The Reagan Administration and the Policy of Differentiation: the Case of Czechoslovakia

FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

The Reagan Administration and The Policy of Differentiation: The Case of Czechoslovakia

Bachelor's Thesis

JIŘÍ NYKODÝM

Supervisor: PhDr. Petr Suchý, Ph.D.

Department of International Relations and European Studies International Relations and European Politics

Brno 2021

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION: THE CASE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Bibliographic Record

Author: Jiří Nykodým Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University Department of International Relations and Euro- pean Studies Title of Thesis: The Reagan Administration and The Policy of Dif- ferentiation: The Case of Czechoslovakia Degree Programme: International Relations and European Politics Supervisor: PhDr. Petr Suchý, Ph.D. Academic Year: 2021 Number of Pages: 56 Keywords: Cold War, Czechoslovakia, United States, U.S. policy of differentiation, Reagan administration

1 THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION: THE CASE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Abstract

The research paper analyses Reagan‘s administration's perception of Czechoslovakia from 1981-1989 within the framework of U.S. policy of differentiation. The central thesis objective is to develop a historical work on the much not-contested subject and uncover yet unanswered questions. The study is conducted using a qualitative research method, relying principally on primary sources or official, governmental documents. The paper provides a comprehensive analysis of countries‘ bilateral relations from the perspective of the Reagan administration’s set interests and policies.

2 THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION: THE CASE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Statutory Declaration

I hereby declare that I have written the submitted Bachelor's Thesis concerning the topic of The Reagan Administration and The Policy of Dif- ferentiation: The Case of Czechoslovakia independently. All the sources used for the purpose of finishing this thesis have been ade- quately referenced and are listed in the Bibliography.

In Brno 23 May 2021

...... Jiří Nykodým

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION: THE CASE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor PhDr. Petr Suchý, Ph.D., for his dedi- cated support and encouragement. I deeply appreciate all the advice, ideas, and patience in guiding me throughout the course of my research.

LIST OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 5

Table of Contents

List of Terms and Acronyms 6

1 Introduction 7

2 Literature Review 8

3 Methodology 9 3.1 Research objectives and framework ...... 9 3.2 Data collection and limitations of the thesis ...... 9

4 Policy of differentiation 11 4.1 Post-war situation ...... 11 4.2 Evolution of differentiation: from Eisenhower to Carter ...... 12 4.3 Reagan’s policy of differentiation ...... 16

5 United States approach towards Czechoslovakia 21 5.1 Czechoslovakia’s position ...... 21 5.2 U.S. relations with the Czechoslovak government ...... 25 5.3 Public diplomacy and support of dissent groups ...... 30 5.4 Results and impact of the implemented policy ...... 34

Conclusion 37

Bibliography 41

6 LIST OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS

List of Terms and Acronyms

CMEA – Council for Mutual Economic Assistance CSCE – Commission on Security and Cooperation in Eu- rope GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade IMF – International Monetary Fund INF – Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty IV – International Visitors MFN – Most Favored Nation NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization NED – National Endowment for Democracy NSDD – National Security Decision Directives NSSD – National Security Study Directives RFE – Radio Free Europe SDI – Strategic Defense Initiative START – Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty U.S. – United States USIA – United States Information Agency USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics VOA – Voice of America VONS – Výbor na obranu nespravedlivě stíhaných WTO – Warsaw Treaty Organization

6 INTRODUCTION

1 Introduction

President Ronald Reagan is undoubtedly one of the most interesting and certainly one of the most influential figures in the history of the Cold War, especially concerning his undeniable impact on the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Countless books have been written on his person and resolute political decisions. However, some of his administration policies a ne- glected field, and documents only declassified in recent years. One of those is the perception of Czechoslovakia. This research paper aims to fill the gap in the missing literature and analyze the Reagan administration approach towards Czechoslovakia. Moreover, the research helps readers better understand the administration's policy towards the Eastern block countries and serves Czechoslo- vak readers as a missing puzzle to the context of the following Velvet Revolution. The bachelor thesis is divided into three main sections. The first part acquaints readers with the state of research in literature and outlines which information needs to be supplemented. The second part focuses on the methodology used for the research, closely defines the research questions, and includes possible research limitations. Finally, the analysis section alone splits into two parts. The first one presents the U.S. policy of differentiation in a broader, historical context and its gradual evolution from the end of World War II until the Reagan administration. The second, central part introduces the U.S. approach, tools, and motives towards Czechoslovakia, intending to answer specified research questions.

LITERATURE REVIEW

2 Literature Review

Ronald Reagan's life story has long been one of the most compelling out of American presidents. His historical importance and political abilities have been recalled frequently in recent years. The remarkable story of an ordinary country boy from Tampico, Illinois, who first becomes a Hol- lywood actor and then fights his way to the position of California gover- nor, eventually becoming the president of the United States (J. David Woodard, 2012; H. W. Brands, 2015). The story about an uncompromising politician and the leader of the free world who made the Soviet Union collapse on its own (J. F. Matlock, 2004; Coleman & Longley, 2017). These are probably familiar to most curious readers, but what about the story of Czechoslovakia? Is it often associated with Reagan administration policies? Although many extensive books were written about Cold War and its defining moments (Luňák, 1997; Dunbabin, 2007), and Reagan's policy of differentiation (Staar, 1987; Savranskaya, Blanton & Zubok, 2010), Husák’s Czechoslovakia seems to be bypassing most researchers' interests. Of course, many scholars have dealt with the topic of socialist Czech- oslovakia, its history, and character (Vykoukal, 2000; Rychlík, 2020). However, when it comes to Reagan's policy of differentiation, there is practically no credible publication or unified work on Czechoslovakia, and the literature gap is entirely unfilled. Most mentions of Czechoslo- vakia are part of a broader perception of Eastern Europe or stand along only as additional information: not as a separate chapter. The only exceptions are governmental reports, memoirs, and interviews with specific American representatives, such as ambassadors to Czechoslovakia or high-ranked Department of State officials (Wiliam H. Luers, 1987; Charles S. Kennedy, 1991, 2003 2011). From the perspective of the United States, most of the literature (Garthoff, 1994; Suchý, 2004) solely describes Czechoslovakia as one of the least dynamic regimes of the Eastern Bloc with a solid, puppet-like relation to the Soviet Union and little prospect of change. Nevertheless, concrete works to answer substantial questions are required. There are evident shortcomings that are missing in the literature and need to be supplement accordingly with qualitative research. Therefore, this work serves as a unique challenge to write a historical work and raise awareness of this topic.

8 METHODOLOGY

3 Methodology

3.1 Research objectives and framework

The analysis begins with a description of the U.S. policy of differentiation and its development from World War II to the Reagan administration. While the development up to 1981 is a general overview and a very brief explanation of the policy's character, Reagan's section is put in a more prominent position in order to define a solid approach and detailed ex- amination of the policy of differentiation. This, in turn, would lead to the central part of the work. The primary thesis's objective is to examine the Reagan administration attitude to Czechoslovakia between 1981 and 1989 using a qualitative research method. The thesis sets four primary research questions:

1. What position did Czechoslovakia have in the implementation of the U.S. policy of differentiation?

2. What was the U.S. administration's attitude towards Czechoslovakia, and how did the attitude change over time?

3. How did the U.S. administration approach the resistance movement and Czechoslovak people through public diplomacy?

4. What results brought the implementation of the policy of differentiation towards Czechoslovakia between 1981-1989?

All the questions are answered gradually from first to fourth and chronologically from 1981-1989.

3.2 Data collection and limitations of the thesis

The study is conducted using a qualitative research method with an emphasis on primary sources, predominantly declassified or strictly published governmental documents: letters and diaries, interviews and speeches transcript, negotiations, briefings or conferences, or governmental documents, reports, and records. The document works with

METHODOLOGY primarily online web sources such as history.state.gov., fas.org, and cia.gov. Furthermore, secondary literature: books, reviews, journal, academic or newspaper articles, acquired through the Masaryk University’s joint library archive, JSTOR or Google Scholars. Possible limitations of the research can be found while searching through non-uniform primary sources and the necessity to incorporate information into the established bachelor thesis framework. Unfortu- nately, the Foreign Relations of the United States series dealing with Eastern Europe during the Reagan administration is still not available and is currently in the state of production. Its publication would undoubtedly bring new knowledge to the topic and positively influence and facilitate the study of this work.

10 POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION

4 Policy of differentiation

The United States policy of differentiation was an approach attempting to weaken or limit the Soviet influence on its European satellites during the emerging Cold War, primarily through the enforcement of economic policies on a country-to-country basis. Most administrations considered East-European only the following countries: East Germany, Czechoslo- vakia, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. Although, some administrations partly included or at least mentioned Yugoslavia, which separated from the Soviet sphere of influence after Tito-Stalin disputes in early 1948, and occasionally Albania, which followed in 1960 by joining the front with Beijing. To understand the separate analysis of Reagan's administration approach towards Czechoslovakia, it is necessary to outline the evolution of the concept and the implemented policy in a broader, historical context. Such an analysis without shedding light on the very genesis of the policy of differentiation and its gradual historical development would seem confusing and insufficient to understand the logic behind many of Reagan's administration decisions. Therefore, this particular part of the document will provide readers with the origins of the American differentiation towards Eastern Europe and chronologically explain its evolution in time, emphasizing the key, defining moments.

4.1 Post-war situation

In the aftermath of World War II, devastated Europe found itself in a position of dire change. Questions of world order and peace were brought to the fore of U.S. interests. The policy of differentiation itself only took shape since the time of the Eisenhower administration. During that period, Europe was indefinitely divided by the Iron Curtain into ideological blocs. Nonetheless, the United States had already been well aware that one of the most important post-war reconstruction policies would inev- itably be utilized in order to aid the situation in Europe. Following the problematic question of Germany, Red Army's vast presence in Eastern Europe posed potential issues from the American point of view. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Allies de facto agreed (although unofficially) to divide Europe into two so-called spheres of influence;

POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION however, Stalin promised that the Soviet Union would not interfere with Eastern Europe's affairs and free elections would be held.1 Early after President Roosevelt's death, Harry S. Truman took office and swiftly came across the fact no trust could be put on Stalin. A year later, Truman was supported by the credible Moscow Ambassador George Kennan's "Long Telegram," where he explained that Stalin and the Soviet Union only recognize means of brute force and must be approached in this re- gard. Since then, the policy to prevent the spread of communism, known as containment, started taking place. Even though there was no differentiation policy yet, the fate of many European countries, such as Czechoslovakia, was unclear for a very long time. The Truman administration also had to deal with other problems in Europe associated with the beginning of the Cold War: the Greek Civil War or Turkey's situation (the Truman Doctrine of March 1947). Fur- thermore, the United States relied heavily on the European Recovery Program, or the so-called "Marshall Plan," which aimed to restore an ex- hausted European economy, improve the American reputation, and sup- press leftist tendencies in Western Europe (notably in France and Italy) coupled with the heroic Soviet post-war image. The Marshall Plan was initially offered to all of affected Europe, including the eastern part; however, this was quickly rejected by the command of Stalin. In the end, the United States could not alter the situation, mainly due to the vast Soviet army presence in most of East Europe.2

4.2 Evolution of differentiation: from Eisenhower to Carter

The first mention of European differentiation and its formation can be found only with the Eisenhower administration's arrival when Europe was perennially separated by the Iron Curtain into two antagonistic camps. President Eisenhower soon realized that the countries of Eastern

1 Harriman, W. Averell, and Elie Abel. Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941-1946. New York, NY: Random House, 1975. chap. 17 2 “National Security Council 58/2,“ Report to the President: United States Policy Towards the Soviet Satellite Sta- tes in Eastern Europe, December 8, 1949. Declassified and published in U.S. Department of State, Historical Office, Foreign Relations of the United States 1949. United States Government Printing Office, 1976. pp. 42- 54.

12 POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION

Europe were entirely out of their sphere of influence and that the situation was unlikely to change in the coming years. Therefore, the European differentiation policy was designed to approach the Central and Eastern European states individually and, above all, uniquely compared to the Soviet Union. This was primarily done through the help of economic instruments to motivate these countries to further detach from the Soviet Union. The United States firmly believed that gradual undermining of their loyalty towards Moscow would lead to a significant weakening of Soviet influence or put Soviets in a far worse negotiating position, as was confirmed by the example of Yugoslavia secession in 1948.3 From the Eisenhower administration until the end of the Cold War, the differentiation policy's nature, only with minor exceptions, did not go through much change. Its long-term objective and development were characterized by continuity. Most of the differences and changes in tra- jectory were made due to external factors or short-term individual decisions. However, the general approach and instruments that all administrations were using throughout the years were stable and almost unchanged.4 The majority of those instruments were primarily economic because it is usually beneficial for both sides, and its character is not entirely political. For example: eliminating trade barriers, credit loans policy, export of raw materials and advanced technologies, IMF, GATT, and World Bank accession, or later giving the highly-demanded MFN trade status should attract the interest of the eastern partners. Other instruments were strictly political or diplomatic, such as establishing official recognition (the United States recognized East Germany only in 1974), more frequent state officials' visits, setting an embassy, or only bilateral agreement or exchange (technological, scientific, cultural, etc.).5 Moreo- ver, individuals such as Department of State officials or ambassadors themselves often had an irreplaceable, pivotal role, so as the powerful radio broadcasting of the Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America, which formed the backbone of the entire U.S. agenda and propaganda in

3 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, and William E. Griffith. Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe. Cambridge, MA: Massa- chusetts Institute of Technology, Center for International Studies, 1961. p. 644. 4 Gordon, Lincoln, James Franklin Brown, Pierre Hassner, Josef Joffe, and Edwina Moreton. Eroding Empire: Wes- tern Relations with Eastern Europe. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987. pp. 71- 91. 5 “Eastern Europe,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968. Volume XVII. U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2018. pp. 126, 127, 280-283.

POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION

Eastern Europe. Americans would effectively use all those instruments under the pretext of greater internal liberalization, economic privatization, respect for fundamental human rights, and, above all, greater secession of these states from the Soviet Union in all forms.6 Stalin's death of 1953 played a substantial role in the following Khrushchev “different roads to socialism” policy, characterized by de- Stalinization and the general release of tensions. Most importantly, it led to greater independence and self-confidence of its European satellites. Hence, the United States had more space and opportunities to strengthen and encourage their independent behavior and policies.7 For most of the differentiation period, the United States considered Poland the most pro- gressive and hopeful. Hungary also appeared promising, even more from the beginning of the 1960s. The former for its extended historic anti-Rus- sian tuning and the strong presence of the Catholic Church. The latter for its anti-Slavic victimizing and notably for the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Since then, Hungary started to relax the regime in the early 1960s with its "goulash socialism" brought upon the development of numerous capitalist elements and, overall, significantly contributed to substantial internal liberalization and openness. On the other hand, the Soviet army's presence in some of the East- European countries not only completely prevented the Americans from taking any (physical) action but, at least in the first decades, also made it more difficult for any internal reforms. This could be reflected in East Germany, which did not hold much promise, where the desire for reuni- fication could still play a significant national role. Nonetheless, East Ger- many was ranked along Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria as the least dynamic, pro-Soviet regimes. An unusual case turned out to be tough Ro- mania's stance, which from the 1960s began to have a very limited influence on the Soviet foreign policy and even surpassed Poland in its rebel- lious behavior and actions. Especially when the Romanian administration decided not to participate in Czechoslovakia's occupation of 1968 as a member of the Warsaw Pact. This was one of the reasons Romania was given the MFN status in 1975 as only second to Poland (1960).8

6 Gordon et al., 1987. pp. 71- 91. 7 “Eastern Europe,“ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Volume XXV. U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 2018. pp. 438-471. 8 Nelson, 1984. pp. 68-78.

14 POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION

A noticeable minor change and intensification of differentiation policy came with the Nixon (Ford) administration's arrival. Together with the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, they brought the so-called “dé- tente” policy into place and shifted focus more on diplomacy, trade, and the human rights agenda. This period is characterized by open verbal communication, increased mutual trade, diplomatic negotiations, and vehement signing of exchange treaties. The primary purpose was to in- crease U.S. influence throughout the Eastern European area without hurting its citizens by political confrontation, sanctions, or maneuver- ing.9 One of the challenges that hit the Nixon-Kissinger's détente policy was the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 pushed by Congress to restrict trade relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries because the administration did not take any action against Jews human rights violations.10 In the 1980s, the amendment would be frequently applied by the Reagan administration. Finally, one of the greatest successes and perhaps the most important agreement signed between the West and the East throughout the Cold War was the Helsinki Accords of 1975, which committed the East- ern Bloc countries to respect universal human rights and even authorize free elections. Even though the Eastern Bloc countries hardly complied with these agreements, this document resulted in many resistance groups such as the Czechoslovak Charter 77, Polish Solidarity, and other resistance groups. Such groups could subsequently refer to the agreements negotiated with the Soviets and thus had far more room for ma- nipulation. So had the American side.11 The following Carter administration focused even less on containment and more on arms control and promoting human rights in hot spot countries; however, it continued in the more or less same spirit.12 Nev- ertheless, the détente policy soon ends with the Soviet invasion of

9 “First Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970’s, February 18, 1970.” Re- printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon. United States Government Printing Office, 1971. pp. 130, 132, 181. 10 Nye, Joseph S. “The Making of America's Soviet Policy.” Foreign Affairs, 1984. 11 Griffin, Bell B. “Strengthening the CSCE Process,” Department of State Bulletin, January 1981. p. 18. 12 Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981. New York: Farrar-Straus-Giroux, 1983. pp. 300, 541.

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Afghanistan in 1979 and, above all, with President Reagan taking office in 1981 with an entirely different approach and rhetoric.

4.3 Reagan’s policy of differentiation

With his arrival in 1981, President Reagan completely changed the U.S. approach and rhetoric towards the Soviet Union and communist regimes in general. He reversed the previous policy of détente, which he considered reactive and beneficial for the Soviets. Nonetheless, with the policy of differentiation, the administration seamlessly followed its predeces- sors. Thus, the Reagan administration's main task was to reduce the So- viet influence on Eastern bloc countries and reintegrate them into the European community of nations. President Reagan was well aware that although sometimes marginal, the best way to achieve this was through European political and economic differentiation. He believed that the Eastern bloc countries were victims, their governments were not legiti- mate, and that it was necessary to awaken a desire for freedom in those captive nations. To encourage these so-called “freedom fighters,” as Reagan liked to call them often.13 This awakening was to be motivated by several, primarily, economic instruments, the form of which the Reagan administration outlined in two critical documents in the National Security Decision Directive series: the NSDD 54 & 75. The National Security Decision Directive 54 from Sep- tember 2, 1982, was a report on the United States policy towards Eastern Europe, the latter one, NSDD 75 from January 17, 1983, then provided an overview of the U.S.-USSR relations. Both documents were based on studies, the National Security Study Directives, which had the task of mapping the situation and possibilities. The studies were conducted for about half a year and began explicitly on March 25, 1982, for the NSSD 5- 82 relating to Eastern Europe and August 21, 1982, for the NSSD 11-82 relating to the Soviet Union. The NSDD 5414 was a crucial and primary document regarding East- ern Europe. The directive served not only as a comprehensive report but,

13 “Fortieth Anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising,“ Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. Hereafter Pre- sidential Documents, August 20, 1984. pp. 1132, 1133. 14 “United States Policy Toward Eastern Europe.” National Security Decision Directive 54. Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2, 1982.

16 POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION above all, set up criteria and goals the U.S. administration should follow when dealing with any of the Eastern Bloc countries. Those goals were:

§ strengthening liberal processes in the region § a closer shift towards fulfilling human rights (e.g., freedom of emigration, faith, movement, speech… ) § greater privatization and liberalization of the internal market, openness to Western capital, the presence of trade un- ions, etc. § gradual deviation from the aggressive Soviet diplomacy and foreign policy

The United States was willing to reward those countries that would be inclined to change and, conversely, approach countries that show minimum effort less favorably, such as the Soviet Union itself. In exchange, the U.S. offered commercial, financial, or diplomatic benefits, such as:

§ increased mutual trade § elimination of trade barriers § credit loans, debt relief § export of raw materials and value-added products § IMF, GATT, or World Bank accession § MFN trade status § technological, scientific, educational, and cultural exchange § high-level state visits, number of consulates, size of the repre- sentation § setting an embassy

Moreover, bilateral relations were developed through public diplomacy, individual embassies, and negotiations of ambassadors and De- partment of State officials, on which great emphasis was placed. Overall, embassies played an even more prominent role by supporting dissent groups through financial and informative assistance or secret meetings.15 Another crucial part of U.S. politics towards Eastern Europe was to get the people on their side and anchor their pro-Western orientation, which people often covered up for fear. The Voice of America and the

15 Shultz, George P. Turmoil and Triumph. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993. pp. 692-95.

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Radio Free Europe, which did more than excellent work, were highly supported by the Reagan administration and essential instruments for this ambitious goal.16 The second document, the NSDD 7517, was less comprehensive regarding the European differentiation but still very important, although it was focused more on the U.S.-USSR relations alone. It confirmed the administration's perception that the Soviet Union had a clear dominance over the communist world and the Warsaw Pact countries explicitly. These events had politically mirroring effects in these countries. The primary goal was to force Moscow to respect fundamental human rights and international agreements, especially those relating to Eastern Europe's sovereignty. Also, to limit Russian imperial tendencies towards its satellites, prevent deploying of the military arsenal on the borders with NATO countries, and eliminate the influx of Western, primarily American strategic technologies to Eastern Europe or the USSR for a military buildup. Moreover, to minimize Soviet pressure on Western allies in trade, energy supply, and financial relationship. Among other things, because the East- West trade was still flourishing as Western Europe's countries continued to apply détente policy, and many socialist countries (USSR included) were heavily dependent on trade and credit loans as such (see NSDD 6618).19 The first actual outlines of Reagan's differentiation policy began to appear relatively late (1982); that was mainly due to the situation around Polish Martial law in 1981 and subsequent sanctions against the Jaruzelski’s regime and the Soviet Union, which played a substantial role in the Polish dilemma.20 In the first Reagan term until 1985, the policy and rhetoric were rather uncompromising with the ideological under- tone, marking the return of solid containment policy. However, the

16 Tyson, James L. U.S. International Broadcasting and National Security. New York: Ramapo Press, 1983. 17 “U.S. Relations With the USSR.” National Security Decision Directive 75. Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 17, 1983. 18 “East-West Economic Relations and Poland-Related Sanctions.” National Security Decision Directive 66. Wa- shington, D.C.: The White House, November 29, 1982. 19 Orlik, Igor. “Russia and Eastern Europe: Problems and Prospects,“ Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn (International Affairs), July 1992. p. 35 20 Ploss, Sidney I. “Moscow and the Polish Crisis: An Interpretation of Soviet Policies and Intentions.” Foreign Affairs 64, 1986.

18 POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION situation slowly began to change with his successes in negotiating with the Soviets, who were forced to make concessions. Reagan believed that the Soviet Union would be far more likely to be frightened of the possible consequences of its actions and discouraged from doing so than that the relationship would work on interconnectedness and trust.21 His friend- ship with like-minded Margaret Thatcher and Pope John Paul II, who had a significant influence on the Catholic Church in Poland and the Solidarity movement's persistence, also played an important role. Nonetheless, the second term was quite different, mainly because of the person of Mikhail Gorbachev. Unlike previous Soviet leaders (perhaps except for Andropov), he was aware of unsustainable issues of the Soviet-socialist bureaucratic system. Its dependence on Western supplies and money, and the ever-extending gap between the two camps. Over time, Gorbachev was eventually forced by Reagan (deterrence, large armament, SDI, etc.) to make vigorous concessions and sign dis- armament treaties such as INF (1987) and the START (I), which was signed during the following Bush administration.22 Also, he came up with initiatives such as glasnost, perestroika, and demokratizatsiya, leading to greater openness, rejuvenation of the Soviet apparatus, modernization, and finally, democratization. Above all, it led to Warsaw Pact states' greater independence and autonomy, which had a decisive effect on American options in the region.23 The Reagan administration paid the most attention to Poland, Ro- mania, and also Hungary. Romania was by far the most independent of the Soviet Union. For example, it did participate in the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympics, which the rest of the Warsaw Pact states boycotted. However, unlike Yugoslavia and Albania (1961), Romania retained a kind of "mediator" when it did not leave the military pact and, in some cases, was still subject to the USSR. On the other hand, Nicolae Ceaușescu was becoming more ruthless and rigid totalitarian practices, reminiscent

21 Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. “Foreign Policy and the American Character, “ Foreign Affaris, vol. 62, Fall 1983. pp. 1- 16. 22 Petr Suchý, “Reagan a Říše Zla: Vývoj Americké Zahraniční Politiky a Vztahů Mezi Supervelmocemi v Letech 1981-1989, “ 2004. pp. 94-139. 23 Asmus, Ronald. “Evolution of Soviet-East European Relations under Mikhail Gorbachev,“ Radio Free Europe. RAD Background Report 153, August 22, 1989. p. 2.

POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION of Stalinism in the 1930s.24 Although Romania received MFN status from the United States in 1975, the Reagan administration repeatedly discussed its non-renewal precisely because of Ceaușescu’s approach to mi- gration and human rights abuses. In 1988, the United States finally sus- pended Romania's MFN status. Poland, by contrast, thanks to the newly formed resistance movement Solidarity (1980), a robust Christian Polish society led by an increasingly influential Catholic Church, and newly elected (1978) charismatic Polish pope, John Paul II, was the most attrac- tive of all Warsaw Pact countries. However, the Martial law evoked by Jaruzelski’s regime in 1981 significantly slowed the process and cooled relations until 1987.25 Finally, when it comes to internal liberalization and openness, Hun- gary made the most significant progress. For example, during the 1980s, semi-free elections were allowed in Hungary and even running a small business, which was utterly inconceivable from the Marxism-Leninism point of view and the Soviet doctrine in any Warsaw Pact country until then. Moreover, Hungary obtained the MFN status in 1978, and the bilateral trade with the United States more than doubled in less than four years, reaching 260 million dollars in 1983.26

24 Vladimir, Kusin V. “Gorbachev and Eastern Europe,” Problems of Communism 35, January – February 1986. pp. 39-53. 25 Statement on the Lifting of Economic Sanctions Against Poland, February 19, 1987. Book I. (January 1 – July 3, 1987). Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1989. pp. 155-156. For Romania also see Gordon, 1987. p. 91. 26 “Most-Favored-Nation Status Spurs Favorable Trade Flow with US.” The Christian Science Monitor, May 25, 1984.

20 UNITED STATES APPROACH TOWARDS CZECHOSLOVAKIA

5 United States approach towards Czechoslovakia

This part of the thesis deals with the United States and Czechoslovakia's mutual relations between 1981-1989 from the American perspective. Other Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, which had a significant influence on Czechoslovakia's internal and foreign policy approach, are also frequently mentioned. Emphasis is placed not only on the analysis of relations through the fulfillment of the U.S. policy of differentiation, specifically NSDD 54 & 75, but also on public diplomacy and „background policy,“ formed primarily by U.S. ambassadors, diplomats, members of State Department or communication channels Radio Free Europe or the Voice of America. Each of the four research questions is devoted to a separate chapter and answered, if possible, according to the timeline. The results of the analysis are summarized later in the conclusion with additional com- mentary.

5.1 Czechoslovakia’s position

Since the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the establishment of the so-called “normalization“ process a year later, Czechoslo- vakia was governed by rigid, Stalinist-style communists, and the relations between Czechoslovakia and the United States were not heading in the right direction. In the previous Carter administration, the development of relations was hampered primarily by a dispute over the return of Czech gold27, which was finally settled in 1981 but did not cause any significant change, as several representatives on the American side ex- pected.28 The fundamental disagreement was not so much over specific, joint issues but rather in the character of Husák's Czechoslovakia. From the United States' perspective, Czechoslovakia was reviewed mainly

27 Homan, Richard. “U.S., Czechoslovakia Reach New Agreement on Return of Gold.” The Washington Post. WP Company, November 7, 1981. For more details see: Michálek, Slavomír. “AMERICKÝ KONGRES A ČESKOSLO- VENSKÉ MENOVÉ ZLATO 1980 – 1981.” Historický časopis 66, 2019. 28 U.S. Policy toward Eastern Europe 1985: Hearings. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1986.

UNITED STATES APPROACH TOWARDS CZECHOSLOVAKIA through political, economic, and military factors. From the political point of view, Czechoslovakia was part of the so-called “Gang of Four” – along with Bulgaria, East Germany, and Romania. The political situation in Czechoslovakia was one of the strictest in the entire Eastern bloc.29 Harsh censorship, the brutal persecution of educated intelligence, reli- gious and other groups. The existence of the colloquially called "cadres" and street committees, the inability to express or assemble, shooting at borders, and Czechoslovak foreign policies towards emigres, family reu- nification, or the treatment of western journalists were just a few dread- ful approaches. From establishing the normalization process in 1969, there was virtually no political loosening or change in official represen- tation, unlike in neighboring Poland or Hungary. The Communist Party did its best to push Western culture out of public space. For example, by regularly jamming both Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America. The U.S. administration recognized the “normalization” leadership feared that any slightest political or economic loosening could jeopardize their positions and revive the ideas of the Prague Spring. The Czechoslovak Communist Party did not tolerate any internal debate on the reform or giving in to change while not hesitating to brutally persecute or punish the opposition in the form of dissent or just ordinary people. Moreover, the communist propaganda and ideology were targeting to affect all society areas, including the youth (Pioneer movement, Spartakiáda, Jiskry, etc.).30 After visiting Eastern Europe in 1983, Vice President George W. Bush declared Czechoslovakia the least dynamic, firmly orthodox, and fully committed to the Soviet leadership and Warsaw Pact in general, seeing not much prospect for better future cooperation.31 The light of hope evoked an ever-expanding local dissent group Charter 77, formed by a group of artists and intellectuals around playwright Vaclav Havel as a response to human rights violations agreed to respect at the CSCE in 1975, known as the Helsinki Accords. In contrast to the non-reform, non- dynamic ruling garniture, the U.S. administration saw great scope for

29 Gati, Charles. Eastern Europe on Its Own. Council on Foreign Relations, 1989. p. 100. 30 Fascell, Dante B., and Robert Dole. “Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Congress of the Uni- ted States.” Human Rights in Czechoslovakia: The Documents of Charter '77 1977 - 1982, July 1, 1982. pp. 31-137, 157-171. 31 “The Vice President: Address at the Hofburg, Vienna,” September 21, 1983. State Bulletin, November 1983. pp. 20-22.

22 UNITED STATES APPROACH TOWARDS CZECHOSLOVAKIA progress precisely through negotiations with the resistance, similarly to the Solidarity movement in neighboring Poland. Based on the economy, the United States ranked Czechoslovakia as the urban, industrially oriented economy, in contrast to most other, somewhat rural, agrarian states. Along with East Germany, Czechoslo- vakia was the most developed country, with advanced, heavy industry and a high-level standard of living by socialist conditions. The structure of the Czechoslovak economy was a strict Marxist-Leninist centrally- planned system with state-owned enterprises and state-controlled prices and trade, and typical socialist five-year plans. Compared to, e.g., neighboring Hungary, which had adopted several free-market elements into the socialist command economy already in the late 1960s.32 Alt- hough an economic reform, the so-called “Set of Measures,” was intro- duced in 1980 to tackle deteriorating financial results of last years, it did not bring any meaningful change or economic liberalization, privatization, or adoption of capitalist mechanisms. In the late 1970s, Czechoslovakia’s trade already slowly began to orient exclusively towards the CMEA countries and the Soviet Union. The share of Western imports of goods and cooperation/license agreements was getting smaller every year. Unlike most Eastern bloc countries, Czechoslovakia managed to have a positive trade balance with the non- socialist states and only slightly negative with the Soviet Union. This was caused primarily by Czechoslovakia's debt elimination efforts and “export at any cost” policy when the foreign debt was only about 2 billion dollars at the end of 1984, compared to Poland’s 23 billion in 1980.33 Moreover, Czechoslovakia was entirely dependent on Soviet energy supplies, particularly oil and natural gas. More than half of the Russian gas flowed through Czechoslovakia to neighboring European countries.34 Besides, Czechoslovakia participated in many Soviet development projects like the Progress gas pipeline, Krivoy Rog iron ore extraction plant,

32 “NSC Meeting, 21 July 1982, On the US Policy of Differentiation Towards Eastern Europe.” Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2007. 33 “Czechoslovakia: An Economic Overview Summary.” Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, November 30, 2009. 34 Casey, William J. “Comments on NSC Critique of Outlook for the Siberia-to-Western Europe Natural Gas Pipe- line," DDI SOV 82-10120/EUR82-10078, August 1982.” Washington, D.C.: The Director of Central Intelli- gence, July 8, 2007.

UNITED STATES APPROACH TOWARDS CZECHOSLOVAKIA or construction of a new gas pipeline to Western Europe. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia had a massive uranium deposit and was the leading producer of nuclear reactors and related equipment, which was very important for the Soviet military arsenal and nuclear power plants. Therefore, in 1985 a joint Czechoslovak-Soviet robot development center was established in Prešov.35 Nonetheless, the reluctance of any economic reform and a sharp reduction in Western goods imports resulted in a decreasing standard of living, a growing technological gap, the need for industrial modernization, and new equipment acquisitions. Also, the Soviet Union insisted on the oil supplies trade conditions adopted until 1984, and so Czechoslo- vakia had to purchase oil at higher than market prices, which also had a significant impact on its financial situation. Thus, Czechoslovakia was forced to negotiate separate oil deliveries from Iran for more than 200 million dollars and sign a similar agreement with Turkey.36 During administration writing of NSSD 54 in 1982, Czechoslovakia was not a member of either the World Bank or the IMF institution (ex- cluded from both in 1954) that the Reagan administration usually offered to join countries willing to cooperate and detach from the Soviet dependency. Czechoslovakia was neither offered the United States MFN trade status. The only exception remained the GATT membership that Czechoslovakia received before the communist takeover in 1948, and thus did not depend on bilateral agreements when dealing with Western European countries and automatically obtained the most favored nation treatment. The potential for any U.S.-Czechoslovakia trade or economic agreement was enormous and even necessary for Czechoslovakia but was limited mainly for political reasons.37 Finally, Czechoslovakia bordered Austria, which, although militarily neutral, was a part of Western Europe. Above all, it shared borders with

35 “East European Contributions to Soviet Technology Development.” Washington, D.C.: Director of Central In- telligence, February 19, 2010. p. 8. 36 Lüthi, Lorenz. “Drifting Apart: Soviet Energy and the Cohesion of the Communist Bloc in the 1970s and 1980s.” Cold War Energy, 2017. p. 380. 37 Mendelowitz, Allan I. “National Security and International Affairs Division.” United States General Accounting Office & National Security and International Affairs Division, August 1, 1990. For U.S.-Czechoslovakia commercial relations see “Report on Trade Mission to Central and Eastern Europe,” Subcommittee on Trade of Committee on Ways and Means, 98. Cong. 2 sess. United States Printing Office, 1984. p. 96.

24 UNITED STATES APPROACH TOWARDS CZECHOSLOVAKIA

West Germany, a NATO member, and posed a potential threat to the entire Western Bloc. Therefore, any transfer of military arsenal close to NATO's borders directly threatened American national security. So as the Czechoslovak vassal relationship with the Soviet Union, its army presence in Czechoslovakia (80,000 troops), and the frequency of the WTO maneuvers and exercises on the Czechoslovak territory. Addition- ally, Czechoslovakia spent among the most on its military expenditures, accounting for circa 7 percent of its budget.38 In 1983, Soviet activity on Czechoslovak territory was strengthened when Temp-S missiles (NATO SS-12M Scaleboard B, Soviet 9K76) were deployed in Hranice na Moravě as part of the 122nd Missile Brigade. It was a reaction to the installation of American Pershing 2 missiles in West Germany and BGM-109B missiles in the United Kingdom, FRG, the Neth- erlands, Italy, and Belgium.39 However, these steps were taken mainly in the form of a command from the Soviet Union, not from a Czechoslovak arbitrary initiative, and instead demonstrated the political character of Czechoslovakia, which was entirely subordinate to the leadership in Moscow. Contrary to Czechoslovakia, the deployment of Soviet nuclear warheads would be considered unthinkable in independent-minded Ro- mania, which was on the total opposite side of the spectrum.

5.2 U.S. relations with the Czechoslovak government

When President Reagan entered the Oval Office in 1981, relations between the United States and Czechoslovakia were not on a satisfactory level. No Deputy Secretary had been there for decades, and Czechoslo- vakia was at the bottom of interest to the United States. There was no reason for the U.S. administration to focus more on Czechoslovakia. Its leadership was very close to the Soviet Politburo following their commands without reluctance, and there was no political or economic reform since 1968 at all.40 They were stagnant and led by the same people:

38 Nelson, Daniel N. “Recognizing Complexity in Eastern Europe: A Case for Differentiating Among Communist States.” Southeastern Europe 11, 1984. pp. 73-77. 39 Strzondala, Wieslaw, and Vladimír Panuška. “Raketový Systém Kratšího Doletu Temp-S,” 2008. 40 Kennedy, Charles Stuart. Ambassador William Luers. Other. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Trai- ning Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, May 12, 2011. p. 167.

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Husak was President and the First Secretary of the Communist Party, Strougal still a Prime Minister, Bilak was the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and others like the Foreign Minister, Head of Interior, Head of the Secret Police were unchanged for more than a decade. Moreover, the Czechoslovak regime made almost no effort to improve relations or verbal communication and sometimes went even further in criticizing the United States compared to the Soviet Union.41 When President Reagan got elected, Rudé Právo criticized him for his anti-communist stances and expressed concerns over his “totally unreal- istic conditions“ for talks with the Soviet Union.42 The U.S. administration did not expect any significant change in the Czechoslovak political approach; however, the room for potential im- provements was enormous. Even though Czechoslovakia appeared firmly anti-American, it was very interested in cultural or commercial agreements. Generally, signing agreements was one of the U.S. instruments that could efficiently expand United States ideological penetration and presence in Czechoslovakia.43 For example, the Czechoslovak leadership was highly interested in the MFN status. Getting the MFN trade status would mean tariff tax reduction for more than 40 % to about 7% on specific Czechoslovak goods they were selling on the U.S. market, such as ham, beer, leather, etc.44 Also, Prague was still interested in raising new loans from Western banks, primarily to maintain the country’s presence in the international bank market.45 The United States was willing to take such actions only under certain, strict conditions, based on either security, trade/commerce, or human rights – according to Helsinki Ac- cords‘ “three baskets.“ While the Czechoslovak government was often satisfied with the first two, they had issues over the human rights conditions. This opened a door where the United States could make a significant shift in the relations. Such incentives, as joining the IMF or the World

41 Ibid. p. 173 42 “Meeting with President-Elect's Staff.” Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, July 8, 2004. p. 11. 43 “Soviet Union, January 1981 – March 1983,“ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume IV. Department of State. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Publishing Office, 2021. p. 118. 44 Kennedy, Charles Stuart. Ambassador Julian M. Niemczyk. Other. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, December 16, 1991. p. 31. 45 “Czechoslovakia: An Economic Overview Summary.” Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, November 30, 2009. p. 3.

26 UNITED STATES APPROACH TOWARDS CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Bank, signing agreements, offering cheaper loans, and exporting more advanced technologies. In exchange for economic or political concessions such as the release of political prisoners, respect for human rights agreed at CSCE 1975, opening up to Western capital, or greater privatization and enabling the functioning of partial private enterprise.46 How- ever, it was not an easy task because the hard-lined leadership of the Communist Party was conservatives who feared a possible repetition of the Prague Spring scenario. On the other hand, more pro-reform communists, most notably Prime Minister Lubomír Štrougal, and few others did not have the courage to speak or introduce any reform because they feared for their positions.47 The U.S. Embassy in Prague played an exclusive and essential role in negotiating with the Czechoslovak government. Specifically, ambassadors, diplomats, and State Department members often dealt with reluc- tant Czechoslovak officials and went through seemingly unsolvable challenges. Even though the relations were cold and negotiations compli- cated, there was an extensive russophobia among the Czechoslovak population, evoked mainly by the invasion of 1968, and a strong feeling of historical belonging to western civilization that could have been used by the United States effectively.48 Therefore, the U.S. administration and Embassy’s primary attitude was to strengthen peoples’ political and cultural orientation towards the West and reassure that Americans would always stand by their side. The powerful, charismatic appearance of President Reagan himself gave Czechoslovaks a powerful feeling of hope and optimism. When President Reagan defended the office in 1985, people were cheering for him in front of the American Embassy. His support among Czechoslovaks was enormous, both domestically and in the U.S. diaspora.49 Moreover, the U.S. Embassy worked successfully with western media outlets, which were intended to foster the pro-western orientation. In Czechoslovakia notably, they played a substantial role and had a significant aired time. Also, the Embassy organized many events that went beyond the censorship of the Husák regime. Of course, the

46 Kennedy, Charles Stuart. 2011. p. 178 47 Ibid. pp. 174, 175. 48 Kolt, George. “Your Meeting With Ambassador William Luers (Prague).” National Intelligence Council, Novem- ber 23, 2011. 49 Kennedy, Charles Stuart. William P. Kiehl. Other. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project Information Series, September 15, 2003. p. 153

UNITED STATES APPROACH TOWARDS CZECHOSLOVAKIA communist leadership resented these activities very much and often set up the Secret Police in advance for such events, but the United States saw it fit to spread their influence. For example, there was still animosity or resentment between Czechs and Slovaks. Furthermore, the partial divide between Czechs and Slovaks, as well as the decentralized federal political system of the country, further contributed to these factors, as the U.S. administration knew the issue could serve well in the future, especially if Husak resigns.50 Nonetheless, the Charter 77 dissent group took most of the attention, and the United States hoped there could be significant progress. The formation of such resistance movement was a platform that the U.S. administration could grasp and develop a future strategy. To mobilize hid- den, local resistance and gradually weaken Husak’s regime from inside. Charter 77 legitimately referred to the resolution adopted by Czechoslo- vakia in CSCE 1975 on the observance of human rights, which the communist regime continuously violated. For example, violation of domestic freedom, spying, and installation of bedbugs, repeated imprisonment of regime’s "undesirable" people, length of compulsory military service, or shooting at borders.51 This, of course, immensely helped the United States when negotiating with the communist leadership. Although Char- ter 77 was not a trade union like Polish Solidarity, but rather a small group of creative artists and philosophers, it gained incredible support in Prague and interest among the Czechoslovak population, especially the youth. The U.S. administration hoped that together with the Catholic Church, other dissent groups, and encouraged young people, it could one day escalate to the actual overthrow of the regime, as President Reagan himself believed one day would be the fate of the entire Soviet empire.52 The election of Mikhail Gorbachev to the leadership of the Soviet Un- ion undoubtedly brought the most significant change. Under the initial pressure of President Reagan and his administration, he realized the So- viet Union could not go through another arms race. Thus, Gorbachev came up with vast political and economic reform that affected the entire Eastern bloc and played a crucial role in the last years of the Cold War.

50 Ibid. pp. 143, 144. 51 Fascell, Dante B., and Robert Dole. “Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe Congress of the Uni- ted States.” Human Rights in Czechoslovakia: The Documents of Charter '77 1977 - 1982, July 1, 1982. pp. 1, 2. 52 Kennedy, Charles Stuart, 1991. p. 32.

28 UNITED STATES APPROACH TOWARDS CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Although it was not so apparent as in Poland or Hungary, the gradual change also took place in Czechoslovakia. Prior to this, the U.S. representatives would not interact with any officials and senior officials except for the Foreign Minister and even him at formal occasions such as bilateral meetings or National Holidays. Alternatively, only unofficially, as in the case of Prime Minister Strougal and Ambassador Luers’ secret meetings, which were very rare and sporadic.53 Since then, as this was not practiced anymore, the roles changed to some degree. Even though Czechoslovakia was still the most loyal to the Soviet Union, it did not approve of Gorbachev’s reformist approach. In- deed, this was done outside of the public sphere. However, at the end of 1987, Czechoslovakia committed itself to gradual political and economic liberalization because it was difficult to oppose the Soviet influence.54 It frustrated Czechoslovak leadership, and the United States was able to use it to their advantage. If there was any reform inactivity on the part of Czechoslovakia, Embassy staff would influence and advise on how to conduct the necessary changes.55 The tension was felt even from inside. The whole communist apparatus was already old, tired, and widely bureaucratic. Its members were usually pragmatists who did not believe in the ideas of communism at all but remained in the party for financial and other benefits. They were pretty aware of corruption and lagging behind the Western countries. In some areas, the regime eased their influence slightly; for example, from 1987-1988, they stopped jamming RFE and VOA broadcasts. There were personnel changes as well. The old Husák was replaced by the younger Jakeš and remained only in the symbolic role of the president. Prime Min- ister Štrougal resigned in the fall of 1988, as did Bilak, and hardliner Fojtík was promoted to balance the position. Externally, however, the regime still acted very cruelly in a stubborn manner. For instance, the So- viet invasion of 1968 was still subject to censorship, although some of the surrounding states were already talking openly about the invasion as a mistake made by the USSR.56

53 Kennedy, Charles Stuart. 2011. pp. 128, 129, 169, 174. 54 “Reform and Human Rights in Eastern Europe,” U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Wa- shington: USGPO, 1989. p. 27. 55 Kennedy, Charles Stuart. 1991. p. 35. 56 “Reform and Human Rights in Eastern Europe,” U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Wa- shington: USGPO, 1989. pp. 30, 65.

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Before and after Gorbachev's accession, the United States' approach to the Czechoslovak government was still the same, but suddenly there were far more ways to promote its interests and space for communication. This was proved, among other things, by three visits of Deputy Sec- retary of State John C. Whitehead to Czechoslovakia once in 1987 and twice in 1988. During those visits, he also met with members of several dissent groups. The main topic was the observance of human rights in Czechoslovakia and the possible granting of MFN status by the United States. However, American interest in Czechoslovakia remained one of the lowest across the entire Eastern bloc.57

5.3 Public diplomacy and support of dissent groups

The United States’ approach towards Czechoslovakia could be simply described as a two-track policy. On the one hand, the U.S. Embassy declared setting better relations with Czechoslovak officials. On the other, they would regularly meet with people from the resistance, dissent groups. Naturally, the Czechoslovak government opposed this, just as Americans did not support the violation of human rights.58 Public diplomacy and support for resistance movements in Czecho- slovakia were the responsibility of the U.S. Embassy in particular. The American Embassy had several primary goals in Czechoslovakia. Firstly, to improve relations between the two states, notably, between embassies and officials, to achieve a better negotiating position and access to high-ranked officials. Secondly, to intensify the United States’ image among Czechoslovaks and foster their strong pro-western orientation. Thirdly, financially and informatively support resistance movements and organizations such as Charter 77 or VONS. Fourthly, to constantly draw the attention of the Czechoslovak leadership to the violation of fundamental human rights and demand the fulfillment of the agreements from the CSCE 1975. Despite the fact that some U.S. senior personalities thought Czecho- slovakia was lost, people from the Embassy did not believe that. The U.S.

57 “D498.” Informace o Chartě 77. Praha: Československé dokumentační středisko, October 15, 1988. Atlernati- vely see Kennedy, Charles Stuart. 1991. p. 38. 58 Luers, William H. “The U.S. and Eastern Europe.” Foreign Affairs 65, 1987. p. 988.

30 UNITED STATES APPROACH TOWARDS CZECHOSLOVAKIA ambassadors (Matlock, Luers, Niemczyk) were aware that although the American interests in Czechoslovakia were meager, millions of Czecho- slovaks counted on their encouragement and support.59 The most effec- tive tools of public diplomacy were undoubtedly Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America. Especially during the Reagan administration, major investments into obsolete equipment were made, and the length of the broadcast was greatly extended: RFE more than 144 hours a week and VOA circa 24 hours. While Radio Free Europe was generally more focused on human rights issues and the brutality of the communist regime, the Voice of America functioned, among other things, as a tool of Ameri- can propaganda. Its main task was to serve as a reliable and objective source of news, to promote human rights and warn about crimes against humanity, and inform listeners about dissent activities and U.S. policies in Czechoslovakia and in general. To refute communist propaganda and neutrally describe the events of the 1968 Soviet invasion, February 1948 Coup d'état, or the liberation of Western Bohemia by the U.S. Army during World War II, which the communist regime entirely denied. Additionally, Czechoslovak people had the opportunity to learn about the forbidden literature, listen to censored authors, and the station would sometimes present the Western literature, music, pop culture, and ordinary American life: often presented by Czechoslovak people living in exile, such as Josef Škvorecký or Ivan Medek.60 Morevoer, Embassy officials, and the U.S. Ambassadors themselves frequently spoke there. Often speaking in Czech, which only added to the popularity among the Czech- oslovak population. The mere fact that the Czechoslovak regime vehe- mently tried to disrupt these radio broadcasts indicates how popular and influential instruments they were.61 From the early 1980s, these radio stations became very popular among the young Czechoslovak population, who had far more courage to take risks and participate in various crowdy exhibits, e.g., American Li- brary, Church masses, or laying wreaths for fallen American soldiers. Even though the regime could easily persecute them for it, people turned

59 Kennedy, Charles Stuart, 1991. pp. 37, 38. 60 BIC: behind the Iron Curtain: Review of the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes, Czech Republic. Vol. 3. Prague: Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes, 2014. pp. 25-38. 61 Kennedy, Charles Stuart, 2003. p. 149. Alternatively see Kennedy, Charles Stuart, 2011. pp. 166, 167.

UNITED STATES APPROACH TOWARDS CZECHOSLOVAKIA out in increasing numbers.62 A shining example would be the American Library, where people would come every day and once in a while had the opportunity to meet with several western writers, such as Kurt Vonne- gut, John Updike, and others. During these extraordinary exhibits, even a thousand people came a day.63 Invitations to such events, celebrations, and demonstrations were another task of these communication instruments. According to studies from RFE or independent dissident groups, 4 million Czechoslovaks listened daily to RFE and VOA in the mid-1980s, equivalent to about 35% of all listeners.64 Another important Embassy’s task was to maintain continuous contact with primarily Charter 77 but also other dissent groups (VONS, Jazz section, Catholic Church, Democratic Initiative, Independent Peace Asso- ciation, Initiative for Social Defense, etc.). Although those movements had many members and supporters outside Prague, especially in larger cities such as Brno and Bratislava, where publishing samizdat literature and doing other dissent activities were quite common, most U.S. activities that focused on Czechoslovakia took place in Prague. Not only was the U.S. Embassy based there, but all the important institutions such as Federal Assembly or individual ministries were in Prague since the communist apparatus was highly centralized. Also, the core of Czechoslovak resistance was formed primarily by Prague intellectuals: actors and writers forming since the Soviet invasion of 1968. They were not as sharp and straightforward as the Polish Solidarity and did not form any political entity or opposition to the regime. They fought above all for fundamental human rights, the opportunity to express and write freely, and drew the regime's attention to non-compliance with the Czechoslovak Constitution and the Helsinki Accords. However, due to the regime's harsh censorship, people could hear and read objective information about Charter 77 and people like Václav Havel, Ludvík Vaculík, and Jan Patočka exclusively from RFE, VAO, or samizdat literature; while the regime publicly described them as "traitors and enemies of the nation." One of the few publicly known opponents of the regime was Cardinal

62 Kennedy, Charles Stuart, 1991. p. 34. 63 Kennedy, Charles Stuart, 2003. pp. 143, 144. 64 Behind the Iron Curtain, 2014. pp. 36, 37.

32 UNITED STATES APPROACH TOWARDS CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Tomášek, who was persecuted by the regime since the 1950s and played a crucial role in the 1980s.65 Therefore, one of the Embassy’s objectives was to get the persecuted people out of danger and the political prisoners out of prison. Also, bringing in and getting visas for family members, people in exile, and U.S. representatives and correspondents through better personal relations with Czechoslovak officials.66 Perhaps the most crucial role was played by meetings of American officials, especially the U.S. Ambassadors themselves, with members of Charter 77 and dissent in general. At least once a month, they held secret discussions at the U.S. Embassy, hotels, or someone’s house. It was essentially necessary to stay in touch and give them strong support and help. Of course, most of the time, they were in- tercepted by the secret police, but with the passage of time and the change of atmosphere after Gorbachev's arrival, the meetings took place almost formally and without significant interventions.67 In 1983, at the instigation of the Reagan administration, a non-governmental, non-profit organization was formed: the National Endow- ment for Democracy, which was tasked with supporting democratic, resistance movements abroad both with funds (via USIA) and through smuggling of literature, instruments, and medicaments.68 According to former Czechoslovak dissents, this organization was significant and had a substantial impact on dissent persistence. It financially supported Charter 77, VONS, and its members, who were persecuted or surveilled by the regime and got into severe financial problems.69 Unlike the American approach to the Czechoslovak regime, where there was almost no change, and Gorbachev's later arrival only relaxed the atmosphere, the U.S. administration's approach to Czechoslovak dissent and citizens was all the more pronounced. It was primarily Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America that enjoyed great popularity among Czechoslovaks and kept them courageous and hopeful. Thanks to the support of the U.S. Embassy, the resistance environment could grow, and Charter 77 could persevere until the Velvet Revolution.

65 Kennedy, Charles Stuart, 2011. pp. 187, 188. 66 Ibid. pp. 30, 31. 67 Kennedy, Charles Stuart, 1991. p. 32. Alternatively see Kennedy, Charles Stuart, 2011. pp. 180, 181. 68 Gordon, 1987. p. 105. Alternatively see Garthoff, 2004. p. 31. 69 “Czechoslovakia: ‘If the Culture Survives...",” January 24, 2018, and “Disidenti,” Česká Televize. November 7, 2011.

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5.4 Results and impact of the implemented policy

Despite the fact that the American interest in Czechoslovakia was low because of the character of Husák's political regime, several partial successes were achieved. Czechoslovakia was firmly committed to the Mos- cow leadership, and significant changes rarely took place, even after the ascension of Gorbachev. Nevertheless, a few more or less successful bilateral agreements were signed, and some progress was made. The most fundamental was the signing of the U.S.-Czechoslovakia cultural agreement in 1986, which the Czechoslovak leadership had longed. In full: The Agreement between the Government of the Czech- oslovak Socialist Republic and the Government of the United States of America on Co-operation in the fields of Culture, Education, Science, Technology, and Other Fields served to further the development of mu- tually beneficial and friendly relations between the two states. The agreement primarily included providing annual exchange programs of approximately one month, such as exchange of scholars and teaching specialists, musical, dance, and theatrical groups, exchange between li- braries, museums, galleries, and the distribution of cultural, informa- tional, and other materials to enrich the mutual knowledge of the peoples and their cultural values.70 Despite many difficulties, the agreement was negotiated mainly through the long-term efforts of Ambassador Luers, who managed to negotiate the agreement literally at the last minute. At the time of the signing between the Czechoslovak and American sides, the United States had bombed Libya, one of the closest allies of Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union immediately cut all of the cultural and commercial relations with the United States. The signing took place mainly due to the ignorance of Czechoslovak officials, who learned about the Soviet response only after the contract was signed. This was a great success for the U.S. Embassy, and it certainly outweighed the position where official relations between Czechoslovakia and the United States were.71 Another success was the International Visitors program that the Reagan administration reorganized entirely. Previously, it did not work very well because it was considered by Czechoslovakia to be a U.S.

70 List of Organizations Involved in Exchange Programs with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1986. pp. 78-90. 71 Kennedy, Charles Stuart, 2011. pp. 176, 177.

34 UNITED STATES APPROACH TOWARDS CZECHOSLOVAKIA governmental program in which Czechoslovakia involved only members of the secret police and did not accept almost anybody from the Ameri- can side. Therefore, the Reagan administration transferred the IV money into grants to independent American, non-governmental organizations and allowed them to act alone. It led to dozens of people going abroad and inside the United States, which worked more than well.72 Overall, the U.S. administration's most significant impact was on dissent and the Czechoslovak population. It was primarily the responsibility of the U.S. Embassy and the State Department to get people like Václav Havel and others out of prison, which was successful. Moreover, their constant pressure on Czechoslovak officials to respect human rights and, later, uphold Gorbachev's policies resulted in a slight shift. For instance, from 1988, Czechoslovak people could receive fiat currency from abroad, unlike before, where they had to purchase the currency from the state when visiting non-socialist countries. Also, the number of Czechoslovak citizens permitted to visit relatives in the United States grew significantly during the Reagan administration.73 Moreover, the constant broadcasting of Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America, and the frequent and numerous events organized by the U.S. Embassy, helped young people not be afraid, encouraged them to take more risks, and express their dis- satisfaction with the regime.74 On the other hand, in 1985, there was also a significant cooling of relations when the Reagan administration imposed travel restrictions on some Eastern bloc countries, including Czechoslovakia. Sanctions were imposed after Congress suspected that some Eastern European states were spying for the Soviet Union to gain access to U.S. high technology, for example, from Silicon Valley. The State Department told the Czecho- slovak Embassy that their diplomats and staff would no longer be able to move freely around the United States and would be forced to state their positions every 48 hours if they decided to leave Washington.75

72 Kennedy, Charles Stuart, 2003. pp. 138, 139. 73 “Reform and Human Rights in Eastern Europe,” U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Wa- shington, D.C.: USGPO, 1989. p. 55. 74 Kennedy, Charles Stuart, 1991. p. 34. 75 Gwertzman, Bernard. “EAST BLOC LANDS, IN REPLY TO U.S., LIMIT TRAVEL.” The New York Times, February 7, 1986.

UNITED STATES APPROACH TOWARDS CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Nonetheless, the U.S. Embassy did its utmost to improve relations with Czechoslovakia and, above all, to improve the living conditions of its people. However, it often did not find much understanding in the State Department, which saw Czechoslovakia as lost and fully committed to the Soviet Union. The impact of U.S. policies could not be significant as a result of the orthodox Stalinists ruled over the nation, and more than eighty thousand Soviet soldiers occupied the country. The situation and the impact of the U.S. policy began to manifest itself only with the arrival of Gorbachev and the change in the policy of the entire Eastern bloc.76

76 Kennedy, Charles Stuart, 2003. pp. 137, 138. Or Kennedy, Charles Stuart, 1991. pp. 37, 38.

36 CONCLUSION

Conclusion

The research aimed to thoroughly analyze the Reagan administration approach towards Czechoslovakia using four research questions. The results of the analysis are as follows:

What position did Czechoslovakia have in the implementation of the U.S. policy of differentiation?

Czechoslovakia's position within the U.S. policy of differentiation was very weak. From a political perspective, Czechoslovakia was one of the most rigid and least dynamic regimes in the Eastern bloc. The ruling apparatus remained unchanged since the Soviet-led invasion of 1968 and the establishment of the normalization process: therefore, no political or economic reform took place. In general, Husák’s Czechoslovakia was very brutal, allowed no dialogue, and imposed harsh censorship. West- ern borders were permanently closed under the threat of fire, and the influx of Western goods and culture was minimal. Moreover, regimes’ aggressive propaganda was seen everywhere and did not stray off from the youth either: for example, through Jiskry and Pioneer movements or events like Spartakiáda. Its anti-Americanism sometimes even surpassed the Soviet Union, especially in initial criticism of President Reagan. Over- all, Czechoslovakia was fully committed to Soviet commands, which was reflected, among other things, in the frequent Warsaw Pact military exercises, joint projects, or installation of a nuclear arsenal in the Czecho- slovak territory. From an economic point of view, Czechoslovakia was almost exclusively oriented towards the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. Because of its Marxist-Leninist centrally planned economy and irrational debt elimination efforts, the country found itself in a significantly bad economic situation, a visible decline in living standards, and ever-extending technological backwardness compared to the West. Moreover, Czechoslovakia was not a member of the IMF or the World Bank, nor did it receive MFN status from the United States. The potential for any trade or economic agreement was enormous but was limited for political reasons. Husak's regime was unwilling to make human rights concessions in exchange for economic incentives offered by the United States.

One of the few positives in which the United States saw great potential was the still-nascent resistance movement led primarily by Charter 77. The United States believed that change in Czechoslovakia could be possible from within through Charter 77 and other similar dissent groups, like the Polish Solidarity movement.

What was the U.S. administration's attitude towards Czechoslovakia, and how did the attitude change over time?

The United States' interest in Czechoslovakia could be displayed as infe- rior, mainly due to Husák’s regime stationary character described above. Although Czechoslovakia was very interested in obtaining MFN status and signing diplomatic or commercial agreements, negotiations always stalled on human rights issues that the Czechoslovak regime did not want to hear about at all. The main task of the U.S. administration was to motivate the Czechoslovak regime with the possibility of joining the IMF, World Bank, or preferable loans conditions, in exchange for economic, political, or human rights concessions such as the release of political prisoners or respect for human rights agreed at Helsinki. Despite the fact that the State Department thought Czechoslovakia was lost from their influence entirely, people from the U.S. Embassy had a different opinion and eventually played an even more critical role. They had a two-track agenda. On the one hand, their main job was to improve relations between the two countries, meet with high-ranked officials, and insist on American demands and offers, but on the other, to support local people and especially resistance movements. While the latter was relatively successful, no significant progress was made with the Czechoslo- vak regime until Gorbachev's arrival. Until then, the regime was very tight and strictly followed the Soviet model. However, everything soon changed under Gorbachev’s leadership. Not as outwardly as in neighboring Poland or Hungary, but there were visible internal changes. The Czechoslovak leadership feared the Prague Spring revival for so long that it paradoxically came directly from Mos- cow in the form of Gorbachev's glasnost, perestroika, and other struc- tural reforms. The United States made great use of it. Not only did they warn of human rights abuses, but they could pressure the Czechoslovak government to resort to Gorbachev's reforms, to which they were reluc- tant but followed to a degree regardless. Overall, the regime was no longer as brutal as before, and people seized more courage since then.

38 CONCLUSION

The American side could suddenly meet with high-ranked officials without difficulty, which was not possible before. The encounters with dissent groups were not disrupted. Exhibits in the American Library and other places became more and more numerous. The specific change in the atmosphere was underlined by three visits by Deputy Secretary of State John C. Whitehead with several groups of Czechoslovak resistance, where the issue of human rights and their shift in Czechoslovakia was discussed.

How did the U.S. administration approach the resistance movement and Czechoslovak people through public diplomacy?

The human rights agenda was in charge of the predominantly U.S. Em- bassy with the help of the National Endowment for Democracy and especially the main communication channels: Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America. They were essential tools of American public diplomacy and propaganda. During the Reagan administration, considerable investments were made in the equipment, and broadcasting times were considerably extended. Their primary task was to inform the Czechoslo- vak public about political life and advocate for the U.S. policy in Czecho- slovakia and in general. It had a significant impact on the Czechoslovak listeners – up to 4 million a day. In addition, people were usually invited to various special meetings or had the opportunity to learn more about forbidden literature and Western culture. Those broadcasts were often attended by U.S. Ambassadors, who sometimes spoke Czech, so the Em- bassy had an excellent reputation among Czechoslovaks. Another important task of the U.S. Embassy was maintaining continuous contact with the resistance groups, especially Charter 77 and VONS. To meet with them regularly, or obtain material or financial resources, for example, through the NED. Also, to get people like Václav Havel out of prison or other dissent people out of financial troubles. The U.S. Embassy often organized various meetings: from special guests like John Updike at the American Library to laying wreaths to fallen American soldiers during World War II to celebrating Independence Day on the 4th of July. In contrast to the insufficient progress in negotiations with the Czechoslovak government, the Reagan administration's policy towards the dissent movement and the Czechoslovak population was well conducted. Especially in later years, it successfully helped mobilize young people and encouraged them to take more risks and attend more events

like Church masses, forbidden anniversaries, or even demonstrations alone.

What results brought the implementation of the policy of differentiation towards Czechoslovakia between 1981-1989?

A significant achievement could be considered the administration's approach to resistance and public, which was intensified during the Reagan administration. Especially after Gorbachev's arrival, the administration managed to make full use of relations with Charter 77 and motivate predominantly young Czechoslovak people. However, successes achieved with the Czechoslovak government were only partial. Namely, the signing of a cultural agreement in 1986, which the Czechoslovak party aimed for a very long time, and which certainly outweighed the position where the mutual relations between the countries were at the time. Another success was the International Visi- tors program, which the Reagan administration reorganized and established as a non-governmental, non-profit project that eventually ended up a success. On the other hand, in 1985, there was a relatively large cooling of relations when Congress imposed travel restrictions on Czechoslo- vakia due to suspicion of spying for Moscow. Overall, given Czechoslovakia's position within the U.S. policy of differentiation and the character of the Husák regime, no significantly better results could have been achieved. The American position in Czecho- slovakia reflected hand in hand with developments in the Soviet Union, to which Czechoslovakia was utterly loyal.

In summary, the main motive of this bachelor's thesis was to supplement the existing information and bring novelty into an unexplored theme and contribute to a broader awareness of the policy of the Reagan administration and the final development of Czechoslovakia before the Velvet Revolution.

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