THE EU-RUSSIA REVIEW
Issue Four
Voices from Russia
June 2007© The EU on Russian Television: an overview
Elena Prokhorova - analyst, regular contributor to bbcrussian.com
Russia’s three national television networks hold a virtually unbeatable monopoly on providing and interpreting information – a drastic change compared with the early nineties, when pluralism and glasnost gave rise to a plethora of independent media outlets. Two main TV channels are directly owned and controlled by the state. These are the “First Channel” and RTR, each covering around 95% of the territory with 20%-25% daily audience share. The third one, NTV (nezavisimoje – independent TV), covering 85% of the territory with 12% daily audience share, is formally owned by Gazprom’s media holding in which the Kremlin has a controlling share. RTR positions itself as a predominantly news channel and runs hourly news programmes. The other two show a mix of news, films, talk shows, documentaries and entertainment. TVC is owned by the Moscow city administration which is closely controlled by the Kremlin. The only independent (previously privately owned) channel, REN TV, has now been taken over by a Kremlin-friendly oligarch.
Close monitoring of Russian television today gives the impression that editors-in-chief follow versions of official directives or meet expectations on how to cover news and what messages to give to the audience. It is widely rumoured that the editors of the TV channels and several key state-owned newspapers have a weekly briefing at the office of Vladimir Surkov, the Deputy Chief of Staff to President Putin, where they are given directives about what to show and how to interpret events. For the past three years there have been no live TV shows – everything is pre-recorded and therefore subject to control. A few exceptions apply in the case of certain talk shows and discussions, where independent analysts or politicians might express views that contradict “the party line.” Privately, seasoned TV editors and journalists admit to a certain self-imposed censorship, which at times pushes them to go even further than expected by the authorities in their praise of the Kremlin or criticism of its opponents.
Europe, the European Union and EU-Russia relations feature fairly high on the agenda. Overall European stories on Russian TV fall into several major rubrics.
“Russia is the birthplace of elephants…” This old time Soviet anecdote ridicules a propaganda technique, whereby anything “made in USSR”- from tractors to ideology - would be superior in size and quality. By extension, everything that is the best and the biggest is of home origin. This metaphor could well be applied to the coverage of Europe on the Russian TV nowadays. The Russian public is led to believe that its own leadership has chosen an optimal course to ensure stability, prosperity and world wide respect; while the Old World, in particular the EU, is largely portrayed as a failing system, wrestling with institutional, social and religious problems.
An aggressively polemic commentary on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome describes the Berlin declaration as a propaganda exercise in the old Soviet style (NTV, “Realnaja Politika”, 31.03.2007). It goes over the top to belittle EU successes and achievements. “The European Union was created on the bones of millions of WWII victims… It was Europe which invented World wars, as well as Nazi ideology of the worst kind… The unprecedented scope of European atrocities was
2 largely targeted against Eastern Europe and the USSR… European integration was, in a way, necessary surgery – like the castration of a rapist… ”
According to this TV commentary, Europe’s ex-empires were forced to set millions of people free under pressure from the Soviet Union. “We squeezed the Europeans out of their colonies, so they had to go back home and get down to their boring economic business.” Current tensions between the EU and Russia are described as “normal frictions between the two youngest mega-states on the planet, which only now are becoming aware of their true interests.”
There are very few attempts to contemplate whether Russia’s national interests coincide or overlap with those of Europe. One such discussion was built around the results of the opinion poll commissioned by the EU-Russia Centre and undertaken by Levada Center in Moscow – “Voices from Russia: society, democracy, Europe” - which revealed disturbing figures: i.e. 71% of the respondents do not regard themselves Europeans.
Participants in the debate (“First Channel”, “Vremena”, 4.3.2007) included MPs, journalists and political scientists. Some portrayed Europe as being in a state of decay; regretted the loss of European spiritual ideals and its “degeneration into consumerism, pop culture and Pepsi civilisation”. Others reproached Europe for playing a role in Russia’s disillusionment with liberal democracy as it was prescribed by the West and incorporated in the 90s, leading to a massive impoverishment of the population. However, some participants argued that Russian people easily bow to manipulation and indoctrination, which accounts for their current anti-western sentiments in general and their misperceptions of Europe in particular.
Repeated references were made to common Christian values and respect by the Russians for such principles as private property and the rule of law. Interestingly, these two notions are often invoked as acceptable and welcome by society as a whole, whereas human rights mainly feature in the context of European criticism and therefore have a negative connotation.
Old Europe and New Europe The European Union is very often depicted as a heterogeneous organisation, with deep divisions between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Europe. As a rule, ‘Old’ EU member states are seen as friendly or neutral towards Russia and the newcomers from Central and Eastern Europe are viewed as biased and trying to settle old scores with Moscow. Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece normally receive positive coverage. In the early days of the present German government, TV presenters were looking for evidence that Chancellor Merkel had as much charisma and a human touch like that of ex- Chancellor Schroeder, but then had to admit that the new German leader’s approach to Russia is purely pragmatic and devoid of sentiment, so the subject was dropped.
The UK is singled out as a semi-hostile country fostering terrorist organisations with links to Chechen warlords and harbouring Russian dissidents who conspire to overthrow the current Kremlin regime. This negative image was reflected in comments by TV presenters about the saga of the British marines taken captive in Iran. In the Russian view, London has lost ground in the propaganda war with Iran, whereas the Iranian leader has gained serious political dividends. The story itself received unprecedented coverage on Russian TV, with the ramifications of the role of Syria in mediating the
3 release being highlighted and numerous interviews with Iranian officials and people in the street.
Among new member states, Poland and Estonia are top of the blacklist of unfriendly regimes. The Polish “meat affair” – Warsaw vetoing talks on a new EU-Russia treaty in retaliation to Moscow’s ban on its meat products – is now gradually giving way to a new highly politicised story. All national TV channels have focused on a scandal looming around the Auschwitz museum, whose administration closed down the Russian part of the display insisting that certain historical inaccuracies should be corrected, i.e. inmates from the former Polish territories annexed by the Soviet Union under the Molotov- Ribbentrop pact should be listed as Polish citizens. In Russia’s interpretation, this would essentially amount to acknowledging the Soviet “occupation” of Poland. As a result, Warsaw is now portrayed on Russian TV as seeking to rewrite history, with the EU paying lip service to such attempts.
Estonia today is also increasingly viewed as a revisionist country. A conflict has been simmering for several months between Moscow and Tallin over the destiny of the WWII monument to Russian soldiers in the Estonian capital. The first signs of friction were reported on Russian TV early this year, when several factions in the Estonian parliament voted to transfer the memorial from the centre of Tallin to a military cemetery on the outskirts. This provoked a harsh reaction from the Russian-speaking community. Soon a group of activists emerged to protect the monument, setting up a round-the-clock guard on the site. Clashes with Estonian activists portrayed as “nationalists” or “neo-Nazis” were shown by all Russian TV channels.
Following recent parliamentary elections, the new Estonian Prime Minister, Andrus Ansip, backed the decision to transfer the monument. Works to unearth the remains of the Russian soldiers began some days before the 9th of May – the official V-Day celebrations in Russia, triggering clashes between ethnic Russians and police in Tallin. These new twists triggered a wave of political fury across the country, with the State Duma leading an anti-Estonian campaign. One of the two principle candidates for the Russian presidency, Sergei Ivanov, was repeatedly shown on TV addressing Russian war veterans with patriotic speeches and urging the population to boycott Estonian dairy products. A TV presenter in a talk show sided with an MP who urged Moscow to impose economic sanctions on Estonia, quoting US sanctions against Iran as a comparable precedent. High-ranking Russian officials warned in televised interviews that the Tallin incident might affect Russia’s relations with the EU, i.e. jeopardise the EU-Russia summit in Samara.
The symbolism of the monument is vital for both sides. For many Estonians, it embodies the occupation by the Soviet Union, to which today’s Russia, with its assertive policy in the near abroad, is seen as a moral successor. From the Russian point of view the memorial symbolises its glorious past, which is at the heart of Russia’s newly restored identity. Russia is now accusing Estonia of attempts to revise the outcome of WWII, and the European Union is seen as submitting to dangerous trends towards the revival of Nazi ideology.
In a talk show dedicated to the Russian-Estonian “monumental crises” a pro-Kremlin journalist insisted that Russia should stop talking to small countries like Estonia, who “have delegated their sovereignty to great powers or international organisations, and sort
4 out differences directly with their bosses instead”. (NTV, “Sunday Evening with Vladimir Solovjev”, 21.01.2007”)
The Estonian war memorial drama that was played out on Russian TV is often contrasted by stories from “friendly countries”. Thus a series of reports from Slovakia and Latvia revealed that the WWII monuments are treated with due respect. Also, Latvia has received widespread positive coverage on official TV channels after it dropped claims to a part of Russian territory and finally signed a long overdue border treaty. Here the role of the EU was shown as benign. According to some comments, Latvia has “changed the intransigent position it held under the influence of the EU since EU membership is incompatible with unresolved territorial disputes”.
For years Latvia mainly featured on the Russian TV as a state violating the rights of the Russian-speaking minorities. This hard line towards its Baltic neighbour is softening now, and more nuances emerge. For example, the Russian TV audience learns that the Latvian business community is lobbying for better relations with Russia. Comments go as far as calling the situation ridiculous when two neighbouring countries have no proper relationship. Mutual interests are being discussed, i.e. Riga seeking participation in the North European gas pipeline and Russia promoting the rights of its fellow nationals in Latvia. President Putin appears on TV expressing hope that Latvia, as a member of the EU, will play a positive role in promoting Russia’s interests in attracting European investments.
US Missile Defence The transatlantic allegiances of new EU member states are normally presented on Russian TV as a source of tension and divisions within the European Union. US plans to deploy a new missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic are widely used to substantiate this thesis. Two conclusions are drawn. First, that the US is capitalising on special relations with the new member states in order to weaken the EU, which it allegedly sees as a rival. Second, that the political elite in both countries are ignoring public opinion, which is overwhelmingly against the project, thus defying the democratic principles that they claim to uphold.
Phantom pains of recent history In discussing this theme, Mikhail Leontjev, a TV presenter close to the Kremlin, has recently asked the rhetorical question: Why is Russia criticised for its expansion in the “near abroad? It is ridiculous to talk about expansion in relation to one’s own leg or liver?” (NTV, “Sunday Night with Vladimir Solovjev”, 21.01.2007) This metaphor rather accurately describes the Russian official line, as depicted by the main TV channels, towards what the EU calls “the new neighbourhood.” The European Union is a constant point of reference here, as Russia’s successes and failures in the near abroad are generally viewed against the backdrop of the EU’s “expansion into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence”. Europe is seen as seeking regime changes with a view to tearing away Russia’s traditional satellites.
Poor Old Europe Stories from Europe seem to be deliberately selected to corroborate the theory that most of Europe’s social and political problems, including the spread of Islamic fundamentalism or extremism, stem from the weaknesses of unrestrained, all permissive western-style democracy. For example, a more prohibitive French approach to the issue of Islamic symbols, i.e. wearing hidjab in school, is considered as reasonable compared to the
5 more relaxed approach in the UK which leaves matters to legal interpretation and the discretion of school administrators. A court case in Germany was widely discussed, where a judge refused to allow a quick divorce for a Moroccan woman terrorised by her husband, saying that it was a religious matter.
The choice of European themes gives the impression that Europe suffers from the same vices and shortcomings as Russia, i.e. corruption and criminality, hence it cannot claim the high moral ground for its criticisms. Stories would typically feature an account of the latest news of the Italian Mafia, or the UK cash-for-honours scandal.
The logic of escalation The coverage of the Russian-Estonian conflict over the war monument (mentioned above) provides some insight into the logic of escalation. In the early days of the dispute some politicians appeared on TV calling for a civilised dialogue with the EU over what was seen as Tallinn’s deplorable behaviour. Moscow, they argued, should urge Brussels to hold emergency debates and investigate the disproportionate use of force employed by Estonia’s law enforcement agencies.
But as the story was evolving on a daily basis, it acquired a momentum of its own. Angry reactions on TV reflected sentiments prevalent in wider public opinion. It was not so much about the substance – moving the monument was, after all, an internal Estonia affair - but the form. Tallinn chose surgery to do away with the Soviet past. The authorities ordered the removal of the monument in the run up to the WWII Victory day celebrations in Russia, using excavators to exhume the remains of the Soviet soldiers.
Russian viewers felt deeply shocked and offended watching newsreels from the scene. It was as if the Danish cartoons were published on the eve of Ramadan. Furthering this analogy, Russia’s foreign minister appeared on TV time and again calling Tallinn’s actions blasphemous and inhuman – not dissimilar from the Muslims’ reactions to what was perceived as a western assault on their fundamental values.
The coverage of the conflict, which has beaten all records in terms of the amount of airtime devoted to it, has stirred up debate both in parliament and on TV over the future of relations with Europe. Up until now, anti-western attitudes in Putin’s Russia had been either fairly generic or targeted mainly against the US. Europe’s cautious solidarity with Estonia has fuelled anti-European sentiments. The incident with the monument will be exhausted sooner or later, but it might leave some scars, damaging chances for a new strategic partnership treaty.
It is now likely that Tallinn’s stand off with Moscow will embolden Russia’s critics both inside and outside the EU; for example, in other Baltic states, Georgia, possibly Ukraine and Moldova. Already Estonia has hinted that it might join Poland in vetoing the start of the talks with Russia over a new treaty. Reports of such developments on Russian TV, in addition to the repercussions of the forthcoming decision on the status of Kosovo and the affair of the US missile defence in Europe, is likely to shape the perceptions of the world to Russian voters as being essentially hostile. As a result, Russia’s next president might secure a mandate to continue, or even tighten, the present foreign policy course, pushing the country further towards self-isolation. However, and here lies the drama, this is not what the majority of the Russian population is hoping for. There is a vast constituency in favour of the country becoming a modern state, a respected member of the G8 and enjoying good relations with Europe.
6 Conclusion The Kremlin has succeeded in taking over control of all major media outlets in Russia. The picture that is portrayed of the European Union is thus very much the picture that the authorities wish to paint. This in turn colours the attitudes of ordinary Russians towards Europe. There may be considerable interest in and attraction to Europe in the population but the negative messages projected on Russian TV are hardly conducive to building trust in EU-Russia relations.
7 Russian Media Perceptions of EU-Russia Relations
Introduction The six-monthly summits between the EU and Russia have become an important new feature of European foreign policy. The summits attract wide media attention both in the EU and Russia. The difference in coverage, however, is very noticeable because increasing state control of the media in Russia means that what is shown on TV or printed in the newspapers reflects the message that the Kremlin wishes to propagate.
This research project by the EU-Russia Centre analysed the entire coverage of the two summits in 2006 (Sochi and Helsinki) plus the extraordinary meeting of the European Council at Lahti to which President Putin was invited for dinner. The results provide a revealing insight into how the Kremlin uses the media, Russian official attitudes to the EU and the influence of the media in shaping ordinary Russians’ views of the EU.
Summary Mass media from all sectors, newspapers, TV and radio - except for the small-circulation edition Novaya Gazeta, express their general support for President Putin’s foreign policy. This policy seeks to review every aspect of Russian-European relations in light of the consolidation of Russia’s economic and military power and the diversification of foreign relationships under the motto ‘Returning to Asia and the East’.
Leading newspapers still find a united Europe appealing but not as a political system to be copied. It is rather viewed as a centre for ideas and technologies which could assist the further transformation of the Russian economy.
A united Europe is seen as possible only through reaching ‘a strategic alliance’ between the EU and Russia.
The apparent new attitude of aggression of the Russian government towards Europe is seen by the media as ‘the natural desire’ of a great country to rapidly restore its position in Europe, which was shaken as a result of the ‘historical catastrophe’ of the 1990s when Russia was in debt and on the brink of collapse.
The majority of commentators share the suspicions of officials in Moscow that ‘there is a large-scale and coordinated anti-Russian campaign’ in the West that has resulted in European media and politicians talking about a crisis in Russian-European relations.
If the EU continues to insist that Russia signs the Energy Charter, then the majority of journalists believe that Russia should return to bilateral dialogue with each EU member state.
Methodology The research was based on an analysis of 22 national newspapers and the coverage of five national TV channels between May and December 2006. At this time there was heightened interest in Russian-European relations because of the number and level of official events. These included the EU-Russia summit in Sochi (May 25), the first period, the unofficial meeting of leaders of EU countries with President Putin in Lahti (October 20) - the second period, and the EU-Russia summit in Helsinki (November 24) - the third period.
8 Opinion and editorial articles published in the week before each event were reviewed in order to gain insight into the expectations of the Russian media and to discover any apparent attempts to influence public opinion. Articles published during the month following each event were subjected to an in-depth analysis looking at all areas of Russian-European relations relating to the outcome of each event.
The research focused on television and national print media to reflect the demographics of the Russian population and the way that they normally would receive information on national and international events. According to a study by the Yuri Levada Sociological Center in January 2007, 85.9% of the population receives information about events in the country and across its borders overwhelmingly from television news broadcasts, though the concentration of state capital in television mass media is the highest. 46.5 % of the sample believes the information broadcast by local and national TV. The number of people who receive information from radio programmes is much lower – 19.4%. According to the survey conducted by ROMIR-monitoring (http://www.rmh.ru) for the fourth quarter of 2006, only 21% of the adult population of Russia uses the internet and only 7% use it on a daily basis, 18% surf the web once a week. Thus the internet has the least influence on the formation of public opinion.
The selection of media sources was conducted to reflect estimates of the National Circulation Service (http://www.pressaudit.ru) which looked at newspaper circulation figures and the data from TNS Gallup Media on the audience share of TV channels as published by the Itogi journal.
Only original publications and programmes were included in the research; repeats and reprints (30% of the total) were not considered in the final estimates.
Groups of the studied sources The analysis of the data allows the division of the Russian media into several groups with regard to their position on the European Union.
Group A – Hostile to the EU: daily newspapers Moskovsky komsomolets (circulation 800,000, readership – 1.7 million); Nezavisimaya gazeta (circulation – 49,000, readership – 64, 000 people); RBC daily (circulation – 68,000 copies); weekly Moskovskie novosti (circulation - 67,200 copies); TV channel TVC (daily audience share in the first period 3.1%, in the second – 2.6%, in the third – 2.9%).
This group is characterised by a more sceptical analysis of Russian-European relations and their future. It is dismissive of most of the initiatives undertaken by the European Commission and Russia’s European orientation. Many articles are emotionally charged. Attitudes voiced by Russian officials are cited along ideological lines and arguments from the opposition are not provided.
Group B - Pro-European: daily newspapers Vedomosti (circulation – 69,800, readership - 113,600); Kommersant (circulation – 120,000, readership – 230,000); Gazeta (circulation – 72,000, readership – 55,100); (Novye Izvestia (circulation – 107,000).
Newspapers within this group are convinced of the appropriateness and inevitability of Russia’s ‘European path;’ they believe in a deepening of the Russian-European dialogue, only lightly criticising the authorities for any lack of flexibility in the negotiations.
9 They reflect the arguments of both sides. Articles in these publications are marked by a positive attitude towards democratic and civil subjects.
Group C – Officialdom: daily newspapers Izvestia (circulation– 103,000, readership – 385,000); Komsomolskaya Pravda (circulation 600,000– 900,000, readership – 2.68 million); Rossiyskaya Gazeta (official newspaper of the Russian government of Russia, circulation – 291,000; readership – 390,000); TV channels - First channel (average audience share in the first period – 22.3%, in the second - 21.8%, in the third –20.6%); VGTRK ‘Rossia’ (average audience share in the first period – 17.6%, in the second - 20.4%, in the third – 22%); NTV channel (average audience share in the first period – 11.6%, in the second - 12.7%, in the third – 12.3%).
This group is characterised by widespread quoting of officials without any editorial comment, straightforward coverage and a simplistic approach to evaluation. Often a loose command of the subject is reflected in articles. Opposition to the government is quoted but often its statements are edited and are not reported in context.
Group D - Articulate; daily newspaper Vremya novostei (circulation – 51,000, readership – 210,000); weekly Itogi (circulation – 85,000 copies, readership - 465,400); TV channel Ren TV (average audience share in the first period – 4.9%, in the second – 4%, in the third – 3.8%)
The group is characterised by a competent, professional approach where attention is given to arguments from both sides. These publications have demonstrated an interest in concrete problems that may be resolved by dialogue between Russia and the EU. Articles do not use emotionally charged language.
Group E – Novaya Gazeta (it was issued twice a week at the time of the research with a circulation of 535,000 copies (readership – 1.6 million)).
Editorial consistently and harshly criticises the EU for its lenient position towards Moscow, openly declaring its focus on European values.
Levels of mass media interest in EU-Russian- summits
EU-Russia summits coverage by mass media
10 Publications in research period
Number of publications 120 Helsinki 100 Lahti 80 Sochi 60 40 20 0 1
Sochi Lahti Helsinki
The second and third periods are marked by an increase in the number of publications as compared with the first period on average by 1.5 times. This increase can be interpreted as evidence of the journalist community perceiving that the Russian relationship with Europe as a key priority of the Kremlin as determined by the activity of the President and his close circle. A boost in the number of publications is also explained by intensified PR activity from the government on this issue.
The emotional language of the publications also changes throughout the period studied. It is reserved and shows moderate optimism on the future of Russian-European relations in the first period: this gives way to scepticism in the second period and then shifts to confrontation and emotion in the third period.
Comments from official representatives of the Russian government The character of public speeches made by Russian officials also underwent substantial changes during the studied period. The number of interviews and opinion articles in the third (confrontational) period doubled, as compared with the first period, and grew by 3.5 times compared with the second period. The level of representation of these speakers grew considerably.
In the first period, bilateral relations were largely commented upon by experts, such as the permanent representative of Russia to the European Union, Vladimir Chizhov, deputy foreign minister Alexander Grushko, special representative of the President, Sergei Yastrezhembsky and heads of foreign affairs committees of the State Duma and Council of Federation Konstantin Kosachev and Mikhail Margelov. Their overall contributions can be boiled down to comments on a description of the situation. The Assistant to the President, Igor Shuvalov, one of the chief Kremlin ideologists, was a notable exception.
In the second period, prominent figures such as Vice-premier Sergei Ivanov and the President (he gave two extensive interviews entirely dedicated to the EU) took part in the discussion. The debate became gradually more and more politicised. Speakers’ contributions become tougher and more simplistic.
11 The third period saw the theme of Russian-European relations emerge most prominently¹ due to an article written by the deputy head of the President’s administration, Vladislav Surkov. ‘Nationalisation of the future’ (Expert, #43, 2006) perfectly fitted into the discussion about a national strategy and the new state ideology – ‘sovereign democracy’. Several days before the summit in Helsinki, leading world newspapers (including Russian newspapers Vedomosti and the official publication of the State Duma, Parlamentskaya Gazeta) ran President Vladimir Putin’s article ‘Russia-EU partnership opens the way for the construction of a united Europe, new opportunities for all Europeans’. This summed up Moscow’s official position. The majority of ideas spelt out by the President were adopted by newspapers from groups A and C, heavily influencing the slant taken on the issue in media coverage.
It is worth noting that interviews and articles by Russian officials make up 25% of the total number of publications during the studied period (regardless of the extensive coverage on television), direct comments from EU representatives do not exceed 5% of the entire media content.
12 Coverage of the Sochi Summit (May 25, 2006) in the media
Media attitude to the Sochi Summit
The summit in Sochi saw potentially difficult issues on the table: for instance, the adoption of the new law about non-governmental organisations and the Russian- Ukrainian war. However, these became rather distanced from the event and lost their initial urgency. The only real tension was sparked off by US Vice-president Dick Cheney’s tough speech on May 4 at the meeting of leaders of Baltic and Black Sea countries in Vilnius. This event was used by Russian authorities to demonstrate the gaps in Moscow’s relations with Washington and Brussels.
Media-group C announced that the May summit had been very successful (‘To everyone’s surprise the meeting was successful. A response to sceptics’ – ‘First channel’, ‘The parties manifested their willingness to hear and to listen to each other’, NTV) pointing out that the leaders established very close relations - the journalists of these media saw Putin’s charm as one of his most significant attributes (‘To an outsider it was rather like a meeting of old friends’ – ‘Rossiya’). Signing the agreement on readmission and simplification of the visa regime for certain categories of citizens were depicted as ‘a breakthrough in Russian-European relations’ (‘First channel’) and ‘quite a serious achievement’ (NTV).
The remainder of the media groups gave a more sceptical assessment of events, ‘The negotiations were uneasy. The parties found a real difficulty in making a compromise’ – TVC, ‘We are faced with the dizziness of success and delusions of grandeur. US and Europe perceive Moscow’s current behaviour as a challenge’ – Kommersant, ‘A month ago we spoke as the tentacles of our pipeline were reaching the Europe’s neck. Now we have decided to back down in all the ways’, - Novaya Gazeta, ‘The bottom line of the first decade of cooperation between Russia and EU is drawn, the new decade promises to be much more complicated’, - Vremya novostei.
Coverage of the Lahti Summit (October 20, 2006) in the media
Media views of the Lahti Summit Written Media TV Positive 2 2 Neutral-positive 4 6 Neutral 16 10 Neutral-negative 17 7 Negative 11 4
The coverage in the second period was totally different. The informal meeting in Lahti was preceded by Putin’s trip to Dresden, during which he stated his readiness to redirect the Stockman deposit towards Europe and invited Germany to become the chief gas distribution centre in the EU. The response to these offers was the creation of the energy alliance between Germany and France - without Russia’s participation. A serious blow to Moscow’s negotiating position was then inflicted by the murder of journalist Anna Written media TV Positive 5 10 Neutral-Positive 2 7 Neutral 17 11 Neutral-Negative 16 5 Negative 7 2 13 Politkovskaya. The situation was worsened by the Russian-Georgian conflict, to which the EU Council dedicated a tough resolution several days before the summit. Head of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, voiced open criticism of the Kremlin’s course during a lecture at the Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House in London.
Newspapers within all of the groups pointed out that the negotiations had been difficult, however, they disagreed that they had been unsuccessful. The moral victory went to Vladimir Putin, ‘Leaders of EU countries left Lahti as outsiders’, ‘European leaders gave in to the psychological attack’ (Kommersant), ‘The invitation to Lahti was very flattering. It demonstrated that Europe may criticise Russian democracy but it cannot do without Moscow in solving international problems’ (Nezavisimaya gazeta), ‘Putin’s stance was as hard as concrete’ (Moskovsky komsomolets). The opinion was shared by Novaya Gazeta which reproached Brussels for betraying democracy in Russia.
Coverage of Helsinki Summit in the media
Media view of the Helsinki Summit Written Media TV Positive 2 3 Neutral-positive 4 7 Neutral 25 10 Neutral-negative 20 19 Negative 10 10
Finally, the third summit was held against the dramatic background of the murder of Alexander Litvinenko and the Polish veto on the start of negotiations on the new framework agreement between Russia and the EU. These events came as a blow to Moscow. The Kremlin had begun a media campaign that promoted the need to transform the framework agreement into ‘the strategic partnership’ agreement (this idea had been actively promoted by Russia’s representative to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov, in interviews and articles since May). Moscow’s frustration at having its hopes dashed of an easy re-signing of the PCA ’was naturally reflected in mass media from Group A, ‘The summit of small affairs’ (Moskovskie novosti), ‘European leaders inappropriately put down Vladimir Putin and received a corresponding tongue-lashing’, ‘The meeting between Russia and the EU was disrupted, officially because of Poland. However, there are two real reasons: the EU’s unreadiness for positive compromises with Russia and a US drive not to allow these compromises’ (RBC-daily).
‘B and D groups’ publications were even tougher in delivering their assessment of the summit’s outcome, characterising it as ‘a total failure’. ‘We haven’t seen such a scandalous EU-Russia summit before’ (Gazeta), ‘Leaders keep silent with journalists around, though without them they also have got nothing to say. The agenda has been disrupted’ (Ren-TV).
Only the state-controlled media tried to inject some optimism (Group C and partially Group A), ‘The summit showed that Russia and EU will always have something to discuss’ (Rossiya).
This interdependence allows Russia much room for manoeuvre. A break in the rapprochement between Russia and EU was proposed by Groups A, C and D’s media to
14 allow a review of Russian interests and the development of appropriate tactics. According to them, Moscow shouldn’t look to reach the new framework agreement in the current circumstances, as the viewpoint of Russia and Brussels differ considerably.
Main concepts in highlighting the present situation around Russian-European relations in Russian media
Europe and the European Union The European Union is viewed as a political block which may not be aimed directly against Russia, but undoubtedly damages its cultural and geopolitical ‘European nature’ (Groups A, C and D). Its expansion is perceived as an attempt to ‘push Russia into the East’ (Group A) while the new policy of cooperation between neighbours of former CIS countries aims to set up ‘a sanitary cordon’ at the Russian border (Groups A and C). Characterising the competition between Moscow and Brussels in the post- Soviet space as ‘ideological’, Russian mass media simultaneously stresses the commonality of European values with its own ‘different’ interpretation’ (all newspapers, official speakers – Putin, Surkov, Margelov).
United Europe and Russia The prospect of a united Europe is regarded positively by the majority of Russian journalists, but the European Union is viewed as a work-in-progress, a raw and weak conglomerate of states with very different self-interests. They consider that the European Union project is only truly achievable if a 'strategic union' can be agreed based on the consolidation of the EU military power and Russia's extensive natural resources. ’
At the same time as Russia is not viewed as a potential member of the EU and as the object of a cultural and economic takeover – ‘The path that was taken by small peoples of Europe is not appropriate for Russia’ – Moskovskie novosti quotes Putin’s official, Surkov. The outcome of such a move could result in a new stimulus for the EU, the mutual consolidation of the parties and the transformation of Europe as a world power capable of balancing out ‘aggressive US policy’.
The creation of a genuinely united Europe is seen as one of the steps on the way to building a new, ‘fairer’ world system, in which Russia will play a crucial role (all groups, officials – Lavrov). As an initial contribution to the world’s well-being, journalists from Groups A and C believe that Russia could offer its thousand-year-long experience of peaceful co-existence between different religious affinities and nationalities that could help the EU to overcome the crisis related to the dominance of culturally alien migrants (official speaker – Surkov).
The main proponent of the idea of a ‘Great Europe with no demarcation lines’ is the Russian President himself. (In the course of his presidency, Putin has attempted to create a great common Europe and it is not his fault that the project is falling apart’, - Nezavisimaya gazeta’.)
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement The EU’s cautious stance in negotiations with Russia is interpreted by journalists as a manifestation of ‘distrust’ (Groups B, C and D) and even a ‘conscious exclusion of Moscow from the discussion of crucial issues’, an ‘unwillingness to take reciprocal steps’ (Group A).
15 In this situation, the media is inclined to view the EU’s partial concessions over certain issues as ‘a gambit’ or even ‘a trap’. Thus the signing of the agreement on readmission and the simplification of the visa regime was taken as ‘a convenient excuse’ to delay the final cancellation of mandatory visa permits for Russian visitors to Europe. The decision to create an energy alliance between France and Germany without Russia’s participation came as a blow to any optimism regarding Russia-EU relations as far as the Russian mass media was concerned.
Europe’s Attitude towards Russian democracy Views on the fairness of European claims regarding the democratic situation in Russia differ considerably in Russian media. Novaya Gazeta’s approach is most the radical in this sense. It demands that Brussels toughens its rhetoric and considers breaking diplomatic relations and presses for the exclusion of Russia from international organisations. An overwhelming majority of journalists from A and C groups consider Brussels’ criticism ungrounded and too harsh; Group D publications doubt its sincerity.
On the whole, the media demonstrates its readiness to justify any change in the socio- political life of the country to be Russia specific; sovereign democracy’ (introduced by Surkov). Even the most cautious criticism is regarded as ‘interference with domestic affairs’ and the ‘imposition of artificial standards’. The bad feeling caused by the EU’s harshness has prompted a geopolitical shift to Asia that is ‘less demanding of democratic standards’.
Anti-Russian Campaign in Europe There’s a widespread conviction within the Russian media (all groups, except for Group E) that public opinion compels leaders of the EU (who cannot afford to overlook public opinion after the failure of European constitution) to pose unpleasant questions to Putin. Europeans tone down their talks with Moscow in private meetings – discussions become more substantial, articulate and respectful. Russian journalists view Europeans’ ‘Cold war victory syndrome’ (introduced by foreign minister Sergei Lavrov) as a factor that stands in the way of bilateral relations. The media believes that Europe is not willing to understand the psychology of modern Russia and doesn’t make an effort to consider its arguments.
A considerable part of the journalist community (Groups A and C) share Moscow’s suspicions of the ‘existence of a large-scale and coordinated anti-Russian campaign’ being mounted in the West that has resulted in talk about a crisis in Russian-European relations. This version of events has been made public personally by the President’s special representative, Sergei Yastrzhembsky.
The Future of Russian-European Relations Despite the fact that Russian-European relations today are characterised as at ‘a stand off’ and full of ‘mutual suspicion’, the prospect of an improvement in relations is inevitable to all mass media outlets (except for Group E) – because with the existing level of mutual dependence, it is felt that an agreement between the parties will be reached anyway and its achievement is just a matter of time.
Perception of the Russia-EU Energy Dialogue Moscow and Brussels’ fixation on the energy issue is viewed by the media as one of the main obstacles for the development of a constructive dialogue. Many publications
16 believe that relations with the EU are subject to the interests of big state business that dictates the agenda and rarely considers the interests of ordinary people.
Europeans’ demands to liberalise the Russian energy market and to open cross-country pipelines for the transit of raw materials from third-world countries are perceived by Groups A, C and partially D as a threat to Russian sovereignty, ‘EU views our resources as if it owned them’ (Interfax), ‘They attempt to make Russia act against its national interests’ (Nezavisimaya gazeta).
In response to ‘Brussels’ undue pressure’ Group A and C publications call for ‘energy nationalism’ and a more decisive use of energy as a political tool. Groups B and D agree that such energy pressure will enjoy a short-term effect, but point out that ‘similar tools will depreciate while frustrating Russian diplomacy’ – Vedomosti.
Groups A, B and C view recognition of Russia’s leadership in the sphere of energy security as a constructive step towards a more close political union with Europe, a signal of political trust.
Russia doesn’t regard Europe as a reliable consumer capable of paying for supplies in ‘hard currency’ (Barroso), ‘The leadership of our government finally realised that our natural resources in terms of their value, are no match for coloured paper, so-called money, if these coloured papers are directly given to those who printed it’ – Literaturnaya gazeta, A group. Considering the economy’s reliance on ‘raw materials’ as temporary, the media demands that supplies are redirected towards those consumers that can ‘offer cutting-edge scientific-technical development for our economy’ – Moskovskie novosti. This idea is officially promoted by Vladislav Surkov.
Groups A and C view the investment of Russian capital in European companies, primarily in the hi-tech sector, and using western companies as contractors in the development of Russian deposits, as the main way of acquiring new technologies. They also propose seeking funds for investments in the fuel and energy industry which are necessary to maintain the status of a reliable supplier to the end-consumer market in Europe.
All media covers the unwillingness of Brussels to allow Russian business access to its market, not because of any principles but due to a desire to defend its own companies from competition. Russian journalists believe that political setbacks in EU-Russia relations are the result of economic competition that allows the Russian approach to diplomacy of ‘where there’s bargaining there’s a deal’.
Groups A and C take the EU’s statements concerning its intention ‘to include’ the main provisions of Energy Charter into the text of the new framework agreement as an insult that aims to highlight Moscow’s status merely as a source of ‘raw materials’. Representatives of these groups take an uncompromising stance: if Brussels refuses to make concessions, then Russia should return to bilateral dialogue with each individual EU member. The gambit of highlighting the contradictions inside the EU at present may considerably benefit Russia.
Perception of the History of Russian-European Relations The media’s attitude towards the modern European Union is, in many ways, conditioned by a sort of 1990s ‘psychological trauma’. It is at this point, the journalists believe, that
17 relations between Brussels and Moscow were founded on an unequal basis. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that took effect in 1997 ‘When Russia was experiencing a system crisis’ (Itogi) is characterised by the majority of mass media as ‘one-sided agreement’ (TVC channel).
The market reforms that were driven by international experts, including the EU, are frowned upon in the media (especially for A group): ‘The talk about democracy and a free market in Russia clouded a bitter fight for power and money. By the end of the 1990s its results became obvious: millions of people got poor and lost their illusions’ – TVC channel. There is a widespread conviction among a small group of publications about Brussels’ malicious intentions, ‘The project aimed to put the Russian economy into total dependency, caused by its debts. Then it would have had to pay it off by providing oil and gas to Western companies. Thus our natural resources were to steadily pass into foreign ownership’, - Moskovskie novosti. Lack of criticism of a young Russian democracy during the Yeltsin period is perceived as another manifestation of Brussels’ insincerity about this issue, ‘Can you call this a democracy? But they did because they found a weak, dependent, neglected and powerless Russia quite suitable’, - TVC channel.
Russia’s modern ambitions are depicted as part of its drive to get back its legitimate position which it lost in the 1990s. This viewpoint is strongly promoted by official speakers, including the President himself.
The Political Situation Inside the European Union All Russian media appears to be convinced that the EU is experiencing one of the most dramatic periods in its history. A deep cultural and economic crisis provoked by a half- baked decision to extend its borders and uncontrolled migration may lead to the collapse of the idea of a united Europe. The EU is seen divided into two contending camps – old members and so-called new countries – the newcomers. The conflicts between these are not being solved and continue to intensify.
‘The new Europe’ led by Warsaw, is seen by all media groups as a stronghold of Atlantic interests in Europe. It is stated that Washington openly uses EU ‘newcomers’ to restrain its European competitors.
Such an alternative doesn’t facilitate the unification of the European Union. For some countries important decision-making is spurred more and more frequently by national egotism as manifested by Poland’s veto on EU negotiations with Russia on the new framework agreement – the media called the setback ‘an internal problem for the European Union’.
Journalists call for a dialogue with EU countries independently because there’s no shared opinion regarding co-operation with Moscow throughout the EU. Despite a change in the political leadership of Germany and Italy, the Russian mass media (Groups A and C in the first place) continue to consider these countries as chief promoters of Russian interests in Europe. Russia pins much hope on the German chairmanship in this respect. Journalists prefer to overlook the Atlantic slant in Berlin’s policy.
It is assumed that the disagreements inside the EU will inevitably entail a cut in Brussels’ political influence on the international stage, as a result of which the EU will have to seek
18 an influential ally which is open to a dialogue on an equal basis. This ally could be Moscow, which is interested in the stability of its borders to the West.
Conclusion Media coverage of EU-Russia summits, with a few exceptions, is a reflection of the authority’s position on present and future relations between Russia and the EU. It is also a propaganda ‘map’ relayed by the authorities to the people. Analysing the publications dedicated to these issues, it is possible to form an opinion on the position of the authorities, as well as their interpretation of this issue - as they control the media.
The analysis shows that the authorities aim to deepen a pragmatic Russian-European dialogue. However, Brussels is viewed only as one potential partner. Russia mainly relies on specific European capitals, relations with which are promoted to Russian society as tradition-bound, conditioned by a centuries-old history of diplomatic and cultural connections.
The commentary of the Russian mass media illustrates that the authorities believe that the European Union is not a single political player on the international stage. They expect that intensification of contact with Brussels will result in political gains leading to the creation of a strategic union (‘The Big Europe’, new world centre of power). The Russian elite’s fixation on energy dialogue to the detriment of other forms of cooperation should be pointed out. At the same time the potential of Russian-European relations goes virtually undisclosed and undiscussed, Russian-European dialogue is presented in a dry and formalised way.
19