Egyptian Salafism Between Religious Movement and Realpolitik WP S Adapting to the Demands of the Political Game Nagwan El Ashwal

Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Co m ments

Egyptian Salafism between Religious Movement and Realpolitik WP S Adapting to the Demands of the Political Game Nagwan El Ashwal

The Salafi Nour Party’s explicit endorsement of the July 2013 coup, its continued criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood and its cooperation with secular forces took many observers unawares. Of course, the first surprise was the party’s strong showing in the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections. Since then the Nour Party and Al-Da’wa Al-Salafiyya (the Salafi Call movement) have emerged as important political actors. Access to the political scene has impacted their internal structures, positions and interactions with other players, initiating a process of moderation, albeit within limits dictated by doctrinal strictures. While not necessarily compatible with liberal democratic values, their record thus far suggests that they will remain committed to the rules of the political game and contribute to the inclusion of groups that might otherwise be susceptible to unequivocally anti-democratic forces, such as jihadis. At the same time, the Nour party has been faced with strong criticism from its constituency, which might lead to a fragmentation of the Salafi vote in upcoming elections. Still, Salafi actors will remain a force to reckon with in Egypt. Europe should therefore not shy away from engaging in dialogue.

The spectacular entrance of the Salafi movements underlined their capacity for current into Egyptian politics took many mass mobilization on 29 July 2011 in the politicians and analysts by surprise. Orig- first demonstration called exclusively by inally, its various strands had taken an am- Islamist-leaning organizations, and went biguous position vis-à-vis the popular upon to achieve stunning electoral success in rising that brought down Hosni Mubarak. the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections. The While several prominent sheikhs rejected Salafi alliance achieved 27.8 percent (or 7.5 the demonstrations as khuruj (disobedience million votes), second only to the Brother- of the ruler, religiously unacceptable in hood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party, Salafi thought), many adherents partici- with 37.5 percent (10.1 million votes). Once pated on the basis of fatwas issued by others in office, they further surprised observers calling for active participation. The Salafi with their pragmatism and readiness to

Nagwan El Ashwal is a Doctoral Fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” realized SWP Comments 27 by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of the transformation August 2013 partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the PhD grant program of the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung.

work with non-Islamist actors, contrary Mubarak regime initially tolerated or to their conventional image of ideological even encouraged the spread of the Salafi rigidity. religious call or mission through satellite channels and in mosques, hoping that a rival Islamist force would undermine the What Is Salafism? social basis of the Muslim Brotherhood. Salafism is a religious current that Conversely, Salafi sheikhs who criticized accepts religious guidance only from the leadership’s domestic, social, or foreign the Quran and the Sunna (the religious policies became targets of police harass- and life practice of the prophet), rejects ment and imprisonment. innovation in religion, and emulates the The spread of Salafism was also fur- mode of worship and ethics of the first thered by their decentralized network three generations of Muslims (Al-Salaf structures, which reduced the need for al-Salih, or righteous forefathers, from material resources to a minimum and fur- which these trends derive their name). ther lowered the threshold for affiliation. This purist orientation is reflected in Unlike the highly hierarchical Muslim their approach to doctrinal matters, Brotherhood, where new members have to which is characterized by rigidity, rejec- undergo a challenging screening process, tion of oral traditions and later inter- all it takes to become a Salafi is to follow pretations, and a strong emphasis on Salafi thought. the literal meaning of textual sources. The economic policies of the last Salafism holds that there is only one Mubarak years, which brought high truth, and differences of opinion are unemployment and rising cost of living, frowned upon as they may lead to dis- further increased the appeal of Salafi cord (fitna) and thus jeopardize the sheikhs, who focused on social justice and paramount unity of the religious com- led prayers and charitable projects in dis- munity. Accordingly, Salafis were tra- advantaged areas. In contrast, the Muslim ditionally skeptical of Western and Brotherhood, whose platform is strongly contemporary modes of institutional- in favor of private property rights and ized political expression and contesta- entrepreneurship, was reluctant to espouse tion. Beyond the lack of legitimizing social demands and instead concentrated precedents in the textual tradition, the on the application of sharia (religious) law. institutionalization of political compe- Last but not least, private and public tition was considered liable to lead to funding, mainly from Gulf monarchies, a permanent state of discord, and the helped the dissemination of Salafi ideas in idea of humans making their own laws North Africa, in particular in Egypt. Such as usurping an authority that is God’s funding has been reflected in the estab- alone. lishment of Salafi-oriented satellite TV (See also Mohamed Masbah, Moving channels (in support of the pro-ruler and towards Political Participation: The Modera- da’wa strand) and charities mainly active tion of Moroccan Salafis since the Beginning in rural areas. of the Arab Spring, SWP Comments Despite the assertion that there can be 1/2013, January 2013.) only one truth, in reality, various opinions exist within the Egyptian Salafi camp con- cerning their relationship with society and The Spread of Salafism politics. This has translated into different Since most Salafi sheikhs traditionally currents and organizations that can be dis- focused on individual piety and religiously tinguished by their level of internal organi- correct behavior, and advocated obedience zation and the extent and modes of their to worldly rulers to avoid discord, the participation in the political process. First,

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there are highly organized movements parties, which however failed to achieve without political ambitions, such as the significant political traction. Also, there Da’wa for Good Manners with branches in all are a number of charismatic sheikhs (some Egyptian governorates and hundreds of officially members of the Muslim Brother- thousands of followers, functioning in the hood) who are strongly influenced by Salafi mode of traditional civil society associa- thought and able to attract large crowds of tions and mostly working in local charity. supporters, without having an organization There are also many loosely organized of their own. The most prominent among youth groups with Salafi orientation, most these, Hazem Abu Ismail, tried to set up his significantly the Ahrar (Free People) Move- own party, Ar-Raya (the Flag), without, how- ment, which partly overlaps with the Ultras ever, achieving a tangible presence on the (the fans of the Cairo football clubs Al-Ahli ground. and Al-Zamalek), and engages in street The dominant force among politically politics rather than the formal political active Salafis is currently the Alexandria process. Another group known, after their “Salafi Call.” Also known as Scientific preference of meeting in Costa coffee Salafism, this group was originally estab- houses, as Costa Salafis, have received some lished in the late 1970s in response to the media attention for their liberal positions perceived doctrinal laxness of the Muslim on equal citizenship rights (and probably Brotherhood, but also in opposition to also for the apparent dissonance between their friendly relationship with the revolu- their supposedly traditionalist ideology and tionary regime in Iran – and thus with a appearance and a meeting place associated Shiite leadership considered heretical by with globalized capitalism), but wield little the Salafis. Up to 2011, the Salafi Call influence on the ground. advocated refraining from politics and Finally, and as opposed to all the other proposed a gradual transformation of groups, jihadi Salafis believe in and practice society rather than adopting what it con- armed struggle to bring about political siders Western models of institutional change. Since the 25 January 2011 revolu- politics. After the revolution, they rapidly tion, they have been mainly active in the changed their stance and now play a vital Sinai. While they have repeatedly declared role in shaping the political scene in Egypt. that their actions are directed only against Despite their diversity, there is wide Israel, and have requested the army to leave agreement among the different strands them alone, the army has accused them over central tenets of Salafism, and the of attacking state buildings, security in- essential objectives of political participa- stallations and churches, as well as arms tion, namely: defending Egypt’s Islamic smuggling. Not much is known about identity, in particular through the appli- their structures, but it is clear that their cation of Sharia law, and resisting a per- discourse attracts radical youth who are ceived “Shiite cultural invasion” by dissatisfied with the Islamic movements preventing any rapprochement with Iran, engaged in the political process. which is seen as being behind supposed Shiite proselytizing. Accordingly, the Nour Party worked hard (and successfully) to Salafis as Emerging Political Actors have three specific articles included in the During the 2011 revolution, only the 2012 constitution: article 2 defining sharia so-called “movement Salafists” (salafiyya as the main source of law, article 219 tying harakiyya) explicitly called for open oppo- that principle to Sunni doctrine, and article sition, even non-violent rebellion, against 4 giving al-Azhar University a consultative the “unjust” rule of the Mubarak regime. role in the legislative process. In the post-revolution period, they formed All Salafi groups (with the exception of the Islah (Reform) and Asala (Authenticity) the Ahrar movement and the Costa group)

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grant the sheikhs a central role, with a hierarchical structure. In fact, one reason special relationship between sheikhs and behind the arrest of certain leading sheiks followers characterized by a high degree in 1994 was that the security services had of commitment and spiritual obedience. uncovered these structures, and were deter- Sheikh in this context can refer to any mined to prevent the formation of a group person who has great knowledge of Islamic as well organized as the Muslim Brother- sources, irrespective of formal training and hood. After the 2011 revolution the group age, although there is special respect for worked to revive and strengthen both its elder sheikhs. This premium on knowledge, networks and these hierarchical structures. which is held to be attainable through Yet it faces challenges in making them scholarship by any capable person, thus effective in terms of decision-making and potentially provides the Salafi movements enforcement at the lower levels of the pro- with equal opportunities (albeit much less vincial structures. To this end, a three-tier so for women) with low barriers against structure for internal deliberation and new members, and implies a strong poten- decision-making has been established, tial for recruitment and organizational which provides for a certain degree of par- growth. ticipation and inclusion: A board of trustees, consisting of the six founders, presides over the movement. From Da’wa to Institutionalization: They possess permanent tenure and broad the Rise of the Nour Party authority over the lower councils, includ- Among all Salafi groups, the Salafi Call of ing the power to discipline and expel in- Alexandria achieved the most extensive dividual members. Such decisions are grassroots presence in Egyptian society, in supposed to be taken unanimously. The particular in the countryside and the towns second body is the executive council, con- and medium-sized cities of the densely sisting of sixteen sheikhs who attend to populated north. Its political arm, the Nour administrative matters and oversee the Party, emerged as the strongest single party local executive councils. Finally, the shura within the Salafi alliance that contested the (or consultative) council consists of two 2011–2012 parliamentary elections, secur- hundred affiliated sheikhs from different ing 123 out of its 136 seats. The decision to provinces nominated by the board of trus- establish the party had been taken in March tees. This body (which is later to be elected), 2011, and, according to its leaders, was is considered the general assembly of the largely driven by concern over the possi- da’wa; it elects the executive council, ap- bility of abolition of article 2 of the con- proves the annual budget, and takes final stitution (sharia as the main source of law). decisions on strategic issues where re- The leaders cite pressure from their base as quested by the board, such as endorsing a the main reason to become an active and presidential candidate, all by majority vote. autonomous player in the political field, During the 2011/2012 parliamentary elec- rather than simply mobilizing electoral tions its members, who generally wield support for the party affiliated with the significant spiritual and social authority in Muslim Brotherhood. their constituencies, provided an essential boost to the candidates of the Nour Party, by telling people that they would apply Structure and Decision-making sharia and solve social and economic prob- Entering the political sphere has con- lems. fronted the movement with numerous In contrast, deliberating issues of doc- challenges, starting with its organizational trinal relevance that require consulting the structure. Unlike other Salafi groups, the sources and potentially involve new inter- Alexandria Salafi Call possessed a semi- pretations or revisions, remains the prerog-

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ative of the board of trustees, who may take coordination with the da’wa sheikhs, who such decisions by majority vote, or delegate objected on several occasions that the Nour them to the shura council. For example, Party was deviating from the right path. when the crucial question arose whether The confrontation became especially pro- the movement and its followers were to nounced between Abdelghafour and one consider President Mohamed Morsi a reli- of the most prominent trustees, Yasser giously legitimate ruler, against whom Borhamy. Matters first came to a head over any rebellion or even opposition would be the visit of an associate of Abdelghafour to illegitimate, the board of trustees issued a the Iranian liaison office in February 2012, religious opinion arguing that Morsi was which was considered a step to “normaliz- a civilian ruler who can be legitimately ing” relations with Shiite Iran. The conflict opposed. escalated into a fully-fledged internal crisis However, once the board of trustees has and potential split in September 2012, decided to delegate such a decision to the when Abdelghafour called off internal elec- shura council, the latter’s decision is con- tions (for party branch chairs, the supreme sidered to be final. For instance, when the committee, and the party leadership) that trustees asked the shura council to decide Borhamy’s followers appeared poised to which candidate to endorse in the first win, and dismissed the supreme committee round of the 2012 presidential elections, when it overruled his move. Intervention by the council endorsed renegade Brother- one of the most influential trustees, Ismail hood leader Abdel Moneim Aboul Futouh. El-Mokadem, finally forced Abdelghafour And although some of the trustees clearly to back down. He then left to form a new opposed this choice, the decision stood. party, al-Watan, but only 150 members fol- Thus, despite the still powerful role of lowed him. To avoid future disputes, an the original founders, the movement has inofficial coordination body including adopted semi-democratic elements that members of both party and movement was introduce a degree of inclusivity into the established. Still, the movement clearly decision-making processes that in turn dominates the party at the level of strategic helps to maintain the loyalty of followers. decisionmaking, remains the undisputed Due to the heritage of decentralized organi- final arbiter of intellectual and doctrinal zation, however, these structures lack lev- matters, and rejects independence for its erage over individual sheikhs who refuse political arm. It is also clear that the final to implement decisions taken by the shura instance for internal conflict remains the council in their home provinces. For ex- undisputed authority of the founding ample, in the run-up to the July 2013 mili- sheikhs, to which both movement and tary coup, some sheikhs defied a decision party members defer. taken jointly by the Salafi Call and the Nour Party to abstain from demonstrations for or against then-President Morsi, and Rigid in Religion, called their followers to the streets in sup- Pragmatic in Politics port of the President. Before the 2011 revolution, tight control by the ubiquitous security services severely limited the outreach of the Salafi Call of Movement and Party Alexandria. One of the results of this lim- A second challenge concerns the relation- ited public exposure was a tendency to ship between the movement and its politi- extreme doctrinal conservatism, and rigid- cal arm, the Nour Party. Tensions surfaced ity in relationships with others. Since their after the opening of parliament in January entry into the political sphere, the Salafis 2012, due to party leader Emad Abdel- have been exposed to new actors and issues, ghafour taking decisions without prior and, under the pressure of this new reality,

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their discourse has evolved. Their take on ment. Al-Nour also joined forces with the the revolution itself is a case in point: After socialist parties to oppose new loans from their initial rejection of demonstrations as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), dangerous disobedience, the determination if for diverging reasons. The Nour Party of the Salafi youth and their mostly peace- rejects interest-based loans for religious ful conduct led the sheikhs to reverse their reasons; socialists are primarily concerned position. In an unprecedented and, for a about the adverse effects of structural movement professing a single truth and the adjustment measures on the poor and the superiority of the scholars, momentous burden on future generations. Salafis have move, they apologized to the Salafi youth, thus ceased to perceive secularists as exis- admitted that they had erred, and blessed tential enemies, but rather treat them as their actions. opponents or allies on particular issues. In In the context of their participation in particular, political competition with and parliament (before it was dissolved in June ideological rivalry to the Muslim Brother- 2012), the Constituent Assembly and the hood appear to outweigh any remaining Shura Council (the upper chamber of the reservations vis-à-vis non-religious forces. Egyptian parliament, dissolved after the In addition, Salafi positions on Chris- July 2013 coup), Nour Party representatives tians have been changing in a climate of found themselves obliged to interact and domestic insecurity and sectarian tensions, often cooperate with other actors, leading as exemplified by events in Ameriya close them to modify their behavior and accom- to Alexandria in January 2012. Here, after modate actors and views they had not reports of a Christian man harassing a Mus- encountered before. In this context, the lim woman and then disappearing, Mus- strong emphasis on doctrinal purity and lims attacked Christian houses and shops coherence that has characterized the move- and called for all Christian families to be ment imposes limits on their capacity for expelled. Sheikhs associated with the Salafi pragmatic decisions and tactical compro- Call played a vital role in calming Muslim mise. On the other hand, precisely because families, avoiding the expulsion of Chris- significant decisions require doctrinal tian families and persuading families that authorization, they are not easily reversed. had already left to return. Persuading the Salafis to compromise may In response to satellite TV hate propa- require a long and torturous process, but ganda from (mostly Saudi-based) Salafi once they come around they are likely to sheikhs that raised fears over the safety and abide by their commitments. status of Egyptian Christians, the sheikhs In traditional Salafi thinking, actors of the Alexandria Da’wa took the significant professing what were seen as secularist out- step of declaring that Egyptian Christians looks were regarded as nothing more than were citizens with full rights and autonomy atheists working against Islam. Parliament in spiritual and personal status matters. provided, for the first time, a space for They also welcomed the article in the 2012 interaction between the two groups. Most constitution that permits Christians to spectacularly, the Nour Party cooperated follow their own rules and customs in per- with the opposition National Salvation sonal status and spiritual matters. However, Front (NSF) to support the military coup this did not quite mean accepting Chris- of July 2013 and give it a civilian face. tians as fully equal, as they also insisted Previously, the two groups had already that the top political positions, such as joined ranks in opposing the Muslim prime minister and president, must be Brotherhood’s attempts to monopolize reserved for Muslims (as is actually the case power, in particular after the 2012 con- in most Arab countries). However, as they stitutional referendum, and even explored have also ruled that the presidency is a the option of forming a coalition govern- civilian post devoid of any spiritual dimen-

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sion, there may be room for further devel- The Future of Salafi opments here. Political Participation Similar observations hold for Salafi posi- Across the Arab world, different Salafi tions on women. On the one hand, female movements have reacted differently to the candidates for parliament were given list political openings created by the so-called positions where they had no chance of Arab Spring. While jihadi Salafis in Egypt winning – a practice adopted by nearly all and Tunisia have completely refused to Egyptian political forces except for the participate and resorted instead to violence, Muslim Brotherhood. The Nour Party also others have entered the political game and refrained from nominating any female rep- established political parties with different resentatives to the Constituent Assembly, degrees of institutionalization and weight and regards women as ineligible for the on the ground. The Egyptian Nour Party presidency under its interpretation of has emerged as an important actor in the sharia law. On the other hand, there are Egyptian political landscape, capitalizing active women’s committees in the Nour on widespread grassroots support for the Party, as well as in associations affiliated Da’wa of Alexandria. It is likely to remain a with the Da’wa. Also, it supported the factor in future elections. appointment of a (Coptic Christian) woman However, after endorsing the coup to a parliamentary committee investigating against Morsi, the future of movement and sectarian incidents in Alexandria in Feb- party hang in the balance. The Nour Party ruary 2012. provided cover for the actions of the mili- Presence in the public sphere, and with tary, a step that all other forces in the it the challenge of dealing with issues they Islamist spectrum rejected. While fears of have not encountered before, as well as the further destabilization and violence were necessity to win support with arguments certainly among the motives, the decision rather than spiritual authority, have worked has exposed the party to strong criticism in to create a distinction in the Da’wa dis- the Islamist milieu. This makes it unlikely course between everyday social, political that the party will be able to pick up votes and economic matters, where they behave of disenchanted former supporters of the with marked pragmatism, and issues seen Muslim Brotherhood in future (as yet un- as relevant to doctrinal principles, where confirmed) elections, as it appeared poised the margin for compromise is minimal. For to do before the July events. Further criti- example, the Salafiyya Call and its Nour cism from these quarters focused on the Party opposed establishing relations with appointment of Mohamed El Baradei as Iran, to the point of refusing economic aid vice-president, after the Nour Party had to help save the Egyptian economy from successfully vetoed him as interim prime collapse. Rather, they strongly criticized minister, and the inclusion in the interim the Brotherhood and President Morsi when government of figures from the former they opened the door to cooperation with Mubarak regime. Most damagingly, many Iran in the tourism sector. This, the Salafis potential supporters hold the Nour Party said, would normalize relations with Shiite responsible for the violence meted out by Iran and might lead to a “Shiite invasion” the security forces against followers of that would threaten Egypt’s Sunni identity. the ousted President Morsi. Consequently, After Morsi’s visit to Tehran, prominent many individuals from the Salafi milieu sheikhs around Yasser Borhamy initiated joined the demonstrations against the an anti-Shiite campaign, delivering speeches coup, and several influential members in many villages. In fact, this hostile dis- declared their withdrawal from the move- course, reinforced by satellite programs, ment. might have incited the killing of Shiites in It now appears likely that the Nour Party the Giza village of Zawyat Abomusalem. will lose significant electoral support to

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other Islamist parties, such as the Asala parts of the Arab world. It is therefore Party, the Watan Party, and the Construc- important to encourage comparative tion and Development Party (the political studies on Salafi movements in the Arab arm of Gamaa Islamiyya). Not only are these transition countries, but also to seek direct forces closer to the Muslim Brotherhood, contact with Salafi representatives in order they also take a more uncompromising to better understand their developing position vis-à-vis liberal forces and criticize stances – rather than merely relying on the political role of the Coptic church media coverage. That applies in particular (especially after statements by the Coptic to the Egyptian Da’wa movement, whose Patriarch were construed as supporting experience other Salafi movements in violence against Brotherhood supporters. North Africa are seeking to replicate. De- It is highly unlikely that supporting the spite reservations about the extent of their coup will gain the Nour Party any votes commitment to democracy and liberal from liberal Egyptians to compensate for values, Europe should open direct channels

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und these losses. On the contrary, a leaked video of dialog with Salafi movements. The coun- Politik, 2013 appeared to suggest that some representa- tries of the Arab Spring, and in particular All rights reserved tives of the secular elite wanted to exclude Egypt, are still in an early phase of their

These Comments reflect the Nour Party from the political scene transformation process, and all parties are solely the author’s views. along with the Muslim Brotherhood. in a process of adapting, mostly by trial and

SWP The outcome of these developments may error, to the new rules of the game (see Stiftung Wissenschaft und well be a fragmentation of the Salafi vote, Nagwan El Ashwal, Egypt on the brink of un- Politik German Institute for and thus a party spectrum that includes governability, http://www.swp-berlin.org/ International and several smaller religious parties alongside en/publications/kurz-gesagt/point-of-view- Security Affairs the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice egypt-on-the-brink-of-ungovernability.html). Ludwigkirchplatz 34 Party (assuming the latter is allowed and Refusing to engage with such actors will 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 willing to run). Furthermore, a growing serve to confirm the image of Europe as Fax +49 30 880 07-100 number of formerly Salafi youth are likely the supporter of past dictators, and enemy www.swp-berlin.org to abandon this political current alto- of Islamists – or even Islam itself – today. [email protected] gether. Some, in particular from among the Thus, it is crucial that Europe insist that ISSN 1861-1761 Ahrar movement, have started to open up to Islamists be included the political process other youth groups and movements that in Egypt. are disenchanted by political developments and have been calling for a third current transcending the entrenched secular/religious divide. Others may soon conclude that Islamists will not be allowed to win democratic elections in Egypt. As in Algeria and Palestine, that might lead some to abandon the non-violent approach to domestic politics.

Recommendations Although a degree of understanding has been acquired on traditional Salafi movements (both their quietist and jihadist strands), little is known about the new political Salafism currently on the rise in Egypt and – to a lesser extent – in other

SWP Comments 27 August 2013