CHAPTER 9

ECFA and Beyond: The Paradigm Shift of Taiwan’s National Defense Policy

Y o r k W . C h e n

I. Introduction Paradigms, according to Kuhn, refer to the entire constellation of beliefs, val- ues, and methods shared by the members of a given community and employed as models or examples in solving problems. 1 Paradigms set the standards for the conceptualization of problems and appropriate ways to solve them. Every paradigm is unique. So they are incommensurable. They can be replaced only through an irreversible discontinuity occurring in previously shared beliefs, values, and methods. Such a change is called a paradigm shift. The concepts of paradigm and paradigm shift are widely applied in different disciplines. In the field of national security, the concept of paradigm can be translated into three elements:

1. Shared value on the goal and constitutive elements of national security; 2. Shared beliefs on the recognition of threats against (or opportunities for) national security; and 3. Shared methods on the practical means in dealing such threats (or opportunities).

When an irreversible discontinuity of these elements occurs, it engenders a paradigm shift in national security. By this reasoning, the author believes that Taiwan’s national security policy toward China in general and defense policy in particular are in the process of undergoing a paradigm shift because all three elements (values, beliefs, and methods) that were embedded in previous practices during the past decades are now changing, and such a change could become irreversible.

P. C. Y. Chow (ed.), National Identity and Economic Interest © Peter C. Y. Chow 2012 206 ● York W. Chen

The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed between Taiwan and China in 2010 exemplifies a paradigm shift in the evolution of cross-strait relations. Without doubt, the likely socioeconomic impacts on Taiwan in the post-ECFA era cause great concerns and are well examined in other chapters. In this chapter, the author focuses on the confusing of identity and its implications on Taiwan’s national defense policy. The author makes three main arguments: first, both the signature of the ECFA and the weaken- ing of Taiwan’s national defense were logical products of idiosyncratic strategic paradigm. Both are organic to the broad geostrategic beliefs—or, more pre- cisely, a reconceptualization of China—framed by the deep-rooted values held by President Ma Ying-jeou and the Kuomintang (KMT) elites. These values and beliefs, which differ sharply from those of previous administrations since 1949, lead to the signing of the ECFA and the weakening of Taiwan’s national defense. Second, the reconceptualization of China facilitates a redefinition of Taiwan’s proper responses to China’s rise and thus affects the core assumptions and practices of Taiwan’s national defense policy. And, finally, given that the military imbalance in the Taiwan Strait continues to shift in Taiwan’s disfavor, many believe that Ma administration will create an irreversible strategic land- scape, if not a straightjacket, vis-à-vis China for succeeding administrations in Taiwan. If Ma is reelected in the approaching 2012 presidential election, the last brake on implementing several harmful policies in national defense may be released. If Tsai Ing-wen, the presidential candidate for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), wins, she could at most manage to moderate the neg- ative impacts caused by Ma’s China policy. However, a reboost of Taiwan’s defense capabilities would be a very challenging task.

II. Conflicting Identity(ies) in Taiwan History National security is by nature an ambiguous concept and without clear-cut boundaries. 2 Nevertheless, in order to exploit the concept, recent literature in the fields of International Relations and Security Studies suggests a construc- tivist approach and emphasizes the role of identity in formulation and practice of national security.3 There are many variants in the constructivist camp; how- ever, these scholars hold two common views in understanding the concept of national security. First, the definition of national security is neither given nor fixed, but constructed and subject to manipulation. And, second, definitions of identity that distinguish between the self and the other imply definitions of threat and interest that have strong effects on national security policies. In other words, political leaders designate other states as “friend” or “enemy” and approach them as such—on the basis of conceptions of identity. 4 S i m p l y p u t , for constructivists, though the concept of national security is based upon some material referents, such as relative capabilities or external environment, the interpretation of and responses to these referents is based on collective identity in a given state. Such an approach is widely used in analyzing Taiwan’s national security pol- icy. Though related works may vary in methods, they more or less agree with the view that Taiwan’s national security policy is largely framed by the identity ECFA and Beyond ● 207 factors. Taking two local scholarly works as examples, Lin traces the process of a rising Taiwanese identity (or so-called Taiwanese nationalism) since the early 1990s that led to Lee Teng-hui’s redefinition of the cross-strait relations as a “special state-to-state relationship”. 5 Hisao and Yan argue that Taiwanese iden- tity has become the major campaigning agenda for domestic elections as well as the driving force of Chen Shui-bian’s China policy.6 Moreover, it is widely believed that since Taiwanese identity is on the rise, Taiwan’s national security policy should be accordingly kept in a direction opposite from China and ulti- mate unification.7 Rigger’s concluding passage, for instance, reads

Unificationists in Taiwan have a more difficult leap of faith to make; this may explain why their numbers are declining. What is left for most Taiwanese, then, is a pragmatic outlook that acknowledges Taiwan’s cultural and ancestral con- nection with mainland China, but rejects the assertion that these links must someday be forged into political unity. 8

Such a linear notion implies that Taiwanese identity, once it has emerged, will persist. However, this argument is so straightforward that some points that deserve more examination are overlooked. Taiwanese identity is prey to local politicians and has various referents, including ethnical, sociocultural, and political. Political referents are the most critical variables in understanding the impact of Taiwanese identity on Taiwan’s national security policy. But, with- out supplementary investigation of sociocultural or even ethnical referents, the analysis of such impacts would be incomplete. In addition to different referents, identity is a collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same group and of sharing most of the attributes that make it distinct from other groups. 9 Both belonging (creating sameness) and distinction (creating otherness) are two elements that constitute identities of various categories. Of course, individual sentiment of sameness and otherness can be very subjective. But a collective identity is not simply a matter of choice; it must be “negotiated.” 10 Such “negotiation” often takes place at various levels such as internal/external, ideational/material, past/future, sym- bolic myth/brutal fact, and so on. That renders an exhaustive study of identity (and its relations with national security policy) difficult to achieve. Suffice it to say for now, at the internal/external level, a collective identity derives from the internal (among the constitutive members) and external (between the same group and other groups) interactions within the specific social and cultural context. As Brown suggests,

Identity formation occurs through the social experience of [the] interaction. People negotiate with others, both those who claim the same identity and those who claim different identities, and what these different groups of “others” allow one to claim often varies. 11

Such a negotiation is never easy and particularly difficult to attain in Taiwan. In the past, the path of developing Taiwanese identity, even in terms of most explicit political identity, was rugged and often suffered from 208 ● York W. Chen deliberate disruption if not total displacement. During the past 500 years, Taiwanese affiliation with the government in Mainland China was like roll- ercoaster. It was once vacant (before 1624), denied (Dutch colonial rule, 1624–62), mutually opposed (Zheng Cheng-gong era, 1662–83), marginal- ized (early Qing rule, approximately 1684–1885), normalized (late Qing rule, approximately 1885–95), abandoned (Japanese colonial rule, 1895–1945), normalized again (1945–50), mutually opposed again (from Two-Chiang era to early Lee Teng-Hui era, 1950–91), assumed parallel (Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian era, 1991–2008), and now assumed overlapped (Ma Ying- jeou period, 2008–Present). These 10 different and often conflicting politi- cal affiliations in Taiwan’s relatively brief history made the collective sense of political sameness and otherness difficult to negotiate and thus created several profound identity crises. On the aspect of ethnic referents, some believe that both Taiwanese (ben sheng ren, old inhabitants in Taiwan before the end of World War II) and Mainlander ( wai sheng ren , new immigrants from Mainland China after the end of World War II) share ethnical sameness because their ancestors all came from Mainland China. Both are from the same Han blood. Yet, others refute such sameness, and their arguments are supported by scientific evidence from recent blood and genetic research. Taiwanese, the old inhabitants of Taiwan before the end of World War II, can be further differentiated into three ethnic groups: aboriginal peoples, Minnan , and Hakka . Aboriginal peoples in Taiwan are regarded as being obviously different from Han Chinese and they are proved to have direct blood relationship with the Polynesian, not Han Chinese. Furthermore, against conventional wisdom, the blood of Minnan and Hakka is almost identical. Both are also different from Han Chinese of northern China but are rather closely related to peoples of Southeast Asia or the ethnic minor- ity Baiyue of southern China. Taiwanese further mixed with local aborigines Pingpu and became even less related to northern Han Chinese.12 In a word, the opponents suggest that Taiwanese and Mainlander differ not only in their time of arrival in Taiwan, but also in their ethnicity. As to sociocultural identity, some emphasize that the inhabitants on both sides of Taiwan Strait share the same rituals, language, art, religion, and, most notably, miserable history of suppression by Western or Japanese imperial- ists. Such sociocultural sameness will bind their fate together under the great Chinese nationalism (zhong hua min zu). Still others oppose this notion. Even if there are some similarities in culture, they argue that Taiwanese had a totally different experience from that of people in Mainland China; for example, the period of Japanese rule was not necessarily a bad memory for Taiwanese. Taiwanese 90 years ago enjoyed limited political participation (such as a Taiwan Parliament), could organize political parties, and stage several political dem- onstrations against ruling Japanese. Even contemporary Chinese in Mainland China do not have such possibilities. Opponents believe that, given the more than 100-year (Japanese rule period plus the post-1950 period) experiences across the strait, the sociocultural gap between Taiwanese and those on the Mainland cannot be bridged. ECFA and Beyond ● 209

Furthermore, such a divergence also existed among the communities in Taiwan. Due to incompetence or premeditation of the rulers in Taiwan, inter- nal relations among different communities in the past were poor and sometimes led to bloody infighting. For example, the Dutch, using the “divide and rule” colonial policy, allied with wealthy Taiwanese merchants in exploiting local farmers and laborers. The Dutch armed aboriginal militias to reinforce their few expedition troops to control the population. Local uprisings were brutally suppressed by the Dutch and their collaborators. Thousands were killed in the uprisings, and it was the local merchants and aboriginal militias that did most of the indiscriminate killing. 13 Similarly, during Qing dynasty rule in Taiwan (1683–1895), conflicts between the above-mentioned three ethnic groups, aboriginal peoples, Minnan and Hakka , or within Minnan (between Chang Zhou group and Chung Zhou group) were extensive and bloody. More recently, in Two-Chiang era (Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo; 1950–88), the February 28 Incident and the subsequent White Terror Period also resulted in hostile sentiment among suppressed Taiwanese toward Mainlanders. These internal tensions significantly hampered the unity of inhabitant communities in Taiwan. Though the authorities managed to improve intercommunal rela- tions, some historical wounds are still visible today. Crisis of inclusion and crisis of self-definition are two common types of iden- tity crises. 14 The former is more discernible in Taiwanese history. Confusing political affiliations caused such crises several times in the past. Except for a few periods, the sense of belonging to a state government among the inhabit- ants of Taiwan was no more than fragmentary; and Taiwanese political affilia- tion with China’s central authorities in the past was very weak or nonexistent. Taiwan is an immigration society. Development in Taiwan started around the middle of the sixteenth century. Before this and for a period thereafter, there was no government in Taiwan. Political affiliation was vacant for aborigi- nal peoples and the few settlers who immigrated from the Mainland. Land- power-centric imperial China viewed Taiwan as an untamed wilderness of no great strategic importance and had no intention of administering or establish- ing a government there. It was the Dutch, with the tacit approval of China, that established the first administration in Taiwan in 1624. Under the Dutch colonial administration, Taiwanese political affiliation with the government in the Mainland was denied. The Dutch colonial regime was replaced by Zheng Cheng-gong in 1662. Though different in its pirate/merchant hybrid origin, Zheng’s regime had many striking similarities to two-Chiang KMT regime in the twentieth cen- tury. Both brought in large numbers of troops, officials, and civilians and thus created remarkable demographic changes in Taiwan. 15 Bo t h c l a i m e d t o have liberated Taiwanese from previous colonial authorities that they repre- sented the orthodox Chinese nation and the legitimate Chinese government, and mobilized the Taiwanese population in order to overthrow the hetero- dox and illegal regimes in the Mainland (Manchurian Qing dynasty or the Communist’s Red China). However, Zheng’s regime was so brief that most soldering burden fell upon Zheng’s original troops only. Under both regimes, 210 ● York W. Chen

Taiwanese political affiliations with the governments in the Mainland were mutually opposed. Zheng’s regime fell in 1683 and Taiwan fell under the domain of the Qing dynasty in 1684. In the earlier years of Qing rule, governance by the central government with regard to Taiwan was passive and focused more on prevent- ing rebellion than on local development. Taiwan was regarded as an upheaval territory or so-called domestic colony. 16 The immigration ban was officially lifted only in 1874. Officials and troops were sent from the Mainland and were rotated every three years. Most were incompetent; many were corrupt.17 The Dutch practice of “divide and rule” was further institutionalized. Special “guilds” were recognized by the authorities. Those guilds, differentiated by regions (north or south guilds) or commodities (rice or sugar guilds), were organized by merchants and were granted monopoly privileges in commerce. In exchange for such privileges, almost all the guild merchants collaborated with local governments in recruiting militias or covering military expenses for the suppression of uprisings by fellow residents. Such practices illustrate the weakness and mindlessness of early Qing rule in Taiwan. Before the late nine- teenth century, when the Qing dynasty finally made proper efforts to achieve governance in Taiwan, Taiwanese received different treatment from citizens on the Mainland; Taiwanese political affiliation with the central government in China remained marginalized. During late Qing rule, Taiwanese affiliation with China was finally normal- ized. Taiwan’s political status was elevated as a province in 1885. Its defense and linkage with China were strengthened. However, such a development was only a flash in the pan. In 1895, the Qing dynasty signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki and agreed to cede Taiwan to Japan. In order to resist Japanese occupation, the Taiwan Democratic Republic was hastily declared. Qing’s last governor in Taiwan, Tang Ching-sun, was appointed president. The repub- lic was short-lived and lasted only 147 days. Qing officials, including Tang, soon fled, and Qing nonlocal regular armies looted Taipei City and evapo- rated. Only local irregular militias kept on fighting. Without help from the Mainland, Taiwanese resistance was hopeless. Although suffering an unexpect- edly high number of casualties, the Japanese troops finally defeated the poorly equipped local militias and established the Japanese colonial administration in Taiwan. According to the treaty, Taiwanese inhabitants were granted the right to choose their nationality within two years. Only 4,500 Taiwanese (less than 1% of total population) chose to keep their Qing affiliation and left Taiwan. 18 For the majority of inhabitants, their political affiliation with China was then abandoned and changed to Japan. In order to fully incorporate Taiwan into the Japan’s domain, Japanese authorities in Taiwan adopted an “assimilation” (Japanization) policy, including the notorious “name changing movement” in the early 1940s. Though local uprisings against Japanese colonial rule occurred periodically, very few were for the political purpose of reverting to Chinese rule. Taiwanese elites challenged the local authorities mainly over efforts to secure the same rights for Taiwanese as those enjoyed by the Japanese. For this pur- pose, they suggested that Taiwanese should bear the same citizen obligations ECFA and Beyond ● 211 as Japanese and thus proposed that Japanese universal conscription should be applied to Taiwanese as well. Conscription was finally adopted in Taiwan in January 1945.19 During World War II, some 207,000 Taiwanese volunteered or were recruited as Japanese soldiers or military labor. Approximately 23,000 were sent to Mainland China and fought alongside Japanese troops against the Chinese.20 After World War II, China reclaimed Taiwan in 1945. Chiang Kai-shek decided to set up the Office of Chief Administrator in Taiwan, which dif- fered from the practice of reestablishing provincial government in other terri- tory previously controlled by the Japanese on the Mainland. On October 25, immediately after the surrender of Japanese troops in Taiwan, the first chief administrator, Chen Yi, declared that, from that moment on, Taiwan had offi- cially become a territory of China; all land and residents were under the juris- diction of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China (ROC). The nationality of Taiwan’s residents was simultaneously changed from Japanese to Chinese. There was no two-year period for people to choose their nationality. Many officials and officers from the Mainland regarded themselves as victors or rulers and having higher status than Taiwanese. Most Taiwanese could not speak Mandarin and were treated as Japanese sympathizers if not collaborators. The political participation that Taiwanese had enjoyed under Japanese rule was gone. When Chen Yi was asked about the delay in the enforcement of a newly legislated (in 1946) ROC constitution in Taiwan, he crudely replied it was because “Taiwanese had long been Japan’s subjects. Taiwanese was degenerated in a political sense and lacked the ability of self-government.” 21 A new round of identity crisis in Taiwan began to spread. Furthermore, Taiwan was drawn into the war-torn economy of the Mainland and suffered shortages of goods, vicious inflation, and increasing unemployment. The combination of commu- nal tension, political disappointment, Chen Yi’s incompetent and corrupt rule, and socioeconomic turmoil finally trigged the February 28 Incident in 1947. 22 The Incident was not only a political uprising against the KMT government in Taiwan, but also bloody infighting between Taiwanese and Mainlander com- munities. First, Mainlanders, officials or not, were indiscriminately attacked by Taiwanese; later, after KMT reinforcement troops were shipped to Taiwan, a program of indiscriminate retribution on a much more bloody scale was unleashed upon the Taiwanese. Approximately 15,000–20,000 Taiwanese were killed during the Incident. Most Taiwanese elites were wiped out. 23 T h e c o n - sequence of the Incident, as the major contributor to the official report on the massacre suggested, “led to the emergence of the Taiwan independence move- ment, leftist thinking, and hostility between Taiwanese and Mainlander. It seri- ously damaged the harmony and future development of Taiwan’s society.”24

III. Old Paradigms National security and national defense became meaningful terms to Taiwanese only after 1950 (perhaps with the single exception of Zheng’s regime). In the past, all governments in Taiwan were imported. Taiwan was only a part of the 212 ● York W. Chen

Qing or Japanese empire. The business of national security and defense was the exclusive remit of officials in Beijing or Tokyo. Taiwanese had no say about this issue but only provided their resources to fulfill the national security goals of the distant empires. Worse, Taiwan was seen as a troublesome spot for the empires’ national security that required constant policing measures. Taiwanese were treated with suspicion; for example, Taiwan’s defense during the Qing era was solely the responsibility of soldiers rotated from the Mainland, while Tokyo only approved conscription in Taiwan in the final stage of World War II. However, the situation changed after 1950. Most fundamentally, “the fall of [China],” as Hsiao suggested, “implied the end of ‘absentee government’ that only draw resources from Taiwan. Taiwan was no longer [regarded] as a frontier to China but gradually established its subjectivity.” 25 The KMT was defeated by the Communists in Mainland China during the Chinese Civil War (1945–49) and fled to Taiwan. Mao Zedong of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declared the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949; and Chiang Kai-shek was self-appointed president of the ROC and rebuilt government in Taiwan in 1950. After 1950, the fate of Taiwanese was subsumed into the survival of the newly imported government, the KMT. After 1950, China was divided. As mentioned above, Taiwanese affiliation with China under the two-Chiang KMT regime was one of mutual opposition. Each claimed it was the only legitimate government representing the whole of China and committed to annihilate the other claimant to the title. Thus the Chinese Civil War continued. In order to continue the political struggle with the PRC, Chinese sociocul- tural identity was institutionally and systematically implanted into the popula- tion in Taiwan. Taiwanese were taught that people at both sides of the strait, including Taiwanese—those who lived on the island before the end of World War II—were all fellow countryman ( tong bao ), the same ethnic Han and cul- tural Chinese. Taiwanese identity and its correlatives such as language, drama, literature, and art were suppressed. The implantation of Chinese identity in Taiwan’s military was undertaken in a more rigid fashion. Chiang Kai-shek built the KMT army in 1924 (12 years after the establishment of the republic) in Whampoa, Guangdong, a southern province in China. He kept a firm control over Whampoa forces and ensured they were better equipped and trained than other elements in the national army. After the defeat in the Civil War, new armed forces were rebuilt in Taiwan under, in the author’s term, a “re- Whampoaisation ” process. Re-Whampoaisation represented a crucial stage and process in shaping the armed forces in Taiwan. In the main, it was an endeavor to build another KMT army, Whampoa forces, with more prominent monopolized control under the two Chiangs. 26 T o e n s u r e loyalty in the ranks, the entire officers corps was institutionally and culturally shaped into a homogenous group that adhered to the KMT affiliation and Chinese identity. The KMT even established party branches in the military. The graduates in military academies had to be members of the KMT before they could be commissioned. Senior officers were recruited into the power core of the KMT. 27 In addition to responding to military threats from China, the ECFA and Beyond ● 213 armed forces were also used against domestic dissidents, local Communists, defeatists, and advocates of Taiwan independence during the Martial Law Period. Taiwanese society was militarized, with the military penetrating every sector or society. 28 This led to the sameness of Chinese identity within and outside the barracks. The struggle with the PRC was not only simply of selfness versus otherness but also good/righteousness versus bad/evilness. The KMT, though an authori- tarian ruler by nature, claimed its government represented Free China and was a member of the democratic camp while denigrating the PRC as Red China, a third world regime. Mainland China under CCP rule was misguided by brute Communism and was portrayed as a betrayal of traditional Chinese culture. The catastrophes of the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s were also seen as evidence of the poor governance of the CCP. On the other hand, Taiwan under the ROC was better governed by “righteous” KMT leaders and good ideology guided by the Three Principles of the People (San Ming Chi I ). Taiwan’s blooming economy after the 1970s further reinforced such a sense of superiority. People who enjoyed a better life in Taiwan were indoctrinated with the belief that it was their responsibility to rescue their fellow countrymen in the Mainland who lived in misery under Communists rule. Mutual political opposition created a zero-sum interactive pattern, the so- called either Han or bandit (Han Zei Bu Liang Li), in Taiwan’s cross-strait and foreign relations. Given the uttermost goal of Taiwan’s national security at the time was to overthrow the PRC and return to China, China under CCP rule was a threat to Taiwan under the ROC. No exchanges with China were allowed unless approved from the top. There was no room for “dual representa- tion” of China on the diplomatic front: any country that recognized the PRC would be shunned by the ROC. This “either Han or bandit” practice was well illustrated by the ROC’s withdrawal of its seat in the United Nations (UN) minutes before a proposal on the PRC’s admission was passed in 1971.29 S u c h inflexibility, though often apotheosized as acts of gallantry by KMT authori- ties, virtually put Taiwan’s foreign relations on the defensive and losing side. For Taiwanese, the United States, though rather unpredictable, was basi- cally seen as the best ally, one that was vital to Taiwan’s security even after the severance of official diplomatic relations in 1979. The ROC tried very hard to take a role as the outpost, or the pivot position, in the first island chain in the Pacific, and of U.S. containment against Communist expansion. Although such a geostrategic significance was diminished starting with Sino-U.S. détente in the 1970s, the ROC held firmly onto this self-identity and made itself avail- able in assisting the United States to balance against China. The combination of military and ideological measures were highly empha- sized as the major instruments for fulfilling reunification of China and fend- ing China’s threat against the survival of the KMT regime in Taiwan. The status of the Civil War was sustained during two-Chiang era even though large skirmishes had virtually ceased since the naval battle off Wu Chu Island in 1965. Thanks to the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States signed in 214 ● York W. Chen

1954; Taiwan’s rear was well protected by U.S. forces. As a result, Taiwan’s overall defense strategy was directed at “creating opportunities for retaking the Mainland by force” during 1949–66. Accordingly, an offensive defense posture was adopted. Taiwan’s ground forces were concentrated on the offshore islands such as Quemoy and Matsu and ready to launch jump-off operations into the Mainland. The KMT conducted frequent raids on China’s coastal areas in order to keep military pressure on the CCP as well as to demonstrate its determination to retake the Mainland by force. The size of Taiwan’s Marine Corps and its amphibious offensive capabilities, both were seen as the indica- tions of large-scale offensive preparedness for retaking the Mainland, at the time was larger than that of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). However, the opportunities that Chiang Kai-shek was waiting for never materialized. After the repeated refusal by the United States (in 1963 and 1966) to sup- port KMT military adventurism against China, Chiang Kai-shek’s hope to reunify China by force died off. During 1966–94, Taiwan’s defense strategy was adjusted to “indirect approach” that stressed “ideology first, forces second” (Chi I Wei Sian, Wu Li Wei Cong) and “30 per cent military, 70 per cent poli- tics.” Military forces would be used only once the collapse of the PRC regime was imminent. Two different force postures, forward defense (1966–79) and defense-in-depth (1979–2000), were employed under this indirect approach. For rapid response to China’s collapse, under the concept of forward defense, troop deployments on the offshore islands kept increasing and reached 170,000 at its peak. However, the withdrawal of American troops stationed in Taiwan after the break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Taiwan in 1979 required Taiwanese to assume total responsibility for rearguard defense. The main Taiwan island, rather than the tiny outposts, was conceived as the center of gravity which required layered defense. In 1983, the first division-level redeployment from Quemoy to Taiwan marked the beginning of a continuous troop reduction on the offshore islands. The concept of defense-in-depth thus began to take shape. 30 Framed by the dominance of Chinese identity and mutually opposed politi- cal affiliation, Taiwan’s national security and defense paradigm during the two-Chiang era (hereinafter referred to as the Two-Chiang Paradigm) com- prised the following elements:

1 . V a l u e • Fe l l o w c o u n t r y m e n i n t h e M a i n l a n d a n d i n T a i w a n s h a r e e t h n i c a l a n d sociocultural sameness (we are all Han Chinese). To rescue those in the Mainland from misery, political distinction must be and will be solved under the KMT’s superior leadership and governance (China will be reunified under the Three Principles of the People). 2 . B e l i e f s • Mainland China under CCP rule poses a military threat to the survival of Taiwan and constitutes an obstacle for the reunification of China; thus it needs to be opposed. • T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i s o u r f r i e n d . ECFA and Beyond ● 215

3 . M e t h o d s • Initially military-oriented; later combined with KMT ideology. • From offensive defense, forward defense to defense-in-depth. • D i p l o m a t i c d e f e n s i v e . • N o i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h C h i n a .

The Two-Chiang Paradigm lasted some 40 years. It was largely inherited by Lee Teng-hui in his early years as president of the ROC. For example, “Taiwan and China,” Lee said in his inauguration address in 1990, “are indivisible parts of China” and all Chinese were “compatriots of the same flesh and blood” who together should seek peaceful and democratic means to achieve the “common goal of national unification.” 31 Various accounts can help explain Lee’s adher- ence to the Two-Chiang Paradigm: Lee needed to reduce the threat from China in order to remove past restrictions and push for further democratization; 32 o r he was politically too weak to overthrow the Two-Chiang Paradigm entirely; or he was embarking on a strategic initiative of engaging with China for the purpose of a peacefully changing China. 33 The last two seem more convincing. After the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989 and the dismantlement of the Soviet Union in 1991, many in the KMT believed the days of the CCP in the Mainland were numbered and that the reunification of China promised under the Two-Chiang Paradigm was approaching. A National Unification Council was established in 1990. The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), a cabinet- level apparatus, and the quasi-official Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), were established in 1991. Also, in 1991, Taiwan officially terminated the “Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” and announced the National Unification Guidelines. The former recognized the legitimacy of CCP rule in the Mainland and the latter proposed a three-phase roadmap for the reunification of China. Lee’s early efforts in cross-strait relations were double-edged. On the one hand, many aspects of his initiatives, such as the acceptance of a One China principle and reunification of China, clearly reflected key elements in the Two- Chiang Paradigm. Those ideas were acceptable to the CCP. Before the SEF entered formal negotiations with its Chinese counterpart, the top leadership across the strait had had extensive exchanges and built up a certain level of confidence through secret channel.34 Therefore, two months after Taiwan’s announcement of the National Unification Guidelines, Beijing positively responded to Lee’s proposal by proclaiming that the CCP would be willing to discuss the gradual achievement of peaceful reunification with the KMT. This stance was reaffirmed again by Jiang Zemin in 1992. These led to the Koo- Wong Singapore Talks of 1993, which marked the highest point of cross-strait reconciliation. On the other hand, some of Lee’s formulations marked a profound departure from the Two-Chiang Paradigm. In the first, or reciprocal exchange, phase of the National Unification Guidelines, it clearly states that “each side shall not deny the other as a political entity” and “[both sides shall] mutually respect [each other] in the international arena and do not repel each other.” Not only 216 ● York W. Chen was the previous mutually opposed political affiliation under the Two-Chiang Paradigm altered, implicit in the Guidelines, the ROC was asking to be treated as an equal by the PRC both in cross-strait relations and on the international stage. The latter part was soon deemed unacceptable by Beijing since it implied “one state, two governments” or, even worse, “two states.” For Beijing, the KMT and the CCP may be equals, but no such equality exists between the PRC and the ROC.35 Lee finally switched over from his adherence to the Two-Chiang Paradigm to establishing a new strategic paradigm in the mid-1990s. The advance of a “new Taiwanese” concept in 1998 marked the perfection of Lee’s new paradigm. New Taiwanese refers to people who live in Taiwan, share the same experiences, and identify community values that are proper to Taiwan—no matter where a person was born and when he/she arrived in Taiwan. “New Taiwanese,” accord- ing to Lee’s later elucidation, “is not an identity that is distinguished by ethnic groups, but [rather] based upon the living space we found ourselves . . . upon a sense of community that we share the same fate.” 36 Analytically, the first part of Lee’s notion tried to erase the distinction between Taiwanese and Mainlander, and thus created the sameness of the population in Taiwan, while the second part highlighted the differences in living space and common fate, and thus marked a distinctive otherness between (new) Taiwanese and Chinese. By this reasoning, the symbolic ROC gained a new functional meaning: Taiwan. The fate of the ROC was to be determined by all (new) Taiwanese only. In 1992, the Ministry of the Interior amended the Act of Household Registration. The registration of ancestral home was replaced with one’s birthplace. Since then, the distinction between Taiwanese and the Mainlander has become less visible. It was one of Lee’s designs in easing off long-standing tensions among different communities in Taiwan, an important initiative for the development of a so- called “New Taiwanese Identity” Taiwan’s relationship with the PRC is parallel and equal; and such is the precondition for both sides of the strait to develop a special relationship. One China is not necessarily unacceptable to Lee if the definition of this China is not the PRC, but one that is broader and includes two parallel and equal political entities, the ROC and the PRC. These lines of arguments led Lee’s announce- ment of a “special state-to-state relationship” in 1999. 37 In this regard, as Roy observed, “Lee did not play up Taiwan independence. Instead, he aimed to capture the political middle ground by focusing on economic growth and con- stitutional reform, and enhancing Taiwan’s international opportunities under the status quo.” 38 Counterintuitively, Taiwan’s democratization provided the reinforcing momentum for the rise of Taiwanese identity, but it also made the “negotia- tion” of Lee’s concept of new Taiwanese very difficult to be achieved. On one hand, the first general renewal election of the legislature was held in 1992 and the first direct presidential election in 1996 reflected Lee’s notion that Taiwan’s fate would be determined by Taiwanese only. For the purpose of winning the election and remaining in power, the KMT realized it had to be closer to the Taiwanese polity. “In the process of democratization,” as an observer argued, ECFA and Beyond ● 217

“Lee also Taiwanized the Chinese Nationalist Party [KMT].” 39 One the other, democratization also let off political opposition inside and outside the KMT. The New Kuomintang Alliance was formed in 1989 by a few young reformists in the KMT and later was transformed as an individual political party, New Party, in 1993. Its strong anti-Lee position soon attracted those who agonized over or opposed against Lee’s Taiwanese identity. Lee’s confrontation with Army General Hau Pei-tsun, the military strongman of the time, forced Hau to join the New Party in 1996 and became the leading figure against Lee’s “indepen- dence direction.” The New Party claimed to represent the orthodox KMT and soon emerged as the leading advocate of prounification and anti-independence. The New Party had once achieved remarkable expansion in Taiwan’s political map in the late 1990s until was assimilated into the KMT in the middle 2000s when the latter had given up Lee’s direction and committed to prounification again. At another extreme, the DDP, though appreciated Lee’s move away from Two-Chiang Paradigm, kept complaining about Lee’s compromise. For most in the DPP of the time, there was a simple distinction between China and Taiwan and nothing to be claimed as “special” in Lee’s definition of cross-state rela- tions. They rejected Lee’s prescription of Taiwanizing the ROC. They claimed that the ROC had been ceased to exist since 1950. Taiwan was regarded as an unsolved territory after World War II but was occupied by the KMT only for the time being. These strong positions later evolved as the baseline of Chen Shui-bian’s notion of “one-country-on-either-side” in 2002. For many indepen- dence supporters, the one on their side is Taiwan (or Taiwan Republic, prefer- ably) and nothing more. Both Lee’s moderate stance of “special state-to-state relations” and Chen’s purified notion of “one-country-on-either-side” created a new round of identity crisis. But this time, it was for Mainlanders who convinced to be the targeted victims during the rise of Taiwanese identity, or so-called de-Sinicization. Veteran community and the military, who had received the most rigid indoctri- nation of Chinese identity during two-Chiang era, naturally became the most prominent group against the rise of Taiwanese identity. For them, Taiwanese identity in Lee and Chen’s terms directly collided with their Chinese identity, which had long been implanted and entrenched in the Whampoa ethos and was held by the military. Several pol-mil confrontations in Lee (with Hau) and Chen (with Army General Tang Yiau-ming) administrations further stimulated their resistance. Particularly, Chen’s instructions to remove two Chiangs’ stat- ues out of barrack that began in 2006 immediately received serious condemna- tion from veteran community and the military. For many uniformed soldiers, they respected the commitment of President Chen and his civilian executives in defense modernization (see below), but this did not mean that they would accept the DDP stance and ideology. Many Taiwan-born young officers, though more open-minded, were, and still are, reluctant to Taiwanese identity or anything that related to Taiwan independence. As the author observed, “Chen elevated two Chiangs’ symbol by trying to remove it. Also, its political consequence was unexpectedly counter-productive. When the uniformed soldiers were forced to face the either-DPP-or-KMT choice, the latter would always prevail.”40 C h e n ’ s 218 ● York W. Chen actions caused the KMT counteractions. And the KMT was tempted to make the soldiers choose. The KMT-controlled legislature, of course, humiliated the responsible officers in public and cut the budget of their units as retribution. 41 The head of KMT Huangfushin division (branch in veteran community), retired general Wang Wen-hsieh, announced the revocation of the then defense minister admiral Lee Jei’s KMT membership for his disrespect to two Chiangs. “It is a warning,” Wang shamelessly said, “the rest of the people [in the MND] must be better behaved.” 42 Though encountered many difficulties and resistances in the negotiation of Taiwanese identity and assumed parallel political affiliation, a new Taiwan’s national security and defense paradigm took shape in the Lee-Chen era (here- after referred to as the Lee-Chen Paradigm) and comprised the following elements:

1 . V a l u e • All people in Taiwan, including Mainlanders, through common expe- rience since 1945 have developed a collective sense of sameness, termed as Taiwanese identity. This identity makes them distinct from the Chinese. • Taiwan is not a part of China, at least politically. Both the PRC and the ROC are equals. Taiwan seeks to coexist with the PRC. Any arrangement of Taiwan’s future shall be based on the consensus of Taiwanese. 2 . B e l i e f s • Mainland China represents both a threat and an opportunity. But it is more a threat than an opportunity. Military threats need to be hedged. Economic opportunity need to be approached with caution. • The United States is our friend. Taiwan can rely on the United States for support in developing cross-strait relations. 3 . M e t h o d s • T o d e m i l i t a r i z e c r o s s - s t r a i t r e l a t i o n s , b u t u n d e r t a k e m i l i t a r y m o d - ernization and increase coordination with the United States as a precaution. • F r o m d e f e n s e - i n - d e p t h t o a c t i v e d e f e n s e . • D i p l o m a t i c o f f e n s i v e . • A v o i d a n c e o f e c o n o m i c r e l i a n c e o n C h i n a .

After the termination of the “Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” in 1991, the Chinese Civil War, in the view- point of Taipei, was officially ended. This unilateral ending of hostilities with the PRC led to the demilitarization of cross-strait relations and a reorienta- tion of Taiwan’s national security strategy. The exclusive focus on military aspects of cross-strait relations during the two-Chiang era was replaced by economic concerns. Although the military balance across the strait remained an important issue in Taiwan’s national security agenda, its significance was dramatically diminished. As a result of demilitarization, Taiwan’s military ECFA and Beyond ● 219 was downsized and its defense expenditures shrank. In 1994, Taiwan’s armed forces were 490,000 strong, with a defense budget accounting for 24.28% of the total central government budget and 4.11% of Taiwan’s gross domestic product (GDP). The size of the armed forces and defense budget dropped to 380,000 men, 17.41% of the total government budget, and 2.76% of GDP in 2000; and further to 275,000, 21.51%, and 3% respectively in 2008. 43 M a n y i n the Lee and Chen administrations believed the possibility of military conflict in the strait would remain remote as long as Taiwan refrained from declaring de jure independence and the United States kept its commitments to Taiwan’s security. Instead, how to manage Taiwan’s increasing economic reliance on the Mainland and to insulate Taiwan’s freedom of action from China’s manipula- tion became the most serious issues in cross-strait relations. Both Lee’s “don’t rush; be patient ( jie ji yung ren)” in 1996 and Chen’s “positive openness with effective management” in 2000 were directed at the control of the second- wave investment movement (that meant Taiwan’s largest business group, dif- ferent from medium-sized family-owned companies in the first wave) flocked into the Mainland. 44 Also, because the diplomatic recognition was seen as the indicators of Taiwan sovereign status, Lee and Chen committed themselves in diplomatic offensive in opening Taiwan’s international space. This chapter focuses on defense issues. Since under Lee-Chen Paradigm, retaking the Mainland was no longer the goal of Taiwan’s national security pol- icy, Taiwan’s national defense strategy was redirected to maintaining the status quo and changed from “creating opportunities for retaking the Mainland by force” (1949–66) and “indirect approach” (1967–91) to “prevention of war” (1991–Present). The role of Taiwan’s military forces was redesignated as a hedge against China’s military adventurism. Though Lee and Chen put differ- ent emphases on how to constitute a military deterrent in responding to pos- sible cross-strait contingencies, both administrations adopted similar strategies in military preparedness: force modernization and increased coordination with the United States. 45 The defense-in-depth posture was sustained during the Lee administration. It was a rather Army-centric design that was based upon a conservative opera- tional concept of three-layered attrition (offshore islands, Taiwan strait, and the landing beachhead on Taiwan proper). Army generals preferred to empha- size the last layer of defense, the so-called decisive campaign at the water’s edge. The anticipation of great casualties for the PLA when trying to defeat Taiwan’s ground forces would deter China from invasion against Taiwan or, at least, buy sufficient time for U.S. intervention. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense advanced this concept of “resolute defense and effective deterrence” as Taiwan’s military strategy by defining effective deterrence as “a kind of defensive deter- rence. Its purpose is . . . to dissuade the opponents that the cost of using mili- tary forces will outweigh the gain.” 46 In short, “resolute defense and effective deterrence” represented a typical model of deterrence by denial, in which reso- lute defense is the means to achieve the goal of effective deterrence. On the other hand, Chen cast doubt on the validity of defense-in-depth pos- ture. As the missile crisis of 1995–96 indicated that Chinese ballistic missiles 220 ● York W. Chen could penetrate Taiwan’s layered defense without difficulty and inflict con- siderable damage on Taiwan, Chen believed a combination of missile defense and countering China’s missiles at the source was the best way to compensate for Taiwan’s military vulnerabilities and thus called for a radical change in Taiwan’s military strategy that could be labeled “active defense” or “decisive campaign outside the territory” (2000–2008). Chen overcame resistance from some old guards in the military and pressed on. Traditional notions of “resolute defense and effective deterrence” were replaced by “effective deterrence and res- olute defense.” 47 It was not merely a change of word order. Implicit in the new concept, the relations between “effective deterrence” and “resolute defense” was redefined. Both effective deterrence and resolute defense are means to achieve the purpose of defending Taiwan. The latter refers to the traditional concepts of ground war while the former specifically refers to air, naval, and information countermeasure capabilities in general, and the HSIUNG FENG 2E (HF-2E, over 600 kilometers range) cruise missile in particular. In order to fulfill the concepts of “effective deterrence and resolute defense,” as the MND stated in National Defense Report 2004, “[we will] actively develop, research and acquire the precision stand-off weapon systems and establish electronic counter- measure forces in order to augment our deep strike capabilities. Through the buildup of defensive counter-measure capabilities, [we hope to] deter the enemy from initiating hostility by complicating its probability of success.”48 Though differing in their approach to achieving “effective deterrence,” both Lee and Chen were committed to large-scale force modernization focusing on Taiwan’s air, naval, cruise missile, and missile defense capabilities. The PLA’s steady increase in ballistic missile deployment against Taiwan, acquisition of advanced fighters, and modification of its naval surface and underwater fleet also stimulated Taiwan’s response. During the Lee and Chen administrations, the entirety of Taiwan’s air and naval assets were modernized from a Vietnam War equivalent to pre–Gulf War levels. Taiwan’s aged F-104 and F-5E/F fight- ers were replaced with 130 FCK A/B (FIGHTER CHING-KUO, also known as the Indigenous Defense Fighter, IDF), 60 MIRAGE-2000–5, 150 F-16A/B fighters, and six E-2T and E-2K early warning aircraft. Both air-to-air and air-to-surface capabilities were significantly strengthened by the acquisition of HARPOON antiship missiles, AIM-120 and SKY SWORD II medium-range air-to-air missiles, and the like. In the last few months of the Chen admin- istration, upgraded FCK C/D capable of carrying deep strike missions with indigenous ammunition such as the SKY SWORD II-A high-speed antiradia- tion missile and WAN CHIEN 60-kilometer-range antiairfield missile (both developed and produced by the MND’s Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology, CSIST) was successfully tested and programmed. With the only exception of its small submarine flotilla, Taiwan navy’s entire antiquated YANG-class destroyer fleet was retired and replaced by 6 LA FAYETTE (KANG DING)-class, 8 PERRY (CHENG KUNG)-class, 8 modified KNOX (CHIN YANG)-class frigates, and 4 modified KIDD (KEELUNG)-class destroyers. An advanced supersonic antiship missile, the HSIUNG FENG 3 (also produced by the CSIST), which outperformed any equivalent that the ECFA and Beyond ● 221

PLA possessed, was deployed in 2007. A new type of missile boat, the KUANG HUA VI-class, was also programmed in the same year. Had a special budget for the U.S. arms sale package of 2001 not been boycotted by KMT legislators, Taiwan’s navy could have obtained the first of 8 U.S.-agreed diesel-electric sub- marines by 2010 and could have secured a deal on AEGIS-equipped destroyers that had been under discussions as far back as 2003. 49 Chen paid unprecedented attention to military preparedness and military research and development (R&D) in responding to China’s growing missile arsenal. Chen’s National Security Council (NSC) conducted annual Yu Shan pol-mil exercise starting in 2005. The Yu Shan exercise was designed as cabi- net-wide contingency drill that always began with a simulated surprise missile attack by China. The exercise was intended to help cabinet members acquire the knowledge and develop the skills to deal with a high-pressure military conflict situation. Chen also always personally selected the Director General of the CSIST. Under Chen’s instruction, the CSIST’s development of cruise missile technology was accelerated. In 2007, the first HF-2E unit was com- missioned and the budget for the mass production of HF-2E was programmed. A longer-range version of the missile, the HF-2E BLOCK II (estimated 1,000 kilometers range), was also successfully tested in the last month of the Chen administration.50 In the Lee and Chen era, missile defense was regarded not only as a defensive weapon system but also as a means for jointness under a U.S.-Japan-Taiwan defense pact. In the early 1990s, such a political implication became one of the few issues of Taiwan’s national defense debate to be made public. Three initial PATRIOT missile defense units were programmed in 1992. Although additional PATRIOT purchases were boycotted by the KMT-controlled leg- islature during Chen’s second term, an ultra high-frequency long-range early warning radar—a critical infrastructure for Taiwan’s missile defense—was programmed in 2004. To increase interoperational capability with U.S. forces, Taiwan also programmed a wholesale upgrade of its C 4 ISR system, known as the PO SHENG data link system, in 2001 and 2003. Military coordination between the United States and Taiwan was signifi- cantly improved since Clinton’s Taiwan Policy Review in 1994. The ban on official interaction and exchanges was largely lifted. 51 The range of such coor- dination soon expanded from arms procurement-related matters to so-called “nonhardware programs” that included defense planning, C 4 I, air defense, maritime capability, antisubmarine warfare, logistics, joint force integration, and training. 52 After the missile crisis of 1995–96, in order to have better com- munication and assist Taiwan in modernizing its armed forces, such coordina- tion was further institutionalized and, in the early 2000s, gradually developed as a three-layered framework: The Monterey Talks (at Taiwan’s NSC level), Defense Review Talks and Security Cooperation Talks (both at Taiwan’s MND level), and service talks (many function-specific talks at Taiwan’s service level). The Monterey Talks and Defense Review Talks are the two most important ones in the framework. The Monterey Talks were initially a military-to- military meeting that began in 1996. Since 2001, Taiwan’s NSC took charge 222 ● York W. Chen and the Monterey Talks became a high-level defense dialogue. Its function was further expanded to include security agendas (such as regional security, cross- strait relations, Taiwan’s military preparedness, continuity of government, crit- ical infrastructure protection, and information security), and starting in 2006, Taiwan’s body of participants was enlarged to include policy officials from the NSC, MND, MAC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other interagency delegations including the Ministry of Transportation and Communication, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, the Coast Guard Administration, the National Fire Agency, and the National Police Agency. The leader of Taiwan’s delegation is the deputy secretary general of NSC. At the MND level, the Defense Review Talks (DRT) began in 2001 and replaced the previous talks on arms sales. It is the most concrete coordinating mechanism between the two militaries for four reasons: first, the DRT is posi- tioned as the pivot for the layered framework and comports more substantial supervisory functions. Since it often takes place six months after the Monterey Talks, the DRT translates the conclusions authorized during the Monterey Talks into joint work plans for implementation. Second, the DRT are more defense-focused. The agendas in the DRT include the cross-strait military bal- ance, defense resource allocation, strategic planning, and, the most sensitive aspect, arms sales. Third, the DRT is the only formal and comprehensive occa- sion for Taiwan MND officials (delegation led by vice defense minister) to dis- cuss with their counterparts in the pentagon and exchange with other civilian experts in Washington DC-based think tanks. The delegation often pays a visit to U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii. Finally, if any formal agreement needs to be signed between two militaries, the DRT wills serve as the platform to do so. For example, during the DRT in 2007, both sides signed the groundbreaking Terms of Reference for Information and Communication Technologies Forum, under the joint supervision of Taiwan’s vice defense minister and the U.S. assis- tant secretary of defense. 53

IV. Ma’s Paradigm Shift Ma’s acceptance of the One China principle embedded in so-called 1992 Consensus marks a clear departure from the Lee-Chen Paradigm. However, two modifications prevent it from being a return to the Two-Chiang Paradigm: First, Ma emphasizes the sameness of two sides of the strait: they live at the same place (China) with the same culture and will have the same fate (Chinese). However, he believes that cross-strait relations shall not be regarded as mutual opposition or zero-sum. Both sides, under One China umbrella, can coexist via a tacit understanding of mutual nonrecognition (avoiding the Lee-Chen Paradigm) and mutual nondenial (avoiding the Two-Chiang Paradigm). Second, unlike previous administrations, Ma’s China policy evidently indicates a sense of Taiwan’s inferiority to China, or at least the loss of Taiwan’s advantage vis- à-vis China. Diplomatically, Taiwan needs to consult with China first, as the case of the World Health Assembly has shown, in unlocking its international space. Economically, Taiwan also needs to cooperate with China first, which ECFA and Beyond ● 223 led to the signing of the ECFA, in dealing with increasing regional trade inte- gration. The KMT considered that the openness of Chinese tourists was the cure for Taiwan’s worsening domestic economy. By doing so, the Ma adminis- tration conveys a message to Beijing that the combination of Chinese identity in Taiwan, the acceptance of the One China principle, and Taiwan’s inherent reliance on China’s assistance is creating an environment for the peaceful reso- lution of cross-strait relations that is favorable to China. Such a concept does not come out of the blue. For example, Jiang Yi-huah, Ma’s current interior minister (2009–Present), argued in 2001 that the rise of Taiwanese identity was mainly an issue about Taiwan’s political affiliation, or how to define relations between the ROC and the PRC. Given the ethnic and cultural sameness, Taiwanese identity had nothing to do with building a new state. Jiang said

The issues involved in Taiwan’s identity problems are not those concerning “independence” or “nation-building” in Western nationalism literature. Instead, it should be the issues concerning how Taiwan, as an “actually existing state,” defines itself or how the residents in Taiwan affirm what they belong to. The essence of these issues is the people’s self-understanding about the political com- munity they belong to, not the activities involving large-scale political status change . . . More importantly, such a self-understanding aims at “state,” not “nation.” 54

Ma’s Chinese identity and sense of inferiority were further reinforced by two material referents: Taiwan’s economic reliance on China and the size of the Taiwanese population living in the Mainland. Although Lee and Chen tried to control cross-strait trade volume, Ma believes such efforts have already been proven to be useless and harmful. In 2005, China became the largest export- ing market and the second-largest importer for Taiwan. 55 Compared with a stable trade relation between Taiwan and the United States, the trade volume between Taiwan and China has experienced remarkable growth. For example, according to Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs,56 Taiwan’s exports to the United States saw a 2.95% average growth rate during 2005–10, while Taiwan’s exports to China rose 14.9%. In 2010, trade volume of Taiwan’s export to the United States and China was 31.4 and 76.9 billions U.S. dollars respectively. Also, China became the most popular destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) by Taiwan. In 2005, 70% of Taiwan’s FDI flowed into China.57 F o r some, this tendency shows that Taiwan, at least in terms of economic relation- ships, will be more dependent to China than the United States. 58 As to the size of the Taiwanese population in the Mainland, by 2004, it was found that more than half a million Taiwanese lived there. The number increased to a million in 2005. It was found that 2 million Taiwanese currently live and work there. Such a phenomenon was not caused by material reasons alone. In a focus group research, Lin argued that it was partly because some Mainlanders were very discontented with political development under the Lee and Chen administrations: they were sad about the KMT losing its power in 224 ● York W. Chen

2000 and were also frightened about a deepening process of “de-Sinicization” in Taiwan. In other words, the deeper reasons driving some Mainlander back to China, their cultural motherland, were because they believed that their core values, Chinese identity, once dominant in Taiwan, were now not only abdi- cated to but were also being suppressed by Taiwanese identity. The sense of being politically and culturally marginalized in Taiwan, together with a flour- ishing Chinese economy, inspired them to leave Taiwan and seek their personal development in China, where they preferred to stay as long as they could find acceptable employment.59 The Ma administration is confident that what it regards as a healthy devel- opment in cross-strait relations can ensure China sticks to a peaceful agenda. For example, Kao Lang, one of Ma’s most trusted policy advisors (now the deputy secretary general of the Office of the President [2008–Present]), sug- gested in 2006 that the rise of China would be a peaceful one. China would focus on economic development and had no intention of expanding its sphere of influence or to compete with other powers. Under China’s peaceful rise,

The current “no independence, no war” policy toward Taiwan will be main- tained. As long as Taiwan does not go for de jure independence, Beijing can wait; the separated status will be tolerable. Compared with economic develop- ment, unification is not the priority. However, if Taiwan seeks de jure indepen- dence and declares [its intention] to separate from the Mainland China for good; China’s nationalism will be stirred up, and Beijing leadership will reverse the development priority and use military forces to solve [Taiwan issues].60

Framed by a modified version of Chinese identity dominance and assumed overlapping political affiliations, Taiwan’s national security and defense para- digm in the Ma Ying-jeou era (hereafter referred to as the Ma Paradigm) com- prises the following elements:

1 . V a l u e • Chinese identity prevails. People on both sides of the strait share ethni- cal and sociocultural sameness. Feeling a sense of inferiority, Taiwan’s development will require China’s assistance. • Constitutional One China. Taiwan is part of China, but the jurisdic- tions of the ROC and the PRC, with both claim to represent the whole of China, overlap. Any arrangement of Taiwan’s future will be based on the consensus of Taiwanese. 2 . B e l i e f s • Mainland China represents both a threat and an opportunity. But it is more an opportunity than a threat. Military threats can be moderated or even cancelled by increasing economic interdependence and cultural exchange. • Friendship with the United States must be maintained, but the priority is China first and the United States second in dealing with national security issues and cross-strait relations. ECFA and Beyond ● 225

3 . M e t h o d s • To downplay China’s military threat against Taiwan. • From active defense to fortification defense. • D i p l o m a t i c t r u c e . • U t i l i z a t i o n o f C h i n a ’ s e c o n o m i c r i s e .

Under the Ma Paradigm, Taiwan’s national defense is used not for oppos- ing, balancing, or hedging China’s military buildup. The extent of the mili- tary imbalance across the Taiwan Strait seems irrelevant. “We want sufficient defense capabilities,” as Ma said in a recent address, “so we could have more confidence and willingness to carry on and deepen cross-strait exchange.” 61 Since Taiwan’s national defense, according to Ma Paradigm, serves the purpose of “carrying on and deepening cross-strait exchanges,” one can expect the Ma administration could soon face a dilemma whereby, in Beijing’s view, Taiwan’s total disarming would be the best reward for the current progress of cross-strait relations. In addition to adoption of diplomatic truce that unilaterally gave up any attempts to strengthen Taiwan’s sovereign status via increasing the number of its allies, Ma is seen to be the least enthusiastic commander-in-chief in Taiwan since 1949. Prior to his presidency, it was Ma and Lien Chan (his predeces- sor) as the Chairmen of the KMT (2005–7, his first term) that KMT legis- lators ganged up against the special budget for 2001 arms sales package. It was unprecedented in Taiwan’s history. Chen Zhang-wen, one of Ma’s closest friends, argued that the best way to protect Taiwan’s security was not to spend- ing money for weaponry, but to “treat [China] as a friend and thus reduce his hostility [against us].” Then-Legislator Su Chi (and later became Ma’s first sec- retary general of NSC, 2008–10) fundamentally rejected the concept of “active defense” in the DPP administration and stated openly that the KMT would never consider developing any weapon that could strike Mainland China.62 Su believed that Chen’s “decisive campaign outside the territory” was not only irrelevant for defending Taiwan but also a dangerous idea that might generate further military confrontation between Taiwan and China. Su boycotted the MND budget for the HF-2E production.63 Instead, Su proposed the idea of “Hard ROC” for Ma Ying-jeou during the presidential campaign 2008, which has become the main theme of Taiwan’s military strategy after Ma’s inaugura- tion. Su argued that the imperatives of defending Taiwan was

the capabilities to sustain China’s surprise attack and maintain air superiority in order to deprive China from landing and occupying Taiwan. If China can not ensure its swift victory and create a fait accompli before the U.S. intervention, then China’s incentive of invasion is naturally decreased. 64

Under the idea of “Hard ROC,” Su argued that Taiwan’s arms procurement should be redirected to those items that could contribute to harden Taiwan Island. For Su, rather than big ships and fast planes, he preferred runway repair kit (for maintaining air superiority), sea mines (to deny the enemy’s command 226 ● York W. Chen of the sea), and troop transport helicopters (for rapid force redeployment within Taiwan Island). 65 The concept of “Hard ROC” can be said to be no more than fortification defense—even a relegation of the traditional “defense-in-depth” strategy. 66 China’s military preparedness against Taiwan maintains in a constant prog- ress even after Ma’s inauguration. Ma’s “goodwill” and the signature of the ECFA never affect the PLA’s modernization. The gap of military imbalance across the strait is widening. The ratio of counterair combat strength between China and Taiwan, according the author’s estimation, will further deteriorate to a level of eight-to-one within 10 years. The number of China’s (ballistic and cruise) missiles against Taiwan will soon excess the level of 1,900—the required amount for knocking out some 140 Taiwan’s critical political and military targets. 67 Though verbal advocate of “seeking reduction of Chinese forces targeted at the island,” an observer suggested, “the Ma government remains reluctant to take steps to build up Taiwan’s own forces or to work more closely militarily with the United States.” 68 But this argument is only partly right. The author believes that Ma administration does take many steps in disarming Taiwan’s own forces. Immediately after Ma’s inauguration, rumors concerning the urge of Ma’s NSC to postpone U.S. arms sales to Taiwan was widespread. The cases of upgrading FCK C/D and producing HF-2E were reviewed and nearly can- celled if without protests from the military. Unfortunately, the further refine- ment of HF-2E BLOCK 2 was officially abandoned. NSC-conducted Yu Shan exercise was changed from a defense-oriented exercise to a disaster-relief gam- ing. Ma’s introduction of all-volunteer-force system, which plans to be fully implemented in 2013 or 2015, will consume one-sixth of total defense budget and may lead to a disastrous downsize of armed forces (from the current level of 275,000 strong to 215,000 [official figure] or less 120,000 [the author’s esti- mation]) in the future. 69 Ma administration is currently pushing the legislation to remove the CSIST, the core of Taiwan’s defense R&D, out of the MND organization and converted to an incorporated administrative agency, a nonof- ficial and nonprivate organizational design that the only precedent in Taiwan is National Theater/Concert Hall.

V. Conclusion In tracing the evolution of identity in Taiwan, we find that there seems to be no the Taiwanese identity at all, but many identities and many interpretations compete each other for the dominance in Taiwan. If so, our confidence on the solid foundation of Taiwanese identity may be misplaced. If so, the strait could be possibly “narrowing.” In tracing Two-Chiang, Lee-Chen, and Ma Paradigms concerning Taiwan’s national security and defense, their profound differences in values, beliefs, and methods are also identified. Identity—the definition of the self and the other; friend and enemy—plays a significant role in shaping these differences. Identity is not merely a matter of choice. It must be negoti- ated at different levels with various referents. Its construction takes time. ECFA and Beyond ● 227

While many items in Ma’s Paradigm shift, such as all-volunteer-force sys- tem, removal of the CSIST from the MND organization, or entering politi- cal negotiation with China, wait to be implemented in his next term if he is reelected, some in Ma’s Paradigm shift have already caused remarkable confusion. Besides the failure of the acquisition of 66 new F-16 C/D fighters (in 2011) came as a big blow in Ma’s already weakening security tie with the United States, Taiwan’s determination to defend itself was also doubted. The intensification of cross-strait exchange between the PLA and Taiwan’s retired senior officers in Ma era provides a most recent example. A Taiwan’s retired three-star general at a PLA-hosted event for celebrating Whampoa ethos report- edly said that “from now on, we should no longer separate the ROC Army and the PLA. We are all China’s army.” The public, even the KMT legislators, is shocked and enraged at once. The general fearlessly defends against Ma’s public condemnation, “the government officials or the party politicians are allowed to visit Mainland and express similar views. What made us the exceptions and being condemned as treason?” 70

Notes 1 . T h o m a s S . K u h n , The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 175. 2 . A r n o l d W o l f e r s , Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 150. 3 . F o r e x a m p l e , M a r t h a F i n n e m o r e , National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1996); Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 4 . Matt McDonald, “Constructivism,” in Paul Williams, ed., Security Studies: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 61; Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 18–19. 5 . Lin Chia-lung, “National Identity and Taiwan’s Security,” in Alexander C. Tan, Steve Chan, and Calvin Jillson, eds., Taiwan’s National Security: Dilemmas and Opportunities (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001). 6 . Hsiao Hsin-hung and Yan Jiann-fa, “Taiwan’s New National Identity and Its Impacts on Domestic Party Contention and Cross-Strait Relation,” in Yuan I, ed., Is There a Great China Identity? Security and Economic Dilemma (Taipei: Institute of International Relation, 2007). 7 . For example, Hans Stockton, “National Identity, International Image, and a Security Dilemma: The Case of Taiwan,” in Peter C. Y. Chow, ed., The “One China” Dilemmas (New York: Palgrave 2008), pp. 106–7. 8 . Shellery Rigger, “Competing Conceptions of Taiwan’s Identity,” in Zhao Shi- Sheng, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, the 1995–1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 239. 9 . This definition is adapted from Montserrat Guibernau, The Identity of Nations (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), p. 11. 228 ● York W. Chen

1 0 . M e l i s s a J . B r o w n , Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identity (Berkeley: University of California, 2004), p. 13. 1 1 . I b i d . , p p . 1 4 – 1 5 . 1 2 . L i n M a - l i , We Have Different Bloods: Explaining the Antecedents of Various Ethnic Groups in Taiwan by Scientific Evidences of Blood Types and Genes (Taipei: Avant- garde, 2010), original in Chinese. 1 3 . B r o w n , Is Taiwan Chinese?, pp. 36, 40; Kiyoshi Ito, History of Taiwan, translated in Chinese and English by Walter Chen (Taipei: Avant-garde, 2004), p. 33. 14 . Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, “In Search of a Theory of National Identity,” in Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., China’s Quest for National Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 27–30. 15 . In Zheng’s case, 20,000–25,000 were brought into Taiwan; Taiwan’s population was approximately 100,000 on the eve of Zheng’s invasion. In KMT’s case, esti- mated 1.2 millions followed Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan, Taiwan’s population at the time was 8 millions. However, Zheng’s associates were sent back to mainland China by Qing after 1683. The numbers are quoted from Zhang De-shui, The Origins of Taiwan’s Politics, Ethnicity and Geographical Names (Taipei: Avant-garde, 1996), pp. 85, 88. Original in Chinese. 1 6 . I t o , History of Taiwan , p. 75. 1 7 . C h e n K o n g - l i , A Brief History of Taiwan (Beijing: Jiu Zhou Press, 1996), p. 113. Original in Chinese. 18 . The number is quoted from Zhang, The Origins of Taiwan’s Politics, Ethnicity and Geographical Names , p. 86. 1 9 . I t o , History of Taiwan, p. 217; Tsai Jin-tang, Taiwan under War Regime (Taipei: National Institute for Compilation and Translation, 2006), pp. 115–16. Original in Chinese. 20 . The number is quoted from Peng Lin-song, “Historical Sadness of Taiwanese Veteran,” in Chen Ming-cheng and Zhang Guo-quan, eds., Taiwanese Soldiers: Their Images and Stories (Taipei: Avant-garde, 1997), p. 15. Original in Chinese. 2 1 . C i t e d f r o m I t o , History of Taiwan , p. 247. 22 . The February 28 Incident Research Team, Executive Yuan, Report of February 28 Incident (Taipei: Readingtimes, 1994), pp. 405–12. 23 . The number is cited from Report of February 28 Incident , p. 262. 2 4 . Report of February 28 Incident , p. 6. 2 5 . S h i a u C h y u a n - j e n q , New Mercantilism in Taiwan (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1989), p. 47. Original in Chinese. 26 . York W. Chen, “From Kuomintang Army to National Armed Forces: The Complexities in the Process of Nationalization of Taiwan’s Armed Forces,” in National Cultural Association, ed., Looking back Our Past Path (Taipei: Avant- garde, 2008), pp. 49–50. Original in Chinese. 27 . For example, according to Cheng’s study, the military representatives occupied 19% (in 1973), 20% (in 1979), 18% (in 1981), 15% (in 1984), 13% (in 1986), and 6% (in 1988) of the seats of the KMT Central Standing Committee. See Cheng Hsiao- chih, “The State and the Military: A Framework for Analyzing Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan (1950–1987),” Journal of Social Science and Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1992): 147. Original in Chinese. 28 . For example, military instructors were inserted in high schools and universities for the purposes of primitive military training and monitoring students. See Hung Lu-shun, Mo Ta-hua, and Tuan Fu-chu, “The Evolution of the ROC’s Military- Societal Relations: From Militarized Society to Socialized Military,” in Martin ECFA and Beyond ● 229

Edmonds and Michael Tsai, eds., Defending Taiwan: The Future Vision of Taiwan’s Defense Policy and Military Strategy (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 179–80. 2 9 . D e n n y R o y , Taiwan: A Political History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 134–35. 30 . York W. Chen, “The Evolution and Prospect of Taiwan’s Military Strategy,” in Wang Kao-cheng, ed., The Strategic Future of Taiwan (Taipei: Hwa Young, 2006), pp. 298–308. Original in Chinese. Also, York W. Chen, “The Evolution of Taiwan’s Military Strategy: Convergence and Dissonance,” China Brief , Vol. 9, No. 23 (2009): 8–9. 31 . Cited from Richard C. Bush, Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), p. 40. 3 2 . B u s h , Untying the Knot , p. 40. 33 . Lin Wen-cheng, “President Lee’s Mainland Policy and Its Influence,” in conference proceeding of Twelve Years of President Lee’s Governance and Taiwan’s Achievements (Taipei: Taiwan Research Institute, 2000), pp. 117–18. Original in Chinese. 3 4 . S u C h i , Brinkmanship: From Two-State-Theory to One-Country-on-Each-Side (Taipei: Bookzone, 2003), pp. 11–15. Original in Chinese. 35 . Richard Bush, “Lee Teng-hui and ‘Separatism,’” in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ed., Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 80–81; Roy, Taiwan , p. 214. 36 . Lee Teng-hui, “The Meaning of New Age Taiwanese” (2005). Original in Chinese. See Taiwan Advocates website. http://advo.tw/lee/blog/%E6%96%B0%E6%99%8 2%E4%BB%A3%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%E4%BA%BA%E7%9A%84%E6% B6%B5%E7%BE%A9 3 7 . R o y , Taiwan , p. 221; Su, Brinkmanship , p. 101. 38 . Steven Phillips, “Building a Taiwanese Republic: The Independence Movement, 1945–Present,” in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ed., Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan- China Crisis (New York: Columbia University, 2005), p. 60; Roy, Taiwan , p. 184. 39 . J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan’s Colonial History and Postcolonial Nationalism,” in Peter C. Y. Chow, ed., The “One China” Dilemma (New York: Palgrave, 2008), p. 50. 40 . York W. Chen, “Fragile Partnership: Taiwan’s Pol-Mil Relations, 2000–2008,” paper prepared for the fellowship provided by Henry L. Stimson Center, 2009, p. 43. 4 1 . China Times , March 13, 2007, p. 4; Liberty Times , October 16, 2007, p. 6. Original in Chinese. 4 2 . Liberty Times, March 12, 2007, p. 2. Original in Chinese. 43 . The figures from ROC Ministry of National Defense (MND), National Defense Report (NDR) 1994 , pp. 97, 153–54; ROC MND, NDR 2000 , p. 81; ROC MND, NDR 2002 , p. 104; ROC MND, NDR 2008 , pp. 203–4; ROC MND, ND R 2009 , p. 142; ROC MND, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2009 , p. 52. Original in Chinese. 44 . Terms are cited from Chi Yun-han, “The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Mainland Policy,” in Zhao Shi-Sheng, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, the 1995–1996 Crisis (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 174–75. 45 . Unless indicated otherwise, the following descriptions on Taiwan’s military modernization and increasing military coordination with the United States are based upon the author’s previous works, see Chen, “The Evolution and Prospect of Taiwan’s Military Strategy,” pp. 308–15; “The Evolution of Taiwan’s Military Strategy,” pp. 9–10; “A New Imbalance in the Equation of Military Balance across the Taiwan Strait,” in Peter C. Y. Chow, ed., The “One China” Dilemma (New York: Palgrave, 2008), pp. 281–82. “Taiwan-U.S. Defense and Military 230 ● York W. Chen

Exchange: Framework and Interaction,” in the Conference Proceeding on Obama Administration and the U.S.-China-Taiwan Relations (Taipei: Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, 2011), pp. 2.1–2.9. 4 6 . R O C M N D , NDR 1998 , p. 53. Original in Chinese. 4 7 . R O C M N D , NDR 2000 , p. 64. Original in Chinese. 4 8 . R O C M N D , NDR 2004 , p. 63, Original in Chinese. 4 9 . S h i r l e y A . K a n , Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales since 1990 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), p. 9. 50 . Chang Yen-hsien and Chen Shih-hung, eds., Tsai Ming-hsien and the Safeguard of Taiwan’s National Defense (Taipei: Wu San-lian Taiwan’s History Foundation, 2011), pp. 208–9. Original in Chinese. 5 1 . A l a n R o m b e r g , Rein in at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy toward Taiwan and U.S.-PRC Relations (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), p. 160. 5 2 . U . S . D e p a r t m e n t o f D e f e n s e , Executive Summary of Report to Congress on Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act (2000), p. 2 5 3 . See website of American Institute in Taiwan.http://www.ait.org.tw/uploads/26/30 /26301294955e6a5947817d837d492887/108.pdf 54 . Jiang Yi-huah, “Taiwanese Identity in New Nation State Movement,” in Lin Chia- lung and Zheng Yong-nian, eds., Nationalism and Cross-Strait Relations (Taipei: New Naturalism, 2001), pp. 189–90. Original in Chinese. 5 5 . G a b e T . W a n g , China and the Taiwan Issue: Impending War at Taiwan Strait (Lanham: University Press of America, 2006), p. 111. 56 . Ministry of Economic Affairs, “Export by Key Trading Partners” (2011), see web- site of Ministry of Economic Affairs.http://2k3dmz2.moea.gov.tw/gnweb/English/ Indicator/wFrmEnIndicator.aspx 57 . Kenneth S. Lin, “Cross-Strait Economic Integration and Its Impact on Taiwan Society,” in Yuan I, ed., Is There a Greater China Identity? Security and Economic Dilemma (Taipei: Institution of International Relations, National Chengchi University, 2007), p. 275. 58 . Chen I-shien, “The U.S. Taiwan Alliance under Cross-Strait Relations,” in the Conference Proceeding on Changing Strategic Situation in the East Asia: Opportunities and Challenges (Taipei: Graduate Institution of International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Tamkang University, 2011), p. 66. Original in Chinese. 59 . Lin Ping, “Being Strangers at Home: Mainlander Taiwanese in China,” in Zhang Mao-Gui, ed., Nation and Identity: Perspectives of Some “Waishengren (Mainlanders)” (Taipei: Socio, 2010), pp. 312–14. Original in Chinese. 60 . Ka Lang, “How to Perceive the Rise of China?” Prospect Quarterly , Vol. 7, No. 2 (2006): 85. Original in Chinese. 61 . Ma Ying-jeou’s address on the twentieth anniversary ceremony of the Mainland Affairs Council (January 2011), Original in Chinese. See website of the Office of the President. http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=131&itemid=2336 0&rmid=514. 62 . Quoted from Su Chi’s public statement on September 11, 2007, see http://big5. chinabroadcast.cn/gate/big5/gb.cri.cn/14714/2007/09/12/[email protected]. Original in Chinese. 6 3 . United Daily , June 26, 2004, p. 19. Original in Chinese. 64 . See Su Chi, “Soft Power + Defensive Defense = National Security,” published in United Daily News, January 24, 2006, p. 15. Original in Chinese. 6 5 . Liberty Times, October 20, 2007, p. 3. Original in Chinese. ECFA and Beyond ● 231

66 . Chen, “The Evolution of Taiwan’s Military Strategy,” p. 10. 67 . York W. Chen, “Taiwan’s Armed Forces at 2020: Military Challenges and Organizational Response,” Taiwan International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2010): 119, 122. Original in Chinese. 68 . Robert Sutter, “Taiwan Future: Narrowing Straits,” NBR Analysis, May 2011, p. 14. 69 . For the details of following description, see York W. Chen, “Immediate Challenges for Taiwan’s National Defense,” Strategy: Taiwan’s National Security Policy Review , No. 1 (2008): 116–31. Original in Chinese. 7 0 . United Daily , June 9, 2011, p. 2. Original in Chinese.