An Arms Control Association Conference Report
CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Vienna, Austria
October 2012
Organized by the Arms Control Association in partnership with the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation with financial support from the Government of the United Kingdom
An Arms Control Association Conference Report
CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects
Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Vienna, Austria
October 2012
Organized by the Arms Control Association in partnership with the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation with financial support from the Government of the United Kingdom Acknowledgements
ACA thanks the speakers and participants at our February 17, 2012 roundtable for their time and contributions. We appreciate the help and support of the Elena Sokova and the staff of the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation for hosting the event. Thanks to Sally James and Katie Burgess at Cutting Edge Design for layout and design of the report. Responsibility for any errors or omissions in the summaries of remarks and discussion in this report rests exclusively with the ACA staff. We are grateful for the generous support of the Government of the United Kingdom and our ACA donors and members, without which the conference and this report would not have been possible.
Cover Photo
CTBTO Executive Secretary Tibor Toth addresses foreign ministers and diplomats representing CTBT member states at an event marking the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the organization at the Vienna International Center on February 17, 2012. Photo courtesy of the CTBTO.
©Arms Control Association, October 2012 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects iii The February 17, 2012 ACA-sponsored 2012 The roundtable February 17, conference together leading brought governmental and nongovernmental experts evaluate to the CTBT’s contributions future for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, the status and capabilities of the international monitoring and verification system, and the views the Annex of key regarding 2 states the the moratorium, test CTBT, and that developments signature/ratification. to lead could help ifteen years after the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Ban Treaty Test ifteen Comprehensive years the signature after of opening the for CTBT the for Commission Preparatory the (CTBT) of establishment the and against norm a global CTBT the reinforce Organization in Vienna, has helped
The CTBT and the CTBTO can already be have signedhave states and 157 183 date, To explosions and contribute to disaster response and preparedness. and response disaster to contribute and explosions and established a robust global monitoring system that can help detect and deter nuclear nuclear deter and detect can that help system monitoring global a robust established and nuclear testing, contributed to progress on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, disarmament nonproliferation, and nuclear on progress to contributed testing, nuclear F Preface considered a success, their but full potential has not beenyet realized. ratification ratified of 2012 Indonesia’s the treaty. the CTBT provides energy new win to even broader support and secure the eight remaining ratifications necessary bring to the treaty states, Key force. into including and the States China, United continue to express their entry support prompt for force, into although the ratificationprocess in those countries remains delayed.
Table of Contents
1 Welcome
Elena K. Sokova, Executive Director, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association
Robert Wood, Charge d’Affairs and the Acting Permanent Representative to the CTBTO, U.S. Mission in Vienna
5 session 1: The CTBT’s Role in Curbing Vertical and Horizontal Proliferation
5 Key Points
6 Remarks
Amb. Juan José Gómez Camacho, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations Office and International Organizations in Geneva
Amb. Thomas Graham, Jr., former U.S. Special Representative for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Amb. Michael Weston, former U.K. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament
Pierce Corden, former Director of Administration, CTBTO, and Visiting Scholar, Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy, American Association for the Advancement of Science
12 Summary of Discussion
13 Keynote Lunch Address
Remarks
Amb. Tibor Tóth, Executive Secretary, CTBTO
15 session 2: Progress to Date with the International Monitoring System
15 Key Points
16 Remarks
Lassina Zerbo, IDC Director, CTBTO
Hein Haak, Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute
Wolfgang Weiss, German Radiation Protection Agency
21 Questions and Answers 22 session 3: Pathways Toward Entry Into Force
22 Key Points
22 Remarks
Amb. Mohamed Shaker, Chairman, Egyptian Council on Foreign Affairs
Amb. I Gusti Puja, Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations (Vienna), UNIDO and CTBTO, Resident Representative to IAEA
Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, The Hindustan Times
Michael Krepon, The Henry L. Stimson Center
Amb. Nils Daag, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the International Organizations in Vienna
Emily B. Landau, Ph.D., Director, Arms Control and Regional Security Program, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University.
31 Summary of Discussion
32 Concluding Remarks
Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Association
Elena Sokova, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Nonproliferation
33 Appendix A: Speaker Biographies and Conference Participants
36 Appendix B: Statement of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, February 17, 2012
39 Appendix C: Additional Resources CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 1
examine the status and capabilities of the international monitoring and verification system; and explore the considerations of key Annex 2 states regarding the test moratorium and the CTBT and review and discuss CTBT’s contributions for future review and discuss CTBT’s nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament efforts; Over seen the past have we few months, new theBut CTBT remains in progress. a work We’ve
momentum the treaty for with the important decision by as Indonesia, well as Guatemala, ratify, to the contributions ongoing the of CTBTO’s impressive monitoring systems, support and of the the show at Article XIV Conference and August Against 29 Day Nuclear Testing. organized this meeting and invited all here to: you of • • • elcome. Let me first tell you about our organization here in Vienna. We We are here Vienna. in ourorganization about you tell first Let me elcome. in and discussion partnership oriented results for a platform form to motivated for the ACA. as initiative such inThe active this organizations with field, other okova . Kimball
hank Elena you and thank the to Vienna you DisarmamentCenter for and Nonproliferation teamingfor with up the Arms Control
aryl G
We are gatheredWe here today fifteen some years after The CTBT and the CTBTO can already be T Executive Arms Control Association Director, D W Status and Prospects” and Status lena K. S K. Elena Executive Vienna Center Director, for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Welcome to “CTBT at 15: 15: at “CTBT to Welcome Association organize to roundtable today’s conference, which has been through made possible a generous grant Foreign from the Kingdom’s United and Commonwealth Office. the opening signature for the of Comprehensive Test Ban (CTBT) Treaty and the on anniversary the of establishment the of Preparatory Commission the for CTBT Organization, which many us of celebrated this morning the CTBTO at headquarters the Vienna at International Center with Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Ambassador and his team, Toth and other distinguished guests. considered a success their but full potential has not beenyet realized. and disarmament. We look forward to continuing this work with you and others. and with you this work continuing to forward look disarmament.and We center to conduct work—including seminars training and work—including arms to activities—relevant control conduct to center tank. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) applied to manage the the manage (CNS) to Studies applied tank. Nonproliferation Martin for The James Center Center comes from the Austrian minister of foreign affairs to establish an international think affairs Austrian from the an foreign minister international of comes establish to Center developments that could help lead to signature/ I would like to remind everyone that the meeting ratification by other states. will be held under Chatham House rules, which means that with the exception of the opening Our aim is to promote a serious, civil conversation remarks of our presenters, no comments will be involving governmental and nongovernmental attributed to specific participants or speakers. experts from around the world. I’m so pleased that To allow as many of you as possible the opportunity we have such a high-level group here, which includes to join the conversation, we’ve asked our opening several old friends and new colleagues. presenters to keep their remarks brief—to about 7 to As you can see from the agenda, our program is 10 minutes—and interventions should also be brief as divided into three sessions, with a pair of keynote well as there are over forty of us here today. addresses over our luncheon. Unfortunately, Ms. Let me now turn to the United States’ government’s Emily Landau has informed us that she will not be representative to the CTBTO, Mr. Robert Wood, for here due to a family emergency, but her remarks some his opening remarks. will be included in our report on our roundtable conference here today.
Robert Wood Charge d’Affaires and the Acting Permanent Representative to the CTBTO, U.S. Mission in Vienna Remarks as prepared for delivery.
ood morning. Thank you, Daryl, for that learned of the related benefits that the treaty and introduction. Thank you, also, to the Arms the CTBTO bring to bear. The CTBT provides a GControl Association, VCDNP, and our friends ready mechanism to ensure the integrity of regional in the UK government for bringing us together today nuclear-weapons-free zones such as those in Africa, for the opportunity to discuss the Comprehensive Central Asia, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. South Pacific. It serves as an important confidence It is a pleasure to see so many diplomatic and building measure, contributing to regional peace government colleagues, officials from the CTBTO, and security by limiting the extent to which nuclear and prominent scholars and NGO representatives testing can be used as a political lever in regional here this morning. The level of participation in this conflicts. And with the recent Fukushima nuclear seminar, not to mention in the anniversary event crisis, we saw dramatic proof of the capabilities of earlier this morning, is indicative of the continued the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System for high-level support for the treaty and the organization. non-verification related purposes, such as providing The CTBT remains central to leading us toward a early tsunami warnings and tracking the dispersal of world of diminished reliance on nuclear weapons, radioactivity from reactor accidents. reduced nuclear competition, and eventual nuclear As a representative of the United States, I’m not disarmament. The legal ramifications of its entry oblivious to the obvious question: in the face of all into force, and the practical effects of its verification the benefits I’ve just listed, why hasn’t the United provisions, remain vital to achieving our ambition States ratified the treaty? of a world without nuclear weapons. With a global You all know that, while the United States abides ban on nuclear explosive tests, states interested in by the core prohibition of the CTBT through the pursuing nuclear weapons programs would have nuclear testing moratorium we voluntarily undertook to either risk deploying weapons uncertain of their in 1992, the principal benefit of the treaty—that effectiveness, or face international condemnation of legally constraining all states from testing—still for conducting nuclear tests. And with the immense eludes us since it has not yet entered into force. And progress that the Preparatory Commission has made the United States remains one of the Annex 2 states in the last decade toward establishing the CTBT’s that have not yet ratified the treaty. verification regime, the International Monitoring Here I can only reinforce what you—as experts— System is well on its way to providing States already know well. President Obama remains Signatories with an effective system for monitoring committed to seeking the treaty’s ratification. Our nuclear explosions anywhere in the world. senior officials continue to engage with members In addition to the primary value of the treaty, of the United States Senate and their staff. The in the 15 years since the Provisional Technical Administration commissioned a number of classified
Arms ControlAssociation Secretariat began its work here in Vienna, we’ve and unclassified reports, including an updated National
2 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 3 We also with concluded We the Provisional Technical In addition to our financial support,U.S. technical And while forward moves the States United with to reduceto andeliminate our pastarrears. Earlier this week, transferred we $33 million the to PTS our pay to dues and retire an additional tranche of arrears. As Secretary in Clinton noted her remarks theto Article Conference in 14 September 2009, isthe States prepared United our pay to share the of Preparatory In budget. fact, Commission’s we’ve since demonstrated prepared that we’re good a do to deal than more that. In our addition to annual assessment, provided the States United a voluntary, in-kind contribution $8.9 of Those million in 2011. monies will underwrite a series multi-year of projects the of verification accelerate theto development system capabilities. its and improve to Secretariat a Memorandum Understanding of for provide to a contribution the States to United up of $25.5 million rebuild to a hydroacoustic monitoring station in the southern Indian Ocean. That station, Crozeton Island, will the International complete importantMonitoring acoustic hydro System’s network. Those contributions are all the more significanttough how climatebudget the given is in Washington—they reflect the importanceUnited the attachesStates the to CTBT and of the to completion verificationits system. experts are working closely with their counterparts from the Provisional Technical Secretariat and with other experts from many States Signatories in collaborative efforts to improve the capabilities of the global International Monitoring System and the International Data Centre. After a long absence, U.S. experts have since 2009 again been fully engaged in further developing the On-Site Inspection element of the verification regime, both from policy and technical perspectives. Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Verification Rose Gottemoeller led the U.S. delegation at the CTBTO’s Preparatory Commission meeting last June. Her participation in that meeting—as the most senior U.S. representative to date—underscored the depth of our commitment to preparing a fully operational verification regimefor the entry into force of this treaty. the ratificationprocess, to we continue call on all governments declare to reaffirm or their commitment conduct explosive to nuclearnot tests, and encourage members of the United States Senate and their staff. ratification. Our senior officials continue to engage with President Obama remains committed to seeking the treaty’s And even the as have engage we Senate, we The question the key reports and briefings will is thanksIt the to the hard of CTBTO work Which mean that doesn’t U.S. ratification will the New START Senate for us prepare taught to for an equally have the over robust CTBT. We debate been careful specific no that have we note to in date mind a ratification for vote. goodThere is a reason that:for rushing before the important a vote to process and engagement explanation of has run its course increases the risk an of unfavorable outcome, which is the last thing those support us of who the CTBT want. So will we continue working engage to members the of Senate the on national security rationale behind our support the CTBT, for and will keep a close that on eye dialogue the when judge to time is right bring to the CTBTU.S. the to of floor the a formalSenate for debate. increased our participation in all the of Preparatory activities.Commission’s increased have We our request thebudget over past three years in order Intelligence Estimate and an independent National National independent an and Estimate Intelligence the of ability the assess to report, Sciences of Academy treaty the with compliance monitor to States United in maintain, to States United the of ability the and secure safe, a testing, explosive nuclear of absence the weapons these as long so arsenal nuclear effective and and Senators with meetings and reports Those exist. of wealth a Senate U.S. the give will staff expert their determination a making in them assist to information CTBT. the of ratification of merits the on answerattempt to is whether the CTBT can be effectively verified. you As manyof well are aware, the U.S. Senate declined provide consent to to its ratificationof the CTBTin large part1999, in because concerns of effective about verification. With the advances in technology and the build the of IMS out takenthat have since place a much then, have we stronger case today. Preparatory Commission, the CTBT’s States Signatories, and the staff the of PTS that the treaty’s verification regime has made such tremendous progress in the last decade. The expansion the of IMS network, together with significantadvances in the technologies the of verification regime,mean that the CTBTO can reliably detect even relatively small nuclear explosions, a capability that was regrettably the to in test put 2006 and 2009 in the DPRK. Gettingbe quick easy. or advice and consent from all States that have not done so to sign and ratify of the CTBT. The United States is working to join the treaty. We enthusiastically welcomed Indonesia’s Indonesia, Guatemala, and the many other states ratification of the treaty, which is particularly that have ratified the treaty, and in the meantime, significant given that it is the first Annex 2 state to we intend to continue to provide robust technical ratify the CTBT since Colombia did so in 2008. We expertise and political and financial support to the were also very pleased that Guatemala ratified the CTBTO and to this important treaty. treaty a bit earlier this year, bringing Central and Thank you very much for allowing me to speak South America closer still to region-wide ratification with you today. Arms ControlAssociation
4 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 5
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The CTBT’s Role in Curbing Curbing in Role CTBT’s The Vertical and Horizontal Proliferation
ion 1 ion ss Se The United States is the most important hold-out of the remaining eight Annex 2 states, many of which will likely follow suit once the United States ratifies. Entry into force would, however, increase the international security value of the treaty. Despite not yet having entered into force, the CTBT has reinforced the de facto global test moratorium. Ratification of the CTBT is a tangible way for states, including Israel, Egypt, and Iran, to contribute to the realization of a Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction and help de-escalate tensions in the region; The CTBTalso can provide confidence about the peaceful intentions of non-nuclear weapon states; With the CTBT in force, the established nuclear- weapon states cannot proof-test new, more sophisticated nuclear warhead designs; Without the option of nuclear explosive testing, newer nuclear nations cannot perfect smaller, two- stage thermonuclear warheads, which are more easily deliverable via ballistic missiles; The CTBTcontributes to efforts to curb horizontal and vertical proliferation; The CTBT entry into force will reinforce the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
• • • • • • • • Key Points Key • Amb. Juan José Gómez Camacho Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations Office and International Organizations in Geneva Summary of remarks.
“The CTBT’s Role in Curbing Vertical and Horizontal Proliferation”
t is a pleasure to be here. We value this by CTBT rules and will not test new explosions. But opportunity, where we can discuss the successes advanced technology allows them to “modernize” Iof our endeavors. The problem with like-minded their arsenals. In any case, the CTBT does help discussions is that we reinforce our own views. With maintain the status quo. this discussion we have the opportunity to be critical 4) We can state that the CTBT has been successful and honest. I will make three brief points: in setting the norms necessary to underpin the nonproliferation regime, the NPT in its three 1) The success of the CTBT. Very clearly the CTBT has pillars, but not entirely preventing the qualitative had an impact on horizontal proliferation. This is improvement of nuclear weapons, nor has it clearly the case and it has served its purpose. fostered the elimination of those nuclear weapons 2) The validity of the legal purpose. Whether that already exist. the content of the CTBT already constitutes 5) Neither the CTBT nor the fissile material cut-off international law, and to what extent its entry treaty, nor the reductions in nuclear stockpile into force will make that even more binding, is numbers have addressed the issue of the policies a grayish area. In our view however, the CTBT regarding the threat and use of nuclear weapons already constitutes international law. The success of and the maintenance of the nuclear capacity efforts to prevent horizontal proliferation and end necessary to realize those threats. testing indicates the success of the treaty and the non-testing norm. The vast majority of countries 6) A comprehensive approach to nuclear weapons have acknowledged the binding nature of these abolition and nonproliferation is therefore norms and their moral weight. required, and that view has been expressed by many influential bodies and people around the 3) Vertical proliferation. This is a more complex world, including prominent politicians, the point. It is more difficult to assess the impact of International Court of Justice, and the United the CTBT on vertical proliferation. There appears Nations General Assembly. Mexico’s commitment to be less success here. Was it the intention of the is to total nuclear disarmament. We need to CTBT to stop vertical proliferation? Or not? Some strengthen the norm beyond the current status of technological developments may have overtaken the CTBT. We need to strengthen its legitimacy and the CTBT’s desired impact in preventing qualitative advance its entry into force. improvements in nuclear arsenals. Nuclear-armed countries, even if they have not ratified, are bound
Amb. Thomas Graham, Jr. former U.S. Special Representative for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Remarks as prepared for delivery.
“The CTBT’s Role in Curbing Vertical and Horizontal Proliferation”
resident John F. Kennedy truly believed that by the feeling that by 1970 … there may be 10 nuclear there was a serious risk that nuclear weapons powers instead of 4 and by 1975, 15 or 20… . I would Pwere destined to sweep all over the world. In regard that as the greatest possible danger and March of 1963 in response to a reporter’s question at hazard.” He spent much of his presidency pursuing a news conference, he said, “Personally, I am haunted the cause of nonproliferation. Arms ControlAssociation
6 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 7 This deadline was and met the Comprehensive India point reportedly one at privately promised Iran two of is one NPT non-nuclear states weapon The NPT is currently under stress as a result The NPT everything; solve doesn’t cannot it hasIt been 40 over years since the entry force into only arms agreement control explicitly mentioned in the NPT (preambular paragraph 10) and the CTBT is the significant most commitment by made the nuclear bring to states weapon the necessary political balance Principles, of the to Statement NPT. The 1995 which was the political price the indefinitefor extension the of NPT explicitly in 1995, called the for ban test a comprehensive of treatynegotiation in one thatyear, is, by the 1996. end of Ban (the Treaty CTBT)Test was signed in September with1996 as the States the United first signatory. The provides Treaty terms by its will that it enter ratification upon force into by the states 44 had that nuclear facilities their on territory and were members the of Conference Disarmament on With in 1996. the action recent welcome by thirty-six Indonesia, ratified those now of have states the most CTBT. The importanthold-outs are and the States China, United with China waiting When the States United for the ratifies, States United Israel will likely suit follow soon with Egypt acting thereafter. ratification1998 wasStates Unitedto but in the in offlet 1999 the vote by the hook U.S. Senate’s denying CTBT ratification.Perhaps India will return thisto ratify the position States should United and if is likelyso it that Pakistan suit. follow would thatratified has not (the other is Egypt). failure Iran’s so do raisesto questions program whether Iran’s is innot reality a military program. Then there is the caseproblematic North of Korea. diverseof problems; the North Korean nuclear andweapon missile programs; the Iranian uranium enrichment program; Pakistan’s nuclear Kahn’s A.Q. Wal-Mart; the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapon programs and tests; the Israeli nuclear arsenal outside the treaty; the nuclear flirtationsSyria by others; and and the concern that proliferation might cascade in the view living states of in troubled neighborhoods. constrain the potential misuse nuclear of fuel cycles energyfor production, without but the NPT this issue cannot even be addressed. theof NPT has and been it 40 over years since the promise the of NPT nuclear deliver to states weapon a necessary political balance to the NPT. The CTBT is the most significant commitment made by the nuclear weapon states to bring the The important most the of element NPT basic theFrom earliest days of the non-nuclear weapon The NPT is the central international agreement In 1965 the UN General Assembly took up the the up took Assembly General UN the 1965 In the But success the of NPT was was accident. It no to submit to international submit to to safeguards verify to compliance with this commitment, the NPT nuclear the the States, U.K., United (now states weapon France, Russia and China) unfettered pledged access peacefulto nuclear technologies and undertook in engage to nuclear disarmament negotiations aimed the ultimate at elimination their of nuclear arsenals. is this It basic bargain the that last for four decades has formed the central underpinnings the of international nonproliferation regime. bargain was and is the ban. test was It understood the timeat the of signing the of NPT that the elimination the of nuclear arsenals weapon the of nuclear was states weapon far in the future. Thus, if they were give the going to up possession this of ultimate least, they at weapon, agreed, the nuclear could states weapon in the nearer futuretake the step conducting longer no of nuclear tests. weapon states saw the test ban as the litmus testnuclear of complianceweapon state with this basic bargain of the Therefore treaty. without a comprehensive test banthe NPTtreaty, is seen by many NPT non-nuclear weapon states, as being not a treaty balanced of obligations. A one-sided NPT will survive not forever. underlying international peace and security in The principal world. today’s the of quid quo for acquire never to nations the nuclear of most world weapons under this is Treaty the ban. test is the It subject. A resolution was passed which over the next next the over which passed was resolution A subject. Nuclear the of blueprint the be to proved years few things other Among NPT. the Treaty, Nonproliferation obligations” “balanced for called resolution this weapon non-nuclear and weapon nuclear between was NPT The negotiated. be to treaty the in states came It 1970. in force into entered and 1968 in signed with reason—along principal the as recognized be to United the of policies deterrence extended parallel the Kennedy’s President Union—that Soviet the and States realized. been not far thus have fears darkest based a carefully on crafted central bargain, which incorporated the “balanced concept. In obligations” exchange a commitment for from thenon-nuclear than (today more states weapon nations, most 180 acquire to not nuclear theof weapons world) and comprehensive test ban and it still has not happened. placed on the record in Geneva the U.K. position that Since the NPT over time may not survive without the CTBT should not “permit any nuclear weapon it, the bringing into force of the CTBT is a non- test explosion involving any release of nuclear proliferation objective of the highest order. energy, no matter how small.” There are some who question whether the CTBT On April 21, 1996 President Yeltsin at a meeting should be approved who have argued that it is not with President Clinton, announced the Russian clear that all the NPT nuclear weapon states are position that the treaty prohibited … ” any size committed to the CTBT’s zero-yield prohibition and of test forever”, this position was formalized in who therefore argue that the scope of the treaty the negotiating record by Russian Ambassador should be reaffirmed before action is taken on it. But Berdennikov on May 14, 1996. this issue has no legal basis whatever. Lastly, on the 28th of March 1996, Chinese The language or scope in the CTBT was fashioned Ambassador Sha Zukang declared in Geneva that by Australia and was first tabled at the Geneva there was a common understanding that the negotiations in March 1995. It prohibits “any Australian scope formulation should be interpreted as nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear meaning zero-yield. explosion” and was later characterized as a “zero- Thus, there is no real issue about the scope of the yield” limitation. treaty. The CTBT negotiating record unquestionably On August 9, 1995 the French government reflects that the treaty scope is a zero-yield announced that it would support this text and prohibition. Whatever one or the other NPT nuclear confirmed that it meant zero. This was entered weapon state may or may not do or have done after into the negotiating record in Geneva by French the signature of the treaty, once the CTBT enters Ambassador Errera the next day. The day after this, into force all will be legally bound to a zero-yield, August 11, 1995, President Clinton in Washington, comprehensive nuclear test ban. DC committed the United States to a “true zero-yield This Treaty simply must be brought into force as ban,” confirming that the Australian text excluded soon as possible. Strategic stability in the world, the low yield and hydronuclear testing. viability of the NPT and peace and security in the On September 14, my colleague here and before international community depend upon it. Ambassador Michael Weston, the U.K. Ambassador,
Amb. Michael Weston former U.K. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament Remarks as prepared for delivery.
“The CTBT’s Role in Curbing Vertical and Horizontal Proliferation”
n my statement in the Conference on clear: while we could accept constraints on our Disarmament (CD) in January 1994, when the ability to develop new weapons, the treaty should not ICTBT negotiations opened, I said that for the UK prohibit activities necessary to maintain the safety a successful outcome of the negotiations would be the and reliability of our existing weapons. This view was conclusion of a treaty which made a real contribution shared by the other Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), to non-proliferation, by interposing a substantial although the precise requirements of each of us were obstacle in the process of developing nuclear weapons. slightly different. I went on to say that we believed that two elements This issue, that is to say the scope of the treaty, was were essential for the success of the negotiations. First, the main focus of discussion for many months, both the treaty should have as large a number of parties in the CD and in the parallel talks between the NWS. as possible and, secondly, it should have an effective, I do not think it would be appropriate to go into the credible and efficient verification system. details of these parallel discussions here, even if I I also made clear in my statement that the UK could recall them at this distance in time. Suffice it continued to attach importance to the role of nuclear to say that, at the end of the day, all the NWS were weapons for the preservation of our security both forced to accept that neither very small explosive then and for the foreseeable future. Although I did tests, nor Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNEs), nor not spell it out, the corollary of this last point was safety tests were acceptable to the international Arms ControlAssociation
8 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 9 While is, course, of it disappointing that the Treaty had signedLast States and time 182 I looked, But this is moreno a satisfactory substitute EIFfor United States that had been the most enthusiastic of the NWS about the treaty and hadit been President Clinton who had launched the negotiations and, by a series of initiatives, largely determined their course, sometimes to the discomfort of the other NWS, and their outcome. But clearly we were all forgetting the checks and balances of the American constitution. the fifteen force, enteredhas yet into not years that passedhave since the was Treaty opened signature for been not have wasted. Support the has Treaty for continued grow. to these of all 26 but also had ratifiedAs Treaty. the a result, the provisions been the of have Treaty established as the international norm. the At same time, great progress has been made in putting in theplace International Monitoring (IMS), System which nearing is now and has completion already demonstrated effectiveness its detection by its the of DPRK tests. Progress has also been made towards establishing an Inspection On Site (OSI) capability. No nuclear can test be conducted without now the virtual certainty will that it be detected and condemned by the international community as if the had alreadyTreaty entered force. into than provisional application of the Treaty would be. The CTBT has a to inplay key role the international non-proliferation regime. U.S. ratificationof the CTBT would demonstrate continued support thefor Treaty and thepave way ratificationfor by fewthe remaining Annex 2 states that yet not have ratified. EIF of the CTBT would greatly strengthen the NPT, at a time when the is facing world proliferation major challenges, due to the re-emergence of civil nuclear power as a goal of many states’ energy policies and also to the ambitions of some countries to develop an indigenous nuclear capacity. The need thefor United States to ratify the Treaty has never been greater. Support for the Treaty has continued to grow. was opened for signature have not been wasted. The fifteen years that have passed since theTreaty When was the clear it concluded, negotiations that was assumption,It my and I think the assumption It frankly never occurred to me that the United Apart from scope, the two other most difficult We believed, that madeWe sense no it however, all at a treatyhave to that did bind not all the NWS and the three nuclear-capable or threshold states not already bound by their commitments under the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Despite subsequent developments, or the lack of them, I continue to believe that were we right. time, some for force into enter the not would Treaty because the of attitude India. of Nevertheless, was it view themy time at that the been had negotiations successful. Certainly essential the UK’s requirements had been had achieved we met. But than more that. I believed that the treaty was that had negotiated we a good treaty and make would a real contribution to non-proliferation, as well as the to achievement of freethe vision a world nuclear of of weapons. other most of people in the the CD time, at that all the NWS ratify would the as Treaty soon as their legislative processes permitted and that they would then join with other ratifiersto others, encourage in particular the Annex ratification whose 2 states was necessary ratify to EIF, for the Treaty. States would not ratify. After all, it had been the community be.to had yield” and Ways that it “zero be ensurehad to found to the safety and reliability ourof nuclear weapons without resorting nuclear to explosive tests. aspects of the negotiations were verification and entry forceinto (EIF). Through Peter Marshall, the Friend of the Chair Technical for Verification and Chairman of the IMS Expert the UK Group, made an important and positive contribution to the discussions on verification.We also made an important contribution theto discussions on EIF, although all not would agree that our contribution in this case was entirely positive. Some blamed us insistingfor on such a “difficult” EIFprovision. Pierce Corden former Director of Administration, CTBTO, and Visiting Scholar, Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy, American Association for the Advancement of Science Remarks as prepared for delivery.
“The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a Technical Barrier to Advanced Weapons”
he Preamble of the Comprehensive Nuclear- state is moving in the direction opposite to the Test-Ban Treaty recognizes “that the cessation direction of nuclear disarmament. Tof all nuclear weapon test explosions and What about weight? Contrast the 4080 kilograms all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the of the Hiroshima bomb, with an explosive yield of development and qualitative improvement of nuclear about 13 kilotons, to the some 300 kilograms of a weapons and ending the development of advanced modern ICBM reentry vehicle warhead, with a yield new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an of some 300 kilotons. The less the weight, the easier effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non- the weapon is to deliver; and the greater the number proliferation in all its aspects,….” that can be deployed on a given aircraft or missile. Thus the Treaty links the cessation of nuclear Again, the wrong direction for nuclear disarmament. testing both to nuclear disarmament and to non- What about yield? Again consider the Hiroshima proliferation “in all its aspects.” bomb, at 13,000 tons of high-explosive yield Terminology in the field of international security is equivalent. And then consider the yield of a nuclear often complex. Non-proliferation “in all its aspects” explosive, as tested in the South Pacific in the early surely includes technology development for nuclear 1970s, 915,000 tons. The advanced weapon that weapons beyond what might be feasible without could utilize the data provided by this test is obvious. nuclear testing. “Vertical” proliferation can relate to a Another wrong direction for nuclear disarmament. state building additional numbers of nuclear weapons, Other advances that have involved testing for their even of a primitive, untested type. But it can also refer development or confirmation include: to the development of weapons advanced in their • Increasing the yield of a weapon at a given weight, technology, technologies not possible without the or maintaining yield with less weight. information acquired from testing. Bearing these observations in mind, these remarks • Decreasing the volume of a weapon. focus on the role of testing in the development of advanced weapons, and thus relate the Treaty to • Changing the shape of a weapon. proliferation along the “vertical” axis. The relation • Altering more than one of the yield, weight, of the Treaty to nuclear disarmament will become volume and shape parameters at one time. apparent below. Suppose that a state has acquired a rudimentary • Developing the technology to permit the yield of nuclear weapon, and tested once, so that it has clearly a weapon to be selected, providing more flexibility proliferated “horizontally.” Then what? Stopping in targeting. with a single nuclear explosion is evidently not good • Reducing the amount of high explosive that is enough. The state seeks to expand—to proliferate—its required to assemble the critical mass of the HEU military capabilities, to acquire advanced nuclear or plutonium, or making other modifications to weapons. Doing so has involved carrying out more the non-nuclear components of a weapon. nuclear explosions, in some cases many more We begin with the use of fissile materials in Some of the specifically nuclear weapon weapons. The Hiroshima gun-type bomb used technologies involved in developing advanced about 60 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU). An weapons include: implosion-type weapon using HEU, developed with nuclear testing, requires less than half that amount. • Introducing the technology of “boosting” a fission The Nagasaki bomb used about 6 kg of plutonium. explosion by fusions in the center of the imploding The plutonium first stage of a modern nuclear fission material to increase the yield by producing weapon might use, say, about 4 kg of plutonium. more fissions. Again, the advancement is clear. • Adding a second component, or stage, to a weapon, The less the amount of fissile material used per using fusion to increase the yield (thus a fission-
Arms ControlAssociation weapon, other things being equal, the greater the fusion-fission explosion). number of nuclear weapons a state can build. The
10 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 11 is is
—
to a to
—
The United States conducted some 1030 nuclear 1030 conductedThe some States United have that states that argued be might it Perhaps Not allNot likely have states explored all the thatAnd a state has goes for tested? never It There is global good news for security and stability in the direction the direction opposite nuclear of disarmament. explosion tests between that and From 1992. 1945 point forward has developed not any it type new of nuclear Less weapon. is known the other what about if anything,nuclear do, to powers sought have by deploying of way type a new nuclear of after weapon their nuclear testing has ceased. the But numbers of tests carried Russia, by the States, the out United UK, France and China, the point to barrier considerable embodied in the CTBT, and in even the now test moratoriums,further to “vertical” proliferation. “requirements” military their satisfied have tested has ban test the that so future, indefinite the for global the of light in that me to seems It value. little century, half past the during testing with experience be might What unwarranted. is conclusion this weapons nuclear for space” “design the termed of tens to zero from range can that Yield large. is equivalent explosive high of tons of millions scientist a range of over seven orders of magnitude of orders seven over of range a scientist for space” “design this of dimension enormous an of hundreds to tens from ranging Weight exploration. parameters The dimension. such another is kilograms other are volume and size as such above discussed space.” “design this of dimensions dimensions this of space a given or dimension the to same degree. The inventiveness humans of to is not be underestimated. There is good reason agree to to impose limits, such as the CTBT,it. on without saying thattesting a firstwould beyond one only providenot the with state an assured nuclear capabilityweapon also would but advanced to lead nuclear capabilities in that state. in the decreasing numbers nuclear of weapons. be global would news bad for it stabilityBut and security were nuclear testing resume to begin, to or inin or many one states. The CTBT, particularly as it toward entrymoves by providing force, into a strong barrier against the emergence advanced of weapons and their contribution vertical to proliferation, constitutes a continuing and effective nuclear for tool disarmament and nonproliferation. to nuclear disarmament. to advanced weapons and contributes The CTBT presents a strong technical barrier Developing and building weapons that alter the Developing and building the material explosive energy partition between output. An enhanced- output and the radiation the so-called “neutron bomb,” radiation weapon, Or developing other was such a development. as optimizing the weapon to special features, such pulse, or to provide generate an electro-magnetic for x-ray laser, the x-ray energy input to “pump” an example for use against a ballistic missile. Developing lower and lower yield weapons, Developing lower and to hundredths of a kiloton. down historically, Developing higher and higher yield weapons, higher and higher Developing test of kilotons, with a up to 100,000 historically, kilotons. the weapon at 50,000 Adding fission to the second, fusion stage to stage fusion to the second, fission Adding fission-fusion-fission—fusion-fission produce a weapon. This description ways in of which seek may a state In other were nuclear words, testing to now What about advanced weapons with respect to to respect with weapons advanced about What
warheads housed in multiple independently targeted targeted independently multiple in housed warheads ballistic single a on fourteen to up vehicles, reentry sea and land to shells artillery nuclear From missile. missile anti-ballistic and anti-aircraft torpedoes, mines, to need the to relate developments Other warheads. an for as launch, upon acceleration high withstand from radiation the to subjected be to or shell, artillery functional. remain and explosion, nuclear a increaseto nuclear its capabilities weapon illustrates pretty well the CTBT why presents a strong technical barrier advanced to weapons and contributes to nuclear disarmament. resume, begin, to or is reasonable in it to any state, that theconclude series or test, tests, of will result in an advance in the nuclear capabilities weapon of thatthat is, “vertical” state, proliferation, a move type? As testing progresses, states have developed developed have states progresses, testing As type? specific for optimized weapons, of types different compelled been have they doing, so In uses. military to needed advances, or developments, the test to variety the thus And weapon. specific the produce earliest the from time: over types weapon nuclear of higher- and lighter modern to bombs heavy and large on deployed warheads single the From bombs. yield various of missiles ballistic on and missiles, cruise to submarines, on sea at or land on based ranges • • • • Summary of Discussion
The discussion began with several questions and did not pay the same price for testing that Pakistan points regarding the issues that have held up did, especially since India was granted an exemption approval of U.S. ratification of the CTBT. These points from Nuclear Supplier Group rules barring civil include: concerns over on-site inspections; the ability nuclear commerce with states that do not allow of the IMS to detect covert nuclear tests; lingering comprehensive nuclear safeguards. concerns about the ability of the United States to The role of the CTBT as a barrier to vertical maintain the effectiveness of its arsenal in the proliferation was also discussed. Some noted that if absence of nuclear explosive testing; and the failure the CTBT did not exist and there was not a global of other Annex 2 states to ratify the treaty. Several consensus against nuclear explosive testing, the participants expressed the view that the United United States, for one, would still be developing States’ failure to ratify the treaty in 1999 was the new weapons. Others expressed concerns that result of proponents not being sufficiently prepared advances in technology have allowed the established to win these arguments. nuclear weapon states to continue to develop Some participants noted that advances in the nuclear weapons without nuclear explosive testing. U.S. stockpile stewardship program and the IMS Participants generally agreed that the CTBT has should resolve some of the earlier concerns about prevented proliferation along the horizontal axis. U.S. ratification of the treaty, and that the Barack The relationship between CTBT entry into force Obama administration is already preparing a plan and the broader nuclear disarmament agenda was to move forward on ratification. This plan includes also discussed. Several participants voiced the meetings with members of Congress to present the opinion that the CTBT entry into force is a step latest information on stockpile stewardship in order toward incremental disarmament because it limits to prevent any misconceptions about the verification the options of nuclear-armed states and helps ability of the IMS and the United States’ ability to prevent the emergence of new nuclear-armed states. maintain a safe and reliable arsenal without further Participants also noted that moving toward a nuclear nuclear explosive testing. weapons free world also requires progress toward a The view was also expressed that India and global fissile material cut-off treaty, further verifiable Pakistan did not suffer the same consequences from nuclear reductions involving all nuclear-armed states, engaging in nuclear testing. While the point was and a balanced approach to preventing the spread of made that both tested for strategic interests, India sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies. Arms ControlAssociation
12 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 13 The Obama Administration still views non- There is widespread consensus the on steps that The CTBT international is a joint venture its of form of multilateralism that is all encompassing, rather than the selective multilateralism of the willing, or sometimes, the coerced. Pervious commitments on nuclear disarmament were retracted. Disillusionment with our collective ability to face common problems led to a more and more confrontational atmosphere in arms control fora. Confidence in themultilateral treaty-regime reached a low-point. The CTBT, the NPT, the IAEA Additional Protocol and its safeguards system, the andBWC the CD were among the victims. proliferation as anti of a tool terrorism policy. Nevertheless, has returned it the general to more goal establishingof and supporting international norms and regimes. The last three years witnessed have the resurging belief in multilateralism as an essential framework deal to with common problems. Whether in theof field disarmament nonproliferation, and climate change, terrorism drug or trafficking, multilateralism is back. The multilateral response to the promise and threats possible nuclear of energy, whether in the areas physical of security, safety, proliferation,or has been reconfirmed as only the forward. way plausible needbe to taken strengthen to the arms non- control, proliferation, and disarmament legal architecture. The entry the of force CTBT into is a fundamental requirement strengthening for the regime. Norms need be to established and, where they already exist, they need be to strengthened. control However, systems can only function through the acceptance by all actors the of need, the effectiveness, and the fairness the of rule-based system. stakeholders. is an It all inclusive, multilateral, and
xcellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, is it a pleasure My be to here with today. you appreciation the to Arms Control Association
Judging by the remarks made by the UNSG and Judging by the remarks made by the UNSG Looking back the to 20 years after the new these agreementsHowever, were mired with slow- The past decade, in particular, witnessed the E Remarks as prepared for delivery. Control“Arms Association Roundtable: at CTBT 15: Status and Prospects” Amb. Tibor Tóth Amb. Executive Secretary, CTBTO Keynote Lunch Address Lunch Keynote and the Vienna Disarmament Center for and Non- Proliferation organizing for this conference to coincide with the CTBTO anniversary. 15th anniversary other high officials during this morning’s event, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of our time. remain one of the most defining issues beginning arms of and control disarmament, one cannot the many note successes, but and many more failures. The war the end of cold ushered in a new era restraint of in weapons deployments, weapons transfers, and military operations. The hopes the of eranew were codified in several treaties between such and as 1996, START I and1991 START II, the andCWC the CTBT. paced ratification STARTand I implementation. did until force into 1994; START enter not late II never andentered force was into replaced by SORT in 2002. The widespread of CTBT, in spite support, is India, force. into enter Pakistan to yet and the DPRK raised questions new the about viability the of NPT. In declined addition, the States United sign to the landmines withdrew treaty, from the ABM in Treaty 2002, and rejected the verification for the protocol 2009, to seemed the Up States United BWC. give to preference the arrangements prevent that to sought proliferation parties to that were considered a threat U.S.to international or security. In other non- words, proliferation became anti-terrorism of a tool policy. erosion of the multilateralism. Perhaps I need to underline here that I am talking about that democratic legally bind framework. It is a prohibition As stockpiles are reduced, verification becomes regime of equal obligations. It has a verification more salient. It is necessary to strengthen CTBT regime that relies on its parties, and serves all monitoring technologies and ensure that it remains of them in an equal and transparent manner. It at the cutting edge of scientific discovery. Our represents what I call “disarmament and non- technology foresight program aims to keep an eye on proliferation 2.0.” the emerging technologies to ensure that we are in I have just returned a few days ago from New front of the pack. York where Indonesia deposited its instrument We continue to invest in the future of disarmament of ratification of the CTBT. An Annex 2 state, and non-proliferation. We invest not just in Indonesia’s ratification brings us closer to the entry verification technologies, but more importantly, we into force of the Treaty. It is a vote of confidence in invest in the training and capacity building of the the CTBT and its continued relevance as a pillar of human resources needed to reach our goals. It was the regime. Indonesia’s ratification, together with the with this belief that the CTBTO launched its Capacity other 104 ratifications that the CTBT has fathered in Development Initiative (CDI). The Initiative aims to the last 10 years must not go unnoticed. Ratifying build and maintain the necessary human resource states have reaffirmed that the CTBT has a key role capacity required to deal with the technical, scientific to play in today’s security environment. The CTBT and political complexities of the multilateral provides the last and clearly visible barrier between non-proliferation and disarmament regime. There the peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy. is a clear urgency to strengthen the political The overwhelming majority of states have resolved underpinnings and the verification capacities across that this legal line needs to be drawn clearly and the whole range of multilateral arrangements. irrevocably. The broadest possible range of stakeholders is Maintaining the status quo is not an option. As invited to join in a network of global partnerships. long as any state has nuclear weapons others will These include States, disarmament and non- want them. We cannot be complacent to the threats proliferation organizations and arrangements, and risks of the failure to disarm existing nuclear universities, research institutes, non-governmental states, the prevention of new states acquiring nuclear organizations, as well as individuals with expertise weapons, stopping terrorist actors from gaining and interest in CTBT science and technology areas. access to such weapons, and properly managing the The scope for potential cooperation could vary from rapid expansion in civil nuclear energy. The CTBT exchange of and access to limited electronic resources verifies the silence of nuclear weapons—for the to developing fully-fledged joint and mutually existing possessors and for the newcomers. It is an recognized training programs. essential element along the road to zero. It should be The CDI is building synergies between the in place to move forward. We at CTBTO are trying to Preparatory Commission, NGOs like the ACA do our part. and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and During the past 15 years, we have been able to Nonproliferation, universities and international more than triple the number of state signatories. organizations in order to build and sustain the The Commission has built up a one billion dollar human capital that will become more and more verification system. Almost 80% of the International essential as we travel down the road to zero. The Monitoring System’s global monitoring stations are road to “Zero” requires the widest possible coalitions already sending operational-standard data to the and that’s where the NWS, NNWS, IGOs, NGOs and headquarters in Vienna. The volume of the data broader academic community and civil society need transmitted from the station to the data centre in to cooperate. Vienna has tripled during the last five years. A new But, the international community needs to decide global communications infrastructure for relaying that on the direction it wants to take. Are we serious data has been installed. Important advances have been about our calls for nuclear disarmament and non- made in processing methods and software in all the proliferation? Are we willing to work on realizing the verification technologies. The system has been tried vision of a world free of all nuclear weapons? I believe and tested. Tried by the two DPRK test explosions in we are at a crossroads. There are quite a few steps to 2006 and 2009. These tests are deplorable, but they take down the road leading to entry into force. But proved the reliability of the system. remember. Entry into force is only the beginning. Reaching zero nuclear weapons will require “over It is not an end in itself. Entry into force shall open the horizon action,” which is based on three main the door for new horizons of security and clear the pillars: the creation of new systems; the mastering way for other pressing issues on the international of state of the art technology; and the education/ disarmament and no-proliferation agenda. training of human resources. Thank you. Arms ControlAssociation
14 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 15 same
being
is the
at
track;
not
on
is
is
it
but infrastructure
States are ultimately
increases the legitimacy of the organization and the data provided to the states; • responsible for making conclusions regarding data provided by the IDC, not the CTBTO, and nations need to develop strategies for verification. IMS
(OSI)
currently
the
CTBTO Preparatory Commission as
tested;
Inspection
and
readiness
of
On-Site
Verification is a cooperative effort between the technical secretariat and states; The technical secretariat is responsible for delivering data and not data analysis, which Building human capacity and experience with the system will increase verification ability; developed level The data.
• • • • sending
yet
not
is
Iran,
Tehran,
in
PS21,
station
Progress to Date with with Date to Progress the International International the System Monitoring
ion 2 ion ss Se seismic
Work on thesystem has largely transitioned from development mechanics to maintenances of the system; The IMS is composed of four types of technologies, seismology, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide; The International Monitoring System (IMS) is 85% complete—to date 287 of the 337 stations have been built and are operational;
Primary • • Key Points Key • Lassina Zerbo Director, International Data Center, CTBTO Remarks as prepared for delivery.
“Progress to Date with the International Monitoring System”
t is my pleasure to be here addressing you on the explosion cannot be confidently hidden if its yield is progress achieved and the capabilities of the test larger than 1 or 2 kilotons.” Iban monitoring and verification system since the Since the 2002 NAS report 80% (all but eight) of CTBT opened for signature some 15 years ago. the IMS primary seismic stations have been installed The Preparatory Commission is responsible for and certified. With the amount of data at the IDC developing the Treaty’s verification regime, whose we can use actual station capabilities rather than primary purpose is to ensure that any nuclear estimated capabilities to improve the model of IMS explosion is detected, located, and described primary seismic detection capabilities. sufficiently well for it to be identified. One decade later the model (now using real noise The verification regime includes the global network estimates) predicts a slightly better performance than of 337 stations and radionuclide laboratories of the 2002 estimate, but the original estimate is fairly the International Monitoring System (IMS); the consistent with this updated model. International Data Centre (IDC) where data are How accurate are these models? To understand received, forwarded to States Signatories, processed, this, we must examine the measured capabilities of analysed and archived; the Global Communications the network and compare them to models of what we Infrastructure (GCI) for transmitting IMS data would predict for the same network. The Reviewed and IDC products; and the infrastructure and Event Bulletin (REB) is one of the main products of methodology required to conduct On-Site the IDC and it was used to measure the IMS seismic Inspections (OSIs). network capability. The average global capability was The past 15 years have been quite fruitful for the computed for the years from 2003 to 2011. build-up of the verification regime. 287 of the 337 A steady decrease in the 90% probability of IMS facilities have been installed, most of which detection is observed over the period, which is have been incorporated into the IDC processing and attributed to the gradual build-up of the IMS seismic are contributing to the products generated by the network. In 2011, the average global threshold IDC. The GCI has been developed and has reached for detecting a seismic event with three or more a satisfactory level of operational maturity. The IDC seismic stations of the IMS was between 3.4 and 3.5 is restricted to operating in a provisional mode, but magnitude units. As this is a global average computed except for interactively reviewed products, generates over a three-month period, in some areas the actual and distributes products according to post-EIF threshold will be lower and in some areas the actual requirements. And the OSI infrastructure is being threshold will be higher depending on a number developed and tested through large-scale of factors that include station noise levels and field exercises. propagation effects that are influenced by geology, The PTS is working diligently to build-up and weather, cultural activity, etc. exercise these capabilities and the remainder of this Model predictions for the network performance presentation will reflect on some of the expectations are similar to the REB measurements, which gives of the envisioned verification regime and the reality us confidence in our global average modelling that we see today. capability. Validating results by region is an area of A decade ago, the US National Academy of active investigation for the IDC. Sciences evaluated the technical issues related to What of the IMS hydroacoustic network capability? the CTBT. A model of the completed IMS primary Energy propagation in the oceans is highly efficient, seismic network’s detection capability showed a which is why the IMS hydroacoustic network projected capability at the magnitude anticipated was designed with only eleven stations (10 of during negotiations (mb = 3.5). At this time, many which have been installed). The main obstacles to of the stations had not been installed and their detection are not the size of the event, but rather the capabilities had to be estimated. Based on the seafloor topography. For example, islands can block modelling, the NAS study concluded that “Taking all propagation of hydroacoustic energy. Models of 90% factors into account and assuming a fully functional detection capability for events in the oceans are well IMS, we judge that an underground nuclear below a kiloton of explosion yield. Arms ControlAssociation
16 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 17 etwork Capabilities eismic N etwork (2012) eismicN odel of Primary IMS S Source: CTBTO.Note: The yellow The stationsSource: remain built to CTBTO.Note: and/or certified.redremovedstation Thewas during negotiations and has not been re-located. Predicted magnitude at which there is a 90% probability of detecting at least 3 P phases with the full IMS primary seismic network (using empirical station noise values where possible) M IMS Primary S Predicted Capability of the IMS Seismic & Hydro Networks for the Oceans
In the case of an atmospheric event the picture is threshold models for the minimum yield in tons with far more complicated due to the dynamic nature of real-time station noise and based on LANL (Whitaker the atmosphere, although the modelled capability of 2003) yield relations are well below one kiloton. the IMS infrasound network of 60 stations is rather As with the infrasound network, the particulate and satisfactory (as shown during ISS09 by UK, France noble gas radionuclide networks are also dependent and Germany). Wind dramatically affects acoustic on the weather for their detection capability—wind propagation, and wind conditions change on short transports the nuclides from their source to the IMS time and small space scales. To predict the detection network stations. The detection capability is further capability of the IMS infrasound network (45 of complicated by the decay of the nuclides themselves the 60 stations have been certified) global weather (each isotope having a different decay rate) and the measurements are employed. Maps produced by time between their creation and their arrival at the modelling at three-hour intervals show the dynamic stations. Although the probability of detection could nature of this problem. The two-station detection be calculated for any of the nuclides associated with a nuclear explosion, Barium 140 is used as the standard for Model of Radionuclide Network Detection Capability the IMS particulate network detectability calculations. The calculations produce a map of the minimum detectable activity (Bq) of BA-140 that could be detected by at least one station of the IMS particulate network within 14 days of a nuclear explosion with 90% probability. Averaging several of these maps reduces the effects of the atmospheric variability and gives an estimate of the average network
Arms ControlAssociation capability. At the
18 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 19 The roots the of unique verification regimeof the Timeliness and technical quality both the of The IMS detection capabilities are optimized to Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty reach Treaty down Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Scientific the of theto of decades-long Group work Experts, began who working test-ban on verification in before the negotiations 1970s—long the Treaty’s actually started. After thousands man-hours of of by dedicated scientists,work the verification regime has thrived and developed in a range disciplines: of meteorology and acoustics), (seismology, geophysics nuclear sciences, sciences, computer system engineering and maintenance, and information and communication Scientists technology. have helped make to this state-of-the-art system ever facilities the With of 337 287 capable. more the of International Monitoring already System installed, confidence adherence absolute that have we to a bancomprehensive nuclear on explosions can be effectively in monitored the in atmosphere, the oceans and underground. for the optimizationfor the of verification capabilitiesof Banthe Treaty. nuclear Test measurement results the of IMS and the analyses of the data products are indispensable features the of verification regime. The CTBTO has implemented and is further developing a thoughtful system of both the operation for QA the of IMS stations and the analyses the of data products in the IDC with the aim guarantee to reliable and high-quality The work. global its of IMSoutcomes system and in particular the RN network has reached a technical standard which is unique. Standardized applications qualityof performance indicators the different for verificationtechnologies are indispensablefeatures a verificationof system,which operates monitoring stations under extreme wide. conditions world detect, identify, and locate minute signals related to nuclear weapons tests. The detection capability of the IMS is in many cases limited by the “noise” of these signals due to natural events like volcanic or seismic activities or man-made events such as the radionuclide production for medical purposes or the accident in Fukushima in March Based 2011. on operational experience of the IMS and the
o begin, allow acknowledge the to me remarkable technical and technological initiateddevelopments and applied by the This figure projectedshows networkthe capability asEven build we the up IMS the and show
During Ban Treaty the the of negotiations Test T “Progress to Date with the International Monitoring System” Wolfgang Weiss Wolfgang German Radiation Protection Agency Remarks as prepared for delivery. beginning of 2012, 61 of the 80 particulate stations stations the 80 particulate 61 of of 2012, beginning IDC were under the 40 noble gas stations and 21 of responsibilities. operational particulate the completed for network. color The blue represents better detection capability than green and the upper green of level is in the a small level of fission explosion. capabilities various its of networks, the PTS is also developing On-Site Inspection capabilities. Integrated Exercises Field (IFEs) and associated build- exercisesup progressively the test PTS capabilities an deploy inspectionto team and associated its inspectequipment, large areasunder hostile environmental and political conditions, and produce unbiased reports findings. its on The IFE in 2008 used inspectors 50 and core inspection equipment; IFE willthe 2014 100 inspectors involve and a full set The equipment. of target full for OSI readiness is to conduct two to be inspections able simultaneously. CTBTO establish to the IMS and the IDC as of a state the art verification regimeduring years.15 pastthe I consider this success. as The a major development CTBTO has the of based art state on developments its in science This and technology. is documented by the performance standards the of IMS and the IDC. The interaction with the scientific community was exercised during the International ScientificStudy Conference organized by the CTBTO in 2009 and by activities.many follow-up several standard the of now verificationtechnologies been not the of have art—one state example being gas detection. noble Innovation, technical and standardizationdevelopment since been have aspectskey the of CTBTO. the of work This was and is a prerequisite arrive to which solutions, are at for purpose considered nowadays fit to verifyto the nuclear ban. test Maintaining the high technical and scientificstandards a not is trivial issue. The management the of CTBTO and staff its members are strongly encouraged continue their to efforts to utilize technological new and scientific developments analytical capabilities of the IDC the operational from the nuclear accident after the 2011 Great East- procedures of the stations are subject to continuous Japan earthquake and tsunami. optimization. In order to achieve optimal results for In addition to these valuable contributions to the verification system as a whole the simultaneous improve the scientific understanding of global use of different verification technologies as well as processes on and in the earth, in the ocean and in the application of sophisticated analytical techniques the atmosphere, particularly in relation to disaster is required. These techniques have been and are mitigation. One of these benefits is already in place— being developed by the CTBTO. the contribution of data to tsunami warning efforts. Many of the results of the IMS and the IDC can In 2006, Member States mandated the CTBTO to and should be utilized for the advancement of science provide seismic and hydroacoustic monitoring data in the relevant scientific disciplines, e.g., geophysics, to a number of tsunami warning centers in the Indo- atmospheric physics and climate change. The Pacific region. cooperation between the CTBTO staff and members Data were also made available to Japan when it of these scientific disciplines and data sharing was hit by the massive earthquake on 11 March. with expert organization is strongly encouraged. After the nuclear accident in Japan on March the As chair of UNSCEAR, I am grateful to the CTBTO IMS radionuclide data were made available to that the global data set of the RN network has been international organizations like IAEA and to member made available to the Committee for the purpose states as an important input to public communication of the scientific assessment of radiation exposures of health related risks. Data sharing of this kind is to populations inside and outside of Japan resulting in the interest of societies world-wide and should be organized in a structured way in the future. CTBTO Preparatory Commission Preparatory CTBTO
Winter at radionuclide station RN16 at Yellowknife, Canada. Arms ControlAssociation
20 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 21
Similarly, while trainedwe have inspectors for The bottom line is that built that have we a good Also, some participants suggested that states that that states that suggested participants some Also, Some participants noted that is it only not are already trained this do to they but also must effectively work togetherbe to brought as an organization. OSIs and will again ahave training exercise in 2014, we—the member states—must train our people and thehave organizations in place to make the right judgments about the OSI reports. must We train ourselves—at the state level—to make those judgments. system with further very improvements likely. need provide continue to the to trainingWe and expertise the national at make level to the judgments and assessments necessary verify to compliance with the CTBT. expressed concern growth” thata “zero may budget inhibit future progress and maintenance the of thesystem, diminishing despite monitoring cost of technology and hardware. could treaty the ratified or signed yet not have allowing by treaty the for support their demonstrate monitoring uncompleted as-yet on forward go to work participants Some territory. their on stations understanding greater and IMS the that suggested of means a as used be also could capabilities its about and treaty the of value the of policymakers persuading force. into entry toward progress encourage to important to underscore the success of the IMS, isbut it also important to underscore that the CTBT monitoring system as by vastlya whole, increasing the probability of detection of illicit nuclear testing, creates a strong deterrent against noncompliance. together, the Taken combined capabilities of the primary and auxiliary IMS stations, national technical means of verification, the tens of thousands of civilian seismic monitoring stations, along with the option of short-notice on-site inspections mean that potentialno CTBT violator could be confident nuclearthat a explosionof military utility would escape detection. aak
hrough the of CTBTO the work the over past decadeand half,a built have we robusta global system nuclear for explosive monitoring. test
I would likeI would emphasize—from to national my example,For parties states the consider how must The discussion verification of monitoring and Regarding the further technological development
Questions and Answers and Questions T “CTBT at 15:“CTBT Status and Prospects, Session 2: Progress Royal Netherlands Royal Meteorological Institute Summary of remarks. ein H Hein to Date with the International Monitoring System” We originallyWe our concentrated efforts the on mechanics to moved have the we of system, now but maintenancea working of system. perspective—that the remaining of key one tasks gainto greater experiencewith the system. This depends in large part the of CTBT the on work states parties themselves, they for are the responsible for making thebest use the of information and tools the monitoring system provides. use the IMS data analyze to and clarify a typical sequence events. of Indeed there are people who Some participants raised concerns enforcement about mechanisms the CTBT for (and other multilateral nonproliferation instruments). was that It noted monitoring nuclear events requires test for weapon calls,judgment just the monitoring not system itself, and enforcement compliance of depends the on action and leadership CTBT of parties. states Referral Security theto U.N. Council by itself is not always an effective means enforcement. of need think States to through the other measures that be may necessary to ensure compliance with the treaty. led several participants the on comment need to capacity-buildingfor in relation the to IMS. It was suggested that additional mechanisms and exercises designed member improve states to practical experience with the system and improve to communication evaluate to collected data should be explored. In addition, several participants suggested that further clarificationof the divisionof responsibilities between the organization and states bewould useful. Some participants that there noted is a tendency task to the CTBT Organization with responsibilities the of such states, as data analysis and characterization events identified of by the IMS. and future operation theof IMS, several participants ion 3 Pathways Toward ss
Se Entry Into Force
Key Points
• Failure to ratify the CTBT is not a question of • Egypt will likely ratify after Israel; leaders in commitment to the Treaty, but a problem of Cairo are hesitant to move first given their NPT political will; ratification experience;
• Annex 2 states that have not yet ratified continue • Countries that have ratified and especially those to hold out to make a political statement or use that have recently ratified, such as Indonesia, ratification for future leverage; can help speed along entry into force by actively encouraging “hold out” states to consider and U.S. ratification will likely spur other Annex 2 • complete ratification; holdouts to sign and/or ratify; • Any progress made toward CTBT entry into force Unique political and strategic situations in hold • will reinforce security and other arms control out states will require different approaches and related measures; confidence building measures to encourage ratification; • The CTBT must stay on the political agenda at the global level to maintain progress toward entry into In India there is no real lobby in favor of continued • force; testing, even amongst the ultra nationalists; the lack of movement on the Treaty is the result of • Intergovernmental contact and nongovernmental waiting for the United States and China to ratify organization-led public education efforts are and paralysis of the Indian political system; essential to efforts to encourage Annex 2 states to reconsider and ratify the CTBT.
Amb. Mohamed Shaker Chairman, Egyptian Council on Foreign Affairs Summary of remarks.
“Pathways Toward Entry Into Force”
he Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) could break or make an NPT Review Conference. The is the body and soul of all efforts exerted to CTBT and the NPT are closely linked. Tliberate our world form Nuclear Weapons It is important to recall that the NPT includes, and all other Weapons of Mass Destruction. It is the apart from it’s Article VI disarmament provision, yardstick by which we measure progress achieved and a key preambular paragraph that recalls: “the progress expected. My experience shows that a CTBT determination expressed by the Parties to the Arms ControlAssociation
22 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 23
U.S. Department of State Treaty
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As we celebrate the 15th anniversaryAs the celebrate 15th we the of CTBT Thus, the ratificationsof the CTBT by the eight and consider how long it will it long and consider how take entry for into back look and to recall ought we force, that progress toward the took CTBT It has been steady. but slow years achieve to the Partial Moscow Ban Treaty Test which by the was the on Treaty followed 1963, of the so-Limitation Tests, Underground of Weapon and the on Treaty called Ban 1974, Threshold of Test the Underground Nuclear Explosions Peaceful for Purposes (both only entered force in into 1976 of December 1990). thoughstates, essential and badly needed, be may characterized a belated adherence a full-fledged to operating international mechanism growing in membership and activity. gypt and the CTBT Egypt I take this opportunity as a representative an of Egyptian non-governmental organization call to for universal adherence only the to CTBT, not also but theto NPT itself. Egypt has signed the NPT the on firstit wasopened signature, day for which wason and ratified 1968, July 1st it February in Egypt1981. signed the CTBT the on firstit wasopened for day remarks
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The CTBT has been a measure and a catalyst for When nuclear to comes testing, it must we Assembly (CTBT) 1963 Treaty banning Treaty 1963 nuclear tests weapon in the inatmosphere, space and outer underwater in its Preamble seek to achieve to the discontinuance all of explosionstest nuclear of all weapons for times, to this to continue negotiations end.” progress. is important It recall to that following the CTBT of conclusion talks and opening signature for thein Chemical (CWC) 1996, Convention Weapons These two agreements inentered force into 1997. were achievements the last the of major Conference Disarmamenton (CD) in Geneva. Both treaties established organizations, the CTBTO and the that oversee each the of OPCW, implementation international instrument. What is remarkable more theabout CTBTO is the existence a Preparatory of Commission. is functioning It and developing progressively in the absence the of entry of force into the treaty itself. recognize there back. way is no Action by the eight remaining CTBT Annex necessary is 2 states now in bringorder to the treaty fully and realize force to into the full potential the of CTBTO, which has already established an impressive set accomplishments. of This is a great success story. U.S. signature in 1996, demonstrating its sincere and in the Middle East. The venue and the facilitator have serious commitment to the treaty. been agreed upon. When we ratified the NPT in 1981, the government The newly named convener, Ambassador Lajava put two arguments before the people of Egypt in of Finland, was in Cairo a few weeks ago. We were favor of ratification: privileged at the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs to receive him and engage in a fruitful dialogue. 1) Egypt wanted the option to produce nuclear energy Once a date is fixed for the 2012 Conference, we and needed to ratify the NPT to get there; promise to organize an NGO pre-conference meeting with our partners and friends in the civil society, as a 2) In 1980, for the first time Israel and Egypt joined prelude to the Conference and in the presence of the the consensus at the UN on a zone free of nuclear facilitator. He greatly welcomed the idea. weapons. 2012 is also a year in which we shall embark on But of course, the concept of a zone free of nuclear preparing for the NPT Review Conference of 2015. weapons has not yet been realized and other states It is here in Vienna that the first session of the in our region still remain outside the NPT, which, in Preparatory Committee of the Review Conference turn, impacts Egypt’s decision on whether to ratify will meet this spring. the CTBT. Progress towards the MEWMDFZ and Let me conclude with congratulations to the positive action by Israel on the CTBT would allow able team that is managing the CTBT Preparatory Egypt to move toward CTBT ratification as well. Commission under the leadership of the tireless The road is now open for all countries of the Ambassador Tibor Toth. Middle East region to work towards the establishment Lastly, a word of remembrance on this very special of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other occasion for all those who lost their lives or were weapons of mass destruction in the region. This year handicapped for life as a result of nuclear weapon is the year in which a conference should be held to tests. God bless their souls. embark on a process for achieving a WMD free zone
Amb. I Gusti Puja Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations (Vienna), UNIDO and CTBTO, Resident Representative to IAEA Remarks prepared for delivery.
“Pathways to Entry into Force: Indonesian Perspective”
Why did Indonesia ratify the CTBT? any kind of nuclear weapon test since the SEANWFZ entry into force in 1997. The withholding was more Our support for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban of an open political message to the nuclear-weapon treaty had been formally expressed long before the states and other states claiming possession of nuclear initial formal negotiations were started. Our former weapons that it was they, above all, who must first Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ali Alatas, was the and foremost commit to the CTBT. Ever since, this President of the PTBT Amendment Conference principle position has been our benchmark for in 1991, which paved the way for the CTBT ratifying the CTBT. negotiations. Since then, our commitment to an However, in 2010, we decided that it was the right operative CTBT has never wavered. We signed the time for us to enhance our contribution to increasing Treaty on the same day it was opened for signature the momentum for disarmament by initiating our on 24 September 1996. own ratification process. There were three main However, as an Annex 2 country, Indonesia chose reasons for that: in the past to withhold ratification. The withholding First, since 2008 we observed that the disarmament of our ratification did not in any way represent agenda had gained new momentum by the a degraded commitment to a comprehensive reaffirmation of commitment by the remaining nuclear-test-ban, because as a founding party of the nuclear weapon states in Annex 2 to ratify the CTBT. Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty With that promising development, we believed that (SEANWFZ), we were already legally bound to ban our position had served its purpose. Arms ControlAssociation
24 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 25 We believe the of remaining that none We Annex 2 areaware theWe of unique strategic and political strongly believeWe that the time has for come Since initiated we our ratification process in 2010, I thank you. India’s PrimeIndia’s Minister has said in public and commitment that are we facing of is more it here, an far issue wants how contribute the of one to to universalization and the of long-sought long-awaited Ban Treaty. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test countries withholds the signing and ratificationof the preserve to Treaty ability its test option or to isa nuclear just a matter It weapon. leadership. of also we believeHowever, that, while U.S. and Chinese leadership are urgently needed trigger to the domino effect,each Annex 2 country has the chance to exercise their leadership by making progress toward ratification. situation in different regions. indeed would It require significant confidence-building measures before progress can be made by the countries in those also we regions. believe However, that confidence beshould This built, be waited not for. again demonstrates that leadership is needed build to confidence. countries another encourage to one the do to right thing, and extend to their contribution the to thegreatest CTBT extent promote to possible entry aretruly since we now force, into cruciala at junction in creating momentum new and possibilities new for freea world nuclear of weapons. consider ourwe ratification as an goal.intermediate The goal itself is an operational CTBT, which requires Therefore,the as entry has the of force Treaty. into been stated many times by our Foreign Minister, our Government and Parliament will beyond go ratification promotingby to accession ratificationand theof CTBT by our friends. In doing that, shall we rely cooperation on with other ratifying countries. negotiations on the on negotiations CTBT were in concluded 1996, had thewe Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in had the we NSG1998, India, exemption for had we vigorous whether about there domestic debate was any technical further need for nuclear testing, and the Indian nuclear moratorium test after has 1998 been incorporated every into Indian civil nuclear areagreement. working with now one on We Japan that will further strengthen the moratorium. and the States let Chinaprivate, United ratify and the will make the argument, as more a journalist than as National a member Security India’s of Advisory Board, that in India there real is no Having said that, I believe that all countries, be Second, that hope we by demonstrating our Third, between signed it when the CTBT, 1996, For domestic politicalFor reasons nothing that have Summary of remarks. I Pramit Pal Chaudhuri Pal Pramit The HindustanForeign Editor, Times Let me first be clear onmy point of departure in discussing the pathway to entry into force of the CTBT. No country is substantially against the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world, especially among the non-nuclear weapon states, and no country objects to the view that for the total abolition of nuclear weapons to be achieved, all weapon testing must be halted. they Annex non-Annex 2 or 2, a commitment have theto entry the of force CTBT. of most into Even remaining Annex 2 countries, especially the United China,States, Iran, Egypt, India and Pakistan, before duringor the formal contributed have negotiations, CTBT of theto completion in way negotiations one another.or Having said an is that, not issue it of ndonesia is calling for other Indonesia is calling for Why the CTBT to sign and ratify states enhanced contribution improving to the chances for the entry the of will CTBT, force we into encourage other countries, especially remaining Annex 2 countries, the do to same. has much changedand 2010, in has Indonesia. It been successfully and peacefully transformed from an authoritarian a vibrant to state and dynamic thedemocracy, third-largest have in We theworld. fulfillto our constitutional to to contributemandate the creation a peaceful of have We and world. orderly listento the to aspirations more the of people who seek an everlasting peace. That endorsement was why the of ratificationof the CTBT ourby parliament 6 December wason strongly supported 2011 by all political parties, including the opposition. In short, democracyhas become an our enabler for ratification. lobby leftlobby nuclear of in testing. favor The indications theof political leadership are that they will eventually sign and ratify. Parliament does have not ratify. Signature to and ratification are samethe thing India.for withto will CTBT, it be difficult. India will,however, and the States China. United follow Since the situation will change as far as India is concerned. If In 1998, India’s Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee you talk to others in the senior political leadership told the 53rd UN General Assembly that India would they will all agree. not be among the last states standing in the way of There are four schools of foreign policy in India: the treaty’s entry into force. Recall that Vajpayee the ultra nationalists who have at times said they was the leader of the BJP, the right wing nationalist want more tests; the cautious pragmatists who say party that believed that the Indian arsenal should be we should ratify after the United States and China; equivalent to China’s. the left wing who favor global disarmament and say But, of course, the United States failed to ratify that the CTBT is not enough; and the neo-liberals, in 1999. So I would argue that institutionally and for whom this is about increasing India’s leverage, ideologically in India there is no argument against technology and status, and who believe the CTBT ratifying CTBT other than waiting for the United does not matter. States and China, which is of particular importance. In 1996, all four groups were opposed the CTBT, With respect to India, it is also important to note and after the 1998 tests, three of these groups the paralysis affecting the Indian political system supported the nuclear test moratorium. In 2009, over the past couple of years, which is not related the ultra nationalists said that the 1998 Indian to CTBT at all. There has been a break up of parties, nuclear tests failed. The Indian Nuclear Commission, an economic downturn, and anti-incumbency that however, came out to say that the test did not fail, prevents most politicians from doing anything that and India accomplished all it needed to accomplish appears to be politically sensitive. If there are an from a technical standpoint. The ultra nationalists insufficient number of votes they put the issue aside. then had to backtrack. There are 180 pieces of legislation stuck in the Indian Now, the ultra nationalists have been silenced; the parliament. It is a very unproductive time now for the left and those who support the Rajiv Gandhi vision Indian political system. of global disarmament still want to go beyond the As a consequence, if the United States and China CTBT and pursue global disarmament. But the left do ratify the CTBT, it would not be opposition that is weakened and lost almost all of its seats in recent prevents India, but lack of prioritization of the CTBT. state elections. The neoliberals say we now have I would also observe that for the most part the access to the global civil nuclear market, so we don’t value of the CTBT for nuclear nonproliferation and need to or want to resume nuclear testing, otherwise disarmament is not well understood within India we would lose much of what we have gained in today. But that can change through greater public prestige and access to nuclear technology; as for the awareness, often through high-profile journalism, pragmatists, they have no problems, but United States which can, in turn, lead the politicians to respond. and China must ratify first.
Amb. Nils Daag Permanent Representative of Sweden to the International Organizations in Vienna Remarks as prepared for delivery.
“Pathways to Entry into Force: how to make progress on CTBT entry into force over the next few years?”
ear Friends, Colleagues, Ladies and by among others the UN Secretary General Ban and Gentlemen, first, let me thank the Arms the Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt. Its entry into DControl Association for organizing this force is not only a political and moral imperative. timely seminar in partnership with the Vienna It would also increase and strengthen international Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. peace and security. I am glad to address this seminar as a representative Some twenty years after the end of the cold war of Sweden, one of the two Article XIV coordinators most of us would consider the era of nuclear testing as together with Mexico. Seminars such as this serve something for the history books. Yet its specter might as important reminders of the crucial importance of still come back to haunt us. Nuclear testing is not yet the CTBT. As does the festive celebration of the 15th completely banned under international treaty law. anniversary of the CTBTO this morning, attended Arms ControlAssociation
26 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 27
CTBTO Preparatory Commission CTBO
during
structures
underground
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This includes creating broader public awareness and and awareness public broader creating includes This Our common task is the entry the of force into Of course, had hoped we in that the the 1990’s And just recently another Indonesia, Annex 2 state, all know which the remaining states are: We a deeper understanding of the role of the CTBT and its its and CTBT the of role the of understanding deeper a security. and peace international in regime verification Thistreaty. requires two things: the necessary remaining eight Annex 2 ratifications, and the the of completion build the of up international monitoring system and its verificationtechnologies. In few other international contexts are science and technology and high politics so inseparably intertwined. earlier. Prospectsforce enteredinto have would Treaty anfor early entry indeed force into gloomier looked in the first decadeof this millennium. However, Presidentwhen Obama clearly committed himself to American ratification in Prague welcome 2009new, a political momentum was created. thetook historic ratifying of step reducing the treaty, the number outstanding of necessary ratificationsto eight. This political leadership sets an example for the remaining endorse eight to the CTBT, enabling it full into come to legal effect. North China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, have a Korea, and the United States. These countries detect
to
radar
ground-penetrating
using
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exercise.
Short of having entered into force, the CTBT is is CTBT the force, into entered having of Short While all existing nuclear on moratoria weapon to process XIV Article an is there know, all you As The final declaration adoptedat the Article XIV field Inspection nevertheless already a success story. Since its adoption, adoption, its Since story. success a already nevertheless State the of All stopped. virtually has testing nuclear countries The testing. from refrained have Signatories condemnation universal faced have tested have that action. Council Security UN unanimous and explosionstest need be to maintained, must one remember that these measures the same have not do permanent and legally binding effect as the entry the of force Treaty. into the Since CTBT. the of force into entry the promote year, last September in Conference XIV Article seventh the for process the coordinate Sweden and Mexico XIV Article of task the on Taking years. two coming resolute Sweden’s of sign further a is co-coordinator to interest wider our as well as CTBT, the for support architecture. security international the strengthen Conference in Newlast York September emphasized the importance of an early entry into force of the treaty and called the ending of nuclear weapons testing meaningful “a step in the realization of the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons It globally.” also set forth ten concrete steps towards early entry into force. responsibility to make the legal ban on nuclear testing CTBT by all States in the region could be part of a reality. We strongly urge them to show leadership security-enhancing measures that would advance the and political will to put the legal ban into place. WMD free zone process. It is my hope and belief that this will happen. It We applaud the fact that all of the nuclear-capable is becoming increasingly clear what the alternative countries in Europe and Latin America and many in might be: a world where nuclear testing would again other regions in the world have ratified the CTBT. risk inflaming international relations. The stakes are The Treaty thus provides an important and high—disarmament and non-proliferation cannot be powerful confidence-building tool for the taken for granted. maintenance of global security. It offers a Further ratifications, in particular by key nuclear transparent and democratic system, with equal weapons states, could pave the way for all the access for every Signatory state to all data and remaining necessary ratifications. That’s the positive products of the CTBTO. scenario. Indonesia’s ratification is also important in the regional perspective. Conclusion Progress with the CTBT has a strong potential to reinforce other security and arms control measures. First, it is important to make sure that the issue stays CTBT and nuclear weapons free zones can be seen as on the political agenda and to keep the spotlight mutually reinforcing positive security elements. on the remaining necessary ratifications. This is our Building on the leadership shown by Indonesia, role as Article XIV coordinators, this is the role of progress currently underway with the South Asian all ratifying states, having unanimously adopted the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone could be strengthened by final declaration of the article XIV-conference. This CTBT ratification by remaining states in the region. is also the role of civil society groups—NGOs, media, The positive political developments in Burma could universities, and youth organizations—including hopefully open up possibilities for ratification. those in the remaining eight states which could urge One of the more prominent up-coming their decision-makers to ratify the CTBT. Meetings and disarmament and nonproliferation events include conferences at every level of decision-making make the International Conference to establish a Zone sure that the CTBT stays on the political radar screen. free of Weapons of Mass destruction in the Middle Second, it is important to complete the CTBTO’s East, envisaged to be held this year in Finland. verification regime, which all states should support as Establishing such a zone would be no easy task, a powerful deterrent to any would-be nuclear testers. but hopefully the beginning of a phased process, There are many reasons for the Treaty; there are no comprising of broad and mutually reinforcing valid arguments against the it. confidence-building measures. Ratification of the Thank you for your attention.
Michael Krepon Co-founder, The Henry L. Stimson Center Remarks as prepared for delivery.
“The CTBTO and the CTBT: Securing Their Valuable Global Services”
eptember 24th marks the fifteenth anniversary leaders felt obligated to sign, but remained reluctant of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’s to end nuclear testing permanently. They resolved Scelebratory signing ceremony at the United this conundrum by giving other recalcitrant states Nations. That’s fifteen years in which the treaty vetoes over the treaty’s entry into force. has remained in limbo, due to the worst entry-into- The fifteen year-long wait for the CTBT has been force provision ever negotiated. A much longer wait put to good use. A Preparatory Commission and is in store, as long as entry into force depends on a Provisional Technical Secretariat have worked the United States, China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and diligently in Vienna setting up a global monitoring Indonesia depositing their instruments of ratification, system and dispensing data that have undeniable and India, Pakistan and North Korea deciding to sign value. This network, which is 80–85% complete, and ratify the treaty. currently consists of ten laboratories and over 250 The treaty’s tortured entry-into-force provision was monitoring stations. I’m told by the CTBTO that the handiwork of China, Russia, and France, whose seventeen of the remaining facilities have already Arms ControlAssociation
28 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 29 Other including that states matter, Pakistan, Brazil, willIt take a very time long before all the of Some treaty supporters will argue that these steps France took It and China 22 years join the to to complete, maintain complete, to and upgrade the treaty’s monitoring network. countries Even yet that have signto and ratify the CTBT a minimum, could, at demonstrate responsible nuclear stewardship by provide helping to facilities and the data CTBTO. for The Government India, of example, for has yet contributeto a single seismic, infrasound and radionuclide the station to treaty’s International Monitoring System. New Delhi does even not connect the to CTBTO’s tsunami warningsystem. Egypt, China, France, Israel, Iran, Britain, Great South Africa, Russia, and could the do States, United demonstrate to theirmore commitment end (or, to in the case Pakistan of and India, suspend) to nuclear tests. These fulfill to yet have states allof their the to Internationalpledges Monitoring System’s network. Beijing, example, for does share not its monitoring data with the CTBTO, unlike Washington and Moscow. states named consent above ratify to this treaty. After fifteenyears of waiting, the time has come reaffirmto the treaty’s objectives and purposes in than more Reaffirmation a rhetorical way. and recommitment can take many forms: by completing and upgrading monitoring stations, sharing data, making transparent, more test sites and by participating in monitoring joint experiments. Above all, the CTBT can be reaffirmed by making the treaty organization’s essential global services permanent rather than provisional. are insufficient and poor substitutes for the treaty’s entry They force. into are correct. they But are also unable persuade to enough Republican Senators in convince to or the Treaty, for vote to States theUnited likestates Egypt, Iran, India, Pakistan and North board. on come to Korea is likely It take to even Nonproliferation Treaty. all relinquish for to longer the of holdouts their vetoes the over CTBT’s formal entry In force. into the mean time, that states matter can reaffirm their commitment end nuclear to testing by making the treaty organization’s essential global services permanent rather than provisional. purposes in more than a rhetorical way. After fifteen years of waiting, the time has come to reaffirm the treaty’s objectives and The United States also possesses a world-class The United States also possesses a world-class The Preparatory Commission the for The treaty has valuable generated global services, The symbolic most and effective so do is to to way In demonstrate would states renewed doing so, The capabilities the of CTBTO’s global monitoring Mongolia, Kazakhstan,Mongolia, Finland, Ukraine, Germany All thirteenand Norway. told, primary and nine auxiliary seismic stations linked the to CTBTO immediately this picked up test. can make monitoring system, but even Washington don’t world the of Parts data. CTBTO’s the of use good word as gospel when it comes to take Washington’s in other states. nuclear weapon-related developments error data can help remove potential The CTBTO’s and deceit, all in judgment as well as veils of artifice helpful in deterring covert nuclear tests. Organization Treaty Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban and Provisional its Technical Secretariat produce help global services in other areas, as well. In 2006, treaty members mandated the CTBTO provide to data directly national to tsunami warning centers. The transmissionprompt the of CTBTO’s data can save lives and mitigate disasters. help The CTBTO also has the capacity serve to public safety by tracking radiation released after nuclear accidents plant and venting from underground tests by outlier states. monitoring its but system can as as the long atrophy treaty remains in limbo. While awaiting the entry the makes of force CTBT, it into good sense ensure to that these essential global services are permanent rather than provisional. the “preparatory”remove words and “provisional” from the letterheads the of Preparatory Commission and Provisional Technical Secretariat. This could step be accomplished by a UN Security Council resolution a collectiveor decision by treaty signatories. commitment the to CTBT while providing impetus been built and are in the process of calibration calibration of process the in are and built been under are more Twenty-seven certification. and six and stations Twenty-three construction. political, of variety a for built be to remain laboratories reasons. financial or technical administrative, network were displayon after North tested a Korea nuclear device in October, 2006. This fizzled, test producing a small fraction-of-a kiloton yield. Nonetheless, the was test immediately detected by seismic stations connected theto CTBTO’sgrid in Bolivia, Canada, the States, United Australia, Emily B. Landau, Ph.D. Director, Arms Control and Regional Security Program, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University Remarks as prepared for delivery. Note: Dr. Landau was unable to attend the conference in person, but submitted her remarks for the conference report.
“Israel and the CTBT”
he fact that Israel signed the CTBT is the executive council of the future CTBTO; and testimony to the importance that Israel adherence to and compliance with the CTBT by states Tattributes to international arms control in the Middle East. treaties, and its general desire to cooperate with the As to the possible misuse of on-site inspections, global regime within the margins of its security Israel’s concern is that the surveillance system could interests and concerns. Israel supports the CTBT and expose sensitive security information in adjacent has been very open about its position since signing facilities, or serve as a platform for false accusations the treaty in 1996. and political pressure on Israel if it sought to limit Not only does Israel support the treaty, but it has the access of inspectors for this reason. Israel’s been very active in the preparatory commissions experience of being singled out for humiliation in of the CTBTO, and has established a CTBT-related many international frameworks is what explains infrastructure on its territory. Israel has lent active its concern, especially when Arab and Muslim support to the establishment of the verification states readily come together to isolate Israel with regime of the treaty out of concern for the poor blatant anti-Israel positions. Israel’s involvement in coverage of the IMS mechanism in the Middle formulating the procedures could help. The issue of East. In this context, it constructed two auxiliary equal treatment relates to the geographical divisions seismic monitoring stations in Meron and Eilat, per in the CTBTO, and the fact that the Middle East and the treaty’s requirements, with data continuously South Asia group is non-operational because of Iran’s transmitted to the IDC. Israel also operates a refusal to participate in a group that includes Israel. radionuclide laboratory. Beyond Israel’s position on the CTBT, attention to One might ask if support for the treaty is strong, this treaty must be put into broader perspective, with and Israel takes an active part in the deliberations an eye to the overall global arms control picture. of the organization and has implemented decisions, With all of the importance attributed to ratification what is preventing it from ratifying. It is clearly not of new global disarmament treaties, the greatest the treaty provisions per se that deter Israel from concern today in the nuclear realm goes to the doing so, because in addition to its cooperation with nuclear proliferation that is occurring in states that the CTBTO, Israel supports a moratorium on nuclear are (or were) parties to the NPT. testing until entry into force of the treaty. Rather, North Korea, Iran, and possibly still Syria are additional considerations come into play for Israel, dangerous proliferators acting in contradiction to the that are a function of the way Israel is often treated obligation they took upon themselves to remain non- in different international forums and in the context nuclear. North Korea has conducted two nuclear tests, of international organizations, and especially the and might go for a third, and Iran could do so as well. ongoing hostility that it faces from many states in the These real-world and urgent threats are the primary Middle East. nuclear challenges that the international community Israel has three major concerns with regard to should be directing its energies to. Unfortunately, ratification: completion of the inspections system in the case of Iran, some of the international actors and verification regime, especially the rules that should be taking action to ensure that this governing on-site inspections, in order to ensure that determined proliferator is prevented from developing they are immune to abuse by other states; Israel’s a military nuclear capability are not shouldering their sovereign equality status in the policymaking organs responsibility. And if Iran—a member of the NPT— of the treaty—those related to the geographical becomes a nuclear state, the implications for the NPT region of the Middle East and South Asia and in and other global treaties will be dire. Arms ControlAssociation
30 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 31 The provisional entry into force option was also also was option entryforce into provisional The proposal for dropping the words In response to the Participants also that further noted progress they made the decision ratify to the treaty and forego any further nuclear explosive testing. the given that noted participants Several discussed. provisional of pursuit the treaty, the of state current that questions legal raise would entryforce into to amendments require and IMS the impact may raised problems practical the of Some treaty. the IMS; the for payment continued determining were: decisions and stations; monitoring of ownership that raised was point The OSI. an pursue to how on the in option an be may force entryinto provisional force. into entry up holding is country single a if future “preparatory” when referencing and “provisional” entrythe CTBT as a symbolic move toward into force, the practicality some participants were skeptical about that official of the concept. Others expressed concern entrydiscussion of options for provisional into force from of the CTBT might result in a loss of support in key states. some states and from some key actors toward CTBT entry will force into require greater civil society/non-governmental organizations and intergovernmental contact with yet that states have ratifyto the Specific treaty. suggestions included: better use the of International Against Day Nuclear raise to awarenessTests the about CTBT; greater victims of involvement past of nuclear testing to illustrate the dangers a return of nuclear to testing; and providing up-to-date technical information theon international security value the of treaty to political leaders in Annex key 2 states. ummary of Discussion of ummary SpecificU.S.obstacles to ratification were also Participants commitment to Indonesia’s welcomed S Several participants that concluded the opening presentations suggested that progress toward ratification by remainingthe Annex states 2 is especiallypossible, with action by the States United and/or China. Several participants commented that the shift views of within India nuclear on testing and the CTBT suggest that if Washington and Beijing forward,move there could be a “chain reaction” of ratifications, including India, wellas Pakistan,as which very would likely ratify if India did so. discussed. was that It while noted the current United governmentremains States strongly committed the to CTBT Senate ratification approval of and theof 2010 New Washington START is that for possible it shows politically approve to controversial nuclear arms treaties,control the necessary “high-level” effort for the CTBT begun has yet not and will that it remain difficultto assess prospects the U.S. for ratification until such time as that effort begins. Several participants that the noted March release 2012 of the U.S. National Science of Academy report on “Technical Issues the to Comprehensive Related Ban address Treaty” help should Test many the of concerns that led manySenators withhold to their support the CTBT for in 1999. assist in efforts encourage to other Annex to 2 states participants some but ratify, that influence its noted with certain Annex be may 2 states limited. Some participants suggested be would that useful it for those nuclear ratified that states weapon have the treaty actively more to speak and how why about up Concluding Remarks
Daryl Kimball Executive Director, Arms Control Association
want to thank Vienna International Center and the technical progress regarding test ban monitoring the staff once again for your hospitality and and verification. It is clear that the IMS and IDC have I advice. This center is an excellent idea. Thank fulfilled and exceeded the earlier expectations. you Elena. Allow me to underscore a few key points And of course throughout the past couple of from the course of the day. days, I hope you have made some new contacts and Earlier we discussed in great detail the value of connections and learned more from our roundtable the CTBT going forward in relation to disarmament discussions. To the CTBTO—congratulations on and impact on the development of new nuclear your 15th anniversary. We are constantly impressed weapons. Clarification was provided on the Article by your work and by your dedicated team of 1 provisions, that “zero-yield” means “zero-yield.” professionals. We heard about the importance of leadership from And as a final admonition to all of you, I would individual countries and statesmen, and we heard like to note that throughout the history of the work about the importance of prompt action on the CTBT on the test ban, nations have been the driving the United States and China. forces behind the negotiation and implementation We also heard interesting perspectives and of treaties, but the efforts of those governments insights regarding the concerns of other so-called are catalytic individuals, both inside and outside “hold out” states, particularly from Pramit Pal government, who provide the energy and ideas that Chaudhuri regarding India. We also heard very drive progress. Further progress on the CTBT will detailed and powerful presentations on the enduring require persistence and your participation in the contributions of a global, legally-binding prohibition effort. Please consider yourself an important group on nuclear test explosions on preventing both that has a responsibility to help advance the CTBT horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. We also beyond this meeting. received a very impressive and up-to-date report on
Elena Sokova Executive Director, Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
hank you all. There is much value in keeping very grateful to have you all here to discuss this. We the discussion on the CTBT open. That is hope this is the future of a great collaboration. Thank Texactly what we are striving here to do. We are you very much. Arms ControlAssociation
32 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 33 Ambassador, Resident Representative of Chile of Ambassador, Resident Representative United to IAEA, the Representative to Permanent Nations (Vienna), Chairman UNIDO, and CTBTO, Commission Preparatory CTBTO the of Executive Director, Arms Control Association Control Arms Director, Executive Co-Founder Asia South of and and Director Space Henry Stimson L. Security Programs, Center Director, Department Climate and of Seismology, Director, Royal Netherlands MeteorologicalThe Institute; CTBTO Verification, for Group Working Chair, Daryl Kimball is the executive director the of Arms Control Association Before (ACA). joining in ACA served he 2001, as the executive director the of Coalition Nuclear Reduce to Dangers (1997–2001) and the director Security of Programs Physicians at Socialfor Responsibility (1990–1997). Michael Krepon is the co-founder the of Henry L. Stimson Center and directs South its Asia and Space Security programs. Prior co-founding to the Stimson the Carnegie at worked he Center, Endowment for International Peace and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Hein Haak heads the Division Seismology of at the Royal Netherlands Meteorological Institute. In Scientific joined of the he Group 1987 Experts that laying on theworked scientific out basis for the CTBT and assisted the Dutch chair during the finalyear CTBTof also negotiations. He chairs the CTBTO’s Verification. on Group Working Ambassador Alfredo Alejandro LABBE VILLA Daryl G. KIMBALL Michael KREPON Hein HAAK . Mr. Pal. Mr. Chaudhuri has served
Speaker Biographies and and Biographies Speaker Participants Conference Appendix A Appendix Ambassador, U.S. former for Special Representative and Disarmament; Nonproliferation, Control, Arms Power Thorium Chairman Board, the of Executive Ambassador, Resident Representative Ambassador, Resident Representative IAEA, Sweden the of to Permanent UNIDO to and CTBTO Representative Visiting Scholar, Center for Science, Technology, Science, for Center Scholar, Technology, Visiting American The Associationand Security Policy, Advancement the Sciencefor of Foreign Editor, Hindustan Times Editor, Foreign Ambassador, Permanent Representative of of Ambassador, Representative Permanent Nations United OfficeMexico the to and in Geneva Organizations International Pierce Corden is a visiting scholar the American at Association the Advancement for Science’s of ScienceCenter for and Technology Security Policy. 2002–2007,From served he as the Director of Administration Ban the Comprehensive for Test Organization’sTreaty Preparatory Commission. Prior that Cordento Dr. directed offices for responsible CTBT and negotiations the preparatory commission the U.S.at Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and then the Department State. of as the South Asia the fellow Stimson at Center in and hasWashington, D.C. been awarded fellowships Cornellat University and the University Maryland. of Pramit Pal Chaudhuri is the foreignThe editor of Hindustan Times Ambassador Thomas GRAHAM Jr. Ambassador Nils Gustav DAAG Pierce CORDEN Pramit CHAUDHURI PAL Speakers Ambassador Juan Jose GOMEZ CAMACHO Ambassador I Gusti Agung Wesaka PUJA Robert WOOD Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Charge d’Affaires and the Acting Permanent Indonesia to the United Nations in Vienna, UNIDO Representative to the CTBTO, U.S. Mission and CTBTO, Resident Representative to IAEA Lassina ZERBO Ambassador Mohamed SHAKER Director, International Data Centre Division, CTBTO Ambassador, Egypt; Chairman of the Lassina Zerbo is the director of the International Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs Data Centre Division of the Preparatory Commission Among his many diplomatic posts, Ambassador for the CTBTO. He served previously as divisional Shaker served as President of the 1985 Review principal geophysicist for Africa, Johannesburg, Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- South Africa and divisional geophysicist for Central Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Ambassador and East Africa. of Egypt to the United Kingdom, and is a former member of the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Conference Participants Board on Disarmament Matters. Khaled ABDELHAMID Elena SOKOVA Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary, CTBTO Executive Director, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Ambassador Zamir AKRAM Elena Sokova is the executive director of the Vienna Ambassador and Permanent Representative Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation. She of Pakistan to the United Nations and previously served as the assistant director of the International Organizations in Geneva James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Ambassador John BARRETT Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Ambassador Tibor TOTH Canada to the United Nations, IAEA and CTBTO Executive Secretary, CTBTO Ambassador Tibor Tóth has been the Executive Ambassador Jingye CHENG Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Ambassador, Permanent Representative CTBTO since 2005. He has previously served as of China to the United Nations and other the Ambassador and Permanent Representative International Organizations in Vienna of Hungary to the United Nations in Geneva and Vienna. In these capacities he represented Hungary at Tom Z. COLLINA the Conference on Disarmament, the International Research Director, Arms Control Association Atomic Energy Agency and its Board of Governors, as well as the CTBTO. Kelsey DAVENPORT
Wolfgang WEISS Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow, Arms Control Association and conference rapporteur Head, Department of Radiation Protection and Health of the Federal Office for Koji ENOMOTO Radiation Protection, Germany Advisor, Mission of Japan Wolfgang Weiss is head of the Department of Radiation Protection and Health of the Federal Office Sarah FALLON for Radiation Protection in Munich, Germany. He Attaché, Mission of the United Kingdom served as an advisor to the German government during negotiations on the CTBT. Enrico FIORENTINI Ambassador Michael WESTON Intern, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Ambassador, United Kingdom; Chairperson of the CTBTO’s Advisory Group; former Sergio GARCIA HOFER Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament and negotiator for the CTBT Third Secretary, Mission of Mexico Arms ControlAssociation
34 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 35 Chief of Public Information Section, CTBTO PublicChief of Information Peace for Mayors Senior Counselor Permanent the of Mission Russian to the of Federation in Vienna Organizations International for Vienna Center Pre-doctoral fellow, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Representative Permanent Adviser the to IAEA,to Mission Australia of for Vienna Center Pre-doctoral fellow, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Ambassador, Permanent Representative Ambassador, Representative Permanent Nations United and Guatemalaof the to UNIDO, to Resident Representative CTBTO Representative Permanent Ambassador, Representative Permanent Nations United and the CTBTO, to Egypt of IAEA to Resident Representative Ambassador, Representative Permanent Kingdom United United the the to of in Vienna Nations Organizations for Vienna Center Senior Fellow, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation SHAMAA Aaron TOVISH Igor VISHNEVETSKY Anna WEICHSELBRAUN Christopher WHITE Carmen WUNDERLICH Ambassador Carla Maria RODRIGUEZ MANCIA Ambassador Khlaed Abdelrahman Abdellatif Ambassador Simon John Meredith SMITH Nikolai SOKOV Annika THURNBORG Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary, CTBTO Secretary, Special Executive the to Assistant Third Secretary, Mission Pakistan of Secretary, Third Intern, Vienna Center for Disarmament for Vienna Center Intern, and Non-Proliferation Alternate Permanent Representative of Japanof Representative Permanent Alternate IAEA Nations, United CTBTO, the to Adjunct Fellow, International Security Program, SecurityProgram, International Adjunct Fellow, Studies and International Strategic for Center Ambassador, Resident Representative of Germany of Ambassador, Resident Representative the to IAEA, the Representative to Permanent NationsUnited (Vienna), UNIDO, and CTBTO Government of Mexico of Government Director, Department on Disarmament, Arms Director, Government Austrian and Nonproliferation, Control Associate, Nuclear Carnegie Policy Program, Peace; International for Endowment NuclearStanton Security Fellow Professor for Science for and PeaceProfessor Research, von Friedrich Carl Hamburg; of Director, University Science for Center Weizsacker and Peace Research Second Secretary, Egyptian Embassy in Egyptian Vienna Second Secretary, Arms Control Counselor and Alternate Permanent Counselor Permanent and Control Arms Alternate U.S. Mission CTBTO, the to Representative Markus REITERER Shakaib RAFIQUE Emily PATRICK Tsutomu OSAWA Jenifer MACKBY Ambassador Rüdiger LÜDEKING Rodrigo LOPEZ Alexander KMENTT KASSENOVATogzhan Martin KALINOWSKI Mohamed HELMY John GODFREY Statement of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon,
Appendix B February 17, 2012
Ban Ki-moon U.N. Secretary General Vienna International Center
“On the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization”
t is a great pleasure to meet you this morning. So today I issue a challenge to all leaders of all This anniversary is an important event for the countries that have not yet endorsed the CTBT: Visit Iworld. And it also carries great personal meaning the site of a nuclear test. for me. Visiting this Preparatory Commission, which Speak to the population exposed to the fallout. Then I used to chair in 1999, is like a homecoming. take action to prevent this from ever happening again. I look around this room and see very familiar faces. Today, on this fifteenth anniversary, we remember Many of us have been working together on these the victims. At the same time, we remember the hope issues for many years, at least for 15 years. We are in which the CTBT was conceived. honoured by the presence of our very distinguished The hope for a future where international peace colleague Executive Secretary Tibor Toth. and security do not depend on the mad doctrine of As a diplomat, I tried to move the international mutually assured destruction or hang on the thin community to act against nuclear testing. thread of good luck. As Ambassador Tibor Toth introduced, when I Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are took over as chairman of CTBTO, I said: My name not utopian ideals. They are critical to global peace is pronounced “Bahn.” But many people called me, and security. “Ban.” I said, that is fine, I will ban nuclear tests. We have a legal and moral obligation to rid our So since then my nickname has become “Nuclear- world of nuclear tests and nuclear weapons. When Test-Ban.” we put an end to nuclear tests, we get closer to My name and my commitment have continued all eliminating all nuclear weapons. A world free of my life-time. In fact I also served as Vice-Chairman nuclear weapons will be safer and more prosperous. of JNCC, a Joint Nuclear Control Commission Governments now spend vast sums of money to between South and North Korea. So I have been build and test arsenals of death. The world is over- negotiating with North Korea on nuclear issues. armed and development is under-funded. It is time to As Secretary-General, I am committed to the reverse that equation. goal of a world free of nuclear tests and nuclear Excellencies, the CTBT was a milestone. It is an weapons. During the last five years I have visited essential building block in strengthening the rule of Semipalatinsk, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nobody can law in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. visit such places and return home the same person. That is why it is distressing that this Treaty has yet to Nuclear tests poison the environment and they enter into force. also poison the political climate. They breed mistrust, When I chaired this Preparatory Commission, Arms ControlAssociation isolation and fear. I never imagined I would one day return as
36 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 37 We have opportunities have We SpecialMy is Envoy Excellencies, have we moratoria on nuclear on moratoria weapons tests—and to any action thatavoid underminewould the Treaty. coming up: the Nuclear Security Summit next inmonth Seoul: the Preparatory Committee the NPTfor Review Conference: and a conference the on establishment a of Middle East free zone nuclearof weapons and other weapons mass of destruction. working very hard to thisconvene conference, as was mandated by the NPT Review Conference 2010. of another celebration taking a is not It today. place fifteenth anniversary—it is a firstbirthday.
CTBTO Preparatory Commission in
I am hereamplify today to her call, so that it I urge all Governments signed yet not that or have [IndonesianI met Foreign] Minister Marty only eight countries have we Now and I am ready or signing avoid to reason good no is There is irresponsibleIt see to this still Treaty waiting anniversary
reaches peoplein power. ratified Treatythisto immediately I especiallydo so. call action for by the countries ratification whose is essential Indonesia force. into the enter to Treaty for is one—and I commend Jakarta depositing for its instrument ratification of earlier this month. inNatalegawa office my receivedand this instrument ratification. of it was And the first time during years last five my as Secretary-General that this instrument ratification of me wasto deposited personally. What is important more is that Indonesia thewas of nine one countries ratification whose is essential this get to treaty force. into meetto all these leaders and if necessary travel with Ambassador those to eight countries Tibor Toth arewho still reluctant doubts the about have may or ratificationof this So my commitment. is treaty. that signing to country Any opposed Treaty. this ratifying responsibilities its meet to failing simply is ratifying or community. international the of member a as effect into come to years15 after was opened it signature.for I urge all existing honour to States 15th
CTBTO
the
at
speaks
Ki-moon
Ban
Austria.
Secretary-General
In the meantime, are we using the Preparatory This example is just one the of added value of Of course, real the Treaty’s value lies in moral its Dear friends, a woman exposed the to fallout of UN Vienna, Secretary-General. certainly I But believed that this will We by now. force entered into have would Treaty continue pressing reach to this goal. scientificCommission’s expertiseprotectto people from the effects natural of disasters. Last year when the earthquake in Japan damaged the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear International the facility, Treaty’s Monitoring immediately System kicked It gear. into helpedthe Japanese Government issue warnings. And providedit all countries with critical information on the spread radiation. of the CTBTO. This I invited is why the CTBTO the to High-Level Meeting Nuclear on Security and Safety I last September.convened and legal authority in outlawing nuclear tests once all.and for testingatomic said once that the as watched she nuclear bombs fall, they thought never she would wipe her immune out system. This woman made a heartfelt governments. to said—I plea She quote: “While remembering the victims past of nuclear weapons also must tests, we protect the health and safety future of generations—by ratifying the Treaty.” Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban It is my great pleasure to officially open the I have high hopes for this Office. I thank Member new Vienna Office of the United Nations Office States for the voluntary contributions that have for Disarmament Affairs. The establishment of helped bring it into being. The Government of this Office is a response to the growing need for Austria has been especially generous, another sign of cooperation in all areas of disarmament, non- its commitment to the United Nations. proliferation and arms control. It will especially Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, the work you improve collaboration among the Vienna-based do here in these offices is part of a global movement organizations and specialized agencies. The Office to rid the world of its most deadly threat. Now: let will also bring in regional intergovernmental us press even harder toward realizing our vision of a organizations like the Organization for Security and nuclear-weapon-free world. Co-operation in Europe. Thank you. Arms ControlAssociation
38 CTBT at 15: Status and Prospects 39 , uclear an Treaty, an Treaty, rganization in Vienna an Treaty uclear Test B uclear Test an Treaty O an Treaty y-Article Analysis of the ComprehensiveN uclear-Test B uclear-Test B ebruary 2010 ciences, 2012 epartment’s Article-
Additional Resources Additional ssues Related to the Comprehensive N Appendix C Appendix an Treaty tate D B . S S ational Academy of S . N Website of the Project for the Comprehensive B Test www.ProjectfortheCTBT.org www.twitter.com/CTBTnow www.CTBTO.org http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12849 Website of the Comprehensive N Technical I Arms Control Association, F www.state.gov/t/isn/trty/16522.htm http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/ACA_CTB_Briefing_Book.pdf U Now More Than Ever: The Case for the Case ComprehensiveNow The More for Ban Ever: Than Treaty Nuclear Test Test-
Roundtable conference organizers: Daryl G. Kimball, Elena Sokova, Tom Collina, and Kelsey Davenport.
The Arms Control Association (ACA), founded in 1971, is a national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Through its public education and media programs and its magazine, Arms Control Today (ACT), ACA provides policy-makers, the press and the interested public with authoritative information, analysis and commentary on arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, and related national security issues. In addition to the regular press briefings ACA holds on major arms control developments, the Association’s staff provides commentary and analysis on a broad spectrum of issues for journalists and scholars both in the United States and abroad. THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY has already helped bring an end to nuclear testing and reduced nuclear arms competition. Before the CTBT was opened for signature in Sept. 1996, there had been 2,046 nuclear tests. Since then there have been six tests by three countries. But until the CTBT enters into force, the door to renewed nuclear testing is still open. To close the door on testing, eight key states must still ratify the treaty.
With the CTBT in force, the established nuclear-weapon states would not be able to proof-test new nuclear warhead designs. Newer nuclear nations would find it far more difficult to build more-advanced warhead types, and emerging nuclear states would encounter greater obstacles in fielding a reliable arsenal. The CTBT strengthens global capabilities to detect and deter testing and will reduce nuclear dangers.
This conference report details the value of the CTBT and outlines obstacles and pathways to its entry into force.
Arms Control Association 1313 L Street, NW, Suite 130 Washington, D.C. 20005
Arms ControlAssociation www.armscontrol.org
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