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Seminar Research Paper

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Law Enforcement, Security, and Community Impact

Approve: Dr. Cody Gaines Date: 12/11/2020

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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND THEIR IMPACT ON

LAW ENFORCEMENT, SECURITY, AND COMMUNITY

A Seminar Paper

Presented to

The Graduate Faculty

University of Wisconsin-Platteville

In Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirement for the Degree

Master of Science

In

Criminal Justice

By

John R. Stout

2020

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Abstract

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND THEIR IMPACT ON

LAW ENFORCEMENT, SECURITY, AND COMMUNITY

Purpose

The purpose of this investigation will be to make a determination based on published empirical research and study as to best practices for implementation, utilization, and investigation of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) use in the criminal justice environment, so that law enforcement agencies can make informed decisions about UAVs in their communities. The use of UAVs for a variety of purposes in the United States is expected to grow quickly, but legal and regulatory requirements have been struggling to keep pace (Urban, 2018). This research will address legal concerns as well as public perception of UAVs by law enforcement agencies. This research will also address potential threats posed by UAVs and what law enforcement agencies can do to mitigate them.

Methods

The information for this research will come from a review and evaluation of secondary sources. Sources will include government reports, accredited journals, organizational and agency websites, and any other agency or government data that is available. Studies that have examined the application of UAVs to law enforcement missions, such as what has been done by Koslowski and Schulzke (2018), will be assessed. Developing legal issues and constitutional concerns, including those identified by Dwyer-Moss (2018) and Urban (2018), will be evaluated. Studies that have identified potential risks to public safety and criminal or terrorist use of UAV systems will also be assessed. Studies that have evaluated public perception of law enforcement will be assessed to determine the impact to community involvement and police relationships. iv

Findings

Based on empirical studies, the implementation of a UAV program in a law enforcement agency will be met with support or criticism depending on relationship with the community.

Agency use of UAVs are limited only by imagination, but UAV have so far found success in search and rescue operations, disaster response, emergency operations, accident investigation, and crime scene investigation. UAVs being widely used in the national infrastructure will lead to new types of threats, but they can be mitigated. Legislation, case law, and regulatory infrastructure is developing, and will need to grow in order to keep pace with new developments in technology and infrastructure. Community acceptance of law enforcement UAV use will depend greatly on the agency implementing the program, their outreach efforts with the community, and their intended use. Theoretical framework for UAV acceptance is limited, and the acceptance of specific law enforcement UAV use is even more limited. This research identified applicable theory and acceptance models for law enforcement use.

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Acknowledgements

To my wife Laura and son John for their support and sacrifice through my academic endeavors. Thank you for the encouragement and for allowing me the freedom to pursue an aggressive academic schedule while also meeting my professional requirements. I also need to thank my mom who, decades after proofreading my undergraduate work, was willing to pick up my papers and proofread them again. Thank you to my mother-in-law, Brenda, who spent so much time looking after John and helping Laura while I was going through this. I could not have done it without you all.

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John R. Stout

Under the Supervision of Dr. Cody Gaines, Professor UW-Platteville Criminal Justice

Department

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVAL PAGE………………………………………………………………………………..i

TITLE PAGE……………………………………………………………………………………...ii

ABSTRACT……………...………………………………………………………………………iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…...…………………………………………………………………..v

TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………………………....vi

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION……...……………………………………………………..………1

Overview of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)

Statement of the Problem

Purpose of the Study

Significance of the Research

Contribution to the Research

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II. LITERATURE REVIEW……………………………………..………………………7

UAV Industry Growth

History

Laws/Regulations

Use in Government and Military Applications

Use for Commercial Enterprise

Use as a Criminal/Terrorism tool

Other Public Safety Risks/Concerns

III. CURRENT LAW ENFORCEMENT UAV PROGRAMS………………..………...21

Strategic Use/National Security

Tactical Use

Investigative Use

Public Safety Use

LE Response to Misuse/Criminal Activity/Terrorism Involving UAV

Public Perception of Existing Programs

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A SUCCESSFUL LAW

ENFORCEMENT UAV PROGRAM…………………………………………….…30

Impact on Community Relationships with Law Enforcement

Privacy Concerns

Educating the Public About UAV Use

Program Implementation Considerations

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V. SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY, AND CONCLUSIONS…………41

Summary and Conclusions

Limitations of this Study

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Overview of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV)

It is helpful to provide definitions and explanations of terms, as identified by the Federal

Aviation Administration, that are commonly applied to UAVs (FAA; 2012, 2016). For instance,

UAV refers to the aircraft, which is also sometimes referred to as an unmanned aircraft (UA), which is operated without any human intervention from within the aircraft. An unmanned aerial system (UAS) refers to the entire system that allows a UAV to conduct assigned tasks. This typically includes the UAV, the ground station, the communication and navigation equipment, and any sensor or photographic or video system. A small, unmanned aircraft system (SUAS) is an unmanned aircraft that weighs less than 55 pounds including all associated navigational systems and sensors (Federal Aviation Administration, 2016). The remotely piloted aircraft

(RPA) refers to a UA flown by a trained pilot. “Drone” is a generic term that is commonly used to identify a UAV (Card, 2018).

While UAVs were originally used in military contexts, they are quickly finding usage in many capacities in the public and private sector (Card, 2018). Kasim (2018) expected that UAS technology will continue to advance until it has an impact on the quality of life of the populace in a manner similar to the proliferation of the mobile phone and the smartphone. He was also concerned that increased use and adoption of UAS in the National Airspace System (NAS) will carry unique risks that will have to be addressed by establishing safeguards as hazards are identified and studied.

Commercial UAS have found usefulness in the oil, gas, power generation, agricultural, and transportation sectors (Koslowksi & Schulzke, 2018). Companies such as Amazon would like to create infrastructure so that they may combine a UAS with other technologies to make 2 deliveries and cut overhead costs (Card, 2018). Commercial applications already include aerial photography, monitoring of infrastructure, mapping, and the taking over some roles traditionally assigned to helicopters, such as providing video for the media. Card (2018) expected that the capabilities and functions that UAS operations provide will expand at a rapid pace in the coming decades. Legal and regulatory requirements have so far limited the way that UAS may be used in the United States, but the FAA is expected to expand regulations to account for new usage.

Mlezivová (2018) identified the dual role that military and law enforcement see UAV playing: tool and threat. According to Heen, Lieberman, and Miethe (2018), law enforcement use of UAS would increase capabilities in crime scene photography, search and rescue, crime detection, and crowd management. A UAS provides vantage points that have been previously inaccessible. When combined with other emerging technologies such as facial recognition and license plate recognition, UAS could substantially enhance law enforcement capabilities.

Koslowski and Schulzke (2018) described some of the roles that UAS have taken over in border security; they are able to provide for search and rescue for migrants and refugees as well as track smugglers and other border crimes.

Card (2018) stated that it is likely that the use of UAS will not be limited to commercial or government operations and those only looking for a hobby. He predicted that UAS technology will advance to be even more user-friendly and easier to operate. Card predicted that terrorists will soon see UAS as a resource to carry out devastating attacks at relatively low cost. The military has conducted analyses of potential threats and ways to counter them, and the knowledge acquired may be useful when applied to public safety (Yamakado, 2020). 3

Statement of the Problem

The use of UAVs presents challenges and opportunities for law enforcement in the

United States, and best practices need to be identified when planning for the implementation of a

UAV program. There are many ways in which UAV capabilities can provide cost-effective solutions for law enforcement agencies. Koslowski and Schulzke (2018), for instance, emphasized the advantages of using UAVs for border security: reduced cost, the risk involved in long surveillance missions, and the ability to locate and respond to emergencies in remote areas near the border. There is also a variety of new risks and problems regarding the UAVs that are now within reach of the average consumer and their potential use as tools of terrorism or criminal behavior. Card (2018) proposed some solutions for these risks, such as tracking purchases of certain navigation systems and enabling law enforcement and intelligence agencies to identify and track potential threats.

Law enforcement within the United States will have to become familiar with the risks and advantages of UAS as a way to address public safety considerations while also staying abreast of developing legislation and case law and preserving relationships with the communities they serve. Heen et al. (2018) concluded that community confidence and trust in a law enforcement agency had a significant impact on their receptiveness and support for law enforcement use of

UAV and the level of tension involved in such use. Koslowski and Schulzke (2018) acknowledged that public perception of UAVs as part of the militarization of police is a barrier that must be addressed.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this research will be to make a determination based on published empirical research and study as to best practices for the implementation, utilization, and 4 investigation of UAV use in the criminal justice environment so that law enforcement agencies can make informed decisions about UAVs within their communities. Wide and varied usage of

UAVs is expected to occur quickly in the United States, and legal and regulatory requirements have been struggling to keep pace (Urban, 2018). This research will address legal concerns as well as public perception of UAVs used by law enforcement agencies. This research will also address potential threats posed by UAVs and establish what law enforcement agencies can do to mitigate them.

Significance of the Research

UAVs are becoming more common and are finding uses in a number of industries

(Koslowksi & Schulzke, 2018). Their use as a tool to enhance public safety and security is promising (Heen, Lieberman, & Miethe, 2018). Using UAVs to commit crimes, carry out terrorist acts, and disrupt communities are also concerns as they become more commonplace and accessible to the general public (Card, 2018). Laws and regulatory guidance have been slow to respond to new capabilities provided by what was once a niche market (Urban, 2018). The slow development of policy, regulation, and laws with regard to UAV use can lead to community misinformation, confusion about utilization, and distrust of the law enforcement agencies that employ them (Heen, Lieberman, & Miethe, 2018). This paper will analyze how agencies can establish and maintain programs while building and maintaining public trust. It will also analyze risks associated with the proliferation of UAV use and subsequent mitigation factors. This paper will serve as a comprehensive guide for law enforcement administrators to implement UAV programs within their agencies as well as a place to address risks that UAVs pose to the public.

This research will be informed by the review and evaluation of secondary sources that will include government reports, accredited journals, organizational and agency websites, and 5 any other available agency or government data. This research will include a literature review giving historical perspective on the development of UAS. Evolving legal issues and constitutional concerns, including those identified by Dwyer-Moss (2018) and Urban (2018), will then be evaluated. Studies that have examined the application of UAVs to law enforcement missions, such as Koslowski and Schulzke (2018), will be assessed. Studies that have identified potential risks to public safety and criminal or terrorist use of UAV systems, including those identified in Card (2018), will also be assessed. Studies that have evaluated public perception of law enforcement, such as Heen et al. (2018), will additionally be evaluated to determine its impact on community involvement and police relationships.

Contribution to the Research

The analysis will determine best practices for law enforcement agencies to preparing for widespread UAV use within their communities and agencies that allow them to meet the needs of their communities and preserve civil rights. The use and industry distribution of UAV technology are growing, and the potential change to existing infrastructure as a result cannot be overstated. At the same time, there has been limited research into the impact UAV adoption will have on the field of criminal justice. This research aims to address many of the concerns that

UAVs bring to the United States, the opportunities they provide to law enforcement, and best practices for the mitigation of the damage they bring to community relationships.

There is a gap in the research into UAS use in law enforcement and its impact on community relationships once implemented. This paper will identify the impact that following the best practices have on the community relationship. There will also be an analysis of the health of community relationships with the law enforcement agency after a program has been implemented and efforts have been made to mitigate negative impact to those relationships. 6

Research into the theoretical framework of the community acceptance of UAV use by law enforcement agencies is very limited, and this study will include an analysis of the theories behind the successful implementation of a UAS program while also attaining and retaining the support of the community the technology is serving.

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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

This literature review consists of five sections. First, a brief history of the growth of the

UAV will be discussed. Second, the application of UAV as fulfillment of government and military missions will be identified. Third, an overview of the growth of UAV used for commercial enterprise will be given. Fourth, the use of the UAV as a tool for criminal and terrorist objectives will be explained. Fifth, other potential safety risks and concerns that are less nefarious in nature but just as potentially devastating will be examined.

UAV Industry Growth

History

To achieve a productive discussion of the development of UAV, it is first necessary to provide historical context of the development of aerial observation platforms requiring manned flight. According to Heen et al. (2018), private and commercial use of UAV have developed from awareness of their utility in military applications in recent military conflicts. Blom (2010) stated that the military development of UAV technology began at the end of World War I. He observed that the desire to see a battlefield from an aerial perspective stems from the known military advantage in detecting an enemy from a distance—referring to long-held military practices of erecting towers and choosing high-ground areas for military fortifications—that dates back centuries. Prior to pursuing unmanned observation, the military realized the usefulness of manned aerial observation as early as the French revolution, using the balloon l’Entreprenant [The Enterprising] during the Battle of Fleurus (see Appendix A) to observe enemy movements and report information back to commanders on June 26, 1794 (Guttman,

2012). This event marked the first employment of an aircraft making an impact on the outcome of a military battle. 8

Despite their success in the French Revolution, balloons were largely ineffective during the Civil War and did not find usefulness in the U.S. military until World War I (Blom, 2010) when aerial platforms were used to direct artillery, track enemy movement, acquire targets, and assess damage (see Appendix B). The United States also began to utilize observation airplanes during World War I, which provided greater range and made them less susceptible to being shot down than the stationary balloon. The United States would utilize aerial reconnaissance in every military conflict after that, and balloons are still in use as a viable military observation platform.

The taking of aerial photographs surged in popularity during World War II as commanders began to realize its usefulness. According to Samusson (1953), logistical demands of U.S. Army doctrine shortly after World War II were problematic. A theoretical 60-mile front would have required a daily production of 650 pounds of photographs with a volume of 16 cubic feet and required sufficient logistical support to supply and produce chemicals and materials.

Such bandwidth limitations would continue to pose a problem throughout the development of aerial information dissemination.

Nikola Tesla began to develop unmanned vehicles in the form of watercraft in the 1890s, displaying a craft to the public in 1898 (McCormick, 2014). As early as 1911, Tesla shared ideas with Elmer Sperry about applying these remote-control methods to aircraft (Blom, 2010). In

1917, Sperry received the first military contract for an unmanned aerial torpedo from the U.S.

Navy (see Appendix C). Charles Kettering then developed a UAV for the U.S. Army in 1918, known as the Kettering Bug (see Appendix D). The Kettering Bug would be launched with a preset number of rotations for the propeller to reach; upon reaching that preset, power would be cut and the aircraft would descend in the hope it would be toward the target. These early attempts at engaging the enemy with UAV were extraordinarily inaccurate. 9

UAVs were used for target practice during World War II (Blom, 2010) as well. The

UAVs at this time evolved in power, speed, and wingspan. There was some experimentation with adding weapons to UAVs then as well, notably Operations Aphrodite and Anvil, in which the decommissioned and explosive-laden B-17 and B-24 bomber aircraft took off as manned aircrafts and pilots would bail out after arming the explosives and turning control over to a remote operator (see Appendix E). John F. Kennedy’s older brother, Joe Kennedy, Jr., was killed when the explosives in the aircraft he was flying detonated prematurely. The concept of weaponizing UAVs was met with skepticism, and maintenance issues associated with the endeavor ultimately canceled the research.

Early in the Cold War, the U.S. military continued to experiment with UAVs (Blom,

2010). There was limited success with notable developments in technology and concepts. For instance, UAVs that were capable of film, infrared, and radar were introduced and sensor packages were contained in interchangeable noses. Wireless transmission of photographs, which initially took two minutes to receive an initial picture but subsequent images became available every 8 seconds, were presented in 1964. The system used traditional film so that images could be developed after landing. According to Blom (2010), reliance on aerial photography continued until the mid-1970s, when the military began experimenting with transmitters capable of sending real-time video. He categorized this technological innovation as critical to the development of

UAS.

The rotor wing UAV, the QH-50C (see Appendix F), was adopted by the U.S. Navy as an antisubmarine program until program costs drove it to cancellation. UAVs were used during the

Vietnam War for reconnaissance missions, usually with the Lightning Bug (see Appendix G) built by Ryan Aeronautical (Blom, 2010). China shot down a UAV flying over the country, but 10 the manned U-2 piloted by Gary Powers that was shot down over the Soviet Union alleviated any embarrassment at that, and higher risk missions began to be assigned to UAVs instead of manned aircraft. UAV photography was also used to defend against propaganda accusing the U.S. of carpet-bombing civilian areas of Vietnam. The development of strategic UAVs that employed high endurance capabilities with stealth technology was researched during this time, and the

Ryan YQM-98A set an endurance record for flying more than 28 hours without refueling in 1974

(although the USAF chose the Boeing YQM-94A; see Appendix H) as the aircraft for the

Compass Cope reconnaissance program.

During the 1980s, sensor packages became more sophisticated and expensive (Blom,

2010). While the cost of the UAV platform remained relatively constant, the rest of the UAS increased in expense and sophistication. Sensor packages could include daylight television, low light television, forward-looking infrared (FLIR), 35mm panoramic camera, and target acquisition capabilities for guided munitions. The Aquila and the Pioneer (see Appendix H) were the primary UAVs during this time.

During the 1990s, the U.S. military deployed the Pioneer for Operation Desert Storm

(Blom, 2010). In a historical first, enemy forces, in this case Iraqi soldiers, surrendered to an unmanned vehicle. Development on the Hunter UAV (see Appendix I) was pursued, and it was indeed utilized in the Balkans in 1999 and in Iraq in 2003 alongside the Pioneer. Law enforcement use of UAV emerged when a small UAV, the FQM-151A Pointer (see Appendix J), was acquired by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). The Oregon Army National Guard and local law enforcement used the Pointer in at least a dozen law enforcement operations. The U.S.

Marine Corps also supported border drug interdiction as a part of Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) using the Pioneer UAV. The Pioneer UAV used in JTF-6 was credited with intercepting over $2 11 million—adjusted for inflation—in drugs and over 300 illegal border crossers (Zamichow,

1990).

It was during the 1990s that the General Atomics Aeronautical Systems GNAT 750 (see

Appendix K) reached maturity and was placed into service by the Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA; Blom, 2010). The GNAT 750 had been deployed operationally but proved to have design flaws that hindered its ability to complete the designated mission profile. Based on the GNAT

750 design, the RQ-1 (reconnaissance) and MQ-1 (armed) Predator (see Appendix L) were placed into service in 1994 with improvements in airworthiness and mission capabilities. The

Predators’ first overseas deployment played out through several 1995 Balkans missions. Among the improvements was the ability for multiple users to view incoming, real-time, full-motion video simultaneously. The first deployment of the armed MQ-1 occurred in October 2001

(Tenet, 2004).

The RQ and MQ-9 Reaper (see Appendix M) is the successor to the RQ and MQ-1 program. Introduced in 2007, it is now used by the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Customs and Border

Protection (CBP). The RQ and MQ-4 Global Hawk (see Appendix N) is a strategic UAV that can take on many roles that have historically been held by the manned U-2 aircraft, with a range of over 3,000 nautical miles and an endurance of over 40 hours. These platforms’ affordance of real-time live video feeds again generates concerns regarding bandwidth, and digital communications services have strained to accommodate their use. It has been suggested that there is a need to prioritize full-motion video needs, only using it when necessary.

Laws/Regulations

The FAA Modernization and Reform Act (2012) intended to require the FAA to develop regulations that would bring UAV operations into the national airspace (NAS) by September 30, 12

2015. Their deadline was not met, the FAA stating that enacting such regulations would require more time (Urban, 2018). The regulatory guidance for non-recreational UAS operations became public in June 2016 with an implementation date of August 29, 2016 (Federal Aviation

Administration, 2016).

The first case resulting in the fine of a UAV operator by the FAA was against a photographer who used a UAS to take aerial photographs of the University of Virginia (Federal

Aviation Administration v. Raphael Pirker, 2014). The case highlighted confusion in the regulations applicable to model aircraft as early as 1981 and the regulation of UAV operations as aircraft. The case was eventually settled, but it nonetheless emphasized the need to address confusion regarding NAS regulation. Shortly afterward, regulations regarding the recreational use of UAS were published (Federal Aviation Administration, 2015). Aircraft that weigh between 0.55 and 55 pounds were required to register with the FAA. The FAA also began to issue guidelines for the safe and recreational operation of UAS (Federal Aviation

Administration, 2020):

1. UAV need to be registered, have a registration number, and the operator must carry proof

of registration.

2. Fly only for recreational purposes.

3. Fly at or below 400 feet above the ground when in uncontrolled (Class G) airspace.

4. Obtain authorization before flying in controlled airspace.

5. Keep within visual line of sight, or within the visual line-of-sight of a visual observer

who is co-located (physically next to) and in direct communication with the operator.

6. Do not fly at night unless the aircraft has lighting that allows the operator to know

location and orientation at all times. 13

7. Give way to and do not interfere with manned aircraft.

8. Never fly over any person or moving vehicle.

9. Never interfere with emergency response activities.

10. Never fly under the influence of drugs or alcohol.

11. Do not operate in a careless or reckless manner (Federal Aviation Administration, 2020)

As of August 2016, public safety users of UAS faced less restrictive FAA regulations

(Heen, Lieberman, & Miethe, 2018). The changes made it easier for law enforcement agencies to acquire and fly UAS, but they also stipulated sight rules and other flight restrictions. The FAA gave the new non-recreational regulations of UAS operation the formal designation of Title 14

Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 107, often referred to only as Part 107 (Federal Aviation

Administration, 2016). Criteria for a remote pilot airman certificate was established. It included a knowledge test requirement and maintained rules that were similar to the recreational UAS pilot with the additional requirements that operators can do the following:

1. Operate the SUAS at or below 100 mph.

2. Not fly the SUAS over people except for those participating in the operation or those

under a covered structure.

3. Not operate the SUASs from a moving vehicle unless the operation is over a sparsely

populated area (Federal Aviation Administration, 2016)

Part 107 provides a process for operators to request and obtain waivers if their operations will fall outside the parameters of outlined use. There are some emergency situations that law enforcement could encounter that would require UAS operations outside of designated regulatory parameters. For these situations, an agency could either apply for a waiver, or, if they decide to follow the application process, they can apply for a certificate of authorization (COA). 14

This would allow them to self-certify their operators while behaving as a public aircraft operator within the parameters of their authorization (Federal Aviation Administration, 2019). Operation under a COA is commonly known as Part 91, referring to the number assigned to public aircraft under Title 14 CFR.

According to the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF; 2020), many agencies choose to conduct operations under both parts 107 and 91. They describe the Part 91 COA application process as lengthy, so they will often have their operators earn their certificates while they wait for their COA to get approved. The PERF then states that once the COA is approved, an agency can operate within the confines of their COA. However, if operations stray outside the parameters identified in the COA, an agency many have their pilots conduct UAS operations as required under their Part 107 airman certificates.

David Boggs’ neighbor, William Merideth, shot down his UAV, and Merideth claimed it was an invasion of privacy for it to trespass over his property (Urban, 2018). The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) had most recently ruled on property rights and airspace in U.S. v.

Causby in 1946. During the ensuing lawsuit, the FAA claimed responsibility for the safety of

U.S. airspace from the ground up. The is a lack of precedent for these issues that will eventually need to be addressed. In Boggs’ case, the lawsuit was dismissed in federal court based on the judge determining that there were not enough federal interests involved to warrant federal jurisdiction (Boggs v. Merideth, 2017).

Use in Government and Military Applications

The use of UAV for border security has increased (Koslowksi & Schulzke, 2018). Border security and the search and rescue of migrants and refugees along the border have all been allowed to employ UAV as a tool. The Predator, which became well known by the U.S. public in 15 the Global War on Terror, is currently in use by CBP along the U.S. border (Blom, 2010).

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have also been using UAV along the border (Koslowksi

& Schulzke, 2018). The same advantages that make UAS beneficial for military use generates interest in them as border security tools. They can reduce risk to personnel, operate for long periods of time, and they can operate where it may be otherwise difficult to place other kinds of resources. The U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) became interested in UAS after seeing successful use during the JTF-6 operation in 1990, but they ultimately decided not to adopt their use at that time.

Following the establishment of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the MQ-9 Reaper was tested along the border in

2003 (Koslowksi & Schulzke, 2018). Customs and Border Patrol currently uses them along the

U.S.-Mexican and the U.S.-Canadian borders (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013).

The UAS used by CBP can monitor a wide range of radio frequencies, including GSM and

CDMA mobile phones (Koslowksi & Schulzke, 2018).

Use for Commercial Enterprise

Commercial UAS are often larger, carry heavier payloads, and are designed for specific purposes (Koslowksi & Schulzke, 2018). Amazon has begun testing of delivery services by UAS in countries other than the U.S. because of restrictions placed on their use of them domestically

(Urban, 2018). Amazon and other companies focused on delivery would like to utilize the technology, seeing it as a future that they will embrace for their business models. One of the major limitations keeping UAS from seriously being implemented as part of a delivery service is the requirement that UAS operations remain within line of sight of the operator. 16

The FAA (2020b) launched the UAS Integration Pilot Program (IPP) in 2017. The purpose of the IPP was to bring government entities and the private sector together to identify safe ways to integrate UAS into communities and the NAS in order to provide some of the delivery services that businesses would like to implement. The FAA (2020c) created a certification process for entities to become UAS air carriers using the existing Part 135 regulatory framework. There are four types of certifications that can be obtained:

1. Part 135 single pilot. A single-pilot operator is a certificate holder limited to using only

one pilot for all part-135 operations.

2. A single pilot in Command certificate is a limited part-135 certificate. It includes one

pilot in command certificate holder and three second pilots in command. There are also

limitations regarding the size of the aircraft and the scope of operations.

3. A basic operator certificate is limited in the size and scope of their operations. Maximum

of five pilots, including second in command. Maximum of five aircraft can be used in

their operation.

4. A Standard operator holds a certificate with no limits on size or scope of operations.

However, the operator must be granted authorization for each type of operation they

conduct (Federal Aviation Administration, 2020c)

According to the FAA (2020c), the first single pilot air carrier certificate for UAS operations was issued to Wing Aviation, a subsidiary of Alphabet Inc in April 2019. Wing obtained the certificate to begin delivery operations in October 2019 and uses UAS operations to deliver food and over-the-counter pharmaceuticals in Christiansburg, VA. The first company to receive a standard air carrier certificate, allowing them to operate without limits to the size of their operation, was UPS Flight Forward, Inc., which conducted its first delivery by UAS on 17

September 27, 2019: flying medical supplies for delivery at WakeMed’s hospital campus in

Raleigh, NC. Amazon Prime Air announced on August 31, 2020 that they had become the third

U.S. company to receive approval for UAS operations under Part 135 (Herrera & Pasztor, 2020).

These first UAS operations operated within specific geographic parameters and tasks in order to determine requirements for future broader adoption.

Use as a Criminal/Terrorism tool

Drug cartels use UAS in their efforts to identify USBP positions (Koslowksi & Schulzke,

2018). The UAS provides a level of intelligence that can be used effectively and for a lower cost than previous equivalent human intelligence. Use of UAS for the delivery of narcotics across the border has increased, and concern is growing that the narcotics that cartels currently place in the

UAV will be replaced with explosives.

The scope and speed at which UAS expansion has moved to consumer availability cannot be understated. Jackson et al. (2008) concluded in their research that it is unlikely UAVs would be embraced due to the technical knowledge required to operate them and the costs associated with their procurement and operation. Just a decade after the study was published, developments leading to the cost-effective and user-friendly nature of commercially available UAS have negated these safeguards and increased the risk that terrorists and criminals will use UAVs for dangerous purposes (Card, 2018).

The ability to circumvent perimeter barriers using UAS provides an opportunity for terrorists to exploit the mobility and ability to carry small payloads (Card, 2018). Another benefit of UAS use for terrorists is the ability it affords them to carry out attacks while reducing exposure to risk or harm, which could attract more prospective terrorist recruits to a cause with reduced apprehension. The small size and mobility of UAVs also makes them difficult to detect 18 and attacks early in order to thwart them. Autonomous SUAS can also be programmed to operate without transmitting or receiving any signals, relying instead on programming set prior to the mission (Yamakado, 2020). The SUAS could operate in a reduced-power “sleep” mode until activated by a trigger that would allow the perpetrator to exit before its mission begins.

There is increasing potential that investigators will have to consider new types of leads when investigating crime and searching for evidence (Yamakado, 2020). For instance, arson could be perpetrated by SUAS if it is equipped with a droppable payload that includes any number of incendiary devices meant to disrupt infrastructure or cause structure and forest fires.

This method of attack could be used in conjunction with civil unrest or a terror attack. Swarm attacks could use multiple SUAS to overwhelm targets and their defenses.

Targeted killings are one of the missions that UAVs are given by military officials in the

United States, and terrorist groups or criminals against heads of state or other high-ranking government officials could use them for the same purpose (Yamakado, 2020). This possibility challenges the traditional model of personal protection afforded to such officials. The use of temporary “no-fly zones” to protect such officials may be seen as one layer of security that could be added.

Other Public Safety Risks/Concerns

Use of UAS has expanded into use by many organizations with a wide variety of objectives. Their use by NGOs can include organizations concerned with humanitarian missions, concerned citizens aiming to assist law enforcement, or criminal organizations looking for ways to exploit their use (Koslowksi & Schulzke, 2018).

Incursions into controlled airspace for manned aircraft is an increasing concern (Urban,

2018). When UAVs unexpectedly enter airspace controlled for the safety of manned aircraft and 19 passengers, procedures are implemented to redirect air traffic; this can sometimes result in an airport shutdown, a delay that can have a significant impact on the economy with each lost minute representing losses in the millions of dollars.

Another concern that has been proven to be warranted is UAS’ vulnerability to hacking

(Urban, 2018). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been able to demonstrate that cyberattacks are easily perpetrated in many consumer-grade UAS, in which video feeds can be intercepted, flight controls hijacked, and wireless systems accessed due to lax manufacturer security protocols. With thousands of devices potentially entering the NAS, such weaknesses could be exploited, posing a great risk to privacy and security.

Another concern is the credibility of the UAV manufacturer itself (Yamakado, 2020). Da-

Jiang Innovations (DJI) is the world’s largest manufacturer of SUAS and is Chinese state-owned.

The DJI SUAS account for 70% of the civilian UAV market worldwide with an annual revenue of $3 billion. Parrot, based in France, is the next-closest company, and their annual income is only $200 million. The risk of a Chinese-manufactured SUAS providing information back to the

Chinese government was deemed too great of a security risk, and the U.S. military banned them in 2017. The price point and quality of DJI products have helped them achieve almost total proliferation within their market segment. The DJI SUAS have become the most commonly weaponized SUAS in the world as a result. DJI continues to use the U.S.-based companies it owns to lobby for favorable legislation.

Barlow et al. (2019) were concerned that with increased UAS operations, some of which is certain to be conducted near roadways, there will be increased risk of distracted drivers— noting that external distractions account for 29% of automobile collisions in the United States.

Barlow et al. found that 70% of drivers exposed to a variety of UAS operations in a simulator 20 made risky glances off the road. They defined a risky off-road glance as one lasting longer than two seconds. They also noted in their study that several participants exceeded seven seconds of risky off-road glances.

21

CHAPTER III: CURRENT LAW ENFORCEMENT UAV PROGRAMS

Strategic Use/National Security

According to the Stimson Center (2015), the Department of Defense (DOD) has greatly increased their reliance on UAS in recent decades. While most attention is given to kinetic action using UAS, less than one percent of DOD’s UAS carry weapons at any given time. Within the

DOD, the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) UAS do not have any weaponized capability and are used mainly for surveillance, although the USMC has used unmanned helicopters for resupply in Afghanistan. Department of Defense agencies have also used UAS for humanitarian disaster relief missions and for assisting with U.S. firefighting operations.

The Secure Border Initiative (SBI) coordinates technologies, policies, infrastructure, and manpower in order to secure the border and reduce illegal cross-border activities (Haddal,

2010b). The SBI Program Office is responsible for constructing the fencing required under the

Secure Fence Act of 2006 and is responsible for SBInet, which is often referred to as the “virtual fence” (Haddal, 2010b). The physical structure of a fence along the southern border is only one component of the SBI, and its effectiveness relies upon a synergistic relationship with other components (Haddal, 2010b). The inclusion of technologies, like sensors and cameras, along the wall is expected to act as a force multiplier (Kelly, 2017). This includes UAS, which will represent an integral component of the virtual fence. It is, however, ineffective on its own because UAS lacks the capability to physically respond to locations on the ground.

According to Brannon (2014), the use of UAS by the DHS is limited to nonlethal systems. Their missions are focused on border security and their current fleet includes the

Predator aircraft. The leading agency for UAS operations within the DHS is the CBP Office of

Air and Marine. Requests from other federal agencies are regularly reviewed and approved by 22

CBP. Agencies can request similar support from the DOD but it requires approval from the

Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).

U.S. Department of Defense Other U.S. Agencies

1

2

3

JSOC

Air Force Navy Army Marine Corps SOCOM / CIA CBP

Mission Intelligence • • • • • • • Type Surveillance • • • • • • • Reconnaissance • • • • • • •

Targeted Strikes • • • • Close air support • • •

1Includes Air National Guard 2Includes Army National Guard CBP has flown missions to support both the FBI and DEA Figure 1 Use of UAS by Mission Type and U.S. Agency. Note. Reprinted from “Military, utility, national security, and economics working group report” by the Stimson Center. Stimson Center, 2015, p. 5. Copyright 2015 by the Stimson Center. Tactical use

Law enforcement uses for UAS can be categorized by type of use. There are tactical uses, investigative uses, and public safety use. Tactical use by law enforcement agencies are in the form of responding to a specific event or incident. The investigative uses include utilizing the

UAS to accomplish tasks that are normally required during an investigation and could be resource intensive, time consuming, or difficult to accomplish because of the perspective that an investigator would not otherwise have. Public safety uses fulfill needs that arise within communities that do not necessarily involve crime prevention or crime solving, but that communities typically expect their law enforcement agencies to accomplish or assist with when needed as a service. Figure 2 shows many of these expected uses and the categories in which they are included.

23

Category Examples of Use Tactical Use Drone as a first responder • Intelligence for first responders • Incident command oversight • Real-time dissemination of information Document use of force situations Investigative Crime scene photography Use Crash scene reconstruction • Photogrammetry Search and rescue • Locate victims wandering away from home or care facilities Crowd management Public Safety Wilderness search and rescue Use • Video and photo • Signal location • Deliver supplies Firefighting • Monitor remote areas for developing fires • 3D vegetation mapping to identify fire risks • Post-fire analysis and damage assessment Communications network deployment when existing communications have been disrupted or communication networks are unavailable • Natural or manmade disasters • Wilderness or rural settings Pandemic Response • Surveillance of crowds • Automated cleaning and disinfecting • Disseminating information • Delivering medical supplies and essential items • Screening large numbers of people • Monitor public spaces for symptoms, such as coughing Figure 3 Use of UAS by Law Enforcement Category Type and expected usage. According to the FAA (2020b), the Chula Vista Police Department (CVPD) in Chula

Vista, CA began using UAS (see Appendix O) to assist in its responses to 911 calls as part of its participation in the UAS IPP. The CVPD’s participation in the IPP was in partnership with

Motorola and their development of a software package managing UAS operations within the

NAS. The CVPD began using UAS in support of tactical operations in 2017 (Chula Vista Police

Department, 2020). In October 2018, the CVPD became the first organization in the U.S. to use

UAS in a program that it calls Drone as a First Responder (DFR). In May 2019, the CVPD was given authorization to fly beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) within a three-mile radius surrounding their headquarters. 24

Under the DFR concept (Chula Vista Police Department, 2020), UAS can be deployed from the rooftop of the CVPD headquarters to emergencies in order to provide overhead perspective on an incident prior to the arrival of emergency responders. The UAS streams high definition live video to the command center and emergency responders’ cell phones, tablets, and laptops, providing useful intelligence prior to on-scene arrival. The information the UAS provides also combines live audio with any associated ongoing 911 call, which is distributed to responders so they can act on the same information that their dispatchers are receiving in real time.

Advancements in technology have allowed law enforcement to enter high-risk areas to gain situational awareness (Heen, Lieberman, & Miethe, 2018). While not conducted with UAS, a robotic EOD system was used to neutralize an active shooter in Dallas and was used to enter the Pulse nightclub in Orlando following an active shooter event to search for possible explosives and reducing risk to law enforcement. The same practices can be applied to UAS to further reduce risk. The risk to law enforcement could continue to deplete if UAS were employed along with body-worn cameras to gain better perspective on and better document use-of-force encounters.

Investigative Use

The use of UAS by criminal investigators includes but is not limited to such missions as crime scene photography, search and rescue, and crowd management (Heen, Lieberman, &

Miethe, 2018). The use of UAS for crime scene photography could reduce crime scene contamination. The same benefits of UAS use in crash scene investigations are also realized in crime scenes. 25

According to Johns Hopkins University (2017), use of UAS for crash scene reconstruction has been increasing among law enforcement agencies. They found that the most common use for UAS in crash scene reconstruction was aerial photographic documentation. Law enforcement agencies responding to the Johns Hopkins University study emphasized the value of creating an overhead picture of a crash scene within an hour of the incident and overlaying other crash scene details for better understanding. They also found that such documentation was useful in assisting jury members in understanding the crash scene in court proceedings.

Johns Hopkins University (2017) also studied the impact of UAS on photogrammetry and their relation to crash scene investigations. Photogrammetry is the science of making measurements from photographs and using them to construct maps or 3D models of an object or scene. Photogrammetry itself is a relatively new technology that relies on software to conduct tedious and resource-intensive calculations based on flat images. Technology has contributed to the usefulness of photogrammetry, but the tool remains time-consuming and can result in longer road closures while being conducted. John Hopkins University found that, when using UAS to conduct photogrammetry, there could be a reduction in road closure time. They estimated that using UAS for photogrammetry could save between one and two hours of road closure time depending on how extensively it was implemented.

Public Safety Use

Using and maintaining UAS is less expensive than traditional aircraft (Heen, Lieberman,

& Miethe, 2018). Using methods to allow the remote gathering and monitoring of public safety information has been advancing continually as such technology has become available. In April

2017, it was estimated that there were 347 state and local public safety agencies were operating

UAS (Heen, Lieberman, & Miethe, 2018). 26

According to Dinh et al. (2019), the use of UAS in wilderness search and rescue (SAR) missions has reduced the cost of conducting such operations, but the time-sensitive nature of

SAR makes time reduction imperative. They stated that UAS is finding wide acceptance in SAR operations due to its ability to assist in locating missing persons by transmitting images to ground personnel using a variety of on-board optics. Dinh et al. also found that only using the on-board video feed is underutilizing the potential for UAS to locate victims more quickly, and that in the future technology that will provide capabilities to locate devices, such as cellular devices, that could have been used to transmit distress signals. They believed that further cost and time reductions could be realized if cellular detection were included in the overall package carried by SAR UAS. They also looked into the deployment of technology that would establish wi-fi communications networks for ground personnel in areas where other forms of communication are either non-existent or have been disrupted by positioning UAS.

Firefighting is a public safety area that stands to benefit from the growth of the UAS industry. Ollero et al. (2006) noted as early as 2006 that UAV most likely had the potential to be cost-effective as an alternative to manned systems in monitoring remote areas for fires at reduced risk. They recognized that many of the 3D vegetation mapping at the time relied on satellite imagery, and that UAVs had the potential to carry out such mapping in greater detail, with greater flexibility, and at a lower cost. Ollero et al. specified the desirability of a UAV that can act as a signal repeater for communications systems in rural areas, much like Dinh et al. (2019) described. Ollero et al. (2006) found that UAVs would be useful in detecting fires that were possibly too small to discover using satellite imagery. They noted that UAV could allow firefighting ground crews to relay information in real time. Ollero at al. also found that the UAV would be effective in monitoring the effects of a fire after it has been extinguished and in 27 conducting post-fire analysis. These benefits were highlighted again when Akhloufi et al. (2020) found that UAS were becoming more affordable and more capable of being integrated into firefighting operations.

Chamola et al. (2020) identified ways in which UAS have been implemented to assist in the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. They identified advantages such as minimizing human contact and reaching otherwise inaccessible areas. Chamola et al. listed crowd surveilling, disseminating public announcements, screening masses of people, performing disinfectant tasks, and delivering medical supplies and other essential items as functions that have been performed by UAS. They stated that crowd surveillance has been concerning to governments that have been concerned with civil unrest or violation of prohibitions on gatherings, and UAS has allowed for the deployment of cameras to monitor developing situations and respond quickly. The ability to provide public announcements during such responses has been important, as has disseminating important information using UAS equipped with loudspeakers. They also identified several countries that have added the ability to check the temperature of a person and monitor public spaces for the sounds of coughing or sneezing. Chamola et al. even pointed out countries that have repurposed agricultural UAS with tanks meant for disbursing insecticides or fertilizer by filling the tanks with disinfectant and programing disinfectant routes for the UAS to follow.

Law Enforcement Response to Misuse/Criminal Activity/Terrorism Involving UAV

Card (2018) stated that it is difficult to defend against terrorist attacks utilizing UAS. One of the most promising defenses he mentioned is in the use of jamming—a practice favored for its ability to be employed in an area rather than as a focused defense that would not necessarily require recognizing a threat in order to defend against it. Communication between the terrorist operator and the UAV could be interrupted to prevent manual operation, and navigation systems 28 could be disrupted to prevent an automated strike. This form of defense also does not require decisions regarding the use of kinetic action, which may be delayed due to public and bystander safety considerations.

Another defensive tactic that Card (2018) favored is hosting high-risk events indoors to make targeting more difficult. The difficulty of placing a UAV indoors and operating it successfully may make the target less desirable for that form of attack. Methods to ensure some defenses are in place if an event is outdoors include the use of netting, covered stages, and ensuring that protective shelter is available to the most likely targets of an attack. Card also suggested that the monitoring of those purchasing UAV navigational systems and UAS that are capable of certain payload thresholds may help identify those plotting to cause harm.

In the case of UAVs violating controlled airspace, experimental flights with UAS are being conducted; they are potentially capable of patrolling airport perimeters, tracking unauthorized UAS frequencies, and could follow the unlawful UAV back to its owner where they could be identified (Urban, 2018). Mlezivová (2018) identified options to counter threats from UAS, such as net guns fired from the ground or from other UAVs. He also mentioned that the Netherlands began using trained birds of prey to hunt unauthorized UAVs but found the method to be too expensive and resource-intensive to continue.

Public Perception of Existing Programs

Koslowski and Schulzke (2018) acknowledged that there is a shortage of information regarding the use of UAVs for border security and migration. They stated that many aspects of border security can become militarized, particularly in law enforcement. Koslowski and

Schulzke pointed out that roughly a third of CBP officers served in the military, and that the equipment and values of CBP’s culture are similar to those of the military. This may impact 29 public opinion of UAV by furthering the image that militarization is occurring along the border.

While the UAS that CBP uses are variants of the military specific Predator and Reaper UAS that are used to strike targets, the CBP UAS are unarmed and are acquired directly from the manufacturer to be built specifically for the purpose of border and coastal protection with equipment packages specified jointly by CBP and the U.S. Coast Guard (U.S. Department of

Homeland Security, 2013). The adoption of UAS for law enforcement reasons is properly described by Dwyer-Moss (2018) as being pursued due to lower costs and risks than that of traditional manned aircraft that have historically been used to fulfill similar missions.

The use of UAV for humanitarian missions was narrowly viewed as favorable (Soesilo &

Sandvik, 2016). While they found that there is support for UAV use during disaster response operations, 40% of respondents to a survey of humanitarian aid workers stated that they did not believe that drones should ever be used by humanitarian organizations in conflict zones. The same survey found that 41% of respondents would consider using UAV during armed conflicts.

The general public opinion around utilizing UAS is typically dependent on how they are used

(Koslowksi & Schulzke, 2018). A 2013 survey suggested that most of the public is supportive of

UAS use for search and rescue missions, that slightly above half support its use in immigration enforcement, and that only 21% would support its use in issuing traffic tickets (Monmouth

University Polling Institute, 2013). Approximately 67% of respondents supported their use to track down runaway criminals. A more recent survey (Sakiyama, Miethe, Lieberman, Heen, &

Tuttle, 2016) showed that respondents were more supportive of UAS employment in reactive situations like a tactical operation rather than proactive situations trying to prevent crime. 30

CHAPTER IV: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A

SUCCESSFUL LAW ENFORCEMENT UAV PROGRAM

Impact of Community Relationships with Law Enforcement

Much of the history of UAS is connected to military programs and usage (Blom, 2010).

This could lead community concern about the militarization of their law enforcement agencies.

As Chamata and Winterton (2018) pointed out, its militaristic nature may slow public acceptance of UAS overall. Moule et al. (2019) added to this discussion by positing that a community will be more accepting of some military aspects of their agencies if they have established trust, justice, and legitimacy with each other. They found that police legitimacy influences public perception and consideration of the consequences of allowing more militarization, and the effectiveness of such decisions were consistent with rational choice theory (Cornish & Clarke,

1987).

Younger people with lower incomes historically lack trust and confidence in law enforcement (Heen, Lieberman, & Miethe, 2018). General views about the legitimacy and effectiveness of law enforcement in a community can strongly predict how supportive or opposed they will be. Minority groups have fewer positive experiences with police than the general public, with Heen et al. finding that African Americans were less supportive of UAS law enforcement use than Caucasians.

According to the Community Policing Consortium (1994), there are two core components of community policing. The first component relies on building community trust through community partnership. The second component focuses on problem solving. They demonstrate the community partnership process as building trust through community contact and communication. By securing trust through an ongoing effort, Community Policing Consortium 31 state that the developed trust allows law enforcement access to valuable information from within the community as community support builds. They describe the approach for becoming a valued partner in the community as beginning by reaching out to the community to discuss crime prevention, listening to their concerns, and providing feedback to members of the community when law enforcement action is necessary.

The problem-solving component is focused on the elimination and prevention of crime

(Community Policing Consortium, 1994). This component involves exchanging information with the community to set priorities. By allowing the community to cooperate with law enforcement in their problem solving, it strengthens trust and provides opportunities to identify other areas of concern for the community (Community Policing Consortium, 1994).

Intelligence-led policing focuses on gathering information and developing intelligence on potential areas of concern, such as a specific type of crime or terrorism, and deploying resources where they will be most effective (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2005). This allows law enforcement agencies to target crime with fewer resources. The International

Association of Chiefs of Police (2005) describe a program by the New Jersey Department of

Corrections whereby they identify and catalog gang members and their affiliations while they are incarcerated. This information is then shared with other law enforcement agencies to assist with investigations and tracking gang-related activities.

Community and intelligence-led policing (ILP) in the United States have similarities, beginning with the fact that both are philosophies currently being promoted by the U.S.

Department of Justice (Diamond & Weiss, 2009). They are also both relatively new strategies, with community policing surging in popularity in the 1980s (Diamond & Weiss, 2009) and ILP gaining popularity with the U.S. Department of Justice in the mid-2000s (International 32

Association of Chiefs of Police, 2005). Both approaches to policing have led to innovative and non-traditional uses for law enforcement resources (Carter & Carter, 2009). The community is an important component of both philosophies because they rely heavily on gathering information from the community in order to secure it (Carter & Carter, 2009).

Community policing focuses on building and maintaining relationships with the served community as a way to assist in crime deterrence; the goal of this philosophy is to motivate community members to actively involve themselves in crime deterrence (Community Policing

Consortium, 1994). An ILP also relies on an engaged community, though the community disengages after providing any needed information (International Association of Chiefs of

Police, 2005). Community policing seeks to build relationships with community members to accomplish these tasks more effectively and with the support of those they serve (Diamond &

Weiss, 2009). Carter and Carter (2009) described ILP as an approach used to complete these tasks through actionable intelligence and identification of suspects and threats. They believed that this allows police to protect communities from attack and allocate resources to target suspects and bring them to justice. Communities may have a distrust of ILP since they are not engaged in as direct a manner similar as seen in the community policing model, and they do not experience the same sense of control (Carter & Carter, 2009).

Braga et al. (1999) provided a theoretical framework for the impact that community policing has on crime. They determined that the rational choice (Cornish & Clarke, 1987) and routine activities (Cohen & Felson, 1979) theories were most applicable to community policing.

Braga et al. (1999) also considered the routine activities theory to be applicable because offenders become aware of criminal opportunities while conducting their daily routine activities, taking action when the opportunity to successfully complete a criminal activity is presented. 33

They believed that rational choice theory applies to offenders when they balance the risks, efforts, and rewards before they offend. Braga et al. stated that having an effective community relationship challenges both opportunity and risk for an offender to engage in criminal behavior.

In order to balance crime prevention with maintaining community support, there are some policies that can be adopted with a UAS program that can help alleviate community concern. Policy surrounding the use of UAS should be transparent and provide the community with clearly defined accepted missions as well as what missions will be prohibited. Public support will wane if there is a perception that the UAS program will be used to diminish the rights of law abiding citizens (Police Executive Research Forum, 2020), so policy should limit missions that can be perceived as general surveillance and eavesdropping. The community should be able to see what missions were flown by the law enforcement agency UAS program and easily determine how the flights fit within the acceptable missions listed by the agency.

Privacy Concerns

Constitutional protections for privacy focus primarily on government intrusion. There is little constitutional protection afforded to citizens suffering an intrusion on their privacy by private individuals or entities. Constitutional protections could address whether UAS is allowed to be used in conjunction with license plate recognition by law enforcement, but they will do little to protect citizens from their neighbors (Urban, 2018).

As UAS finds many more uses and is employed in greater capacity, the likelihood of infringing on the privacy rights of the public increases (Koslowksi & Schulzke, 2018). The majority of U.S. residents view using UAS to monitor them in public is an invasion of privacy, while a third view the practice as a way to increase public safety (Heen, Lieberman, & Miethe,

2018). Younger people with lower incomes tend to place individual rights above public safety, 34 and they are typically not as supportive of UAV use due to the belief that it constitutes excessive surveillance. They may be more suspicious of the use of UAS in law enforcement roles.

Urban (2018) suggested that the three-pronged regulatory approach proposed by the

Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) is a reasonable place to begin identifying risks to privacy. These suggestions included placing prohibitions on surveillance that are not specific and confined to a geographic area except where privacy will not be substantially affected. They suggested limitations on the data that is retained after it is acquired through UAS operations, specifically identifiable images of people. They also recommended requiring giving notice when

UAS operations are ongoing.

Privacy concerns regarding criminal investigations utilizing aircraft have been addressed by the SCOTUS. In California v. Ciraolo (1985), police officers flew above Dante Carlo’s residence at an altitude of 1,000 feet to observe and photograph the marijuana he was growing outdoors. It was not visible from outside the property at ground level because of fencing that

Ciraolo had erected to prevent such observation. The SCOTUS determined that flying in public airspace over the property in an aircraft did not violate Ciraolo’s Fourth Amendment protections.

The SCOTUS decision in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States (1986) remained in line with the decision in California v. Ciraolo. The difference in this case was that the surveillance was performed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which had aerial photographs taken of a facility they had wanted to inspect. Dow Chemical argued that they were protected from such surveillance due to trade secrets protections. The SCOTUS did not agree because the government was not interested in stealing their secrets and using them in competition, and they sided with the EPA. 35

Aerial surveillance was once again upheld by the SCOTUS in Florida v. Riley (1989). In this case, the police department had been investigating an illicit marijuana grow operation based on a tip. Unable to clearly see a greenhouse located on Michael Riley’s property due to its location behind the residence, police used a helicopter to fly over the property. There were roof panels of the greenhouse missing, and at 400’ above ground level (AGL) they were able to observe marijuana plants inside the greenhouse with the naked eye. The difference in this case, as opposed to the arguments made in California v. Ciraolo and Dow Chemical Co. v. United

States was that a helicopter was used to fly lower than a fixed wing aircraft are typically allowed to fly in navigable airspace. The SCOTUS concluded that helicopters are regularly allowed to fly at altitudes lower than other airspace traffic, and they were not violating any law at the time. The

SCOTUS decided that any person with access to a helicopter could have legally flown the same flight path and observed what the police had, and that no violation of the Fourth Amendment had occurred.

Advances in technology have historically created concern over privacy violations when applied to criminal investigations. In Kyllo v. United States (2001), a forward-looking infrared

(FLIR) camera was used to record the amount of heat emanating from the residence of Danny

Kyllo. There was an unusual amount of heat observed, which indicated that he was growing marijuana. Upon a search of his residence, a number of marijuana plants were found growing indoors. The SCOTUS determined that the use of a thermal imager outside of the home violated the Fourth Amendment rights of Kyllo and would have required a warrant. Thermal imagers are also commonly used in UAS operations.

Existing case law concerning privacy and applicability to UAS use comes from United

States v. Jones (2012). Antoine Jones was a suspect in a narcotic trafficking case, and a variety 36 of surveillance techniques were used to gather evidence including a global positioning system

(GPS) tracker that had been placed on his vehicle outside surveillance window specified in a warrant. Initially, the data collected from the tracker was allowed to remain as evidence, as the data showed travel on a public roadway. The SCOTUS eventually accepted the case and they determined that placing the tracker on the vehicle and collecting data on a public roadway constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.

Another recent case, Riley v. California (2014), may have some relevance in determining the impact of technology on privacy. David Riley was pulled over by officers of the San Diego,

CA Police Department for having expired license plate registration tags. Riley was found to also have a suspended driver’s license. Prior having the vehicle towed, as per the San Diego Police

Department’s policy, they performed an inventory of the vehicle. During the inventory, they found two handguns that were a ballistic match for a murder in which Riley was considered a suspect—a fact that was not known to the officers who stopped him at the time. During his arrest, officers searched Riley’s cell phone without a warrant as a search incident to arrest. Data contained on the cell phone provided further evidence of Riley’s involvement in the murder as well as documented his street gang involvement, which carried sentencing enhancements. Riley was convicted of the gang-related murder, which the California Court of Appeal affirmed.

The SCOTUS unanimously decided that a search incident to arrest was not appropriate for smartphones. The reasoning concluded that data contained within a smartphone could not be used as a weapon to harm arresting officers or to affect an escape. They also concluded that the preservation of evidence was not a sufficient argument for immediate access to the phone because immediate access would not be able to prevent data destruction. The data collected from

Riley’s smartphone was not allowed to be used. 37

Educating the Public About UAV use

The public is becoming increasingly involved in UAS and learning about their capabilities (Koslowksi & Schulzke, 2018). The rapid expansion of hobby and commercial UAS has transformed the public awareness of such systems. This may provide the general public with a basic level of knowledge that allows for increased comfort with UAV use. Their use by hobbyists performing photography and other benign tasks may help the public view UAV as a less threatening piece of equipment. That said, the Police Research Executive Forum (2020) is concerned about the impact of criminal or terrorist use of UAS on the community and the detrimental impact such an event could have on the support of the community in their continued use.

Chamata and Winterton (2018) identified five criteria for predicting public acceptance of

UAS: public concerns over risk, advantages of the technology, control over their use, public attitudes, and the intent to use. They also identified the lack of theory or modeling to adequately predict public acceptance of general UAS use. They stated that the technology acceptance model

(TAM) as described by Davis (1989) has been widely utilized to determine public acceptance of new information technology, but that TAM is lacking because it does not sufficiently address perceived risk. Chamata and Winterton also noted that TAM is often criticized for its excessive use in information technology acceptance research.

Chamata and Winterton (2018) believed their conceptual model (see Figure 2) of acceptance could act as the basis for an additional, further developed theory of technological acceptance—specifically regarding technologies that have the potential to cause harm, such as a

UAV if it were to collide with another object or person. Chamata and Winterton were limited in finding adoption of technology such as UAS, so they reviewed previous literature on the 38 adoption of other controversial technologies such as genetically modified food and nuclear energy. In their proposed model of acceptance, external variables affect public perceptions of the technology, which in turn drives their attitudes and intentions about whether they will use the technology. While this model was developed by Chamata and Winterton to address public acceptance of their own purchase and use of UAS technology, the same model can be applied to a community whose law enforcement agency desires to establish a UAS program. Community perceptions will need to be addressed in order to ensure overall support of the program.

Figure 4 Chamata and Winterton Model of Public Acceptance of UAS. Note. Reprinted from “A conceptual framework for the acceptance of drones” by J. Chamata and J. Winterton. The International Technology Management Review, 2018, p. 39. The CVPD decided to conduct outreach efforts to gain community trust prior to purchasing the required equipment (Police Executive Research Forum, 2020). Their efforts focused on members of the public and stakeholders like the American Civil Liberties Union

(ACLU) to share their vision and their vision for the benefits to public safety that UAS can provide. According to the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF; 2020), the CVPD, and other agencies that were early adopters of UAS operations, communicating the benefits of a UAS program to one’s community is an essential, foundational layer of community support. They 39 focused on life-saving capabilities and were open to discussing community concerns, including risks to privacy. This gave the community and stakeholders ways to address perceived risks, giving them a sense of control and educating them about potential benefits in order to shape their attitudes toward the agency’s use of UAS.

Program Implementation Considerations

Chamata and Winterton’s (2018) model for public acceptance can be applied to agency management in their decision-making process early in the program’s development phase.

According to PERF (2020), external variables that drive equipment and resource requirements for a program should be considered. In practice, an agency should identify their requirements and their intended accomplishments regarding their UAS program. The PERF suggested that an agency should wait to begin procurement of the technology or to tailor their outreach efforts for the public until after program requirements have been identified and overall expectations have been determined to be reasonable and legal.

Law enforcement agencies looking to implement a UAV program should begin by using them in reactive policing roles such as search and rescue, crime scene photography, and in emergency response in a tactical role (Heen, Lieberman, & Miethe, 2018). Proactive activities related to the detection and prevention of crime and the monitoring of crowds should take place after UAVs have been first successfully introduced as a reactive tool, and the community has had a chance to familiarize themselves with their use. Agencies should provide the community with opportunities to learn more about the use of UAS in law enforcement roles and be transparent about their effectiveness. Law enforcement agencies should be able to provide their communities with information regarding the ways UAVs are making the community safer. Allowing community input to occur during program development can help a UAV program gain 40 community acceptance. This is also in line with PERF (2020)’s advice of beginning with a smaller program and then focusing on expansion after gaining experience and determining actual needs and potential returns on investment.

41

CHAPTER V: SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY, AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary and Conclusions

This study documented significant events in the history of UAS development so that community concerns could be identified within a historical context of public attitudes. This information is useful in determining a basis for such concerns and gives law enforcement administrators the ability to address them as they arise. For much of UAV’s history, it has predominately played a militaristic role, and attempts have been made to weaponize them since early in the 20th century (Blom, 2010). Community concerns about UAS technology contributing to the militarization of law enforcement are valid, and knowing the history of military development is helpful in dispelling concerns and gaining community support.

Military applications for UAVs have provided strike capabilities that have been sought as early as 1918 (Blom, 2010). Kinetic missions involving UAS have been the focus of much media attention, but most of the missions involving UAS with the military have actually been in roles that are not focused on using the aircraft as a weapon (Chamata & Winterton, 2018). The majority of UAS functions in the military have been in observation and intelligence gathering roles (Blom, 2010). Many of the observation functions that benefit the military would also benefit law enforcement agencies in a similar manner, providing first responders with information prior to arriving on scene and assisting with documenting actions that are taken once there (Police Executive Research Forum, 2020). The best practice for an agency preparing for the implementation of a UAS program would be to highlight these benefits to the community that they service and define the parameters in which the aircraft would operate in such capacities so that the proposed uses for the UAS program has an opportunity to overcome community perceptions of them being used solely for kinetic action (Chamata & Winterton, 2018). 42

That there have been bandwidth concerns with UAV and information gathering since before information was digitized is especially interesting (Blom, 2010). The amount of photographic processing equipment identified by Samusson (1953) was unexpected, but it is logical, as the burden of logistics at the time would have been significant. While the equipment has since become digital and the information can be distributed wirelessly, the bandwidth of the transmitting and receiving channels has become a contemporary limitation as well (Dinh, et al.,

2019). The increased resolution of advanced optical and sensory systems onboard UAS has increased the required bandwidth. Identifying bandwidth requirements and resolving potential problems by determining what missions an agency anticipating UAS program implementation would be necessary as part of program development (Dinh, et al., 2019).

Legislation and case law continue to address issues as they arise. As with many legal scenarios surrounding developing technology, legislation and case law lag behind the pace of technological development; this is because the law is usually reactive rather than proactive, as seen in Koslowksi and Schulzke (2018), Heen, Lieberman, and Miethe (2018), and Urban

(2018). Regulatory infrastructure in the United States has been slow to develop, but now that it is in place there are starting points for UAS to become a routine part of life for many people

(Koslowksi & Schulzke, 2018). The expense involved in UAS operation is decreasing as technology advances, and the ease of equipment operation makes it usable for the general public.

Commercial operations are gaining a presence in the public, with companies such as Amazon and UPS negotiating regulatory hurdles to test the technology in real-world use for their services.

There are risks associated with the ease and availability of UAS technology (Urban,

2018; Card, 2018; Police Executive Research Forum, 2020; Koslowksi & Schulzke, 2018;

Yamakado, 2020). As law enforcement and the public find lawful uses for UAS, there remain 43 nefarious uses as well. Law enforcement will have to be prepared for the inevitable use of UAS for criminal and terroristic activity. Negative perceptions of criminal or terrorist events can carry over into the perceptions of how acceptable UAS technology is to the community and whether they want law enforcement agencies to employ them.

Law enforcement and public safety could see significant improvement with the wide variety of UAS employments that have been discovered (Stimson Center, 2015; Federal Aviation

Administration, 2020b; Chula Vista Police Department, 2020; Heen, Lieberman, & Miethe,

2018; The Johns Hopkins University, 2017; Dinh, et al., 2019; Ollero, Martinez-de-Dios, &

Merino, 2006; Akhloufi, Castro, & Couturier, 2020; Chamola, Hassija, Gupta, & Guizani, 2020).

There are emerging strategies for employ them such as the CVPD DFR program that gives first responders a view of the scene before they arrive to increase their situational awareness. Some law enforcement programs that have found UAS to be beneficial in accident investigation and crime scene processing due to the photographic and video footage they are able to obtain from viewpoints that were previously unavailable. In public safety arena, UAS has been employed with advanced optics such as FLIR to reduce the amount of time and expense required to conduct

SAR activities. A UAS also finds use in disaster response and other activities—aside from

SAR—such as enabling communications networks in remote areas or where existing networks have been compromised.

The community that a law enforcement agency serves will determine whether a UAS program is an acceptable tool (Chamata & Winterton, 2018). A community’s perceptions of risk, benefits, and their control over the program’s limitations will determine the ways in which they allow their law enforcement agencies to use UAS. Educating communities about the benefits of a

UAS program and accepting public input about acceptable uses and policies will allow 44 community members to have the perception of control and improve their attitudes toward a potential UAS program. This communication is in line with Chamata and Winterton’s (2018) proposed model of UAS acceptance. Seeking public input prior to establishing a UAS program should be a priority for the law enforcement agency that is considering one.

Limitations of this study

There were limitations in this research because UAS programs and technology are largely still in development. Regulations, legislation, and case law have made some progress but are recent and limited. While there are some theoretical models regarding technology and acceptance, many of those models were developed decades ago. Models of UAS acceptance are emerging, but they are new and have only had limited exposure to developing markets and programs. Future studies will have a larger body of research and history to use to expand the current understanding of UAS program establishment and theories of acceptance. This paper can serve as a basis to continue such research.

45

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55

Appendix A

l’Entreprenant as depicted in art at the Battle of Fleurus on June 26, 1794

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56

Appendix B

Allied Balloon During World War I

Figure 6. An Allied balloon (1918) [Photograph]. Photographer John Warwick Brooke. Ministry of Information First World War Official Collection. Retrieved from https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205247451

57

Appendix C

Aerial Torpedo

Figure 7 Sperry "Aerial Torpedo" (ca. 1918-1919) [Photograph]. National Archives. Retrieved from https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/our-collections/photography/numerical-list-of-images/nhhc-series/nh- series/80-G-651000

58

Appendix D

Kettering Bug

Figure 8. Kettering Bug (2004) [Photograph]. National Museum of the United States Air Force, Early Years Gallery. Retrieved from https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/198095/kettering-aerial-torpedo- bug/

59

Appendix E

Operation Aphrodite B-17

Figure 9 Operation Aphrodite B-17 (ca. 1942) [Photograph]. National Museum of the United States Air Force. Retrieved from https://www.afhra.af.mil/Photos/igphoto/2000404087/

60

Appendix F

QH-50C Rotor UAV

Figure 10QH-50C drone (1965) [Photograph]. National Archives. Retrieved from https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/our-collections/photography/numerical-list-of-images/nhhc-series/nh- series/USN-1111000/USN-1111342.html

61

Appendix G

Ryan Model 147 Lightning Bug (designated AQM-34 as pictured)

Figure 11 Ryan AQM-34N (2009) [Photograph]. National Museum of the United States Air Force, Cold War Gallery Collection. Retrieved from https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/198013/ryan-aqm-34n/

62

Appendix H

RQ-2B Pioneer UAV

Figure 12 RQ-2B Pioneer UAV (2006) [Photograph]. Photographer Brandon L. Roach. U.S. Marine Corps, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing. Retrieved from https://www.3rdmaw.marines.mil/Photos/igphoto/234826/

63

Appendix I

MQ-5B Hunter UAV

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64

Appendix J

FQM-151 Pointer UAV

Figure 14 FQM-151 Pointer UAV (2002) [Photograph]. Department of Defense. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap 2002- 2027, page 15

65

Appendix K

GNAT 750

Figure 15 GNAT 750 (ca. 1990s) [Photograph]. U.S. Air Force. Retrieved from https://www.af.mil/News/Photos/igphoto/2001679736/mediaid/1619979/

66

Appendix L

MQ-1 Predator

Figure 16 MQ-1 Predator (ca. 2010s) [Photograph]. U.S. Air Force. Retrieved from https://www.af.mil/News/Photos.aspx?igphoto=2001601881

67

Appendix M

MQ-9 Reaper

Figure 17 MQ-9 Reaper (2020) [Photograph]. U.S. Air Force. Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2020/Feb/07/2002245915/-1/-1/0/200114-F-HP405-9947.JPG

68

Appendix N

RQ-4 Global Hawk

Figure 18 RQ-4 Global Hawk (2015) [Photograph]. U.S. Air Force. Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2015/Oct/13/2001299561/-1/-1/0/150918-F-HA566-910.JPG

69

Appendix O

Chula Vista Police Department DJI M300

Figure 19 Chula Vista Police Department's DJI M300 (2020) [Photograph]. Chula Vista Police Department. Chula Vista CA. Used with permission.