of the Charter from the constitution meant the document did not guarantee their right to observe Islamic law (Hosen 2007: 63). In an attempt to placate the Muslim lobby, Sukarno promised Islamic leaders that they would later be given the opportunity to campaign

17 Islamic parties, including Masyumi, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Indonesian Islamic League Party (Partai Sarikat Islam Indonesia, PSII), campaigned for inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in the national philosophy and the constitution for a second time during the deliberations of the Indo- nesian Constituent Assembly in 1959 (Prins 1959: 122). However, the proposal did not gain the required two-thirds majority support (Hosen 2007: 67; Nasution 1992: 32). Islamic Politics After Independence 35 for the inclusion of the Charter through constitutional procedures (Hosen 2007: 67).18 Moreover, to shore up support for resistance to the return of the Dutch, Sukarno established the Ministry of Religion in January 1946 (Noer 1978: 13). However, tensions between Islamic groups and the Republican government were exacerbated in 1947 with the signing of the Linggajati Agreement between the Republican government, led by the Minangkabau Sutan Sjahrir, and the Dutch, which stated that they would work together to establish ‘a sovereign, democratic, federal state’, of the United States of Indonesia as part of a Netherlands-Indonesia Union—an agreement considered by Islamic political parties and organisations as evidence of the influence of the Dutch in the Republican government (Kahin 1999: 123). The collapse of this agreement led to armed conflict with the Dutch in what they referred to as the ‘police action’ of 1947. In the following year, the Darul Islam rebellion broke out in West Java, led by Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo. The rebellion in West Java was followed by Darul Islam rebellions in Kalimantan, and more significantly in South Sulawesi in 1950, led by Kahar Muzakkar, and in Aceh in 1953, led by Daud Beureueh (Feith and Lev 1963).19 Kartosuwiryo, who had initially supported the Republican government, proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia) in 1948 in protest over the Renville Agreement, the second truce between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic (Kahin 1999: 175). In a response to the Darul Islam movement, Sukarno began to consider ways of increasing Muslim support for the Republican government. He established a Council of Ulamas in West Java in 1958, the head of which was the former regional military commander.20 After attempts in 1960 and 1961 to persuade the movement to disband, Sukarno sent military troops to capture Kartosuwiryo and his followers on 4 June 1962. At the same time as it faced the outbreak of the Darul Islam rebellion, the Republican government was at war with the Dutch who attacked guerrilla strongholds in Java at the end of 1948. This second Dutch ‘police action’ led to the taking of the Republican capital, Yogyakarta, at the end of 1948. President Sukarno and Vice President Hatta were taken prisoner, leaving Syafruddin Prawiranegara to establish a caretaker government (Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia, PDRI) in Bukittinggi. With the departure of the Dutch in 1949, the West Sumatran Muslim politician Muhammad Natsir was appointed Prime Minister.

18 A number of attempts made to revive the Jakarta Charter during the New Order period and the early the post-Suharto era also failed (Hosen 2007:59–107). 19 Kahin (1999: 176) argues that Darul Islam did not take hold in West Sumatra because the Minangkabau were not attached to any particular regional political party and were not yet interested in regional autonomy. Kartosuwirjo and Kahar Muzakar were executed in 1962 and 1965 respectively. The Indonesian government negotiated with Acehnese leaders in 1962, leading to a peace agreement that restored Aceh as an autonomous province with special rights to implement Islamic law. The same approach was used by Jakarta in 2005 following the 2004 tsunami and the subsequent cessation of conﬂict. (For a detailed discussion of Aceh’s relations with Jakarta, see Aspinall 2009). 20 The national-level council, the Indonesian Council of Ulamas (MUI), was subsequently established in 1962, with the aim of gaining more support from Islamic groups (Noer 1978). 36 2 Islam, Politics and Identity

With the implementation of the parliamentary system in the 1950s, many anti-colonial organisations were reconfigured as political parties.21 The secular nationalist Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) was led by Sukarno and Hatta, while Masyumi was re-formed as a modernist Muslim party under the leadership of Natsir. Traditionalist Muslims were represented by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), headed by Kyai Haji Idham Chalib. The parliamentary system also strengthened the position of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). In the national election of 1955, the PNI received the largest proportion of the vote with 22 %, while Masyumi, NU and the PKI gained 20, 18 and 16 % respectively (Hosen 2007: 66). From the mid-1950s, efforts to balance the competing interests of Muslims, communists and the military increasingly consumed Sukarno. Ideological faction- alism was evident in the military as well. The military leadership had generally favoured the Pancasila doctrine, leading to the expression of secularism, but Abdul Haris Nasution, the Armed Forces Chief of Staff and Minister of Defence, wanted to institute Islamic doctrines as an ethical and moral guide for the Armed Forces (Crouch 2009: 410). The ideological contest between competing political interests at the national level had a geographical element as well. Some regions were dominated by one ideology while others were dominated by another. For example, areas in the north and south of Central Java were dominated by the PKI while most of the eastern and western extremes of Java were under the control of the Islamic political parties. Masyumi dominated Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Maluku while the PNI was strong in the southeastern islands from Bali to Timor (Vickers 2005: 123–124). In an attempt to control these ideological conflicts, Sukarno adopted a consensus approach. However, when the Ali cabinet collapsed in March 1957, leaving no single political party with a majority of votes (Lev 1966: 12), Sukarno declared a return to the 1945 Constitution, giving him and the military forces authoritative power in the country.22 In this he split decisively from his deputy, Hatta, who had also been prime minister in previous governments. The declaration of martial law increased regional grievances in Indonesia, which the Djuanda cabinet attempted to assuage by delivering funds for regional development (Lev 1966: 30). A National Conference (Musyawarah Nasional) for regional leaders was also held twice in 1957 in an unsuccessful attempt to create national unity (Lev 1966: 30).23 The PRRI/Permesta rebellion began in September 1958, when regional military officers such as Husein, Sumual and Barlian, the commanders of Central Sumatra, North Sulawesi and South Sumatra respectively, met in Palembang. They demanded that the national government return Hatta to his position, grant extensive regional

21 It is important to note that youth groups also played important role in debates around national ideology. The Indonesian Islamic Students’ Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, HMI), formed in 1947, was closely associated with Masyumi during the Sukarno years, and constituted a strong force of opposition against communism (Baswedan 2004: 674). 22 Hatta had resigned as Vice President in protest against Sukarno’s growing authoritarianism in December 1956. 23 Sukarno was almost killed in an assassination attempt known as the Cikini Affair in November 1957 (Lev 1966: 33). Islamic Politics After Independence 37 autonomy, make changes in military leadership, and outlaw communism in Indonesia (Lev 1966: 36; Kahin 1999: 178). In response Sukarno sent military units led by Abdul Haris Nasution to quell the rebellion, and made illegal Natsir’s Masyumi as well as Sjahrir’s Socialist Party. From Pekanbaru, the national military officers took control of Medan, then Padang, and finally Gorontalo and Manado in North Sulawesi, although PRRI/Permesta leaders carried on guerrilla warfare until 1961 (Lev 1966: 40). In a final attempt at appeasement, Sukarno issued President Decision No. 1/PNPS/1965 in January 1965, which subsequently became Law No. 5/1969 on Prevention of the Misuse of Religion and Blasphemy. The law contained a prohibition on deliberate and public advocacy of an interpretation of a religion adhered to in Indonesia, or the performance of religious activities resem- bling the religious activities of a religion adhered to in Indonesia, where that interpretation or activity deviated from the accepted tenets of that religion.24 Sukarno lost power when the army, under the direction of General Suharto, destroyed the Communist Party after an attempted coup on 30 September–1 October 1965, during which six top military leaders were killed. In the months that followed, around half a million members of the Indonesian Communist Party and others accused of being communists were killed by the Indonesian army and Muslim paramilitaries supported by Islamic organisations. General Suharto officially banned the Communist Party, together with all affiliated social and cultural organisations, in March 1966. Under intense political pressure, Sukarno transferred much of his authority to the army and to Suharto in a Presidential Decree dated 11 March 1966.

A West Sumatran Perspective

West Sumatra was deeply involved in national politics, and in the politics of Islam, during the Sukarno years as a consequence of the engagement of Minangkabau ﬁgures like Haji Agus Salim from the PSII, Hatta and Sjahrir in the nationalist movement, and their subsequent rise to power within the Republican ranks. The province itself was also a site of Republican activity. In an attempt to shore up support for a return to colonial status, the Dutch promoted the concept of a Min- angkabau state (Negara Minangkabau) through local adat leaders, introducing a form of regional government called General Unity (Persatuan Umum), which had a military arm called the Association of Black Cats (Serikat Kucing Hitam) in 1946. This initiative, which attracted adat leaders who had been ofﬁcials during the Dutch colonial period, served to increase the polarisation between these local leaders and Islamic groups (Kahin 1974: 110–111). As part of its campaign against the Republicans, in 1947, the Dutch introduced the Special Autonomous Region of West Sumatra (Daerah Istimewa Sumatera Barat, DISBA) in Padang, as a step towards the planned establishment of the

24 As will be seen later, this law was important in the politics of Islam in the post-Suharto era. 38 2 Islam, Politics and Identity

Negara Minangkabau in 1949 (Kahin 1999: 152). Ultimately, however, this initiative failed, and, as noted above, Bukittinggi became the seat of the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintahan Darurat Republik Indo- nesia, PDRI) after the Dutch attack on Yogyakarta in 1948 (Kahin 1974: 115). Relations between the Republic and local Muslim politicians began to sour with the signing of the Linggajati Agreement in 1947. Islamic groups such as Masyumi and Muhammadiyah and religious militia such as Hizbullah, Sabilillah and Lasjmi accused the regional Republican and military leaders of continuing to maintain close ties to the Dutch and proceeded to stage an attempted coup in March 1947. Kahin (1999: 123) argues that the attempted coup was prompted not only by suspicions of the regional Republican government’s close relationship with the Dutch but also because Islamic political parties were not represented in the village administration and in the regional Republican government. They also resented the fact that local Islamic militias were not given arms. Islamic groups, according to Kahin, considered higher-ranking military ofﬁcers to be adopting luxurious and immoral lifestyles that were inconsistent with Islamic principles.25 Attempts were made to bring Islamic militia groups under the control of the regular army after the formation of the Banteng Division in 1947. The fusion of the militias and the regular forces was not particularly successful, as some militia commanders refused to forfeit their independence and some military units remained loyal to their militia commanders and to various political parties.26 The West Sumatran division of Masyumi joined a movement created by veterans of the Banteng Division over the issue of regionalism in 1956. Together they formed the Banteng Council and declared the Banteng Charter, demanding greater regional autonomy, especially in matters of defence and ﬁnance. The Banteng council was opposed by the local branch of the PKI, which prompted the formation of a local network called the Joint Movement against Communism (Gerakan Bersama Anti Komunisme, GEBAK) on 4 September 1957. Led by Colonel Dahlan Djambek, GEBAK accused communist groups of accepting funds from foreign Chinese, also suggesting that communism had caused the split between Sukarno and Hatta. Among the propaganda used by GEBAK was the statement that West Sumatra was considered as Islamic and national government was communist (Kahin 1999: 191–204).27 Mansoer Sani, the new military head of Sawah Lunto

25 The tension between Islam and the Republican government in West Sumatra also affected the relationship with communists in the region. During the March 1947 coup the Army commander was Colonel Ismael Lengah, who had a secular education and was considered by Islamic groups to be a socialist and a follower of Tan Malaka. Lengah refused to return weapons of the Islamic militia even though Muhammad Natsir and the Vice President Mohammad Hatta at that time asked him to do so (Kahin 1999: 125–127). 26 The Banteng division became the Territorial Division I and II (Divisi Bukit Barisan) of the Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) in 1950. 27 Kahin argues that Djambek’s accusations should be contextualised in the fact that he had been forced to resign from the Indonesian military in Jakarta after being charged with corruption, and was seeking opportunities for inﬂuence on his return to Padang (Kahin 1999: 202–204). Islamic Politics After Independence 39

Sijunjung district removed all communists, mostly immigrants from Java, from civilian and military positions and arrested their leaders in 1957. The PRRI movement in West Sumatra was headed by Syafruddin Prawiranegara and Muhammad Natsir. According to Leirissa (1991), the rebellion was caused by four factors. First, there had been a significant Javanisation of the outer islands from 1955, which local powerbrokers feared would enable the national government to easily control Central Sumatra. Second, the national economy was in crisis, and poverty was rampant not only among civilians but among lower level military units in the region. Third, there had been a history of local and national coup attempts by communists, including the local attempt on 3 March 1947 in West Sumatra. Finally, fragmentation in the local and national armed military made a regional uprising possible. Kahin (1999: 198, 207), however, suggests that the PRRI was made possible because of US support as part of attempts to encourage a national front against communism. The national government sent military forces to the province and PRRI leaders were captured and killed in 1961 (Kahin 1999: 226). Following the rebellion, control over the regional army was put in the hands of communist groups within the Diponegoro Division, who proceeded to entrench their power in the local military (Kahin 1999: 236). Civilians who supported the rebellion were also detained in jails or kept under house arrest (Kahin 1999: 228). The political repression that followed the PRRI prompted many Minangkabau to migrate to other regions, including Jakarta, and also to Malaysia. The involvement of Masyumi leaders in the PRRI and Darul Islam rebellions led Sukarno to ban to ban the party and imprison a number of its leaders, including Syafruddin and Natsir. The same fate befell the Indonesian Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, PSI) and its leaders, including Sukarno’s long-time nemesis, the West Sumatran Sutan Sjahrir (Kahin 1999: 236). In West Sumatra, the banning of Masyumi meant that Muslims voters were forced to support the traditionalist Perti, which had rejected support for the Banteng Council and the PRRI movement and agreed with Sukarno’s Guided Democracy (Kahin 1999: 246). It was in this political context that Haji Abdul Malik bin Abdul Karim Amrullah, better known as Hamka, the son of the founder of Muhammadiyah’s West Sumatra branch, Haji Rasul, began criticising Sukarno from Jakarta. Hamka had worked in the Ministry of Religion in Jakarta from 1951 to 1960, also serving as a Masyumi member of the Indonesian Constituent Assembly representing Central Java from 1955 to 1960. Hamka challenged Sukarno’s personal and political behaviour, including his polygamous tendencies and his close association with communism, a view widely shared in West Sumatra. Sukarno responded by having Hamka arrested in 1964 under the Subversion Law. After the failure of the alleged communist coup in Jakarta in 1965, the national government held trials for regional communist leaders in Padang, including Major Djohan Rivai, Leitenant Colonel Bainal and Sukirno as well as PKI members such Djajusman (Kahin 1999: 240). Tens of thousands of communists were jailed without trial, and although no exact figures are available on the number of those killed (Kahin 1999: 248), it is clear that the numbers were significant. In addition, communist officials who had been dominant in the administrative structure of West 40 2 Islam, Politics and Identity

Sumatra after the PRRI were replaced by anti-communist military ofﬁcers in 1966 (Kahin 1999: 235). The regional army under Colonel Poniman also isolated traditional adat and religious associations that had been associated with communism, such as the Supreme Consultative Council of the Adat of the Minangkabau World (Majelis Tinggi Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau, MTKAAM) and the Islamic Educational Movement Party (Partai Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Perti) (Kahin 1999: 245–246). In their place, a new adat organisation, the Minangkabau Adat Consultative Body (Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau, LKAAM) and a group called the Contact Body for the Struggle of the Islamic Community (Badan Kontak Perjuangan Umat Islam, BKPUI) were established in 1966 (Interview with Saafroedin Bahar, 3 November 2010).

Islam and Politics in Suharto’s Indonesia

Over the course of his presidency, Suharto adopted a ‘two-pronged Islamic policy’, on the one hand denouncing the politicisation of religion (and especially Islamic political parties) while encouraging personal—but moderate—piety (Liddle 1996: 621). For a short time, the Muslim lobby was viewed favourably by the new regime as a result of Muslim involvement in the anti-communist massacres. Members of HMI who had fought against communism took up positions in Suharto’s administration and the Islamic parties were confident they would do well in the election promised by Suharto in his early days in office (Hefner 2001: 503). However, at the same time, Suharto moved swiftly to contain political Islam. He refused to support an attempt to revive Masyumi in April–May 1967, because of the party’s former association with rebellion and its promotion of political Islam (Ricklefts 2001: 356– 357). Masyumi members subsequently joined the Indonesian Muslim Party (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Parmusi), which was later controlled by Suharto, who pre- vented prominent members, including Mohammad Natsir, Muhammad Roem and Pramoto Mangkusaswito, from heading the party (Samson 1973: 5).28 In 1968, the People’s Consultative Assembly rejected calls for the inclusion of Jakarta Charter in the Indonesian Constitution for the third time in Indonesian history. Those who sought to link Islamic laws with the constitution were accused of being subversive (Hosen 2007: 72). Despite Suharto’s political vehicle, Golkar, winning by a landslide in the 1971 election, the New Order continued to seek to limit the influence of political parties, in 1973 fusing the nationalist parties into the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, PDI) and all remaining Muslim parties into the United

28 The former Masyumi leaders established the Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII) in 1967. DDII has strong links with Saudi Arabia. It has sent Indonesian youths to study in the Middle Eastern countries and has funded the construction of mosques and Islamic schools in Indonesia (Hasan 2002). Islam and Politics in Suharto’s Indonesia 41

Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP).29 NU and Muham- madiyah were depoliticised in the 1970s, while allowing those organisations’ religious activities to continue (Caraway 2007: 78). Muslim political forces were also one of a number of targets of the Campus Normalisation Act of 1978 (Nor- malisasi Kehidupan Kampus, NKK), under which all political activity on university campuses was banned. However, the repression of student activism actually served to push some groups of students more towards Islam. Students at the Bandung Institute of Technology (Institut Teknologi Bandung, ITB), for example, made the Salman Mosque the centre of their social and political activities, a focus that exposed them to the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement that positions Islam as the solution to all political, social and personal problems. In the early 1980s, there was a fear of Islamic terrorism, in part the result of the National Intelligence Organisation (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, BAKIN)’s anxiety over the increase in Muslim militancy following the Iranian Revolution (Conboy 2004: 161). A number of violent incidents did indeed take place. A Gar- uda jet was hijacked in 1981, while Chinese Indonesian banks and the Borobudur monument were bombed in 1984. In 1982, Suharto introduced a policy on ethnic, religious, racial and class relations (Suku, Agama, Ras dan Antargolongan, SARA) (Heryanto 1997). This policy began to be implemented with the passing of Law No. 21/1982 on the Duties of the Press, which mandated that it was the duty of all media to strengthen national unity and cohesion by avoiding reports on events related to ethnicity, religion, race or class which might lead to social conﬂict. With Suharto’s subsequent announcement, the term SARA became a tool for the government to use against any political activities that it considered to be a threat to the New Order regime (Heryanto 1997). At the same time that his government was increasingly seeking to control political Islam, Suharto made appeals to personal piety as a means of achieving his national projects. In 1982, the Ministry of Religion was expanded and Islamic centres, schools and mosques began receiving subsidies from the Pancasila Muslim Charity Foundation (Yayasan Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila, YABMP). In the following year, Suharto convinced the MUI to issue a decree to help accelerate the government’s family planning program. Suharto had sought support from Islamic leaders on family planning since the 1970s, and it was for this reason that the two methods of fertility control most opposed by Muslims, abortion and sterilisation, were omitted from the program. At the same time, the support of the MUI was sought on the use of intra-uterine devices, which had been controversial before the decree was issued. Some Islamic leaders were also invited to receive formal training and then asked to actively promote the family planning project (Warwick 1986).

29 Golkar won the 1971 election easily, with 62 % of the vote in Indonesia as a whole (Hindley 1972: 58). For more discussion on this period see for example Reeve (1985) and Suryadinata (1989). 42 2 Islam, Politics and Identity

However, not all Muslims were appeased by the New Order regime’s support for religious activities. The most serious incident in the early 1980s was the Tanjung Priok Massacre of 1984. Thousands of Muslims engaged in protest against the government. Troops fired into the crowd with automatic rifles, killing dozens, perhaps even hundreds (van Bruinessen 1996). Van Bruinessen (1996) argues that the protest in the Tanjung Priok was mainly triggered by protesters’ economic grievances. In the following year, Suharto announced that Pancasila was to be the sole foundation (azas tunggal) for all social and political organisations. As Hosen (2007: 72) has shown, azas tunggal had two different consequences for Muslims: those who rejected it went to jail while those who accepted it, including Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, continued to operate in conjunction with the Suharto government. Opponents of the doctrine feared that accepting Pancasila would compromise their organisational integrity and independence, and turn them into secular organisations (Ramage 1995: 37). Eventually, however, a number of changes to be made that increased state support for Islamic institutions. In 1989, the Islamic education system was accorded formal status as a sub-system of the Indonesian educational system, and religious education was made compulsory in state primary and secondary schools, as well as in universities (see Chap. 5 for more details). In the same year, Islamic courts were integrated into the national justice system (Hosen 2007: 73). In 1990, the Indo- nesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI) was established under the sponsorship of Suharto and headed by B.J. Habibie, then the Minister for Research and Technology. The stated goals of ICMI were to unify Indonesia’s Muslims, to improve their economic status and to ensure Islamic values were reflected in government policy (ICMI 2011; van Bruinessen 1996).30 Among other initiatives, ICMI established the Muslim newspaper Republika as a competitor to the Catholic-owned Kompas and the Protestant-owned Suara Pembaharuan. The publication of Republika was seen as a necessary foil for these other papers because Indonesian newspapers are known to promote the interests of their owners and their allies (Tapsell 2010). ICMI also initiated the establishment of the Islamic Bank Muamalat Indonesia in 1991 to compete with Chinese owned banks (van Bruinessen 1996).

30 Schwarz (1999) argues that the organisation was in fact set up to facilitate Muslim input into public policy. However, van Bruinessen (1996) claims that ICMI was designed to generate Muslim support to balance growing dissent within the armed forces. From 1987 to 1993, Suharto was in conﬂict with the powerful armed forces commander, the chief of the major intelligence services and then the Minister for Defence, the Catholic Benny Moerdani. According to Baswedan (2004), Suharto’s change of heart was not only designed to balance the power of the armed forces, but also to accommodate the increasing strength of Islamic elements within Golkar. At the 1998 national convention, members of ICMI and former members of HMI gained control over the party’s leadership. . Islam and Politics in Suharto’s Indonesia 43

West Sumatra

In an attempt to mend bridges in West Sumatra, on coming to power, the Suharto regime appointed Harun Zain, a Minangkabau born in Jakarta but then a teacher at Andalas University in Padang, as governor of the province in 1967. Harun was eager to show West Sumatrans that they would benefit by working with the New Order, working hard to develop agricultural and communication infrastructure in the province (Kahin 1999). In 1969, as part of the lead-up to the 1971 election, the military officer Saafroedin Bahar was appointed head of the local Golkar branch. He subsequently led the campaign to convince West Sumatra’s people that support for Golkar was crucial for the continuance of regional development (Interview with Saafroedin Bahar, 3 November 2010). In West Sumatra, Golkar ultimately bettered its national average, winning 63 % of the votes in that election (Kahin 1999). Harun also sought to re-establish an understanding of Minangkabau heritage and regional identity that did not emphasise Islam, for example by promoting the use of traditional architecture in official buildings (Kahin 1999). As part of this push, Islamic leaders were sidelined in Harun’s regional development program. Sup- porters of Masyumi, for example, were asked to distance themselves from political Islam in the interests of regional development (Kahin 1999). Azwar Anas, a military officer, replaced Harun Zain as Governor of West Sumatra in 1977. The greatest challenge he faced during his term in office was that of implementing Law No. 5/1979 on Village Governance, which determined the basis on which funding was to be allocated to each province. Although Azwar succeeded in establishing a way of identifying villages (based on the Javanese concept of the desa) that did not disadvantage the province in terms of funding (Kahin 1999: 258), the implementation of this law undermined the status of the nagari, which not only linked rural society to land, inheritance and rice cultivation but also to social and cultural relationships, including those based on kinship and cultural Islam. In an attempt to retain some traditional authority, Azwar established a Village Adat Council (Kerapatan Adat Nagari, KAN) within each desa in 1983 (Kahin 1999: 260). However, local dissatisfaction with the division of nagari into several desa continued to grow. After Hasan Basri Durin was appointed governor in 1987, he overturned Azwar’s policy, regrouping some of the smallest desa in 1988 (Kahin 1999: 261).31 He also encouraged cooperation between traditional rural leaders, Islamic scholars, intellectuals and government officials, establishing the Manunggal Sakato program in 1990. In the following year he established Village Development Discussion Bodies (Musyawarah Pembangunan Nagari, MPN), which were made up of both nagari leaders and government officials. Muchlis Ibrahim replaced Durin as governor in 1997 but he stepped down 2 years later when his recommendation for the position of Deputy Governor was rejected by the central government. Ibrahim had supported Nurmawan, a bureaucrat in the provincial office. However, Syarwan Hamid, the Minister for Internal Affairs, appointed

31 Between 1987 and 1996, the number of desa decreased by 1,000 (Kahin 1999: 261). 44 2 Islam, Politics and Identity

Zainal Bakar, the candidate backed by the regional parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD). The tension between the governor and the DPRD marked the beginning of a new era in West Sumatran local politics, in which Islam once more became a pivotal factor after many years in the wilderness under the New Order.

Islam and Identity Since Suharto

When Suharto was forced to step down from the presidency in 1998, his close ally, B.J. Habibie, was appointed as the new President. Following the fall of Suharto, Indonesia’s political system underwent dramatic change through a series of institutional reforms, which saw the reintroduction of an open system of electoral democracy. In the process, Islamic parties re-emerged as a force in the new multi- party system. Islamic nationalist parties established during this period included the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), led by Abdurahman Wahid, the head of NU and a long-time campaigner for democracy, and the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), led by Amien Rais, an academic, democracy campaigner and then leader of Muhammadiyah. Other Isla- mic parties were the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), the party established in 1973, the Crescent and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB), the successor to Masyumi, led by Yuzril Mahendra, an academic and prominent Muslim political figure from Bangka Belitung, who served as Suharto’s speech writer in his final term, and the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK) that emerged from the university students’ association, the Body for Islamic Propagation on Campus (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK) in the early 1980s, inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin) movement in Egypt.32 Despite the failure of Islamic parties to gain a majority in any of the post-1998 elections, they have played an important role in national politics since the fall of Suharto. In 1999, the Central Axis (Poros Tengah) coalition of Islamic parties delivered the presidency to Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) rather than to Megawati, the leader of the winning party in the 1999 election, the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Perjuangan Indonesia, PDIP). Representatives of various Islamic parties have also taken key roles in government. Yusril Mahendra, the head of the PBB, was a minister in various departments from 2000 to 2007, while Hamzah Haz was Vice President in the Megawati administration from 2001 to 2004. Hidayat Nurwahid, the president of the PKS, served as leader of Indonesia’s highest legislative body, the People’s Consultative Assembly, between 2004 and 2009. The PKS, which has played an influential role in the Islamicisation of political discourse, has alternated between appealing to an Islamic agenda and emphasising issues of general concern such as corruption, law

32 The Justice Party changed its name to the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) in 2002 after failing to reach the electoral threshold of 2 % in the 1999 election. Islam and Identity Since Suharto 45 enforcement and social welfare.33 During this time, a number of Islamic laws were also passed at the national level, including laws on Zakat Management (1999 and 2011), Islamic banking (2008), charitable land (wakaf) (2004), pornography (2008) and the Hajj (2008). In the process of constitutional reform from 1999 to 2002, the PPP and the PBB lobbied for the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter. However, this move was strongly opposed by other Islamic parties, especially PAN and PKB.34 A second key development in the post-Suharto period was the introduction of decentralisation. In 2001, after more than three decades under a centralised national government, political power was devolved under Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy to around 400 district authorities in all but five areas, namely national defence and security, the judicial system, fiscal and monetary policy, foreign and religious affairs.35 Decentralisation and democratisation have proven to be a powerful mix, as members of local parliaments and heads of local executives have been directly elected since 1999 and 2004 respectively. This dramatic shift in the architecture of Indonesia’s political system has fundamentally changed the relationship between politicians and officials and voters. Since that time, local governments have passed regulations on everything from labour relations to taxation. An unintended consequence of the decentralisation of regulatory authority has been the passing of more than 160 religious regulations at the district level. West Sumatran local parliaments have been responsible for more of these laws than local parliaments in any other province, (Crouch 2009: 54, 58), although laws passed by the West Javanese province of Banten have been the most controversial.36 In addition, a number of other mechanisms, including Gubernatorial Letters (Surat Gubernur), Gubernatorial Instructions (Instruksi Gubernur), Mayoral Instructions (Instruksi Walikota), Circulars (Surat Edaran) and Appeals (Himbauan) have been used to enforce aspects of Islamic practice. As demonstrated in the chapters that follow, Islamic practices are also promoted through public discourse by way of seminars, conferences, and the regional media—but also through the actions of radical organisations such as Lasykar Jihad, the Islamic Defenders’ Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI), which have particularly targeted ‘un-Islamic’ forms of behaviour, for example, by engaging in raids on entertainment venues.37

33 Scholars have written extensively on the PKS. See, for example, Fealy (2010), and Tomsa (2011). 34 Hosen (2007) argues that this was the case because Muslims have generally been more concerned more with maintaining the right to practise Islam freely, than with the establishment of formal Islamic laws through which the state enforces religious practice. 35 For more discussion on Regional Autonomy, see, for example, Aspinall and Fealy (2003), Hadiz (2010) and Sakai (2002). 36 A report from Human Rights Watch in 2010 suggests that more than 200 regional Islamic regulations had been implemented throughout the country. 37 The most radical of these organisations is the Jamaah Islamiyah, which was the main group behind the bombing of Western-linked targets like the Sari Club in Bali in 2002 (Jones 2005). Some observers assert that there has not been a strong enough response from the government to 46 2 Islam, Politics and Identity

Such has been the controversy over local governments’ enthusiasm for Islamic regulation that in 2004 the central government passed Law No. 10/2004 on Law- making in an attempt to prevent the practice, declaring that religious affairs remained the responsibility of the central government (Crouch 2009: 56). However, local Islamic regulations continue to be promoted and enforced. In West Sumatra, the most recent of these was Regulation No. 2/2010 on the Implementation of Zakat, which was passed in April of that year.

Conclusion: The Assertion of Islamic Identity in West Sumatra

The chapter has demonstrated the interplay between transnational and local factors from the advent of Islam in the Malay world to the post-Suharto era. The chapter has identified the key phases in West Sumatra’s history and positioned them in the broader history of the archipelago and the Malay world. It has also demonstrated that the relationship between Islam and Minangkabau culture was simultaneously accommodating and contested, and that the strong association between Islam and regional identity only solidified in the post-Suharto era. The chapter has demonstrated how the Minangkabaus’ matrilineal culture has been shaped by successive waves of foreign influence, including Hindu-Buddhism as well as Islam. As has been shown here, the Minangkabaus’ connection with the Malay world increased the acceptance of Syaria-centric understandings of Islam, first introduced by reformist Muslims coming back from Mecca in the 17th century. Gradually, Syaria-oriented Islam, and later Wahabism, largely replaced the Sufi form first adopted, which was more accommodating of local beliefs. However, as also shown here, Islam as an ideology was subordinated after Independence days, and again under the New Order, this time to a largely secular formulation of national identity. Indeed, it has only been in the post-Suharto period that Islam has assumed a hegemonic position in Minangkabau identity discourse. In contemporary West Sumatra, regional governments has been utilising claims that local customs are

(Footnote 37 continued) acts of this kind because of links between the military and the militant groups and a failure of law enforcement (van Bruinessen 2002; Azra 2006). Lieutenant-General Prabowo Subianto has been said to be associated with the Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Muslim World (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam, KISDI) and the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII), both of which strongly support militant Islamic groups (Rabaza 2010: 26). As reported by Wikileaks, the FPI was also initially funded by the former head of the Indonesian Police Department, Retired General Sutanto, now the head of the Indonesian Intelligence Agency (Badan Koordinasi Inteligen Nasional, BAKIN). There are many studies on Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. See, for example, van Bruinessen (2002), Rabasa (2003), Eliraz (2004), Lim (2005) and Hadiz (2008). Conclusion: The Assertion of Islamic Identity in West Sumatra 47 based on Islam and Islam is based on the Qur’an (Adat Basandi Syarak, Syarak Basandi Kitabullah, ABS-SBK). This assertion is ubiquitous, appearing as justiﬁ- cation for almost every political decision made at the provincial level and below. Moreover, every disaster, from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis to natural disasters such as ﬂoods, landslides and earthquakes, has been attributed to the community’s failure to meet its religious obligations. For example, after the 2004 tsunami, large billboards were displayed throughout the city of Padang proclaiming ‘religiosity must be practised in order to prevent a tsunami’. Important as they have been, however, it is not simply the twin processes of democratisation and decentralisation in the Post-Suharto that have given rise to the Islamicisation of social policy in contemporary West Sumatra. As the chapters that follow show, Islamic regionalism has drawn on two additional and related processes, both of which have transnational elements. First, the failure of the central government to support economic development in this resource-poor province has prompted regional leaders to seek out alternative models and sources of capital for development, many of them drawn from elsewhere in the Islamic world. Second, in a continuation of the process chronicled in this chapter, engagement with the global umma has encouraged a quite dramatic shift in local understandings of what it means to be a Muslim and therefore, in the current political context, a Minangkabau.

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Abstract This chapter demonstrates how the Islamic financial system has been shaped by, and come to reflect, broader socio-cultural, political and economic developments such as the 1997 economic crisis in Indonesia and increases in oil welfare from Middle Eastern countries. The chapter argues that a complex system of socio-economic pressures and financial systems at the regional, national and transnational levels has enabled the regional governments to engage in Islamic financial system. The chapter suggests that the involvement was driven by the capacity to distribute resources to large sections of the population through small business groups provided a useful mechanism for shoring up electoral support. It also argues that the presence of a robust Islamic banking system was vital to the regional government’s attempts to source additional financial resources from the Islamic world that could be used to fund local development.

Keywords Islamic ﬁnance Á Local politics Á Socio-economic developments

With more than 500 Islamic financial institutions in 75 countries, Islamic finance has increased in significance and availability as a result of growing markets in regional and transnational Islamic communities. Total assets within the Islamic financial system worldwide are US$1 trillion, or an estimated 4 % of the global economy in 2008 (ABC Online 20 November 2008), up from US$700 million in 2007 (Banker 2007). Furthermore, with an annual growth rate of 10 %, the system is expanding at a higher rate than conventional banking (Karim et al. 2008). Of the market for Islamic financial products, 36 % is in the Middle East countries, and 35 % is in Asia and Africa (Banker 2007). Within Indonesia, Islamic finance has become institutionalised since the late New Order, with the establishment of Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI) in 1991, the formalisation of dual banking systems in 1998 and the subsequent promulgation of an Islamic Banking Law in 2008. While once marginal in the country, Islamic finance is now an important part of national and regional strategies to promote economic development and to mitigate the impact of fluctuations in global markets. Along with conventional systems, Indonesia has attempted to develop a model of

Islamic financial systems that has come to be linked to development projects and social and economic reform. Previous studies have generally viewed Islamic finance as a product of symbolic interaction with the West and have therefore regarded the establishment of Islamic financial institutions as a display of Islamic identity (Kuran 1997). Studies of Islamic finance in Indonesia have also suggested that the development of Islamic finance mechanisms has been fuelled by criticisms of Western conventional banking after the 1997 economic crisis (Lubis 2004) and the success of Islamic finance in other Islamic countries (Saeed 1999; Lubis 2004). Critics have shown, however, that Islamic finance is highly pragmatic (Saeed 2004), and shares a high degree of similarity with conventional banking (Kuran 1995). This chapter situates the spread of Islamic finance in West Sumatra in the context of the 1997 economic crisis in Indonesia and increases in oil welfare from Middle Eastern countries, demonstrating how the Islamic financial system has been shaped by, and come to reflect, broader socio-cultural, political and economic developments. Drawing on the market relational approach, it examines the interplay between the local socio-political and economic realms and transnational Islam, emphasising the highly spatialised character of the Islamic financial system. The structure of the chapter is as follows. After describing Islamic finance in terms of its ethical criteria, institutions and products, I outline the market relations created by the successful development of Islamic finance in Islamic countries before examining the motivation and aspirations of government officials and users for Islamic finance in Indonesia and West Sumatra. The chapter argues that the political motives of regional governments in endorsing Islamic financial systems were a response to a complex system of socio- economic pressures and financial systems at the regional, national and transnational levels. In short, the decision of local governments in West Sumatra to engage in the promotion of Islamic finance and the development of Islamic financial institutions was driven by both inward and outward looking considerations. In terms of the former, the capacity to distribute resources to large sections of the population through small business groups provided a useful mechanism for shoring up electoral support. In terms of the latter, the presence of a robust Islamic banking system was vital to the regional government’s attempts to source additional financial resources from the Islamic world that could be used to fund local development.

The Religious and Social Meanings of Islamic Finance

Everyday language sometimes depicts Islamic finance as a subject: ‘Islamic finance does, or must do, this or that’. Sometimes it treats Islamic finance as an object, in the form of a particular product or economic group bent on pursuing particular projects or interests. Indeed, Islamic finance changes shape and appearance with the activities being described, the scale on which it operates, the political economic forces acting upon it, and the circumstances in which it operates. The Religious and Social Meanings of Islamic Finance 55

This is in part because the definition of Islamic finance is very broad. As described by Lewis and Hassan (2007a: 2), Islamic finance is an economic system that seeks to promote:

Economic well being with full employment and a high rate of economic growth, socio economic justice and an equitable distribution of income and wealth, stability in the value of money, and the mobilization and investment of savings for economic development in such as a way that a just (profit sharing) return is ensured to all parties involved … and the opportunity to conduct religiously legitimate financial operations. As this definition suggests, Islamic finance can be defined in terms of Islamic ethics and rules as they pertain to economic activities (Roy 1991; Kuran 1995; Billah 1998;Rice1999; Hakim 2007). As Islam originated in the commercial city of Mecca, it is not surprising that economic activity is an important subject within Islamic ethics (Venardos 2006: 40). There are 20 invocations of riba (interest, sometimes translated as usury), in the Qur’an. Among these, five verses in particular stand out1:

Those that live on interest will not rise (on Doomsday) but like a man possessed of the devil and demented. This because they say that trading is like usury. But trade has been sanc- tioned and usury forbidden by God. Those who are warned by their Lord and desist will keep (what they have taken of interest) already, and the matter will rest with God. But those who revert to it again are the residents of Hell where they will abide for ever (Q 2: 275).

God takes away (gain) from usury, but adds (proﬁt) to charity; and God does not love the ungrateful and sinners (Q 2: 276).

O Believers, fear God and forego the interest that is owing, if you really believe (Q 2: 278).

O you who believe, do not practice usury, charging doubled and redoubled (interest); but have fear of God: you may well attain your goal (Q 3: 130).

What you give on interest to increase (your capital) through others’ wealth, does not find increase with God; yet what you give (in alms and charity) with a pure heart, seeking the way of God, will be doubled (Q 30: 39). Despite the variety of interpretations on riba in the Qur’an, there is consensus among scholars that the Qur’an bans all charging of interest, regardless of its rate and form. Islamic financial products use different mechanisms to attract investors, encouraging participatory finance and banning speculation in order to avoid extreme, and socially disruptive, financial losses. Islamic finance also mandates that financial decisions are guided by a set of behavioural norms defined in scripture (Kuran 1986; Hakim 2007) such as productivity and distributional equity (Choudhury 1983), mutual co-operation (Gamal 2007), solidarity, ‘brotherhood’ in sharing profits (Billah 1998) and the obligation of alms giving, or zakat (Kuran 1986; Philipp 1990).

1 All quotations from the Qur’an are taken from the Ahmed Ali translation: Al-Qur’an: A Con- temporary Translation (1984). 56 3 Islamic Finance

Speculation and the funding of destructive activities are prohibited, along with avoidance of waste, extravagance, and ostentation (Saeed 2004). As this suggests, the theoretical lineage of the Islamic economic system is anal- ogous to what has come to be known in recent decades in the West as ‘ethical investment’ (Wilson 1997). Wilson shows us that the ethical funds that have been established in Europe develop both positive and negative ethical criteria. In response to the demands of particular types of customers, Western ethical ﬁnance prioritises green ﬁnance and industries that are not involved in activities such as arms production. Companies may be rewarded by ethical investors for characteristics such as product quality, safety, as well as involvement in environmental projects, sustainable forestation and energy savings, or be punished for activities such as the promotion of gambling or pornography, or tobacco or alcohol production.

Modern Islamic Banking

Scholars differ in their identification of the beginnings of modern Islamic banking. Lewis and Algaoud (2001) argue that the first Islamic banks were established in Malaya in 1940s. The concept re-emerged in the 1950s in Pakistan, when a group of landlords made deposits without interest to help poorer landowners in sustaining agricultural production. Ariff (1988), Iqbal and Mirakhor (1999), Akacem and Gillian (2002) and Storm et al. (2007) argue that Islamic finance started with the establishment of a shared bank in Egypt in 1963 called the Mit Ghamr Local Savings bank, while Salem (2008) identifies 1975 as the year of the emergence of Islamic finance with the establishment of the Faisal Bank in Egypt, which started offering Islamic financial services. According to Ariff (1988: 48), these early Islamic banks functioned as ‘saving investment institutions rather than as commercial banks’. By the end of the 1970s, around ten Islamic banks had been established, including the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in Saudi Arabia (1975), the Dubai Islamic Bank (1975), the Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan (1977) and the Bahrain Islamic Bank (1979).2 A similar number of banks were established in the 1980s, including banks such as the Abu Dhabi Islamic bank (1980), the Qatar Islamic Bank (1981) and the Malaysia Islamic Bank Ltd (1983). Since that time, Islamic finance has been a key site of economic power relations in the Islamic world. Islamic banking soon began appearing in other parts of the Islamic world, underwritten by the IDB. Islamic financial institutions have successfully entered international markets in countries like Pakistan, Turkey, Morocco, Bangladesh, Jordan, Malay- sia, Bahrain and Indonesia (Wilson 1997; Salem 2008), tapping into growing local demand (Bahar 2005, cited in Salem 2008).

2 Apart from the Islamic Development Bank, which is owned mostly by the Gulf countries, Verdasco (2006: 63) shows that there is no bank with a name that incorporates the word ‘Islam’ or ‘Islamic’ in Saudi Arabia and only one bank, established in 1987, operating on Islamic principles there. The Religious and Social Meanings of Islamic Finance 57

Islamic financial institutions reached the Western world and minority Muslim countries after the establishment of Islamic Saving and Loan in India in the 1970s and the Islamic Finance House in Luxemburg in 1978 (Ariff 1988). Beyond the Muslim world, currently Islamic financial services have become available in India, China, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, Luxemburg, the United Kingdom, the United States, New Zealand, Australia and Canada.3 In addition, two large international banks have established Islamic units in their banks: the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC)’s Amanah and the Union de Bangues Suisses (UBS)’s Noriba (Lewis and Hassan 2007b). As Islamic banking gained momentum, conferences and centres were created to further develop the concept and the application of Islamic finance. So far, there have been six international conferences on Islamic economics: Saudi Arabia 1976, Pakistan 1983, Malaysia 1992, the United Kingdom 2000, Bahrain, 2003 and Malaysia 2008. The more recent Malaysian conference was held in collaboration with Monash University in Australia. In addition to the IDB, international Islamic financial institutions now include the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM), International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA), International Islamic Centre for Reconciliation and Commercial Arbitration and General Council of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (GCIBFI) (Iqbal 2007). Several academic centres have been established in non-Islamic countries, including those at Harvard and Oxford universities (Lubis 2004). There is on-going debate about the reasons for this contemporary development of Islamic finance. Some claim that this trend developed in response to the oil crises of the 1950s and 1970s, when oil rich states such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait emerged as major international financial powers (Saeed 1999: 315). Philipp (1990) argues that the Islamic financial system emerged as a result of the establishment of the Islamic state of Pakistan and the attempt by Muslims around the world to engage in symbolic interaction with the West, embedded within normative discourses and mirroring networks within the Islamic world that intersect with discourses about Islamic identity and solidarity (see also Kuran 1997). According to Saeed (1999: 315), initiatives to establish a global Islamic financial system emerged after internationally-recognised Islamic leaders such as Hasan Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb and Abu al-A’la Mawdudi attacked the presence of conventional banking in Islamic communities, while Maurer (2005) argues that the movement of Muslim students and professionals to the United States and the United Kingdom in the 1970s and 1980s, coupled with increased oil prices in the Middle East in the same period, led to the emergence of the concept. Oil revenue is, however, widely recognised as a contributing factor (Saeed 1999). For example, Saeed (1999) argues that oil revenue funded Islamic banking institutions such as the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) and that in both Gulf countries and non-oil

3 Wilson (2007: 430) argues that Islamic banks in Britain and United States are still largely supplied by Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. 58 3 Islamic Finance countries, other Islamic banks were supported through the establishment of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1969. There is also significant debate about whether the principles and institutions of Islamic finance can be accommodated within global financial systems (Roy 1991). According to Lewis and Hassan (2007b), Islamic financial institutions are now at a ‘crossroads’ in dealing with conventional banking that offer Islamic products while maintaining a unique Islamic system. In addition, as Storm et al. (2007) argue, the system faces internal conflicts between purists, who reject the engagement of Islamic banking in conventional banking activities, and pragmatists, who support such involvement. As Timber (2006) notes, conventional systems have tried to create room for Islamic financial products by making minimal changes to their procedures. In some cases, this has led to the development of dual bank systems in which a conventional bank has an Islamic unit offering products of the Islamic banking system. In some countries, including Malaysia and Indonesia, Islamic and conventional systems operate side by side. Many countries favour a system in which Islamic finance has its own institutional structures and products (Chapra 2000). These various arrangements suggest that the two systems can co-exist quite comfortably. However, other scholars claim that the relationship on the two financial systems is fragile. For example, Kuran (2004) argues that Islamic finance can be a threat to the global economy, since Iran, Sudan and Pakistan have transformed all conventional banks in these countries to Islamic banks (Saeed 1999; Yousef and Aggarwal 2000; Lewis and Algaoud 2001; Karim et al. 2008).

Islamic Financial Institutions and Products

Modern financial products and institutions developed to accommodate the principles of Islamic finance differ significantly from those available in the conventional financial systems (Gamal 2000). Financial institutions such as Islamic commercial banks, rural banks, units in conventional banking, cooperatives and charitable institutions (Akacem and Gillian 2002; Strom et al. 2007; Salem 2008) operate on the principle of loss and profit sharing or shared risk and shared reward, and the eschew interest (riba) in favour of a partnership between the institution and depositors and borrowers (Weiss 1989). Discussions of Islamic finance often refer to a suite of allowable and disallowable financial products (Lock 1987; Philipp 1990; Roy 1991; Kuran 1986, 1997; Wilson 1997; Yousef and Aggarwal 2000; Venardos 2006). Allowable products include saving without interest, short term investments, fixed returns, and equity agreements between owners of capital and entrepreneurs based on loss and profit sharing. Disallowable products include investment in conventional bank savings and investment deposits, the purchase of interest yielding bonds, acquisi- tion of shares in companies involved in dealings with forbidden products (such as alcohol and pork), along with speculation and excessive profit (Choudhury 1983). The Religious and Social Meanings of Islamic Finance 59

Ahmad (2000) and Venardos (2006) argue that these structures and products promote an equity-based or stake-taking economy over one based on debt. The Islamic terms for financial products related to financing, leasing, lending and supporting products are as follows. Musharakah is a partnership between the bank and its customers in which both parties provide capital towards the financing of the business. Any profits are shared in pre-agreed proportions and any losses are shared in the proportion of capital advanced. This method is commonly used in project financing and to fund small business and long-term trade finance. By contrast, mudharaba is a form of trust financing where the bank contributes all of the capital required for an enterprise and the customer is responsible for the day-to-day running and management of that enterprise. The customer receives an agreed percentage of the profits as a management fee and the bank receives the balance (McMillen 2007; Saadalah 2007). According to Wilson (1997), contemporary Islamic banks have tended to eschew musharakah, focusing instead on short term murabahah financing, a form of cost-plus trade financing where the bank buys a commodity or an asset based on the customer’s needs from a third party supplier and resells the commodity or asset to the customer either for immediate or deferred payment. Another form of trade finance commonly used for the purchase of agricultural products is Istisna where the bank makes an agreement with the supplier for the manufacture and delivery of goods at a future date to the customer in which the purchase price is specified and can be paid in instalments or deferred until the product is delivered. Where goods are perishable another form of deferred delivery called Bei Salam is used, in which the bank makes an advance payment to its customer for delivery of a commodity to be traded or exchanged in measurable quantities and paid in full at a future date. Other Islamic financial products are designed to accommodate the day-to-day financial needs of business, for example, ijarah, a leasing agreement where the bank buys an asset based on the customer’s specifications and leases it to the customer or wadiah. Under this arrangement the bank uses the deposited item for trading or other purposes and is liable for any damage or loss but some portion of the profit may be given to the customer and the customer can withdraw the goods from the bank at any time. Qard hasan is a form of loan which is returned at the end of an agreed period with consideration given to the sharing of any profit or loss made by the business during the term of the loan. Wakalah is a form of authori- sation on the part of the customer given to the bank so that it can conduct business on the customer’s behalf. Havalah is a form of an agreement by the bank to take over some of a customer’s possessions for a fee which is paid back when the possessions are returned. Finally, sukuk involves the selling of Islamic bonds by the bank to an investor group that then rents the bonds back to the bank for a prede- termined rental fee. The bank also makes a contractual promise to buy back the 60 3 Islamic Finance bonds at a future date at par value (Mirakhor and Zaidi 2007; Hakim 2007; Saadalah 2007; McMillen 2007; Sidani 2007).4 In recent years, Islamic insurance (takaful), the dinar monetary standard and microfinance products have also emerged as popular features of Islamic finance. Islamic insurance defines a pack of loss and damage that may befall a customer and the insurance companies ‘pay for a defined loss out of a defined fund’ (Venardos 2006: 81). A dinar or gold monetary standard has been suggested as a replacement for current forms of monetary standard in order to avoid major inflation or devaluation of currencies, while Islamic microfinance refers to the collection of small savings and the provision of small loans in line with Islamic financial criteria (Seibel 2008).

Assessments of Modern Islamic Banking

Some scholars have compared the Islamic financial system favourably with the conventional system. For example, Verhoeven et al. (2005), conclude that, despite higher interest rate risks, Islamic financing has significantly lower credit and liquidity risks than commercial banks because Islamic banks deal with debt generated on a profit sharing basis with the customers, rather than within the global debt economy. In fact, as Wilson (1997) argues, Islamic markets have attracted not only Islamic countries, but also non-Islamic investors and are able to construct Islamic investment products with active stock markets. These processes have encouraged investors to follow Islamic financial systems while at the same time fundamentally dividing the globe into dual markets and thereby creating a complex inter-market system within the existing market. By contrast, critics of the Islamic financial system focus on its impracticality, particularly with regard to interest-free products that offer no additional return at all (Kuran 1995; Storm et al. 2007; Lewis and Hassan 2007a; Khan 2007). These scholars point to the fact that the provisions of Islamic finance are still vague, as institutions claim that no interest is charged while imposing fees. Saeed (2004: 115) shows that there is risk in Islamic finance since the shared profit cannot be pre- determined. Moreover, he demonstrates that interest is applied in different forms, such as when compensating customers who are late in paying their instalments, or by placing funds in a conventional bank and rewarding depositors (Saeed 2004: 118–120). Kuran (1995) argues that, despite these shortcomings, Islamic financial mechanisms have succeeded in delivering services to groups with special needs, since religious values are an important factor for some customers when engaging in

4 Sukuk practices in Islamic communities that follow the Shafi’i school, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, are criticised on the basis that most sukuks have been turned into capital-protected and fixed-return bonds. While this is acceptable according to Shafi’i view, it is not considered to be so in the Maliki and Hambali views, which are the majority views in the Middle East countries (Rosly and Sanus 1999). The Religious and Social Meanings of Islamic Finance 61

financial activities. As Kuran also emphasises, for some, the networks created through participatory financing in Islamic systems, where the bank and the customers work together, constitute a reason to support Islamic finance. Ultimately, as the arguments of both proponents and critics suggest, it is clear that the emergence of Islamic financial institutions does not depend solely on the nature of Islamic finance itself. Islamic finance does not exist in isolation, but rather is embedded in a wider political economic system, articulated with other financial institutional orders and linked to different forms of economy. A key aspect of this development is the relationship between an Islamic financial institution and its environment, its effectiveness, the extent to which it seeks greater innovation or promotes new products, and how much those products become embedded within the economic order. At the same time, global economic processes are influenced by the development of Islamic finance. While there are significant differences between Islamic and conventional financial systems, they are in fact interdependent. This cross-fertil- isation is seen to be strategically beneficial for the global economy for three reasons. First, although the Islamic financial system has its own distinctive institutions and products, which underpin its new emerging markets in the Islamic world, Islamic finance can share profits in existing conventional markets through products such as sukuks. Second, Islamic financial institutions have a specific and differential impact on the ability of various economic forces to pursue particular economic interests and strategies in Islamic communities and states. This, in turn, increases potential economic activity in Islamic world. Third, the nature and capacities of Islamic finance—and hence the nature and impact of economic power—depend on the structural relations between countries in the Islamic world, and the strategic ties among politicians and state officials that link Islamic finance to the broader goals of economic development.

Islamic Finance in Indonesia

The principles of Islamic financial systems can be found in traditional Indonesian financial practices. Venardos (2006: 165) argues that the traditional financial practice, ijon—an interest-free loan used by farmers in rural areas based on a share of crops—has been practised for centuries in Indonesia. Another traditional practice with Islamic principles, according to Venardos, is arisan, saving circles where each member regularly contributes a certain sum and, in turn, obtains an interest-free loan from the pool by drawing lots. (The Islamic credentials of ijon and arisan are questionable, however, as the practices have been found in non-Islamic communities as well.) Other scholars have claimed that the first Islamic financial institution emerged along with the establishment of the Islamic Traders’ Association (Sarekat Dagang Islam, SDI) in 1911 as part of an attempt to compete with ethnic Chinese traders (Lubis 2004). Much more recently, Islamic cooperatives, such as the Teknosa Cooperative in Bandung and the Ridho Gusti Cooperative in Jakarta, were 62 3 Islamic Finance established in the 1980s (Hefner 1996)5 while another Islamic organisation, Nah- dlatul Ulama, established a joint venture with the owner of the Bank Summa in 1990 to trial products that conformed to Islamic law (Saeed 1999).6 Indonesia formally established its Islamic banking system rather later than some other South East Asian countries, notably the Philippines, with its Philippine Amanah Bank, established in 1973 (Ariff 1988), and Malaysia, with Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, which opened in 1983 (Billah 2007).7 Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI), the first private Islamic bank in Indonesia, began operating in 1992, endorsed by the Indonesian Council of Ulamas (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI) and the New Order government, with initial capital raised personally by President Suharto, his foundation, Yayasan Amal Bhakti Muslim Pan- casila and a number of wealthy entrepreneurs (Hefner 1996). This flurry of activity represented a significant shift from his position in the 1980s, when he refused a request to allow the establishment of Islamic banking in Indonesia (Hefner 1996; Lubis 2004). The legal mechanism underpinning the change was Law No. 7/1992 on Banking, which allowed Islamic banking operations, supplemented by Government Decree No. 72/1992 on the Banking Act, which allowed the Banks to apply share base principles and included provisions that provided the opportunity to develop interest- free banks. Several years later, the passing of Law No. 10/1998 on the Banking Act, permitted the establishment of dual system banks, whereby a conventional banks could open Islamic banking units without necessarily becoming wholly Islamic. Under the 1998 Banking Act, an Islamic bank is described as a commercial bank without interest, contractual ambiguity, speculation or other functions prohibited by Islam (Juoro 2008). One year later, the Reserve Bank of Indonesia was given the power to conduct monetary control of Islamic financial activities through the amendment of Law No. 23/1999 on the Reserve Bank of Indonesia. A Syari’a Bureau was subsequently established in the Reserve Bank. Since that time, two new Islamic banks have been established, namely the state- owned Bank Syariah Mandiri in 1999 and the private Bank Syariah Mega Mandiri in 2004. By 2004, BMI had total assets of IDR5.2 trillion, which in 2008 had reached IDR13 trillion. In addition, as of early 2009 there were 133 Islamic rural banks throughout the country (BI, Islamic Banking Statistics February 2009). The assets of these rural banks were equivalent to 4 % of conventional rural banks in 2007 (Juoro 2008). This growth of interest in Islamic finance has also prompted more conventional banks to open Islamic business units. The first conventional bank to do establish a Syari’a unit was the Bank of Indonesia Finance and

5 Antonio (2008) claims that the first Islamic microfinance initiative, BMT, was established in 1992. 6 Before this, Nadhlatul Ulama had established three conventional banks in the 1950s and 1960s (Lubis 2004: 107). 7 This was so at least in part because some military officials and liberal technocrats feared that Islamic finance would split the country along ethnic lines (Hefner 1996). Islamic Finance in Indonesia 63

Investment Company (IFI) in 1999,8 followed by the Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI) and Bank Jabar in 2000 (BI 2003). In September 2008, there were 28 conventional banks—including HSBC—operating Islamic units in Indonesia (BI 2009). In total, Islamic financial institutions employ around 12,000 workers in 581 Islamic banking offices, 241 Islamic business units and 202 Islamic rural banks throughout the country (BI 2009). The endorsement of Islamic finance again strengthened during the 2008 global financial crisis, when bond sales of Indonesian conventional banks decreased dramatically and Islamic bonds reached a total value of IDR5.56 trillion (BI Banking Statistics March 2009) or US$650 million in assets (Jakarta Post 17 April 2009). The release of the bonds, which were not included in the initial draft of the 2008 banking law, was an initiative of the Reserve Bank, introduced in early 2009. In 2011, there were eleven Islamic banks, twenty-three Islamic units in conventional banks and one hundred and fifty four Islamic rural banks in Indonesia (BI Islamic Banking Statistics October 2011). Despite this dramatic increase in assets, however, Islamic banking still plays minor role in the Indonesian economy. Some predicted that the assets of Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia would be 5 % of national economic activities in 2008; however, figures from the Indonesian Central Bank at that time showed that total assets were just over 2 % of Indonesian total activity (BI Islamic Banking Statistics January 2009). In 2011, the assets of Islamic financial institutions accounted for less than 4 % of national economic activity (BI Islamic Banking Statistics October 2011).

Hiccups in the System

There have been a number of hiccups in the formalisation of Islamic financial systems in Indonesia. Although the 1998 law classified Islamic banks and Islamic units in conventional banks as part of the Islamic banking industry, it ignored the existence of Islamic rural banks and cooperatives. Another major issue arose in 2004, when MUI issued a decree prohibiting interest. There was concern that the decree, which urged Muslims to use Islamic banks, would prompt a rush on conventional banks in Indonesia (Ika and Widgado 2008). Other critics observed that the decree created a conflict of interest, since the members of MUI are also members of a board of commissioners in Islamic banks. Although a rush on conventional banks did not eventuate, the assets of the Islamic banks doubled within a year of the decree. In response to the 65 % growth in the assets of Islamic banking between 2003 and 2005, the law on Islamic banking was again amended in 2008 to cover more kinds of Islamic financial activities in the country. Under Law No. 21/2008 on

8 The bank was liquidated by the government in 2009 because its capital ratio was below 8 % and its non-performing loans had reached 24 %. 64 3 Islamic Finance

Islamic Banking, Islamic rural banks were included as part of the Islamic banking industry. However, the law did not include other types of Islamic finance, such as Baitul Mal waTanwil (BMT) and Islamic insurance (takaful). BMTs are organisations established by individuals or groups (Juoro 2008; Sakai 2008) or sponsored by regional governments to provide micro-finance as a strategy to reduce poverty, especially in villages and traditional markets.9 During and after the 1997 economic crisis, this type of Islamic financial mechanism played an important role in Indo- nesia’s economic recovery (Lubis 2004). Their omission from the law has meant that around 3,200 BMTs and 38 Takaful in Indonesia are not supervised by Bank Indonesia (Sakai 2008: 267). Instead, BMTs are regulated under the Cooperatives Law managed by the Ministry of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises while Takaful are regulated by the Ministry of Finance. This is problematic since, as Seibel (2008) argues, the lack of supervision from the Bank of Indonesia means that BMT customers risk losing their savings, if BMTs fail to continue their operations. In addition, BMTs are free to charge customers a fee higher than the interest rates charged by conventional banks (Sakai 2008). Seibel (2008) asserts that in order to avoid such problems, the collection of small amounts of savings and the provision of small loans currently associated with Islamic microfinance in Indonesia should be developed into products that can be offered by Islamic banks, Islamic units in commercial banks or Islamic rural banks. In the lead up to the passing of the 2008 law, there was considerable debate about the implications of the law for the dual judicial system in the country. The draft law had allowed disputes in the Islamic financial system to be handled by the general courts, a provision that Muslim judges disputed, arguing that they should be solved in Islamic courts as suggested by Law No. 3/2006, an amendment of Law No. 7/1989 on Islamic courts, or Peradilan Agama. The debate was resolved by omitting the provision in the Islamic banking law that allowed general courts to deal with Islamic financial disputes (2008 Islamic Banking Act No. 21 Chap. 55 Para- graph 1). The new law also paved the way for the creation of an Islamic banking committee consisting of members of the Reserve Bank, the Department of Reli- gious Affairs and MUI to cement the Reserve Bank’s role within the system. Before that time, Islamic banking activities in Indonesia were supervised by a committee called the National Syari’a Council, which was created by MUI in 2000 with funding from the Ministry of Finance, the Reserve Bank and the community. The 2008 law also gave MUI a formal role in recommending candidates for the selection of members of the Syari’a Supervisory Board in each Islamic bank or conventional bank with Islamic units.

9 BMI offered takaful early on, inspired by the success of the insurance arm of Malaysian Islamic Banking. The Malaysian company Syarikat Takaful Malaysia, Bhd is a major shareholder in one of Indonesia’s major takaful companies, PT Syarikat Takaful Indonesia (Annual Report Takaful Indonesia 2005). Sakai (2008) argues that the creation of BMTs was a result of BMI’s inability to deal with ﬁnancially disadvantaged Muslims. Islamic Finance in Indonesia 65

Islamic Banking Products Offered in Indonesia

The financial products of Islamic banks in Indonesia are largely similar to the products of the banks in other Islamic countries, although some critics say that the Islamic finance products offered in Indonesia and other Asian countries are not Islamic, as a result of different interpretations of Islam between different regions (Islamic Finance News 2009). For example, like conventional banks, Islamic units in conventional banks require collateral (agunan) for loans—a practice not found in their Middle Eastern counterparts. There is variation in the way Indonesian Islamic banks operate, but in general they offer shared returns in the application of profit and loss at an agreed ratio of 50:50 or 60:40 between the bank and the depositor depending on the deposit period chosen (Juoro 2008). The most popular mudharabah deposit in 2008 was the one- month deposit (BI Islamic Banking Statistics January 2009). Whereas in financing sector, Murabahah, where the Islamic banks buys a commodity or an asset at the customer’s request from a third party supplier and then resells the commodity or asset to the user either for immediate or deferred payment accounted for almost 60 % of the total financing in December 2008 (BI Islamic Banking Statistics January 2009). BMI offers products for two types of customers. For creditors, the bank offers savings, investment, giro, term deposits and pension fund arrangements. Ummat Saving, Ummat Junior Saving for students and Haji Arafah savings for people intending to undertake the hajj are interest-free saving products, while Shar-E and Wadiah clearing are offered for profit-sharing investment and giro investment, as well as short and long term deposits in the form of Mudharabah and Fulinves. In this latter service, the bank invests the depositor’s money in a system of profit sharing. The bank also offers a pension fund. For debtors, BMI offers financing facilities such as Murabahah Credit, where the bank buys goods or products required by a customer, such as a vehicle, and the customer pays for the purchase in instalments. Musyarakah financing offers customers the opportunity to enter into a partnership with the bank in a business. Finally BMI offers an Islamic pawn service, where the bank pays cash up to a maximum 90 % of the value of a customer’s collateral such as jewellery or a vehicle, which is returned after the customer repays the fee (Muamalat Bank 2009). Similarly, Bank Syariah Mandiri (BSM), the Islamic banking unit of Bank Mandiri, offers funding and financing facilities to its customers. It offers saving accounts, including a monthly saver account, where a certain amount of the customer’s money is automatically transferred to the account each month. Education financing plans are designated accounts for saving for the current and future costs of education. Haj candidates and pensioners are also offered special accounts. In terms of financing, BSM buys products such as medical equipment, government subsidised housing, and motor vehicles for customers, who pay for the purchase in instalments. Like many Indonesian banks, BSM provides incentives such as a priority service lounge and check-in counter in airports in several Indonesian cities 66 3 Islamic Finance for customers who hold deposits of a minimum of two hundred and fifty million Indonesian rupiah (BSM 2011). A third key player is Bank Negara Indonesia Syariah (BNI Syariah), which, like BSM, is an Islamic banking unit within a major conventional bank. BNI Syariah offers funding in special accounts for individuals, haj candidates, and investors. In terms of financing, BNI Syariah uses collateral arrangements to ensure that its investments are viable, while customers pay the bank in installments. For example, the bank purchases a motor vehicle and uses the purchased vehicle or, alternatively, some other form of fixed asset, income or the balance of the customer’s account, as collateral (BNI 2011). BMI, BSM and BNI Syariah differ in some of the products they offer but also in the operational fees they charge on the general accounts for individuals and other general fees. As of January 2012, BMI was charging its customers a monthly fee of IDR7,500; BSM charged IDR5,000 and BNI Syariah charged IDR11,000. While BMI does not charge its customers for cancelling their accounts, BSM charges IDR20,000 and BNI Syariah charges IDR10,000 (BSM 2011). Islamic banks’ administrative charges are lower than those of conventional banks. For example, Bank Mandiri charges their conventional customers IDR4,000 more per month in administration fees and IDR30,000 more in cancellation fees than BSM (BM 2011). However, the difference in charges between Islamic banks shows the flexibility that they have in determining what constitutes an Islamic bank in everyday financial activities. Other Islamic units in conventional banks such the Syariah Business Unit of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBC Amanah) offer Islamic bonds (sukuk). Sukuks originate with the Reserve Bank of Indonesia (BI) only. From 2004 to 2008, the Bank of Indonesia sold Islamic bonds (Sertifikat Wadiah Bank Indonesia, SWBI) with a nominal unit of IDR1,000,000. However, these bonds did not attract Islamic bankers since the return on them was far lower than conventional bonds (Sertifikat Bank Indonesia, SBI). In 2008, the Bank of Indonesia released a new form of Islamic bonds (Sertifikat Bank Indonesia Syariah, SBIS). SBIS could not be sold on the secondary market, and required Islamic banks to have a minimum Financing to Deposit Ratio (FDR) of 80 % before they were permitted to buy the product. Even so, SBIS proved to be a successful product because of its high return, and bonds having a total worth of IDR1.8 trillion were in circulation in August 2011 (Investor Daily Indonesia 2011). To increase profit- ability, the Bank of Indonesia subsequently replaced SBIS with a new type of Islamic bonds (Surat Berharga Negara Syariah, SBSN) which could be sold in secondary markets. In December 2008, the assets of Islamic financial institutions in Indonesia had tripled from their 2004 level (BI Islamic Banking Statistics January 2009). At this time, more than half the assets of Indonesian Islamic finance came from the mudharaba time deposits, while a third were from Mudharaba saving deposits (BI Islamic Banking Statistics January 2009). Additionally, Juoro (2008: 230) shows that the loan to deposit ratio in Islamic banks is 103 % higher than it is in conventional banks (63.2 %). The level of non-performing loans in Islamic banking is Islamic Finance in Indonesia 67 also higher than in the conventional system (Juoro 2008: 230). Assets in the Islamic financial system increase 25–36 % every year and in the first three months of 2009 total assets were valued at IDR53.43 trillion, representing 2.22 % of total national economic activity (BI Triwulan I 2009). Assets of Islamic banking and Islamic units in conventional banking grew 36 % from 2008 to a total of IDR51.68 trillion, while assets of Islamic rural banks were increasing 42 % per year, reaching IDR1.75 trillion in early 2009 (BI Triwulan I 2009).

Islamic Finance in West Sumatra

There is little historical evidence of the existence of Islamic financial structures in West Sumatra. The principles of Islamic economics were probably first adopted in an institutional sense by the Enterprise Associaton (Sarekat Usaha, SU), established in 1914 by Islamic modernists with the support of trading groups in Padang and by the local branch of the Islamic Association (Sarikat Islam, SI, formerly Sarekat Dagang Islam), set up in 1916 by pedlars and farmers in Padang in as a way of competing against ethnic Chinese merchants (Abdullah 1972: 228). The West Sumatran chapter of Muhammadiyah then established its social welfare department, called the Hardship Relief Agency (Penolong Kesengsaraan Umum, PKU) in 1927 (Abdullah 1971: 78). The idea of Islamic finance, as an element of an ekonomi sharia (Islamic economic system) has been an important element in debates about the nature of regional economy in the post-Suharto era. Ekonomi Syaria has become such an important concept that any new program or idea must in some way or another be shown to contribute to it. Government officials invoke this concept as the motivation, and justification, for their economic programs, which they claim support the needs of the majority of the population. As the discussion that follows demonstrates, they have also increasingly relied on the structures of Islamic finance to demonstrate their credentials to, and facilitate dealings with, rich Islamic countries in the hope of attracting alternative forms of investment to the region.

The Public Discourse of Islamic Finance

A set of key terms emerged in discussions around Islamic finance, including tanpa bunga (no interest), sektor riil (the ‘real’ economy), bagi hasil (profit sharing), and underpinning all the other terms, Ekonomi Syaria. In addition to the requirement that a financial system should operate on shared profit rather than interest, Ekonomi Syaria implies the existence of a set of economic relations in which the rich finance and fund activities to help the poor, and the people are motivated by a general ethos of solidarity. The term corresponds to notions of a moral obligation in economic dealings, but it has been reworked by the local elites to become a cultural- 68 3 Islamic Finance ideological instrument for expanding networks in local politics and developing economic relations with Islamic countries. For Romeo Rissal Pandjialam, the head of the regional office of the Bank of Indonesia in Padang, Islamic finance is just one part of a total Islamic economic system which, if implemented more fully, would transfer the possession of big business resources from a few big entrepreneurs to hundreds of people:

If just a small proportion of entrepreneurs control economic resources, society cannot really progress. The purchasing power of the community will not increase. I always give the example of what we did in Mandailing Natal [in North Sumatra]. In the past, palm plan- tations were controlled by a few big business persons. But now, more than ﬁve thousand family heads each own two or three hectares of palm. Why isn’t that the case in West Sumatra? Because we stand by and do not help our community (Interview, Padang, 19 November 2010). In West Sumatran public discourse, the concept of the Islamic economy is linked to the cultural identity of the Minangkabau people. Public statements about the Islamic economy take its association with regional identity for granted, invoking the Minang philosophy that culture is built on Syari’a and Syari’a is based on the Qur’an (Adat Basandi Syarak Syarak Basandi Kitabullah). As Fauzi Bahar, the Mayor of Padang, expressed it:

With the philosophy of the Minangkabau people, that ‘Adat Basandi Syarak, Syarak Ba- sandi Kitabullah’, it makes sense that the concept of Islamic economics is an important tool for Muslims seeking to develop their economy (Padang Today 7 February 2010). Although Islamic finance institutions are relatively new to the province, local power-holders are anxious to demonstrate that the Minangkabau people have a long commitment to the principles of the Islamic economy. According to the Vice Governor of West Sumatra, Muslim Kasim, they are reflected in long-standing profit sharing practices:

Islamic economics has existed in Padang Pariaman for a long time. West Sumatra can be a pioneer in the application of Islamic economics. In fact, at the philosophical and ideological level, we have been practising Islamic economics from the very beginning—long before the establishment of the first Islamic bank in Indonesia. Islamic economics is not a foreign concept in West Sumatra. It underpins [profit sharing arrangements] such as paduoan sapi [cattle raising] and paroan sawah [rice cultivation]. Islamic economics can be implemented in West Sumatra because the region has the philosophy that ‘Adat basandi Syarak, Syarak basandi Kitabullah’ (Padang Today 27 September 2009). Drawing a parallel between these traditional forms of Islamic economic practice and their modern counterparts, Muslim Kasim exhorted the population of West Sumatra to position the province as a pioneer (pelopor) of Islamic economics in Indonesia. The connection between the Islamic economy and the Minangkabau people’s assertions of their Muslim cultural heritage is invoked in a number of different ways: as evidence of the religiosity of the province, as evidence of the desirability of the Islamic economic system, and as a way of urging West Sumatrans to embrace practices associated with the Islamic economy. An example of the former is a Islamic Finance in West Sumatra 69 statement by Devvyzal, the head of the Nagari Islamic Bank, who made the following observation: ‘the fact that Minangpeople are 99 % Muslim has allowed concept of the Islamic economy to grow’ (Posmetro Padang 17 January 2009). An example of the way cultural heritage is invoked in support of the Islamic economy occurs in a statement by Gamawan Fauzi, the Governor of West Sumatra, emphasising the desirability of an Islamic economy and the logic of its adoption in the province: The growth in Islamic banking in West Sumatra should be higher than in other regions of Indonesia because of the community’s philosophy that ‘Adat Basandi Syarak, Syarak Basandi Kitabullah’ (Padang Ekspres 20 March 2009). In an example of the appeal to West Sumatrans to embrace practices associated with the Islamic economy, Romeo Rissal Pandjialam, the head of the regional office of the Bank of Indonesia in Padang, made the following comment: It is deeply ironic that West Sumatra, with [its philosophy of] ‘Adat Basandi Syarak Syarak Basandi Kitabullah’ is not supported by an Islamic economic system (Padang Today 7 February 2010). The second major reason invoked in explanations of the benefits of an Islamic economic system is the stability it offers in times of trouble. In Romeo’s words, ‘Conventional economic systems look very strong from the outside. However, when the wind blows or problems arise, they are very susceptible to destruction’ (Padang Today 7 February 2010). Or as Fauzi Bahar, the Mayor of the Padang, puts it, ‘an Islamic economic system is very effective, safe and reassuring’ (Padang Today 7 February 2010). Some commentators even go as far as suggesting that Islamic economics is the answer to the world’s financial woes. In the words of Muhammad Ali, one of the Directors General at the Ministry of Religion, ‘the concept of the Islamic economy offers a solution for improving the world economy, which is currently facing a global crisis’ (Posmetro Padang 28 March 2009). According to Muslim Kasim, this fact has already been recognised:

Islamic economic systems have been adopted by many outsiders. Regions with non-Muslim majorities like Bali have applied the principles of Islamic economics. Now many Western countries have also developed Islamic economic systems. Almost 70 % of countries in Europe and America have them (Padang Today 27 September 2009). Public figures also use their public statements to elaborate on how such an economy would benefit the people of West Sumatra. The institutions most often referred to are Islamic financial institutions, such as Islamic banks and Islamic units in conventional banks, the Islamic micro financial institution, BMT, and less commonly takaful. Other institutions linked to the trope of the Islamic economy in public discourse are zakat (the subject of the next chapter) and Islamic production systems. The reason most often cited for the stability of Islamic economic systems is that they focus on the ‘real economy’ (sektor riil), avoiding speculation and high risk financial transactions. As Faisal Rivai, the head of the National Islamic Economics Society puts it, ‘the benefits of Islamic economics start from the “real” sector, especially from micro, small and medium enterprises’ (Padang Today 7 February 2010). 70 3 Islamic Finance

It is this aspect that local power-holders emphasise when claiming that fuller adoption of an Islamic economic system would enhance regional development. According to Firdaus K., Secretary of the Provincial Government of West Sumatra, ‘Islamic economics is strategic for regional economic development’ (Posmetro Padang 28 March 2009). Romeo Rissal Pandjialam, the head of the regional ofﬁce of the Bank of Indonesia, agreed with this assessment:

Islamic economics is very important for regional development, and especially for the recovery of the regional economy after the [2009] earthquake. Islamic economics offers a very important opportunity at this time (Posmetro Padang 26 November 2009). On a separate occasion, he took the opportunity to provide a concrete example of the beneﬁts of Islamic economic practice in West Sumatra, using it to illustrate one of the key underlying principles of Islamic economic exchange, namely the fair distribution of proﬁt:

I am really impressed that there is a tea company near Mount Kerinci that has fully adopted the principles of Islamic economics. When export prices for tea rise, they automatically increase the price they pay to tea farmers, even though they could just make a bigger profit. I asked why they do that, and they answered, ‘Society also contributes to the growth of this company.’ Therefore, profits must be shared. This is the real concept of Islamic economics (Padang Ekspres 29 April 2010). A key part of the strategy of adopting elements of an Islamic economy in order to promote regional development is its role in increasing opportunities for economic cooperation with Islamic countries. As Marwan Zein, a journalist now living in Jakarta, observed, there is a significant market for consumer goods in the Middle East, a market in which Muslim providers could have an advantage:

Islamically-certiﬁed products can be exported to Middle Eastern countries … The Gulf countries are a market. In Saudi Arabia, there are quality prayer mats made in China [English in the original]. I also saw packaged dates from America competing with dates from Iraq, Egypt and from Saudi Arabia itself (Singgalang 18 September 2008). According to some, being seen to be more Islamic would also be beneﬁcial in the promotion of West Sumatra as a tourist destination. In a particularly telling example of this, Romeo described his attempts to encourage Muslim tourists to visit the province:

When I talked to Middle Eastern tourists in Malaysia and asked them why they did not come to West Sumatra as well, given the beauty of the region. the answer they gave me was really depressing. ‘It is a secular region’, said one of the tourists, whose great-grandfather was from Magek in the district of Agam (Padang Ekspres 14 May 2010). Perhaps more importantly, Islamic economics is seen as a means of attracting investment. Mahyeldi Ansharullah, the Deputy of the Provincial Parliament in Padang and member of the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) cited Hidayat Nurwahid, the national Head of PKS when commenting on Middle Eastern investment in a local newspaper: Islamic Finance in West Sumatra 71

It is time for Indonesia to attract investment from Middle Eastern countries that are benefiting financially from the financial crisis in America. There is a lot of money in the Middle East. The financial crisis in United States of America has also affected Europe, so Indonesia has a real opportunity to attract Middle Eastern funds (Singgalang 20 October 2008). Syafrudin Karimi, a lecturer at Universitas Andalas, goes one step further, arguing that cross-border collaboration, especially with neighbouring Malaysia, could serve as a tool in the development of West Sumatra’s Islamic economy:

The development of an Islamic economic system can be accomplished by establishing cooperative arrangements with number of the Middle Eastern countries and with Malaysia, which has long embraced the concept of Islamic law (Postmetro Padang 28 March 2009). A ﬁnal, closely-related theme in public statements about the Islamic economy pertains to the success of current initiatives and their beneﬁts for the people of West Sumatra. The words ‘promising’ (menjanjikan), ‘increasing’ (meningkat) and ‘encouraging’ (menggembirakan) are most often used to describe these developments. Firdaus K., for example, noted that:

The development of Islamic economics in the region is quite encouraging. This development is evident in the number of conventional banks that have opened Islamic units (Posmetro Padang 28 March 2009). According to Nelly Sumarni, the regional head of the Association of Indonesian Islamic Banks, ‘the rapid expansion in Islamic banking is evidence that Islamic banks are promising ﬁnancial institutions’ (Padang Ekspres 27 February 2010). Several months later, Romeo noted that:

The Islamic unit of BRI has increased its assets dramatically within the last 10 months … because it truly reaches the ‘little people’. The Islamic bank operates on the belief that Minang people are people who embrace Islamic law … Until now conventional banks in West Sumatra have focused on medium and big business (Padang Ekspres 30 July 2010).10

He went on to observe that:

Many small and medium enterprises suffer because they do not have capital. When they come to conventional banks, they are considered ‘non-bankable’ because they don’t meet the requirements for getting a loan … The small number that do get loans are charged inordinately high interest rates (bunganya selangit) (Padang Ekspres 30 July 2010). Like Romeo, many other public figures have emphasised the benefits of Islamic financial institutions for people at all levels of society. According to Fauzi Bahar, the Mayor of Padang:

10 West Sumatran papers also report statements about the positive impact of Islamic banking in other regions. For example, Singgalang cited Bambang W Budiawan, one of the supervisors in the Surabaya Regional Bank of Indonesia as having said that the assets of Islamic banks were increasing, and could reach 55 % in 2011. He suggested that Islamic banks would need substantial numbers of new employees as a result of their growth, noting that an estimated 9,000 new employees would be required by Islamic banks by 2014 (Singgalang 6 December 2010). 72 3 Islamic Finance

The problem faced by small business groups has been that it has been difficult for them to get loans. As a result, they are forced to go to moneylenders. If there is a local Islamic financial institution, small business groups benefit greatly (Padang Ekspres 7 May 2010). Two years earlier, Ahmad Wira, a lecturer in the Padang State Institute for Islamic Studies had explained that the hope was that the establishment of Islamic micro-finance institutions would ‘spearhead the distribution of regional government funds and other forms of assistance, so that community members who require assistance and funds for their businesses can be reached and empowered’ (Padang Today 17 December 2008). Around the same time, Mardius Asmaan, the head of the Minangkabau Adat Consultative Body, (Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Min- angkabau, LKAAM) in the district of Agam, suggested that ‘the presence of Islamic micro-finance institutions has really been felt by the poor families that have accessed micro credit from BMT (Singgalang 31 December 2008).

Local Government Policy on Islamic Finance

Regional governments have not passed any regulations on Islamic finance in West Sumatra. But they have promoted the up-take of opportunities created under the national level changes. The first modern Islamic financial institutions to emerge in West Sumatra were the Islamic Rural Bank (BPRS) and BMT Takwa in 1997 (Tim Peneliti Unand and BI 2001). The first Islamic bank established was the Bank Syariah Mandiri in Padang in 2002. The number of Islamic banks subsequently increased significantly after the passing of the 2008 national Islamic Banking Act and, as of 2010, there were eight Islamic banks in the region, namely BNI Syariah, Bank Danamon Indonesian Syariah, Bank Muamalat Indonesia Syariah, BRI Syariah, Bank Bukopin Syariah, Bank Syariah Mandiri and Bank Mega. With total assets of IDR1.6 trillion in 2010, these banks had the equivalent of 5.6 % of the total regional assets of conventional banks, the highest contribution of Islamic banks in any province in Indonesia (Romeo Rissal Pandjialam, Interview, 19 November 2010). In the same year, the assets of Islamic rural banks totalled IDR1.1 trillion, or 3.9 % of total assets of regional conventional rural banks in 2010 (BI Padang, Data Triwulan III 2010). The provincial government has capitalised on these broader trends in the growth of Islamic finance by establishing Islamic units in the regional government-owned Nagari Bank in 2006 and subsequently an independent Islamic banking unit in 2008. Some local governments have shown their support for the Islamic banking system by depositing government funds in Islamic accounts. For example, in 2009, Gamawan Fauzi, then Governor of West Sumatra (and now the Minister of Internal Affairs) transferred funds amounting to IDR3 trillion to the Islamic Nagari Bank for the establishment of a regional government mosque in Padang (Padang Ekspres 5 March 2009). Islamic Finance in West Sumatra 73

The practice of requiring collateral (agunan) for loans, which is also found in non-governmental Islamic banks, is criticised by Islamic groups because it effectively excludes poorer Muslims from the system because they have no collateral to offer (Interview with Amir Syarifuddin, Islamic leader, 12 September 2008). Similarly, according to Sudarman Yonidarma Dt. Rangkayo Basa, the head of the Semen Padang Hospital Society, fixed return or fixed margin arrangements are simply substitutes for interest in conventional banking, and many Islamic bank products are simply conventional products with Arabic names (Singgalang 19 December 2010). Even Romeo acknowledges that the directors of many Islamic banks are still more concerned with growing their customer base than with supporting their customers’ business activities (Interview, Padang, 19 November 2010). Outside the formal banking system, regional governments have sponsored the expansion of Islamic micro-finance in the region through the development of BMTs, the assets of which were worth IDR16 billion in 2008 (Singgalang 5 February 2009). In the district of Agam, for example, 18 of Agam Madani’s41 BMTs were initially subsidised by the provincial government, while a further 23 were initially subsidised by the district government itself, with each BMT being provided with initial capital of IDR300 million. In collaboration with the Ministry of Welfare, the BMTs provide loans for the construction and renovation of housing, infrastructure construction and training. As well as accepting savings, the BMTs provide loans for small groups in the production of palm sugar, livestock, and for small businesses such as barber shops (Setkab 2009). Islamic banks enabled the regional government to deliver funds to a large number of people in support of their small business activities (Usaha Kecil Men- engah, UKM). However, according to Romeo Rissal Pandjialam, the head of the Regional Office of the Reserve Bank of Indonesia, the Islamic units in the conventional Bank Nagari and Bank Nagari Syariah were opened to attract foreign Muslim entrepreneurs (Interview, 19 November 2010). According to Romeo, the reason why so few foreign Islamic entrepreneurs were doing business in West Sumatra was that the region lacked an integrated Islamic financial system. Islamic entrepreneurs from Islamic countries were reluctant to invest through non-Islamic systems even if they believed that their companies would profit from doing so. They preferred to go to Malaysia, which is seen as an Islamic alternative to secular Indonesia. Therefore, regional governments must develop mechanisms to encourage Islamic financial systems without necessarily annulling conventional banks, to attract investors from Islamic countries into the region. Moreover, the establishment of Islamic financial systems attracts students and tourists from Islamic countries, making them feel comfortable in the region. Mahyeldi Ansharullah, the Vice Mayor of Padang, told me that students and tourists from Malaysia are very keen to use Islamic financial systems in the region (Interview, Padang, 8 September 2008). Romeo also believes that Islamic banking facilities are necessary to attract tourists from Islamic countries (Interview, Padang, 19 November 2010). The Islamic financial system was given a significant boost with the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Although the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis hit Indonesia 74 3 Islamic Finance hard, it did not affect the global financial markets. As a result, agricultural exports played an important part in Indonesia’s economic recovery, and farmers benefited from the high prices their exports attracted in the global market. The 2008 crisis was quite different. In recent years, agricultural industries in the region have become exposed to Western export markets, and have consequently suffered from the Global Financial Crisis. Oil palm cultivation constitutes a significant proportion of agro-industry. Cultivators were forced to sell their harvests at low prices.11 As a result, oil palm companies were not able to pay wages and their workers were not able to find other work. Concerned with the stability of conventional systems, government officials turned their attention to Middle East countries (Mahyeldi Ansharullah, interview, 8 September 2008). The campaign to attract Islamic investment picked up pace in 2009, when Fauzi Bahar, the Mayor of Padang, and other local politicians made trade visits to Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia, Dubai and Malaysia. Fauzi travelled to Dubai, and arranged for representatives of Dubai World Investment to visit West Sumatra in April 2009. That visit was expected to attract investment of around US$300 million for several regional projects, including the construction of facilities at the tourist destinations of Gunung Padang, Pantai Air Manis and Bung Hatta Botanical Gar- dens, and for the infrastructure at Taluk Bayur Port, and Bingkuang Bus Terminal of Bingkuang (Antara-Sumbar 15 and 16 April 2009).12 In addition, regional representatives attended the 5th World Islamic Economic Forum in Jakarta, where they presented their regional banking program to investors from Islamic countries. The delegation succeeded in attracting a number of projects organised by the Malaysia-based Forum, including a market for gambier and organic farm products, a project for organic rubbish management in agriculture, and finance for the development of the Mandeh Tourism Resort, the Twin Lakes and Cable Car Track in Maninjau, and the Bukit Tinggi Syariah Bank (WIEF Indonesia 2009). In 2011, the Mayor of Padang, Fauzi Bahar, embarked on another attempt to cement economic relations with investors from Dubai when he and the director of the Mineral Energy Commodities (MEC) Holding Company from Dubai discussed the development of a new port at Bungus (Media Centre of Regional Office of the Ministry of Information and Technology, 10 December 2011). The presence of Islamic finance shapes international investment practices in many ways. West Sumatra’s close proximity to Malaysia in particular has given rise to the development of Islamic economic relationships between two governments. With decentralisation, this relationship has been extended beyond individual official encounters to government to government agreements on local development projects. The Mayor of Padang Pariaman, Mukhlis Rahman, for example, signed off on contracts for the development of regional tourist destinations with Worldwide Far East BHD Malaysia in December 2011, including a marine tourism project at Pauh

11 West Sumatra had more than 380,000 hectares under oil palm in 2008. During the Global Financial Crisis, the price of fresh fruit bunches dropped from IDR1,900 to IDR600. 12 These projects were cancelled at the end of 2009 because of Dubai Debt Crisis. Islamic Finance in West Sumatra 75

Beach, cultural tourism at Gandoriah Beach, a family tourism venture at Cermin Beach and a nature tourism venture at Kata Beach (InfoPublik Sumbar 2011) to which Islamic identity was a key element in achieving these agreements.

Conclusion

The chapter has analysed the interplay between national socio-political and economic imperatives, the geopolitics of the Islamic world and transnational structures of Islamic finance in the development of Islamic finance in Indonesia, and the ways in which the national system has filtered down to the regional level and been incorporated into political discourse about what it means to be an appropriately Islamic society. It has shown how the development of regulations pertaining to Islamic finance in Indonesia was influenced by the development of modern Islamic banking systems in other countries and the impact of regional and global financial crises on the conventional banking system. The chapter has documented the rapid increase in the global penetration of Islamic financial institutions after the oil shocks of the 1970s, as new-found wealth in parts of the Arab world facilitated the spread of Arabian financial practices throughout the Muslim world. It has also analysed how these practices have been interpreted and localised in Indonesia to accommodate local norms. In analysing their function in West Sumatra, it has demonstrated that, while regional governments have used Islamic financial practices in part as a tool to transfer resources from big business to local communities, they have increasingly relied on the structures of Islamic finance to demonstrate their credentials to, and facilitate dealings with, rich Islamic countries in the hope of attracting alternative forms of investment and Muslim tourists and students to the region. In the chapter that follows, the coexistence of local and transnational influences, and local and transnational imperatives, in the increasing emphasis on Islamic practice, is illustrated through a second example, namely the practice of Islamic tithing (zakat).

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Abstract While zakat was once a marginal institution in Indonesia, it is now recognised by governments at the national level, as well as many local jurisdictions, as a primary way through which Muslims contribute financially to the common weal. In the post Suharto era, many districts have sought to introduce local regulations on zakat alongside national-level laws, both as a means to redistribute wealth within society and as a means of increasing the financial resources over which they have control. In West Sumatra, zakat is now an important part of regional and district strategies to raise funds for poverty-related projects, in part as a response to local factors such as natural disasters, but also to deal with the local consequences of successive regional and global financial crises. This chapter situates an account of the institutionalisation of zakat in West Sumatra since decentralisation in a discussion of the meanings of zakat in the contemporary Islamic world and in the political discourse around poverty that emerged after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The chapter argues that zakat has provided an alternative revenue stream that has enabled regional governments to accumulate resources in ways that capitalise on increasing public religiosity in the province and to selectively distribute them in ways that increase their electoral prospects. As the discussion that follows will show, the local collection of zakat has indeed provided funds for poverty alleviation. However, it has also allowed politicians and those who manage local zakat institutions to shore up their own status and, consequently, their hold on political power.

Keywords Global Islam Á Local politics Á Socio-economic pressures

The Religious and Social Meanings of Zakat

Zakat is referred to 82 times in the Qur’an (Ali 1988: 9), most often alongside prayer.1 The command to pay zakat is derived mainly from the following ﬁve verses.

1 This pairing is also found in the Jewish and Christian traditions (Zysow 2009).

Fulfil your devotional obligations and pay the zakat. And what you send a head of good you will find with God; for He sees all that you do (Q 2: 110). …be firm in devotion, pay the zakat, and hold on firmly to God. He is your friend: How excellent a friend is He, How excellent a helper! (Q 22: 78). … observe your devotional obligations, pay the zakat, and obey the Apostle so that you may be shown mercy (Q 24: 56). … Fulfil your devotional obligations and pay the zakat, and obey God and his Apostle. God desires to remove impurities from you (Q 33: 33). … and be firm in devotion, pay the zakat, and lend a goodly loan to God. And what you send for yourself of the good, you will find it with God better and greater in reward, So ask for God’s forgiveness. Indeed God is forgiving and kind (Q 73: 20). The payment of zakat is, therefore, a religious obligation which is broadly perceived as representing and cultivating the piety of individuals through the meeting of their social and economic responsibilities as members of a Muslim community. The philosophical basis of zakat is that wealth is God-given and therefore does not fully belong to the wealthy. There are two types of zakat. The first is zakat fitr, which must be paid by every Muslim annually before the Islamic festival of idl fitr, celebrated at the end of the fasting month, to ensure that every Muslim has food for the celebration. There are several interpretations of the appropriate application of zakat fitr. While it can be paid in cash or in kind, the minimum amount of zakat fitr that can be paid is equal to the cost of 1 day’s staple food for each member of a donor household, in Indonesia, generally rice (Ariff 1991: 39). This is in accordance with Shafi’i School practice, the national standard in Indonesia. By contrast, the Hanafi School believes that zakat fitr can be an equivalent measure of some other thing required by poor Muslims, the value of which is now determined in a country’s local currency (Zysow 2009). Wheat, barley, dates, raisins and milk products such as yogurt and cheese are other examples of the goods deemed appropriate for the payment of zakat fitr.2 The second form of zakat is zakat mal is also an annual imposition, traditionally paid at harvest time, which is used to fund social and political projects. According to the Shafi’i School, payment of zakat mal is required of every Muslim in possession of a certain assets, such as gold, farmland and livestock. Those deemed wealthy enough to pay zakat mal are generally expected to pay the equivalent of two and half per cent of their possessions’ values (Salim 2008). In the Hanafi School, zakat mal is calculated not only from the value of such assets but also from the method by which goods are farmed, which serves as a proxy for profit (Zysow 2009). For example, goods farmed using a local water supply are calculated at twice the rate as goods produced on a farm without irrigation.3 Interpretations of the means by which zakat mal is calculated have changed over time. The practice initially focussed on the possession of products such as gold,

2 Islamic countries such as Pakistan and the Sudan adopt this approach (Kahf 1995: 214). 3 Unlike zakat fitr, zakat mal has been the focus of several scholarly works. See, for example, Zysow (2009), and Alfitri (2006). The Religious and Social Meanings of Zakat 81 agricultural products and livestock as the determinant of the obligation to pay zakat mal. However from the time of Umar Ibn Khattab, the second of the four ‘rightly- guided’ Islamic caliphs, new categories of zakat-liable commodities were developed, including merchandise (Zysow 2009).4 In the contemporary Islamic world, income derived from waged work and other new commodities, including services, are also considered in the calculation of zakat mal. Companies must also pay zakat mal, just as individuals do. Assessments regarding which groups constitute appropriate recipients for zakat also vary. According to the Qur’an, eight groups are eligible to receive zakat: the poor; the homeless; the collectors of zakat (amil); new converts to Islam; slaves; debtors; and those engaged in the ‘way of God’, such as students and priests, and, finally, wayfarers (Ariff 1991).5 Although all these groups are eligible to receive zakat, the poor and the homeless are given priority. Some zakat institutions distribute zakat collection to the collective body, but some of them do not. At times, particular groups were excluded altogether. For example, during his caliphate, Umar Ibn Khattab decided that new converts to Islam no longer needed to rely on zakat (Zysow 2009). In contemporary times, there have been debates about whether non-Muslims can be among recipients of zakat. The proponents of this interpretation—such as British Islamic Relief, which funds non-Muslims in Africa—argue that the term ‘the poor and the needy’ implies both Muslims and non-Muslims, while their opponents —such as Muslim Aid, which is also based in Britain—believe that zakat should only be distributed to Muslims because majority of Muslims is in less advantage financial society (Benthall 1999). Islamic scholars also differ on whether the payment of zakat is voluntary or compulsory. For example, Baqir al-Sadr, the Iraqi Shi’i scholar, asserts that zakat is a moral obligation, but one that should be voluntary. Governments with power over Islamic communities can enforce its payment but, in contrast to a voluntary system which enables the rich to recognise their social responsibilities, a compulsory system does not encourage the rich to commit to improving the welfare of the poor (Wilson 1998: 49). Umer Chapra, the research advisor at the Islamic Research and Training Institute of the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah stresses that while governments need to apply basic guidance for zakat, individual responsibility must be encouraged (Wilson 1998: 49). The Indian Muslim scholar, Nejatullah Siddiqi, on the other hand, proposes that zakat should be compulsory, since it is the task of a socially responsible government to administer social justice (Siddiqi 1996:19–20).

4 Initially, Muslim merchants were charged at the rate of 2.5 % and non-Muslims at 10 % (Zysow 2009). 5 Some categories have a broad deﬁnition, which leaves them open to new interpretations. For example, Burr and Collins (2006: 13) argue that zakat has been used to fund terrorism under the category of those engaged in ‘the ways of God’. 82 4 Zakat Zakat as Taxation

As Islam developed as the functional equivalent of a state in Muslim communities, it is not surprising that the collection of financial resources was an important concern, similar to the development of taxation in modern states. Indeed zakat has often been compared to modern systems of taxation. Salim (2008: 11), for example argues that zakat does indeed function as a form of taxation, as does Benthall (1999), who describes zakat as the first system of social security in which the state recognised its obligation to provide for the welfare of citizens. Unlike zakat, however, taxes aim to raise revenue to cover government expenditures such as the cost of administration, defence, and to pay for the implementation of state policies, while zakat is limited to the social welfare of underprivileged groups. In recognition of this important difference, some experts assert that zakat cannot be considered a tax in this modern sense (Abdullah 1991:54–55). Historically, taxation was first instituted in polities in the ancient world such as Mesopotamia, Syria-Palestine and Greece, where particular goods or property were handed to the King or to the royal temple (Harrelson 2005). This practice continued in ancient Rome, where non-citizens (the people living in the provinces of the Roman Empire) were required to feed Rome’s military machine. It was a system which then evolved first to encompass the direct levy of taxes on citizens’ property during times of war and later the imposition of taxes on public and cultivated land, cattle, inheritance, sales and slaves (Coffield 1970: 3, 8). Jews also had a tradition of tithing. Jewish rabbis were paid from tithes levied on crops such as grain, first collected from farmers and later from their customers (Zeitlin 1932: 47). Similarly, in Medieval Europe, the Catholic Church worked with local rulers to ensure the flow of tithes, which were first payable on grain, vineyards, and cattle and later also on wages and certain other kinds of profit (Meagher and Dietlein 2003). With the development of the nation state in the seventeenth century, taxation came to be handled by the secular authorities, rather than by religious institutions, although countries such as Germany continued to provide support for the administration of tithing until it became part of taxation by the state in the 1950s (Barker 2004: 169–170). There is a significant debate, however, about whether the principles of zakat can be accommodated within more modern conceptualisations of taxation.

The Administration of Zakat in Modern States

The debate on zakat not only concerns how it should be calculated and who should receive it but also how the process is managed, a consideration that arose with the emergence of Islamic states around the world. During the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad, zakat was imposed after the Prophet and the Islamic community, called the Al-Muhajirun, migrated from Mecca to Medina and established the functional equivalent of a state. Poor members of this community were among the The Religious and Social Meanings of Zakat 83

first recipients of the zakat (Basher 1993: 85). It was at this time that the diwan, the administrative body that called on Muslims to pay zakat, was established (Al-Omar 1995: 27) and zakat officers were appointed (Ahmed 2004: 30). After the death of the Prophet, some Muslims refused to pay zakat to his successor, the Caliph Abu Bakr. In his response to this act of insurrection, the Caliph labelled them apostates and rebels (Zysow 2009) and stressed the importance of zakat, positioning it as equal in importance to the practice of prayer (Ahmed 2004: 30). During Abu Bakr’s term as Caliph, a state treasury, the Bayt Mal, was established in Medina to collect zakat and distribute it to the recipients (Burr and Collins 2006: 12).6 The collection and distribution of zakat became more decentralised with the expansion of Islamic communities in the Umayyad and Abbasid periods (661–1258), when it was controlled by local Islamic leaders under the auspices of a central administration (Burr and Collins 2006: 12). In modern times, many Islamic states, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya and Pakistan, and even some non-Islamic states with large Islamic populations such as Bahrain and Malaysia, have taken a role in zakat management. The practice has varied from one Muslim country to another. In Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan, the Sudan, Yemen and Malaysia the payment of zakat is compulsory (Al-Omar 1995: 31). However the institutions that manage zakat in these countries vary. In Saudi Arabia, zakat is collected by an agency located in the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (Al- Omar 1995: 34). Similar agencies have existed in Libya, where zakat has been collected by the General Directorate for Zakat since 1971; and in Pakistan, where the system has been administered by the Ministry of Finance since 1983 (Al-Omar 1995; Zysow 2009). In other Muslim countries, such as Jordan, Bahrain and the Sudan, semi-governmental zakat institutions collect zakat which is paid voluntarily (Al-Omar 1995; Zysow 2009). In Southeast Asia, Malaysia is the only state that imposes compulsory payment of zakat on Muslims, although even there, enforcement of the law is weak (Al-Omar 1995: 31; Zysow 2009). As a federated constitutional monarchy, Malaysia assigns jurisdiction over Islamic laws and customs to individual states. In most states, compulsory zakat payments are managed by the State Religious Councils, through offices called Baitulmal. For example, in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and Negeri Sembilan, zakat is collected by a corporation and the proceeds are disbursed by the Islamic Religious Council’s Baitulmal Department. However, in the State of Selangor, both the collection and disbursement of zakat are managed by a corporation (Ahmed 2004: 77). Islamic countries do not only differ in the institutional forms used to collect zakat but also in what income/assets are considered in its calculation. Pakistan does not apply zakat on bank accounts in foreign currencies, while Libya applies zakat on paper money and company shares (Zysow 2009). The Sudan and Saudi Arabia apply zakat on income from assets such as rented property, factories, and farms but

6 The functions of the Baitul Mal were later expanded by caliphs, dynasties, sultans and empires to include management of government ﬁnances and expenditures (Zysow 2009). 84 4 Zakat

Saudi Arabia also collects it on hotels, taxi owners and offices of real estate agents. Zakat is also calculated on buried treasure in the Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Libya but not in Pakistan, Malaysia or Yemen (Al-Omar 1995: 39 and Nienhaus 2007: 174). In Iran, one-fifth of financial benefits gained are paid to religious leaders, including benefits derived from precious metals as well as land bought from non-Muslims (Al-Omar 1995: 40). In Saudi Arabia zakat is levied on salaries and income from vocational and permanent jobs, while Malaysia collects zakat from all income generated by Muslims. In Pakistan certain institutions, such as government departments, government-owned bodies and religious and social institutions are excluded from the obligation to pay zakat (Imtiazi 1985). Different standards also apply for more traditional assets like agricultural products and livestock. Libya applies zakat on camels and cows (Al-Omar 1995), while the Sudan does not apply zakat on livestock because of the frequency of drought. Saudi Arabia applies zakat on wheat while grains like maize, millet, barley and cotton are liable to zakat in the Sudan. In Malaysia, the only agricultural product used in the calculation of zakat is rice. Different countries also use different scales for calculating zakat on crops and fruits. In the Sudan and Libya, 653 kg/ annum is the threshold, while in Pakistan and Malaysia, it is 948 and 1,316 respectively (Al-Omar 1995). There is also significant variation in the way zakat is distributed, both in terms of the designated recipient groups and the extent to which individuals can determine who benefits from their contribution. For example, in the Sudan, 25 % of the zakat collected is allocated to the poor and the needy, 10 % to converts and debtors and 20 % to the promotion of Islam (Burr and Collins 2006: 18). Libya allocates 50 % of zakat to the poor and divides the remainder between the other nominated categories of zakat recipients (Zysow 2009). In Malaysia, the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur spent 19 % of zakat collected in 2003 on the needy, and 17 % on the poor. The remainder was allocated mainly to administration or distributed to new converts and those engaged in ‘the way of God’ (Ahmed 2004: 82). In terms of control over zakat distribution, Saudi Arabian law authorises individuals to distribute 50 % of their zakat obligation personally to the needy, while in Yemen individuals can distribute 25 % individually (Zysow 2009). In Malaysia, Zysow (2009) claims that individuals prefer to pay their contributions personally to recipients rather than use the state-mandated system. The extent to which official institutions pass on the costs of administering zakat also varies considerably. For example, in 2003 10 % of zakat proceeds were allocated to administrative expenses in Jordan, Pakistan, Libya and the Sudan (Burr and Collins 2006: 18; Al-Omar 1995: 53) and 29 % in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur (Ahmed 2004: 82) but administration expenses are covered by the state budget in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Al-Omar 1995: 53). Non-governmental zakat institutions also exist in the Western world and in minority Muslim countries. For example, Islamic Relief, which has its headquarters in the United Kingdom, collects zakat in many countries including the United Kingdom itself (since 1984), France (since 1992), the USA (since 1993), Belgium The Religious and Social Meanings of Zakat 85

(since 1994), as well as Sweden and the Netherlands (since 1996).7 The organisation collected around 47 million pounds sterling in 2008, which was distributed to more than twenty-six countries in Africa, Asia and Southeast Asia (Islamic Relief 2009). Aid was provided to Muslims facing conﬂicts, such as those in Bosnia, Darfur Sudan, Iraq and Afghanistan, and natural disasters, such as in the 2004 Aceh tsunami and the 2005 Pakistan ﬂoods (Islamic Relief 2009). Critics of the institutionalisation of zakat focus on its ineffectiveness and impracticality in some countries. Kuran (2004) argues that zakat has failed to reduce poverty and inequality in Muslim societies because of the very traditional concepts of distribution used and poor management of zakat schemes. While management by governments would conceivably address these concerns, a further issue is that of a lack of community trust in governments’ capacity and integrity in the administration of zakat (Zysow 2009).

Transnational Zakat Mechanisms

In addition to the cross-border distribution of zakat by Muslim organisations based in the Western world, attempts have been made to coordinate zakat internationally, in recognition of zakat’s potential as a resource transcending regional and national borders and a means of consolidating a financial system that enables wealth to be transferred within the Islamic world. One of the primary mechanisms in the promotion of a more uniform approach to zakat has been the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Between 1984 and 2010, the OIC organised eight international conferences on zakat in collaboration with zakat institutions in Islamic countries. The first of these, an initiative of the Kuwait Zakat House, was held in 1984 in Kuwait while the second, sponsored by the Zakat and Income Tax Department of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy of Saudi Arabia, was held in Riyadh in 1986. The third conference, which was attended by 21 members of the OIC, was held in Kuala Lumpur in 1990. This conference discussed the application of zakat in several Islamic countries, including Jordan, Iran, Pakistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Egypt and Yemen. While the conference admitted that zakat had made little contribution to the alleviation of poverty, no concrete initiatives were established to address this issue (Burr and Collins 2006: 15).8 In 1995, the fourth International Zakat Conference was held in Senegal. At the fifth conference, held in Kuwait in 1998, zakat was promoted as both charity and as a way of generating employment opportunities. Muslim governments were encouraged to become more involved in the collection and distribution of zakat, and to cooperate with international aid organisations and the zakat organisations of

7 Islamic Relief has also had an office in Malaysia since 2005. 8 Information is not publicly available on how many people attended the first two conferences and what resolutions were adopted. 86 4 Zakat other countries in the implementation of joint programs (Burr and Collins 2006: 15). The sixth conference on zakat was held in Qatar in 2003 and the seventh in Kuala Lumpur in 2006. After the 2006 conference, the International Zakat Orga- nisation (IZO), worth some USD3 billion, was created within the OIC to improve collection and distribution of zakat in Islamic countries (Global Islamic Finance 12 March 2009). The eighth international zakat conference was held in Beirut in 2010. On this occasion, the conference focused on finding sustainable sources of financing for zakat institutions (Kuwait News Agency 30 March 2010). Another initiative of the OIC is the Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI), which operates under the supervision of the Islamic Development Bank. IRTI has been working to develop the concept and application of zakat since 1981, producing books and articles on zakat such as Management of Zakat in Modern Muslim Society (1989), Lectures on Islamic Economics (1992), A Survey of the Institution of Zakat: Issues, Theories and Administration (1994), Institutional Framework of Zakat: Dimension and Implications (1995), Economics of Zakat (2002) and Role of Zakat and Awqaf in Poverty Alleviation (2004). However, no new books have been published since 2004, and IRTI provides no training for the management of zakat. There are also zakat networks at the regional level. For example, the Zakat Council of Southeast Asia (Dewan Zakat Asia Tenggara, DZAT), which was established in 2006 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei Darusssalam, aims to improve standards and become a regional centre of zakat management in Southeast Asian countries, facilitating, for example, the distribution of zakat collected in the wealthy countries of Brunei Darussalam and Singapore in poorer countries in the region, such as Indonesia (Moh. Arifin Purwakananta, General Manager of Fund Raising at Dompet Dhuafa, cited in Kompas 14 November 2007). DZAT also aims to host seminars and training programs in the management of zakat and has organised two conferences on zakat, the first in 2006 in Malaysia and the second in 2007 in Indonesia.

Zakat in Indonesia

Zakat had been practised in Indonesia since the time of the Islamic kingdoms of the seventeenth century (Salim 2007: 688). At this time, as Salim shows, the collection and distribution of zakat was managed by religious officials (amil and modin at the village level and penghulu and naib at higher levels), as well as informal religious leaders such as kiai and ulama. It was mainly used by those directly involved in collecting it, as a form of compensation in lieu of salary (Salim 2007: 688). The practices of the Islamic kingdoms in the collection of zakat continued into the colonial period. Indeed, the Dutch only began to engage in zakat management in the nineteenth century. Correspondence between Snouck Hurgronje, Advisor on Native Affairs to the colonial government of the Netherlands East Indies, and Dutch officials in the Netherlands suggests that the colonial administration was concerned Zakat in Indonesia 87 that native officials, such as the penghulu and the naib, were misusing zakat proceeds, and that their actions would have a negative effect on the colonial authority (Abdullah 1991). Ultimately, in 1893, the Dutch introduced a policy to prevent the misuse of zakat by indigenous officials (Ali 1988: 32). When that failed, they introduced a new regulation prohibiting indigenous officials from collecting zakat. This policy left individual Muslims free to decide whether or not to pay zakat, and whether to pay it through religious institutions or directly to their chosen benefi- ciaries (Snouck Hurgronje 1992 [1936]). The first modern zakat institution in Indonesia was the Indonesian Bayt Mal, established during the Japanese occupation in 1943 by the Japanese-sponsored Islamic political and social organisation, the High Indonesian Islamic Council (Majlis Islam A-la Indonesia, MIAI) (Abdullah 1991: 57). In Aceh, zakat was collected by the Syaria court (Mahkamah Syariah), also created by the Japanese (Abdullah 1991: 58).9 After the declaration of independence, the Indonesian Republican administration established a Ministry of Religion in 1946 (replacing the Office for Indigenous Affairs), but it reinstated the Dutch policy on zakat through a circular which stated that the Indonesian government would not engage in zakat management (Salim 2008: 28). In 1959, after it was granted special autonomy by the Indonesian government, Aceh was the first province to institutionalise zakat (Abdullah 1991). Here, Baitul Mal were established at every level of the administrative structure, down to the village level. However, zakat fitr, rather than zakat mal, was the main target of the zakat institution (Abdullah 1991). No further steps were taken to institutionalise zakat until the fall of Sukarno’s government and the establishment of the New Order in 1966–1967. Shortly after the New Order was established, the Ministry of Religion proposed a draft zakat law that instructed every governor to establish Baitul Mal in the province he administered (Ali 1988: 36). The draft was rejected by the Minister of Finance, Frans Seda, in 1967. Seda believed that it was not necessary to regulate zakat through a national law, arguing that a regulation issued by the Ministry of Religion would be sufficient (Ali 1988: 36). A year later, the Ministry of Religion changed the focus of its proposed law from the enactment of zakat laws to the establishment of zakat agencies. Following the advice of the Ministry of Finance, the revised proposal was released as Ministry of Religion Regulation No. 4/1968, under which the emergence of zakat agencies and committees was to be regulated (Salim 2008: 182). However, Suharto annulled the regulation a few months later and instructed the Ministry of Religion to abandon its attempts to manage zakat. In its place, he proclaimed himself as collector of zakat as a private person (Ali 1988; Abdullah 1991) and instructed military officers to prepare for the establishment of a nationwide zakat foundation (Salim 2008). He also encouraged public officers and local governments to establish zakat institutions in their own offices.

9 The MIAI was dissolved in the late 1943 and the Sharia court ceased operating after the Japanese left Indonesia. 88 4 Zakat

Suharto’s initiative, which Salim (2008) argues was an attempt to sidestep demands from the Islamic lobby to implement Islamic laws, opened a new chapter in the state’s engagement with zakat. While subverting attempts to regulate zakat under national law, it opened up new opportunities for the institutionalisation of zakat by regional governments (Abdullah 1991). Government-sponsored agencies for zakat, charity and alms (Badan Amil Zakat Infak dan Sedekah, BAZIS) were established after the president sent a circular to all public ofﬁces and local governments in 1968, suggesting that they establish zakat agencies in their respective workplaces (Salim 2008: 30). BAZIS were established in Jakarta (1968), East Kalimantan (1972), West Sumatra (1973), West Java (1974), South Kalimantan (1974), South Sumatra, Lampung and Aceh (1975), Papua (1978), North Sulawesi (1985), and South Sulawesi (1985) (Ali 1988; Abdullah 1991). These quasi-government zakat institutions operated parallel to traditional systems of zakat collection and distribution, through which Muslims paid zakat voluntarily to Islamic organisations such as Assyaﬁiyyah and Attahiriyyah in Jakarta. In the 1980s, these parallel systems were joined by a new form of zakat institution, namely voluntary company-based zakat institutions (Abdullah 1991).10 After the shift in the New Order’s approach toward Islam in the late 1980s, the Ministry of Religion began to offer broad guidance on the management of zakat and limited assistance to a variety of zakat institutions. As part of this initiative, the Ministry issued Ministerial Instructions No. 16/1989 and No. 5/1991 and Joint Ministerial Decrees No. 29/1991 and No. 47/1991 concerning the existing zakat agencies, which jointly served to provide a legal basis for zakat agencies in Indonesia. Importantly, however, these instructions and decrees made way for a shift in the nature of zakat agencies from the established government sponsored agencies to non-governmental and semi-autonomous local agencies (Salim 2008: 34). Zakat payment remained voluntary, and no provisions were made for any kind of central coordination of zakat institutions.11

Developments in the Post-Suharto Period

Law No. 38/1999 on Zakat Management was passed in the aftermath of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, which had seen a massive increase in the number of Indonesians

10 Abdullah highlights the example of the Badak LNG Company in East Kalimantan, which established a zakat fund in 1987 to receive contributions from around 300 employees. 11 Note that an organisation called the Forum Zakat emerged in 1997. Led by the private zakat institution, Dhompet Dhuafa Republika, it attempted to unite all zakat agencies (Salim 2008: 40). This organisation, dominated by leaders of private zakat institutions, played an important role in disseminating information before the institutionalisation of zakat in 1999. Zakat in Indonesia 89 living in poverty.12 The law was developed from drafts proposed by the Ministry of Religion in 1967, 1985 and 1991, which had been rejected by Suharto (Salim 2008: 48). The Ministry presented the 1999 draft to parliament on 24 June and the law was enacted in December of the same year.13 The law, whose stated purpose is to enhance the state’s ability to help Muslims pay zakat and to utilise Islamic concepts in achieving social justice, deﬁnes zakat as the submission of property by Muslim individuals or institutions, which is to be distributed to zakat recipients. According to the law, it was necessary to regulate the institutionalisation of zakat through legislation in order to realise zakat’s potential as a source of funds to improve social security for less advantaged citizens. Under the law, the Indonesian government and its agencies are authorised to create zakat institutions to collect and distribute zakat at each level of their administrative structure, with the requirement that each institution meet reporting requirements on its activities. It also allows private zakat institutions to collect and distribute zakat. The 1999 law legalised the establishment of zakat institutions by both government and private organisations. It mandated the establishment of a supervisory board to oversee government-based zakat institutions and the payment of zakat on assets such as gold, silver, cash; trade and companies, products of agriculture, plantation and ﬁsheries, mining, animal husbandry, income from work and services, and treasures buried in the earth. It includes sanctions for administrators who fail to record, or make errors in recording the proceeds of zakat. While it makes the payment of zakat compulsory, it does not impose sanctions on failure to comply (Chap. 7 Article 21). Moreover, it does not nominate the assets to be used in zakat calculations, the methods be used to assess those assets or the groups eligible to receive zakat. Acknowledging some of the shortcomings of the law, the Forum Zakat, the members of which included more than 150 zakat institutions, put forward a proposal for the amendment of the law in 2002. The members of the forum demanded that changes be made so that the principles of Islam formed the basis of zakat management. They proposed that a Ministry of Zakat and Wakaf be established, that zakat institutions be required to actively collect zakat, and sanctions be imposed on those who failed to meet their zakat obligations. This proposal was rejected by Tulus, the Director of Zakat and Wakaf in the Ministry of Religion and Wahiduddin Adam, the director of the Harmonisation of Regulations in the Min- istry of Justice and Human Rights (Salim 2008: 57). Despite its shortcomings, the law facilitated a dramatic restructuring of the institutional landscape around zakat. Most importantly, it created a mandate for the establishment of government zakat institutions (called Badan Amil Zakat) at all levels of government and of the National Government Zakat Institution (Badan Amil Zakat Nasional, BAZNAS). BAZNAS was established in January 2001

12 In 1990, just 3 % of population were said to be living in poverty. This figure rose to 15 % in 1999 and 23 % in 2001. According to a World Bank report released in 2002, the number was even higher, reaching 49 % living under US$2 a day. 13 The Ministry of Religion was criticised for failing to involve Islamic scholars in the drafting process (Salim 2008: 49). 90 4 Zakat through Presidential Decision No. 8/2001.14 As well as collecting and distributing zakat, the institution aims to encourage Muslims to pay zakat, to use the monies collected to reduce poverty, and to create networks among zakat institutions. The zakat institution has three departments: an Operating Committee consisting of 19 members and Advisory and Supervisory Boards, each with seven members. BAZNAS has 33 provincial agencies (Badan Amil Zakat Daerah, BAZDA) and 66 collection units, mainly in Jakarta. As of 2010, there were 497 BAZDA offices at the district level. These local agencies have some autonomy. For example, BAZ- NAS may call on BAZDA to assist in the distribution of zakat proceeds, but not to remit zakat collected locally to the central level. Since its formation, the amount of zakat collected by BASNAS and BAZDA has increased from IDR100 million in 2003 to IDR1.8 trillion in 2011 (Republika 16 January 2012). In terms of distribution, BAZNAS is authorised to distribute zakat into five programs; education, farms and fisheries, natural disasters, health and Islamic education. Critics suggest that BAZNAS has spent a relatively high proportion of zakat proceeds on advertising materials in order to attract more zakat payers, arguing that such costs should be covered by the state budget—a practice that, as noted above, is found in a number of countries in the Middle East—and the institution suffers from poor transparency and a lack of reliable reporting.15 The criticism has prompted BAZNAS and BAZDA to urge Indonesian governments to fund their operational expenses. Since the enactment of the law, 18 private zakat institutions have also been established at the national level, including Dompet Dhuafa (which is associated with the prominent daily newspaper, Republika), Indonesia Zakat House, The Justice Post and People’s Care, as well as institutions under the auspices of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. The Justice Post Concerning Muslim Society (Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat, PKPU), affiliated to the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) which claims to be one of the leading private zakat institutions, was established in December 1999 to help Muslim refugees fleeing social conflicts in Ambon and Maluku.16 It was subsequently formally recognised as a zakat institution through the Minister of Religion’s Decision No. 441/2001. As required by the zakat law, PKPU has three departments: a Supervisory Board, an Advisory Board and an Operating Committee. Its 14 provincial branches deal with more than 70 large companies in Indonesia and have links with 35 international Islamic organisations and communities around the world. In 2010, PKPU collected zakat proceeds worth around IDR10 trillion. Like BAZNAS, PKPU has rescue and rehabilitation programs for natural disaster victims and runs advocacy

14 The information presented here was taken from BAZNAS website, available at http://www. baznas.or.id (Accessed 21 June 2009). 15 Both criticisms were taken from a speech given by the Minister of Religious Affairs in 2008. See the Baznas website, http://www.basnaz.co.id (Accessed 21 June 2009). 16 Most information presented here was taken from http://www.pkpu.or.id (Accessed 21 June 2009). Zakat in Indonesia 91 services. PKPU also provides scholarships for students, clinics in rural areas providing affordable health care and funding for small business groups. Private institutions like the PKPU collect a greater proportion of zakat than the government zakat institutions at the various levels. For this reason, and also in light of the fact that governments cannot control the distribution of zakat that is collected by private institutions, the Ministry of Religion sought to introduce further amendments to the 1999 law on zakat management in 2009. The 2009 draft amendments proposed the imposition of sanctions for those who do not meet their zakat obligations, as proposed earlier by the Forum Zakat, and made provisions for the introduction of tax concessions for zakat payments. Perhaps most importantly, it also aimed to centralise the management of zakat within government-run zakat institutions (Republika 5 June 2009). A heated debate took place on the proposed centralisation of zakat institutions, which, if instituted, would bring all existing zakat institutions under the administration of BAZNAS. Nasaruddin Umar, then Director General for the Guidance of the Muslim Community (Direktur Jenderal Bimbingan Masyarakat Islam, Dirjen Bimas Islam) in the Ministry of Religion—later Vice Minister for Religion—argued that centralisation would be of great beneﬁt because it would increase control over the total amount of zakat collected (Ikhlas Beramal June 2009). However spokespersons for many private Islamic organisations vociferously rejected the proposal for centralisation under government control. For example, Jaya Saputra, a branch head of Rumah Zakat Indonesia said that it would limit the activities of private zakat institutions, while Ahmad Juwaini, the head of Forum Zakat, argued that the government should be more concerned with those who do not pay zakat rather than with centralising zakat management. With regard to the provisions for tax deductions, Government Regulation No. 17/2000 on Income Tax had already provided for a 2.5 % concession on state income tax for Muslims who have paid zakat on their income. Moreover, in August 2010, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issued Government Regulation No. 60/2010 on Zakat as a Tax Deduction on Gross Income, which allowed for the discounting of gross income by the amount of zakat paid, thus reducing the amount on which income tax is paid. The proposed revision sought to apply tax credit for zakat paid on all assets. In September 2010, the Minister of Finance, Agus Martowardojo, spoke strongly against this proposal which, as he pointed out, would have a signiﬁcant effect on tax revenue (Penghasilan Kena Pajak, PKP) (Republika 17 September 2010). A further point of debate on the proposed amendments concerned the proposed sanctions for those who do not meet their zakat obligations. Yusuf Wibisono, the Deputy Head of the Centre for Islamic Business and Economics at the University of Indonesia, suggested that this provision would not be effective, noting that similar measures on secular taxes had been largely ineffective, as had the 1999 law, which had obliged Muslims to pay zakat but had not made provisions for sanctions 92 4 Zakat

(BaituMal 25 October 2010).17 As Wibisono went on to point out, zakat is seen by Indonesian Muslims as voluntary in nature. In any case, the relatively low representation of Muslim parties in the national parliament meant that it was unlikely that any amendment imposing sanctions would be passed.18 The proposed amendments to the 1999 law on zakat management were debated in parliament in 2010 and 2011. Ultimately, in November 2011, Law No. 23/2011 on Zakat Management was passed, despite protests from representatives of the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), who argued that the law would limit the activities of private zakat institutions such as PKPU, which is afﬁliated with the party, and abstention by members of the People’s Conscience Party (Hati Nurani Rakyat, Hanura). The amended law requires private zakat institutions to report their activities to either BAZNAS or BAZDA, depending on their administrative level. It also provides for sanctions on private institutions that fail to do so. Upon the passing of the law, many private zakat institutions again made public statements against it, arguing that it would decrease the role of private zakat institutions (Republika 3 November 2011).19 In 2013, 9 private zakat institutions, such as Dompet Dhuafa, Yayasan Rumah Zakat Indonesia, Yayasan Yatim Mandiri had requested a judicial review on the 2003 Zakat Law to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court then annuled strict requirements for establishment of private zakat institutions. Private zakat institutions were not necessarily from Islamic organizations, must have legal forms and permit from governments. The court also rejected criminali- zation of unlicensed private zakat institutions. However, the court maintains the private zakat institutions to report their management of zakat to government body in their own region. Regulations have also been passed in several provinces and districts on zakat. There is no reliable data on how many local regulations dealing with zakat exist, since regional governments often fail to report the regulations they pass to the central government. However, based on a report from the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, there were at least 18 zakat regulations in seven provinces and 17 districts in 2010. To reinforce the 2011 law on zakat, Governmental Regulation No. 14/2014 was issued. The regulation requires each district throughout Indonesia to establish a BAZDA—which had already been established in majority-Muslim districts throughout Indonesia since 2001—to manage the collection and distribution of zakat. At the time of this writing, this governmental regulation is being proposed by Indonesia zakat forum a judicial review to the Constitutional Court in which the

17 The Indonesian government has a long-standing problem with income tax collection. Of just 20 million registered tax payers in Indonesia, only eight and half million paid tax in 2010 (Kompas 25 September 2011). 18 In 2009, 17 % of seats were held by Islamic political parties. 19 Yusuf Wibisono reportedly plans to mount an appeal against the law in the courts (Republika 3 November 2011). Zakat in Indonesia 93 regulation maintains strict regulation for establishment of zakat institutions and appoints the Ministry of Religious Affairs as ﬁnancial auditors of zakat institutions, not the Indonesian Ulama Council as it is used to.

Zakat in West Sumatra

In West Sumatra, as in other parts of Indonesia, zakat was traditionally collected primarily through mosques or through Islamic private schools. The bulk of the money collected was used to pay for the building and operation of the mosques, orphanages and schools, with very little being distributed to the poor. Following changes at the national level under the New Order, the first modern zakat institution was established in West Sumatra in 1973, with the founding of the government-sponsored BAZIS (Ali 1988; Abdullah 1991). Subsequently, BAZIS were established in governmental institutions such as PT. Semen Padang and the University of Andalas Padang. President Suharto’s circular to government offices in 1968 (the circular that underpinned the establishment of BAZIS across Indonesia), zakat collection was limited to employees of these institutions. In later years, a number of modern private zakat institutions, which became an important mechanism for zakat collection, also emerged in the province. For example, the Collective Body for Zakat, Charity and Alms (Badan Pelaksana Urusan Zakat, Infak dan Sedekah, BP-UZIS), established by Muhammadiyah’s West Sumatra branch in 1995, collected IDR3.4 million in 1995, which increased to IDR19.2 million in 1999. Although Muhammadiyah established another private zakat institution (Lembaga Amil Zakat Muhammadiyah, Lazismu) in 2002, BP- UZIS has maintained its independence, collecting some IDR240 million in 2011 (Padang Ekspres 29 January 2012). With the passing of the 1999 zakat law, regional governments were able to establish their own zakat collection institutions. A BAZDA was first established at the provincial level in 2001. Then between 2003 and 2007, BAZDA were established in 18 of the 19 districts of West Sumatra (the exception being Kepulauan Mentawai, which has a Christian majority population). In practice, these local zakat collection agencies are controlled by the mayors and district heads. For example, Fauzi Bahar, the Mayor of Padang, served as the head of the Padang BAZDA’s Advisory Board from its establishment in 2006 until 2010. In this role, he personally appointed the personnel to the Padang BAZDA’s Advisory, Supervisory and Executive boards (Interview with Irsadunas, BAZDA Executive Committee Member, 25 November 2008).20 The Mayor of Padang then appointed the head of

20 There are clear signals, however, that local governments’ need for popular support in the current political environment will mean that any attempt to do so will have to be negotiated with private stakeholders. 94 4 Zakat

BAZDA’s executive at his time in ofﬁce from members of the Regional Indonesian Ulama Council. Here negotiate the Mayor and the Indonesian Ulama Council in arrangment of zakat management.

The Public Discourse of Zakat

Official narratives about zakat have focussed strongly on the religious risks of not fulfilling one’s obligation to pay zakat, zakat’s potential as a tool for poverty reduction and emergency relief, and on regional governments’ important role in the facilitation of zakat collection and distribution. However, in contrast to the public discourse on the other issues dealt with in this book, I have not been able to find any instances where the imposition of zakat has been justified in terms of the Minang philosophy, ‘Adat Basandi Syarak Syarak Basandi Kitabullah’. Instead, admoni- tions to the community to meet their zakat obligations are framed in terms of the moral risks of failing to do so. The Padang city administration, for example, has put up a large billboard in the centre of the city proclaiming that zakat keeps the rich from the flames of hell and the poor from blasphemy (Zakat Menyelamatkan Sikaya dari Api Neraka dan Simiskin dari Kekufuran). Moreover, the failure to comply with the obligation to pay zakat is said to have implications not only for individuals but for the entire community. According to Amri Darwis, head of the District of Limapuluh Kota:

Recurrent disasters happen because of the faults of mankind. People no longer follow God’s commands and doctrines. Take the example of zakat. So many people are reluctant to fulﬁl their obligation to pay zakat, including government employees (Padang Ekspres 15 June 2009). The fear of total destruction as a result of an earthquake or other natural disaster unleashed by God on his sinful subjects has proven to be a strong incentive to meet one’s religious obligations.21 More common, however, are appeals to Muslims’ conscience and sense of social justice. Salmadanis, the head of BAZDA Padang has told the public on many occasions that the function of zakat is to alleviate poverty.22 Similar statements have been made by the Mayor of Padang, Fauzi Bahar (Padang Ekspres 23 April 2008) and the head of the Regional Parliament’s Special Committee for the Regulation of Zakat, Azwar Siry, who went as far as to claim that ‘with zakat, no Muslims will be in poverty’ (Padang Ekspres 30 April 2010). According to Fauzi Bahar, the task of the regional government in alleviating poverty would be minimal if wealthy people paid the appropriate amount of zakat. In 2008, he claimed that ‘as much as IDR90 trillion could be collected in Padang

21 As noted in Chap. 2, there is general feeling in West Sumatra that natural disasters have befallen the province because of the community’s lack of religiosity. 22 He restated this in a personal meeting with me (Interview, 15 November 2010), as did Mah- yeldi, now the Vice Mayor of Padang in an interview 2 years earlier (Interview, 20 October 2008). Zakat in West Sumatra 95 every year. If that potential were reached, there would be no poverty in the city’ (Singgalang 15 September 2008).23 Reiterating this theme in the following year, he became even more pointed, exclaiming ‘how can it be that the 72 % of the people of Padang who are prosperous cannot alleviate the poverty of the remaining 28 %?’ (Padang Ekspres 30 September 2009).24 Similar statements have been made by officials in other parts of West Sumatra. Amran Nur, the Mayor of Sawahlunto, observed that ‘if the potential for zakat collection was mined more intensively by BAZ Sawahlunto, there would be no poor people in the district’ (Padang Ekspres 30 April 2010). According to Zulfiadi, the secretary of BAZDA Bukittinggi, ‘the more people who pay zakat, the sooner our goal of eliminating poverty will be realised’ (Padang Ekspres 12 August 2006). The second major theme in the public discourse pertains to promoting BAZDA or zakat institutions over alternative means of paying zakat. Proponents justify the choice of a zakat institution (over individually-directed contributions) by pointing to the risks of not reaching those in most need. According to Muharlion, a member of the Padang regional parliament from the local Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), contributions to institutions such as mosques or orphanages should be avoided because the zakat institution is most able to ensure that distribution can be targeted at those who need it (PosMetro Padang 8 Sep- tember 2009). Kardinal, the head of the local Ministry of Religion office in the District of Solok Selatan, agreed with this assessment, observing that ‘while there is no problem with paying zakat to immediate family or to neighbours, it is better to contribute through zakat institutions because the institutions will manage the contribution and distribute it to worthy recipients’ (Padang Ekspres 5 October 2010). Salmadanis, the head of BAZDA Padang, spoke even more strongly against alternative distribution mechanisms, arguing that it was in fact un-Islamic to distribute zakat through private companies. In his words: ‘The practice of big companies (in distributing zakat directly) contravenes God’s commands. In At-Taubah verse 60 of the Qur’an, it is said that a Muslim must pay zakat through a zakat institution’ (Padang Ekspres 16 September 2008). The Mayor of Padang, Fauzi Bahar, also took a strong stand, arguing that there was in fact a risk that zakat would be used inappropriately if channelled through the wrong institution. He warned that contributing to a mosque fund could, for example, result in a situation where zakat proceeds were used for mosque construction, which was against the precepts specifying the permitted categories of zakat recipients (Padang Ekspres 18 August 2010). On another occasion, he warned that direct contributions to individuals were inappropriate, commenting that:

23 According to one estimate, a total of IDR300 billion in zakat could be collected in West Sumatra. Currently, only about 10 % of this amount is being accessed (Padang Today 19 August 2010). 24 According to the National Bureau of Statistics, 15 % of West Sumatrans were living in poverty in 2001. The ﬁgure decreased to 9 % in 2011. 96 4 Zakat

The obligation to pay zakat is not such that it should be paid directly to recipients. At the moment our contribution passes from our hands to the zakat institution, God notes that we have fulfilled our obligation. It is up to those zakat institutions to decide what is to be done with the money they collect (Singgalang 18 September 2008). Officials justify their emphasis on the importance of regional zakat institutions in terms of their focus on the local community. As Zulfiadi noted, ‘zakat is collected from the people of Bukittinggi and distributed only to people in Bukittinggi’ (Padang Ekspres 26 August 2010). In addition, officials explain, the use of regional mechanisms is beneficial because regional governments are prepared to work hard to encourage more people to fulfill their obligations and can use the funds collected flexibly in order to meet the needs of the people of West Sumatra. The determination of local officials to stimulate the collection of zakat is clearly reflected in a statement by Zulfiadi, the secretary of BAZDA Bukittinggi, describing his plans for ensuring that the well-off fulfil their zakat obligations:

Wealthy people must help the poor. All the economic resources of the wealthy in each sub- district (kelurahan) will be documented: how many hectares of agricultural land they own, what their business activities are, and how much income they earn. Those who are eligible to pay zakat will be required to do so (Padang Ekspres 18 August 2010). In another example, Hamdy Burhan, the Vice Head of the District of Pasaman, noted that BAZDA Pasaman had managed to increase the amount it had collected by raising awareness among government employees of their obligation to pay zakat (Posmetro Padang 8 September 2009). Meanwhile, Fauzi Bahar received a Zakat Award in 2011 from the national zakat research organisation, Indonesian Magnif- icence of Zakat (IMZ), for increasing the amount of zakat collected every year in Padang (Padang Ekspres 5 August 2011). Ofﬁcials celebrate the capacity of local government zakat mechanisms by providing examples of the good to which monies collected have been put. When Maigus Nasir, the head of operational administration of BAZDA Padang, announced that in 2008 a total of IDR321.6 million had been allocated for scholarships to be distributed to the highest achieving students from poor families, he emphasised that ‘this money was collected by BAZDA Padang’ (quoted in Padang Ekspres 31 August 2008). According to Maigus Nasir, ‘every new academic year we read in the media that there are children of great ability whose parents cannot afford to send them to university. For this reason, Bazda Padang provides university scholarships for the needy’ (Padang Today 26 May 2010). Announcing that transport costs for poor families needing to travel to a hospital were being funded from zakat payments, Pun Ardi, the Secretary of Commission IV in the Padang Regional Parliament, again emphasised that these expenses were ‘paid by BAZDA’ (Padang Ekspres 5 April 2010). Fauzi Bahar also pointed to the beneﬁts of locally-controlled zakat resources in emergency circumstances:

I think that if the management of zakat is effective, its beneﬁts will be enormous, especially in emergency situations. For example, in the aftermath of the 30 September earthquake, we helped children avoid dropping out of school by using funds from the IDR43 trillion in zakat collected by the Padang city administration (Padang Today 10 April 2010). Zakat in West Sumatra 97

Similarly, Yandril, the head of BAZDA in the District of Agam announced that locally-administered zakat funds had been used for emergency relief after the 30 September 2010 earthquake (Posmetro Padang 26 Mei 2010). Muslim groups have been critical of local governments’ engagement with zakat more generally. The head of the Fatwa unit of the regional Ulama Council (MUI), Gusrizal Gazahar, suggested that they have taken advantage of the poor, trumpeting the distribution of zakat proceeds to them as a government success (Padang Eks- pres 3 September 2010). Another regional Islamic leader, Nasrun Harun, asserted in the major national Islamic newspaper that implementation of zakat in Padang, where all employees are subject to zakat, is not in line with Islamic principles (Republika 15 June 2006). Individuals are required to meet a threshold (nisab) calculated on income from their assets (or wages) before they are required to pay zakat. According to the Shaﬁ’i School, the nisab should be set at around 85 grams of gold, or the equivalent of IDR25 million per a year. According to this calculation, the majority of government employees in West Sumatra should be exempted from payment of zakat since their salaries are lower than the nisab.

The Regional Regulation of Zakat

Since decentralisation, several forms of regulation (local regulations, instructions and circulars issued by district heads) have been used to make zakat compulsory in West Sumatra. Local regulations (Peraturan Daerah, Perda) on zakat have been passed in nine of the 19 districts in the province.25 The first local regulations on zakat management was passed in Solok in 2003 (Local Regulation No. 13/2003), quickly followed by Pesisir Selatan (Local Regulation No. 31/2003). Local Reg- ulation No. 13/2003 on Zakat Management has the stated aim of improving the management of zakat in order to facilitate its collection, to increase the function and role of religious institutions in the creation of a fair and just society; and to increase the use and efficiency of zakat. The law not only requires individual Muslims and business institutions owned by Muslims to pay zakat but designates that payments should be channelled through the appropriate BAZDA. From 2004 to 2010, local regulations on zakat management were also passed in Bukittinggi and Padang, as well as in the districts of Sawahlunto, Sijunjung and Agam. Local regulation No. 2/2010 on Zakat Management in Padang, for example, makes the payment of zakat compulsory for Muslim citizens financially capable of paying it, along with businesses owned by Muslims in Padang. The local regulation nominates assets including gold, silver, cash, trading and business profits, agricultural, plantation and fishery products, mining, livestock, income and artefacts as being liable to zakat and identifies the recipients of zakat as the poor, the homeless, those who collect zakat (amil), new converts to Islam, slaves, debtors, those

25 Some laws extend to charitable donations (infaq) and alms (shadaqah). 98 4 Zakat engaged in the ‘way of God’ and wayfarers. All these local regulations nominated BAZDA as the agency for the collection and distribution of zakat. Although other districts have not passed local regulations on zakat management, instructions and circulars by district heads on management of zakat have been applied in all but Kepulauan Mentawai. In the other nine districts, mayors and district heads have used these regulatory tools, as well as less formal policies, to better control the collection and distribution of zakat. Among other initiatives, BAZDA have been established in Pariaman, Payakumbuh, Tanah Datar, Solok Selatan, Pasaman Barat, Pasaman, Padang Pariaman, Lima Puluh Kota and Dhar- masraya. In Payakumbuh and Bukittinggi, all regional government employees are obliged to pay 1 % of their monthly income to BAZDA. The zakat contributions of these employees are deducted automatically from their salaries (Padang Ekspres 15 June 2009). Local officials have also argued for an amendment to the 1999 national zakat law in an attempt to wrest control management of zakat from private zakat institutions, asserting that government zakat institutions should be given the sole rights to the distribution of zakat proceeds. Under this proposal, private zakat institutions would still be allowed to exist, but only to collect zakat, not to distribute it. According to Febri Thomas, the Head of the Zakat Sub-Unit in the Padang office of the Ministry of Religion, a single mechanism for the management of zakat distribution is necessary to avoid situations where there is overlap with other programs for poverty alleviation, because this could result in some recipients receiving double the amount they deserve (Interview, 29 November 2010). This proposal elicited strong opposition from proponents of private zakat institutions, who argued that they are more trustworthy that the government’s zakat institutions (Padang Ekspres 26 August 2010), citing as evidence for this that the private zakat offices receive more contributions from Muslims overseas than the state institutions (Padang Ekspres 21 August 2010).26 The mechanisms for managing zakat are determined separately by each zakat institution. BAZDA Padang, for example, collected IDR10 billion in 2009, of which more than IDR8 billion was distributed in that year.27 Funding allocations included IDR5 million for four muadzin (those who call Muslims to prayer) and

26 In 2007, Fauzi Bahar, the Mayor of Padang, hosted a Zakat Conference for Southeast Asian countries, inviting speakers from Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam and Singapore. Attendees also included individuals from other countries such as Australia, Saudi Arabia and Germany (Rumah Zakat 31 October 2007). It was at this conference that the decision was made to create a secretariat of the Southeast Asian Zakat Council (Dewan Zakat Asean) in Indonesia. Private zakat institutions’ overseas links are primarily with expatriate West Sumatrans. For example, the Minangkabau Association of West Sumatra Society (the Minang USA Foundation) in America channelled their zakat collection through PKPU in 2009. The PKPU also has links with the Minangkabau Asso- ciation (Minang Saiyo) in Sydney Australia, which remitted around AUD3,500 to PKPU in 2009 (Interview, Jon Afrizal, 19 September 2009). 27 An amount of IDR1 billion was to be collected in 2010 in the sub-district of Kuranji alone (Asril, the head of the education sub-unit in the sub-district of Kuranji, cited in Singgalang 25 August 2010). Zakat in West Sumatra 99 more than IDR600 million for Islamic activities, such as payments for sermons in governmental ofﬁces and on the local radio station, activities proposed by private citizen Muslims and ceremonial activities during the month of Ramadan. The remainder was distributed through a variety of allocations such as direct cash contributions, scholarships and training for around 20,000 Muslim recipients (Ba- zda Kota Padang 2010). BAZDA Bukittinggi announced that 60 % of the IDR1 trillion it collected in 2009 was allocated to the education of children from poor families (Rahman Ritonga, head of the Educational Council of Bukittinggi cited in Posmetro Padang 31 March 2010). A further IDR1.8 million was distributed to each of seven poor older people via the Family Empowerment and Welfare Agency (Pemberdayaan dan Kesejahteraan Keluarga, PKK) (Tati Budi Perwira quoted in Padang Ekspres 3 June 2009). Two years later, this agency allocated the funds it collected to social welfare programs including the provision of scholarships for students at primary and secondary schools and incentives for non-permanent teachers (guru honor) in both general and Islamic schools (Padang Ekspres 29 July 2011). BAZDA Pasaman Barat, meanwhile, allocated their zakat proceeds to cash subsidies for the poor and to scholarships for tertiary students (Padang Ekspres 24 November 2011). Muslim groups are concerned that regional governments rather than Islamic leaders now have the authority to decide which groups of Muslims receive zakat and which activities are funded from zakat proceeds. They fear that these funds are being used to further the government’s own agenda. For example, in 2009 a zakat program was combined with a governmental program called the Poor Family Program (Keluarga Miskin, Gakin) in Padang. In another example, recipients of scholarships from zakat proceeds are required to participate in Islamic activities (Maigus Nasir, head of administration, BAZDA Padang, quoted in Singgalang 2 November 2010). These concerns, however, have so far had little impact on the regional government’s engagement in the collection and distribution of zakat. Other criticisms include complaints that the regional government’s emphasis on zakat has silenced discussion on the use of secular income tax for social welfare programs, which frees up the proceeds of secular taxes for other projects.

Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, regional governments construct zakat in two particular ways. On the one hand, zakat is religious obligation designed to assist in the alleviation of poverty, which can be used by regional governments to increase the availability of ﬁnancial resources for the provision of social welfare and other poverty-related projects, thus releasing funds for other initiatives. These efforts have been extremely important in leveraging the contemporary focus on Islam within local politics to maximise the province’s resources. The chapter has also demonstrated, however, that the local politics of zakat have been strongly inﬂuenced by the zakat movement in the wider Muslim world. 100 4 Zakat

The regular international conferences held by the OIC and regional meetings of the DZAT in Southeast Asian countries, which provide networks and information to the national government and to regional authorities, have had a significant influence on national and local decision-making about the administration of zakat, even though local pressures and considerations have ultimately shaped the precise institutional form taken by those initiatives in the West Sumatran context. Importantly also, as the chapter has shown, zakat has not been justified in local political discourse by reference to the Minangkabau philosophy of ‘Adat Basandi Syarak Syarak Basandi Kitabullah’, but rather to West Sumatra’s place in the contemporary Islamic world. This is particularly striking since, as the previous chapter has shown, references to the regional philosophy have been a strong characteristic of public discourse on Islamic finance, even though Islamic financial institutions have much less of a history in the province than zakat. As will be shown in the following chapters, the public discourse on education and behaviour and dress also make significant reference to the regional philosophy, meaning that zakat is very much the exception in this respect.

References

Abdullah, Taufik. 1991. Zakat collection and distribution in Indonesia. In The voluntary sector in Southeast Asia, ed. Mohamed Ariff. Singapore: ISEAS. Ahmed, Habib. 2004. Role of Zakat and Wakaf in poverty alleviation. Riyadh: Islamic Research and Training Institute. Alfitri, 2006. The law of Zakat management and non-governmental Zakat collectors in Indonesia. International Journal of Non-for-Profit Law 8(22): 55–64. Ali, Mohammad Daud. 1988. Sistem ekonomi Islam: Zakat dan Wakaf. Jakarta: UI Press. Al-Omar, Fouad Abdullah. 1995. General, administrative and organisational aspects. In Institutional framework of Zakah: Dimensions and implications, ed. Al-Ashker, and Sirajul Haq. Riyadh: IRTI, IDB. Ariff, Mohammad. 1991. Resource mobilization through the Islamic voluntary sector in Southeast Asia. In The Islamic voluntary sector in Southeast Asia, ed. Mohammad Ariff. Singapore: ISEAS. Barker, Christine R. 2004. Church and state: Lessons from Germany? The Political Quarterly 75 (2): 168–176. Basher, Suliman. 1993. On the origins and development of the meaning of Zakat in early Islam. Arabica 40(1): 84–113. Benthall, Jonathan. 1999. Financial worship: The Quranic injunction to almsgiving. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 5(1): 27–42. Burr, J. Millard, and Robert O. Collins. 2006. Alms for Jihad: Charity and terrorism in the Islamic world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coffield, James. 1970. A popular history of taxation: From ancient to modern times. London: Longman. Harrelson, Walter. 2005. Tithes. In Encyclopedia of religion, second edition, ed. Lindsay Jones. Detroit: Macmillan. Imtiazi, I.A. 1985. Organisation of Zakat: The Pakistan model and experience. In Management of Zakat in modern Muslim society, ed. I.A. Imtiazi, M.A. Mannan, M.A. Niaz, and A.H. Deria. Karachi: IRTI Islamic Development Bank. References 101

Islamic Relief. 2009. 25 years of service to humanity 1984–2009. Birmingham: Islamic Relief Worldwide. Kahf, Monzer. 1995. Applied institutional models for Zakah collection and distribution in Islamic countries and communities. In institutional framework of Zakah: Dimensions and implications, ed. A.A.F. El-Ashker, and M.S. Haq. Jeddah: Islamic Research and Training Institute Islamic Development Bank. Kuran, Timur. 2004. Islam and mammon: The economic predicaments of Islamism. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Meagher, P.K., and D. Dietlein. 2003. Tithes. In Encyclopedia, second edition, ed. New Catholic. Detroit: Gale. Nienhaus, Volker. 2007. Zakat, taxes, and public ﬁnance in Islam. In Islam and the everyday world: Public policy dilemmas, ed. Sohrab Behdad, and Farhad Nomani. New York: Routledge. Salim, Arskal. 2007. Muslim politics in Indonesia’s democratisation: The religious majority and the rights of minorities in the post-new order era. In Indonesia: Democracy and the promise of good governance, ed. Ross McLeod, and Andrew MacIntyre. Singapore: ISEAS. Salim, Arskal. 2008. The shift in Zakat practice in Indonesia: From piety to an Islamic socio- political-economic system. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. Siddiqi, M. Nejatullah. 1996. The role of the voluntary sector in Islam: A conceptual framework. In The Islamic voluntary sector in Southeast Asia, ed. Mohammed Ariff. Singapore: ISEAS. Snouck Hurgronje. 1992 [1936]. Nasihat-nasihat C. Snouck Hurgronje Semasa Kepegawaiannya Kepada Pemerintah Hindia Belanda 1880-1936 (trans: Sukarsi). Original edition Ambtelijk Adviezen van C. Snouck Hurgronje 1889–1936. Jakarta: INIS. Wilson, Rodney. 1998. Islamic ﬁnance and ethical investment. International Journal of Social Economics 24(11): 1325–1343. Zeitlin, Solomon. 1932. The Am Haarez: A study in the social and economic life of the Jews before and after the destruction of the Second Temple. The Jewish Quarterly Review 23(1): 45–61. Zysow, Aron. 2009. Zakat. In Encyclopedia of Islam, second edition, ed. Bearman et al. Leiden: Brill Online. Chapter 5 Islamic Education

Abstract Islamic education has become an integral part of the secular education system in West Sumatra in the post-Suharto era. Although it has traditionally been managed by the local ofﬁce of the Ministry of Religion, regional governments now also have a role to play in providing Islamic education and determining the form it takes in a particular province. They also help shape community expectations about the level of religious knowledge individuals should possess. This chapter examines the interaction of local, national and transnational Islamic inﬂuences in Islamic education in West Sumatra historically and since decentralisation, with a particular focus on local government intervention in debates around Qur’anic literacy and Pesantren Ramadan, a compulsory religious activity for public school children during the fasting month. The chapter argues that, in discursive terms, the regional government has sought to identify Islamic education with regional culture (which must be maintained), while also using it as a policy tool in response to community demands for moral renewal in the face of rapid social change.

Keywords Global Islam Á Education Á Local politics Á Social moral demands

The Origins of Islamic Education

Islam endorses education and strongly encourages Muslims to study and learn. The following two verses in the Qur’an show the importance of education in Islam:

God will raise those of you who believe and those who have knowledge. God is aware of what you do (Q 58: 11). Say: Can those who know, and those who do not know, be equal? Only they think who are wise (Q 39: 9). Halstead (2004: 522) argues that the term ‘Islamic education’ has three meanings. First, it refers to the ‘development of individual potential and to the process of nurturing and guiding the child to a state of completeness and maturity’. Second, it is ‘the process of character development and learning a sound basis for moral and social behaviour within community and society at large’. Third, it refers to ‘the

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015 103 D.P. Salim, The Transnational and the Local in the Politics of Islam, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15413-8_5 104 5 Islamic Education imparting and receiving of knowledge, usually through training, instruction, or other form of teaching’. Other scholars have tried to narrow the definition of Islamic education. Douglas and Shaikh (2004: 2) describe it as education in which classical Islamic literature, such as the Qur’an and Hadith, and in which the use of classical methods, such memorisation, are central. Similarly, Wagner and Lotfi (1980) identify mastery and memorisation of Islamic scripture as the main goal of traditional Islamic education. Other scholars focus on the purposes of Islamic education. Rosenthal (1970) and Talbani (1996) argue that Islamic education aims to reproduce Islamic culture and promote Islamic ideology, while Al-Attas (1979: 1) describes its purpose as instilling a sense of what it means to be Muslim. Chamberlin (1975) argues that Islamic education aims to unify communities through its appeals to classical Islamic literature, and in particular to verses on the Qur’an and the Hadith. More recently, Haneef (2005) has described the purpose of Islamic education in the twentieth century as being to link modern knowledge to classical Islamic literatures in order to identify solutions to contemporary problems in Islamic communities. Perhaps most relevant in the modern era is the concept of the ‘Islamisation of knowledge’,a phrase first coined by the Malaysian scholar Muhammad Naquib al-Attas in 1977 and later developed by Palestinian philosopher Ismail Al-Faruqi (Halstead 2004: 522), to describe the process through which Islamic scholars filter modern education through an Islamic lens. Many Islamic countries favour either modern educational institutions where Islamic education is added to the curriculum or Islamic modern educational institutions where modern knowledge is taught. In modern Islamic universities, there are faculties of information technology, engineering, pharmacy and health, for example. However, they also provide Qur’anic education and other disciplines such as Arabic language, translation and interpretation of the Qur’an, history of Islam, Syari’a and jurisprudence (Talbani 1996: 69).1 In this way, as Hefner (2007) argues, present-day Islamic education is neither traditional nor medieval but embedded in the modern world.

Global Perspectives on Islamic Education

Informal Islamic education arose soon after the emergence of Islam in the seventh century. Later, when mosques were established as places of worship for Muslims in the eighth century, they became the focus of educational practice. Prominent

1 The Islamic jurisprudence introduced by the Shafi’i School is designed to respond to day-to-day Islamic issues by looking to the Qur’an and the Prophet’s messages for answers to contemporary dilemmas faced by Muslims. If no direct reference to contemporary issues can be found, analogies are drawn from other issues found in the Qur’an and the Prophet’s messages. If there is no analogy to be drawn, Muslim judges turn to the decisions made by previous Muslim judges, customs, and historical precedents for inspiration. Global Perspectives on Islamic Education 105 mosques like Masjid il Haram in Mecca and Nabawi in Medina attracted Muslims from all over the world, who came as pilgrims and stayed to study Islam and Arabic. Mosques in other Islamic communities, such as the Umayyad Mosque in present-day Syria, the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Israel, and the Al-Azhar Mosque in Egypt, also became centres of Islamic and Arabic learning.2 The trend continued in Tunisia, Mali and Spain from the eighth to the twelfth century. Mosques have continued to be centres of informal Islamic education in present-day Islamic communities, along with Qur’anic schools (many of them associated with a mosque) and community-based study groups (Wagner and Lotfi 1980: 239–240). The origins of a more formal Islamic education system can be traced to developments in the ninth century.3 Darul Hukama (House of Wisdom), the first formal Islamic educational institution, which was established in Bagdad by the Abbasid dynasty, became a centre for translation and specialised study and investigation. The Fatimid dynasty then established the Al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo in 972 and transformed it into an academy in 989 (Ali 1996: 11). When the Ayyubids took over Egypt in the twelfth century, they sponsored several madrasas, including the Al-Azhar Madrasa (Ali 1996: 13). Nizamiyah University in Nishapur, and Nizamiyah University and Mustansariya University in Baghdad were subsequently established between the tenth and thirteenth centuries. By the middle of the fifteenth century, there were 73 madrasas in Cairo, each of which offered religious-based instruction according to one of the four established Sunni schools, namely the Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanafi and Hambali schools (Ali 1996: 14). By the sixteenth century, these forms of Islamic educational institution had expanded to locations in North Africa such as Tunisia and Morocco. At this time, Islamic educational institutions taught Islamic religious subjects as well as philosophy, astronomy, medicine and mathematics. With the expansion of colonial empires from the seventeenth century, the financial base of Islamic education was destroyed and their graduates lost their positions in their communities (Eickelman 1978: 488). Local officials were trained in newly established modern secular schools and secular education replaced Islamic education in providing the qualifications for high-status occupations (Talbani 1996). Consequently, Muslims in urban areas aiming to enter the professions abandoned Islamic schools in favour of secular schools (Reid 1977: 353; Eickelman 1978). Although some Islamic institutions introduced subjects taught in secular schools (Eickelman 1978: 488)—including Al-Azhar University in Cairo (Heyworth-Dunne 1968: 395–405)—other Islamic educational institutions remained unchanged (Eickelman 1978: 488). In the twentieth century, the waning of colonial empires and the creation of Islamic nation-states led to the growth of Islamic education in the Islamic states of

2 See Laffan (2004) for a detailed discussion of the importance of Cairo, as a centre of thought and learning, for Indonesians wishing to study Islam. 3 Most early formal educational institutions were created by the relocation of informal Islamic educations from mosques and surrounding buildings. Today’s Islamic educational institutions build mosques as part of their educational facilities. 106 5 Islamic Education the Middle East. The University of Tehran was established in 1934, Baghdad University in 1956, King Abdul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia in 1971 and University of Umm Al-Qura in Mecca in 1981. However, the sector grew much more slowly in other Islamic countries, which lacked clear policies on Islamic education (Brenner 2001). In Pakistan, Aligarh Muslim University was established in 1911 (Jaffrelot 2002: 9), but the Islamic University was not established until 1980, changing its name to the International Islamic University in 1985. In Malaysia, the first Islamic education institution was the Kolej Islam, which was established in 1955 in Selangor. In 1970 Kolej Islam became the Islamic Studies Department of the University of Malaya and then the National University of Malaysia (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia) in 1982 (Roff 1998: 219). While the tertiary sector experienced limited growth, expansion of the system was far greater at the primary and secondary levels. In Egypt, the number of classrooms in primary and secondary madrasas managed by Al-Azhar had risen to more than 4,000 in 1981 (Anzar 2003: 9) while in Pakistan, the number of madrasas had grown to some 2,000 in 1980. In Bangladesh, the number of madrasas had reached almost 7,000 in 1990s (Anzar 2003: 12). Likewise, the rise of madrasas was also apparent in Malaysia, particularly with Mahathir Muhamad’s efforts to co- opt traditional madrasas into the modern education system and to establish new ones from 1981. Islamic educational institutions have also been established in Western and minority Muslim countries. These include Arkana College, which was established in Sydney in 1960, the King Fahad Academy, established in London in 1985 (and subsequently in 15 other Western cities), and the British Columbia Muslim School, established in Canada in 1983. By 2008, these institutions were much more numerous. In the United Kingdom alone—one of the biggest Western recipients of education funding from Islamic countries—there were 126 Islamic schools, a number of which also received state funding (BBC News 8 February 2007). Adefining influence on Islamic education around the world since the 1950s has been the flow of money from oil-rich Middle Eastern countries (Brenner 2001). Saudi oil money in particular has been used to export Saudi Arabian interpretations of Islam to other Islamic countries through the building of, and provision of ongoing funding for, mosques, Islamic centres, schools and universities, along with scholarships for study in Saudi Arabia. Many students are enrolled in Saudi Arabian schools in countries such as Sudan, Pakistan, and Senegal (Prokop 2003: 83). Qatar and Kuwait have also played an important role in funding Islamic schools in Southeast Asia.4 Government intervention of this nature is not new. The rulers of Islamic polities have long played a role in the establishment of Islamic educational institutions, and in their internal politics. In the tenth century, the Fatimid dynasty used the Al-Azhar

4 There is little information available on the role of Iran in Southeast Asian educational institutions, perhaps because, although Shi’a communities do exist in Southeast Asia, the majority of Southeast Asian Muslims are Sunni. Global Perspectives on Islamic Education 107 mosque to train Shi’a missionaries, who were subsequently sent throughout the Islamic world. The collapse of the Fatimid government led the Abbasid dynasty to introduce Sunni Islam to the Al-Azhar mosque and to establish the Nizamiya Madrasah in Bagdad in the twelfth century (Ali 1996: 11). From the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire tried to control Islamic education by planning the curricula of Islamic schools throughout its empire. The ﬂow of ﬁnancial resources to these institutions and appointments were used by Ottoman rulers to encourage the development of interpretations that were in line with their interests (Talbani 1996: 71). Islamic states continued to control Islamic education after they gained independence from their colonial rulers, and to use it to propagate their messages. For example, the Saudi Arabian curriculum is designed to homogenise the population and instil loyalty to the state (Doumato 2007: 154). History books disregard the pluralist history of Saudi Arabia, in particular, the historical importance of the Shi’a, and instead emphasise the role of Abdul Aziz (Ibn Saud) in unifying the tribes and region. Moreover, Shi’ism was denounced openly in schoolbooks before 1993 and is still not allowed to be taught in Saudi Schools (Prokop 2003: 81).5 Since the revolution in Iran, Islamic schools have been used to train politicians (Eickelman 1985: 652), while Islamic education is considered as instrument for identity-creation in Pakistan (Talbani 1996: 76). By contrast, in Turkey, Mustafa Kemal limited the reach of Islamic education as part of his attempt to secularise the country (Landis 2007).6

The Development of Islamic Education in Indonesia

Indonesia has a long-standing tradition of private Islamic boarding schools called pondok pesantren, initially established in Java and Madura. The word pondok, derived from the Arabic word fundug, means dormitory, while pesantren originates from Sanskrit, as does santri, the word used to describe pesantren students (Dhoﬁer 1982: 18). The ﬁrst pesantren was established in 1742 in Tegalsari in Java (van Bruinessen 1994, 2004). Hasyim Asyari, the founder of Nahdlatul Ulama, established Pesantren Tebuireng in Jombang in East Java in 1899 and Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah, established a school in Kauman in Yogyakarta in 1918. Both these organisations have played a vital role in Islamic education ever since.7

5 Shi’ism continues to be denounced in books distributed at mosques (Prokop 2003: 81). 6 Since the Islamist Justice and Development Party came to power in Turkey in 2002, Islamic education has been combined with secular Western inﬂuences, resulting in a syllabus that devotes 40 % of class time to Islamic subjects such as Arabic, Islamic jurisprudence and rhetoric and 60 % to secular subjects (Pak 2004: 327). 7 According to Pigeaud (1967: 76), this form of Islamic educational institution has its roots in pre- Islamic educational institutions including the Hindu mandala and ashrama. Similarly, Fokkens (1886, cited in van Bruinessen 1994) argues that they were inﬂuenced by the ‘education villages’ (desa perdikan) and taxation-free status accorded to teachers in pre-Islamic Java. 108 5 Islamic Education

In addition to pesantren, Indonesia has a system of madrasas, which arose in under the influence of trends in Islamic education in Egypt which saw secular subjects introduced into the madrasa curriculum (Kelabora 1976: 231). The oldest madrasas in Indonesia are the Sekolah Adabiyah, which was established in Padang in 1909 by the reformist Abdullah Ahmad, and the Madrasa Aliyatus-Saniyah Mu’awanatul Muslimin, established by Sarekat Islam in Kudus in 1915 (Yunus 1979: 63). In the 1930s, Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam (Persis) also introduced modern disciplines in their Islamic schools (Yunus 1979: 102). Similarly, in 1932, Persyarikatan Ulama established an Islamic boarding school called Santi Asrama in Majalengka, West Java, where agricultural skills were taught (Noer 1973: 71). By contrast, Nahdlatul Ulama maintained a focus on traditional Islamic studies in its thousands of traditional boarding schools but introduced general subjects such as English and Dutch in affiliated madrasas. In the late colonial period, a number of madrasas offering secular subjects as part of their curriculum were also established in other parts of the country. These included the Madrasa al-Khairat in Palu, which was established by Al-Khairat, an organisation led by Idrus bin Salim Aljufrie in Sulawesi in 1930, and the Madrasa Nahdlatul Wathan, established by the Nahdlatul Wathan Organisation in Lombok in 1936. Al-Irsyad Islamiyah, in Jakarta, was established by Indonesians of Arab descent in 1913, while Tarbiyah Islamiyah established Madrasa Tarbiyah Islamiyah in 1938 in Sulawesi (Yunus 1979:64–67). There were two main drivers of the development of the formal Islamic education system in this early part of the twentieth century. The first was the result of the limited reach of the general school system. When the Dutch first came to Indonesia in the seventeenth century, they had no interest in education. However, they introduced secular schools in Java and the outer islands in the middle of the nineteenth century, with the establishment of the 3 years of primary village schooling for low level government officials. A secondary level consisting of general and technical high schools was then introduced in the 1860s, and teacher training colleges in 1870s (Kelabora 1976: 232). Opportunities for ordinary Indonesians expanded with the introduction of the Dutch Ethical Policy in 1901. The Ethical Policy was recognised the ethical responsibility of the Netherlands government for the welfare of its colonial subjects. As part of the implementation of the policy, the Dutch introduced Village Schools (Volksscholen), and a 2 year extension school (Vervolgschool), to accommodate children who wanted to continue their studies after attending a village school. These schools made formal secular education much more widely available but still only a small proportion of Indonesians had access to it (Abdullah 1971: 56). The other main driver of the development of the formal Islamic education system at the turn of the twentieth century was developments in the Middle East. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the plummeting of the costs of completing the haj as a result of the establishment of new sea route through the Suez Canal (van Bruinessen 1990: 47) and increasing economic activity and migration of Hadrami Arabs to the Indonesian archipelago (Abaza 1994: 39) led to an increase in the number of Indonesian pilgrims and students in the Middle East. Numbers rose from The Development of Islamic Education in Indonesia 109

1,100 in 1853 to 28,800 in 1920 (van Bruinessen 1990). Many pilgrims spent years in the Islamic education system in Mecca, Medina or Cairo before returning home to establish Islamic schools in the Dutch East Indies. For example, Ahmad Dahlan established Muhammadiyah schools throughout the country. In 1905, however, the Dutch issued the Teacher Ordinance (Guru-Ordonnantie), which established a licencing system for Islamic teachers (Suminto 1985: 51). Under this system, native Islamic teachers were required to obtain a teaching licence from a ‘native chief’ before they could give religious instruction. Anyone wishing to give instruction in the ‘Mohammedan religion’ to persons other than his immediate family was also required to inform the regent. Islamic schools failing to comply with this requirement risked forced closure: in Java and Madura, some Islamic teachers were not allowed to teach in mosques and private funds earmarked for Islamic education were shifted to the Dutch treasury (Yunus 1979: 225). For example, in the 1930s, the Madrasah al-Rabithah Islamiyyah in South Sulawesi was closed by the Dutch after failing to conform to the Dutch regulation (Ali 2007: 101). Those who met the Dutch requirements, such as the Muhammadiyah schools, received funding (Ali 2007: 101).8 Under the Dutch, there was a distinct polarisation between public and private schools, where private Islamic schools were seen as being in competition with government schools. This changed, however, during the Japanese occupation. Not only was the Dutch language replaced by Indonesian in public schools, but it became possible to teach Islamic subjects at primary and secondary public schools (Yunus 1979:121–122). Islamic teachers were also allowed to form an association to facilitate their contact with the government (Ali 2007: 110). After the proclamation of independence in 1945, the Indonesian National Committee (Komite Nasional Indonesia) required the government, through the Ministry of Religion, to oversee and assist madrasas and pesantrens and to accommodate Islamic subjects in general schools, a requirement that the government implemented for year four students in 1947 (Kelabora 1976: 236). The drafting of Law No. 4/1950 on Education subsequently gave rise to intense debate about the location of administrative responsibility for Islamic schools, prompted by the fears of Islamic leaders and ofﬁcials within the Ministry of Religion that Islamic schools would be transformed into secular schools if they were included in the national educational system under the supervision of the Ministry of Education (Kelabora 1976: 235). Ultimately, a compromise was reached, and it was agreed that Islamic schools would be excluded from the bill, meaning that Islamic schools would be continue to be supervised by the Ministry of Religion. The government also set out to increase the number of public Islamic educational institutions. After the creation of the Directorate of Islamic Education (Jawatan Pendidikan Agama) in the Ministry of Religion in 1950, Islamic schools were established for teachers (Pendidikan Guru Agama, PGA), and for religious

8 In another example of accommodation, the Dutch introduced public holidays for Islamic fes- tivals in general schools in 1925 (Ali 2007: 62). 110 5 Islamic Education judges (Sekolah Guru Hakim Agama, SGHA) (Yunus 1979: 361). From 1951 to 1960, PGA producing Islamic teachers were established in 20 cities in Java, Madura, Kalimantan and Sumatra and SGHA providing training for Islamic judges were instituted in five cities in Java and Sumatra (Yogyakarta, Bandung, Malang, Kotaraja and Bukit Tinggi).9 In 1957, the Ministry of Religion also established the Academy for Islamic Education (Akademi Dinas Ilmu Agama, ADIA), to train existing Indonesian civil servants to be eligible to teach Islam in general schools.10 In addition, the Ministry of Religion provided funding for struggling private Islamic schools. For example, Mambaul Ulum in Surakarta, which had been established in 1905 but closed in 1916, was reopened as a PGA in 1951 (Yunus 1979: 288). In the public school system, the creation of the Education Act of 1950 decreed that Islamic subjects were optional. Where they were offered, they were based on Ministry of Religion-designed curriculum and textbooks distributed by the Minis- try. In 1964, 2 h per week of religious studies were introduced into public schools. Public schools had always been a key battlefield for the proponents of Islamic education, because of their significance in the community. Since colonial times, graduates of these schools had direct access to work in governmental offices, an association that continued after independence, even though Islamic schools had long since introduced modern disciplines. Meanwhile, Islamic groups were afraid that the absence of Islamic studies in public schools would lead students to abandon Islam. At the tertiary level, the first private Islamic educational institution was the Normal Islam School, established in 1930, and then the Islamic College, established in 1931 (Abdullah 1971: 214). The first state Islamic college was the State Acad- emy for Islamic Studies (Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri, PTAIN), established Yogyakarta also in 1950. In 1960, this college became the State Institute for Islamic studies (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN). IAIN were subsequently established in 14 cities across Indonesia between 1960 and 1973.11 Within the public tertiary education system, the creation of the Supervisory Institute for Islamic Education in General Universities (Lembaga Pembina Pendidikan Agama pada Perguruan Tinggi, LEPPA) by the Ministry of Education led to the inclusion of

9 Private Islamic schools for teachers and judges were also established in the 1950s in Sulawesi and in Kalimantan (Yunus 1979). 10 In 1960, the academy became a faculty of the Islamic Institute of Yogyakarta before becoming the Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic institute of Jakarta in 1963. It has been known the State Islamic University (UIN) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta since 2002. 11 Five IAIN became State Islamic universities (Universitas Islam Negeri, UIN) in the 2000s. These public tertiary Islamic educational institutions, which were supervised by the Ministry of Religion, were of three types: State Islamic Universities (Universitas Islam Negeri, UIN); State Institutes for Islamic Studies (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN) and State Islamic Colleges (Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri, STAIN). The difference between these three types of institution is that while STAIN has disciplines such as Islamic Principles (Ushuluddin), Islamic Law (Sharia) and Education (Tarbiyah), these disciplines constitute separate faculties in an IAIN. IAIN and UIN differ because UIN also has faculties in general subjects such as pharmacy, information technology and psychology. The Development of Islamic Education in Indonesia 111 compulsory Islamic studies subjects for Muslims in public universities from 1963. As a result, just as Islamic subjects were taken by students in public schools, tertiary students were required by the state to continue studying their religion as part of their higher education. At the primary and secondary level, the number of Islamic educational institutions continued to grow in the 1970s and 1980s. The number of pesantrens increased dramatically, from around 2,000 in 1942 to over 4,000 in 1977 and more than 6,000 in 1985 (Yusuf 2009). The establishment of public Islamic schools followed. In the late 1980s, the Ministry of Religion introduced fully-funded selective public Islamic boarding schools called Islamic Special High Schools (Madrasah Aliyah Program Khusus, MAPK), in five regional cities (including Padang), where students were trained in Arabic and English. As in other Muslim-majority countries, the expansion of the system during the Suharto years was made possible by the flow of money from the Gulf states. An example is the Institute for Islamic and Arab Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab, LIPIA), which has been operating in Jakarta since 1980. Fully funded by Saudi Arabia, its objectives are to spread Islam and the Arabic language using a curriculum and strategies taken from the Imam Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University in Riyadh. It also provides aid, curriculum and teachers to Islamic institutions and organisations including schools, universities and mosques. The institute, which is designed to create cadres teaching Islam and Arabic to Muslims across Indonesia, has produced around 8,600 Islamic teachers since its establishment (Republika 12 February 2009). Islamic countries including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt have also provided scholarships for Indonesians, as has the World Muslim League and the Islamic Development Bank (ISDB). Middle Eastern educational institutions have been a key link in the international exchange of Islamic ideas in education. When political Islam was repressed under Suharto’s New Order, studying in the Middle East enabled students to keep up with the major currents of Islamic thought and other important developments in education in the Islamic world.12 Islamic schools were, however, closely controlled by the New Order, which established an examination for Islamic teachers seeking to teach in public educational institutions. Official Islamic teachers were also required to participate in Pancasila indoctrination courses (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancas- ila, P4), a program of instruction for all Indonesian citizens, including teachers and students at Islamic educational institutions. Pancasila indoctrination courses

12 Since the advent of the Internet, Muslims have been able to search online for scholarships offered by universities in Islamic countries. Global Islamic organisations, such as the Islamic Development Bank, also advertise scholarships for Muslims on their websites. Moreover, the Internet provides information about education in various Islamic countries. Islamic universities now have ofﬁcial websites that make educational information available worldwide, while global Islamic organisations such as ISESCO circulate information on Islamic education through the new media. 112 5 Islamic Education reinforced the fact that Islam was just one of ﬁve accepted religions in Indonesia, and that its status was in no way superior to that of the others. Since the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998, Islamic schools have been accorded equal status with their public equivalents under Law No. 20/2003 on the National Educational System. This law also states that Islamic studies subjects taught in public schools must be taught by Muslims who have graduated from Islamic universities and been appointed by the Ministry of Religion. This requirement has not only increased the number of students studying Islamic Edu- cation (Tarbiyah) in Islamic universities, but has also tightened the state’s control on the way Islam is taught in public schools. In addition, Islamic schools established since the law was enacted are required to register with the Ministry of Religion. Registration is not only necessary for the recognition of their graduates in the national educational system, but also to obtain funding from the government. All of these public Islamic schools under the Ministry of Religion must allocate two-thirds of their curriculum to general subjects such as mathematics, English and biology.13 As of 2010, almost 4,000 of the 42,000 Islamic primary and secondary schools in Indonesia were registered with the Ministry of Religion as public Islamic schools. There were also 574 Islamic tertiary educational institutions, of which 52 were public. In a period when Islam has become a far stronger feature of public life than previously, the status of these Islamic educational institutions continues to grow.

Islamic Education in West Sumatra

West Sumatra has a long tradition of informal Islamic education in the surau (neighbourhood mosques), where young unmarried Minangkabau men traditionally resided and were taught a local form of martial arts (silek) alongside their religious instruction. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, surau became tarekat schools in rural areas, largely catering to local villagers (Young 1994: 86). As noted in Chap. 2, the ﬁrst tarekat centre in West Sumatra was the Syattariyah Tarekat, which was established in the seventeenth century. Islamic education in the tarekat schools emphasised the individual’s connection with and knowledge of God rather

13 Law No. 20/2003 also recognises informal Islamic education as having an equal status with other types of informal education in the national educational system, such as playgroups. An important example of the government’s efforts to control informal Islamic education is that of Ahmadiyah. Although the Indonesian Ministry of Justice acknowledged Ahmadiyah in 1953s, the organisation has become controversial since global Islamic organisations such as the OIC and the Muslim World League (Rabitah Alam Islam) declared that it was not a recognised Islamic organisation. Pressure from the international level led organisations such as the Indonesian Council of Ulamas to declare that Ahmadiyah was blasphemous on several occasions in the 1970s, 1980s and 2000s and to push the Indonesian government to consider it as a new religion (Nasution 2009). Islamic Education in West Sumatra 113 than moral self-control. For them, this connection was attained through personal experience under the charismatic teachers (Dobbin 1983: 121–122). In the surau, boys learned to recite the Qur’an and to write out passages in Arabic calligraphy (Graves 1981: 107). As in other parts of Indonesia, however, the emergence of modern Islamic schools in the region was driven by development of secular education and the influence of Islamic educational institutions in the Middle Eastern countries in the early twentieth century. The Dutch supported local secular schools (Nagari schools) from 1825 to 1870, the students of which were not allowed to read the Qur’an in class (Graves 1981: 78). The Dutch also established a Normal School (Kweek- school) in 1856 in Bukittinggi. The nagari schools aimed at providing students with the skills required to work in coffee warehouses (Hadler 2008: 92), while the Normal School initially trained students of noble background and government officials to be teachers. In 1870, the Dutch transformed the nagari schools into public elementary schools, which aimed to train civil servants and to provide a general ‘civilising’ influence (Graves 1981: 11). In 1872, the Normal School (Kweekschool Buki- ttinggi) was established, which was referred to by the Minangkabau as the ‘King’s School’ (Sekolah Raja). Graduates of the school that had performed with merit were eligible to pursue higher degree in the Indies Medical Institute (School tot Ople- iding van Indische Artsen, STOVIA) in Batavia and even in the Netherlands. In 1892, the Dutch also introduced a dual elementary school system, establishing First Class Schools for notables and the children of wealthy men, and Second Class Schools for the general population (Graves 1981: 122). These secular schools produced nationalist leaders including Agus Salim, Muhammad Hatta and Tan Malaka. These secular schools, however, were not able to accommodate all the children seeking an education, a situation which led to the establishment of Islamic education institutions in West Sumatra (Abdullah 1971: 57). In the early twentieth century, the reformist Kaum Muda movement began to establish Islamic schools in the region, as part of its attempts to counter the influence of traditionalist Islam in Minangkabau society. The first formal Islamic school established in West Sumatra was Madrasa Adabiah in Padang, which was founded in 1909. It was followed by other madrasas such as Madrasa Sungayang in Batusangkar (1910) and Madrasa Diniah in Padang Panjang (1915). These madrasas introduced new subjects adopted from Egypt, including Egyptian geography (Yunus 1979: 66). Around the same time, some surau formalised their educational activities under the name Sumatra Tawalib (Students of Sumatra). The first surau to establish a Sumatra Tawalib school was that of Jembatan Besi in Padang Panjang in 1918. This school became a model of other surau schools in the region, and in the 1920s it was followed by Sumatra Tawalib Parabek, Sumatra Tawalib Padang Japang and Sumatra Tawalib Maninjau (Abdullah 1971:58–61). The use of the term ‘Sumatra’ rather than ‘Minangkabau’ in the name of the schools reflects the fact that the term ‘Minangkabau’ was not associated with Islam at this time. As noted in Chap. 2, 114 5 Islamic Education

‘Minangkabau’ was associated with Datuk Sutan Maharaja’s movement for adat- oriented progress (Abdullah 1972: 218–234). Faced with the sudden expansion of Islamic education in West Sumatra, the Dutch introduced the Teacher Ordinance there in 1925, some 20 years after it was ﬁrst applied in Java and Madura. The Sumatra Tawalib schools opposed the authority of the Dutch as prescribed in the Ordinance, and in 1930, teachers from Sumatra Tawalib established an organisation called the United Indonesian Muslims (Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia, Permi), as a vehicle for their anti-Dutch activities. After its establishment, the Dutch prohibited some Islamic teachers from teaching and in 1933 moved to close down a number of Islamic schools. The colonial authorities also banned Permi in retaliation for its engagement in politics. After the organisation was disbanded in 1934 and some of its leaders captured and exiled to other parts of Indonesia, some Sumatra Tawalib schools changed their names. For example, the Tawalib Padang Japang became Darul Fununul Abbasiah and Tawalib Bukittinggi and Batusangkar became the Perguruan Muslim Bukittinggi and Per- guruan Muslim Batusangkar respectively (Yunus 1979: 95).14 Muhammadiyah also played a key role in Islamic education in the region before independence. A local Islamic teacher, Haji Rasul, had an interest in Muham- madiyah and went to Java in 1925 to study the organisation. On his return, he introduced Muhammadiyah in his village, Sungai Batang (Abdullah 1971: 70). Unlike the Kaum Muda movement, which established itself in local mosques opposing tarekat Islam before it built schools, Muhammadiyah began in West Sumatra with a focus on Islamic schooling. Like Kaum Muda, Muhammadiyah was on generally friendly terms with the colonial authorities.15 Muhammadiyah cooperated with the adat leader, Datuk Madjo Lelo, to establish a second class school offering religious education in Sungai Batang in 1925.16 Soon after, Muhammad- iyah established a public second class school, also in Sungai Batang, resulting in competition between government and Muhammadiyah schools and initially leading to a decline in the number of students in the only government school in the region (Abdullah 1971: 77).17 The staff of this ﬁrst school were graduates of Sumatra Tawalib in Padang Panjang and Maninjau (Abdullah 1971: 77). The success of these Muhammadiyah schools led to the establishment of other schools, including

14 The founder of the Ahmadiyah sect in Indonesia, Maulana Rahmat Ali, was invited to West Sumatra by graduates of the Sumatra Tawalib schools who had attended an Ahmadiyah school in India in 1920s (Ahmadiyah Indonesia 2008). Subsequently, Padang became the centre of Ah- madiyah in Indonesia before it moved to Java in the 1930s. Evidence of the sect’s presence includes a mosque and a madrasa in the centre of Padang. 15 This is not to say that Muhammadiyah had always had good relationships with the colonial government. In 1930, its Tabligh (Islamic mass preaching) activities were banned after an anti- government speech was given at its Congress (Abdullah 1971: 95). 16 Unlike other local Islamic schools, the first Muhammadiyah school was supported financially by West Sumatrans living outside West Sumatra (perantau). 17 The enrolments in the government school rose again in the following year (Abdullah 1971: 77). With the increased demand for formal education, ultimately both schools remained viable. Islamic Education in West Sumatra 115 one in Padang Panjang in 1926 and then in Padang, Batusangkar and Payakumbuh in 1928.18 A final organisation of note that had an interest in formal Islamic education during this period was Tarbiyah Islamiyah. Established in 1928 by Inyiek Canduang Sulaiman Ar-Rasuli, this organisation aimed at improving the Islamic education managed by traditional religious leaders in the surau. It went on to build Madrasa Tarbiyah Ampek Angkek Canduang, Madrasa Tarbiyah Batu Hampar Payakumbuh and Madrasa Tarbiyah Jaho Padang Panjang (Yunus 1979: 98). These schools were modern forms of the traditional surau, which continued to operate in tandem with them (Noer 1973: 221). In total, by 1933, there were more than 1,200 private schools—including schools offering a general curriculum—with affiliations to Islamic groups such as Muhammadiyah, Permi and Kaum Tua, as the traditionalists opposed by the Kaum Muda were known (Abdullah 1971: 212). Apart from Kaum Tua schools, which catered for a minority of students, these schools all offered elements of a secular education. This arrangement continued until the arrival of the Japanese in 1942, when Islamic studies were introduced into public schools, although Islamic teachers worked on a voluntary basis. The Japanese established a local Islamic organisation, the Minangkabau High Islamic Council (Majlis Islam Tinggi Minangkabau, MITM), which established the Beginner Islamic School (Madrasah Awaliyah, MA), which offered Islamic instruction in the afternoons to students attending morning public schools (Yunus 1979: 122). After independence, the regional office of the Ministry of Religion established Islamic schools in the region. As in other parts of Indonesia, the Ministry of Religion transformed the purpose of Islamic schools from that of training Islamic missionaries to producing government functionaries such as official Islamic teachers and judges. In 1951, Islamic schools for teachers (PGA) and religious judges (SGHA) were established in Bukittinggi and Padang respectively (Yunus 1979: 361). Madrasa Ibti- daiyyah, Tsanawiyah and Aliyah (Islamic primary, junior and senior high schools) were established along with Islamic colleges and institutes in the region. The local office of the Ministry of Religion also managed the teaching of Islamic studies in public schools. However, unlike in other regions, where voluntary Islamic subjects were introduced in 1950, Islamic studies were formally included in the general school curriculum in West Sumatra from 1947. After the implementation of the Education Act in 1950, Islamic studies was taught from year one to year six, instead offrom year four as it was in other regions of Indonesia (Yunus 1979: 129). There is little information on developments in the private Islamic educational sector in West Sumatra during the late 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. What we do know is that the Ministry of Religion established the State Institute for Islamic studies (IAIN Imam Bondjol Padang) in 1966, along with branches in Bukittinggi, Padang

18 In 1930, Muhammadiyah had nine Islamic schools and 10 general schools in the region (Abdullah 1971:70–108). The ﬁrst Muhammadiyah university was established in 1955 in Padang Panjang. By 2008, there were 291 Muhammadiyah educational institutions in West Sumatra (Karim 2008). 116 5 Islamic Education

Panjang and Payakumbuh, and later also in Solok (1968) and Batusangkar (1971). Eventually, the branches in Batusangkar and Bukittinggi became autonomous State Islamic Colleges (STAIN Batusangkar and Bukittinggi) while the other branches became private Islamic colleges, including the Islamic College of Solok Nan Indah (STAI SNI 2008). The development of Islamic schools continued in the 1980s with the establishment of the Academy for Qur’anic studies in Padang in 1981. As elsewhere in Islamic world, the number of private Islamic schools increased in the 1980s and 1990s with the flow of money from Middle Eastern countries. However, this increase was also driven by the growing number of middle-class Muslims benefiting from economic development under the New Order. These middle-class Muslims established Islamic boarding schools such as Serambi Mekkah in Padang Panjang and Pesantren Hamka in Pariaman. Charging relatively high school fees compared to normal private and public Islamic schools, these schools were well-equipped with modern facilities such as language laboratories, computer laboratories and multimedia facilities. While an emphasis creating an environment that promotes appropriate Islamic behaviour is considered to be important, these schools try to achieve a balance between Islamic and general subjects in their curricula. The influence of Middle Eastern funding nevertheless continued after the fall of Suharto. In 2003, for example, the Islamic boarding school Ar-Risalah was established in Padang by a group of alumni from LIPIA Jakarta and the Middle East universities. As of 2010, there were 219 government-registered Islamic schools and 453 private Islamic schools offering primary and secondary education in West Sumatra. At the tertiary level, West Sumatra had one IAIN, two STAIN and 19 private Islamic universities and colleges (Kemenag 2011). All these institutions were eligible to receive funding from the national government through the Ministry of Religion. Locally, they were also able obtain support from governments at both provincial and district levels. Private Islamic schools also continued to receive funding from networks in the Middle East (Field Observations, West Sumatra, 2009).

The Public Discourse of Islamic Education

In public discourse in West Sumatra, Islamic education is closely associated with the over-representation of Minangkabau in the Indonesian national leadership before and after independence. In Minangkabau culture, intellectual acuity, which is seen as an intrinsic part of Minangkabau ethnicity, is highly valued. As Gamawan Fauzi, then Governor of West Sumatra (now Minister of Home Affairs), expressed it:

We often get caught up in the historical success of the Minangkabau… Their success should not be something we romanticise. Compared to the present day, very few of them had masters degrees or doctorates. Some hadn’t even been to university. But they proved that the land of the Minangkabau is the land of the ‘brain industry’ (industri otak)(Padang Ekspres 28 January 2009). Islamic Education in West Sumatra 117

Although historic figures like Sjahrir and Hatta attended Dutch secular schools, public figures like to suggest that they benefited from Islamic education. According to Muhammad Kosim, an Islamic studies teacher at SMP Negeri 8 Padang:

Education in public schools at that time was imbued with the spirit of learning in the local mosque (surau)… [Now] the people of West Sumatra are concerned about their ability to produce ﬁgures of the calibre of Hamka, Mohammad Hatta, Sutan Syahrir, M. Natsir, M. Yamin, Agus Salim and others in the future (Padang Ekspres 14 May 2010). Kosim goes on to claim that these concerns are unfounded, because regional autonomy had once again given control over education to the Minangkabau people:

Regional autonomy and the 2006 national curriculum mean that we should be able to develop outstanding education programs in the regions. In West Sumatra our local Mina- ngkabau and Muslim customs are very strong, to the extent that we’re known for our regional philosophy, ‘Adat Basandi Syarak, Syarak Basandi Kitabullah’ (Padang Ekspres 14 May 2010). Although Kosim’s main point concerns regional autonomy, as is so often the case, he goes on to invoke the truism that Minang culture is built on Syari’a and Syari’a is based on the Qur’an, thus tying the potential for a return to excellence in education to the region’s Islamic character and its Minangkabau heritage. The local government’s decision to invest in Islamic education nevertheless reﬂects the increasing emphasis placed on religion in secular institutions. In some districts in West Sumatra, the opportunity to join the pilgrimage to Mecca has been offered as a reward for high-achieving educators and students. In 2009, the deputy head of Pesisir Selatan proclaimed:

The local government (pemerintah kabupaten) has made a commitment. School principals, school inspectors, teachers and students who achieve at the highest levels will be rewarded with an opportunity to go on the hajj (Posmetro Padang 30 Mei 2009). The influences of contemporary transnational Islam in West Sumatra were reflected in statements by Said Agiel Siraj, the national chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, during his visit to West Sumatra in 2009. He observed that, unlike in Java, teachers of tarekat were no longer respected in West Sumatra (Singgalang 29 July 2010). According Ohruhlik (2002: 27), the hardening of attitudes toward tarekat is a model of interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia which influence of interpretations of Islam in the province. Islamic subjects in general schools were also mainly based on interpretations of Islam from Saudi Arabia (Assyaukanie 2006). In a context where the transmission of religious knowledge to students is obligatory, and the formal education system an obvious mechanism for maintaining religiosity, there is an expectation that students in West Sumatra will be taught to follow the tenets of their religion, not to convert to another religion, and certainly not to abandon religion altogether. The lack of the capacity to engender religiosity has incited a kind of moral panic about children’s perceived lack of Islamic credentials in West Sumatra, reflected in the prominence of concerns about Qur’anic literacy in the region. Research published in the local newspaper by a university student from the State Institute for Islamic Studies (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN), in 2004 118 5 Islamic Education concluded that 17 % of more than 5,000 brides and grooms surveyed in the city of Padang could not recite the Qur’an at all and a further 20 % were not fluent in their recitations. Among school students, the figures were even higher, with 60 % of all elementary and secondary students in Padang being unable to recite the Qur’an at all (Singgalang 20 June 2004). The inability to recite the Qur’an is linked to all kinds of social problems in the region but, most importantly, the lack of religious skills like the ability to read the Qur’an was seen to be the cause of increasing moral decay among students. On a related theme, being smart as a result of an Islamic education is distinguished in public discourse from being smart without being religious, a strategy associated with the—as of 1997, failed—developmentalist strategies of the New Order regime. Indeed, according to the Mayor of Padang, Fauzi Bahar:

The human resources we need do not come only from knowledge and technological skills but also from behaviour that is in line with Islamic teaching. We again call on everyone to acknowledge that Islamic education is an investment in the future, in ‘quality children’ (anak yang berkualitas) capable of leading the country (Singgalang 18 December 2008). In addition to being smart, as Fauzi implies, religiously observant students—the product of a well-thought-out, locally-controlled Islamic education system—behave well. This makes them the ideal students, in Fauzi’s words, students who are ‘smart and religious’ (pintar dan agamis). Indeed, a key theme in public statements about Islamic education draws attention to a perceived association between Islamic education and students’ religiosity, leading to a more obedient attitude towards their parents. As Mahyeldi Ansharullah, the Vice Mayor of Padang, asserted in relation to Pesantren Ramadan, the Islamic study program that is compulsory for general school students during the fasting month:

The positive impact of Pesantren Ramadan is obvious among students. For example, changes in their activities during Ramadan, from wandering around aimlessly to going regularly to the mosque. These changes in behaviour are also felt by their parents. Because of the opportunities provided for group introspection (muhasabah) (at Pesantren Ramadan), children have become obedient towards their parents (Padang Ekspres 30 July 2008). As this quotation suggests, Islamic education is believed to promote a sense of industry, self-awareness and respect towards others, values that are the antithesis of the aimlessness and social decay believed to be afﬂicting school age children in West Sumatra. Indeed, according to Fauzi Bahar, the beneﬁts of this program extend beyond keeping students occupied and encouraging them to develop an appropriate attitude towards parental authority:

Pesantren Ramadan has four beneﬁts. (1) It can prevent brawls and develop a sense of solidarity between students; (2) It discourages ‘dawn romance’ [a long-established tradition of young people spending time together after morning prayers] among secondary and high school students because students can attend their Pesantren Ramadan lessons at their own mosque; (3) When attending school, each student needs to spend IDR4,000 a day… by our calculations, around IDR20 trillion can be saved during Ramadan… which is good for the ﬁnancial situation of families; (4) It has a good effect on the health of the students. Islamic Education in West Sumatra 119

During Pesantren Ramadan, students get used to sitting cross-legged. Throughout the Pesantren Ramadan program, they practise sitting cross-legged in the mosque. This practice prevents a range of conditions, including developing a hunched back in later years (Padang Ekspres 1 September 2009). This tendency to ascribe all kinds of outcomes to increased religious observance is a common one, not only in relation to education, but also more generally in relation to behaviour and dress (as we shall see in the next chapter). In the opinion of many commentators, education is best used as a preventative rather than as a cure. In late 2008, Fauzi Bahar told the local newspaper Singgalang that his government endorsed further investment in Islamic education because ‘increased numbers of drop outs, the widespread use of drugs and indecent behaviour among students is caused by the weakness of Islamic education. The most important thing about Islamic education is that it changes attitudes and behaviour (Singgalang 18 December 2008). This statement prompted a ﬂurry of similar statements. According to Aristo Munandar, the district head of Agam, for example, ‘Islamic studies should be introduced as early as possible because it will greatly inﬂuence the students’ mentality… and prevent various negative activities such as the use of narcotics’ (Singgalang 30 December 2008). Similarly, Ali Mukhni, the Vice Mayor of Padang Panjang, declared that ‘one way of preventing students from using narcotics is by to provide Islamic education for children’ (Singgalang 20 December 2008). In another example, Khatib Pahlawan Kayo, the former head of the local Muhammadiyah branch in Padang, posited a direct causal relationship between HIV/AIDS and Islamic education, asserting that ‘HIV and AIDS are caused by lack of Islamic education’ (Singgalang 26 December 2008). Statements such as these, which exploit the community’s fears about students’ failure to stay in school and the use of drugs to promote Islamic education, is very important for our understanding of the politics of piety in West Sumatra, as we shall see in the next section.

Policies Promoting Islamic Education

The first regulation mandating Qur’anic literacy in West Sumatra was passed by the local parliament in the district of Solok in 2001. Under Local Regulation No. 10/2001 on Qur’anic Literacy, primary school students in Solok are required to be able to recite the Qur’an. Under the regulation, couples intending to be married must also demonstrate their Qur’anic literacy, which is tested by a sub-unit of the local office of the Ministry of Religion (Kantor Urusan Agama, KUA) before the office records the marriage. The Regulation also states that Qur’anic literacy is supported by Law No. 2/1989 on the National Educational System, which describes one of the purposes of education as being to create students of religious character. Other districts followed suit. In 2003, the local parliament of the Sawah Lunto Sijunjung district (renamed Sijunjung in 2008), passed Local Regulation No. 1/2003 on Qur’anic Literacy which, in addition to mandating Qur’anic classes for primary 120 5 Islamic Education school students, required those intending to marry to pass a Qur’anic literacy test. In the same year, the local parliament of Lima Puluh Kota district followed with Local Regulation No. 6/2003 on Qur’anic Literacy. As in other districts, this regulation mandated students’ attendance at Qur’anic schools and the Qur’anic literacy test for couples intending to marry, while its counterpart in Pasaman passed Local Regu- lation No. 21/2003 on Qur’anic Literacy, which requires students at all levels, including tertiary students, as well as brides and grooms, to be able to recite the Qur’an. Around the same time, the parliament of the Padang district enacted Local Regulations No. 3/2003 on Qur’anic Literacy and 6/2003 on Qur’anic Literacy for Primary School Students, the former dealing with Qur’anic classes, and the latter requiring certification from Islamic schools for students who wish to attend public secondary schools. In the following year, Pesisir Selatan passed Local Regulation No. 8/2004 on Qur’anic Literacy and Prayer, which obliges school students and couples intending to marry to possess Qur’anic literacy and to perform the five daily prayers. An important symbolic aspect of all these local regulations is their reinforcement of the link between being versed in Islamic studies (through formal classes) and being well-behaved. Indeed, the tropes ‘perfect person’ (insan kamil), ‘whole person’ (manusia seutuhnya) and ‘physically and spiritually sound’ (sehat jasmani dan rohani) are used interchangeably in endorsements of the Qur’anic literacy programs. The importance of legal symbolism was also reinforced when the provincial parliament enacted Local Regulation No. 3/2007, which endorsed the requirement for lessons in Qur’anic recitation. The initiative was questioned, since under decentralisation the authority to pass local regulations falls to the local parliaments at the city and district level, rather than to the provincial parliament. However, the provincial regulation on Qur’anic literacy was seen by provincial legislators as being important because it demonstrated to the West Sumatran people that the provincial parliament supported the regulations on Qur’anic literacy passed by district parliaments in the province (Interview with Irdinansyah Tarmizi, Member of the West Sumatra Provincial Parliament, 21 November 2008). In practice, students in public morning schools are now obliged to attend Qur’anic schools in afternoon Islamic schools in mosques or in private Islamic schools. Similarly, afternoon students in public schools attend Qur’anic schools in the morning. When a child is able to recite from the Qur’an, he or she can take an examination at a registered mosque or Islamic private school. Once the students pass the examination and are awarded certificates, they no longer are required to attend lessons. It is rare to see students in year four or above at Qur’anic schools. When the Padang regulation was implemented, there were fears that students would be ineligible to attend school if they failed to be able to recite the Qur’an. However, a representative of the local government quickly allayed those fears, suggesting that the students who failed to reach the required standard would be given an additional year to acquire the skill, and would be able to continue attending school while doing so (Bambang Sutrisno, the Head of Education Department of the Regional Government of Padang, cited in Antara-News, 18 June 2011). Islamic Education in West Sumatra 121

Another example of regulation pertaining to education was Instruction No. 451.411/2005 on Islamic Study Circles, Dawn Education, Anti-Gambling and Drugs as well as Islamic Dress, an issued by the Mayor of Padang. This regulation required students at public secondary schools to attend an Islamic study circle (pengajian) at a nearby mosque twice a month from 7.30 pm and for public primary students to attend ‘dawn education’ (Didikan Subuh) classes every Sunday from 5 am. The marks awarded for their participation in these activities constitute 50 % of the mark they receive for the Islamic studies subject taught in public schools. The Mayor of Padang also required students in the city to memorise and chant the Asmaul Husna, the 99 names of God under Mayoral Instruction issued in 2007. On the initial implementation of this instruction, students were required to undertake the memorisation activity every day before going into classes. However, many teachers complained that this activity was eating into time allocated for other subjects, and the requirement was adjusted so that students only had to sing the names of God every Friday morning before the commencement of their classes (Interview with Iryani, Principal of Junior High School 34 Padang, 23 November 2008).19 The teachers’ complaints tapped into a major concern in the complex debate about compulsory Islamic education. On the one hand, if students use more than the 2 h allocated within the school curriculum for Islamic education each week, they have less time for their academic subjects—something that weakens their capacity to compete with private general schools in terms of reaching the national standards in education prescribed by the central government. On the other hand, as Fauzi Bahar observed in his speech at the opening of a seminar on Mosque Management in Padang in 2008, proponents of compulsory programs like the Qur’anic literacy program believe that they are necessary, precisely because insufﬁcient time is allocated for Islamic subjects in public schools (Republika 8 July 2005).20 Other important initiatives such as the Pesantren Ramadan have been imposed through policy rather than through the enactment of a purpose-speciﬁc local regulation. Many cities and districts in the province operate Pesantren Ramadan programs, although policies on their implementation differ from place to place. In many districts, such as Tanah Datar and Pariaman, the programs are held on three consecutive days in a large mosque, while in Padang the program lasts for a whole week, replacing educational activities at schools during that time. The Ramadan schools teach students different types of Islamic subjects, such as faith (tauhid), piety (ibadah) and morality (akhlak). Memorisation of short verses from the Qur’an is also encouraged. Pesantren Ramadan is compulsory for students, but there has

19 This initiative reveals the Mayor’s personal interpretation of Islam. Influenced by tarekat Islam, he believed that singing the Islamic names would be a positive influence on individual students’ daily lives. 20 Although the implementation of policies on Islamic education in West Sumatra has seen an increase in the number of hours assigned to Islamic subjects, the change is insignificant when compared to the increased number of Islamic subjects in public schools in other parts of the Islamic world (Rivard and Amadio 2003: 214–215). 122 5 Islamic Education been little debate in the province about the appropriateness of mandating this or other forms of extra-curricular Islamic education. It is important to note that, like the regulations on zakat, local regulations on Qur’anic literacy have been challenged by the central government. In 2010, the Directorate General of Regulations and Legislation in the Ministry of Law and Human Rights announced that the regulations on Qur’anic literacy would be examined to determine whether they complied with national laws.21 According to Des- maniar, the head of a sub-unit of the local office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights in Padang, these regulations are incompatible with national law because school age children have the right to attend secondary school even if they are unable to recite the Qur’an as the local regulation requires (Padangkini 21 May 2010). Also fundamental is the paradox that a supposedly secular government in a region where Muslims are in the majority but there is also a significant presence of followers of other state-approved religions, mandates religious instruction only for Muslims. Islamic education has also been managed through the development of the regional curriculum for public primary and secondary schools. Designed in 2010, the regional curriculum, which is called the Increasing Quality for Surau-inspired Education (Peningkatan Kualitas Pendidikan Bernuansa Surau, PKPBS),22 requires teachers to employ Islamic and Minangkabau values in their teaching, for example by beginning their lessons with the Islamic phrase, bismillah (in the name of God), and closing them with Alhamdulillah (praise be to God), as well as creating a ‘surau environment’, in which students are led in congregational prayer during school hours (Muhammad Kosim, Curriculum Development Team Member cited in Padang Ekspres 14 Mei 2010). Similarly, at the tertiary level, the concept of a ‘Student’s Surau’ (Surau Mah- asiswa), meaning student dormitory with Islamic environment, has been introduced, for example, at Al-Quds in Air Tawar Padang. Those who live in Surau Mahasiswa, must pray five times a day in the nearby mosque and must eat all their meals together. Like the surau based curriculum, Surau Mahasiswa was inspired by the claim that Surau has had an important role in the local prominent leaders in the past and regional philosophy, ‘Adat Basandi Syarak, Syarak Basandi Kitabullah’ (Interview with Mochtar Naim, 3 December 2010).

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that contemporary forms of Islamic education have been constructed primarily as a solution to fears of what Muslims perceive as an explosion of social problems in the region. Initiatives such as Qur’anic education

21 See their website: www.djpp.depkumham.go.id. 22 The meaning of surau has been transformed from a literal reference to a traditional prayer house to a reference to schools and modern dormitory houses. Conclusion 123 and Pesantren Ramadan seek to stem the tide by reintroducing traditional values associated with both Minangkabau culture and Islam, which are presented in relation to education as being one and the same. Indeed, Islamic education has been constructed as the way to once more enjoy the intellectual success associated with West Sumatra in the past. West Sumatran nationalist leaders may have been products of secular schools, but their history has been recast through claims that their success was the result of their experiences of Islamic education. What precisely constitutes Islamic education in West Sumatra is less definite. As this chapter has shown, the interaction of the transnational and the national with the local development of Islamic education is evident in the plurality of forms of Islamic education available in the region. While the contemporary influence of the Middle East is clearly apparent in the adoption of the policy on Pesantren Ramadan, for example, the influence of tarekat remains in the practice of chanting the Asmaul Husna promoted by Fauzi Bahar—a complexity that sits in strong contrast with the logic of regional laws concerning behaviour and dress, which are discussed in the next chapter.

References

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Abstract In West Sumatra, as in a number of other regions in Indonesia (most notably Banten), decentralisation has seen the introduction of multiple local regulations, as well as other less formal measures, designed to promote and enforce modes of behaviour and dress seen to be Islamic. Across Indonesia, these initiatives have been seen as ways of dealing with ‘social ills’ (maksiat) including prostitution, adultery, the consumption of alcohol and immodest dress. As this chapter will demonstrate, many of these initiatives have affected women much more than they have affected men. The chapter traces contemporary debates about public behaviour in Islamic society at a global, national and local level. While it looks at Islamic behaviour in general, it focusses particularly on the issues of modest dress, the consumption of alcohol, gambling and illicit sexual behaviour. It argues that the discourse on dress and behaviour primarily assumes a ‘modern’ outlook, which positions ‘Islamic’ (Middle Eastern-inspired) practices as the direct opposite of local tradition and the practices of the West, much as is the case with Islamic ﬁnance. Where dress and behaviour are concerned, the adoption of properly ‘Islamic’ practices is seen as a necessary part of the local governments’ arsenal in the ﬁght against social problems in the region. However, it is also a means to redirect responsibility for failing to manage those social problems away from politicians and bureaucrats and towards the community.

Keywords Global Islam Á Local politics Á Women and behaviours Á Social problems

The Religious and Social Meanings of Behaviour and Dress

Islamic teachings prohibit the consumption of alcoholic drinks, gambling and sexual activity outside a marriage between a man and a woman.1 The Qur’an prohibits Muslims from drinking alcohol and gambling through a series of increasingly strong statements. The ﬁrst verse informs Muslims that the potential harm of gambling and consuming alcohol outweighs their beneﬁts.

They ask you about drinking and gambling. Say: ‘There is great harm in both, although they have some beneﬁt for men; but their harm is far greater than their beneﬁt’ (Q 2: 219). A second verse on drinking alcohol forbids Muslims to pray while intoxicated:

Believers, do not approach your prayers when you are drunk, but wait till you can grasp the meaning of your words (Q 4: 43). Finally, a third verse prohibits Muslims from drinking alcohol and gambling altogether:

Believers, wine and games of chance, idols and divining arrows, are abominations devised by Satan. Avoid them, so that you may prosper. Satan seeks to stir up enmity and hatred among you by means of wine and gambling, and to keep you from the remembrance of Allah and from your prayers. Will you not abstain from them? (Q 5: 90–91). Similarly, the Qur’an prohibits sexual activity outside marriage in several verses, which include the following:

You shall not commit adultery, for it is foul and indecent (Q 17: 32).

The adulterer and the adulteress shall each be given a hundred lashes. Let no pity for them cause you to disobey Allah, if you truly believe in Allah and the Last Day; and let their punishment be witnessed by a number of believers. The adulterer may marry only an adulteress or an idolatress; and the adulteress may marry only an adulterer or an idolater. True believers are forbidden such marriages (Q 24: 2–3). According to Ahmed (1986: 678), extra-marital sexual relations are prohibited in Islam because of its emphasis on paternity. She suggests that while it was socially acceptable for both men and women to have more than one spouse before the coming of Islam to the Middle East, this practice was condemned because Islam requires men to be able to take responsibility for their children, which is impossible if paternity cannot be established (Ahmed 1986: 669). Ahmed also argues, however, that the concept of ‘idda (a waiting period imposed on women before they can

1 This is in contrast to the public discourse around zakat and education, in which articulations of regional identity position Islam not only as an integral part of the regional philosophy but also as a fundamental aspect of historical practice in West Sumatra. Where approaches to dress and behaviour and Islamic ﬁnance differ from each other is in the degree to which conformity with practices elsewhere in the contemporary Islamic world is presented as being discretionary. While the promotion of Islamic ﬁnancial institutions is primarily an outward-looking process, with very few implications for everyday life, the regulation of behaviour and dress is directed inward, towards the daily conduct of individuals and communities. The Religious and Social Meanings of Behaviour and Dress 129 remarry after divorce or the death of their husband) is a means of controlling women’s movements and relationships, since no similar waiting period is imposed on men (Ahmed 1986: 678). As Dialmy (2010) notes, Islam also allows men to have extra-marital sexual relations with their slaves while denying the same right to women, which she says is further proof that in Islam men are accorded more rights than women with regard to the expression of sexuality. The most visible symbol of Islamic behaviour is the dress code adopted by Muslim women. The requirement to cover one’s head, arms and legs, and how precisely this must be done, is also one of the most contested aspects of Islamic theology. Whether women cover, and whether they do so with a burqa (an all- encompassing body covering, of the kind worn in contemporary Afghanistan), a niqab (a total body covering, revealing only the eyes and palms of hands), the hijab or jilbab (a garment that leaves only the face and hands exposed), or a simple headscarf that reveals the hair is not simply a personal decision, but a highly political one.2 Conventional interpretations of Qur’anic injunctions concerning women’s dress are echoed in the English translation of the Qur’an supervised by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Da’wah and Guidance of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1989. In sura An-Nur (34), verse 31, it is said:

And say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty: that they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what (ordinarily) appears. Thereof; that they should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, their husbands’ fathers, their sons, their husbands’ sons, their brothers or their brothers’ sons, or their sisters’ sons, or their women, or the slaves whom their right hands possess, or male attendants free of sexual desires, or small children who have no carnal knowledge of women; and that they should not strike their feet in order to draw attention to their hidden ornaments. And O ye believers! Turn ye all together towards Allah in repentance that ye may be successful. The key words in the above translation, the words ‘that what (ordinarily) appear’, had been understood as referring to what ‘ordinarily appears’ in different Islamic communities, thus constituting a general exhortation to modesty. In more recent times, however, the Saudi government has adopted a more rigid interpretation, closing the space available to regional meanings by reinterpreting the words ‘that what (ordinarily) appear’. In the Saudis’ new translation of the same verse, it is said:

And tell the believing women to lower their gaze (from looking at forbidden things) and protect their private parts (from illegal sexual acts) and not show off their adornment except only that which is apparent (like both eyes for necessity to see the way, or outer palms of hands or one eye or dress like veil, gloves, head-cover, apron, etc.), and to draw their veils all over juyubihinna (i.e. their bodies, faces, necks and bosoms) and not to reveal their adornments except to their husbands, or their fathers, or their husband’s fathers, or their sons, or their husband’s sons, or their brothers or their brother’s sons, or their sister’s sons,

2 As El-Guindi (1999: 475) points out, all styles of Middle-Eastern veil now considered to be Islamic in fact pre-date Islam. 130 6 Behaviour and Dress

or their (Muslim) women (i.e. their sisters in Islam), or the (female) slaves whom their right hands possess, or old male servants who lack vigour, or small children who have no sense of feminine sex. And let them not stamp their feet so as to reveal what they hide of their adornment. And all of you beg Allah to forgive you all, O believers, that you may be successful (Al-Hilali 1999). Another difference between the old and the new translation is in the meaning of the word juyubihinna. Whereas the old translation referred to the bosom, the new refers not only to the bosom but also to the body, face and neck. Another verse of the Qur’an that has been reinterpreted by the Saudis is verse 59 of sura Al-Ahzab (33). In the 1989 translation, this was rendered as:

O Prophet! Tell thy wives and daughters and the believing women that they should cast their outer garment over their persons when out of doors that is most convenient that they should be known (as such) and not molested. The new translation is, again, much narrower:

O Prophet, tell your wives and your daughters and the women of the believers to draw their cloaks (veils) all over their bodies (i.e. screen themselves completely except the eyes or one eye to see the way). That will be better, that they should be known (as free respectable women) so as not to be annoyed… (Al-Hilali 1999). Whereas women were exhorted to ‘cast their outer garment over their persons when out of doors’, the new translation urges them to ‘draw their cloaks (veils) all over their bodies, except their eyes’. Moreover, unlike the old interpretation, which refers the function of women’s dress as identifying them in public, the new translation equates the adoption of correct dress with their social status in the community as ‘respectable women’. The Saudi interpretation is important because of Saudi Arabia’s particular position in the Islamic world as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites. However, it is by no means uncontested. The present Saudi endorsement of the niqab has been challenged by Islamic scholars, including Sheikh Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, the grand sheikh of Al-Azhar University, who, in 2009, asked a student to remove her niqab in his presence. This suggested that the grand sheikh regarded the wearing of the niqab as an aspect of tradition, rather than a religious injunction (Chesler 2010). In Malaysia, the wearing of the niqab by public servants has been prohibited since 1994 (Chesler 2010: 37). Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the question has been avoided through the introduction of the term aurat, which leads either to an injunction to wear the niqab (in the Hanaﬁ school) or the jilbab (in the Shaﬁ’i school) (Al-Qur’an dan Terjemahannya 2007: 353).3

3 Warburton (2006) identiﬁes three dominant approaches in the study of veiling. The ﬁrst approach represents veils as a form of institutionalised male power over women through which the requirement to veil is used to suppress women and undermine their social position (Mahmood 2001). The second approach sees veils as a symbol of resistance not toward male domination but Western hegemony and the secular state (El-Guindi 1999). The third approach emphasises the function of veiling as a means for women to enter the space dominated by men and thus to participate more fully in society (Mule and Barthel 1992). The Religious and Social Meanings of Behaviour and Dress 131

Importantly, restrictions on dress and other aspects of Islamic practice that discriminate against women have become a key site of feminist activism across the Islamic world. Saba Mahmood (2005), a Muslim feminist born in Pakistan, argues that the root of women’s oppression in Islamic countries is Islamic forms of pa- triarchy. Similarly, Moroccan feminist writer, Fatima Mernissi (1987) argues that Qur’anic verses are not in themselves patriarchal but rather the interpretation of them has become a patriarchal tradition because it has been dominated by men.4 The US-based scholar and activist Amina Wadud (1999) agrees that the problem of patriarchal domination should be challenged by the reinterpretation of the Qur’an from a woman’s perspective. Through her scholarly work, Amina has demonstrated that mainstream interpretations of Qur’anic statements on the role of women solely as child bearers and care-givers are misguided. In Southeast Asia, the Malaysian Muslim feminist group Sisters in Islam has played important role in studying the Islamic sources used to support discriminatory practices against women, such as the failure to condemn domestic violence, polygamy, the demand for women’s unquestioning obedience to men, the inferior position of women as witnesses in courts of law, and conventions of modesty (Anwar 2001: 227–230).5

Behaviour and Dress in the Islamic World

Most of the scholarship on the enforcement of Islamic behaviour focuses on the development of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia in the nineteenth century (Commins 2009; DeLong-Bas 2008; Peskes 1999).6 With initial support from the Al Saud dynasty, Wahhabi authorities enforced Islamic behaviour in the Ottoman lands in present-day Saudi Arabia. They banned smoking in public and enforced attendance at prayer. With the collapse of the Al Saud dynasty in the late nineteenth century, this regime of enforcement came to an end. However, when Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud, the son of Al Saud regained control of Riyadh in 1902 and expanded his domain to encompass the territory of present-day Saudi Arabia, he established a religious police force called mutawwa’in (Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice) in 1926 (Commins 2009: 95).7 In the following year, a series of ‘illicit’ practices such as extra-marital sexual relations, gambling and the

4 As Riffat Hasan (1987) notes, paradoxically, Muslim men have continued to suggest that Islam has given women more rights than any other religious tradition. 5 In Indonesia, Rahima, the Muslim feminist organisation established in 2000, has also been active in reinterpreting Islamic sources. 6 The Wahhabists call themselves either salafi, one who follows the ways of the first Muslim generation (salaf)ormuwahhid, one who professes God’s unity. 7 This force was established in collaboration with the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Saudi Arabia to enforce Wahhabist standards of public morality and punctual observance of prayer. This religious force has become a model for other guardians of correct religious observance, such as the Taliban in the former Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. 132 6 Behaviour and Dress consumption of alcohol were criminalised (Seaman 1980: 440). Punishments available at sentencing included public beheadings for adulterers (Michalak and Trocki 2006: 547). The enforcement of Islamic standards of behaviour in other Islamic countries have varied widely, although, as in Saudi Arabia, enforcement regimes have changed over time in response to social and political change. When Muammar Gaddafi came to power in Libya in 1969, he relied heavily on Islam for the legitimation of his regime, and, by 1972, extra-marital sexual relations, gambling and alcoholic drinks were designated as offences under Libyan criminal law (Peter 1994: 255). In Iran, the 1979 revolution also led to prohibition of extra-marital sex, the consumption of alcohol and gambling (Peters 1994:260–261). Before the 1979 revolution, the Pahlavi dynasty enforced a legal code modelled on those of Europe, first adopted in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1907. The Pahlavi dynasty also adopted European dress and enforced rigid restrictions on the wearing of religious dress and the veiling of women (Arjomand 1981: 302), which came to be associated with the excesses of the regime. In the wake of the Iranian revolution, Islamic behaviour has become a form of symbolic opposition to the West. Zia Ulhaq introduced similar prohibitions in Pakistan in the same year as the revolution took place (Peters 1994: 256), and in Sudan, the Nimeiri regime introduced laws banning the consumption of alcohol and extra-marital sex in 1983 (Gravelle ibid: 263). In Malaysia, adultery and the consumption of alcohol are criminalised for Muslims under the Federal Constitution and are subject to the legislative and executive powers of the Federal authority and the states. Some states, for example, Kelantan, have used their authority to introduce laws punishing Muslims who violate received codes of behaviour. In the case of Kelantan, a Hudud law was enacted in November 1993, under which adulterers and those caught drinking alcohol can be punished (Kamali 1998: 204). The most extreme, and well-known, regime of behaviour regulation in the contemporary Islamic world is that implemented by the Taliban in Afghanistan in 1994, under which everything from listening to music, dancing, watching television, playing cards and kite-flying to schooling for girls was banned (Kleiner 2000: 21; Rashid 2002: 2; Armajani 2012: 199). The interpretation of Islam by the Taliban originated with Mullah Omar, who claimed to be applying Divine Law (Kleiner 2000:21–22).8 Unlike behaviour, which has been intermittently regulated in the Islamic world, clothing—and especially the clothing of women—has been politicised since the early days of Islam. During some periods, clothing has been used as a symbol of a particular regime or stream of Islam. The Abbasid dynasty (750–1250) used black garments (Baker 1997: 179) as a symbol of opposition toward the previous Umayyad dynasty (661–750) (Khaldun 1967: 215). Abbasid high officials were required to wear black garments a few times a week (Baker 1997: 179) to remind

8 Mullah Omar led the rebellion against Afghan warlords during the Soviet invasion (Armajani 2012: 196–197). Behaviour and Dress in the Islamic World 133 them that they were mourning the loss of their people in the battle against the Umayyad (Khaldun 1967: 215). Particular forms of headdress were also required of officials of the Ottoman Empire before the nineteenth century. In Iran, the Qajar Shi’i regime replaced the headdress associated with Sunni Islam with the kolah,a tall black lamb-skin headdress, in the nineteenth century (Baker 1997: 179). In Islam, men and women are regarded as sexual beings and sexual intercourse is seen as highly desirable (Mernissi 1987), as long as it is enjoyed in a socially approved marriage (El-Guindi 1981). In Islamic communities, veils are generally donned by young women after they experience their first menstrual cycle. As this physical experience marks the time from when women may be married, the wearing of a veil effectively demonstrates a woman’s physical readiness to enter into a sexual relationship with a man. However, socio-economic and demographic factors also contributed to the development of cultures of veiling in Islamic countries. With increasing numbers of slaves and concubines in Islamic communities in the eighth century, veils became a symbol of wealthy women’s separation from slaves and concubines (Nelson 1973). Veils were also markers of families’ economic success, as the wearing of the veil distinguished women of means, who could afford not to work, from the majority of the population, who worked in rural agriculture (Chatty 1997: 129). The prevalence of veiling continued to increase in Islamic communities with the abolition of slaves in 1950s (Chatty 1997: 143), as ex-slaves wore veils to show that they were now free. According to El-Guindi (1999: 475), rural to urban migrants enthusiastically embraced the veil because they saw it as ‘a symbol of urbanising and moving up’. A countervailing force within Muslim communities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was the influence of colonialism and of Western modernity more generally. During the colonial period, veils were eschewed by many women, at a time of widespread adoption of Western-style clothing. Centred in Egypt, a movement developed among educated women who rejected the veil, which they saw as unnecessary and as a symbol of oppression. A key figure in that movement was Qasim Amin, who in 1899 wrote a book called The Liberation of Women,in which she argued that veil excluded women from public life (Hoffman-Ladd 1987: 27). A number of other prominent women joined her, including Nabawiya Musa, Malak Hifni Nasif and Huda Al-Sha’rawi, and in 1923, Egyptian women began to appear in public without veils (Salmoni 2003: 486). Governments, too, have long recognised the symbolic importance of veiling, either encouraging the practice as a marker of resistance towards Western cultural imperialism or enjoining its absence as a marker of modernity. The most influential examples of the former are Saudi Arabia and Iran. Veiling, an established cultural practice in the Middle East, was initially enforced in the name of Islam in Saudi Arabia by the Wahhabi movement in the early nineteenth century. Midawwara,an outer white garment that lay over a woman’s head, was the traditional form of Islamic dress for women before the establishment of Saudi Arabia as a country in 1932, when the wearing of the abaya (a black cloak and scarf) began to be encouraged (Yamani 1997:57–59). Even up to the late 1950s, when the use of black was officially endorsed, Saudi Arabian women mostly wore pale coloured 134 6 Behaviour and Dress veils (Yamani 1997: 59). According to Yamani (1997: 59), although the enforcement of the abaya in the late 1950s was clearly a result of increasing Wahhabi influence, it was also a response to Saudi Arabians’ intensive contacts with the Western world since the early 1950s. The next major turning point in the Saudi Arabian politics of women’s dress was the regime’s attempts to justify its enforcement of the wearing of the niqab through a new interpretation of the Qur’anic passages concerning women’s dress, as described above. Saudi Arabia has clearly played important role in development of veiling in the contemporary Islamic world. However, it was the 1979 Iranian revolution that was the watershed in the global politics of veiling. Veils were outlawed under the Pahlavi dynasty (Savory 1978: 206), and the Reza regime killed around 500 and arrested 800 people involved in a demonstration to support veils in Iran in 1935, a few days before veils were officially banned (Baker 1997: 183). The forced unveiling lasted only 5 years, until Reza Shah was replaced by his son, Mohammad Reza, who adopted a more flexible approach toward the veil, leading women to wear loose head scarves (Zahedi 2008: 256). After the 1979 revolution, however, the veil became compulsory for females over the age of 12 regardless of their religion. From 30 May 1981, failure to comply has attracted a punishment of 1 year’s imprisonment (Paidar 1995: 232).9 The Iranian revolution inspired the introduction of veils in other Islamic countries (Norton 1997), but it also led a number of regimes to try to restrict what they perceived as attempts to spread the revolution through new forms of dress. Like the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran, Mustafa Kemal had discouraged the veil in Turkey in the 1920s, arguing that it was an uncivilised form of dress (Norton 1997). In order to westernise Turkey, Mustafa Kemal first abolished the Caliphate and its offices, religious schools and madrasas in 1924 and then, in 1925, introduced an obligation for men to wear hats. At the same time, women were discouraged from wearing veils (Norton 1997). While in urban areas Turkish women increasingly followed Western fashion, veils nevertheless persisted in the countryside. In the 1970s, the National Salvation Party, led by Necmettin Erbakan, sought to legitimise the wearing of the veil as a form of traditional dress, a position that increased the polarisation in Turkish politics (Olson 1985). After General Kenan Evren established a military regime in 1980, the Turkish government’s attempts to limit the influence of the Iranian revolution led to an increasingly intense focus on veiling and its political implications. The result was the mandating of a form of national dress that excluded veils but emphasised modesty. Under the new regime, a law regulating dress and appearance was introduced that prohibited male employees of public agencies from growing a moustache, beard or long hair and female employees from wearing mini-skirts, low-necked dresses and headscarves (Olson 1985: 163). A major dispute erupted over the restriction on veiling in 1984, when a

9 It is important to note also that policies on veiling have often been associated with political crisis. In the context of the Arab-Israeli war, for example, Egyptian Muslims believed that their defeat was caused by a decline of religious faith, and a return to veiling was part of the symbolic reassertion of traditional values (Chatty 1997; El-Guindi 1999: 469). Behaviour and Dress in the Islamic World 135 female professor from the Aegean University in Izmir was dismissed for insisting on wearing a veil while teaching, on the grounds that the Turkish Constitution guaranteed freedom of religion and thus her right to wear a veil (Olson 1985: 162). In another high-profile case, four medical students from Uludag University were suspended for wearing veils to university in the same year (Olson 1985: 161). Debates around veiling re-emerged in 2002, when Turkey’s major Islamic political party, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) gained a parliamentary majority. However, it was only in 2008, when the AKP gained a majority of seats in the parliament for a second term, that the ban on the wearing of veils in universities was overturned (Saktanber and Corbacioglu 2008: 515). Nevertheless, this decision was quickly annulled by the Constitutional Court (Chesler 2010: 36). Veils continue to be prohibited in some other Muslim countries as well. Since its independence from France in 1956, the Tunisian government, like its Turkish counterpart, has promoted a version of national dress that did not include a veil for women. It formally banned the wearing of veils in schools and government offices in 1981. Many citizens ignored the 1981 banning, prompting the Tunisian government to reassert its prohibition against the wearing of veils in public places. In 2006 veiled women were threatened with the prospect of losing their jobs (Chesler 2010: 37). Veils were also prohibited in Somalia in 2007, after the collapse of the Islamic regime. There, police officers have the power to remove veils from women’s heads on the streets of the major cities (Afrol News 24 August 2010).10 As this discussion suggests, the politics of veiling has long contained a transnational element. In recent decades, that transnational dimension has been institutionalised through global Islamic organisations such as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which strongly supports veiling and links it to opposition to the Western world. A major campaign tactic employed by the OIC has been to link negative incidents related to veils in Western countries with Islamophobia (Sheri- dan 2006). A major focus of that campaign has been France, which has banned the hijab in public schools since 2004 (Parker 2005), and the wearing of the niqab and burqa in public places since 2010 (Ismail 2010). Of nine negative incidents reported at the 36th Council of Foreign Ministers of the OIC in Damascus, Syria, in 2009, five were incidents related to rejection of the niqab and the burqa.11 The IOC has described such incidents as a form of religious and racial discrimination, and has used human rights frameworks to challenge the banning of any form of Islamic head covering (Third OIC Observatory report on Islamophobia 2010: 61). While it is clear that the use of the human rights framework is simply expedient—since the concept of religious freedom or freedom of expression is never been used by these organisations in relation to cases of protests against veiling in the Islamic world—

10 In response, the Islamist rebel group, Al-Shabaab, ordered Somali women in areas they controlled to wear veils or face punishment (Newstime Africa 10 December 2009). 11 2nd OIC Observatory Report on Islamophobia, June 2008 to April 2009, issued at the 36th Council of Foreign Ministers, Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic, May 23–25, 2009. 136 6 Behaviour and Dress the campaign is instructive as an example of attempts to shift the status of veiling from religious observation to a form of collective opposition to the Western world. It is in the context of these international struggles over Islamic behaviour and dress that Indonesia’s experience over the last century and a half must be evaluated.

Behaviour and Dress in Indonesia

Behaviour and dress have never before been as highly regulated as they are in contemporary Indonesia. In the era of the Islamic kingdoms, marriage and inheritance were the focus of jurisdiction in the kadi courts (Lev 1972: 5). However, there is little information on what mechanisms were in place to ensure compliance with the law. Marriage and inheritance were also the focus of the Islamic court system (raad agama) established by the Dutch in 1882 (Lev 1972: 14). Other aspects of public behaviour during the colonial period were regulated under provisions concerning local (as opposed to Islamic) standards of decency. For example, the Criminal Code of 1915 included chapters on decency, which criminalised acts such as adultery and homosexuality. The law also contained provisions to deal with public inebriation and the sale of alcohol (Staatsblad No. 732 Chaps. 281–303). The law, however, was not strictly enforced (Blackburn 1997: 113). In 1937, the balance between Islamic and local norms was further regulated when the Dutch adopted the so-called ‘reception theory’, under which Islamic norms were explicitly subordinated to rules of adat, meaning that where incom- patibilities existed (for example, in matters dealing with inheritance), the norms of adat, rather than Islam, were to be followed (Cammack 1997: 146). This approach was strongly criticised by later generations of Islamic scholars. For example, writing after independence, Professor Hazairin, a well-known Indonesian scholar of Islamic law, described it as ‘the devil’s theory’ because in some parts of Indonesia, the adat code sometimes incorporated practices prohibited in Islam, for example in regard to marriage (Lindsey 2010: 307).

After Independence

Initially, the colonial-era adat code and the secular law on decency were maintained after independence, while Islamic marriage was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Religion in 1946. In 1951, under Emergency Law No. 1/1951 concerning Civil Courts, the Islamic court system was re-established and inheritance added to the matters to come before it. Marriage was further regulated under Law No. 22/1964 on Registration of Marriage, which made provisions for Muslims to register their marriages with the Ministry of Religion. Marriages recorded by the Ministry were recognised by the state, but registration was not compulsory. Behaviour and Dress in Indonesia 137

The state’s regulation of Islam was strengthened considerably with the introduction of Law No. 1/1965 on Prevention of the Misuse of Religion and Blas- phemy, which was passed in response to pressure exerted on the government by Islamic groups in the early 1960s. The blasphemy law not only outlawed the rituals of deviant Islamic sects but also made it illegal for any individual or organisation to promote religious practices that were perceived to deviate from the state’s interpretation of Islam (Platzdasch 2011: 4). The first major intervention of the early New Order period in this sphere was the introduction of Law No. 1/1974 on Marriage. As noted above, marriages had been registered with the Ministry of Religion since 1964; however, there had been no attempt to fully codify marriage before the passing of this law, leaving Muslim women in particular with little certainty in terms of their rights within marriage and mechanisms to protect them (Katz and Katz 1975: 656).12 In its initial draft, the law made registration obligatory, and required polygamy or inter-faith marriage to be authorised by a civil court. It also included recognition of the status of engagement to marry, and contained provisions to compel a man to marry his fiancée if she fell pregnant during the engagement period (should she wish him to do so). Under pressure from Islamic organisations the more radical elements of the bill were ultimately revised; however in the final law, registration of marriage was made compulsory and Muslim men were required to obtain permission from a civil court to be able to divorce or to marry a second or subsequent wife (Katz and Katz 1975: 660–662). Paradoxically, then, Law No. 1/1974 was in fact the first codified version of Islamic behaviour pertaining to marriage in Indonesia.13 The struggle over the marriage act was just one of a number of clashes between Muslim groups and the state over behaviour and dress in the 1970s. During that decade, new Islamic organisations began promoting their interpretation of Islamic behaviour in Indonesia. For example, Tablighi Jama’at (Jamaah Tabligh), formed in India in 1930 by Shaikh Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas, arrived in Indonesia in 1950 but it only began to gain influence in the 1970s. Led by Ahmad Zulfakar, it required its female adherents to wear the chador and its male adherents to wear Middle Eastern style clothing (the jalabiyah) and to grow beards (Azra 2006: 190). Another politically-oriented Islamic organisation that introduced conservative forms of dress in Indonesia in the 1970s was Darul Arqam. Established in Malaysia in 1968 by Imam Ashari Muhammad al-Tamimi, this organisation sought to introduce what it saw as a totally Islamic way of life, which included encouraging women to wear the chador and men to wear the jalabiyah (Azra 2006: 191; Hamid 2005: 88).14 Hizbut Tahrir (HT), originally a political party established by Shaikh Mohammed Taqiuddin an-Nabhani in Lebanon in 1952 (Ahmed and Stuart 2009:

12 Before the passing of the law, it was common for Muslim women to be married, divorced or made to share her husband with other wives without her consent. 13 Scholars have written extensively on the marriage law in Indonesia. See, for example, Cam- mack, Young and Heaton (1996); Blackburn and Bessel (1997); Blackburn (2004, 2008). 14 Darul Arqam was banned in most provinces in the 1990s (Azra 2006: 192). 138 6 Behaviour and Dress

15) was established in Indonesia in 1978 under the leadership of Abdullah bin Nuh, the head of an Islamic boarding school in West Java, and his son, who joined Hizbut Tahrir as a student in Jordan (Ward 2009: 150). This organisation, which aims to establish a caliphate to unite Islamic communities across the globe, also mandates the wearing of Middle Eastern styles of clothing. The introduction of new kinds of Islamic dress by these organisations marked the beginning of a gradual change in the form of Islamic dress adopted more generally in Indonesia. Dress had never been a major focus of Islamic practice in the country before 1980. Like the midawwara in Saudi Arabia and the basortusu in Turkey, the kerudung, a white outer garment that covers the woman’s head and shoulders, was until this time considered sufficient to fulfil the Islamic exhortation to cover the female body. In fact, many devout women considered it sufficient in public to wear a selendang, which partially covered their hair, or indeed not to cover at all (Amrullah 2008).15 As elsewhere in the Islamic world, it was the 1979 Iranian revolution that led to an increase in the wearing of Middle Eastern-style veils and other forms of Islamic dress in Indonesia. Students at the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) with links to the global Islamic organisation, the Muslim Brotherhood, began promoting the wearing of veils in Islamic training sessions at the university mosque, Masjid Salman, in the early 1980s (Fox 2004: 10). Organised by the university-based organisation, the Dakwah Defenders’ Training Institute (Lembaga Mujahid Da- kwah), and led by Imaduddin Abdul Rahim, ITB students also established small Islamic study circles among students. Following the Bandung example, another Islamic student organisation, Indonesian Muslim Students (Pelajar Islam Indonesia, PII), began to promote the veil across the country. They, like students at ITB, saw veiling as a form of opposition to perceived Western cultural domination in Indonesia (Alatas and Desliyanti 2001: 25). In response to the growing importance of veils as a marker of Islamic identity and opposition to the West, the New Order government intermittently took measures against the practice, most often among students. In 1979, the Teacher Training College (Sekolah Pendidikan Guru, SPG) in Bandung placed students wearing a headscarf in a special class, an initiative it was forced to abandon under pressure from regional Islamic leaders (Tempo 11 December 1982). Two senior high schools in Bandung, SMAN 3 and 4, also prohibited the jilbab in 1980 (Alatas and Desliyanti 2001). In Jember, East Java, a student who wore the jilbab to SMAN 1 Jember after participating in an Islamic training session at the ITB was expelled in 1982 (Alatas and Desliyanti 2001). In the same year, following the example of the Turkish government, the New Order government introduced a national school uniform, as a way of containing the influence of the Iranian revolution. The wearing of veils in government offices was

15 Unlike in Middle Eastern countries, there are a few general terms for veils in Indonesia. Cadar is used to describe both the burqa and the niqab, while jilbab refers to a hijab. In the following discussion, I use the generic term ‘veil’ for all categories, and other terms only when necessary. Behaviour and Dress in Indonesia 139 prohibited under Ministry of Education Instruction Letter No. 052/C/Kep/D/82. This prohibition increased debate on Islamic dress in the country. In 1983, the Indonesian Council of Ulamas (MUI) sought to have the regulation annulled through dialogue with the Ministry of Education, but the attempt was unsuccessful (Alatas and Desliyanti 2001). The campaign against the prohibition gained momentum in the mid-1980s, when Islamic magazines and newspapers, including Panji Masyarakat, a magazine published by the Ministry of Religion, began to publicise cases of prohibition on the wearing of the jilbab in public schools, which helped mobilise the magazine’s readers (Alatas and Desliyanti 2001). Suharto changed his approach toward public display of Islamic behaviour from the late 1980s, in an attempt to gain the support of the Islamic lobby. The most conspicuous indication of this remarkable turn-around was his decision to make the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1991, accompanied by his wife, and his sons and daughters. When the family was in Mecca, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia gave Suharto a new first name, Muhammad. While many Indonesian Muslims argue that Suharto undertook the pilgrimage for religious reasons, scholars saw a political motivation in his decision (Azra 2006: 96).16 As part of the softening of Suharto’s stance on Islam, his government’s policies on veiling in schools were relaxed. Initially, there was some variation in the practice adopted by different schools and districts. For example, veiled students were allowed to return to SMAN 1 Bogor in 1988, while those attending SMAN 68 Jakarta were forced to move to Islamic private schools in the same city in 1989 (Alatas and Desliyanti 2001). The New Order government finally annulled the prohibition of on the wearing of the jilbab in public schools through the Ministry of Education Letter of Instruction No. 100/C/Kep/D/1991 on the Wearing of Uniforms in Secondary Schools.17 Another major change that took place in the final decade of Suharto’s rule was the re-establishment of Islamic courts, through Law No. 7/1989 on Islamic Courts.18 Among other measures, this law provided for an expansion of Islamic courts’ jurisdiction over marriage and divorce (the only two issues managed by Islamic courts before 1989), to also cover inheritance. It also equalised the power of Islamic and civil courts, overturning an earlier provision that decisions taken by Islamic courts had to be ratified by a civil court (Cammack 1997: 143). Two years later, Suharto instructed Islamic leaders to codify Islamic law on marriage,

16 Refer to Chap. 2 for a detailed discussion of the politics of this period. 17 Some limits on veiling persisted, even after the circulation of the Letter of Instruction. Students were forced to remove their jilbabs for the photographs that appeared on their academic certiﬁ- cates, although some students were allowed simply to show their ears to meet the requirement (Alatas and Desliyanti 2001). This requirement was only fully lifted in 2002 when the Director General of Primary and Secondary Education released Letter of Instruction No. 1174/C/PP/2002 (Media Indonesia 1 April 2002). 18 Islamic courts have been under the Supreme Court since 1999 and in the post-Suharto era Islamic courts have managed issues such as marriage, inheritance, wills, gifts, charity and Islamic ﬁnance. 140 6 Behaviour and Dress inheritance and charitable land in a document called the Compilation of Islamic Law (Kompilasi Hukum Islam, KHI). Drafted by representatives from the Department of Religion and the Supreme Court and regulated through Presidential Instruction No. 1/1991, the KHI was designated an authoritative point of reference for the Islamic courts (Ka’bah 2007:86). A fourth example of the change in Suharto’s stance towards Islamic behaviour and dress was his decision in 1994 to ban a national sport lottery (Porkas Sepak- bola), which had been operating since 1986 (Liddle 1996: 614). MUI initially supported the national lottery, which was organised by the Ministry of Social Affairs, on the grounds that a lottery was not a form of gambling because it did not incite division and feelings of hatred among participants (van Dijk 2007: 48). In 1991, MUI changed its position toward the ‘Social Charity Donation with Prizes’ (Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah, SDSB), the lottery that replaced Porkas Sepakbola. In conjunction with the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI), MUI issued a statement that all forms of lottery are in fact gambling and thus forbidden in Islam, leading to the prohibition of lottery throughout the country (van Dijk 2007: 48).

Increasing Legal and Social Control

In the post-Suharto period, Indonesia has experienced a dramatic escalation of the process of Islamisation. At the national level, dress and modesty have been a major focus for change. In 2007, the Ministry of Religion released a translation of the Qur’an that changed the interpretation of the requirement for women to cover their bodies. Following the lead of the Saudi Arabian government’s translation, the new Indonesian version mandated the covering of the aurat as the acceptable standard, which meant that a kerudung was no longer acceptable. The old translation, released in 1970, had been ﬂexible enough to accommodate the Indonesian traditional forms of kudung or kerudung. In that version, An-Nur (24) verse 31 had read:

Tell believing women to turn their eyes away from temptation and to preserve their chastity and not to display their adornments except those that are (normally) seen. And tell them to draw their garments (kain kudung)over their bosoms and not to display their ﬁnery except to their husbands, or their fathers, or their husbands’ father, their sons, their step-sons, their male relatives, or the sons of their male relatives or the sons of their female relatives or Muslim women, or the slaves they own or male attendants who have no interest in women or children who are yet to understand women’s aurat. And let them not stamp feet when walking so as to reveal their hidden adornments. In the 2007 version, the translation of this verse was altered to read:

Tell the believing women to turn their eyes away from temptation and to preserve their chastity, and not to display their adornments (their aurat), except what is (normally) seen. And urge them to draw their garments (kain kerudung) over their bosoms and not to display their ﬁnery (aurat), except to their husbands, their fathers or their husbands’ fathers, their sons, their step-sons, or their male relatives or the sons of their male relatives, or the sons of Behaviour and Dress in Indonesia 141

their female relatives, or women (also Muslim), their slave-girls, male attendants lacking in natural vigour, and children who have no carnal knowledge of women. And let them not stamp feet when walking so as to reveal their hidden adornments. According to this new interpretation, women’s ‘adornments’ and ‘finery’, which are meant to be kept hidden except from close relatives, correspond to their aurat (according to the Shafi’i school, all areas of their body except their faces and hands), a term traditionally associated in Indonesia with the requirements for prayer rather than for everyday life. This translation renders the following condition ‘except what is normally seen’ redundant, since there are no parts of women’s aurat (which means something to be hidden) that can be ‘normally seen’ in Islamic terms.19 In the decade and a half after the fall of Suharto, the most controversial debate over the regulation of behaviour and dress in Indonesia at the national level was that surrounding the introduction of the 2008 pornography law. The bill, which was first introduced in February 2006, was proposed in response to a small number of high- profile controversies in preceding years. From 2000, the dangdut singer and dancer, Inul Daratista, whose gyrating hips and scanty attire had featured on national television engaging in what was seen some Muslims as pornographic activities had provoked vigorous debate (Weintraub 2008). Then a month before the bill was introduced to parliament, an Indonesian version of Playboy magazine was laun- ched, prompting an angry reaction from the head of NU, Hasyim Muzadi, who attacked the publication as a ‘spearhead of foreign moral degeneracy, a global trademark of pornography’ (Sherlock 2008: 3). The bill covered both pornography and ‘pornoaction’ (pornoaksi), a term referring to any public act that could be seen as sexual, obscene or erotic (Allen 2007: 101). It attracted great controversy because it sought to ban activities such as kissing on the lips in public, erotic dancing and the wearing of clothes by women that revealed their thighs, navels and any part of their breasts (Sherlock 2008: 2). The bill was supported by Islamic groups including the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), the Islamic Defenders’ Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), the Mujahidin Indonesian Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI), and the Liberation Party (Hizbut Tahrir, HT), as well as by some within Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (Allen 2007: 103). Like Hasyim Muzadi, these groups considered the bill to be a vital weapon in the fight against the spread of pornography, which they perceived to be undermining the country’s morals (Sherlock 2008: 2). Critics of the bill claimed that it could be used to further marginalise and restrict the rights of women, non-Muslims, minority groups practising their traditional way of life and sexual minorities. According to these groups, the bill regarded women as

19 As discussed in the opening sub-section of this chapter, ‘what is normally seen’ was originally seen as an injunction to modesty in line with local customs pertaining to dress. When the original Arabic terms for ‘beauty and adornments’ are replaced by ‘aurat’, ‘what is normally seen’ becomes irrelevant. 142 6 Behaviour and Dress objects that need to be contained—a view held, for example, by the women’s organisation Srikandi Indonesian Democracy (Srikandi Demokrasi Indonesia, SDI) (Allen 2007: 106). Non-Muslims considered the bill as an attempt to enforce the moral code of one religion on all communities. The bill attracted particular criticism in Papua, where traditional dress includes penis gourds, grass skirts and bare breasts, which would be criminalised under the bill, and in Bali, where statuary, paintings and dance exposing parts of body deemed unacceptable in the draft are integral to the island’s culture and religion (Allen 2007: 110).20 After 2 years of heated discussion, Law No. 44/2008 on Pornography was passed, but with the term ‘pornoaction’ omitted. The law deﬁnes pornography as a picture, sketch, illustration, piece of writing, moving picture, animation, cartoon, body movement, but also a voice, sound or conversation, and any other form of message in any type of media and or in a public place containing an obscenity or an instance of sexual exploitation (Article One). The law prohibits the production, duplication, distribution, importation or export of pornographic materials, as well as their sale, purchase or rental, or any other involvement with those processes. Despite the controversy over the pornography bill, attempts have persisted to mandate Islamic dress and behaviour. In 2010, the Indonesian government attempted to regulate the behaviour of public ﬁgures. Minister for Internal Affairs, Gamawan Fauzi, who had earlier succeeded in applying standards of Islamic dress in West Sumatra, advocated the application of Islamic standards of behaviour for candidates for the positions of governor and head of district across Indonesia in a (failed) attempt to foil the plans of Julia Perez and Maria Eva to stand for election as deputy district heads in Pacitan and Sidoarjo in East Java respectively (Kompas 16 April 2010).21 Gamawan Fauzi’s argument is based on Article 27 (l) of Law No. 32/2004 on the amendment of Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy, which required that candidates must not have engaged in immoral (literally ‘disgraceful’) acts.22 However this criterion was revoked in Law No. 12/2008, the second amendment of the law on Regional Autonomy.23 In addition to these legal measures to promote behaviour acceptable to Islam, there has been repeated and widespread action by Islamic religious organisations

20 For further academic analysis of the law, see for example Sherlock (2008) and Lindsey (2008). 21 Julia Perez had a reputation for dressing sexily and for employing erotic dance moves (Jakarta Post 8 July 2010) while Maria Eva, a member of the Golkar party, was having a widely-publicised affair at that time another political Golkar party member (Jakarta Post 8 July 2010). 22 In defining what he saw as constituting an immoral act, Gamawan Fauzi specifically mentioned gambling, adultery and pornography (Republika 20 April 2010). 23 A number of other attempts have been made to introduce legislation to control particular forms of behaviour. For example, in February 2012, Minister of Religion and head of PPP, Suryadharma Ali, proposed a bill to ban the sale of alcohol throughout the country, arguing that the consumption of alcohol led to crime and road accidents. His attempt to manage the sale of alcohol built on Presidential Decree No. 3/1997 on Supervision and Control of Alcoholic Drinks, which limits the the sale of beverages containing more than 5 % alcohol to hotels, restaurants, nightclubs and duty- free shops (Antara 16 February 2012). Behaviour and Dress in Indonesia 143 such as Lasykar Jihad, the Islamic Defenders’ Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) against ‘un-Islamic’ behaviour. This action has included attacks on nightclubs, disco- theques and houses allegedly used for prostitution (Azra 2006: 194; Hasan 2002; Rabasa 2003), particularly during the month of Ramadan. At this time, Muslims are expected to avoid eating, drinking and sexual activity during the day, to act respectfully and to engage in additional acts of worship. In addition, however, tropes such as ‘respecting Muslims’ (menghormati umat Islam)or‘interfering with religious practice’ (mengganggu pelaksanaan ibadah) have been used in recent years to justify the imposition of limits on particular activities, not only those of less observant Muslims, but of non-Muslims as well. Importantly, in the context of this discussion, behaviour and dress have been a major focus of regulations introduced at the local level in many parts of the archipelago. Some of the most controversial local regulations have been introduced in the District of Tangerang, a major manufacturing area immediately west of Jakarta. In the city of Banten, for example, Local Regulation No. 8/2005 on Anti- Prostitution criminalised any person loitering suspiciously on streets, playing fields, in hotels or dormitories, residential areas, coffee shops, amusement centres or theatres, street corners or other public places, as well as acts of intimacy in public places that might arouse sexual excitement. Under the regulation, a woman could also be arrested on the grounds that her appearance raised suspicions of her being a prostitute (Allen 2009; Sherlock 2008). Regulations on behaviour and dress have attracted strong criticisms within Indonesia from those who feel that while Islam is the religion of the majority of Indonesians, there need to be strong safeguards for non-Muslims who believe that different forms of conduct and dress are acceptable. This is especially so, they argue, because Indonesia is not an Islamic state. Moreover, critics suggest, Islam itself is not monolithic. Last but not least, they argue that regulations on behaviour and dress are a waste of resources in the face of issues like corruption, unemployment and poverty (Candraningrum 2006: 1). Despite these criticisms, however, local regulations have remained in place in Tangerang, West Sumatra and elsewhere. As a result of these kinds of controversies, the National Directorate General of Regulation and Legislation in the Ministry of Law and Human Rights announced in 2010 that local regulations were to be examined to determine whether or not they contravened national laws (Kemenhunkam 2010). However, to date there has been little progress on this front, partly as a result of a lack of effective mechanisms through which the national government can regulate regional lawmakers.

Behaviour and Dress in West Sumatra

Historically, ‘un-Islamic’ behaviour has been more politicised in West Sumatra than in any other Indonesian region. This is largely as a result of the Paderi movement of the early nineteenth century, which, as explained in Chap. 2, was strongly 144 6 Behaviour and Dress influenced by Wahhabism. Dominant for a period of around 30 years (Hadler 2008a, b), the movement banned traditional practices such as cock-fighting, card- playing, the smoking of opium, the chewing of betel and the consumption of alcohol. Participation in Islamic rituals was compulsory, and men were expected to grow their beards and were not allowed to wear silk clothes. Women were expected to cover their faces (Radjab 1954: 16). These practices were enforced in the movement’s strongholds. For example, according to Radjab (1954: 16), one of the Paderi leaders, Tuanku nan Renceh, killed his aunt for chewing betel. In perhaps their greatest attack on Minangkabau culture, the early Paderi leaders, Haji Miskin, Haji Sumanik and Haji Piobang declared matrilineality to be against Islamic teachings. The Paderi movement later burned longhouses (rumah gadang) and challenged the matrilineal elite (Hadler 2008a: 24).24 The matrilineal inheritance system of the Minangkabau may have survived the Paderi movement, but it came under attack in the early twentieth century from Syaikh Ahmad Khatib, a Minangkabau who taught many Indonesian students at the end of nineteenth century in Mecca (Abdullah 1985). Syaikh Ahmad Khatib declared that the adat inheritance law constituted a deviation from the teachings of Islam, and that he would never return from Mecca as long as the system persisted—a vow he kept, dying in 1916 without ever having returned to West Sumatra (Abdullah 1985). In an attempt to find a middle way, students of Syaikh Ahmad Khatib belonging to the Kaum Muda movement, such as Haji Rasul, Muhammad Jamil Jambek and Sulaiman Ar-Rasuli, reinterpreted his teachings, declaring that the distribution of land inherited under the adat system (harta pusako or pusako tinggi) could remain matrilineal while the distribution property deriving from parents’ own efforts (harta pencaharian or pusako rendah) should follow the rules of the Islamic inheritance system (Abdullah 1985). This interpretation came to be accepted by both adat and Islamic leaders.25 After independence, local attempts to regulate behaviour in West Sumatra were subordinated to national trends—although Kahin (1999: 123) shows that the 3 March Affair, an attempted coup by Muslim militias against the local republican government in 1947 was caused by, among other things, the ‘luxurious and immoral’ behaviour of higher ranking officers in the government. Similarly, while local officials appointed by the national government adopted the policy on behaviour according to Jakarta’s terms in the New Order period, some pressure to maintain Islamic behaviour and dress remained locally within West Sumatra. For example, when the New Order government prohibited the wearing of the veil in

24 The enforcement of Islamic behaviour decreased with the temporary defeat of Wahhabism in Mecca in 1820 and the subsequent fall of the Paderi movement in 1837. 25 This position was later confirmed in a seminar on land and inheritance in West Sumatra organised by the Association of Indonesian Judges (Ikatan Hakim Indonesia, IKAHI) in 1968. The seminar, attended by leading thinkers including Buya Hamka, Professor Hazairin, Professor Nasroen and Bustanul Arifin, resolved to continue the solution promoted by the Kaum Muda movement between harta pusako and harta pencaharian (Naim 1979: 120). Behaviour and Dress in West Sumatra 145 public schools, the ban was not applied in West Sumatra (Interview with Busta- nuddin Agus, MUI member, 20 September 2008). In the post-Suharto era, behaviour and dress have once again become the main focus of Islamic public discourse in West Sumatra. The collapse of the authoritarian New Order regime initially increased freedom of expression at both national and regional levels. However, with regional autonomy came an atavist focus on local culture, both real and imagined (Wee 2002). Faced with the pressures resulting from the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis, regional governments in West Sumatra turned their focus to the question of behaviour and dress, which represented a relatively easy way to convince the community that it was addressing the ‘social ills’ (maksiat) that the province was experiencing, in comparison to the more difficult tasks of addressing social and economic inequality.

The Public Discourse of Behaviour and Dress

At least four significant terms are used in relation to the discourse on behaviour and the wearing of the jilbab in West Sumatra. The first is ‘morality’ (moralitas). The notion of morality is fundamental to the overall model of regional development adopted by local authorities. According to local officials, every patron must act morally, as must every client. The second term of note is ‘unsettling the community’ (meresahkan masyarakat). The authority with which this nebulous accusation is levelled has two main implications. On the one hand, it leaves no room for those being accused of ‘un- Islamic’ behaviour to explain their actions. On the other hand, it effectively provides a blanket justification for policy measures adopted by regional governments when pre-empting or dealing with such actions.26 The third term that regularly arises in discussions of behaviour and dress in West Sumatra is ‘social ills’ (penyakit masyarakat), often used in conjunction with its Arabic translation maksiat. This catch-all term is used to accord regional governments—and ‘upstanding’ individuals within the community—the authority to do anything necessary in order to rescue ‘society’ from these ills. The fourth construct in this cluster is a more specific one, which links the jilbab with local culture by identifying it as part of customary regional dress (jilbab sebagai pakaian daerah). This clearly fallacious association—Minangkabau traditional forms of headdress are very distinctive, and certainly not remotely like a jilbab (which first adopted in the 1980s)—is a key example of the way in which contemporary Middle Eastern norms have begun to be incorporated not just into contemporary Indonesian practice, but into collective memories of past practice.

26 As noted above, during Ramadan, a number of more speciﬁc versions of this construct are employed, such as ‘interfering with Islamic worship’ (mengganggu Pelaksanaan Ibadah Umat Islam)or‘not respecting Muslims’ (tidak menghormati Umat Islam). 146 6 Behaviour and Dress

Like the justifications of other elements of Islamic regulation in terms of the philosophy ‘Adat Basandi Syarak Syarak Basandi Kitabullah’, the association of particular Islamic forms of dress with Minangkabau culture is important not because of its veracity (or, for that matter, its lack thereof) but because of the moral authority it lends to the matter at hand. It is expected that the population of West Sumatra will be loyal to regional culture and thus fully responsive to all exhorta- tions to ensure that characteristics of that regional culture are maintained (even where they are invented) in the interests of regional development. Indeed, as is demonstrated below, ‘jilbab sebagai pakaian daerah’ has been described by local leaders as being fundamental to the success of West Sumatra as a decentralised region. The connection between Islamic behaviour and dress and Minangkabau culture has been constantly reaffirmed in the public statements of these officials. As Zai- nuddin Tanjung, the head of MUI in Bukittinggi, expressed it:

Non-Islamic behaviour that appears to be rampant in our present day society destroys our city’s image as part of the Minang heartland, characterised by the philosophy ‘Adat Basandi Syarak Syarak Basandi Kitabullah’ (Posmetro Padang 27 January 2010). As Zainuddin’s comments suggest, a second theme in such statements is the impact on the image of West Sumatra’s cities more generally. When discussing the closure of restaurants during the day in Ramadan, Fauzi Bahar, the Mayor of Padang, observed:

There is no need to be afraid to act on what we have collectively agreed upon, especially as the sellers are also Muslims. This is clearly unreasonable and it is fair to take action against it. If not dealt with immediately, the sellers will engage in worse and worse behaviour, creating a bad precedent for this city, which is famous for its religiosity (Posmetro Padang 1 September 2009). Irvianda Abidin, the head of the Bukittinggi branch of the High Council of Minangkabau Culture (Majlis Tinggi Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau, MTKAAM) made a similar observation in relation to the celebration of Valentine’s Day:

It is most ironic that in a region that claims to hold faith and Islamic law in the highest esteem, Valentine’s Day, which is clearly forbidden for Muslims, is celebrated. In addition to creating competition among those seeking a desirable partner, this celebration encourages social ills and is tantamount to fornication (Posmetro Padang 15 February 2009). As in this instance, ‘un-Islamic’ behaviour is very often identiﬁed as a direct source of crime, and its prevention as an important means of maintaining public order. For example, Rosmita Rustam, the head of the police department in the district of Pesisir Selatan, claimed that ‘Alcoholic drinks have become triggers for other crimes’ (Padang Ekspres 11 February 2009). On another occasion, she asserted that ‘The seizure of alcohol increases security in the community. It is well known that alcoholic drinks are sources of crime’ (Posmetro Padang 1 December 2008). Similarly, Bambang, the head of the police department in the district of Dharmasraya asserted that: Behaviour and Dress in West Sumatra 147

If the community had a deep understanding of the negative impacts of gambling, they would go to great lengths to avoid it. Besides ruining the economic prospects of the family, gambling interferes with the security and order of the community (Posmetro Padang 7 June 2009). Socially unacceptable behaviour, moreover, is seen to be contagious. As Gus- rizal Gazahar, the head of the fatwa department of the regional MUI, commented in relation to prostitution:

Prostitutes are a social ill that must be the subject of a serious eradication campaign. If prostitution is allowed to continue, it will damage the mentality and the morality of the community. This social ill must be eradicated so that it does not spread (Padang Ekpres 12 August 2010). As in Tangerang, the risks of prostitution have been cited in West Sumatra as a justiﬁcation for attempts to forbid women from going out at night without a male relative from their immediate family circle (muhrim). Women and girls have also been a major focus of campaigns on Islamic dress, which have also focused on security. Fauzi Bahar claimed that the obligation imposed on schoolgirls attending state schools to wear the jilbab helped keep them safe, since it would prevent muggings and robberies. In his words, ‘the city of Padang has become free of muggings since its women have been covered’ (SCTV Topik Minggu 9 August 2006). More practical reasons are also put forward for imposing Islamic dress on schoolchildren. In the same statement, Fauzi claimed that the obligation would also save poorer students from the embarrassment of not having enough jewellery to display (since the jilbab covers their necks and arms), which might otherwise make them reluctant to attend school. It would also, he said, protect them from the malaria-carrying aedes aegypti mosquito. The introduction of Islamic dress standards for women is, however, not just a matter of security and protection from mosquito-borne diseases. It is also, it is claimed, a vital part of the preservation of West Sumatra’s image. According to Irwan Prayitno, the Governor of West Sumatra:

The clothing donned by a woman is not only just something that covers her body. Clothing also reﬂects a person’s characteristics, from their level of education, to their work, their culture and their behaviour. It is for this reason that the people of West Sumatra have not lost their identity. The people of this region are famous for their religiosity and their strong culture. Don’t destroy that by appearing in such a way that would change other people’s perceptions (Haluan 27 July 2011). As this statement implies, women bear the dual burden of maintaining their self- respect and ensuring that Minang people collectively continue to be respected by others. Women’s cultural responsibilities are also a recurring theme in public statements about social roles more generally, which position them as the primary custodian of family values and local customs. Mahyeldi Ansharullah, the Vice Mayor of Padang, echoed this position, claiming that ‘women’s role is very important to the quality of family life’ (Padang Today 21 April 2010). Indeed, as he iterated a year later: 148 6 Behaviour and Dress

In the life of the household, the respective strengths of women and men must be combined to produce quality families ﬁlled with happiness, love and mercy. Such families protect against ongoing increases in the divorce rate as a result of the lack of synchronicity (sinkronisasi) between husbands and wives (sumbaronline 21 April 2011). In addition to supporting the family, according to Fauzi Bahar, women’s role in the household has a deep and decisive effect on policy making, an interpretation that echoes New Order discourse on the role of women as helpmates. On the occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the regional Dharma Wanita in 2011, Fauzi observed:

We hope that with this twelfth anniversary Dharma Wanita can become even greater and progress further. With its progress, there will automatically be progress in the regional governments as well, since the development of regional governments is 35 % in the hands of officials’ wives. Those who play a role in the development of the officials of Padang City are the wives of [officials like] the Mayor, the Vice Mayors, the Regional Secretary and the heads of department in the regional governments (Padang Today 16 December 2011). In the words of Bustari, the head of the information sub-unit of the Ministry of Education and Culture in Padang:

According to local customs, women have responsibility for the household. Local customs have never forbidden women to develop themselves in other ways. However, they must not forget their roles as women (cimbuak 17 November 2004). Statements about behaviour and dress, and the importance, for Minangkabau people, of following Islamic norms, intensify each year during Ramadhan. Some- times such statements are very general, reminding members of the community to respect Ramadhan and to fulfil their obligations as Muslims, and therefore as Minang and as members of the West Sumatran community. As Djufri, the Mayor of Buki- ttinggi, urged residents of his city, ‘Do not blemish this holy month even once with activities that transgress religious norms, local customs and regional laws’ (Posmetro Padang 26 August 2008). At other times, statements are more specific references to official actions designed to ensure that Muslims can complete their fast in the best possible conditions.27 As one example, Saifuddin Ansyori, the head of operational administration in the Sawahlunto district police department, announced that:

In order to provide comfort to Muslims in Sawahlunto city as they complete the fast in the approaching month of Ramadhan, the police department will conduct an operation to eradicate social ills such as the consumption of alcohol, gambling and the use of narcotics (Posmetro Padang 24 August 2008). The statements of these local stakeholders demonstrate the increasing use of Islamic terms in regional discourse on behaviour and dress, a discursive development that is strongly reﬂected in regulatory practice at the provincial and district levels.

27 Recall also the provisions on Qur’anic classes and pesantren Ramadhan, described in Chap. 5. Behaviour and Dress in West Sumatra 149 Local Government Policy on Behaviour and Dress

Between 2001 and 2011, a number of regional Islamic regulations have been introduced to deal with social ills and Islamic dress. The first local regulation, known as the ‘Perda Sharia’, was passed in 2001, in the first year of the implementation of Regional Autonomy. Provincial Regulation No. 11/2001 on the Pre- vention and Eradication of Social Ills. It prohibited behaviour such as adultery, fornication, gambling and the use of alcohol and narcotics. Initially, the bill also included a provision for a curfew for women out without a male member of their immediate family after nine at night, but after a heated debate at both the regional and national level, this provision was dropped (Ranperda Pelarangan dan Pem- berantasan Maksiat 26 June 2001; The Jakarta Post 21 August 2010). Some local regulations took an even broader view of the concept of ‘social ills’. While Provincial Regulation No. 11/2001 defined social ills as adultery, fornication, gambling and the use of alcohol and narcotics, Local Regulation No. 3/2004 on the Prevention, Prosecution and Eradication of Social Ills in Padang Panjang and Local Regulation No. 2/2004 on the Prevention, Prosecution and Eradication of Social Ills in Padang Pariaman suggested that it meant any behaviour that was displeasing to the community because it contravened religious or customary norms. Local Reg- ulation No. 19/2006 on the Prevention and Eradication of Social Ills in Sawah Lunto Sijunjung included in the category any act disturbing religious observances. In 2002, Gamawan Fauzi proposed Local Regulation No. 6/2002 on Islamic Behaviour in Solok, which sought to regulate dress for men and women. The regulation obliged Muslim men to wear trousers and clothes with short or long sleeves and women to don clothes with long sleeves covering their hips, trousers or long skirt to their ankles and jilbab covering their hair, necks, ears, the back of their head (pundak) and chests, stating that ‘the function of Islamic dress for men and women is to maintain self-respect and the respect of others, to maintain the wearer’s identity as a Muslim and to eliminate threats and harassment from other people’. However the observance of correct Islamic dress was also designed ‘to illustrate that someone or some community… is preserving their local customs’. The initiatives of Gamawan Fauzi and the provincial parliament stimulated a rash of legislation concerning behaviour and dress in other districts in West Sumatra. A year later, Local Regulation No. 22/2003 on Islamic Dress was passed in Pasaman, which again associated veiling with local custom. Taking a slightly different tack, rather than describing the jilbab as a form of pakaian adat (which, as pointed out earlier, does not reflect its history in West Sumatra), Local Regulation No. 5/2003 on the Obligation to Wear Islamic Dress in Lima Puluh Kota described it as being inspired by the regional philosophy of ‘Adat Basandi Syarak, Syarak Basandi Kitabullah’. In addition, the regional governments of West Sumatra implemented a range of policies designed to give local cultural practices a more Islamic face. As has occurred in many other parts of Indonesia, the use of the Islamic greeting, ‘Assalamu’alaikum’, or ‘Peace be upon you’, has changed in recent years. In the past, the greeting was 150 6 Behaviour and Dress routinely followed by other religious greetings such as ‘Salam Sejahtera’ when Christians were likely to be present in the audience and ‘Om Shanti Shanti’ when Buddhists were present. Now, however, it is regularly seen as applying to all members of an audience indiscriminately.28 Regional officials have also discontinued the practice of acknowledging the religious celebrations of officials of other faiths, for example, by saying ‘Merry Christmas’ to a Christian official. These and other forms of everyday practice reinforce the dominant culture of the region and emphasise the importance of the Islamic power bases of the regional governments of West Sumatra in the post-Suharto period. Within this regulatory and political context, it is not surprising that there have been several cases in which instances of ‘un-Islamic’ behaviour have been denounced by regional governments, especially during Ramadan. In September 2008 in Bukittinggi, a mobile cart serving food in Ramadan was removed by the Pamong Praja Police Sub-Unit (Satpol PP), leading to protests from the sellers (Posmetro Padang 2 September 2008). Four students having lunch were also taken to the police office in the same city in September 2009 (Padang Ekspres 9 Sep- tember 2009). Moreover, in September 2011, two striptease dancers at the Cafe and Resto Fellas in Padang were arrested and subsequently sentenced to one and a half years’ imprisonment by the local court (Padang Ekspres 17 February 2012). Islamic and other social organisations have also engaged in ‘independent’ enforcement of Islamic regulations in West Sumatra. For example, the Pancasila Youth (Pemuda Pancasila, PP) raided the Sari Rasa Restaurant in Padang for serving food during the day in Ramadan, even though the owner had permission from the regional government to open the restaurant (Posmetro Padang 3 Sep- tember 2009).29 The Forum for Enforcement of Islamic Law (Forum Penegak Syariat Islam, FPSI), headed by Irvianda Abidin, has also been very active in enforcing regulations concerning behaviour and dress. In 2009, for example, Irvi- anda Abidin and his followers disrupted the Valentine’s Day celebration organised by Yamaha in Padang, forcing the committee of the event to remove the term ‘Valentine’ from their promotional materials and activities (Posmetro Padang 15 February 2009). Unlike the regulations and policies on Islamic finance, zakat and Islamic education discussed in previous chapters, which have had little impact on non-Mus- lims, the regulations on behaviour and dress have had a considerable effect on West Sumatran society as a whole. In terms of dress, non-Muslim women are not formally required to wear a jilbab, but they cannot show parts of their body such as the

28 This tendency is not restricted to strongly Muslim provinces. At an international conference in the majority Christian province of North Sulawesi in 2011, prayers were offered by a local pastor, but the Muslim head of the organising committee, who had travelled from Jakarta to attend the conference, used ‘Assalamu’alaikum’ without any other greeting when addressing the delegates. This was despite the fact that the conference was hosted by the local (resolutely Christian) government (Personal communication, Michele Ford). 29 In Padang, restaurants are allowed to open for non-Muslim customers during the day in Ramadan, but in practice there is no mechanism for preventing Muslims from eating there as well. Behaviour and Dress in West Sumatra 151 navel, thigh or their cleavage.30 In terms of behaviour, although non-Muslims receive some dispensation, for example, permission to eat during Ramadan, they are subject to other prohibitions including bans on the consumption of alcohol, gambling and prostitution.

Conclusion

As this chapter has shown, discourse on Islamic behaviour and dress in West Sumatra in the post-Suharto period is strongly influenced by Middle Eastern practice, even though it is underpinned by a putative connection to regional cultural identity. This reflects a broader trend in Muslim-majority regions in Indonesia, a trend that represents a significant departure from both traditional practice, in which a range of types of clothing were considered to be acceptable within Islam and behaviour was less tightly controlled, but also to government policy and social norms in the 1970s and early 1980s, when Indonesia was strongly influenced by transnational reactions against veiling and other forms of overtly Islamic dress and behaviour after the Iranian revolution. During that earlier period, devout women who chose to veil were sometimes faced with the choice of failing to fully meet their religious obligations as they understood them, or risking exclusion from particular aspects of public life, albeit to a lesser extent than in some other Muslim-majority societies. However, as a consequence of this more recent shift, the space available to Muslims—and especially women—to make their own choices about their behaviour and dress has narrowed even further. Moreover, unlike other areas of Islamic regulation, which have not had a particularly strong impact on people of other faiths living in West Sumatra, regulations on behaviour and dress have clearly affected the everyday lives of non- Muslims in the province, as well as those of their Muslim neighbours.

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Since the demise of the New Order government in 1998, the role of ideology in Indonesian politics has been gradually redeﬁned. In place of the New Order ideology of secular developmentalism (which had replaced the anti-imperialism and radical nationalism of Guided Democracy), the role of Islam has greatly increased. In recent Indonesian political history, Islam has been the dominant ideological player. Religiosity, and the public expression of Islamic values, is a more important part of community life than ever before in post-independence Indonesian history, but attempts to move Indonesia in the direction of an Islamic state have met with little success at the national level. Where Islam has succeeded in making its mark on Indonesian politics in recent years is in the introduction of regulations based on Islamic beliefs and practices at the provincial and district levels. Decentralisation has given regional governments the authority to align local legislation with areas of Islamic practice that have never before been regulated by the Indonesian state. This is not to suggest that the state was previously disengaged with Islam. As this book has shown, Islam has long been a focus, at times incorporated and at others excluded in response to changing social and political circumstances. As Chap. 2 has demonstrated, in the pre-colonial era, the adoption of Islam enabled indigenous states to participate in international trading routes dominated by Muslims. During the colonial period, Dutch suspicion of Islam as a potential ideological base for anti-colonial resistance meant that Islamic networks were severely circumscribed, and the authority of locally-based adat law was given precedence in the administration of justice over Islamic principles. Denied any association with the colonial legal or education systems, Islam found fertile ground in its association with the Indonesian nationalist movement from the early twentieth century, establishing international links through the participation of Indonesian Muslims in Pan-Islamic networks and providing an alternative model of modernity to the secular institutions of colonialism. When colonialism collapsed with the Japanese invasion and occupation of Indonesia between 1942 and 1945, Islam strengthened its political position through its support of the anti-westernism that was a fundamental aspect of Japanese imperial ideology. Islamic social and military organisations established under the Japanese played a signiﬁcant role in the national revolution, and after the Dutch recognised Indonesia’s independence in

1949, Islamic organisations and political parties were well placed to play a significant role in the political and social life of the new Indonesian Republic. Polit- ically marginalised by Sukarno and his left-wing allies in the first half of the 1960s, Islamic parties and social organisations again swept to the fore in the early years of the New Order, when they were seen by the regime as militant bastions of anti- communism. Throughout the New Order period, Islam’s political role waxed and waned, but Suharto’s decision to enter into close association with Islamic political figures and intellectuals in the later years of his rule again placed Islam in a position to benefit from changes to Indonesian political and social life in the post-1998 Reform Era. The main concern of the thesis has been to show that the introduction of Islamic regulations by regional governments in the post-New Order era has been a product of a new iteration of interaction between international, national and local elements that has characterised the relationship between Islam and politics throughout the course of Indonesian history. The interaction of these three elements figures con- sistently in all the case studies examined in the book: Islamic finance, zakat, education, and behaviour and dress, through different periods of history and under significantly varied political circumstances. In existing studies, the Islamic regulations instituted in recent years have tended to be seen as either the result of the influence of transnational Islam or as locally-generated initiatives in response to particular regional or national circumstances. As this book has argued, however, both approaches overlook the complexity and continuous interaction between local Islamic politics and developments in the wider Islamic world. In other words, the book has argued that local forms of Islam must be seen as flexible and subject to change in line with transnational developments in the Islamic world, even as local elements continue to play an important part in the political manifestations of Indonesian Islam. The example of West Sumatra shows that there is a complex process of interaction between local agency, national concerns and international interactions. It emerges in a wide range of responses, from accommodation of global practices to challenges and modification of them. The establishment of Islamic banks and zakat institutions, as well as the endorsement of particular types of Islamic behaviour and dress, are examples of ways in which institutions and ideas originating from transnational Islam have been accommodated to local circumstances in West Sumatra, rather than being direct adoptions of Wahhabi or Salafi modes of social action. They represent new institutions and practices that have evolved in response to local political circumstances and transnational models, the same pattern that has characterised the development of Indonesian Islam throughout history. The book has illustrated the variety of challenges and modifications to global Islamic practices that the West Sumatran regulations have incorporated. The use of collateral in the regulation of loans from Islamic banks is one such example, as is the collection of zakat from all government employees regardless of the threshold for zakat payments that applies in other Islamic countries. In Islamic education, local influences have been responsible for the introduction of the chanting of the Asmaul Husna, the 99 names of God, while in the case of dress, the wearing of 7 Conclusion 157 brightly-coloured jilbab can be seen as deriving from traditional forms of dress in West Sumatra. As the book has argued, the endorsement of Islamic behaviour according to transnational principles is the one major area where recently-instituted regulations have departed from local Islamic norms.

Transnational Factors

Transnational factors influencing the nature of Islamic regulations in West Sumatra have mainly originated from Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (IOC). As Chap. 3 has shown, the OIC has played a major role in creating networks, conferences and centres designed to spread Islamic financial systems throughout the wider Islamic world. It has been supported in this endeavour by increasing oil welfare in the Gulf states, which not only provides the means for promoting these systems in countries with large Islamic populations outside the Middle East, but also supplies a pool of investors looking to invest capital through Islamic financial institutions. In Southeast Asia, Malaysia, with its close proximity to West Sumatra and its well-established Islamic financial systems, has played an important intermediary role in this development. It has provided assistance to West Sumatra in terms of networks, experts and materials in the local development of Islamic financial systems. It has also served as a model for the development of Islamic tourist destinations, such as that envisaged in Padang Pariaman. Chapter 4, on the practice of zakat, has also demonstrated the key role of the OIC in propagating zakat institutions throughout the Islamic world. In cooperation with local zakat institutions in Islamic countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Malaysia, the OIC has sponsored a series of international conferences on zakat that have been designed to promote and assist with the institutionalisation of zakat in countries outside the Middle East. The OIC has also published books and articles on zakat which receive wide distribution throughout the Islamic world. As Chap. 4 notes, Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam have responded to these initiatives with the establishment of the Zakat Council of Southeast Asia (Dewan Zakat Asia Tenggara, DZAT), a regional centre for the promotion of zakat in Southeast Asian countries. Chapter 5, which deals with Islamic education, has shown that oil welfare has also been responsible for an increase in Middle Eastern support for projects designed to further the development of forms of Islamic education among Islamic communities. Saudi Arabia in particular has played an important role in the development of Islamic schools in Indonesia. The Institute for Islamic and Arabic Sciences (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab, LIPIA) in Jakarta has produced thousands of Islamic and Arabic teachers who are now active throughout the country. Large numbers of Indonesian Muslims now also undertake study programs in Middle Eastern countries that are funded by a variety of agencies based in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt, as well as through scholarships provided by the 158 7 Conclusion

World Muslim League and the OIC, through the Islamic Development Bank (ISDB). The number of West Sumatran students graduating from Middle East educational institutions, and the establishment of Islamic schools such Ar-Risalah in Padang by these returning graduates, is an illustration of the influence of Middle East countries in education in West Sumatra. Chapter 6 has also demonstrated the significant role of transnational influences on the promotion of Islamic behaviour and dress in Indonesia as a whole and West Sumatra in particular. Wahhabi organisations in Saudi Arabia and the Muslim Brotherhood Movement in Egypt have been important sources of materials promoting the relationship between behaviour and forms of dress and religious and political identity, as has been post-revolutionary Iran. The association of religious and political identity with behaviour and dress suggests that this particular aspect of transnational influence is driven by the need to assert a polarisation between Islam and the West, an influence that may be inimical to the maintenance of aspects of local practice. As an example, this chapter points to Middle Eastern influence as the source of changes to regional Minangkabau costume that replace the traditional headdress for women with the wearing of the jilbab.

National Factors

International factors have contributed to the development of Islamic regulations in West Sumatra. However, this book has shown that national elements also play an important role. National influence may have waned since the fall of Suharto, but the central government has continued to exert some influence over the regulation of Islamic affairs. As Chap. 3 has shown, national policies on Islamic financial systems have played important role in the development of the various Islamic financial systems introduced in West Sumatra. Branches of national Islamic banks have been established in the province, while a regional micro-financing system, Baitul Mal waTanwil (BMT), has also been introduced as part of the effort to combat poverty, supervised by the national Ministry of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises. Similarly, Takaful, a system of Islamic insurance managed by the Ministry of Finance, is another national initiative operating at the local level. Islamic courts overseen by the Indonesian Supreme Court also manage the adjudication of disputes in regional Islamic financial practices. In addition, policies issued by the Reserve Bank of Indonesia and the National Syari’a Council of the Indonesian Council of Ulamas (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) regarding Islamic financial practices also affect local regulations in West Sumatra. Chapter 4 has shown that policies on zakat at national level have also been influential in the development of zakat institutions in West Sumatra. Indonesian law requires regional governments to establish government zakat institutions (BAZDA) and to collect and distribute the proceeds of zakat, the outcomes of which must be reported to the national government zakat institution, BAZNAS. West Sumatra is National Factors 159 also linked to national private zakat institutions through the establishment of regional branches of organisations such as the National Humanitarian Foundation (Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat, PKPU). The Forum Zakat in Jakarta is also involved in initiatives designed to improve the standard of zakat practices in West Sumatra. In the field of Islamic education, the subject of Chap. 5, national policies have had a similar impact in West Sumatra. Regional Islamic educational institutions are managed by the Ministry of Religion, in association with the administration of public schools by the Ministry of Education. Another area in which national law affects local level Islamic education is in the certification of teachers. Indonesian law mandates that Islamic teachers at public schools throughout the country must be graduates of Islamic tertiary education institutions, a regulation that obliges pro- spective teachers in regional areas to enrol in recognised Islamic universities, institutes and colleges. This national policy has attracted students wishing to become teachers in public schools into faculties of education at local Islamic institutions. Chapter 6 has demonstrated that the national factor has played an important role in the development of regional regulations on behaviour and dress in West Sumatra. The national government not only supports the regulation of behaviour and dress, it has also failed to intervene in cases involving the prohibition of certain types of behaviour by provincial and district administrations. The Ministry of Religion promotes particular interpretations of appropriate Islamic dress and behaviour through its authorised translation of the Qur’an, just as it also manages the conduct of marriage in the regions. National-level Islamic courts also have authority over Islamic inheritance for Muslims at the local level. The national law on pornography has also had an impact on the regulation of behaviour in regional areas, especially in relation to dress and sexual orientation.

Local Factors

Although it is clear that transnational Islam and national factors have both influenced the emergence of Islamic regulations in West Sumatra, this book has argued that the local elements have in fact played a dominant role in this process, albeit one mediated by the influences of these other levels. The introduction of local Islamic regulations can in many cases be viewed as attempts by local politicians and officials to use Islam as a means of gaining or maintaining power, including the power to make people act in certain ways. While transnational Islam provides the materials, forms and networks that enable the formulation of Islamic regulations, and the national government exerts its authority in areas prescribed by national law, regional autonomy has opened up new opportunities for local politicians and officials to harness Islam as a means of furthering their own political and financial interests. As Chap. 3 has shown, it has been in the development of Islamic financial systems in West Sumatra that the interests of local actors have been most readily apparent. 160 7 Conclusion

Poverty and unemployment remain high, especially within the uncertain financial climate of recent times. In this situation, the call for new and equitable financial systems has become a political issue which local authorities have been able to take advantage of through the introduction of Islamic financial regulations that can be seen as a response to local circumstances and local needs. In addition, regional governments have introduced the Islamic financial systems in the expectation that they will be able to utilise Islamic financial systems in building economic relations with, and attracting tourists from, wealthy Islamic countries. In these social and economic circumstances, the discourse on Islamic financial systems points to their potential as a means of opening up opportunities for participation in economic activities on the part of the majority of the local population, for limiting the impact of external financial crises, and for attracting new investment from other Islamic countries. West Sumatran regional governments have also actively promoted the notion that Islamic financial systems are implicated in the regional philosophy ‘Adat Basandi Syarak, Syarak Basandi Kitabullah’ (ABS-SBK), which asserts an integral relationship between Islam and traditional Minangkabau social and cultural norms. As such, local politicians and officials have argued that even though Islamic financial systems were only introduced into Indonesia in the 1990s, they have long existed in both the spirit and the application of local financial practices. Thus, even though Islamic financial systems presently contribute only around 5 % to the regional economy, local politicians and officials are able to assert that they are the most appropriate forms of financial practice for the future development of the West Sumatran economy. Further, as Chap. 3 demonstrates, these financial practices have enabled regional governments to direct funding towards the interests of the majority of the population, an important means of garnering electoral support. The dominance of local factors has also been demonstrated in the discussion of regional regulations on zakat in Chap. 4. The introduction of regulations on zakat has been justified in terms of local issues such as efforts to combat poverty and unemployment, as well as the need to position the local economy to be able to respond to recurrent natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes. In the light of these social and economic factors, the discourse on zakat becomes part of local policies in the field of social welfare. The book argues, however, that politics of zakat plays a more important role than its social and economic meanings. In their endorsement of zakat, regional governments have explicitly stated that rather than it being their responsibility to allocate funds from secular taxes to reduce poverty, it is the responsibility of wealthy Muslims to alleviate the poverty of their fellow Muslims through the payment of zakat. This standpoint is clearly designed to reduce the financial burden regional governments bear in the management of poverty alleviation programs. Equally important, zakat also provides a mechanism that enables regional governments to distribute funds to a majority of the local population, an obvious means of attracting and maintaining electoral support. Local factors are also dominant in the area of Islamic education. As discussed in the discourse on Islamic education in Chap. 5, local elites are aware that the representation of West Sumatrans among the national political elite has greatly declined since the early post-independence period. They see the expansion of Islamic education at the Local Factors 161 local level as a means of redressing this decline. The chapter also suggests that there is concern within the community about children’s behaviour, and Islamic education is seen as a means of enforcing standards of behaviour and respect for the authority of teachers and parents that is lacking in the public school system. In other words, Islamic education provides local governments with a framework for articulating regional cultural identity and deflecting responsibility for the management of social problems. At the same time, like the institution of zakat, it offers a direct means of garnering political support from communities looking for solutions to local needs and issues of concern. Chapter 6 follows the other case study chapters in arguing that local factors are dominant in regional governments’ engagement with matters to do with behaviour and dress. The political discourse on moral issues, which focuses on crime against women and the negative impacts of gambling and the consumption of alcohol, provides regional governments with the opportunity to promote religiously-based solutions to moral issues, rather than engage in the more challenging task of addressing the social and economic problems that are manifested in a perceived decline in moral standards. In this respect, regional governments in West Sumatra have opted to link Islamic behaviour and dress with regional philosophy and identity and to present this association as a solution to perceived social ills. As is the case with other Islamic regulations, the association of Islamic norms with regional culture not only enables regional governments to present themselves as guardians of public morality but also as bastions of regional identity in the face of negative influences imported from the West. However, just as regulations on zakat absolve regional governments from their responsibilities in the area of poverty alleviation, regulations on behaviour and dress deflect attention from the real causes of crime and anti-social behaviour.

The Politics of Islam in West Sumatra

A major theme in this book has been that the Islamic regulations introduced in West Sumatra in recent years have been generated by social and economic factors independent from the religious motives often seen to underlie the phenomenon of Islamisation. Local Islamic regulations first appeared in contemporary Indonesia in the period following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, when increases in poverty and unemployment drew attention to the problem of financial ethics and the need for alternative models of social and economic security. In this light, zakat emerges as a community-based system of wealth-sharing that is independent of the policies and budgetary decisions of the national government. Similarly, regulations dealing with Islamic education, and attempts to promote behaviour and dress consistent with Islamic ethics should be seen as local responses to social issues brought about by financial and political crises and the upheavals and transitions that have followed in their wake. 162 7 Conclusion

As this book has also demonstrated, the discourses that have accompanied Islamic regulation in West Sumatra have used particular interpretations of Islamic ethics to legitimise politically-motivated policy, to marginalise non-Muslims and to undermine the role of women in society. The marginalisation of non-Muslims is particularly noticeable in policies that justify Islamic regulations in terms of their supposed association with regional identity and philosophy (ABS-SBK). With the exception of policies on zakat (which have no impact on non-Muslims in any case), Islamic regulations in West Sumatra have been promoted as manifestations of regional identity, thus denying non-Muslims a basis for an identity as West Sumatrans and to some extent exclude them from participation in the economic life of their community. As shown in Chap. 3, while Muslims still use conventional banks, the introduction of regulations on Islamic finance mean that resources are increasingly being transferred to institutions under the control of Muslims. Simi- larly, Chap. 5 has shown that funding for education has been focused on Islamic education to the detriment of other educational institutions in West Sumatra. Finally, the association of ABS-SBK with behaviour and dress has enforced particular constructions of Muslim standards and practices on all citizens, including non-Muslims, especially during Ramadan. Although Islam has manifested in different forms in the changing socio-political contexts of West Sumatra, the discourse on Islamic regulation in recent years has rested on an essentialised notion of Islam and its supposed manifestation in traditional Minangkabau culture. Despite the philosophy of ABS-SBK, the ideological basis of Islamic regulation in West Sumatra has become increasingly fixed in a monolithic understanding of Islam, rather than the flexible interpretation of Islamic norms that had earlier enabled the Minangkabau to find a distinctive accommodation between Islam’s patriarchal orientations and the matrilineal basis of their own tradition. Thus, while local factors have been significant in bringing about Islamic regulations, their discursive underpinning owes more to the political accommodation with external realities and the need to maintain power and influence than with the evolving religio-cultural matrix in West Sumatra. In this sense, it may be argued that Syaria-oriented Islam has become more influential than the more deeply-rooted traditions of acculturation and gradual change. This material covered in this book forms only a small part of the bigger picture of the relationship between Islam and local politics in Indonesia, namely the pragmatic application of religious norms to social and economic interests. For this reason, it needs to be considered in conjunction with academic work focussing on politics, as well as studies dealing with the social and political contexts of religious expression. At the same time, however, this study has reduced the gap between studies of Islamisation, which position it within trends within the global Islamic community, and studies of Islam in local politics. Having shown that the motives lying behind the introduction of Islamic regulations in West Sumatra are complex and intertwined, this book confirms that both transnational and local factors must be considered if we are to fully understand the drivers and manifestations of the politics of piety in Indonesia. Appendix A Newspaper Articles

Antara-Sumbar ‘140 Investor Dubai Intip Peluang Investasi di Padang.’ 2 August 2009. ‘Tim Ahli Perkumpulan Investor Dubai Kunjungi Padang.’ 15 April 2009. ‘Sumbar Bentuk Gerakan Bersama Berantas Maksiat.’ 17 March 2011.

Haluan ‘Sikat Maksiat di Ranah Minang.’ 29 September 2011.

Ikhlas Beramal ‘Dijen Bimas Islam Luncurkan Desa Binaan.’ Nasaruddin Umar. June 2009.

Investor Daily Indonesia ‘BI Gunakan Sukuk untuk Pengelolaan Likuiditas Syariah.’ 23 August 2011.

Jakarta Post ‘Fresh Sex Scandal Rocks House.’ 8 July 2010. ‘Julia Perez Banned in Pekanbaru.’ 8 December 2008. ‘Pluralism rally provokes intimidation.’ Fitri, E. 30 April 2006. ‘Porn bill dividing people down faith lines.’ Fitri E. 22 March 2006. ‘Saudi Arabia Eyes Special Relationship with RI: Envoy.’ Anjaiah V. 30 September 2009. ‘Sharia Bylaws Bring only Symbolic Change.’ 20 August 2010. ‘Sharia Bylaw Find Hurdles in West Sumatra.’ 21 August 2010.

Kompas ‘Dewan Zakat Asia Tenggara Dibentuk.’ 14 November 2007. ‘Perempuan Sumatera Barat Dalam Posisi Disudutkan.’ Yurnaldi. 6 August 2001.

Koran Tempo ‘RUU Zakat dan Kesejahteraan Ummat.’ Wibisono Y. 14 Mei 2010.

Padangkini ‘24 Perda Sumbar Dipermasalahkan Depkumham.’ 21 May 2010.

Padang Ekspres ‘1 Muharram Bisa Jadi Momentum Ekonomi Syariah.’ 30 December 2008. ‘1.017 Pelajar Dhuafa Dapat Beasiswa.’ Ilham Saputra. 31 August 2008. ‘Anggaran Perubahan, Keluarga Miskin Diasuransikan.’ Gayatri GA. 5 April 2010. ‘Asmaul Husna di FES.’ Zikriniati. 21 March 2009. ‘Bank Nagari Disuntik Rp 1,3 Miliar.’ Vesky FR. 27 October 2011. ‘Bank Umum Syariah Sumbar: Perlahan tetapi Pasti.’ Gaffari Ramadhan. 18 June 2010. ‘BAZ Bukittinggi Salurkan Zakat Lebih Awal.’ Tanjung N. 12 March 2010. ‘Bazda Serahkan Beasiswa.’ 2 November 2008. ‘Bertekad Realisasikan Kerjasama Bidang Pariwisata.’ 27 January 2012. ‘Berzakat lebih Afdhol Lewat Amil.’ Romealis Akbar. 16 September 2008. ‘Depag Tertarik Sistem Pendidikan Islam di Tanah Datar.’ Akmal M. 13 Mei 2009. ‘Disiplin Guru Pesantren Ramadhan Diperketat.’ Rahmi Amalia. 30 July 2009. ‘Ekonomi Islam: Memantapkan Aqidah, Memakmurkan Umat.’ Mizlana. 17 December 2010. ‘Formis Ancam Sweeping Ahmadiyah.’ Anita Z. 13 November 2008. ‘Golongan II Dihimbau Bayar Zakat.’ 12 August 2006. ‘Investor Dubai Belum Tindak Lanjut MoU.’ Rahmi Amalia. 8 September 2009. ‘Kepercayaan Kepada BAZ Mulai Luntur.’ Edison Janis. 26 August 2010. ‘Manfaatkan Bank Syariah.’ Romeo Rissal Pandjialam. 19 November 2010. ‘Mendesak, Perda Miras di Pessel.’ Adri S. 11 February 2009. ‘Mengoptimalkan PAI di Sekolah dan PTU.’ Muhammad Kosim. 20 April 2010. ‘Menyoal Kembali Zakat sebagai Pengurang Pajak.’ 20 September 2008. ‘MUI Sumbar: PSK Harus Ditindak Agar tak Menular!.’ Adri S. 12 August 2010. ‘Pendidikan Berlandaskan Iman dan Takwa.’ 18 February 2010. ‘Pendidikan Bernuansa Surau di Sekolah.’ Muhammad Kosim. 14 Mei 2010. ‘Penetapan 1 Syawal Tunggu Pemerintah.’ Afrianingsih. 29 September 2008. ‘Perda Zakat tak Memaksa.’ 30 April 2010. ‘PinjamanKu: Menjangkau Rakyat secara Nyata.’ Romeo Rissal Pandjialam. 5 March 2010. ‘PNS Berat Hati Keluarkan Zakat.’ Nur Akmal. 15 June 2009. ‘Potensi Zakat PNS Padang Rp. 60 M Pertahun.’ Sanny Ardy. 29 June 2009. ‘Ranah Minang dan Syariah yang Terenyahkan.’ 11 June 2010. ‘Sebanyak 2.200 Lansia di Agam, Tujuh Orang Pra Sejahtera.’ Edison Janis. 3 June 2009. ‘Syariah Menjangkau Rakyat.’ 30 July 2010. ‘Tetapkan 1 Syawal Ormas Dikumpulkan.’ Afrianingsih. 30 September 2008. ‘Usung Ekonomi Syariah Atasi Tengkulak.’ 7 Mei 2010. ‘Wako: Pesantren Ramadhan Antisipasi Asmara Subuh.’ Sanny Ardhi. 1 September 2009. ‘Warga Sumbar Pecah Kongsi.’ Zikriniati. 20 March 2009. ‘Zakat Award, Strategy Meningkatkan Potensi Zakat.’ Akmal M. 6 January 2010. Appendix A: Newspaper Articles 165

Padang Today ‘2010, Target Zakat Padang R. 13 M.’ Hayati H. 18 May 2010. ‘Bazda Alokasikan Beasiswa R. 2,5 M.’ Hayati H. 26 May 2010. ‘BI Gelar Seminar Strategi Membangun Sumbar Pasca Gempa.’ 26 November 2009. ‘Cacat Moral Tak Bisa Nyalon Pilkada.’ 21 April 2010. ‘Kedepan Warga Padang Wajib Bayar Zakat karena Perda.’ Hayati H. 10 April 2010. ‘Keluarga Minang Amerika Salurkan Bantuan.’ 26 November 2009. ‘Krisis Untungkan Syariah: Nasabah BNI Naik 50 Persen.’ Zikriniati. 20 November 2008. ‘MES Gelar Seminar Nasional Ekonomi Syariah.’ 7 February 2010. ‘Pansus Ranperda Zakat akan Belajar ke Bandung.’ Hayati H. 9 April 2010. ‘Pesantren Ramadhan, Hemat Rp. 24,6 M.’ 10 September 2009. ‘Romeo Rissal: Pertumbuhan Ekonomi Sumbar Terendah.’ 7 February 2010. ‘Sektor Riil, Unggulan Ekonomi Syariah.’ 7 February 2010. ‘Sistem Ekonomi Syariah Sudah Ada di Padang Pariaman Sejak Dulu.’ 27 Sep- tember 2009. ‘Sosialisasi Ekonomi Islam Perlu di Tingkat SMA dan SLTP.’ 17 December 2008. ‘Sumbar Miliki Modal Penting Menuju Ekonomi Syariah.’ 7 February 2010. ‘Sumbar Potensial Penerapan Sistem Ekonomi Syariah.’ 28 September 2009. ‘Syarat tak Pernah Berzina, tak perlu Diperdebatkan.’ 22 April 2010.

Posmetro Padang ‘BAZ Agam Salurkan Beasiswa.’ Arian T. 26 Mei 2010. ‘BI Gelar Seminar Strategi Membangun Sumbar Pasca Gempa.’ Musﬁ Yendra. 26 November 2009. ‘BNSy Menerapkan Prinsip Keislaman Dalam Transaksi Keuangan.’ Sriwahyuni. 17 January 2009. ‘Camat dan Lurah Diminta Tuntaskan Warga Berjualan Siang Hari.’ Sriwahyeni. 1 September 2009. ‘Guru Berprestasi Diberi Hadiah Naik Haji.’ Lesmana D. 30 Mei 2009. ‘Hak Semua Warga Dapatkan Pendidikan Baik.’ Salim I. 31 March 2010. ‘Jelang Ramadhan, Pekat Diberantas.’ Hendri N. 24 August 2008. ‘Judi Rusak Ekonomi Keluarga.’ Tibrani. 7 June 2009. ‘Pengelolaan Zakat Sebaiknya Dikelola Pemerintah.’ Agustini S. 8 September 2009. ‘Penyitaan Miras Demi Meningkatkan Keamanan.’ Lesmana D. 1 December 2008. ‘Perda Maksiat Tak Berfungsi.’ Hidayat F. 27 January 2010. ‘Perkembangan Iptek harus Diimbangi dengan Nilai-nilai Islam.’ Efa Nurza. 14 August 2010. ‘Sistem Syariah Strategis untuk Pengembangan Ekonomi Daerah.’ Erinaldi. 28 March 2009. ‘Uang Transportasi untuk Orang Miskin.’ 17 March 2009. ‘Zakat, Pegawai Instruksikan Data Warga Miskin.’ 8 September 2009. 166 Appendix A: Newspaper Articles

Republika ‘Nasib Lembaga Amil Zakat di Indonesia.’ Hamid Almisar. 5 June 2009. ‘Syarat Tidak Cacat Moral bagi Calkada Bukan untuk Jegal Calon Tertentu.’ 23 April 2010.

Singgalang ‘Apel Akbar Santri Didikan Subuh se-Agam.’ 30 December 2008. ‘Bank Syariah Butuh 9.000 Karyawan.’ 6 December 2010. ‘Banyak Generasi Muda tak Pandai Baca Alquran.’ 20 December 2008. ‘Bapaduo-Bapatigo dan Sistim Syariah.’ HISY Dt. Rangkayo Basa. 19 December 2010. ‘BMT Menyentuh Seluruh Aspek Kehidupan Masyarakat.’ 31 December 2008. ‘Celana Ketat, Jilbab Seadanya Gaya berpakaian Muslimah mengkhawatirkan.’ 10 December 2010. ‘Didik Anak Sesuai Syariat Islam.’ 30 December 2008. ‘Ekonomi Syariah di Singapura dan di Mata Indonesia.’ Marwan Zein. 18 September 2008. ‘Generasi Muda dan Bahaya Narkoba.’ Marjohan. 18 January 2010. ‘Membangun Surau Mahasiswa.’ Mochtar Naim. 30 November 2008. ‘Pakaian Ketat Haram.’ 28 August 2010. ‘Praktik Katabelece Marak: Moral Siswa Makin Buruk.’ 1 December 2010. ‘Sistem Ekonomi Kita Abu-abu.’ Syawaldi. 19 October 2008. ‘Tantangan Ekonomi Syariah dan Peranan Ekonom Muslim.’ Agustianto. 25 September 2008.

Sumbar-Online ‘Mahyeldi: Peran Perempuan Harus Bersinergi.’ Sumbar-Online. 21 April 2010. Appendix B Islamic Laws and Regulations

National Laws and Regulations UU No. 22/1946 tentang Pencatatan Nikah, Talak dan Rujuk (Law No. 22/1946 on Registration of Marriage, Divorce and Reconciliation) PP No. 1/PNPS/1965 tentang Pencegahan Penyalahgunaan dan/atau Penodaan Agama (President Regulation No. 1/PNPS/1965 on Defacement of Religion). UU No. 5/1992 tentang Perbankan (Law No. 5/ 1992 on Banking). UU No. 38/1999 tentang Pengelolalaan Zakat (Law No. 38/1999 on Zakat Management). UU No. 20/2003 tentang Sistem Pendidikan Nasional (Law No. 20/2003 on Indonesian Educational System). UU No. 44/2008 tentang Pornography (Law No. 44/2008 on Pornography). UU No. 23/2011 tentang Pengelolaan Zakat (Law No. 23/2011 on Amendment of Zakat Management).

Local Regulations Perda No. 9/2000 Kota Bukittinggi tentang Penertiban dan Penindakan Penyakit Masyarakat (Regulation No. 9/2000 on Prevention and Eradication of Social Ills in the Bukittinggi City). Perda No. 11/2001 Propinsi Sumatera Barat tentang Pencegahan dan Pember- antasan Penyakit Masyarakat (Regulation No. 11/2001 on Prevention and Eradication of Social Ills in the Provincy of West Sumatra). Perda No. 10/2001 Kabupaten dan Kota Solok No. 10/2001 Tentang Wajib Baca Al-Qur’an untuk Siswa dan Pengantin (Regulation No. 10/2001 on Qur’anic Literacy for Students and Candidates of Brides and Brooms in Solok regency). Perda No. 6/2002 Kabupaten dan Kota Solok tentang Wajib Berbusana Muslimah (Regulation No. 6/2002 on Islamic Dress in Solok District). Perda No. 1/2003 Kabupaten Sawahlunto/Sijunjung tentang Kewajiban Pandai Membaca Al-Quran Bagi Anak Usia Sekolah, Karyawan/Karyawati dan Calon Mempelai (Regulation No. 1/2003 on Qur’anic Literacy for Students, Workers and Candidates of Brides and Brooms in SawahLunto/Sijunjung). Perda No. 2/2003 Kabupaten Sawahlunto/Sijunjung tentang Berpakaian Muslim dan Muslimah (Regulation No. 2/2003 on Islamic Dress in Sawahlunto/Sijunjung).

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015 167 D.P. Salim, The Transnational and the Local in the Politics of Islam, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-15413-8 168 Appendix B: Islamic Laws and Regulations

Perda No. 5/2003 Kabupaten Lima Puluh Kota tentang Kewajiban Berpakaian Muslim dan Muslimah (Regulation No. 5/2003 on Islamic Dress in Lima Puluh Kota District). Perda No. 6/2003 Kota Padang tentang Pandai Baca Tulis Al-Qur’an (Regulation No. 6/2003 on Qur’anic Literacy in Padang City). Perda No. 6/2003 Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Lima Puluh tentang Kewajiban Pandai Baca dan Tulis Al-Qur’an bagi Anak Sekolah dan Calon Penganten (Regulation No. 6/2003 on Qur’anic Literacy for Students and Candidates of Brides and Brooms in Lima Puluh Kota District). Perda No. 13/2003 Kota Solok tentang Pengelolaan Zakat, Infak dan Shadaqoh (Regulation on Zakat, Infak and Shadaqoh Management in Solok District). Perda No. 22/2003 Kabupaten Pasaman tentang Berpakaian Muslim dan Muslimah bagi Siswa, Mahasiswa dan Karyawan (Regulation No. 22/2003 on Islamic Dress for students and workers in Pasaman District). Perda No. 31/2003 Kabupaten Pesisir Selatan tentang Pengelolalan Zakat (Regulation No. 31/2003 on Zakat Management in Pesisir Selatan). Keputusan Bupati No. 26/2003 Lima Puluh Kota tentang Pengelolaan Zakat (Decision of Regent No. 26/2003 on Zakat Management in Lima Puluh Kota). Perda No. 48/2003 Kabupaten Pasaman tentang Pandai Baca Tulis Huruf Al-Qur’an bagi Murid SD, Siswa SLTP, Siswa SLTA, Mahasiswa dan Calon Penganten (Regulation No. 48/2003 on Qur’anic literacy for primary, secondary and tertiary students and candidates of Brides and Brooms in Pasaman District). Perda No. 2/2004 Kabupaten Padang Pariaman tentang Pencegahan, Penindakan dan Pemberantasan Masyarakat (Regulation No. 2/2004 on the prevention and eradication of social Ills in Padang Pariaman District). Perda No. 3/2004 Kota Padang Panjang tentang Pencegahan, Pemberantasan dan Penindakan Masyarakat (Regulation No. 3/2004 on the prevention and eradication of social Ills in Padang Panjang District. Perda No. 8/2004 Kabupaten Pesisir Selatan tentang Kewajiban Pandai Baca dan Tulis Al-Qur’an dan Mendirikan Shalat Bagi Anak Sekolah dan Calon Pengantin Yang Beragama Islam (Regulation No. 8/2004 on Qur’anic literacy and prayer’s observance for students and candidates of Brides and Brooms in Pesisir Selatan District). Perda No. 29/2004 Kota Bukittinggi tentang Pengelolaan Zakat (Regulation No. 29/2004 on Zakat Management in Bukittinggi). Perda No. 5/2005 Kabupaten Agam tentang Pandai Baca Tulis Al-Qur’an (Regulation No. 29/2004 on Qur’anic literacy in Agam District). Perda No. 6/2005 Kabupaten Agam tentang Berpakaian Muslim (Regulation No. 6/2005 on Islamic Dress in Agam Regency). Perda No. 10/2008 Kota Payakumbuh tentang Kewajiban Pandai Membaca Al-Qur’an bagi Anak Sekolah dan Calon Pengantin (Regulation No. 10/2008 on Qur’anic literacy for students and candidates of Brides and Brooms in Paya- kumbuh District). Perda No. 2/2010 Kota Padang tentang Pengelolaan Zakat (Regulation No. 2/2010 on Zakat management in Padang City). Abbreviations and Glossary

AAOIFI Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions ABS-SBA Adat Basandi Syarak Syarak Basandi Adat (local customs are based on Islam and Islam is based on local custom) ABS-SBK Adat Basandi Syarak, Syarak Basandi Kitabullah (local customs are based on Islam and Islam is based on the Qur’an) ADIA Akademi Dinas Ilmu Agama (Academy for Islamic Education) AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party (Turkey) Azas tunggal Pancasila as the sole foundation for all social and political organisations Bagi hasil Proﬁt-sharing BAKIN Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (National Intelligence Organisation) BAZDA Badan Amil Zakat Daerah (Regional Government Zakat Institution) BAZIS Badan Amil Zakat Infak dan Sedekah (Agency for zakat, charity and alms) BAZNAS Badan Amil Zakat Nasional (National Government Zakat Institution) BI Bank Indonesia (Reserve Bank of Indonesia) BKPUI Badan Kontak Perjuangan Umat Islam (Contact Body for the Struggle of the Islamic Community) BMI Bank Muamalat Indonesia BMT Baitul Mal waTanwil (Islamic Micro Finance Institution) BNI Syariah Bank Negara Indonesia Syariah (Shari’a Divison of the Indo- nesian National Bank) BPRS Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Shari’a (Islamic Rural Bank) BPUPKI Badan Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Prepa- ratory Body for Indonesian Independence) BP-UZIS Badan Pelaksana Urusan Zakat, Infak dan Sedekah (Collecting Body for Zakat, Charity and Alms) Burqa Body covering of the kind worn in contemporary Afghanistan

BSM Bank Syariah Mandiri DDII Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Prop- agation Council) DISBA Daerah Istimewa Sumatera Barat (Special Autonomous Region of West Sumatra) DPRD Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (regional parliament) DZAT Dewan Zakat Asia Tenggara (Zakat Council of Southeast Asia) Fatwa Islamic decree FPI Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders’ Front) FPSI Forum Penegak Shariat Islam (Forum for Enforcement of Islamic Law) GCIBFI International Islamic Centre for Reconciliation and Commercial Arbitration and General Council of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions GEBAK Gerakan Bersama Anti Komunisme (Joint Movement against Communism) Gebu Minang Gerakan Seribu Minang (Lit. Movement of a Thousand of Minang, the Minangkabau Migrant Organisation) Hanura Hati Nurani Rakyat (People’s Conscience Party) HSBC Amanah Shariah Business Unit of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited HMI Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Students’ Association) HT Hizbut Tahrir (Liberation Party) IAIN Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Institute for Islamic Studies) ICMI Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals) IDB Islamic Development Bank IFSB Islamic Financial Services Board IIFM International Islamic Financial Market IIRA International Islamic Rating Agency IRTI the Islamic Research and Training Institute ISF Islamic Solidarity Fund ITB Institut Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology) IZO International Zakat Organisation Jilbab or hijab An Islamic garment for women that leaves only the face and hands exposed KAN Kerapatan Adat Nagari (Village Adat Council) Kaum Muda (lit. Group of the Young, referring to Reformist Muslims in the early twentieth century) Kaum Tua (lit. Groups of Elders, referring to traditional Muslim leaders in opposition to the Kaum Muda movement) Kerudung Outer garment that covers the woman’s head and shoulders Abbreviations and Glossary 171

KHI Kompilasi Hukum Islam (Compilation of Islamic Law) KISDI Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam (Indonesian Committee for Solidarity with the Muslim World) KKM Kongres Kebudayaan Minangkabau (Minangkabau Culture Congress) KNI Komite Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Committee) LDK Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (Body for Islamic Propagation on Campus) LEPPA Lembaga Pembina Pendidikan Agama pada Perguruan Tinggi (Supervisory Institute for Islamic Education in General Universities) LIPIA Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (Institute for Islamic and Arab Sciences) LKAAM Lembaga Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau (Minangkabau Adat Consultative Body) Maksiat A term associated with ‘social ills’ such as prostitution, adultery, the consumption of alcohol and immodest dress MAPK Madrasah Aliyah Program Khusus (Islamic Special High School) Masyumi Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations) Merantau leaving one’s nagari or village, a concept traditionally applying primarily to the practices of young men who left the homeland in search of wealth, knowledge and skills before returning to establish a family MIAI Majlis Islam A-la Indonesia (Indonesian High Islamic Council) MITM Majlis Islam Tinggi Minangkabau (Minangkabau High Islamic Council) MMI Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin Council) MPN Musyawarah Pembangunan Nagari (Village Development Dis- cussion Bodies) MTKAAM Majlis Tinggi Kerapatan Adat Alam Minangkabau (High Council of Minangkabau Culture) Mutawwa’in Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (Religious Police) Muwahhid Lit.one who professes God’s unity (term used by the Wahabists for their movement) Nagari A term that means both village and state Niqab A total body covering, revealing only the eyes and palms of hands NKK Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus (Normalisation of Campus Life) 172 Abbreviations and Glossary

P4 Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Pancasila indoctrination Guidelines) Perda Peraturan Daerah (Local Regulation) Paderi A term derived from Pedir or Pidie, the part of Aceh where Malays set out on and returned from the pilgrimage PAN Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) Pancasila Five principles enshrined in the constitution that form ideological basis of the Indonesian state: belief in God; nationalism; humanitarianism; social justice; democracy Pari Partai Republik Indonesia (Republic of Indonesia Party) Parmusi Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Party) PBB Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent and Star Party) PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party, later PDIP) PDIP Partai Demokrasi Perjuangan Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party—Struggle) PDRI Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia (Emergency Govern- ment of the Indonesian Republic) Pengajian Islamic religious classes in which Muslims recite and study the Qur’an Permesta Perjuangan Semesta (Universal Struggle) Permi Persatuan Muslim Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Muslims) Pesantren Private Islamic boarding schools PGA Pendidikan Guru Agama (Islamic Schools for Teacher PII Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Students) PK Partai Keadilan (Justice Party, later PKS) PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) PKK Pemberdayaan dan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (Family Empower- ment and Welfare Agency) PKPU Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat (Justice Post concerning Muslim Society) PKS Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party) PKU Penolong Kesengsaraan Umum (Hardship Relief Agency) PNI Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party) PP Pemuda Pancasila (Pancasila Youth) PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) PRRI Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic) PSI Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party) PSII Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic League Party) Abbreviations and Glossary 173

PTAIN Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (State Academy for Islamic Studies) PTI Persatuan Tarbiyah Islamiyah (Association of Islamic Schools) Pusaka rendah (lit. low inheritance, referring to individual inherited property) Pusaka tinggi (lit. high inheritance, referring to the communal inherited property) Qur’an The central religious text of Islam, considered the literal word of God revealed through the Prophet Muhammad Rantau The region outside the Minangkabau heartland Riba Interest, sometimes translated as usury SAAM Sarekat Adat Alam Minangkabau (Adat Association of the Minangkabau World) Salafi Lit.one who follows the ways of the first Muslim generation (Like muwahhid, the term is sometimes used by the Wahhabists to describe their movement) Santri A term used to describe pesantren students SARA Suku, Agama, Ras dan Antargolongan (ethnic, religious, racial and class relations) Satpol PP Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja (Pamong Praja Police Sub-Unit) SBI Sertifikat Bank Indonesia (Conventional bond) SBIS Sertifikat Bank Indonesia Syariah (Islamic bond) SBSN Surat Berharga Negara Syariah (Islamic bond) SDI Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Traders’ Association) SDI Srikandi Demokrasi Indonesia (Srikandi Indonesian Democracy) SDSB Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah (Social Charity Dona- tion with Prizes) Sektor Riil The ‘real’ economy SGHA Sekolah Guru Hakim Agama (School for Religious Judges) SI Sarekat Islam (Islamic League) STAIN Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (State Islamic College) STOVIA School tot Opleiding van Indische Artsen (Indies Medical Institute) SU Sarekat Usaha (Enterprise Association) SWBI Sertifikat Wadiah Bank Indonesia (Islamic bond issued by the Bank of Indonesia) Takaful Islamic insurance Tambo Minangkabau historical chronicle UIN Universitas Islam Negeri (State Islamic University) UKM Usaha Kecil Menengah (small-medium enterprise) Umma Worldwide Islamic community 174 Abbreviations and Glossary

Wahhabism A term that refers to doctrine that belief in God was not enough to make one a Muslim and that one must worship God purely and exclusively because worship of any being other than God is idolatry (shirk) Wujudiyah The cyclic ontology of divine self-manifestations such as the universe is seen as ‘a series of neo-platonic emanations’ and each of these emanations is considered as an aspect of God himself YABMP Yayasan Amal Bhakti Muslim Pancasila (Pancasila Muslim Charity Foundation)