1 A critical review and fairly comprehensive refutation of “Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism” by Timothy A. Stratton
GUILLAUME BIGNON Association Axiome December 2020.
In Human Freedom, Divine Knowledge, and Mere Molinism, Tim Stratton aims to defend the Molinist view of divine providence, which seeks to reconcile God’s sovereignty and human freedom by affirming that: 1. humans have “libertarian” free will, and 2. God is nevertheless in providential control of everything that happens, in virtue of his having “middle-knowledge.” The first affirmation is the thesis of “libertarianism,” according to which human free will is incompatible with determinism and humans are making at least some free choices, from which it follows that determinism is false. The second one is the thesis of “middle-knowledge,” according to which God knows from all eternity what any possible human would freely do (again, in a libertarian sense) in any possible set of circumstances in which God might place them. This thesis was famously articulated by the Spanish Jesuit Luis de Molina, hence the name of the view: “Molinism.” As the subtitle of the book indicates, Stratton covers a lot of ground as he aims to offer “a Biblical, Historical, Theological, and Philosophical Analysis” of the topic. The book was published in October 2020 by Wipf & Stock publishers, and is the book adaptation of Tim Stratton’s doctoral dissertation.
EVALUATION Let’s go straight to the point: my assessment is extremely negative. Now, let me preface this by saying that I am a Calvinist. So, of course, I disagree with the Molinist view defended by Stratton in this book. But the book is peculiarly bad wholly apart from our theological disagreement, and readers should agree with this judgment even if they think my own Calvinist view is thoroughly wrong-headed. Stratton’s book is deeply flawed on almost all counts: some of A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
2 the basic and fundamental definitions are botched, the historical survey is fanciful, the philosophical arguments are confused and scattered, and even the writing style and mastery of English are inconsistent with the expectations of a PhD dissertation. The positive endorsements by such serious scholars as William Lane Craig and Kirk MacGregor—whose work on the topic I deeply respect—have me wondering if we have read the same book. Accordingly, I’m afraid this review is mostly going to be a list of what is wrong with the book, and a very long one at that, as it must be, to substantiate adequately my claim that these serious flaws are indeed legion. Now, not everything in the book is equally weak, and some questions are raised here and there, that do deserve good answers, so I will cover them as well in the course of this response, which I hope will be helpful for the thoughtful Molinist reader. But before I do, let me begin with some measure of good will as I mention 3 positive things.
POSITIVES A first positive point, perhaps unexpectedly, is the view defended therein. I actually like Molinism. I think it’s false, but I have described it as the silver medal of providence models. With its libertarianism, I think it gets free will wrong, but at least with its middle knowledge, it rescues a much higher view of divine providence than its libertarian alternatives: simple- foreknowledge Arminianism and open theism. If I had to abandon Calvinism, I would probably become a Molinist. Once again, I think it’s false, but I’m always happy when someone who rejects Calvinism like Stratton does, at least lands on Molinism. A second point is the multi-disciplinarity I highlighted in the subtitle. I think Stratton’s attempt to do a bit of everything in a limited space backfires as he does none of them really well, but it does introduce the reader to all the facets of this debate, as there are indeed “biblical, historical, theological and philosophical” issues to consider. It’s great to show the reader that all of these disciplines have something to contribute to the debates on free will. And finally, the bibliography contains helpful entries. Stratton has listed a good number of relevant writings, so the reader can use the bibliography as an entry point to discover some good authors and books on free will and divine providence.
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3 QUALITY OF WRITING As a Frenchman who speaks English as a foreign language and has probably proffered his fair share of English sentences with improper grammar or vocabulary (or both), I run the risk of being the pot who calls the kettle black, but the weaknesses in Stratton’s writing are significant enough (and unexpected enough at the PhD level), that I must mention them in this review and document the problem with at least a few examples. First, Stratton puts a “would” in the “if” clause of counterfactuals. And while we may expect a Taylor Swift song to say “it would have been fun if you would have been the one,” we don’t expect a scholarly monograph on Molinism to say “If the son would have never made the choice to return to his father, then their relationship would have never been restored” (p.193) or “God possesses perfect knowledge of how humans with libertarian freedom would choose if he would create them” (p.239). Secondly, philosophy professors have a running joke about the comically bad first sentence of almost every undergrad paper. It goes like this: “For [insert long period of time] humans have debated [insert topic].” Stratton offers his version as the book opener: “The question of the relationship between the terms ‘determinism’ and ‘human freedom’ has occupied the thinking of human beings for centuries” (p.1) and another one for a later paragraph where he finds it helpful to discuss what truth is: “Truth. What is truth? People have been asking this question for centuries” (p.9). But beyond this merely esthetic faux pas, I’m mostly concerned with the flaws in his writing that make it hard to understand what Stratton is even arguing. And while I’m mostly (though not always) able to tell what he must have meant, it constantly slows down the reading to fix the wording before evaluating the thought. Already in the very first sentence quoted above, it’s not the relationship between the terms “determinism” and “human freedom” that is debated, but the relationship between the things they refer to. A bit later, Stratton writes: Perhaps an illustration of this interplay of philosophy and theology can be seen in what might be labeled a determinism of two sorts: “scientific” determinism and “theological” determinism, both of which stand in contrast to a third variable: libertarian free will. (p.2) What is “a determinism of two sorts”? and what does it mean to say libertarian free will is a “variable”? Another example: A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
The primary concern of this study is to critically evaluate, not only scientific determinism, but also 4 the issue as to how Scripture and theologians relate their understanding to the issue of human freedom.” (p.2) I can tell he’s talking about the relationship between determinism and human freedom, but I’m not sure how I would even rephrase this bit: “the issue as to how Scripture and theologians relate their understanding to the issue of …” Another example: “[Theological determinism] has its origins, not only in certain interpretations of select biblical passages, but also in the Bible’s implications on the behavior of Christians.” (p.2) I cannot even guess what this is referring to. What Bible implications? What behavior of Christians? How do these “Bible implications” differ from “interpretations of select biblical passages”? I don’t understand that sentence. Another example: “Moreover, since these contemporary Calvinists also affirm that they offer their objections as knowledge claims, they unintentionally join forces with naturalists.” (p.3) Leaving aside the guilt by association with naturalists, what does it mean to say Calvinists “affirm that they offer their objections as knowledge claims”? Isn’t every offered objection a claim to know something, namely that the view being objected to is unjustified or false? Later on, he discusses the so-called sourcehood and leeway conditions for free will, offered by libertarians: libertarian freedom sometimes refers to a categorical ability to act or think otherwise, and it always refers to source agency without any ultimate external deterministic causes. The former is sufficient for libertarian freedom, while the latter is necessary. and then he adds: “With that said, one of the main aims of this study is to argue for a stronger model description or definitional model of libertarian freedom.” (p.4) What does it mean to argue for a “stronger model description or definitional model”? And stronger than what? Stronger than sourcehood? Stronger than leeway? Stronger than both? The imprecision in the statement of his own position (or is it just his definition?) makes it hard to know what he’s arguing for. Shortly after, he writes: It is with this latter position—one seeking to affirm both freedom and determinism or divine providence, despite the tension that would incline one to either extreme—that prompted this writer to explore the issue as to how the two might be harmonized. (p.6) One way to fix this incorrect sentence might be to remove the “with” if we think it’s a typo. That now makes the “position” the subject of “prompted,” or perhaps he’s missing a noun before the “with” to say something like “it’s a struggle with this latter position . . . that prompted this writer GUILLAUME BIGNON
5 to explore…”? I don’t know. And then does he really mean to call freedom and providence two “extremes” to avoid? I don’t think so, as he aims to affirm that both are true and biblical. A last example: Chapter 2 examines the biblical passages in support of these two propositions. However, to conclude, as does Turretin, that neither (1) nor (2) can be denied—and both accepted—even though they seem irreconcilable, leads to what William Lane Craig has called an interpretative “cul de sac” (p.6) Here again, we can eventually guess what he really meant, but only after we trip over the “Neither can be denied—and both accepted.” I could go on, but limited space precludes exhaustiveness, as all the examples I listed above were taken from the first 6 pages out of 300.
DEFINITIONS Stratton’s definitions of some of the important concepts in the free will debates are actually found in multiple places in the book, not just in the introduction. From what I can tell, this is because several chapters contain extended sections of material that Stratton reproduced from his blog. Those stand-alone blog posts required introductory definitions, and once converted into book chapters, Stratton didn’t see fit to remove their definitions as redundant or transplant them to the beginning of the book. As a result, we are served definitions of libertarianism, determinism, and compatibilism more than once throughout the book. Moreover (and more problematically), they exhibit a great deal of confusion.
Compatibilism Problems in the characterization of the compatibilist position actually begin in the foreword by Kirk MacGregor, who seems to think that compatibilism was intended to be a distinct, mediating view in between determinism and libertarian free will: Stratton also proves to my satisfaction that compatibilism is not a genuine third option mediating between determinism and soft libertarianism, as Guillaume Bignon, Matthew Hart, and Paul Helm assert, but instead collapses back to determinism. (p.xii) This is a surprising misunderstanding of the concepts involved. Compatibilism is the view that determinism is compatible with free will and moral responsibility. It was never intended to be a distinct, middle position between determinism on the one side and libertarianism on the other. And A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
6 so of course it does not “collapse back to determinism,” as if one had to be either a determinist or a compatibilist, and now that compatibilism has to go, we are reluctantly forced to be determinists instead of compatibilists. We Calvinist compatibilists have affirmed determinism all along, and maintained that it’s compatible with moral responsibility. That’s what compatibilism means. And, of course, it’s a complete misattribution of that mistake to me: where did “Guillaume Bignon” ever “assert” this confused view? Stratton then misrepresents Calvinists in his introduction of the contemporary debate, saying modern-day Calvinists assume causal determinism, and conclude that humans are not free: “[more modern Calvinists,] often basing their arguments on certain biblical passages (such as Romans 9), presuppose that God causally determines all things and, thus, humans are not free.” (p.3). No. First, they don’t assume it, they take it to be supported by scripture and reason; but more fundamentally, they certainly don’t conclude nor admit that “humans are not free;” that’s the whole point of being compatibilists: they maintain free will and moral responsibility; they only deny that these require indeterminism. Now, given the slight ambiguity caused by the absence of a quantifier in front of the phrase “more modern Calvinists,” I suppose it’s technically possible for it to refer only to some “more modern Calvinists,” who would happen to be determinists and incompatibilists. But then I would ask for names. Where are those incompatibilist, self-identified “Calvinist” authors, who affirm determinism and deny free will and moral responsibility? I personally can’t think of one, and I don’t think any of the Calvinist authors he quotes in the entire book hold that view. In any case, that doesn’t strike me as a plausible interpretation of Stratton’s words, as he opposes determinism to human responsibility in the very framing of the debate: No debate or solution of this perceived antinomy can be intellectually argued unless one is aware of the weight of the biblical data supporting both a view suggesting that God causally determines all things and the data supporting the view that human beings are responsible for some things. (p.17). Calvinist compatibilists affirm both of those things. Are they not part of the debate Stratton wants to arbitrate? His introduction of the positions is already begging the question of incompatibilism. Stratton does so again at the end of his biblical preliminaries as he shows that divine providence and human free will are both biblical, and asks if the two can be coherent: Both appear to be taught in holy writ, yet they might seem to be logically incompatible. … Must readers shrug their shoulders and retreat to mystery, or can Christians provide a logically coherent GUILLAUME BIGNON
answer to this vital question? One matter is certain: A solution cannot occur by denying free will 7 (by some flavor of divine determinism), nor by denying God’s sovereignty. (p.40). Just like that, before any argument is offered, the matter is already “certain” that determinism cannot be affirmed, as it would be “denying free will.” Additionally, in multiple places, Stratton fails to see that determinism is the thesis that all things are determined by antecedent factors. It is seen for example in his repeated use of the redundant phrase “exhaustive divine determinism.” Determinism is already exhaustive. All things are determined on determinism. That’s what it means. But Stratton is inconsistent on this point. On the one hand, we find him identifying his “exhaustive divine determinism” with theological determinism simpliciter: “This, then, is the view of theological determinism or what this author refers to as exhaustive divine determinism (EDD): all events are causally determined by God.” (p.4) This would indicate that he correctly understands determinism is exhaustive. But at other times he seems to assume the opposite, and we find him awkwardly avoiding to say determinism or compatibilism are false but rather arguing against the view that they “always correspond to reality” (p.165) or “always describe reality” (p.165) or “always explain the way things are” (p.162), or “correspond universally to reality” (p.182). Accordingly, he says: The aim [of this chapter] is not merely to argue against the thesis of compatibilism, but to demonstrate that this thesis does not actually correspond to reality, and thus, compatibilism does not always explain the way things are. (p.162) To say that a thesis “does not actually correspond to reality” is simply to say that it’s false. And if the thesis of compatibilism is false, then it never explains the way things are.
Libertarianism Stratton is also inconsistent in his understanding of “libertarianism.” On the one hand, he gives correct definitions at least twice, in different chapters, saying libertarianism is the conjunction of the thesis of incompatibilism, with the thesis that humans are sometimes free: Libertarian freedom may be defined, essentially, as the conjunction of a rejection of compatibilism (which will be defined in chapter 12) along with the claim that humans (at least occasionally) possess free will. (p.4) And a similar definition is repeated on page 160. But then Stratton suggests several times that compatibilists can agree that humans (sometimes) have libertarian freedom: “Indeed, given the above definition of libertarianism, both compatibilists and libertarians might affirm that some form A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
8 of libertarian freedom at least occasionally corresponds to reality.” (p.161) That’s incoherent. Libertarianism entails incompatibilism, therefore compatibilists cannot affirm that anyone has or ever had or ever will have “libertarian” free will. That would require incompatibilism to be true, and hence compatibilism to be false. Finally, Stratton invents the phrase “Biblical compatibilism” which he defines as the compatibility of “predestination” (understood as he does in a libertarian sense) and free will: One should, however, affirm what this author refers to as “biblical compatibilism.” Biblical compatibilism entails the thesis that God predestines all things, and humans are genuinely free and responsible for some things. (p.186). This invention introduces an obvious confusion with the standard term “compatibilism.” Adding the adjective “Biblical” should only tell us that the thesis is taught or presupposed in the Bible, not that it’s now accommodating the opposite thesis (incompatibilism) from that normally referred to by that same word! If he ever uses this invented phrase of his in this way, it’s bound to spread confusion. Thankfully, he never does in this book: his redefinition is immediately abandoned—it raises the question of why he introduced it in the first place, but let’s be grateful we avoided the additional confusion.
BIBLICAL TEXTS Stratton turns to the Bible in a brief chapter that first surveys texts which seem to support determinism, then those which seem to support libertarian free will, and finally those that seem to support both. I don’t have much to say about the texts that seem to support determinism. Stratton doesn’t really exegete them, he doesn’t engage yet—I guess to let the text speak with full force for now, which is fine, but then I don’t have much to respond to. Let me rather comment on his texts allegedly supporting libertarian freedom.
God tests Abraham He first considers Gen. 22:1, and argues that when it says God tested Abraham, it presupposes that the tester doesn’t control the outcome of the test (p.25). The problem is that this intuition about human testers need not apply to God. Human testers aren’t also the creator and sovereign ruler of the universe. And Stratton’s point is fully exposed to a tu quoque response as there is a similar intuition about human testers, namely that they also don’t know the outcome of the test: the test’s purpose is to obtain new information. Stratton quotes John Willis saying this much: “God tested GUILLAUME BIGNON
9 Abraham’s faith to see if he really put God’s will above what seemed to be logical, his love for Isaac, and the dreams of the future which God’s promises had aroused in his breast.” (p.25) If he insists we transfer those intuitions about human testers onto God, Stratton paints himself into the corner of having to deny God’s foreknowledge. And let every open theist say Amen.
Resisting God Stratton then mentions texts saying that humans resist God, or refuse God: Prov. 1:23-26 where God says “I have called you and you refused to listen,” Matt. 23:37 in which Jesus pleads with men and we’re told they go against his will, and Matt. 22:3 with the wedding guests refusing the invitation. Stratton says it implies they could have come: “People were genuinely invited to join the kingdom of heaven—implying that they could accept God’s invitation—yet these individuals would not come on their own volition or free will” (p.25-26). This claim that humans “could” have done otherwise is also pressed by Stratton with 1 Cor. 10:13 which says God will not tempt the Corinthians beyond their ability, but will leave a way of escape, that they may be able to endure the temptation (p.27). The problem with those claims is that the “ability” to do otherwise can be— and has been—analyzed in two different ways: one that entails indeterminism, and one that doesn’t. The kind of ability that Stratton needs to establish is one whereby the person could have done otherwise while holding in place everything about the person (inside and out) at the moment of choice. That’s a “categorical” ability to do otherwise. But compatibilists have long insisted there is a sense of ability that is necessary for moral responsibility and perfectly compatible with determinism: it’s a “conditional” sense of ability, the ability to do otherwise if we had wanted, or if we had tried, or something along those lines. This is the view of the so-called “Classical Compatibilists.” Incompatibilists are welcome to push back against this conditional analysis—and I do address some of their objections in my article “The Distasteful Conditional Analysis”1—but Stratton doesn’t even mention the distinction, and just leaves us with the equivocal claim that we “can” do otherwise. That doesn’t quite establish libertarianism. This problem will reappear later in Stratton’s book, so we will return to it.
1 Philosophia Christi Volume 18, Issue 2, 2016. A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
10 Freedom from the law and self-control Stratton then references Gal. 5:13 where Paul says Christians are “called to live in freedom.” This is plainly not describing the freedom of the will, but the freedom from moral obligation on certain matters: we are freed from the law. It is demonstrably irrelevant here. Stratton then adds we are called to exercise “self-control” in 2 Tim. 1:7, Prov. 16:32, and 2 Pet. 1:5, 7 (p.28). That again is irrelevant to whether we are determined. We may well control ourselves even if God providentially controls us as he controls all things. Stratton needs to show that both cannot be true. And even if we grant that a human cannot be both self-controlled and controlled by another human, we will then need to hear why God can’t be dis-analogous to humans in that respect. That’s a tall order. Stratton then says we are condemned for our actions in Rev. 20:12, and says it entails freedom. He presses the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP) explicitly, which claims that we cannot be morally responsible if we “cannot” do otherwise. And once again, it features the equivocation on “cannot”: Judgment for the unbelievers, then, is based on deeds done, and thus on both personal responsibility and freedom of action because a person cannot be judged for what he cannot avoid doing, especially if it was causally determined by someone or something other than the defendant. (p.28). This is the same question-begging I pointed out above, camouflaged by the equivocation on the “ability to do otherwise” which may be analyzed as categorical or conditional. Stratton mentions that God issues commands, and we’re said to “have a choice” to obey in Deut. 30:10-20. Well of course, we make choices, we even make free choices, all of this is affirmed by compatibilists. None of this supports indeterminism.
Saving a rich man Stratton then turns to Jesus’s saying that it’s easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of God. Here Stratton simply quotes Roger Olson’s critique: Roger Olson’s comments on [these words] are forceful: “What sense does this verse make in light of irresistible grace? Is Jesus saying it is harder for God to save a rich man than a poor one? How could that be? If everyone, without exception, only gets into the kingdom of God by God’s work alone without any required cooperation on his or her part, then Jesus’s saying makes no sense at all.” (p.29) GUILLAUME BIGNON
11 Olson doesn’t really tell us what allegedly makes no sense about its being harder for God to save a rich man. No one is saying it is actually “hard” for an omnipotent God, but it’s perfectly meaningful to say it’s harder simply to denote that there is more work to do on the person’s heart: there’s a hurdle to overcome on the way to repentance, and so God must give more grace than if the person were not rich (all else being equal). Stratton’s comments don’t help; he first says “Olson reflects his Arminian position.” I don’t understand what that means. And then “If God gives grace to all and sovereignly chooses to create a world in which everyone is extended free choice, then there is no basis for merit.” (p.29) How does “there is no basis for merit” follow from “God gives grace to all and sovereignly chooses to create a world in which everyone is extended free choice”? And how would the truth of that conditional support libertarian freedom? I’m lost, and I don’t think it’s my fault.
Willing to save everyone Stratton then puts forward the texts affirming that God wants all men to be saved (1 Tim. 2:3-4), that he has no pleasure in the death of the wicked (Ezekiel 18:23), and that he doesn’t wish that any would perish (2 Pet. 3:9). There are several Calvinist responses available. Let me just state briefly for now that I favor the view that the libertarian pressing these texts into service is equivocating on the “will” of God, as God may have some desire or will to do a thing, and yet have overriding reasons not to do it. We will revisit that question when Stratton presses these texts as a stand-alone argument later (the contention he calls “The omni argument”).
Determining Judas? Finally, the section on texts that seem to support both determinism and free will has more of the same, there’s not much I need to comment on, except one very strange affirmation in his section on “Jesus and Judas,” where Stratton seems to grant that Jesus teaches determinism! I realize it would be incoherent for him as a Molinist, but I don’t see other plausible interpretations of Stratton’s words, here. He quotes Jesus in Luke 22:21-22: “But behold, the hand of him who betrays me is with me on the table. For the Son of Man goes as it has been determined, but woe to that man by whom he is betrayed.” And then he says that Jesus declared Judas’s act “has been determined,” and “This is a very clear example which shows that determinism—rightly understood—need not mean that the sinner can blame God for being judged.” (p.38) Well yes, A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
12 compatibilists are fully on board with that point. But I don’t think he as a Molinist wants to affirm determinism, unless what he means by determinism “rightly understood” is “indeterminism.”
HISTORICAL SURVEY The ensuing 150 pages, which amount to half of the book, are dedicated to surveying some important Christian thinkers of the past on the question of free will and providence. One of Stratton’s goals here is to show that famous authors who are usually channeled by Calvinists (like Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Luther and others) actually all affirm libertarian freedom! Let’s see how he does that.
Augustine Stratton correctly notes that the early writings of Augustine on free will sound libertarian, but that Augustine later moved rather explicitly toward determinist views in his interactions with Pelagius. Stratton notes Augustine’s affirmations that: “The wills of men are so much in the power of God, that he can turn them whithersoever it pleases him,” “God does whatsoever he wills in the hearts of even wicked men,” and that “God operates on men’s hearts to incline their wills withersoever he pleases.” (p.57) These are best interpreted as determinist/compatibilist views. Here again from Augustine quoted by Stratton: it [scripture] shows us that not only men’s good wills, which God Himself converts from bad ones, and, when converted by Him, directs to good actions and to eternal life, but also those which follow the world are so entirely at the disposal of God, that He turns them wherever He wills, and whenever He wills, to bestow kindness on some, and to heap punishment on others, as He Himself judges right by a counsel most secret to Himself, indeed, but beyond all doubt most righteous. (p.57) Still, Stratton tries to keep Augustine a libertarian when it comes to non-salvation issues: “Although Augustine became more ‘Calvinistic’ in his later years, he never appears to have rejected a limited libertarian freedom in issues unrelated to soteriological issues” (p.59). I don’t see that distinction in the universal declaration quoted above. Augustine sure sounds like a determinist, and it’s no surprise that Calvin quotes him constantly, or that modern-day Calvinists are often said to hold the “Augustinian” view.
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13 Pelagius Stratton then discusses the view of Pelagius, who was famously condemned as a heretic, plausibly for denying original sin and the necessity of grace, among other teachings. Stratton lists a number of Pelagius’s views, but I fail to understand which of these statements Stratton accepts and which ones he rejects when saying that “Pelagianism” must be rejected. Among others propositions, Stratton counts the following as Pelagian: “for Pelagius free will meant the ability to do what was right and good. This must be seen and understood as his reaction to Augustine’s determinism.” (p.62) Isn’t that exactly Stratton’s view that when a sinner freely sins, his free will means he had “the ability to do what was right and good” instead? In “opposition to Augustine’s determinism”? And if Stratton responds that an unregenerate man can only sin but is still free to choose between different sins, then he’s not out of the Pelagian woods yet, because if the principle of alternate possibilities is true at all, it plausibly applies to all levels of granularity for action. There is no reason to claim blameworthiness for specific sin X requires the categorical ability to not commit specific sin X, if one denies that blameworthiness “for sinning” in general requires the categorical ability not to sin. Stratton correctly notes that “Pelagius said it was possible for some people to live without sin.” (p.62). Again, that’s a consequence of the categorical PAP: if moral responsibility requires the categorical ability to do otherwise, (or “ought implies can”), and if we are responsible for failing to live without sinning, then it follows that we can live without sinning. That point is repeatedly made by Luther, affirmed by Edwards, and defended anew in my own book Excusing Sinners and Blaming God.2 Stratton should really tell us how he avoids the Pelagian view on this, not just tell us that Pelagianism should be rejected.
Aquinas Stratton devotes a long section to Thomas Aquinas, and finds him to affirm libertarianism. I don’t need to arbitrate this. Tom Flint and Paul Helm count Aquinas as a determinist/compatibilist, and Eleonore Stump takes him to be libertarian. My own reading of Aquinas makes me side with Stratton and Stump on this, I find that Aquinas does say a number of things that fit best with libertarianism.
2 Guillaume Bignon, Excusing Sinners and Blaming God: A Calvinist Assessment of Determinism, Moral Responsibility, and Divine Involvement in Evil (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2018), onwards of page 133. Also see the discussion of “levels of granularity for action” on pages 110 to 119. A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
14 Erasmus and Luther Stratton then turns to the dispute on free will between Erasmus and Luther. He finds Erasmus is obviously on the libertarian side, and lists some of his reasons. Yes. There is no dispute here. It’s Stratton’s case for how Luther is also a libertarian that is most unexpected. Luther is quoted as explicitly arguing in favor of determinism, not just for providential control of salvation, but for everything which God “foreknows,” which is, of course, everything: Luther forthrightly announces his position, based on the premise that what God “foreknows” is not “contingent,” (that is, shaped or determined by man’s decision or circumstances) but “necessarily” will happen: “It is, then, fundamentally necessary and wholesome for Christians to know that God foreknows nothing contingently, but that He foresees, purposes, and does all things according to His own immutable, eternal and infallible will. This bombshell knocks ‘free-will’ flat, and utterly shatters it.” (p.108-109) How does Stratton rescue Luther’s alleged libertarianism in response to this? He doesn’t. He just separately notes that Luther is ok with the use of the term “free will” for non-soteriological matters (or “matters below”), because we’re not enslaved to one side when making mundane decisions, in the way Luther sees us enslaved to sin when making decisions in response to divine commandments. But from the mere defense of “freedom” by Luther in mundane matters, it obviously doesn’t follow that he means it as libertarian freedom, especially when Luther is quoted right above defending an argument from foreknowledge which applies to every single free choice. Stratton makes the leap from “freedom” to “libertarian freedom,” just like that: Luther clearly believes that there is human freedom in many decisions and actions a person is engaged in this world (‘in the realm of things below him’). This might be termed what philosophers call ‘soft libertarian freedom’ or ‘limited libertarian freedom,’ that is, limited to things other than soteriological matters. (p.110-111). Leaving aside the couple of English mistakes that here again make it sound a bit off—the first sentence is missing the “in” from “engage in,” and the second should read either “might be termed” or “might be what philosophers call,” but not “might be termed what philosophers call”—the fundamental non sequitur should be clear: we cannot jump from “freedom” to “libertarian freedom.” The same mistake is then made with Melanchthon: he affirms we have the “liberty of will” to make regular decisions, and Stratton counts him as a libertarian: “The Reformed, systematic theologian clearly affirms limited libertarian freedom” (p.111). No.
GUILLAUME BIGNON
15 Calvin Stratton continues and repeats the mistake with John Calvin. The French Reformer says Adam had “free choice of good and evil,” and Stratton unwarrantedly inserts libertarianism into his paraphrase: “Adam and Eve had libertarian freedom to choose either the good or evil.” (p.115). No. Once again, the mere mention of free choice isn’t an affirmation of libertarianism, or Stratton should count me as a libertarian too. And Calvin draws the same sort of distinction as Luther, between “heavenly things” and “earthly things,” but Calvin isn’t affirming libertarian free will in this distinction any more than Luther did. Stratton himself quotes Calvin as going against that very interpretation: In those actions, which in themselves are neither good nor bad, and concern the corporeal rather than the spiritual life, the liberty which man possesses, although we have above touched upon it (supra, Chap. 2 sect. 13-17), has not yet been explained. Some have conceded a free choice to man in such action . . . [However] I contend that whenever God is pleased to make way for his providence, he even in external matters so turns and bends the wills of men, that whatever the freedom of their choice may be, it is still subject to the disposal of God. That your mind depends more on the agency of God than the freedom of your own choice, daily experience teaches. Calvin’s view sure sounds like Calvinism. Stratton’s treatment of Calvin to make him out to be a libertarian is most tortured when Calvin says that men sin of necessity and that it’s compatible with their sinning voluntarily. Stratton responds as follows: It is hard for this writer not to conclude that by what he says he is evading the issue. One can readily agree that Adam freely chose—without compulsion—to disobey God. But how is it that a person does something “voluntarily” if the “will is deprived of liberty?”? Does not “necessity” refer to what a person must do because of his nature? (p.119) So, Stratton brings his own incompatibilist conviction to the table and accordingly doesn’t understand how Calvin can affirm human choices are both “necessary” and “voluntary.” But how Calvin can do so is trivial: Calvin is simply not an incompatibilist! Stratton faults him for this belief as if Calvin were engaging in circular reasoning: “Is not Calvin, then, assuming his conclusion, that is, that despite saying that people sin by necessity, they nevertheless have freedom?” (p.119) Leaving aside the accusation of circular reasoning—no, Calvin isn’t begging any question because he’s not here offering an argument for compatibilism, he’s merely voicing his view—the main point remains, that Calvin’s view is very much what Stratton himself says it is: “people sin by necessity,” and, yes, “they nevertheless have freedom.” Calvin does assume the A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
16 two are true (and hence compatible). Stratton disagrees. That’s fine. They can work it out with arguments. But Stratton can’t here assume his incompatibilism, force it onto Calvin’s defense of human freedom, apply redacting tape on Calvin’s affirmation of necessity in that very sentence, and conclude that since Calvin affirms voluntariness he must be denying necessity and be a libertarian! I’m not sure why Stratton would want Calvin in his team, but that’s not the way to draft him.
Arminius The next chapter is on Jacob Arminius. Stratton highlights Arminius’s disagreements with Calvinism. I’m not sure what the takeaway of the chapter should be. Of course, Arminius is not a Calvinist, he’s an Arminian. I guess that’s Stratton’s main point here, though the concluding sentence of the chapter makes an additional claim about misrepresentations of Arminius: “What he [Arminius] did write, however, is clear enough to dispel for the careful researcher that he did not teach what many have accused him of believing.” (p.137) I don’t know which misrepresentations of Arminius are in view here, perhaps accusations that he was some sort of Pelagian? If such accusations are treated and refuted in the chapter, I missed them. But we can proceed, I think it’s clear Arminius is an Arminian: not a Calvinist, and not a Pelagian.3
The Synod of Dort Stratton also seeks to find some libertarianism in the Canons of Dort, that traditional bastion of Calvinist theology. He does so in the same way once again: they affirm that there’s a certain light in all men, which still explains why they’re able to do right some time, and Stratton tells us it must mean libertarian free will. The gap between what the Canons say and Stratton’s interpretation is once again massive. He quotes the Canons as follows: There is, to be sure, a certain light of nature remaining in man after the fall, by virtue of which he retains some notions about God, natural things, and the difference between what is moral and immoral, and demonstrates a certain eagerness for virtue and for good outward behavior (p.145- 146) And Stratton comments: “This is a very important statement because it implies that people can make some decisions freely for matters other than evil—and thus have (at least) limited libertarian
3 Roger Olson does a pretty good job at showing this much, in Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006). GUILLAUME BIGNON
17 freedom—though this freedom never can lead to salvation.” (p.145) The leap is not only unjustified, it’s also inconsistent with Stratton’s later claim that Dort leaves libertarian free will as an “open question.” (p.160)
Libertarianism: all or nothing Let me now make a point that applies to all the figures listed above as allegedly affirming “some” libertarian freedom in things that don’t pertain to salvation, while being determined in the things that pertain to salvation. Stratton had put it like this: if one does not possess the libertarian freedom to resist or not to resist the Holy Spirit’s grace, it does not logically entail that no one ever possesses the libertarian ability to choose among a range of options each of which is compatible with one’s nature regarding matters that are not related to soteriological issues. (p.146) The problem is that the only way to hold this view coherently is to deny that those determined actions that pertain to salvation are morally responsible. That’s because if any of our mundane choices are made with libertarian free will, then it means libertarianism is true, which means incompatibilism is true, and hence any given action cannot be both directly free and determined. So, on that view, if humans are determined “to resist or not to resist the Holy Spirit’s grace,” then they cannot be responsible for it. And while a Christian may feel it’s fine to remove all praiseworthiness for a sinner’s choice to repent and believe, they shouldn’t accept the other side of that same coin which is that a sinner’s choice to reject the Gospel cannot be blameworthy. I don’t think any of the historical figures surveyed in the book would be on board with that. Of course, Stratton may declare that all these historical figures are guilty of affirming just that incoherence, but interpretative charity says we probably should not.
The cost of historical eisegesis The historical section ends with a chapter on Jonathan Edwards, whom Stratton thankfully does not find to affirm libertarianism. Let’s see the “cup-half-full” and note that although Edwards is the only one in that situation, at least there is one that Stratton couldn’t recast as a libertarian. He concludes: “each of [the theologians surveyed]—except for Edwards—seems to occasionally affirm some level of libertarian freedom limited to some things, some of the time.” (p.158) And again, “all of the theologians surveyed in the previous chapters (apart from Edwards) could easily A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
18 agree on this definition of libertarianism and affirm that humans possess it.” (p.161) No. They could not, and they did not. In the end, upon seeing its flaws, we may be tempted to skip this long historical section, or dismiss it as neither helping nor hurting Stratton’s case—since it matters more to us whether a view is true than whether it was affirmed by Christians of the past—but all this historical eisegesis does have a real cost for Stratton's biblical claims as well. Because if Stratton is able to declare that libertarian free will is even in (late) Augustine, Luther, and Calvin—who not only don't affirm it but so strongly seem to deny it in the very texts quoted by Stratton—then we can't be too impressed when Stratton likewise declares he finds libertarian free will in the Bible. And his misguided philosophical exegesis of these authors leads us ironically to a point of happy agreement I have with Stratton: we both maintain that to hold the Bible’s view on whether humans have libertarian free will, one must side with Calvin, Luther, Melanchthon, and the Synod of Dort!
PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS FOR LIBERTARIAN FREE WILL The next chapter aims to offer philosophical arguments supporting libertarianism. It actually opens again with definitions of libertarian free will and compatibilism because this section is coming from a stand-alone post from Stratton’s blog.4 I already addressed the confusions found in Stratton’s definitions, so let me not revisit them here, and let’s turn to Stratton’s case for libertarianism. The first argument he mentions is Peter van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument. Stratton introduces it like this: One strong argument against exhaustive determinism, as argued by Edwards and Bignon, is the “Consequence Argument” (CA) set forth in Peter Van Inwagen’s seminal book An Essay on Free Will. (p.163) The awkward English phrasing unfortunately makes it sound like Jonathan Edwards and I are proponents of the Consequence Argument, but the “argued” in Stratton’s aside on the two of us refers to “determinism,” not to “argument.” I’m not sure why Stratton needs to drag Edwards and me into this sentence to repeat we defend determinism in the middle of introducing the Consequence Argument, nor why he goes for the odd list of just the two of us—though I of course
4 “Excusing Sinners, Blaming God, Compatibilism, & the Consequence Argument” https://freethinkingministries.com/excusing-sinners-blaming-god-compatibilism-the-consequence-argument/ GUILLAUME BIGNON
19 enjoy the flattering juxtaposition of one of the greatest American philosophers and little old French me. He quotes van Inwagen’s brief statement of the Consequence Argument: If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore, the consequences of these things (including our own acts) are not up to us. (p.165) Stratton then rephrases it to target theistic determinism more explicitly, and offers a couple of paragraphs to explain its premises. The main problem with this section on the Consequence Argument (and the reason why I’m not getting into much detail here) is that Stratton simply doesn’t defend it against any of the responses on offer in the literature: the so-called “no-past objection” by Joseph Campbell,5 accusations of begging the question such as those discussed by Fischer and Pendergraft,6 or the argument’s reliance on the incompatibilist principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), none of this is mentioned. This complete abandonment of the battlefield is hard for me to understand (and I’m French!). We’re in a chapter on arguments for libertarian freedom. The Consequence Argument is famously one of them. Does Stratton not care to bring it home? If so, he needs to engage with at least some of its discussion in the literature. Instead, he only mentions my response that van Inwagen begs the question by defining free will in a way that assumes libertarianism, to which Stratton replies by insisting that he thinks the PAP is true and properly basic. That’s not doing much to discharge the incompatibilist’s burden of proof. He quotes Jerry Walls: We believe that libertarian free will is intrinsic to the very notion of moral responsibility. That is, a person cannot be held morally responsible for an act unless he or she was free to perform that act and free to refrain from it. This is a basic moral intuition, and we do not believe there are any relevant moral convictions more basic than this one that could serve as premises to prove it. (p.164). If Walls is right that the incompatibilist PAP cannot be supported by arguments with more basic premises, what does that do to Stratton’s chapter that aims to offer philosophical arguments for libertarian free will understood as the categorical ability to choose between several options?
5 Joseph Keim Campbell, “Free Will and the Necessity of the Past” Analysis 67.2 (2007) 105–11. 6 John Martin Fischer and Garrett Pendergraft, “Does the Consequence Argument Beg the Question?” Philosophical Studies 166.3 (2013) 575–95. A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
20 “Striking” and “candid” admission of standard definitions From then on, Stratton’s comments get really scattered. He leaves the Consequence Argument completely behind, doesn’t interact with any of my further responses to it, and instead says that “strikingly,” I make a “candid” admission that is “quite significant,” when I say that…libertarian free will is incompatible with determinism! This is just embarrassing. The incompatibility of libertarian free will and determinism is completely definitional. How “striking” is it that I, Guillaume Bignon, affirm standard definitions? I should also note that Stratton quotes me out of context in a way that changes the subject of my sentence, and thereby distorts its meaning a bit: I had said that the Consequence Argument establishes what I “happily concede, namely that libertarian free will is incompatible with determinism, but falls short of refuting compatibilism.” Stratton’s truncation of the subject makes me say that libertarian free will falls short of refuting compatibilism (which is trivially true, as “libertarian free will” is not an argument), whereas it’s the Consequence Argument that I said falls short of refuting compatibilism. But why does he think the “admission” is significant? He first says: It means that Calvinists—such as Edwards and Bignon—who affirm that the doctrine of EDD [Exhaustive Divine Determinism] always describes reality—are far more extreme on the issue than Luther and Calvin seemed to be. (p.165) Again, with the odd list of “Edwards and Bignon,” we are now accused of being extremists. In response, perhaps I just need to expand his horizons of Christian proponents of compatibilism and determinism, to dispel the notion that I and Edwards are some sorts of lonely radicals at the extreme end of the theological spectrum: count me in with Paul Helm, Greg Welty, James Anderson, Paul Manata, Daniel Hill, James Gibson, Steven Cowan, Michael Preciado, Paul Rezkalla, David Haines, Daniel Johnson, David Alexander, Heath White, Jay Bruce, Christopher Green, Taylor Cyr, Tom Schreiner, D.A. Carson, Ed Komoszewski, Rob Bowman, Dan Wallace, John Feinberg, Bruce Ware, John Piper, Chris Date, Pascal Denault, Scott Christensen, et al. It’s not “Bignon and Edwards” under a tree. And then Stratton says that as a result of my admission, all he needs is to offer one sound argument against determinism: if the libertarian offers one sound argument for libertarian free will or the claim that God doesn’t causally determine everything about humanity, then “he is justified in claiming that determinism and, consequently, compatibilism (as historically understood) do not always correspond to reality.” (p.165) GUILLAUME BIGNON
21 How is that astonishing? If the libertarian offers one sound argument for libertarianism, then determinism and compatibilism are false. Of course, that’s how arguments work. But the same is also obviously true for the opposing view: if compatibilists offer a single sound argument for compatibilism, then libertarianism is false. None of this is remarkable, and none of this is the result of my “admission.”
THE FREE-THINKING ARGUMENT Stratton then turns to what seems to be his most important argument against determinism, the one he calls “the free-thinking argument.” It’s a claim that determinism undermines the rationality of our knowledge claims. Stratton introduces it by first declaring me to be in bed with Sam Harris: Harris (a naturalist) and Bignon (a theological determinist) both seem to agree that things external to humanity govern and control everything about humanity . . . Naturalists and divine determinists are indeed odd bedfellows; nevertheless, they offer a united front proclaiming that libertarian freedom is an illusion. (p.166-167). Nonsense. We agree on something. We’re not offering a “united front.” And that thing we happen to agree on, is not that libertarian free will is an illusion; it’s that libertarianism is false. I reject the claim that libertarian freedom is an “illusion” as if it somehow appeared to us we had libertarian free will though we in fact don’t. I deny that it appears to us one way or the other. And of course, the guilt by association is a two-way street: Stratton and Harris “both seem to agree” that God doesn’t determine humans to sin. Stratton and Harris “both seem to agree” that determinism is incompatible with free will. Stratton and Harris “both seem to agree” that the sky is blue. Now what? Is Stratton in bed with the new atheist?
Imprecision on the scope As we now consider Stratton’s claim that determinism would prevent humans from making reasonable knowledge claims, we first want to know what kind of knowledge he’s talking about. Is he arguing that determinism undermines the rationality of every knowledge claim, or only some subset of them? I do think he intends to restrict the scope of his argument to something like “knowledge obtained by drawing inferences to the best explanation,” but his own words on the matter are very inconsistent. Since he repeats ad nauseam the conditionals claiming something like “if determinism is true then it excludes reasonable knowledge claims,” we have a large sample A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
22 of his own words to assess which scope he wants for the argument, and it varies greatly. In several places, I found some apparent restrictions like these: If one cannot freely think and infer the best explanation (among a range of alternative options each compatible with one’s nature), then there can be no justification that that specific belief really is the best explanation. (p.168, emphasis mine). [T]he person who denies [that we make libertarian free choices] ultimately must reject rationality and the knowledge (justified, true belief) gained via the process of rational inference and deliberation.” (p.169, emphasis mine) Causal determinism is incompatible with rational inference or reason-based knowledge. (p.173, emphasis mine) But in what seems to be a majority of cases he simply makes unrestricted claims of universal exclusion of knowledge: It appears to be true that one may argue that human beliefs can be rationally affirmed only if humans possess libertarian freedom (p.167, emphasis mine) If determinism is true, then atheists—or anyone else for that matter—cannot possess justification for their beliefs. (p.168, emphasis mine) If libertarian freedom is not possessed by humans, then humans cannot rationally affirm knowledge claims. (p.174, emphasis mine) if an agent is not the source and originator of his own thoughts (and something external to the person is causally determining the person’s thoughts), or if he does not ever possess the ability to think otherwise regarding anything, then he is merely left assuming his or her determined thoughts are good—let alone true! (p.179, emphasis mine) On the up side, I don’t think this lack of precision in the formulation matters a whole lot, since I don’t think the claim is any more convincing when it’s modestly restricted to beliefs obtained by inference to the best explanation, than it is when applied wholesale to all of our beliefs. So, let’s see how Stratton argues the point.
The contested premise Stratton formulates the same basic “free-thinking” argument several times, with syllogisms featuring sometimes as many as 8 steps, but we can skip all the details, because in each case the one premise that Calvinist determinists will reject is trivial to identify: it’s always the conditional that says something like “if determinism, then no knowledge.” It’s the premise called (A3) on page 167: “If humans do not possess libertarian freedom, then humans do not possess the ability to rationally infer and rationally affirm knowledge claims” GUILLAUME BIGNON
23 It’s the one called (C3) on page 171: “If libertarian free thinking does not exist, then the process of rationality is illusory” It’s the one called (D1) on page 174: “If libertarian freedom is not possessed by humans, then humans cannot rationally affirm knowledge claims” And it’s all the other “if / then” statements I quoted just above when documenting the imprecision on the argument’s scope. So, what justification does Stratton provide in support of that disputed conditional? To answer that question properly, I must now break with the order of the book, because Stratton’s supporting claims are scattered all over the chapter, and they are repeated throughout, without much of an attempt to sort them out logically. Accordingly, I have to reorder that material myself, to group related claims, and properly address each contention in turn. From what I can tell, Stratton makes 7 identifiable claims. He says: 1. that deliberation requires free will and it’s obvious we have libertarian free will when we choose between options, 2. that using rationality to refute his argument would be self-defeating as it would tacitly support the argument, 3. that determinism removes our ability to “think otherwise,” or our access to alternate possible beliefs, 4. that on determinism, our beliefs are not “up to us,” or are “outside of our control,” or are “forced” on us, 5. that God on determinism is relevantly analogous to a mad scientist controlling us and choosing our beliefs for us (which would exclude knowledge), 6. that on determinism, our cognitive faculties are not aimed at truth, and 7. that the truth of “indirect doxastic voluntarism” (the thesis that we are sufficiently in control of some of our beliefs to be judged for them) requires our having libertarian free will. As we will see, it’s a mixed bag: some of these are deeply confused, and some of them raise pretty good questions. Let’s tackle them all in order.
Deliberation requires free will and it’s obvious we have libertarian free will as we consider options Here Stratton offers another 5-step syllogism that boils down to saying rationality requires deliberation, and deliberation requires libertarian free will. But of course, compatibilists refuse that second claim, and Stratton gives us precious little in support of it. He gives us a definition of “deliberation” from the Webster dictionary, that is entirely acceptable by the compatibilist, and perfectly compatible with determinism: “To weigh in the mind; to consider and examine the reasons for and against a measure; to estimate the weight of force of arguments, or the probable consequences of a measure, in order to a choice or decision; to pause and consider.” (p.170). A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
24 He then says: “The question, then, that The Deliberation and Liberation Argument raises is this: ‘Is it possible to truly deliberate without libertarian freedom?’” to which the Calvinist responds “yes, it is,” and asks for an argument to the contrary. Stratton simply repeats a different version of the same premise: “It would seem, then, that libertarian freedom is necessary if one genuinely is to possess the ability to evaluate his thoughts/beliefs and to deliberate in the truest sense.” (p.170) And that’s it. Stratton doesn’t tell us anything else about deliberation. He does say that deliberating and evaluating options require “free will,” but he still presupposes that free will is incompatible with determinism, as evidenced by a handful of false dilemmas: he says “the evaluative thoughts a person may feel are governing his deliberations are actually caused and determined by things (or persons) external to him.” Calvinists affirm both horns are true. Again, he says: determinists (if correct) would not have come to their conclusion about determinism based on their intelligence or by choosing to examine the evidence to infer the best explanation. Rather, their very conclusion about determinism would simply be determined by external factors (p.169, emphasis mine) But we say both are true. And finally, the same false dilemma between determinism and deliberation is found in Stratton’s quote of William Lane Craig: if one comes to believe that determinism is true, one has to believe that the reason he has come to believe it is simply that he was determined to do so. One has not in fact been able to weigh the arguments pro and con and freely make up one’s mind on that basis. (p.169) Once again, Calvinists affirm both horns, so we would need an argument to support the claim that it has to be either one or the other. Instead, Stratton tells us it’s obvious: “it seems intuitively obvious that humans possess libertarian freedom and make real choices after deliberating among a range of genuinely available options (at least occasionally)” (p.169). And with his belief that we obviously experience libertarian free will, he says that the alternative is to see this experience of making choices as an “illusion,” a view which I was fascinated to learn is held by Guillaume Bignon: Determinism implies that a human being’s thoughts and beliefs are causally determined by external factors. It is easy to see, then, why some determinists (like Harris and Bignon) claim that human choices are illusory. (p.168-169) At the risk of repeating myself, no, libertarian free will is not an illusion: we don’t have it, and we don’t appear to have it. And free will simpliciter is not an illusion either: we appear to have it, and we do have it. I just say it’s compatible with determinism. GUILLAUME BIGNON
25 Allow me to pause at this point, to note that when I look at the references to my name so far in this book, it's really a sight to behold: multiple flagrant misattributions of views I don't hold, a truncated quote that changes the meaning of my sentence, guilt by association with Sam Harris, and a claim that my affirmation of basic definitions is a “striking admission.” That’s quite the record. Let’s proceed.
It’s self-refuting to rationally argue against the argument Stratton says that using rationality to refute his argument would be self-defeating as it would tacitly support the argument. The argument’s third premise, which he named (A3), was claiming: “if humans do not possess libertarian freedom, then humans do not possess the ability to rationally infer and rationally affirm knowledge claims.” And to defend it, Stratton claims: one must appeal to rationality and assume he has knowledge and/or some degree of justification about why the third premise is faulty. Consequently, the act of objecting to (A3) appears to inadvertently presuppose the truth of (A3). (p.168) No, it presupposes a denial of the consequent, not an affirmation of the conditional. It doesn’t presuppose the truth of (A3), it presupposes the truth of (A4), which said: “Humans do possess the ability to rationally infer and rationally affirm knowledge claims.” Stratton can’t keep track of what his own premises are saying here. And that confusion between (A3) and (A4) is what makes interaction with Stratton on this topic rather unpleasant, because as soon as he hears you argue, he claims his argument is vindicated. That’s just silly. It vindicates the undisputed claim that we are rational (A4), not the disputed conditional that if determinism is true, rationality is excluded (A3).
Alternate possibilities Stratton says that in order to be justified in our thoughts and beliefs, we must have access to alternate thoughts and beliefs. This access to alternate possibilities is requested by Stratton throughout the chapter, with many different formulations. He says that if a person “could not have chosen better thoughts and beliefs,” then “he is simply left assuming that his determined thoughts and beliefs are good or the best, as well as whether or not they are true.” (p.174) He says we need to have the “ability to reject incoherent thinking in favor of coherent thinking” (p.175), and that one must be able to “think otherwise,” because “If one does not possess any ability to think otherwise (at least some of the time), then he has no choice but to affirm that a current thought cannot be otherwise—even if it should be otherwise.” (p.178) A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
26 Again, “if something outside of human control causally determines you to affirm a false belief, then it would be impossible for you to infer or affirm a better belief—let alone the truth!” (p.167- 168). And again, if a person “could not have chosen better thoughts and beliefs, then he is simply left assuming that his determined thoughts and beliefs are good (and that his beliefs are true)” (p.168). Stratton also quotes J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig: “If one is to have justified beliefs . . . then one must be free to obey or to disobey epistemic rules. Otherwise, one could not be held responsible for his intellectual behavior” and Stratton comments: “The phrase ‘to obey or disobey’ implies the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) and a range of options available from which one may choose when it comes to thinking, rationality, and ‘intellectual behavior’” (p.177). One last version of the claim: “if [an agent] does not ever possess the ability to think otherwise regarding anything, then he is merely left assuming his or her determined thoughts are good—let alone true!” (p.179). In short, the claim is repeated all over the chapter: one must have the ability to think otherwise. The problem is that we still haven’t moved beyond the equivocation between “categorical” and “conditional” senses of the ability to do otherwise. As I mentioned above when dealing with 1 Cor. 10:13 and Stratton’s claim that we “can do otherwise” when facing temptation, there is a “conditional” analysis of the ability to do otherwise, which has long been offered by the so-called “classical compatibilists” and is compatible with determinism. That conditional ability, I agree, is necessary to deliberate freely: if you couldn’t choose option B even if you wanted to, then you’re not free to choose between options A and B (whether A and B are actions, or simple belief affirmations). That is compatible with determinism. What Stratton would need to do is to support the claim that a categorical ability to think otherwise is necessary; that the ability in question must be interpreted modally as the existence of a possible world which shares a strictly identical past up until the moment of choice, and contains a different choice. Stratton doesn’t do any of that. Instead, he jumps from “ability to do otherwise” to “libertarian freedom” just like that: Another rhetorical question on possessing the ability to believe otherwise: “Does a person possess the ability to reject irrational thoughts and beliefs in favor of rational thoughts and beliefs”? … If a person answers “yes” to the above question, then he simultaneously, tacitly affirms libertarian freedom and affirms his ability to choose between options consistent and compatible with his nature.” (p.175). GUILLAUME BIGNON
27 To which I reply: non sequitur. Stratton says it’s a properly basic belief that “at least some humans do possess the ability to make these evaluative and rational judgments” (p.175). Yes. And from it, one doesn’t just get libertarianism without an argument. Finally, I should mention here a possible worry for Stratton’s own position, that doesn’t arise in his book: it concerns God’s beliefs. If they necessarily correspond to reality (as they must since God is essentially omniscient), then Stratton cannot analyze God’s ability to think otherwise in categorical/modal terms, or he would have possible worlds wherein God holds false beliefs (where the truth is P, but God exercised his categorical ability to freely believe not-P), which is absurd. Instead, we need to analyze God’s ability to think otherwise in conditional terms, exactly as I suggest we do for human knowledge: God could—and we could—believe otherwise, if something were different, namely (at least in the case of God) if the truth to be believed had been different. This problem mirrors exactly Jonathan Edwards’s argument against the PAP, which pointed out that if moral responsibility requires the categorical ability to do otherwise, then God cannot be praiseworthy for acting righteously, as he isn’t able not to act righteously: there is no possible world in which God acts unrighteously. I articulate and defend Edwards’s argument in my book Excusing Sinners and Blaming God as well. As to God “believing otherwise,” I suppose a defender of Stratton’s view may respond that God never “deliberates,” or never “draws inferences to the best explanation,” and that the categorical ability to think otherwise is only necessary for drawing inferences. This is where precision on the scope of Stratton’s claim about knowledge may come to matter, a precision which I documented above is unfortunately lacking.
Beliefs “outside of our control” or “not up to us” or “forced” In a few instances, Stratton uses the phrase “outside of our control” to refer to things that humans are determined to do (or to believe). And he says: “if all things are outside of human control, then this includes exactly what every human thinks of and about and exactly how each human thinks of and about it.” (p.168, emphasis mine). He also quotes William Lane Craig using that exact phrase: When you come to realize that your decision to believe in determinism was itself determined and that even your present realization of that fact right now is likewise determined, a sort of vertigo sets in, for everything that you think, even this very thought itself, is outside your control. (p.169) The problem here is quite similar to that with the “ability to do otherwise.” The control that is necessary for free will can be—and has been—analyzed in ways that are compatible with A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
28 determinism, as well as in ways that are not. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s book Responsibility and Control did just that, and distinguished between “regulative” control, and “guidance” control, the latter of which is compatible with determinism. Fischer and Ravizza’s model, and in particular their call for “reasons-responsiveness” capture relevant desiderata for free actions while not requiring “regulative” control, and hence remaining compatible with determinism. Michael Preciado’s recent book A Reformed View of Freedom highlights the usefulness of guidance control for Reformed theology.7 Stratton doesn’t give evidence that he’s familiar with these distinctions on “control.” If he is, why not engage with them, and try to take us beyond the mere equivocation on the phrase “out of our control”? Likewise, competing accounts are offered for what counts as “up to us.” There are compatibilist and incompatibilist ways to unpack “up-to-us-ness.” And if free will is compatible with determinism, then it’s perfectly sensible to describe a free (though determined) action as being “up to us,” even if it doesn’t satisfy the libertarian’s expectations for a sourcehood condition. So, when Stratton says that on determinism a human’s thoughts are “not up to that which one refers to as the ‘I’ but to things other than the self” (p.173), the compatibilist will object and request a reason to unpack “up-to-us-ness” in this incompatibilist way. Instead, the way he sees things, what we do is “up to God” on one level, and also “up to us” on another level, which preserves free will and moral responsibility (as well as knowledge). Facing this compatibilist story of what counts as the proper “source” of one’s action, Stratton’s repetition of the conditional “if an agent is not the source and originator of his own thoughts (and something external to the person is causally determining the person’s thoughts), … then he is merely left assuming his or her determined thoughts are good— let alone true!” (p.179) remains question-begging, as it’s unsupported by premises the Calvinist would accept. Finally, in a number of places, Stratton uses the language of “forcing” to describe God’s determination of all things: “If a person’s thoughts and beliefs are forced upon him, and he could not have chosen better thoughts and beliefs, then he is simply left assuming that his determined thoughts and beliefs are good (and that his beliefs are true).” (p.168) He then asks a rhetorical question: “When there is disagreement amongst individuals, does this imply that God is forcing (causing) some/many people to believe false propositions?” (172). I don’t know what Stratton
7 Michael Patrick Preciado, A Reformed View of Freedom: The Compatibility of Guidance Control and Reformed Theology (Eugene, OR: Piwkick Publications, 2019). GUILLAUME BIGNON
29 means by the juxtaposition “forcing (causing),” because the two are not equivalent, and “forcing” has connotations of coercion that don’t follow from determinism. But yes, determinism does mean that all things, including people’s false beliefs, are determined ultimately by God in his providence. And the Calvinist thinks that God has morally sufficient reasons for determining that, just as he has morally sufficient reasons for all the evil that happens in this world. It’s Stratton’s job to tell us—with premises we accept, not just rhetorical questions—why that’s necessarily false. If “forced” is intended to simply denote determinism, then the claim that it undermines rationality is question-begging. But if it’s intended to refer to something stronger, like coercion, then Stratton’s claim isn’t just question-begging, it also stands refuted, because coercion features the use of physical force or threats, which makes it demonstrably disanalogous to the normal compatibilist case wherein God determines our choices but uses neither force nor threats.
Mad scientist Stratton offers a mad scientist manipulation case to argue that we couldn’t know anything if we were under that scientist’s control, and that the same problem applies if God determines us: Suppose a mad scientist exhaustively controls (causally determines) all of Smith’s thoughts and beliefs all the time … [and] consider this rhetorical question: “How could Smith (not the mad scientist) rationally affirm the current beliefs in his head as good, bad, better, the best, true or probably true without begging the question?” (p.173). The problem is that Stratton doesn’t tell us how the scientist does that. Does the scientist’s contraption make our beliefs non-reason-responsive? If he just shoves beliefs in our brains with electrodes regardless of the evidence coming our way, then of course that makes our cognitive faculties unreliable and removes warrant for our beliefs, but then that makes it relevantly disanalogous to the normal compatibilist case where God determines our beliefs in ways that leave our cognitive faculties reasons-responsive. And conversely, if whatever the scientist does isn’t breaking the connection between our beliefs and the reasons and evidence coming our way, then why think it’s impeding on the reliability of our cognitive faculties to detect the truth? All Stratton says is that our beliefs would not be “up to us,” but “up to the mad scientist” (p.173). I already pointed out that “up-to-us-ness” need not be exclusive in that way, which makes this disjunction a false dilemma at least when it comes to God.
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30 Aiming at truth Alvin Plantinga famously argued that our true beliefs amount to knowledge only if they are produced by cognitive faculties functioning properly, in an environment that is friendly to them, and according to a design plan aimed at truth. Additionally, Plantinga argued that if naturalism and evolution are true, then our cognitive faculties are designed by chance and natural selection to aim at “survival,” not particularly at “truth,” which would give us a reason to think they’re not reliable to produce a preponderance of true beliefs. That, in turn, would be a defeater for all the beliefs they produce, including our beliefs in naturalism and evolution, therefore making the pair of beliefs self-refuting. He called this the “Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism.” Stratton attempts to retool Plantinga’s argument to aim it not just at the naturalist, but also at the Calvinist determinist: However, these problems are also burdensome for the Calvinist who—aligning himself with the naturalist—affirms that all things are exhaustively, causally determined, though, not by the forces of nature, but by God. (p.172) Plantinga’s claim was that if naturalistic determinism is true, then our cognitive faculties are not aimed at truth. Stratton seems to endorse Plantinga’s claim against naturalistic determinism, and additionally claims that if theological determinism is true, then our thoughts are not aimed at truth either, because they’re always aimed at God’s greatest desires instead; God determines us to hold some true beliefs, and some false beliefs, all according to God’s plan: Alternatively, if God is exhaustively running the show via causal determinism, then the thoughts and beliefs of humanity are not necessarily aimed at truth either. Rather, the thoughts and beliefs of humanity are always perfectly aimed at the will of God—and God causally determines the majority of humanity to possess and affirm false theological beliefs. Hence, if EDD [Exhaustive Divine Determinism] is true, then human theological beliefs are not reliable (p.173). This confuses general design and meticulous providential purposes. The sense of “aim” relevant to Plantinga’s argument is one that refers to the general design of our cognitive faculties. And the general design of our cognitive faculties—how God has wired the minds of humans in general— can perfectly be said to be “aimed at truth” on theological determinism, even as we also say that God, in his meticulous providence, has specific purposes behind his decree of just when our cognitive faculties will in fact function properly or not. Therefore, determinism isn’t a reason to think our faculties aren’t aimed at truth in the relevant sense. That conclusion is only given to you GUILLAUME BIGNON
31 by naturalistic determinism (which means Plantinga’s argument against naturalism actually works), but it doesn’t undermine Calvinism and its theological determinism at all. Stratton’s misunderstanding of what it means for our cognitive faculties to be “aiming” at something in the sense relevant to Plantinga’s argument, is most apparent in Stratton’s claim that on naturalistic determinism, human thoughts are not aimed at anything: “Ultimately, if naturalistic determinism is true, the thoughts and beliefs of humanity are not intentionally ‘aimed’ at anything since physics and chemistry are running the show.” (p.173) This shows that he doesn’t understand the “aim” in question. We don’t need an intentional designer to say that on naturalism human brains are “aimed” at survival. Natural selection can shape a mechanism whose “general design” is aiming at survival. That’s precisely what Plantinga affirms of our cognitive faculties on naturalism and evolution. And it is that same idea of “general design” to aim at truth, which theists affirm is true of our cognitive faculties, and I insist is perfectly compatible with theological determinism. Stratton adds that on determinism our beliefs are determined by external factors that are not rational: their [the determinists’] very conclusion about determinism would simply be determined by external factors (perhaps chemistry and physics) that are not aimed at truth and have nothing to do with rationality, the process of acquiring reason-based knowledge, or critical thinking and logic. (p.169) Yes, chemistry and physics aren’t rational. But on theological determinism, they’re ultimately determined by God who is most definitely rational. Stratton later does add “God” to the list of candidates for what determines our thoughts, but somehow insists we’re determined by a “non- rational” process: their [the determinists’] philosophy compels them to reply that the non-rational laws of nature and past events, or God, always exhaustively determine a person’s considerations, examinations, and estimations. (p.170) The short insertion of “or God” undoes the entire point. The laws of nature aren’t rational, but God is, so the objection dissolves immediately. As long as God exists—which a lot of Calvinists believe!—determinism doesn’t entail that our cognitive faculties aren’t aimed at truth in the sense relevant to warrant à la Plantinga.
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32 Indirect doxastic voluntarism Finally, Stratton equates the libertarian ability to choose one’s beliefs, with the thesis of “indirect doxastic voluntarism,” or the “freedom to choose what [one] ultimately believes by way of his self-controlled, free thinking,” (p.170) and he says that determinists have to reject it. Here, I do agree that Christians will want to affirm something like indirect doxastic voluntarism, because it seems to me at least some of our beliefs are such that we can be held morally responsible for holding them. But it’s not clear at all why determinists can’t affirm exactly that, and deny that it requires libertarian free will. Doxastic voluntarism has to do with “controlling” one’s beliefs in such a way that one can be morally responsible for them. It’s wide open for Calvinists to use a compatibilist-friendly account of control such as Fischer and Ravizza’s “guidance control” that I mentioned above. Stratton doesn’t engage with that sort of account of control, so he doesn’t block that fine way out of his argument. And it’s worse than this, as he declares not merely that determinists should reject doxastic voluntarism, but that they in fact do! all who hold to exhaustive determinism (natural or divine) reject the idea of indirect doxastic voluntarism because it implies libertarian freedom to indirectly freely choose among a range of options consistent with a person’s nature. (p.171) No, we don’t, and no, it doesn’t.
Conclusion on the freethinking argument It is time to take stock of the free-thinking argument. In summary, the main premise of the argument, the one that Calvinists reject, the one that says that determinism excludes rationality, is supported by ad nauseam repetition, and an army of equivocations on the requirements of rationality—like our thoughts being “up to us,” our having “free will,” our being “in control” of our thinking, our having the “ability” to think and believe otherwise, our ability to deliberate— each of which admits compatibilist and incompatibilist accounts, without much of a hint that Stratton knows that they do, so as to not beg the question, by assuming as he does, that their incompatibilist reading is the only one that can do the job. And once again, the reader may not be convinced by these compatibilist accounts; perhaps they still find them unattractive at various points, c’est la vie. But one doesn’t need to accept compatibilism to appreciate that Stratton’s free-thinking argument falls far short of refuting determinism, much less justifies his awarding it the trophy of best argument ever offered for libertarianism: “As this author sees it, of all the arguments that have been developed in support of GUILLAUME BIGNON
33 libertarian freedom, there is one [the free-thinking argument] that seems to supersede all others.” (p.167) If it’s indeed the best the other side has to offer, Calvinists are pretty safe.
THEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS The next chapter aims to offer “theological arguments” for libertarianism, based on various Christian theological commitments. Stratton first develops into a syllogism his earlier claim that 1 Cor. 10:13 teaches that when faced with temptation, Christians have a libertarian, categorical ability to escape sin. “Christians possess the ability to choose between giving into[sic] temptation or to take the way of escape God promises to provide (1 Cor 10:13).” (p.181) Stratton says it’s a “plain and common-sense interpretation of the Apostle Paul’s words.” I have already responded to this above. There is an equivocation on the “ability to do otherwise,” and to just claim that the ability needs to be categorical rather than conditional not only begs the question of incompatibilism, but if affirmed consistently over the course of a person’s life entails either that humans have the ability to live a sinless life, or that they cannot be blamed for their failure to do so. One lands on Pelagianism, or universalism. Stratton then says that compatibilism entails determinism—that’s all too quick without at least offering an argument, but I’m sympathetic to that move myself, so I don’t need to object here— and he argues against determinism to refute compatibilism. But what argument does he now offer against determinism? He launches again into a re-articulation and defense of his free-thinking argument! The reader may wonder why we’re returning to this philosophical argument when we just left the chapter whose entire point it was to defend that very claim, and when we are now in a new chapter that’s supposed to offer “theological arguments” instead. It appears this odd placement is explained by another unfortunate copy/paste from Stratton’s blog.8 In any case, the repetition of the argument doesn’t fare any better in this new instance, as it still features the same weak premise, now called (G3) “If one does not ever possess the libertarian freedom to think otherwise, then he cannot rationally affirm knowledge claims.” (p.183)
8 This entire section comes from the blog post “Compatibilism is incompatible with reality” https://freethinkingministries.com/compatibilism-is-incompatible-with-reality/ A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
34 Greatest desires Stratton does make one last attempt to support it: this time, he finds issue with the common compatibilist affirmation that the outcome of a human choice is always the one and only that corresponds to the person’s “greatest desire” at the moment of choice. That is one way that compatibilists sometimes seek to highlight the intuitive nature of their account of human inclination, seeing that on the moment of choice, there is only one option that one most desires and naturally that’s the option that will be necessarily chosen. Stratton seizes on the wording of “choosing in accordance with our greatest desires,” and says that it somehow undermines the rationality of our choices. First, he offers a handful of false dilemmas again: it’s either our greatest desires, or logic and reason; either our greatest desires, or truth; either our greatest desires or rationally inferred beliefs: Choices based on “greatest desires” are not choices based on logic and reason. . . . if choices are always—and only—aimed at the target of a person’s “greatest desire,” they are never aimed at the target of truth. . . . On this Edwardsian view, even if a person happens to hold a true belief, it is not a rationally inferred belief; it is simply his greatest desire. (p.184) But of course, the compatibilist affirms it’s “both and” in each case, and we’re not given independent arguments to exclude the view that our “greatest desires” could also be based on logic and reason, be aiming at truth, and be rationally inferred. Instead, choosing according to our “Greatest desires” is somehow depicted as just following prejudicial, pre-reflective, subjective preferences, rather than following objective truth and evidence: Ultimately, according to the Edwardsian compatibilist, the only reason he has chosen to reject libertarian freedom is because he has a “greatest desire” for exhaustive divine determinism (EDD) to be true. That is not a good (rational) reason to believe anything. Subjective personal preference is vastly different than selecting a view based on objective truth. (p.184) Stratton fails to appreciate that on determinism, when our cognitive faculties are functioning properly, our so-called “greatest desire” is aligned with the evidence that educates and motivates our choice. With a minimum of intellectual integrity, our “greatest desire” is going to be following the evidence. It’s going to be molded by the evidence. I walk into the kitchen, I see and smell a fresh loaf of bread, and I rationally infer “someone has baked bread.” To do the opposite instead, and “freely think” that no one has baked any bread despite the loaf and the smell, is positively inconsistent with my intellect (I don’t mean to brag), and it’s unreasonable for Stratton to insist I GUILLAUME BIGNON
35 must somehow retain the categorical ability to pick that irrational option in that exact situation if my actual belief that someone baked the bread is to count as knowledge. I am facing sufficient evidence that someone has baked the bread, which inclines me to say so, as my “greatest desire” has been correctly shaped by the evidence. There is no rationality problem here. Afterwards, Stratton goes on with further repetitions: of descriptions of determinism, of the conditional that “if determinism is true we cannot be rational,” and of the “aha” claim that it’s self- defeating to rationally affirm something which undermines rationality. The ad nauseam is exhausting.
Humans are just as necessary as God Stratton’s next argument claims that if compatibilism is true, then an agent’s desires and actions are necessary; and if one applies this to God, it means that God’s decision to create humans is necessary as well: “If God necessarily desires to create humans and nothing prevents God from creating humans, then God necessarily creates humans.” (p.185) According to Stratton, this would make humans “just as necessary as God,” which he says is absurd. This two-step argument fails at each step. First, theological compatibilists don’t have to grant that God necessarily desires to create humans; what they do say of humans is that they can be determined by God and still responsible. That doesn’t commit them to saying God is determined. But secondly, let’s say they bite the bullet and affirm that God’s decision to create is indeed broadly logically necessary. It means that humans will exist in every possible world, but that isn’t to say they are necessary beings, or as Stratton puts it, “just as necessary as God.” A necessary being cannot fail to exist at any time and must therefore exist forever, in addition to existing in every possible world. That’s clearly not the case for humans who all have a beginning even if they end up existing in every possible world in virtue of God’s necessary desire to create them. So, when Stratton adds the premise “Humans do not exist necessarily” to conclude his reductio, there remains an equivocation on “exist necessarily.” If we all agree that humans aren’t necessary beings, but maintain they are created necessarily by God, then Stratton doesn’t independently support the claim that they are not. He just states equivocally that “humans do not exist necessarily,” which is unhelpful.
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36 THE OMNI ARGUMENT Stratton calls his next argument the “omni argument.” It contains a rather lengthy discussion of God’s “omni” attributes, and multiple formulations of related syllogisms, but the argument ultimately boils down to this: if compatibilism is true, God could make everyone freely repent and be saved, and if he is omnibenevolent then he would want to do it, but he doesn’t, so compatibilism isn’t true. Jerry Walls had already argued along those lines years ago,9 and the compatibilist answer at the time was decisively offered by Greg Welty and Steven Cowan10: while on compatibilism God is able to determine that humans freely repent, and he has some desire to bring it about, it doesn’t follow that he will do so, because doing so may conflict with other good purposes that God may have. Walls protested that we’re not told what those purposes are, and Welty & Cowan responded it’s not up to them to prove they exist, but up to Walls to prove that they don’t. I think Welty & Cowan’s response is exactly right, though I add that Rom.9:22 may well be giving us at least some of God’s purposes behind reprobation. Stratton says the Bible adds support to the claim that God wants all to be saved (Jn 3:16, 1 Tim 2, Ezk 18:23). Yes, he has the desire to do that.11 Again, it doesn’t follow that it’s his only or ultimate purpose in the matter. Stratton then compares God’s love with human love: Would not the majority of people, including this writer, have enough love in their hearts honestly to say that they sincerely desire all people to go to heaven? If this would be how imperfect persons feel about humanity, it seems intuitive that God—a perfect, morally good, and all-loving being— would at least desire the same thing. (p.201) Again, compatibilists need not deny that God “at least desires” the same thing. There’s a false dilemma at play here, as Stratton suggests the Calvinist God either desires their salvation more than any other purposes he may have, or has no desire whatsoever to save them. This latter straw man is worded as a suggestion that God “doesn’t really care” about their eternal suffering, or “hopes you don’t make it to heaven,” or “does not desire the eternal best.” (p.201) None of these
9 Jerry L. Walls, “Why No Classical Theist, Let Alone Orthodox Christian, Should Ever Be a Compatibilist,” Philosophia Christi Vol. 13 No. 1 (Summer 2011): 75-104. And Jerry L. Walls, “Pharaoh’s Magicians Foiled Again: Reply to Cowan and Welty,” Philosophia Christi Vol. 17, No. 2 (Winter 2015): 411-426. 10 Steven B. Cowan and Greg A. Welty, “Pharaoh’s Magicians Redivivus: A Response to Jerry Walls on Christian Compatibilism,” Philosophia Christi Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 2015): 151-173. And Greg A. Welty and Steven B. Cowan, “Won’t Get Foiled Again: A Rejoinder to Jerry Walls,” Philosophia Christi Vol. 17, No. 2 (Winter 2015): 427-442. 11 though John 3:16 is a poor text to cite in support of the position that God wants to save all people without exception. (Doug Becker pointed this out to me in personal correspondence). GUILLAUME BIGNON
37 follows from the Calvinist view that God does not save everyone because he has overriding reasons not to. Stratton doesn’t interact with Welty and Cowan, but he eventually addresses this response based on God’s “competing desires” as it was also offered by John Piper. Unfortunately, he criticizes it in a way that refutes his own view: “What Piper is proposing is that God is like limited, weak, and finite humans who have ‘competing desires’.” (p.202) But even on libertarianism there are two competing desires in God: saving everyone, and giving libertarian free will to everyone. It’s allegedly not feasible for God to bring about both things, so he chose one over the other. Is the Molinist God with these competing desires “like limited, weak, and finite humans”? When Piper makes that very point, Stratton responds: In other words, Piper argues that the Arminian claims that humans freely choosing to love God is more valuable to God than universal salvation. Unfortunately, he fails to recognize that the former is exactly what salvation is. There are no competing desires here but, rather, one desire, namely, for all people to freely choose to love God. Salvation is only found in a true love relationship with God. (p.204) Stratton is free to load all these desiderata in one sentence, to try and say there is “only one thing” that God desires, but it remains that the one sentence contains two identifiable states of affairs that God desires: “all humans having eternal life,” and “all humans having libertarian free will,” which God cannot both actualize, and he picks one over the other. That’s obviously true on Molinism, and that’s Piper’s point. The same also applies to any other evil that’s not salvation-related: on Molinism, God desires that we don’t murder each other, but God also desires that we choose freely not to murder each other, and in light of his permitting that murders occur, he evidently desires the “freely” part more than the “not murdering” part. Two desires.
Speculations on perfect being theology and what brings God glory Stratton seeks to ground his claim that God would save everyone if he could, on perfect being theology: “Furthermore, a philosophical analysis of the nature of a maximally great being would reach this same conclusion: he would (at least) desire all people to ‘flourish’ and avoid eternal hell.” (p.202) But we’re still not told whether that desire can be overridden by another divine purpose. And that question won’t be answered by a mere a priori reflection. This is a clear limitation of perfect being theology: we can start with some of our intuitions of what a perfect being would do, but for the A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
38 Christian, those intuitions must then be educated by the specific record of scripture. Otherwise, Stratton’s practice of perfect being theology would likewise lead us to think that God, as a maximally great being, would maximally love everyone, and hence love them equally, which the Bible tells us he does not. Even if one takes Rom. 9:13 to mean God “loved less” Esau rather than “hated” him, it remains an unequal love between Jacob and Esau, that conflicts with the conclusion one would reach through Stratton’s unbridled practice of perfect being theology. Stratton does come to consider the question of whether God may have those other purposes for reprobation, and speculates on what may bring God more glory. His conclusion is that “the idea that God’s glory and universal salvation are logically contradictory is far from obvious.” (p.203) But it need not be obvious at all. The Calvinist must simply say it’s true; it’s for Stratton to show that it’s impossible, not for the Calvinist to show that it’s obvious.
Saved by the damned – Motte and Bailey Finally, Stratton offers a bizarre non-sequitur alleging that on compatibilism, the damned contribute to the salvation of the elect! Piper had said that the reprobate contribute to the manifestation of God’s glory in judgment, and to the fact that the saved are able to “enjoy giving all credit to God.” Stratton takes this to mean that the damned are contributing to the salvation of the elect. What a strange leap. He writes: Perhaps the most serious theological problem with this view is that, if it is logically impossible for God to have both his desire of glory and his desire of universal salvation, then the atonement of Christ was simply not enough. Piper’s position entails that Jesus merely picked up part of the check and left the unconditionally hated “non-elect” to pick up the rest of the tab and suffer the holocaust of hell into the infinite future so that those in heaven might “enjoy giving all credit to God.” In other words, the cross of Christ—together with the damned in hell—is what it takes to secure salvation for a few. Thus, Jesus’s atonement is only a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition to make salvation possible for the elect. (p.203-204) And he paints the view that “God must damn some humans in order to save others” as somehow affirmed by (some?) Calvinists. (p.204) The whole discussion is a note-for-note rendering of the Motte and Bailey fallacy, where an obviously true thesis is conflated with a highly suspect one, and the reasonable rejection of the latter is equated with the outrageous rejection of the former. In this case, the Motte is: “God doesn’t GUILLAUME BIGNON
39 need the damned to save the elect.” And the Bailey is “God doesn’t need the damned to display the full range of his Glory.” With a good dose of sarcasm, he decries as preposterous the denial of the Motte: “should [the determinists] not also take a moment to thank the damned in hell as well since they could not have been saved without them?”, but concludes from this that the Bailey is true: “The cross was enough. Jesus paid it all. God does not need anyone to suffer hell into the infinite future to receive his glory”. (p.204, emphasis mine) Obviously, the Bailey doesn’t follow from the Motte.
Conclusion And that’s it. The chapters on philosophical and theological arguments for libertarianism end on that note. Not before a cringeworthy reference to God as an “ultimate gentleman,” Stratton concludes that “a rational mind ought to reject any form of exhaustive determinism—and its cousin compatibilism—in favor of some level of libertarian freedom.” (p.205) I think not.
MOLINA AND MERE MOLINISM The following chapter presents Luis de Molina: his life and his work, with special focus on his exposition of middle-knowledge. I don’t need to comment on this part: there isn’t much that’s controversial in there. The next chapter after that aims to offer arguments for what Stratton calls “mere Molinism,” the conjunction of libertarianism and middle knowledge. He refers to it as “mere” Molinism to capture his hope that Christians can agree on it as a minimal statement of divine providence over human free will, even if they disagree on other more peripheral issues, particularly on how God saves humans. He says it’s open both to Calvinists and Arminians to meet in the middle and affirm mere Molinism. That sounds pretty ecumenical. But is this a realistic call to unity across the theological divide? As I understand it, Calvinism—as a philosophical position on divine providence and free will—is committed to theological determinism and compatibilism. And unfortunately (or not!), these two are inconsistent with the first pillar of mere Molinism. So, for Calvinists like me, there is no rallying under the banner of mere Molinism, without first abandoning the theological determinism and compatibilism that made us Calvinists in the first place. Conversely, if someone A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
40 calls himself a “Calvinist” but affirms libertarianism and accepts that God knows the truth of counterfactuals of freedom, then they qualify for “mere Molinism” indeed, but their position is what I would have called Molinism all along, so it’s not much of a revelation to suggest that they’re “mere” Molinists. That’s still Molinist enough to be wrong if you ask the Calvinist determinist. As to the arguments Stratton offers here in favor of (mere) Molinism, they now mostly presuppose that libertarianism has been established by his previous arguments. And given that starting point, I agree that Molinism is quite defensible. God knows the truth of counterfactuals of freedom, from which Molinism follows, if libertarianism is true.
Arbitrating the debate among libertarians There isn’t much for a Calvinist to discuss here. Rather, I suppose it’s the classical (simple- foreknowledge) Arminians and the open theists who are going to find issue with some of Stratton’s claims at this point. For example, his claim that “if God lacks middle knowledge, then God is not a maximally great being.” (p.233) Non-Molinist libertarians may well reply that counterfactuals of libertarian free will aren’t there to be known, so that not knowing them is no impediment to God’s greatness nor to his omniscience. Similarly, Stratton argues later in the chapter that if God doesn’t have a plan to accomplish his goal in creation, then he is irrational. So, if humans have libertarian free will and God doesn’t have middle knowledge to providentially control what happens, then he has no plan to successfully accomplish his goal in creation. The argument doesn’t affect the determinist—as it explicitly presupposes libertarianism—but I don’t think it’s going to move classical (simple-foreknowledge) Arminians and open theists much either. They’ll just say that God relates to his goals differently and is still in a great position to try and bring them about, because he’s all powerful. And again later, Stratton offers an argument he credits to Kirk MacGregor, which says “God either possesses his counterfactual knowledge logically prior or logically posterior to his creative decree,” (p.250), and then says it’s in fact logically prior, because humans have libertarian freedom. So, here again—since libertarianism is a premise—the argument is intended to arbitrate the disagreement between Molinists, classical (simple-foreknowledge) Arminians, and open theists. But here again, I think the non-Molinist libertarians will just deny that God knows counterfactuals of libertarian freedom, which immediately avoids the (mere) Molinist conclusion. That’s no additional cost to their position. GUILLAUME BIGNON
41 But I guess I don’t need to dwell on this exchange too much; I’m actually rooting for the Molinist in this intra-libertarian debate.
The grounding objection This chapter also discusses the so-called “grounding objection” to middle-knowledge, according to which “middle knowledge is impossible because there is nothing that grounds counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.” (p.234) I personally don’t know if the grounding objection is sound, but if it is, I agree it’s not easy to argue. Molinists William Lane Craig and Thomas Flint give the grounding-objector at least a pretty good run for his money.12 Let’s not get into that technical debate here, it’s not a significant reason why I reject Molinism.
Contingent compatibilism The only part in this chapter’s discussion of mere Molinism that may still be relevant to Calvinists is Stratton’s argument that God must have middle knowledge even if he never creates anyone with libertarian freedom in the actual world. That would make theological determinists out to be “mere Molinists” as well, even though they affirm the truth of theological determinism in this world. Stratton argues that “If God is omnipotent, he possesses the ability to create a world including humans who possess limited libertarian freedom, even if he never does” (p.237), and that “If God is omniscient, he possesses perfect knowledge of how humans who possess libertarian freedom would choose if he were to create them, and even if he never creates them” (p.238). The problem with this appeal for Calvinists to affirm mere Molinism without libertarian freedom in the actual world, is that the proposal is incoherent. On the Calvinist view, it’s not just determinism that obtains in the actual world, it’s compatibilism. But the truth (or falsehood) of compatibilism isn’t contingent. It’s not the sort of thing that hangs on God’s creative decision. If it’s true, it’s necessarily true. And if it’s false, it’s necessarily false. But it cannot be true in the actual world while false in any other possible world. It means that if compatibilism is true in the actual world (which Calvinists affirm), then it follows that there is no possible world in which
12 William Lane Craig, “Middle-Knowledge, Truth-Makers, and the ‘Grounding Objection’”, Faith and Philosophy 18 (2001): 337-52. And Thomas P. Flint, Divine Providence: The Molinist Account (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 121-137. A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
42 incompatibilism is true.13 And hence (since libertarianism is premised on the truth of incompatibilism), there is no possible world in which libertarianism is true. Accordingly, the Calvinist determinist not only need not, but cannot affirm that even though determinism obtains in the actual world, God had middle knowledge of libertarianly free creatures he never in fact created. That obligatory Calvinist denial excludes middle knowledge and hence avoids the charge of “mere Molinism.”
The closet Molinist quiz Stratton closes the chapter with a “Calvinist quiz”: six questions aimed at Calvinists, which ask respectively if Satan, Adam and Eve, unregenerate sinners, or Christians, ever had, have, or ever will have a categorical ability to make some choice or other. Since they all refer to the categorical ability to do otherwise than one does, Calvinists should say “no” to all of these, and nothing bad follows from that. But Stratton recounts his encounter with an unnamed “well-known Reformed theologian,” who responded “yes” to all of these. Stratton declared him a Molinist. Yes. That’s what I would call him too. We don’t need six questions to diagnose that someone who affirms any libertarian choice is not a Calvinist determinist.
THE APOLOGETIC SIGNIFICANCE OF MOLINISM The final chapter, titled “the apologetic significance of Molinism,” aims to highlight the benefits of being a Molinist when engaging in Christian apologetics (mostly in dialogue with atheism). William Lane Craig’s blurb said this chapter was “worth the price of admission alone,” and I’m once more at a loss to see why. The material in this chapter is mostly confused, and another import from Stratton’s blog, to which the price of admission is thus, ironically, zero.14
The problem of evil Stratton first says that Molinism is helpful to respond to the problem of evil, because libertarian free will provides a reason why God allows evil. Yes, the libertarian can use the free will defense
13 This point was highlighted to me by Paul Manata in personal correspondence, when discussing whether Calvinists may use libertarian free will as a defense against the problem of evil, while rejecting it as a theodicy. 14 “The Apologetic Significance of Molinism (ETS Edit)” https://freethinkingministries.com/the-apologetic- significance-of-molinism-ets-edit/ GUILLAUME BIGNON
43 and the compatibilist cannot. But Stratton goes all in, and says it “takes the argument off the table” for the atheist: Since this problem of evil seems to be the greatest “reason” for atheism (at least based upon the years of apologetic encounters of this author), it follows that Molinism—if true—takes this so-called “reason” off the table for atheists. (p.259) First, obviously, if Molinism is true then the problem of evil is no longer sound, since Molinism entails God’s existence, which entails that the argument from evil cannot be sound. But that’s trivial and likely not what Stratton meant to say. Rather, he seems to mean that if the Christian interlocutor is a Molinist, the atheist is left with no room to argue that evil counts against God’s existence. And that is going much too far. Atheists clearly still have room to push back and argue that it’s improbable that all evil in this world could be explained by God trying to secure the outcome of human libertarian choices. I’m obviously not saying that the problem of evil is sound, but that Stratton claims far too much when he says Molinism somehow removes the problem altogether. He goes so far as to claim that if only atheist Neil deGrasse Tyson knew about Molinism, he would simply stop offering the argument from natural evil, and maybe consider converting! “If Tyson were aware of Molinism, then he would not make such claims and perhaps even consider Christianity.” (p.260) I don’t think it’s slandering Tyson to say that Stratton’s wildly optimistic counterfactual is out of touch with reality. In this section of the chapter, Stratton also claims that the Calvinist determinist cannot answer the problem of evil. His 3-sentence explanation of why is strangely confused, though: If [God causally determines all things], would it not follow that God causally determined all of Hitler’s thoughts and actions? Do not atheists have an arguable point and can they not rationally infer that (1) while Hitler is in a sense responsible for the Holocaust, (2) God is ultimately to blame; one way or another. . . . Moreover, atheists might rightly infer that God is further guilty of additional evil because he could not, would not, or did not do anything to stop Hitler. (p.257) Of course, that last sentence is just as true on Molinism as it is on Calvinism. Evidently, God “could not, would not, or did not do anything to stop Hitler” on Molinism either. If that’s sufficient to infer that God is guilty, Molinism is disqualified by Stratton’s own standard. But yes, determinism means God determines all things, and that includes Hitler’s actions. The Calvinist of course disagrees that determinism entails God is “ultimately to blame” for evil, and Stratton doesn’t offer any further argument in support of that transfer of blame, nor does he interact A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
44 even a little with modern, detailed treatments of evil by Calvinist philosophers,15 so there isn’t much to respond to. He quotes me in conclusion to declare Molinism’s victory: The Calvinist and theological determinist, Guillame Bignon summarizes the issue well: “Arminianism [which Bignon conflates with Molinism] is better-off than Calvinism to answer the atheist argument from evil against God’s existence. I do affirm that . . . the libertarian has a resource against the problem of evil that the compatibilist cannot use. That, of course, doesn’t mean that Arminianism is overall better, only that it’s more useful at rejecting the problem of evil. It’s a strength of Arminianism [Molinism] I recognize.” (p.263). I need not complain about the perfectly understandable misspelling of my first name, but I do need to complain about his handling of my words here again. He truncated the qualifier “to a certain extent,” which stood right before those words in that very sentence, a qualifier which explicitly limited the scope of my positive appraisal of Arminianism. That limit was also made most clear by the very next words that followed the quoted portion but were not included. They went like this: “It’s a strength of Arminianism I recognize. I just think “being false” is a weakness which on balance makes Arminianism less than ideal.”16 I’m essentially saying Arminianism wins a Pyhrric victory, and Stratton reports something like “Bignon admits ‘Arminianism wins a . . . victory’.” I suppose it’s true enough, but not quite the original message.
The free-thinking argument Stratton re-articulates the free-thinking argument against naturalism, and points out that it’s not available to the Calvinist. Yes indeed, the compatibilist determinist cannot use the freethinking argument, as it’s premised on our having libertarian free will. But having pointed out above at least half a dozen problems with Stratton’s defense of the argument, I don’t think it’s a great loss for Calvinists to have no access to an argument that turns out to be this flawed. If one wants to argue against naturalism by way of an accusation of epistemic self-defeat, then Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism is ready at hand, has the benefit of being actually good, and is fully available to the Calvinist.
15 See David E. Alexander and Daniel M. Johnson, Calvinism and the Problem of Evil (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2016) and part II of my Excusing Sinners and Blaming God (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2018), dealing with divine involvement in evil. 16 “A response to Kevin Timpe’s objections” http://www.associationaxiome.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Response-to-Kevin-Timpe.pdf, page 19. GUILLAUME BIGNON
45 The Kalam argument. The Kalam cosmological argument is a standard fixture of apologetics à la William Lane Craig, who argued that everything that begins to exist must have a cause, and that since the universe began to exist, it must have a cause. Stratton says the Kalam argument entails the existence of a God with libertarian free will, and that if humans are created in his image, then they have libertarian free will too. I don’t see how either of those two steps follows from the Kalam’s premises, its conclusion, or the conceptual analysis of the cause of the universe. Stratton says God cannot be determined to create because that would make him caused by something else, and “whatever the cause of the cause was would be the cause.” (p.266) But who says God must be caused by anything outside of himself? If it turned out that God was determined to create—and I’m not saying he was—that would be in virtue of his self-existing, necessarily good nature inclining him to create, not in virtue of an outside cause. Stratton repeats that a God who creates necessarily, would lead to humanity being “just as necessary as God Himself,” a claim which I already addressed above. And then I fail to see how humans having libertarian free will would follow from God being undetermined. Stratton says it “stands to reason” that if humans are created in God’s image, they “could possess” libertarian freedom. That’s a far cry from an argument establishing that they in fact do. So, for all Stratton gives us here, a proponent of the Kalam argument need not be a Molinist; if Calvinists like it, it’s theirs to use as well.
The moral argument Stratton then turns to the moral argument in the form defended by William Lane Craig again, which claims that if God doesn’t exist, objective moral values and duties do not exist; but they do, and so he does. I’ll mostly skip the defense of the argument and focus on the alleged relevance of Molinism, but I must reproduce Stratton’s awkward argument that aims to “clarify” his claim that Christian theists can affirm life has an objective purpose. He provides this gauche syllogism with five steps, no less:
W1 If a truth corresponds to reality, it is objectively true [apart from human opinion].
W2 If God created humanity for a purpose, then this purpose is a truth that corresponds to reality.
W3 Therefore, if God created humanity for a purpose, then this purpose is objectively true.
W4 God created humanity for a purpose.
W5 Therefore, God’s purpose for creating humanity is objectively true [apart from human opinion]. A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
46 On the up side, the argument is logically valid. But who is this arguing against? Who will ever need premises 1 to 3? And who will ever grant premise 4 if they don’t already affirm the conclusion in 5? Let’s turn to Stratton’s comments about whether Calvinists can use the moral argument. He first comes back to announcing and documenting with direct quotes by myself and by Matthew Hart, that some Calvinists affirm determinism. Well yes, we do. One would think the reader would have gotten the point by now, we’re on page 269 out of 300 in a book whose central goal is in part to refute that very point of view. This odd placement is explained by the fact I mentioned above: this chapter comes from Stratton’s blog,17 complete with its original support for the existence of Calvinist determinists, a documentation now rendered otiose by its new locus in Stratton’s book. What does he say in defense of his claim that proponents of the moral argument must be Molinists? He offers another 7-step syllogism that boils down to saying “ought implies can” (about our thoughts and actions). The use of this Kantian maxim is well known as an argument against the truth of Calvinism, but how is it at all connected to a Calvinist’s access to the moral argument? If the maxim is true (and “can” is interpreted categorically), then it refutes Calvinism, but it doesn’t block the Calvinist’s access to the moral argument. And we can illustrate the point by turning the tables around: I have argued above that this maxim “ought implies can” entails Pelagianism. If that’s right (and Pelagianism is false), then it refutes Molinism, but it doesn’t say anything about Molinists having access to the moral argument. Stratton concludes that “Since libertarian free will is necessary for the moral argument to work, the dedicated apologist ought to be a Molinist” (p.271), a claim which enjoys no support from anything Stratton has said so far. He then turns to the Euthyphro dilemma as an objection to the moral argument, and parts of his response I personally don’t even understand, so I cannot paraphrase it here. The reader will have to see if he’s more successful at exegeting Stratton’s English than I am. He then says that “whether [humans] are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is their free choice” (p.271), so he says Calvinists don’t have access to that response. First, Calvinists affirm humans make free choices, they only deny it requires indeterminism. And secondly, I don’t see how that’s at all a response to the Euthyphro dilemma. What is the alleged connection between the Euthyphro and the debate on compatibilism/incompatibilism? He eventually argues against Calvinism on the basis that the
17 “The Apologetic Significance of Molinism (ETS Edit)” https://freethinkingministries.com/the-apologetic- significance-of-molinism-ets-edit/ GUILLAUME BIGNON
47 Calvinist God isn’t omnibenevolent, and that on Calvinism, our choices are not “up to us.” We’re going around in circles here; I have already addressed those claims above, and they have nothing to do with the Euthyphro dilemma, or the moral argument. The whole section is deeply confusing.
The fine-tuning argument. Stratton then turns to the fine-tuning of the universe as an argument for God, based on intelligent design. The initial conditions of the universe are extremely finely tuned to permit life, and the physics involved are such that if those initial conditions had been even slightly different, then life would not have been possible anywhere in the universe. Stratton seizes on that counterfactual language, and somehow takes it to require Molinist middle-knowledge: This has great significance and relevance to Molinism, which explains that God possesses certain knowledge of what would occur in possible worlds if he were to fine-tune the initial conditions of the early universe with all the “special numbers” referenced (and more) and actualize this certain possible world. This also entails that God would possess perfect counterfactual knowledge—not grounded in anything that actually exists—about what kind of non-life permitting universes would have come into existence if any of those numbers were slightly altered (a different possible world would have been the actual world). This is confused. God knows what the universe would be like if some of the constants and quantities had been different. But they’re not counterfactuals of libertarian freedom; their truth is a pure consequence of the physical properties involved, so they don’t require Molinist middle knowledge at all. Calvinists obviously affirm counterfactuals about the physics of the universe, and they even affirm counterfactuals of freedom, they just deny human freedom is libertarian. You don’t need middle-knowledge to know that “if gravity were stronger, objects would fall faster,” any more than you need middle-knowledge to know that “if I were American, I would have the right to vote in the United States,” or that “if I had a billion dollars, I would be richer than I am.” Counterfactual knowledge doesn’t entail Molinism. And even if we consider the possible indeterminacy of quantum physics (which Stratton mentions), the argument doesn’t work: a non-Molinist could well deny that quantum physics is actually indeterminist, or deny that God knows the truth of counterfactuals pertaining to quantum indeterminacy on the grounds that they’re undetermined, while maintaining God knows the counterfactuals involved in the fine-tuning argument, as they are all determined by physics. That’s the whole point of the fine-tuning argument: physics dictates that the universe would be a certain A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
48 way if the initial conditions had been different. There’s no indeterminacy here, no free will, no Molinism. Stratton concludes: “this author contends that if one is an advocate of the Fine-tuning Argument for the existence of God, then he or she should also be a Molinist. At the very least, the Molinist has no problem incorporating this argument from intelligent design into his apologetics repertoire.” (p.274). What a deflation! It’s quite a different thing to say Molinism is compatible with the argument, from saying it’s demanded by it. It’s not demanded. So, yes, the fine-tuning argument is compatible with Molinism. And with Calvinism. And with simple-foreknowledge Arminianism. And with open theism. Which means Molinism has no apologetic relevance to the fine-tuning argument.
Evolution This chapter features a rather long section on evolution, wherein Stratton tries to offer a model that reconciles Christianity and Evolution. It’s hard to see any connection with Molinism, as none of his proposal for a Christian story of evolution rests on humans having libertarian free will to make the model work. And if the concern is that God may not be able to guide evolution if he doesn’t have middle-knowledge, then it’s even less of a worry for the Calvinist who affirms a stronger view of providence than the Molinist.
Biblical inspiration Stratton then discusses the inspiration of the Bible, and offers a Molinist model of how God could have been sovereignly guiding the free writing of his word. That’s fine by me. It doesn’t touch the Calvinist who, here again, is in an even better position than the Molinist, to explain God’s providential control of the human authors.18
The ontological argument Stratton then turns to the alleged relevance of Molinism to the ontological argument for God. Here, he says that “Molinism affirms the maximal greatness of God.” But then again, so does everyone else in the Christian camp. Stratton doesn’t tell us why they can’t, and his conclusion is
18 I discussed these issues in “Inerrancy, is it a matter of luck?”, presented at the 2013 annual meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society in Baltimore. http://theologui.blogspot.com/2014/07/inerrancy-is-it-matter-of- luck.html GUILLAUME BIGNON
49 underwhelming: “While the Ontological Argument does not prove Molinsim to be true, it is definitely consistent and compatible with it.” (p.288) Which is to say, Molinism is irrelevant to whether an apologist can use the ontological argument.
God’s love for his people. Stratton turns to pastoral issues, and explains that one benefit of Molinism is that it ensures God’s people that God loves them. But that’s also un-controversially true on Calvinism: God certainly loves his people. I suppose the Molinist could say that Calvinism undermines the love of God for the reprobate, but that’s not even Stratton’s point. Instead he tries to say that the Calvinist God “cannot be trusted” because on Calvinism we must reject omnibenevolence. But Calvinists do not accept that determinism excludes God’s omnibenevolence, and even if it did, it wouldn’t follow that they cannot trust God. The argument isn’t taking us very far.
Molinism and prayer. Stratton’s final consideration pertains to petitionary prayer. Here, he misunderstands the requirement for one’s doctrine of divine providence to preserve the meaningfulness of petitionary prayer, and he proceeds to hoist himself with his own petard. He argues that the Calvinist view “leads inevitably and rationally to a pessimism about praying” (p.291) because on that view “prayer does not change the plan of God, a plan established of all eternity.” But exactly two pages later, he says himself—with that very wording—that on Molinism prayers don’t change God’s plan established from all eternity either! He says that on the Molinist view, prayers “were known by God from all eternity past and were incorporated into his plan made before the world began. Thus, while prayers do not change God’s plan—established from all eternity—God knew his people’s prayers, and they influenced what has become his plan.” (p.293, emphasis mine). The contradiction in under two pages is remarkable: he’s arguing that Calvinists should stop believing that prayers do not change God’s plan, and become Molinists, so that they may affirm…that prayers do not change God’s plan. So, let me help the Calvinist and the Molinist out of the pit Stratton just dug. For our prayers to be meaningful, they don’t need to change God’s plans. The relationship between our prayers and God’s plans that is necessary to make sense of petitionary prayer is conditional and counterfactual. What we need to affirm is that God does things in response to our prayers that he wouldn’t have A REVIEW OF ‘HUMAN FREEDOM, DIVINE KNOWLEDGE, AND MERE MOLINISM’
50 done if we hadn’t prayed. Indeed, the denial of that condition is what would make petitionary prayer meaningless, as God would be doing what he does whether or not we pray. But as long as the above counterfactual is true, our prayers can be truly said to affect what happens: we pray, and God does things that he would not have done if we had not prayed. Et voila. But that counterfactual can be affirmed by Molinists and Calvinists alike, as the alternative scenario it posits need not be categorically accessible by one’s use of an indeterministic free will; it’s explicitly conditional and hence compatible with determinism. It means that, contra Stratton, the meaningfulness of petitionary prayer doesn’t arbitrate the debate between Molinists and Calvinists.
CONCLUSION And that’s it, Stratton closes the book, concluding that in light of all his arguments, “it seems that Molinism is probably true.” (p.293) I’m not sure what remains for me to conclude. I suppose my final assessment will now be restating the obvious: I do not recommend this book. While I may very well recognize a good case for a view I happen to disagree with, and am happy to say there are competent defenses of Molinism (and of libertarianism more generally) in the literature today, Tim Stratton’s book isn’t one of them. Its critique of theological determinism is not merely unsound—that commonly happens to arguments by some of the best philosophers—it’s unsound and confused, a confusion which I hope Stratton remedies if he wishes to persist in the ongoing philosophical conversation with Calvinists on the metaphysics of free will and divine providence. Finally, after almost 50 pages of refutations, I may also need to provide a personal justification for having written this much in response to a work that’s arguably so flawed it may not have deserved the attention. My excuse is threefold: I was asked by a good friend to write this critique, I was told Stratton’s work is popular on the internet and spreading a lot of confusion I could help prevent, and I’m mentioned in the book a number of times with obvious misrepresentations of my views that called for correction. Hopefully the present writing has served those purposes.