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December 2018 by General Philip Breedlove and Ambassador Alexander Vershbow

In September 2018, the established a Task Force on US Force Posture in Europe to assess the adequacy of current US de- ployments, with a focus on North Central Europe. The Task Force is co-chaired by General Philip Breedlove, former supreme allied com- mander Europe, and Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, former NATO deputy secretary general. A full report will be completed in January 2019. This paper is a summary of the task force’s conclusions and recommendations.

The force-posture recommendations have been approved by the two co-chairs as the appropriate response to the current and projected mil- itary and geopolitical situation in North Central Europe. All recommen- dations have been endorsed by the other members of the task force as steps that would strengthen the US posture in the region, in order to bolster NATO deterrence and political cohesion.

The Issue North Central Europe has become the central point of confrontation between the West and a revisionist . Under President , Russia is determined to roll back the post-Cold War settlement— to thwart US-led efforts to build a Europe whole, free, and at peace, The Scowcroft Center for and to undermine the rules-based order that has kept Europe secure Strategy and Security since the end of World War II. Moscow’s invasion and continued oc- brings together top policymakers, government cupation of Georgian and Ukrainian territories, its military build-up in and military officials, business Russia’s Western Military District and Kaliningrad, and its “hybrid” war- leaders, and experts from fare against Western societies have heightened instability in the region, Europe and North America and have made collective defense and deterrence an urgent mission for to share insights, strengthen the and NATO. cooperation, and develop common approaches to key transatlantic security challenges. To strengthen deterrence and effectively defend against Russian ag- gression, the United States and NATO have taken significant steps PREVIEW Permanent Deterrence: Enhancements to the Military Presence in North Central Europe

The Need for Enhanced Deterrence since 2014 to enhance their force posture and respond to provocative Russian behavior. US efforts included Over the past four years, the United States, together rotating an armored brigade combat team (BCT) to with its NATO allies, has taken important steps to bol- Europe in “heel-to-toe” rotations every nine months, ster the level of deterrence needed to counter an in- and prepositioning equipment for a second BCT that creasingly aggressive Russia. As a result of the 2014 would deploy from the United States in a crisis. NATO Wales Summit, the Alliance adopted the Readiness efforts included deploying battalion-seized battle Action Plan, which called for the creation of a Very groups to each of the Baltic states and through High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and expansion its enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) initiative; the of the NATO Response Force (NRF) to increase the United States leads the NATO eFP battalion based in Alliance’s capacity to reinforce any ally under threat. northeastern Poland, near the Suwalki Corridor. The United States simultaneously launched the Despite these and other US and NATO efforts, the European Reassurance Initiative (now called the allies in North Central Europe face a formidable and European Deterrence Initiative), which has financed, evolving adversary, and it is unlikely that Russian ef- among other things, a “heel-to-toe” rotation to Europe forts to threaten and intimidate these nations will end of an armored BCT, which exercises with allied forces in the near term. The US military presence in the region from the Baltics to the Black Sea, and prepositioned is predominantly rotational, which offers both geopo- equipment to fill out an additional armored BCT. litical and operational advantages and disadvantages. Looking forward, assessing whether the United States NATO’s “existential deterrence” created by the Wales should transition to a more permanent deterrence Summit initiatives relied heavily on the existence of posture in the region, one that features a mix of per- these relatively small spearhead units. This limited rap- manent and rotational capabilities, has become timely id-reaction capability was judged to be insufficient to and urgent. deter Russian aggression, whether large-scale conven- tional attack or a scenario involving ambiguous “hy- It was against this backdrop that the Republic of Poland brid” methods, such as those Moscow demonstrated in submitted a proposal earlier this year offering $2 billion Crimea and eastern . to support a permanent US base in the country. The offer underscored Poland’s commitment to contribute At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, the Alliance took the to regional stability, burden sharing, and making the next step in building deterrence by agreeing to de- concept cost-effective for the US government. Still, the ploy four multinational NATO battle groups of about issue of an enhanced US presence in Europe is broader 1,200 troops in each of the Baltic states and Poland. than Poland; it is fundamentally about NATO and de- This enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) adds a more fending all of Europe. Any decision about an enhanced effective element of “deterrence by trip wire,” making US presence in Poland would have serious implications clear to Russia that any aggression would be met im- for the region, and for the Alliance as a whole. mediately—not just by local forces, but by forces from across the Alliance. However, while the NATO battle The US Congress has expressed high interest in groups and the US rotational brigade combat team this Polish concept and, in the National Defense both have warfighting capabilities, they lack a compre- Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019, tasked hensive and coordinated battle plan between NATO the US Department of Defense with producing a re- and the United States, as well as adequate enablers— port on the feasibility and advisability of establishing including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais- a more permanent presence in Poland, due March 1, sance assets; air and ; and long-range 2019. fires. A determined Russian conventional attack, espe- cially if mounted with little warning, could defeat these As underscored at the September 2018 summit be- forward-deployed NATO and US forces in a relatively tween US President Donald Trump and Polish President short period of time, before reinforcements could be Andrzej Duda, the US government is carefully consid- brought to bear. Deterrence rests on the certainty that ering the Polish offer and exploring concrete options. NATO would respond to an attack quickly, because However, the discussions could significantly benefit allied soldiers would be killed in the attack. Yet, con- from an independent perspective outside the US gov- cerns have grown that a quick Russian land grab might ernment. That is the goal of this Atlantic Council Task present the Alliance with a fait accompli, dividing the Force, established to consider the broader political and Alliance and paralyzing decision-making before rein- military implications of an enhanced US presence in forcements could arrive. Poland and the wider North Central European region.

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To ameliorate this problem, NATO sought at the 2018 the wider region could bolster deterrence and rein- Brussels Summit to shorten the period of time that it force Alliance cohesion, while avoiding a divisive de- would take for substantial forces to reinforce North bate on whether such deployments are consistent with Central Europe in time of war. The NATO Readiness the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. Initiative, the so-called “Four 30s” plan, would desig- nate thirty ground battalions, thirty air squadrons, and In 1997, seeking to reassure Russia that NATO enlarge- thirty major naval combatants to be ready to deploy ment would not pose a military threat to it, allies agreed and engage an adversary within thirty days. Other steps that “in the current and foreseeable security environ- were taken to bolster the NATO Command Structure ment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and reduce mobility problems through Europe. This and other missions by ensuring the necessary interop- effort has promised to further strengthen the credibil- erability, integration, and capability for reinforcement ity of NATO’s deterrence and improve the defense of rather than by additional permanent stationing of sub- NATO’s eastern frontier, creating what might be called stantial combat forces.” The Alliance has not explicitly “deterrence by rapid reinforcement.” renounced the Founding Act, despite Russia’s repeated violations of its commitments under that agreement. Notwithstanding this progress, the Alliance’s deter- Allies have deployed the eFP battlegroups and other rence posture could be improved further. Even after enhancements to NATO’s deterrence posture, on the the “Four 30s” Readiness Initiative has been imple- understanding that “additional permanent stationing” mented, the thirty-day gap between an initial attack on of forces up to the level of a brigade per country is the Alliance and the time when major reinforcements consistent with any reasonable definition of the limits arrive would be significant. Closing this gap would rely implied by “substantial combat forces.”2 heavily on airpower to prevent or slow advances by enemy ground forces until allied reinforcements could With a view to maintaining the current allied consen- arrive. But, deterrence may still lack credibility. A 2018 sus, the task force began by establishing a set of eight RAND report concluded: principles that should guide deployments of US forces to Eastern and North Central Europe. Then, the task In the event of a ground attack on a NATO mem- force designed a set of proposed additional US de- ber in the Baltic region, Russia would have a sub- ployments consistent with those principles. stantial time-distance advantage in the initial days and weeks of its ground campaign because Principles for Enhanced Deterrence of its strong starting position and ability to rein- force with ground and air units from elsewhere in In considering the proposed forward deployment of Russia.1 additional US military forces into Eastern and North Central Europe, the United States should be guided by Additional steps can, and should, be taken to reduce the following principles. this thirty-day readiness gap and enhance US and NATO capacity to deter, defend, and, if necessary, re- The deployment should take Alliance territory. • enhance the United States’ and NATO’s deterrent Striking the Right Balance posture for the broader region, not just for the na- tion hosting the US deployment, including strength- The members of the task force believe that significant ening readiness and capacity for reinforcement; enhancements to the existing US presence could be • reinforce NATO cohesion; undertaken, while maintaining the framework of deter- rence by rapid reinforcement reaffirmed by allied lead- • promote stability with respect to Russian military ers at their 2018 summit. A carefully calibrated mix of deployments; permanent and rotational deployments in Poland and

1 Scott Boston, Michael Johnson, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Yvonne K. Crane, Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Eu- rope Implications for Countering Russian Local Superiority (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/ RR2402.html. 2 The United States and NATO, in order to maintain flexibility, never agreed to a precise definition of “substantial combat forces” (SCF). How- ever, during NATO deliberations on an enhanced Forward Presence in 2016, they referred to Russian proposals during negotiations in the late 1990s on the Adapted CFE Treaty as providing a reasonable benchmark. In those negotiations, Russia sought to set a limit of one army brigade per country as the definition of SCF. See William Alberque,“Substantial Combat Forces” in the Context of NATO-Russia Relations (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2016), http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=962.

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• be consistent with the US National Defense Strategy and its concept of “dynamic force employment;”3 NATO eFP Battle Groups, and do so while maintaining NATO cohesion. • include increased naval and air deployments in the region, alongside additional ground forces and Specifically, the task force recommends the following enablers; changes. • promote training and operational readiness of US deployed forces and interoperability with host-na- tion and other allied forces; Headquarters • Upgrade the existing US Mission Command Element • ensure maximum operational flexibility to employ in Poznan to a US Division HQ to serve as the hub US deployed forces to other regions of the Alliance for ensuring the mobility and rapid flow of US rein- and globally; forcements from Europe and CONUS to Poland and • expand opportunities for allied burden-sharing, in- the Baltic states in time of crisis. Make the HQ a per- cluding multilateral deployments in the region and manent deployment without dependents. Maintain beyond; and close coordination between this HQ and MNC-NE (Szczecin) and MND-NE (Elblag). • ensure adequate host-nation support for US deployments.

In addition, US and NATO decisions should be made in Ground Forces a way that strengthens the foundation of shared values • Commit to maintaining a continuous rotational pres- and interests on which the Alliance rests. ence of one BCT in Poland centered at Żagań, along the Polish-German border, with some elements Possible Enhancements to US Force deploying for exercises throughout North Central Posture in North Central Europe Europe and, as necessary, to other regions. This might be called a “continuous rotational presence The following enhancements to the current US force based at a permanent installation.” posture would be consistent with the eight principles articulated above. Many of the recommended en- o The US rotational armored BCT currently oper- hancements would take place in Poland, because its ates out of several training sites near Żagań. US size and geographic location make it a key staging troops are housed in Polish barracks, or some- area for most NATO efforts to defend allied territory times in tents. The Polish government has indi- in the three Baltic states. These enhancements would cated a willingness to upgrade these facilities if largely build on the significant US capabilities already the United States plans to stay. With a US commit- deployed in Poland (see Appendix 1) and could be ment to a continuous rotational presence of one complemented by capabilities from other NATO allies. reinforced BCT, the Polish government should un- dertake providing the funds needed to upgrade Recommended enablers would also strengthen the and expand these facilities and, more importantly, ability of US forces currently deployed in Poland to to modernize and expand associated training ar- defend themselves. The recommendations would not eas to meet US standards. The upgraded training move currently deployed US forces from the territory facilities should be made available for both allied of another NATO ally to Poland. and US use.

The package would make certain elements of the cur- o Under the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), rent US deployment in Poland permanent, strengthen the United States will enlarge the at other elements of that deployment by reinforcing Powidz, build up railheads to offload equipment, the BCT deployed there with various enablers, as- build a prepositioning site to store a brigade set sign another BCT on a permanent or rotational basis by 2023, create new fuel-storage sites, and build to , reinforce the impact of US forces on de- new ammunition-storage sites. As part of a pack- fense and deterrence for the Baltic states, where US age of enhancements, the United States should presence has been limited since the deployment of the accelerate these plans as much as possible.

3 Dynamic force employment is an effort to prepare the US military to transition from a focus on fighting terrorist groups to a possible great-power conflict with about the same force size. It calls for greater agility, more lethality, less operational predictability, higher read- iness, irregular deployments, and maximum surge capacity. See Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strate- gy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), p. 7, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/ pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.

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• Commit to maintaining the US lead for the NATO amphibious operations, and counter-A2AD (anti-ac- eFP Battle Group at Orzysz, near the Suwalki Gap, cess/area denial). for the indefinite future. (The Battle Group currently consists of about five hundred and fifty US soldiers Missile Defense from an armored unit, together with troops and equipment from , Poland, , and the • Recommit to the NATO Aegis Ashore missile-de- UK.) fense site at Redzikowo, which is already considered a permanent site. • Deploy a new armored BCT to Germany on a perma- nent or rotational basis, and deploy one battalion of that BCT to Poland and one to the Baltic states on a NATO Coordination and Multinational Participation regular basis for training/exercises. • As the plans for enhanced US deployments develop, • Deploy some of the short-range air-defense units there should be close consultations and full transpar- and rocket-artillery units now slated for stationing in ency with NATO allies. While these are US bilateral Germany (to be completed by 2020) to Poland on a efforts, they affect the security interests of all allies rotational basis. and need to be compatible with NATO decisions. • Station a mid-range air-defense capability in Poland • It should be stressed that the enhanced deploy- to protect US forces, to train with Polish Patriot ments would not exceed the agreed understand- units, and to reinforce the Baltic states in a crisis. ing of “substantial combat forces” mentioned in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, since the deployment • Station enablers such as intelligence, surveillance, remains a reinforced brigade plus some enablers. and reconnaissance (ISR) and engineers in Poland While the division HQ might be in Poland, most of on a continuous basis. the division itself would not be deployed there. • The supreme allied commander Europe (SACEUR) Special Operations Forces (SOF) should develop plans to transfer authority over US • Make the 10th Special Forces Group near Kraków a European Command (EUCOM) forces in Poland to permanent platform for training Polish SOF, and ex- NATO command in the event of an emerging Article pand the group to support US SOF training in the 5 situation, and should be delegated standing au- Baltic states in tandem with Polish SOF. thority to prepare and stage those forces by the . • The United States should seek a few European part- Aviation ners to participate beyond their contributions to the • Establish a new HQ for one Combat Aviation Brigade US-led NATO eFP battle group in Poland. (CAB) in Poland to support a rotational CAB for training missions throughout the region. o Allies could contribute in several ways: increased rotational presence (e.g., the UK, Germany, or an- • Enlarge and make permanent the US aviation de- other ally could deploy forces with the current US tachment at Łask to facilitate rotational de- rotational BCT), deployment of enablers, deploy- ployments of US fighter and cargo aircraft, as well ment of SOF units, and deployment of their own as possible aviation deployments by other allies. aviation and naval detachments to support exer- • Make permanent the US aviation detachment at cises and training. Mirosławiec Air Base in support of the squadron of US MQ-9 reconnaissance drones. o NATO should be encouraged to create an air-op- • Commit to a higher level of US exercises in erations HQ at Powidz Air Base. the region.

Funding of New Infrastructure and Long-term Naval Sustainment • Establish a new, small naval detachment in Gdynia, • While some of the deployments and facilities pro- Poland, to facilitate more frequent US Navy visits to posed above will be funded by the US EDI or the Poland and to other Baltic Sea ports. NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP), the United States should look to Poland and other host • Home-port US destroyers in , with continu- nations to shoulder a share of the burden—both up- ous patrols in the Baltic Sea and port visits to allied front construction costs and long-term sustainment. ports in the region. The mission might include an- ti-submarine warfare, maritime domain awareness,

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Conclusion o The Polish offer of $2 billion is a good start- ing point and, as noted above, could be used to Measures along the lines proposed by the task force construct more permanent facilities for the US would build on the existing US presence in Poland, rotational BCT and upgrade associated training strengthen deterrence for the wider region, and pro- facilities to US standards. The overall cost of the mote greater burden-sharing among allies. While required construction, however, is likely to exceed adding important military capabilities and increasing $2 billion. NATO’s capacity for rapid reinforcement, the scale of the proposed measures should remain within the o Poland could also fund some, or all, of the cost NATO consensus, thereby ensuring continued NATO of facilities for the proposed division headquar- cohesion and solidarity. The task force strongly recom- ters and naval detachment, the Combat Aviation mends that the United States, Poland, and the rest of Brigade HQ, the MQ-9 squadron, and the rotating the Alliance move forward on this basis. mid-level air-defense unit. Appendix 1: Current US Force Posture in Poland o , , and could help fund new facilities or sustainment costs associated with in- Appendix 2: US Force Posture in Europe by the creased US-led SOF training and other rotational Numbers deployments in the Baltic states. Appendix 3: Index of Acronyms • This would mirror the host-nation support provided by other US allies in Europe and Northeast Asia.

Members of the Atlantic Council Posture Task Force

• General Philip Breedlove (Ret.), is a board direc- • Ambassador Paula Dobriansky, former undersec- tor at the Atlantic Council. Previously, he served retary of state for democracy and global affairs as commander of US European Command and NATO’s supreme allied commander Europe. Prior • Dr. Evelyn Farkas, former deputy assistant secre- to that, he commanded US Air Forces in Europe tary of defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia and Africa and NATO . • Ambassador Daniel Fried, former assistant • Ambassador Alexander Vershbow (Ret.), is a secretary of state for Europe and Eurasia distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. Previously, he served as deputy secretary general • Mr. Robert Nurick, senior fellow, Atlantic Council of NATO, US assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, as well as US ambas- • Mr. Barry Pavel, former senior director for de- sador to NATO, the Russian Federation, and the fense policy and strategy, US National Security Republic of Korea. Council

• Ms. Lauren Speranza, deputy director, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Atlantic Council • Mr. Ian Brzezinski, former deputy assistant (rapporteur) secretary of defense for Europe and NATO Policy (project director) • Mr. Jim Townsend, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy • Dr. Hans Binnendijk, former senior director for defense policy and arms control, US National • Mr. Damon Wilson, former senior director for Security Council European affairs, US National Security Council

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Appendix 2: US Force Posture in Europe by the Numbers

Baltics

Country / Key Total Troops Capabilities Rotational Permanent

Poland 1 armored BCT (15+ Paladins, 85+ Army aviation detachment—8 Black ~4,400 Abrams, 130+ AFVs)1 Hawks, 4 Apaches4 1 eFP armored battalion2 Operation Atlantic Resolve Mission Transportation battalion and combat Command Element5 service-support unit3 Special Forces Group detachment

Personnel at NATO Force Integration Unit6 Aegis Ashore missile-defense facility Personnel at NATO MNC NE and MND NE (ready 2020) 2 aviation-support detachments for ISR Prepositioned brigade-level armor and and Air Force flights7 artillery (ready 2021)8

Central / Eastern Europe

Country / Key Total Troops Capabilities Rotational Permanent

Bulgaria 2 armored cavalry companies9 ~300

Hungary 1 armored cavalry company10 ~100

Kosovo 1 infantry battalion11 1 helicopter fleet—UH-60 Black Hawks12 ~675

Romania 1 armored cavalry battalion13 1 Army aviation detachment—8 Black ~1,000 Black Sea rotational force14 Hawks15 1 engineer battalion16

Aegis Ashore missile-defense facility17

Ukraine 1 armored cavalry detachment18 ~300

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Western Europe /

Country / Key Total Troops Capabilities Rotational Permanent

Belgium Strategic signals battalion19 Prepositioned brigade-level sustainment ~900 equipment20

Germany 2 armored cavalry battalions21 1 combat aviation brigade22 ~37,500 1 cavalry regiment23 US Army Europe 1 infantry battalion24 1 theater logistics command29 30 1 combat aviation brigade25 1 signals brigade 31 1 special-forces battalion26 1 military-intelligence brigade 1 missile-defense command32 1 fighter wing—28 F-16s27 28 Prepositioned munitions center—25,000 tons 1 airlift wing—14 C130s and 400 vehicles EUCOM

Greece MQ-9 Reaper drones33 ~400 Naval support facility

Italy 1 airborne brigade combat team34 Southern European task force HQ ~12,000 1 fighter wing—21 F-16s35 US Navy Europe HQ 1 ASW squadron—4 P-8A Poseidons36

Netherlands Prepositioned (M1 Abrams tanks, M109 Paladins, and ~400 field-support-brigade equipment additional armored and support vehicles)37

Norway Marine Rotational Force—700 ~700 Marines38

NALMEB prepositioned equipment and 30 days’ supply for a Marine expeditionary brigade39

Spain Naval station Rota USMC SPMAGTF—crisis-response unit40 ~3,200 4 US Navy destroyers

Turkey 1 attack squadron—12 A-10 1 ELINT fleet—EP3 Aries II44 ~2,700 Thunderbolts41 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar station45 1 tanker squadron—14 KC-135s42 1 CISR squadron—MQ-1B Predator43

United 1 fighter wing—47 F-15s46 1 special-operations group—8 CV-22 Kingdom 1 ISR squadron—OC-135s47 Ospreys and 8 MC-130s49 ~8,300 1 tanker wing—15 KC-135s48 1 early warning and spacetrack radar facility

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Notes 1. US Army Europe Public Affairs, “Atlantic Resolve Armored Rotation 21. US Army Europe Public Affairs, “Atlantic Resolve Armored Rotation Fact Sheet,” July 19, 2008, http://www.eur.army.mil/Portals/19/ Fact Sheet.” Fact%20Sheets/Armored%20Rotation%20Fact%20Sheet. pdf?ver=2018-06-22-114238-593. 22. Hoskins, “4ID Transfers Authority of Atlantic Resolve Mission Command Element to 1ID.” 2. Sgt. Sarah Kirby, “U.S. Army Maj. Gen. John Gronski Visits Battle Group Poland,” US Army Public Affairs Office, 23. “2nd Cavalry Regiment,” US Army, https://www.army.mil/2cr. November 2, 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/213325/ 24. “The 173rd Airborne Brigade History,” 173rd Airborne Brigade, us_army_maj_gen_john_gronski_visits_battle_group_poland. https://www.skysoldiers.army.mil/About-Us/Our-History/.

3. Kelby Wingert, “49th Transportation Cases Colors for OAR 25. “12th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) and Mission Partners,” USAG Poland Deployment,” Fort Hood Sentinel, August 9, 2018, Ansbach, http://www.ansbach.army.mil/12CAB.html. http://www.forthoodsentinel.com/news/th-transporta- tion-cases-colors-for-oar-poland-deployment/article_332ed- 26. “U.S. Special Operations Command Europe,” DVIDS, https://www. f9c-9b24-11e8-9e35-c352686cbdec.html. dvidshub.net/unit/SOCEUR.

4. Joshua L. Wick, “Quick Facts: Aviation Brigade Rotations in 27. “,” Air Base, January 30, 2018, Europe,” US Army, June 20, 2018, http://www.eur.army.mil/ https://www.spangdahlem.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/ Portals/19/Infographics/Aviation%20Rotation%20Infographic. Article/293554/52nd-fighter-wing/. pdf?ver=2018-07-10-030945-860. 28. “,” , June 20, 2013, 5. “NFIU Poland,” NATO Allied Joint Force Command, https://jfcbs. https://www.ramstein.af.mil/About/Fact-Sheets/Display/ .int/page5725819/nato-force-integration-units/nfiu-poland. Article/303604/86th-airlift-wing/.

6. Dan Stoutamire, “Small Air Force Detachment Playing Pivotal Role in 29. 21st Theater Sustainment Command, http://www.21tsc.army.mil/. New ‘Center of Gravity’ Poland,” Stars and Stripes, July 7, 2017, https:// www.stripes.com/news/europe/small-air-force-detachment-play- 30. “About Us,” 2nd Signal Brigade. ing-pivotal-role-in-new-center-of-gravity-poland-1.477100. 31. “Welcome to the 66th MI Brigade Public Web Site,” 66th Military 7. Master Sgt. Nathan Hoskins, “4ID Transfers Authority of Atlantic Intelligence Brigade, last updated July 26, 2018, www.inscom.army. Resolve Mission Command Element to 1ID,” DVIDS, February 28, mil/MSC/66MIB/index.html. 2018, https://www.dvidshub.net/news/267562/4id-transfers-au- 32. “About Us,” 10th Army and Missile Defense Command, http://ww- thority-atlantic-resolve-mission-command-element-1id. w.10thaamdc.army.mil/.

8. Dan Stoutamire, “Army to Move Brigade’s Worth of Firepower to 33. Nancy A. Youssef, “U.S. Eyes Military Expansion in Amid Poland,” Stars and Stripes, April 26, 2017, https://www.military.com/ Strains with Turkey,” Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2018, https:// daily-news/2017/04/26/army-to-move-brigades-worth-of-fire- www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-military-looks-toward-greece-amid- power-into-poland.html. strains-with-turkey-1536696318.

9. “About Us,” 2nd Signal Brigade, http://www.2sigbde.army.mil/ 34. “The 173rd Airborne Brigade History,” 173rd Airborne Brigade. About-Us/Units/39th-SSB/. 35. “Europe,” The Military Balance 2018 (Washington DC: International 10. US Army Europe Public Affairs, “Atlantic Resolve Armored Rotation Institute for Strategic Studies), p. 122, https://www.iiss.org/ Fact Sheet.” publications/the-military-balance/the-military-balance-2018/ 11. Ibid. mb2018-04-europe.

12. Staff Sgt. David Overson, “JMRC Prepares Units for Kosovo Mission,” 36. Ibid. US Army, March 8, 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/201778/ 37. Sgt. 1st Class Jacob McDonald, “Prepositioned Equipment jmrc_prepares_units_for_kosovo_mission. Site Officially Opens in ,” US Army, 13. Spc. Jarel Chugg, “3-61 Cav Assumes New Role in Kosovo,” Fort December 16, 2016, https://www.army.mil/article/179831/ Carson Mountaineer, March 22, 2018, http://www.fortcarsonmoun- prepositioned_equipment_site_officially_opens_in_netherlands. taineer.com/2018/03/3-61-cav-assumes-new-role-in-kosovo/ 38. Ryan Browne, “US to Double Number of Marines in 14. US Army Europe Public Affairs, “Atlantic Resolve Armored Rotation Amid Russia Tensions,” CNN, June 12, 2018, https://www.cnn. Fact Sheet.” com/2018/06/12/politics/us-marines-norway-russia-tensions/in- dex.html. 15. “Black Sea Rotational Force,” DVIDS, https://www.dvidshub.net/ feature/BlackSeaRotationalForce. 39. “Marines May Move Even More Combat Gear to Norway,” Military.com, June 16, 2017, https://www.military.com/defensetech/2017/06/16/ 16. Wick, “Quick Facts: Aviation Brigade Rotations in Europe.” marines-combat-gear-norwegian-caves.

17. Staff Sgt. Matthew Keeler, “Romanian, U.S. Army Engineers Celebrate 40. “Europe,” The Military Balance 2018, p. 152. Four Years of Combined Construction Efforts,” US Army, July 20, 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/208827/romanian_us_army_ 41. Ibid. engineers_celebrate_four_years_of_combined_construction_ef- 42. Ibid. forts. 43. Ibid. 18. US Naval Forces Europe-Africa, http://www.c6f.navy.mil/tags/ deveselu. 44. Ibid.

19. “Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine,” 7th Army Training 45. Ibid. Command, http://www.7atc.army.mil/JMTGU/. 46. “Europe,” The Military Balance 2018, p. 165. 20. Rabia Coombs, “APS-2 Zutendaal Talks Support Equipment with Land Support Section,” US Army, September 10, 2018, 47. Ibid. https://www.army.mil/article/210936/aps_2_zutendaal_talks_sup- 48. Ibid. port_equipment_with_belgium_land_system_section. 49. Ibid.

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Appendix 3: Index of Acronyms HQ—Headquarters A2AD—Anti-access/area denial ISR—Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ABCT—Armored brigade combat team MNC-NE—Multinational Corps Northeast AFV—Armored fighting vehicle MND-NE—Multinational Division Northeast AN/TPY-2—Army Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance NALMEB—Norway Air-Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade ASW—Anti-submarine warfare NDAA—National Defense Authorization Act BCT—Brigade combat team NRF – NATO Response Force CAB—Combat aviation brigade NSIP—NATO Security Investment Program CISR—Combat intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance SACEUR—Supreme allied commander Europe

CONUS—Continental United States SOF—Special operations forces

EDI—European Deterrence Initiative SPMAGTF—Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force eFP—enhanced Forward Presence USMC—United States Marine Corps ELINT—Electronic intelligence VJTF—Very High Readiness Joint Task Force EUCOM—European Command

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 11 PREVIEW Permanent Deterrence: Enhancements to the Military Presence in North Central Europe

Notes

12 ATLANTIC COUNCIL PREVIEW Permanent Deterrence: Enhancements to the Military Presence in North Central Europe

Notes

ATLANTIC COUNCIL 13 Atlantic Council Board of Directors Board of Directors

INTERIM CHAIRMAN Melanie Chen *C. Jeffrey Knittel Kris Singh *James L. Jones, Michael Chertoff Franklin D. Kramer Christopher Smith CHAIRMAN EMERITUS *George Chopivsky Laura Lane James G. Stavridis Brent Scowcroft Wesley K. Clark Richard L. Lawson Richard J.A. Steele David W. Craig *Jan M. Lodal Paula Stern PRESIDENT AND CEO Helima Croft Robert J. Stevens *Frederick Kempe Ralph D. Crosby, Jr. *Jane Holl Lute Robert L. Stout, Jr. EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRS Nelson W. Cunningham William J. Lynn *Ellen O. Tauscher *Adrienne Arsht Ivo H. Daalder Wendy W. Makins Nathan D. Tibbits *Stephen J. Hadley *Ankit N. Desai Zaza Mamulaishvili Frances M. Townsend *Paula J. Dobriansky Mian M. Mansha Clyde C. Tuggle VICE CHAIRS Thomas J. Egan, Jr. Gerardo Mato Melanne Verveer *Robert J. Abernethy *Stuart E. Eizenstat William E. Mayer Charles F. Wald *Richard W. Edelman Thomas R. Eldridge Timothy McBride Michael F. Walsh *C. Boyden Gray *Alan H. Fleischmann John M. McHugh Maciej Witucki *Alexander V. Mirtchey Jendayi E. Frazer H.R. McMaster Neal S. Wolin * A. Mulberger Ronald M. Freeman Eric D.K. Melby Guang Yang *W. DeVier Pierson Courtney Geduldig Franklin C. Miller Mary C. Yates *John J. Studzinski *Robert S. Gelbard *Judith A. Miller Dov S. Zakheim TREASURER Gianni Di Giovanni Susan Molinari HONORARY DIRECTORS *George Lund Thomas H. Glocer Michael J. Morell James A. Baker, III Murathan Günal Richard Morningstar SECRETARY Harold Brown John B. Goodman Edward J. Newberry *Walter B. Slocombe Ashton B. Carter *Sherri W. Goodman Thomas R. Nides DIRECTORS Robert M. Gates Amir A. Handjani Franco Nuschese Stéphane Abrial Michael G. Mullen Katie Harbath Joseph S. Nye Odeh Aburdene Leon E. Panetta John D. Harris, II Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg *Peter Ackerman William J. Perry Frank Haun Ahmet M. Oren Timothy D. Adams Colin L. Powell Michael V. Hayden Sally A. Painter Bertrand-Marc Allen Condoleezza Rice Brian C. McK. Henderson *Ana I. Palacio *Michael Andersson George P. Shultz Annette Heuser Carlos Pascual David D. Aufhauser Horst Teltschik Amos Hochstein Alan Pellegrini Matthew C. Bernstein John W. Warner Ed Holland David H. Petraeus *Rafic A. Bizri William H. Webster *Karl V. Hopkins Thomas R. Pickering Dennis C. Blair Robert D. Hormats Daniel B. Poneman Thomas L. Blair *Executive Committee Members Mary L. Howell Dina H. Powell Philip M. Breedlove Ian Ihnatowycz Arnold L. Punaro List as of October 26, 2018 Reuben E. Brigety II Wolfgang F. Ischinger Robert Rangel Myron Brilliant Deborah Lee James Thomas J. Ridge *Esther Brimmer Reuben Jeffery, III Michael J. Rogers Reza Bundy Joia M. Johnson Charles O. Rossotti R. Nicholas Burns Stephen R. Kappes Robert O. Rowland *Richard R. Burt *Maria Pica Karp Harry Sachinis Michael Calvey Andre Kelleners Rajiv Shah James E. Cartwright Sean Kevelighan Stephen Shapiro John E. Chapoton Henry A. Kissinger Wendy Sherman Ahmed Charai

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