24 Democracy and Conflict Resolution

David Kinsella and David L. Rousseau

Democratic political processes regulate large quantitative data sets. Our primary competition among groups with conflicting focus, then, is what social science, and in preferences. Although much of the particular political science, tells us about competition occurs peacefully within the relationship between democracy, conflict existing political institutions, democratic resolution, and peace between and within practices can also facilitate the resolution of states. intense conflict when the political system is challenged from within by groups fighting against the established government, and DEMOCRACY AND CONFLICT when it is challenged from without and on the BETWEEN STATES brink of interstate war. This chapter provides an overview of the scholarly literature The realist school of thought in international linking democracy to peace and conflict relations, which greatly influenced both resolution, including pertinent theoretical scholarship and policymaking during the propositions and the balance of evidence cold war, maintains that state behavior is generated by empirical researchers. The primarily driven by the balance of power promise of peace associated with civil liberty, among rivals in the international system political openness, and the foreign policies (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer of democratic states has long figured into the 2001). Realists assume that states resemble writings of moral and political philosophers, unitary rational actors in pursuit of a single perhaps most notably in Immanuel Kant’s overriding objective: survival and security in essay Perpetual Peace, published in 1795. an anarchic system. The strenuous demands But the burgeoning academic literature in of the international system lead all states recent decades is largely the product of to behave in a similar fashion regard- social scientific research, much (but not less of their particular political institutions, all) of which is built upon the analysis of economic structure, ideological orientation,

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or leadership quality. Specifically, realists Thus, scholars have attempted to explain typically predict that states will balance democratic peace using a series of related power (e.g. increase defense spending or arguments, which identify causal mechanisms conclude alliances) against all stronger states operating at different levels of analysis. because they represent a threat to the survival It has been difficult to distinguish the of the state. Under similar circumstances, relative explanatory power of these competing democracies behave no differently than arguments because data sets constructed to autocracies. test arguments at one level of analysis are This realist position came under increasing often not appropriate for testing arguments at scrutiny beginning in the 1980s. Doyle other levels. However, progress in both the- (1983, 1986), for example, compiled a oretical development and empirical analysis list of liberal societies and interstate wars has reduced this problem in recent years during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (e.g. Bennett and Stam 2000, 2004; Rousseau and found that no two democracies had 2005). The following review of democratic engaged in a full-scale war. He concluded peace theory and research is organized that “liberal states have created a separate according to the main causal mechanisms peace, as Kant argued they would, and identified in the academic literature. have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression, as he feared they might” (Doyle Democratic norms and conflict 1986: 1151). Rummel (1983, 1985) came resolution to a similar conclusion after subjecting the proposition to somewhat more systematic Many explanations of democratic peace testing. Path-breaking work by Doyle and emphasize the socialization of political Rummel triggered an avalanche of empirical leaders within their domestic political and theoretical investigations into what is environments (Dixon 1993, 1994; Maoz now referred to as the “democratic peace.” and Russett 1993; Russett 1993; Huth and According to Levy (1988), the democratic Allee 2002). This argument has two parts. peace is the closest thing to an empirical First, democratic political elites have risen law found in the study of international to positions of leadership within a political relations. system that emphasizes compromise and non- Some of the earliest research examined violence. Conflicts of interest in democracies the characteristics of democratic governments are usually resolved through negotiation and and societies that shape the state’s general log-rolling. Losing a political battle does not foreign policy orientation and behavior. The result in the loss of political rights or exclusion argument that democratic states are more from future political competition. Moreover, peaceful in their relations with all states, coercion and violence are not considered no matter how they are governed, is known legitimate means for resolving conflicts. Con- as the monadic version of the democratic versely, political leaders in nondemocratic peace proposition. While there is empirical states are socialized in an environment in evidence to support this argument, it is not as which politics is more akin to a zero-sum game robust as the evidence accumulated in support in which rivals and those on the losing end of the dyadic democratic peace proposition, of political struggles are regularly removed which focuses on the interaction between two from the game. Coercion and violence are states. Most recently, scholars have begun to more widely accepted as legitimate means examine systemic versions of the democratic for resolving political conflicts. In general, peace in which the proportion of democracies political leaders in autocracies are more likely in the international system influences the per- to impose decisions rather than compromise ceived legitimacy of democratic institutions when dealing with the opposition. and the use of military force in international Second, the argument assumes that society. domestic political norms are externalized by

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decision makers when they become embroiled of shared values, beliefs, attitudes, norms, in international disputes. Presidents and prime and roles that are used to draw boundaries ministers approach conflicts of interest in the between in-group and out-groups. Members international environment in much the same of one’s own group are viewed as less way they approach conflicts in the domestic threatening than members of other groups. environment, and with conflict-resolution If democratic polities use democratic values skills honed by their domestic political and norms to define the in-group, the actions experiences. Compared to their counterparts and capabilities of other democracies are in authoritarian regimes, democratic leaders then viewed as less threatening. Their are more likely to seek negotiation, mediation, shared identity will reduce the likelihood or arbitration (Dixon 1994; Raymond 1994). that either party will resort to violence Their approach to international conflict to resolve a political dispute. Although resolution reduces the likelihood that an realists discount the importance of ideational international dispute will escalate into a factors in world politics, liberals and militarized crisis and war. constructivists have long maintained that The strong version of the norms argument a shared sense of identity partly accounts holds that democratic leaders externalize for lower levels of international conflict. peaceful practices of conflict resolution While liberals tend to focus on a shared in their interactions with all types of liberal identity, constructivists believe regimes. In contrast to this monadic claim, that many types of shared identity may those who emphasize the dyadic nature of reduce interstate conflict. Risse-Kappen democratic peace argue that although all (1995), for example, argues that a shared decision makers are inclined to externalize sense of identity among democratic states, domestic practices of dispute resolution and not simply their concern with the when dealing with interstate conflicts, this balance of power, explains decision externalization is conditional for democratic making within the North Atlantic Treaty decision makers. Democratic leaders exter- Organization. Laboratory experiments have nalize their domestic norms only if they also demonstrated that shared cultural beliefs expect similar behavior from their foreign and experiences can decrease intersubjective counterparts. Because democratic decision threat perceptions (Mintz and Geva 1993; makers expect that choices by other demo- Rousseau 2006). cratic leaders are also shaped by norms of Explanations for both the monadic and peaceful conflict resolution, there is little dyadic versions of democratic peace imply risk in an attempting to resolve their conflict that as the number of democracies in the in accordance with these shared norms. international system increase, the number Conversely, because democracies expect non- of interstate wars will fall. However, democratic states to externalize coercive and the literature also identifies causal processes uncompromising norms of conflict resolution, operating at the systemic level. As democratic they adopt similar strategies when dealing practices spread globally—that is, as they with these opponents. The argument therefore become internalized by more societies and assumes that a democratic state’s behavior is are reflected in public policymaking—the conditioned upon the expected behavior of its international system is increasingly opponent and that the opponent’s regime type “saturated” with democratic culture and informs this expectation. norms of peaceful conflict resolution. In an A related argument highlights the international society in which democratic importance of identity formation. Some have practice is so commonly viewed as legitimate suggested that peace between democracies and effective, the methods of conflict is a function of a common social identity resolution employed by democratic states (Risse-Kappen 1995; Hopf 1998, 2002; have a greater probability of being reflected Kahl 1998/99). Social identities are bundles in the behavior of nondemocratic states

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as well. When viewing the international The nature of political institutions can have system as a whole, then, we should observe a bearing on the credibility of signals sent fewer interstate conflicts. Testing arguments during an international crisis. Fearon (1994, operating at the systemic level of analysis is 1995) argues that in a world of complete difficult; a correlation between two variables information, decision makers can determine at the systemic level (e.g. number of wars and each side’s expected value for war—the ends the percentage of nondemocracies) may be sought and the likelihood of achieving them expected even if the causal relationships are while suffering the costs of armed combat. limited to those hypothesized for the monadic In such a world, war would be rare; if each and dyadic versions of the democratic side’s aims were known, along with the price peace (Rousseau and Kim 2005; Gartzke each was willing to pay in blood and treasure, and Weisiger 2006). Problems of inference it would always be possible to strike a bargain notwithstanding, statistical analyses of the acceptable to all without actually having to systemic normative argument have provided suffer the costs of war. Unfortunately, we some support for the system-level claim live in a world of incomplete information. (Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Crescenzi and A government’s willingness to use force is Enterline 1999; McLaughlin et al. 1999; usually private information, and leaders may Crescenzi et al. 2005). have an incentive to exaggerate or otherwise misrepresent their resolve in order to strike a better bargain. In this context of incomplete information, signals of resolve are more Democratic institutions and restraint credible when leaders are likely to pay higher Another class of explanations for democratic domestic audience costs for bluffing, and peace highlights the institutions of demo- democracies are political systems in which cratic governance, broadly defined, and the audience costs are highest. Moreover, the domestic political costs of using force (e.g. openness of political debate in democracies Morgan and Campbell 1991; Morgan and provides information to foreign opponents. Schwebach 1992). Decisions to use military When the political opposition in a democracy force are choices made by leaders based lines up behind the executive during an largely on calculations of political costs international confrontation, this is a powerful and benefits. Foreign policy decisions can signal that because the party in power will have costly domestic political repercussions. pay high political costs for backing down, The expenditure of resources and loss of the executive is probably not bluffing (Schultz human life often mobilize opposition groups 1998, 1999, 2001). or fracture ruling coalitions (Mueller 1973; Another institutional argument derives Cotton 1987; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson from a game theoretic model of political 1994). Compared to leaders in other political survival developed by Bueno de Mesquita systems, democratic decision makers are et al. (1999, 2003). Public policies, both more sensitive to these potential domestic domestic and foreign, yield a mix of public costs, and this constrains their behavior and private goods. Public goods, of course, when interacting with nondemocratic states. are available to the entire society, whereas The monadic version of the institutional private goods can be allocated as leaders see argument posits that democratic institutional fit. Political systems vary in terms of the constraints make leaders less likely to initiate proportion of society involved in the selection war regardless of the regime type of their of political leaders (the selectorate), and the opponent. Recent social scientific research has proportion of the selectorate whose support is produced evidence supporting this stronger required to maintain one’s position of power version of the democratic peace hypothesis or, in the case of a challenger, to unseat (Huth andAllee 2002; Bennett and Stam 2004; the current leader (the winning coalition). Rousseau 2005). Democratic states have large selectorates and

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large winning coalitions. Autocratic states whether or not their opponents are believed to may have large selectorates, too, when be similarly constrained. For example, Bueno elections have high voter turnouts but are de Mesquita and Lalman (1992) propose a nevertheless rigged, but they always have three-part institutional explanation for dyadic small winning coalitions. Political survival in democratic peace. First, the international a democracy therefore requires that goods, system is assumed to consist of hawkish states public and private, be distributed among a (leaders are uncompromising and predisposed larger winning coalition than is the case in to use force to resolve disputes) and dovish an autocracy. Public goods serve that purpose states (leaders are prone to compromise and well in a democracy because they go to all, use strategies of reciprocation). At the same while the value of private goods diminishes time, there is some uncertainty surrounding due to the larger number of recipients. In which strategy will be adopted by any an autocracy, however, private goods are particular state. Second, domestic institutional relatively more important to the leader’s structures reduce (but do not eliminate) this political survival because they are distributed uncertainty by signaling a state’s most likely among a smaller constituency. strategy. Due to the potential domestic costs Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues of using force, decision makers believe that argue that successful public policies generate democracies are more likely than nondemoc- the public goods that democratic leaders racies to adopt dovish strategies. Third, when need in order to stay in office. Autocratic a democracy confronts another democracy, leaders prefer that their policies succeed, each expects a negotiated outcome and the but the consequences of policy failure for exercise of restraint when contemplating the political survival are not dire as long as use of force. But when an autocracy confronts the leader has access to resources that can a democracy, a hawkish leader expects to be distributed as private goods to a small encounter a dovish one and is likely to exploit winning coalition. What are the implications the situation. In such a situation, the dove feels for democratic peace? With higher political compelled to adopt the aggressive strategy of costs of policy failure, democratic leaders the hawk and may initiate conflict in order avoid international contests unless they are to preempt an expected attack. The logic confident of victory. And once they become of the argument is dyadic: democratic states involved in a crisis or war, democrats try pursue strategies involving compromise and harder to win. Contests with other democratic nonviolence only when dealing with other states of similar capabilities are to be avoided democratic states. for this reason, but democratic states are Another institutional explanation for the not so disinclined to avoid confronting dyadic character of democratic peace focuses autocratic states, whose leaders have less on the difficulty of mobilizing popular support to lose politically by backing down. The for the use of force. According to Maoz model does suggest, however, that stronger and Russett (1993), the inclusiveness of democracies also face fewer disincentives democratic regimes hinders their ability to when confronting weaker democracies; the rapidly mobilize societal groups in support of stronger state is likely to succeed no mat- military action. Authoritarian regimes, with ter how hard the weaker one tries, and constituencies spanning a much narrower policy success is what counts for political range of the political spectrum, can more survival. quickly reach the necessary consensus on Democratic political institutions often the use of force. When a dispute emerges influence foreign policy decision making in between two democratic states, the slow particular ways regardless of the regime type process of mobilization in both states creates of the opponent. But given a set of institutional opportunities for the resolution of the conflict constraints, the leaders of democratic states through noncoercive means. However, when may well behave differently depending on a conflict arises between a democratic state

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and an authoritarian state, rapid mobilization issues that can be used to build broad popular by the latter forces democratic leaders to coalitions. find ways to work around normal political The issues that tend to be exploited by processes. That is, the emergency situation elites, according to Mansfield and Snyder, encourages the democratic state to adopt the are those that can become the basis for a tactics of its nondemocratic opponent. “belligerent nationalist coalition.” The old elite, including the military establishment, Critics of the democratic peace often seek to define themselves as the guardians of the nationalist cause, reminding thesis the populace of the dangers they collectively In addition to the studies discussed above, face. Newly emerging interest groups are also there is considerable additional social sci- inclined to seize on such issues as group entific research that supports one or more leaders feel compelled to assert their nation- of the propositions contained in democratic alist credentials as a means of unifying the peace theory, especially as concerns dyadic fragmented interests bubbling to the surface peace (see, for example, Maoz and Abdolali in an unstable political environment. While 1989; Bremer 1993; Rousseau et al. 1996; the masses may not be particularly war-prone Rasler and Thompson 2001; Russett and at the start of this process, sustained appeals to Oneal 2001; Dixon and Senese 2002; Peceny nationalism from across the political spectrum et al. 2002). But despite the impressive body can quickly create a belligerent popular of evidence, the academic literature includes mood. The intensification of this mood can many studies that aim to refute the democratic trigger “blow-back,” a situation in which peace proposition in part or in whole. Some the leadership feels compelled to behave of the most noteworthy research focuses on aggressively having become trapped by their the purported risks to peace presented by own demagoguery. In their initial research democratizing states. on wars during the nineteenth and twentieth While acknowledging that mature centuries, Mansfield and Snyder (1995, 8) democracies rarely fight each other, Mansfield found “that democratizing states—those that and Snyder (1995, 2002a, 2002b) have argued have recently undergone regime change in that the process of democratic reform may a democratic direction—are much more actually increase the probability of war. Their war-prone than states that have undergone empirical findings, based on both qualitative no regime change, and are somewhat more and quantitative analyses, have been read war-prone than those that have undergone a not only as partly refuting democratic change in an autocratic direction.” peace theory, but also as calling into Analyses by Mansfield and Snyder question the wisdom of efforts to promote have been challenged on a number of democracy in other countries, a cornerstone methodological grounds (Enterline 1996, of Western foreign policy following the 1998; Weede 1996; Wolf 1996; Thompson end of the Cold War. If the condition of and Tucker 1997), and other empirical being democratic decreases the probability investigations into the war-inducing effects of violent conflict, how could the process of of democratization report evidence at odds becoming more democratic have the opposite with theirs (Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Russett effect? Mansfield and Snyder propose that and Oneal 2001; Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum transitional regimes experiencing high 2003; Bennett and Stam 2004; Rousseau level of political mobilization despite weak 2005). Mansfield and Snyder have responded institution controls are often tempted to to these critiques in various ways, but their incite external conflict. The intense political most recent work has included a closer competition ushered in by the disintegration examination of the position of transitioning of the previous authoritarian government states along the autocracy–democracy leads elites and would-be leaders to identify spectrum when they are at greatest risk of

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becoming involved in militarized disputes such objections by modifying their measures or wars. They have generally concluded that and retesting their propositions. Rousseau the probability of conflict is increased when (2005), for example, finds strong support autocratic states make incomplete democratic for both the monadic and dyadic democratic transitions, but not when they make complete peace propositions using new measures and transitions. Nor do partially democratic data for institutional constraint. regimes appear dangerous when they are A more fundamental objection to the undergoing transitions to full democracy measurement of democracy in the democratic (Mansfield and Snyder 2005). peace literature is leveled by Oren (1995, In challenging some of the core 2003). Polities can be measured along assumptions and arguments of realist numerous dimensions, and social scientific theory, it is not surprising that the democratic practice at any given moment reflects the peace research program has itself come identity evaluation and threat perceptions under attack from various angles. Gowa prevailing during that historical period. Oren (1999), for instance, argues that democratic argues that in the case of social science peace is spurious, that it is a function not research in the United States, the features of democratic governance and conflict of democracy considered most important are resolution but security considerations within those that the American political system the Western alliance in its opposition to the shares with the political systems of friendly Soviet bloc after World War II. Democratic states, while those features it shares with peace researchers have responded to this its enemies tend to be downplayed. Oren’s and other criticisms on realist grounds by claim, therefore, is that democratic peace is an controlling for a number of factors that feature artifact of a built-in bias of the social scientific in realist explanations of war and peace, community. This is a provocative critique including geography, alliance, the balance of to be sure, though one that has so far not military capabilities, and nuclear armament. prompted much reaction among democratic They have also controlled for other liberal peace researchers. factors, like wealth, trade, and participation in The theoretical underpinnings of the international organizations. Efforts to model democratic peace project have also been the liberal determinants of peace alongside scrutinized. There is a lack of agreement realist ones have demonstrated that evidence within the research community regarding for the democratic peace is quite robust (e.g. the exact causal mechanisms responsible for Russett and Oneal 2001; Kinsella and Russett the empirical regularities that are routinely 2002; Kim and Rousseau 2005; Rousseau observed. While we know that democracies 2005). do not fight other democracies, we are not Other critics point to the difficulties sure which of the many causal mechanisms of measuring democracy, an exceedingly is behind the pattern, or which have the most complex social scientific construct. These influence in different contexts. Others have difficulties led early exploratory research to examined the logic of both the normative and opt for dichotomous measures of regime type institutional explanations discussed above, (e.g. Doyle 1986), but the majority of later arguing that those explanations imply even studies have employed the democracy and more pacific behavior on the part of demo- autocracy scales developed by the Polity cratic states than what democratic peace Project (see Marshall and Jaggers 2002). researchers are able to show (Rosato 2003). Although indices constructed from the Polity To some extent, these critiques replay earlier scales have a number of important strengths, objections to the challenges posed to realist they are rough measures and are often theory. What they have not done, however, is insensitive to small but important changes in undermine the democratic peace proposition, domestic power configurations. Democratic the research program supporting it, or the peace researchers have typically responded to implication that the spread of democratic

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forms of governance enhance the prospects collective action, which limit the supply of for the resolution of conflicts between states rebels willing to undertake the hardships and (Ray 2003; Chernoff 2004; Kinsella 2005). risks of armed insurgency (Lichbach 1995). The expected utility of rebellion is higher when poor economic circumstances reduce DEMOCRACY AND CONFLICT WITHIN opportunity costs, when the reach of central STATES government authority is constricted, and when geographic and economic conditions (like In the political science literature, the term rough terrain and the availability of lootable “democratic peace” almost always refers to resources) are conducive to armed insurgency the extraordinary infrequency of war and other (Ross 1999; Collier 2000; Reno 2000; Fearon forms of violent conflict between democratic and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). states, as well as the body of theory and research explaining it. Much less extensive, Grievance and political openness but rapidly expanding in recent years, is the social scientific literature on civil war which The role of democracy figures most addresses directly the relationship between prominently in political theories of internal democratic governance and the outbreak or conflict. Democratic governments are less resolution of violent domestic conflict. The likely to curtail individual liberties and are role of democracy in mitigating (or possibly more likely to grant equal protection under exacerbating) conflict within states needs the law; the absence of such rights and to be understood against the backdrop of freedoms is frequently a source of resentment competing theories of rebellion and civil war on the part of disadvantaged groups within (see Sambanis 2002). nondemocratic societies. Where grievances Early work by political scientists derived do exist in democratic societies, the openness from the fairly intuitive notion that people of the political system allows group discontent rebel when they feel deprived in some to be expressed nonviolently, including by way. Deprivation and discontent breed anger, way of confrontational but nevertheless which may be combined with military means lawful means like strikes and protests to provide the genesis for armed insurgency (Eckstein and Gurr 1975; Diamond 1999). against the state. Feelings of deprivation are Disadvantaged and oppressed groups in not necessarily based on objective conditions; nondemocratic societies have relatively few they are relative to conditions that people alternatives short of open rebellion against believe they deserve but have been denied, the state. The proposition that democracies due either to discrimination or incapacity on are at lower risk of civil war and other forms the part of the government (Davies 1962; of mass internal violence has received some Gurr 1970;Tilly 1978). Grievances against the empirical support (e.g. Rummel 1995; Gurr government or other groups within society can 2000), but this finding is not as robust as the be related to political conditions, economic evidence for democratic peace between states conditions, or both. (Hegre and Sambanis 2006). More recent work, including research by Supply-side explanations found in many economists, starts by observing that social economic theories of civil war tend to discontent is seemingly ubiquitous and that downplay the significance of democracy demand-side explanations of civil war fail to because political rights and freedoms are account for the far less common occurrence assumed to bear upon the degree of grievance of civil war. Among the many societies that and discontent found within societies, fac- are home to especially aggrieved groups, tors judged to be of secondary impor- what distinguishes relatively stable societies tance. However, the extent that political from those experiencing civil war, according systems vary in terms of the inclusive- to this perspective, are the impediments to ness of popular representation pertains also

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to the opportunity cost of rebellion. The democratic neighbors, it is less likely to decision to pursue extralegal means to redress become embroiled in an internal ethnic grievances is a decision to forego the conflict. Hostilities often spill over national opportunities available within the political borders and weak democratic institutions system. Autocratic systems, of course, are increase the risk that disaffected ethnic not very inclusive and the interests of groups in adjacent states will take up arms disaffected groups are less likely to be against their own governments. represented in the policymaking process. But The suppression of dissent is a defining even among democratic states, inclusiveness feature of closed political systems. Therefore, varies and there is some evidence to suggest for any given level of grievance (and other that proportional representation systems, in factors contributing to armed rebellion), which even disaffected groups may occupy we would expect authoritarian states to seats in parliament, have a lower probability experience fewer civil wars than states of experiencing civil war than majoritarian with more open political systems. That systems, which tend to marginalize smaller is, the most democratic societies face few groups when their interests do not correspond rebellions because the level of grievance is to those of the median voter (Reynal-Querol generally lower; group conflict is more often 2002). resolved nonviolently, even if sometimes One possible reason for divergent contentiously. But the most authoritarian expectations regarding the role of democratic societies may also face few rebellions, despite governance in reducing the probability of a higher level of grievance, because group civil war is that theory and research on conflict tends to be suppressed by the state. the question has not paid enough attention This parabolic relationship between political to the different types of civil wars and openness and civil war is one that has been rebellions that societies experience. The repeatedly reported in the empirical literature factors explaining ethnic and nonethnic civil (e.g. Muller and Weede 1990; Ellingsen 2000; wars are not exactly the same. Ethnic civil Hegre et al. 2001). wars pit ethnic communities against the Where does this leave partially demo- state (and its supporters) and are fought over cratic states? The literature does indeed communal status within society. Nonethnic suggest that these are the societies most civil wars, like revolutionary wars, are fought likely to experience serious internal conflict. over ideological or class-based disputes When political rights and freedoms are not rather than identity issues. While economic fully respected, grievances emerge within theories of civil war see the opportunity disadvantaged groups. Although partially costs of rebellion primarily in terms of democratic systems, just like fully democratic economic opportunities, ethnicity and systems, may permit the mobilization of identity-based grievances are often unrelated groups whose interests are at odds with to economic deprivation (see, for example, the policies pursued by the government, Rothchild 1997; Arnson and Zartman 2005). they are also quicker to repress protests, A distinguishing feature of ethnic civil war, strikes, and other forms of civil disobedience, according to Sambanis (2001), is resentment thereby inflaming discontent and resentment at the absence of civil rights and freedoms, even as they close off opportunities for discrimination in the adjudication of disputes groups to redress their grievances. When a between societal groups, and the lack of regime combines the permissive elements political representation or regional autonomy. of democracy with the repressive elements These sorts of grievances emerge less often in of autocracy, the risks of violent domestic democratic political systems, and Sambanis conflict are at their highest. shows evidence that ethnic civil wars are In many cases, partly free societies are indeed unlikely to occur in democratic also those undergoing political change. The societies. He also finds that if a state has argument linking civil violence to the

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transition from authoritarian to democratic because they posit that economic opportunity rule is associated with the work of Samuel costs are a more important consideration than Huntington (1968, 1991), among others, and either group grievances or the opportunity is the starting point for the contention, costs of redressing those grievances through discussed above, that democratizing states democratic institutions. When controlling for are more likely to become involved in the level of economic development, the interstate conflicts. The collapse of autocratic residual effects of such political factors institutions encourages groups to mobilize should be minimal (Fearon and Laitin 2003; and compete for control of government policy Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Although the and positions of authority. Yet this surge in empirical evidence linking an increased risk political activity is difficult to channel in of civil war to incomplete democratization constructive directions due to the weakness is robust (Hegre and Sambanis 2006), more of participatory political institutions and the research is probably needed on economic underdeveloped state of democratic norms. development and democratic governance as In this fluid environment, groups often turn mutually reinforcing mechanisms of domestic against the fragile authority of the central conflict resolution. Evidence suggests the government. Their resentments stoked further peace between democratic states is strongest by opportunistic leaders, this group hostility when those states are also economically can become violent to the point of armed developed (e.g. Mousseau 2000; Mousseau rebellion (Snyder 2000; Kaufman 2001). et al. 2003), and a similar dynamic may Hegre et al. (2001) show that both of these operate at the domestic level (Hegre 2003). factors—the institutional inconsistencies characteristic of partially democratic political Settlement and peace-building systems and the volatility and opportunism associated with political change—are The conditions most conducive to preventing correlated with a higher probability of civil the outbreak of civil war are related to those war. They estimate that partially democratic most conducive to peace settlements and societies are four times as likely to descend the reestablishment of political stability in into civil war as are complete democracies. the wake of civil war. The power of the Societies undergoing a regime change, central government must be consolidated, its whether in the democratic or autocratic legitimacy must be established or enhanced by direction, are at higher risk of civil war allowing previously excluded groups access than stable political systems, and remain at to the policymaking process, and sufficient higher risk for five years after the regime economic resources must be mustered and change. Although the findings suggest civil allocated to support the peace-building war is more common in partially democratic process. The creation of each of these societies than in societies with autocratic conditions may be assisted in various ways governments, other studies have shown by external actors (Zartman 1995; Regan that autocratic governments are more likely 2000). Intergovernmental organizations, for than democracies to experience regime example, especially those composed mainly transitions (e.g. Gates et al. 2006). Thus, of democratic states, have been effec- while democratization may bring a greater tive in facilitating peace-building processes risk of domestic conflict, if democratic within both member and nonmember states political institutions are fully consolidated, (Pevehouse 2005; Pevehouse and Russett the new regime is at the lowest risk of civil 2006). In the case of extremely destructive war, due both to its institutional features and civil wars, and especially those in which group to its durability as a political system. hatreds are acute and communal violence The impact of political openness and never far below the surface, real peace may political change on the occurrence of civil war not be possible in the near term. Political is called into question by some researchers stability may require the establishment of a

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central government that rules with an iron fist estimate that they have a reasonable chance rather than wide consent. However, draconian of winning forthcoming elections—which solutions of this sort fall outside the liberal Wantchekon shows need not be greater than paradigm guiding peace-building efforts since one-half—democracy is the rational choice the end of the Cold War (Paris 1997). (Wantchekon and Neeman 2002; see also Given the secondary role played by political Przeworski 1999). practices and institutions in economic theories This notion of warlord democracy stands in of civil war, relatively little attention has been contrast to the argument that political order in devoted to questions of peace settlement and the aftermath of social upheaval may require post-war reconstruction beyond highlighting authoritarian rule, or at least a substantial the need to transform war economies (e.g. measure of illiberalism (e.g. Huntington 1968; Pugh and Cooper 2004). An exception is Zakaria 2003). Still, although even those who Wantchekon’s (2004) game theoretic analysis once profited from civil war may benefit from of “warlord democracy.” Wantchekon con- a system of democratic governance, getting siders an interaction involving three players: there is rarely a simple matter. Several studies two warring factions (warlords) and the have pointed to the difficulty of post-civil war citizenry. Each warring faction seeks political political reform and the fragility of democratic power and the economic benefits that come institutions when the wounds of communal with it. While the civil war is in progress, conflict are fresh and the process of national each expropriates the wealth of a subset reconciliation is in its infancy. Power-sharing of the citizenry they control as well as arrangements can be essential elements in mineral wealth of the territory they occupy. bringing warring factions to a settlement The interests of the citizenry depend on by assuring the representation of group their affiliation with the contending warlords. interests in policymaking and state-building Those who support one or the other enjoy both (Walter 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). the warlord’s protection and the full economic But members of a governing cartel of benefit of their labors and investments. Those group elites may resist the consolidation who support neither receive no protection of more participatory political reforms as and the return on their economic activities hard-won gains become jeopardized by is subject to expropriation. A continued state the uncertainties of the democratic process of belligerency, with its continued expro- (Rothchild and Roeder 2005). Majoritarian priation of wealth, encourages unaffiliated solutions have a mediocre track record in citizens to invest less, which diminishes the pluralistic societies plagued by suspicion warlords’ take. Wantchekon suggests that and hostility; the absence of guarantees both warlords may expect to do better by leave minorities understandably fearful of disarming and choosing democracy. In this demagoguery and democratic tyranny. case, each campaigns for the citizens’ vote In some post-conflict environments, there by proposing a tax rate, and the electoral is such a thing as too much democracy too competition brings promised tax rates down to fast. Stable democracy provides mechanisms the point where expected government revenue for the peaceful resolution of social conflict, equals the warlord’s take under conditions but democratic governance (like market of continued belligerency. Because the legal capitalism) is inherently competitive. tax rate is to be applied to the economic Electoral competition, perhaps more than any activities of the entire citizenry, it is lower other single institution, is emblematic of the than what is applied to the smaller popu- democratic process, which is why the holding lation under each warring faction’s control of elections after peace settlements have been during belligerency. The winning faction’s reached is so often taken as an indication that total take will be improved relative to the a previously dysfunctional polity has made a status quo, because citizens will now be successful political transition. In a pluralistic investing more, and as long as both factions setting, however, electoral competition may

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encourage candidates for office to distinguish or the dangers posed by democratizing the interests of their constituents from those states—continue to be debated, the of other groups, and even to exaggerate them, core dyadic proposition remains beyond reinforcing the perceived group differences dispute. Democratic peace theory still that fed the violent conflict from which has its detractors, primarily within the society just emerged. This does not mean realist school of thought, but the theory that elections should necessarily give way continues to be developed and is becoming to other, less participatory forms of political increasingly formalized within the rational representation, like power sharing, but it choice framework. Empirical evidence does mean that electoral rules need to be linking democracy to civil peace and designed so that candidates are compelled to conflict resolution is not as robust, but it is seek support from outside their own factions. accumulating. More research is also needed Extremist appeals should not pay on election to help disentangle the pacifying effects of day. It may also mean that elections cannot democracy from the effects of economic be rushed, that they should be delayed until development, and to establish which types such time as violent passions have subsided, of democratic practices and institutions warring factions have been disarmed, and the make for enduring peace and stability in social infrastructure has resumed its basic the aftermath of civil war. The continued functions. application of formal models will advance The danger, of course, is that the theory in this area as well. difficulties associated with peace-building Whatever questions remain, it is clear and state-building will become a justification that democratic governance is generally for delaying indefinitely democratic conducive to the resolution of both civil and consolidation. In the contemporary scholarly international conflict. The policy implications literature, there is a near-consensus that also seem clear: the spread of democracy is democratic political reform is a necessary good for international society as a whole, for component of peace-building after civil war, the security of democratic states in particular, at least once a modicum of post-conflict and for the peoples residing in war-torn stabilization has been achieved. Those regions of the globe. It has, of course, critical of prevailing practices of “liberal been the policy of the democratic major peace-building” usually do not question powers, and especially the United States, the ultimate aim, but rather the rate at to promote democratic reform worldwide—a which the political process is opened up to policy that predates the recent accumulation of societal forces or the design of representative social scientific research linking democracy institutions in the near term (e.g. Paris 1997, to domestic and international peace (e.g. 2004; Fukuyama 2005; Barnett 2006). Carothers 1999; Ikenberry 2000). Yet the end of the Cold War and the dissipation of the major ideological challenge to representative CONCLUSION: PUSHING DEMOCRACY democracy and market capitalism brought TO ACHIEVE PEACE with it a greater willingness to discuss the use of military force as a means of toppling Social science theory and research has authoritarian regimes, with the expectation established a strong connection between that democratization, while good for those democracy and conflict resolution between liberated from tyrannical rule, also generates and within states. As an empirical positive externalities for regional and inter- matter, the peace among democratically national security. Again, military intervention governed states is almost universally with the purpose (among others) of pushing accepted. Although related claims and democratic reform is not new, but in the counterclaims—concerning, for example, the United States at least, a renewed confidence general peacefulness of democratic states in American power and the universality of

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democratic aspirations has encouraged some But peace-building and democratization are to be more forthright in recommending the use never easy, particularly after civil wars in of military means to accelerate the historical societies divided along ethnic or religious forces driving the spread of democracy lines (on the determinants of success, see (Fukuyama 2006). Doyle and Sambanis 2006). And even when As discussed above, most of the reserva- military intervention is likely to succeed in tions in the scholarly literature concerning the bringing about a democratic transition and connection between democracy and peaceful stable peace, it must be weighed against the conflict resolution turn on the social upheaval direct costs in blood and treasure, as well as sometimes associated with democratic tran- the opportunity costs of foregoing alternative sitions. There are other reservations, how- peaceful methods of conflict resolution. ever. Aside from the irony that democracy, and therefore peace, might be promoted at gunpoint, the efficacy of “democratic NOTE imperialism” (Kristol and Kagan 2000; Kurtz 2003; has been called into question. Although 1 Our thanks to the Eeditors and to Bruce Russett there is some statistical evidence linking US for comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. military intervention to the democratization of target states (e.g. Meernik 1996; Peceny REFERENCES 1999), when looking at the specific cases of US interventions intended (wholly or in part) to contribute to the creation or Arnson, Cynthia J., and I William Zartman, eds. 2005. Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection consolidation of democratic regimes, fewer of Need, Creed, and Greed. Baltimore, MD: Johns than half succeeded.And democratization was Hopkins University Press. almost never the by-product of US inter- Barnett, Michael. 2006. “Building a Republican Peace: ventions undertaken for purposes other than Stabilizing States after War.” International Security regime change (Russett 2005; Pickering and 30(4): 87–112. Peceny 2006). The success rate for military Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan C. Stam. 2000. “Research interventions by Britain and France is even Design and Estimator Choices in the Analysis of worse. Furthermore, there is little evidence Interstate Disputes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution that imposing democratic reforms on a state in 44(5): 653–85. an otherwise nondemocratic region will serve Bennett, D. Scott, and Allan C. Stam. 2004. The to encourage democratization elsewhere in the Behavioral Origins of War. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. region (Enterline and Greig 2005). Bremer, Stuart A. 1993. “Democracy and Militarized These and other studies of intervention Interstate Conflict, 1816–1965.” International Inter- recognize that the promotion of democracy actions 18(3): 231–49. is rarely the sole purpose of military action Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and George W. Downs. by the US or other democratic major 2006. “Intervention and Democracy.” International powers. When democratic reforms prove Organization 60(3): 627–49. difficult—usually they do—and threaten the Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and David Lalman. 1992. intervener’s other policy aims, the inter- War and Reason. New Haven, CT: Yale University vening government’s own electoral survival Press. normally dictates that democratization be Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph abandoned altogether or that it be limited M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 1999. “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace.” to mainly symbolic reforms, even rigged American Political Science Review 93(4): 791–807. elections (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Randolph M. Siverson. 2006). Multilateral operations like those 1995. “War and the Survival of Political Leaders: mounted by the United Nations, the more A Comparative Analysis of Regime Type and forceful ones included, seem to have a better Accountability.” American Political Science Review track record than unilateral interventions. 89(4): 841–55.

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