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English Historical Review Vol. CXIX No. 483 EHR(A3)/0013–8266/3051/892 ᭧ Oxford University Press 2004, all rights reserved

Britain, the United States and the Rise of an Egyptian Leader: The Politics and Diplomacy of Nasser’s Consolidation of Power, 1952–4

COLONEL Gamal Abdul-Nasser’s emergence as the acknowledged leader of the Egyptian revolution, which began with a military coup on 23 July 1952, took nearly two years, and his power was only truly consolidated after the defence agreement with Britain in October 1954. The terms of

the agreement resulted in a withdrawal of all British forces from Egypt Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 by June 1956, some seventy-four years after the ‘Temporary Occupation’ began. Nasser was henceforth able to present himself as the Arab leader who had kicked out the British. Within six weeks of the last troops being evacuated, he completed the process of freeing Egypt from foreign interference by nationalizing the Anglo-French Suez Canal Company. The international crisis that followed made him the dominant figure in Middle Eastern politics, as well as one of the main champions of Third World nationalism — mantles that shaped Egypt’s external policies until his death in 1970. Yet Nasser’s progress from the shadows of the military junta to statesman of Egypt was anything but certain. A natural conspirator, his immediate inclination after leading the Free Officers to power was to take a backstairs position of influence. Thus, a more senior army officer only loosely connected with the mutineers — General Mohamed Naguib — became their public leader. At the same time the fiction of civilian authority was maintained by the appointment of thrice-serving prime minister, Ali Maher, to head a new government. But as the weeks and months passed, the difficulties of working through intermediaries (who did not regard themselves as such) gradually resulted in Nasser and other members of the junta assuming prominent roles for themselves. Meanwhile, one of the greatest dangers for the revolution was the threat of foreign intervention. With 80,000 troops garrisoned in the Suez Canal Zone base, Britain held an effective ‘veto’ over developments. The memory of the crushed ‘Urabi uprising of 1882 was seared on the minds of the young officers. To forestall a similar eventuality, Nasser cultivated close relations with American officials in the hope that Washington’s influence would be a ‘trump card’ over the British ‘veto’, as well as help hasten a British military withdrawal. The historiography of Nasser’s consolidation of power between 1952 and 1954 has fallen into two largely distinct fields of enquiry. On the one hand, there has been a focus on the machinations of Egyptian domestic

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POLITICS OF NASSER’S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 893 politics — the collapse of the old order and an anatomy of the new.1 On the other, historians of Britain’s imperial disengagement from Egypt have considered the diplomatic context of the rise of Nasser, specifically the course of the negotiations which culminated in the evacuation agreement of October 1954.2 Yet the relationship between Egypt’s internal and external politics during these years has been neglected. This article seeks to redress the imbalance by examining the link between Nasser’s struggle to consolidate his own domestic position and his role as Egypt’s chief negotiator in the defence negotiations. The main sources used are British and American official papers. Besides offering a fixed perspective on Egypt’s internal developments (one unaffected by the

subsequent political climate), these documents are the record of insiders Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 to the power struggle in Egypt.3

I Seizure of Power, 23–26 July 1952

On the first day of the military coup — Wednesday, 23 July 1952 — the distinction between Egypt’s internal and external politics was practically non-existent. The Free Officers, led by Nasser, began to seize key points around Cairo shortly after midnight. As soon as this was completed the US embassy was contacted. Mindful of 1882, the mutineers asked the Americans to deliver a stark message to the British — that intervention would be resisted by the Egyptian army with force. At the same time

1. See especially P. J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington, IN, 1961; Richard Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brothers (London, 1969); P. J. Vatikiotis, Nasser and His Generation (London: Croom Helm, 1978); Selma Botman, ‘Egyptian Communists and the Free Officers: 1950–54’, Middle Eastern Studies, xxii (3) (July 1986); Joel Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement (New York, 1992); Robert Vitalis, When Capitalists Collide (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 1995). 2. Ritchie Ovendale, ‘Egypt and the Suez Base Agreement’, in John Young (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Churchill’s Peacetime Administration (Leicester, UK, 1988); Muhammad Abd el-Wahab Sayed-Ahmed, Nasser and American Foreign Policy 1952–1956 (London, 1989); Wm. Roger Louis, ‘The Tragedy of the Anglo-Egyptian Settlement of 1954’, in Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (eds), Suez 1956 (Oxford, 1989); David R. Devereaux, The Formulation of British Defence Policy towards the Middle East (London, 1990); Peter L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945–56 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1991); John Kent, ‘The Egyptian Base and the Defence of the Middle East, 1945–54’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, xxi (3) (1993); Wm. Roger Louis, ‘Churchill and Egypt 1946–1956’, in Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis (eds), Churchill (Oxford, 1993); Laila Amin Morsy, ‘American Support for the Egyptian Coup: Why?’, Middle Eastern Studies, xxxi (2) (April 1995); Scott Lucas and Ray Takeyh, ‘Alliance and Balance: The Anglo-American Relationship and Egyptian Nationalism, 1950–57’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, vii (3) (1996); Michael J. Cohen, Fighting World War Three from the Middle East (London, 1997); John Kent, Egypt and the Defence of the Middle East (London, 1998). 3. The Egyptian official papers are, for the main part, scattered in various ministries and the closed State Archives. Some documents are also held at the Abdin Palace Archives, but access is restricted. No central record or catalogue exists. There is an on-going debate in the Egyptian People’s Assembly on the issue of greater public access and legislation has been suggested for the systematic release of materials to the Dar Al-Kutub, Egypt’s national library. In the meantime, Egyptian scholars remain largely dependent on foreign repositories for the period under review.

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894 BRITAIN, THE US AND THE RISE OF AN EGYPTIAN LEADER reassurance was given that foreign lives would not be endangered.4 The coup leaders no doubt hoped that the Americans would counsel caution when passing on what was tantamount to a threat; to have gone directly to the British might have come across as inflammatory. A second reason for dealing with the American embassy was to renew contacts with a friendly official, the assistant air attaché, Lieutenant Colonel David Evans. For several months Evans had been the means by which the Free Officers’ movement reassured the US embassy that they were not a front organization for the communists. Evans’s contact was Wing Com- mander Ali Sabri, the Director of Intelligence in the Royal Egyptian Air Force, whose pro-American outlook had been bolstered by his attend-

ance at an intelligence officers course at Lowry Air Force Base in Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 Colorado the previous autumn.5 Having kept the Americans in the dark about the uprising, the Free Officers wanted to get them on side as early as possible.6 At 7.30 a.m. (an hour later than usual) the Egyptian Broadcasting Service gave its first news broadcast of the day. It was headed by a statement, in the name of General Mohamed Naguib and the ‘General Command of the Armed Forces’, reporting that several senior officers had been detained and that the armed forces were moving to protect public services.7 Though not a conspicuous public figure, Naguib had been mentioned in press reports as a war hero during the Palestine conflict and more recently, in December 1951, as the Free Officers’ successful candidate for president of the Officers Club.8 He was not a member of their executive committee, however, and his first knowledge of the uprising was in the early hours of the 23rd when the mutineers woke him and persuaded him to be their public leader. A grey-haired pipe-smoker, the 51-year-old Naguib was presented as an avuncular figurehead to reassure both Egypt and the world. Behind him lurked the real leaders of the coup — officers in their mid-thirties, liable to be perceived as hot-headed youngsters. Nasser was only 34. Later that

4. Minute by Morris, 28 July 1952, FO 371/96880 JE1018/210G, P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice, London]. 5. ‘Biographic data — Members of the Military High Committee’, Caffery to State Department, 4 Oct. 1952, RG 59 774.521/10–542, N[ational]A[rchives, Washington DC]. Although Sabri was not a member of the Free Officers’ executive committee, he was included in this document because of his role as go-between with the American embassy. For the subsequent histories of the coup leaders, see ‘All the revolution’s men’, Al-Ahram Weekly, (18–24 July, 2002) (595). 6. Robert Stephens, Nasser (London, 1971), p. 105. On America’s lack of knowledge about the coup, see Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York, 1969), p. 53; Wilbur Crane Eveland, Ropes of Sand (New York, 1980), p. 97; and Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, p. 146. 7. ‘Announcing the revolution’, interview with Fahmi Omar by Omayma Abdel-Latif in Al-Ahram Weekly (18–24 July 2002) (595). 8. The Palace had previously made all nominations for the board, but in 1951 the Free Officers decided to put forward their own candidates as a protest against Farouk’s meddling in army appointments. The timing of the July coup was determined by Farouk’s efforts, beginning on 16 July, to abolish the elected board and root out the dissidents. The most useful book on this period is Gordon’s Nasser’s Blessed Movement.

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POLITICS OF NASSER’S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 895 morning, in another calming effort, the Free Officers persuaded Ali Maher, a political grandee, to form a new government. Maher accepted the offer on condition that King Farouk also approved, which he did when all other avenues were exhausted.9 The Free Officers then made their first direct communication with the British embassy, stating that their movement was solely concerned with the eradication of corruption.10 The apparent moderation of the mutineers had its desired effect on British policymakers and a ‘wait and see’ policy was adopted.11 ‘We should not wish to queer our pitch in advance,’ wrote Roger Allen, the Foreign Office official responsible for Egypt, in reference to the possible

emergence of a military dictatorship. The chance that Farouk might be Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 reduced to a titular monarch was, moreover, particularly appealing.12 The key determinant of British policy, however, was apprehension over the consequences of military intervention. This was most clearly shown in an exchange between officials in London and the chargé of the British embassy in Egypt, Michael Creswell.13 Unimpressed with the early signs of moderation from the mutineers, Creswell warned the Foreign Office of a ‘Kerensky type regime’ that would ‘later be swamped by extremists’. He therefore recommended that Britain’s military plans for maintaining law and order in Cairo and Alexandria (operations RODEO BER- NARD and RODEO FLAIL) be placed on twenty-four hours’ notice. These operations, as he well knew, were tantamount to a re-occupation of the Nile Delta. He also advised that warships be sent to Alexandria for a fleet demonstration. Such actions, he argued, would steady the insurgents and possibly discourage them from proceeding rapidly with their revolutionary programme. He warned, however, that the appear- ance of warships off Alexandria (á la 1882) might provoke anti-British riots.14 The Foreign Office rejected the recommendations as coun- terproductive, not least because of the increased danger to civilian lives.15 The wider context for this decision was a British military operation in the Canal Zone town of Ismailia six months earlier which resulted in the deaths of fifty Egyptian policemen. Rioting in Cairo the next day — ‘Black Saturday’ — left more than two dozen Westerners dead.16 These events transformed Britain’s perceptions of its imperial position in Egypt. The existing assumption that the dispatch of troops to Cairo and Alexandria would result in the immediate collapse of resistance both

9. Tom Little, Egypt (London, 1958), pp. 196–7. 10. Creswell to Foreign Office, 23 July 1952, FO 371/96877 JE1018/211 (B), PRO. 11. Minutes by Allen and Strang, 23 July 1952, FO 371/96877 JE1018/211(B), PRO. 12. Minute by Allen, 23 July 1952, FO 371/96877 JE1018/211 (B), PRO. 13. The ambassador had been on leave since early June — a sign that the Foreign Office was expecting a quiet summer in Egypt. 14. Creswell to Foreign Office, 23 July 1952, FO 141/1453 1011/96/52, PRO. 15. Minute by Allen, 23 July 1952, FO 371/96877 JE1018/211 (B), PRO. 16. See the special edition of Al-Ahram Weekly (24–30 Jan. 2002) (570) which commemorates these events and includes a feature article, ‘Resistance at all costs’, by the present author.

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896 BRITAIN, THE US AND THE RISE OF AN EGYPTIAN LEADER there and in the Canal Zone was radically revised. Fierce guerrilla warfare was henceforth expected.17 This paradigm shift in British thinking predisposed London to favour non-intervention during the Free Officers’ seizure of power, and continued to be a major influence on policy over the subsequent two years. As the first day of the crisis progressed, Farouk could hardly believe that Britain was doing nothing to help him. Despite his increasingly reckless behaviour over recent years, the thirty-two-year-old monarch had remained convinced that if a revolt occurred Britain would intervene to save his throne.18 His efforts to enlist British intervention during the coup started half an hour after the Officers’ first radio

announcement when he telephoned the United States ambassador, Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 Jefferson Caffery, to tell him that only foreign intervention could save his dynasty. Farouk’s views were passed on to the British embassy.19 A few hours later, Egypt’s ambassador in London urged Britain to take visible preparatory measures in the Canal Zone to convey the impression that its forces were ready to move in defence of Egypt’s constitutional order.20 When still no action was taken, Farouk telephoned Creswell and in a state of agitation equated Britain’s inactivity to encouragement for the Free Officers, even alleging that London might be behind the plot.21 British officials were more interested in reports that Egypt’s frontline Sinai army had signalled its support for the mutineers.22 The following morning Farouk came under pressure from the new regime, acting through Maher, to dismiss the palace entourage. Farouk stubbornly refused to comply, despite his conviction that the mutineers were getting, in his phrase, ‘saucier and saucier’.23 With the possibility of British intervention hanging over them, the Free Officers refrained from taking more drastic measures. For London it was a deliberate policy of keeping the new regime guessing in order to encourage moderation. However, this approach was modified as a result of an historic secret meeting between a British official and a representative of the mutineers at the Abbassia barracks on the outskirts of Cairo at 10 p.m. on the 24th. John Hamilton, an embassy hand of twenty years, attended on Britain’s behalf (the chargé was in Alexandria, the seat of government during the summer months). Naguib, the public leader of the Free Officers,

17. Robertson to Slim, 25 Jan. 1952, WO 216/801 1A, PRO. Michael T. Thornhill, ‘Britain and the Collapse of Egypt’s Constitutional Order, 1950–52’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, xiii (1) (March 2002), p. 138. 18. For the most recent assessment of this misplaced confidence, see Creswell to Foreign Office, 7 July 1952, FO 371/96876 JE1018/192, PRO. 19. Creswell to Foreign Office, 23 July 1952, FO 371/96877 JE1018/211, PRO. 20. Minute by Allen, 23 July 1952, FO 371/96877, JE1018/210G, PRO. 21. Creswell to Foreign Office, 23 July 1952, FO 371/96877 JE1018/217, PRO. 22. Creswell to Foreign Office, 23 July 1952, FO 371/96877 JE1018/211, PRO. 23. Creswell to Foreign Office, 24 July 1952, FO 141/1453 1011/88/152G, PRO.

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POLITICS OF NASSER’S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 897 represented the mutineers.24 Hamilton informed Naguib that London viewed the events as an internal matter for Egypt, and that British forces would only intervene if foreign lives and property were threatened.25 This message amounted to a momentous shift in Britain’s approach to Egyptian affairs. As Hamilton later recounted: ‘There was no mention in it of King Farouk, or indication that we regarded Naguib and his officers as mutineers against the lawful sovereign’. The freight of what was said did not go unnoticed.26 Britain had effectively given the Free Officers the green light to depose Farouk. The Hamilton–Naguib meeting paved the way for the Free Officers’ executive committee to deliberate later that night on whether Farouk

should be executed or expelled. Nasser led a two-thirds majority in Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 favour of exile.27 The immediate motive for the exile decision came shortly after 4 a.m. on the 25th. According to British and American official papers, this was when Farouk, who had remained in Alexandria throughout the crisis, learnt that the royal bodyguard had declared its allegiance to the mutineers. Panic set in and he telephoned the American embassy and asked for a warship or aircraft to evacuate his family. Caffery advised him to remain calm and stay in Egypt but the King’s flap failed to abate and, once again, he urged the American ambassador to request British intervention on his behalf. It was at this point that the Free Officers learnt of Farouk’s requests for outside intervention.28 Even after the Abbassia meeting the mutineers could not disregard this danger. (A few days later Britain was informed by the new regime that Farouk had ordered his political police to arrange the murder of some prominent Britons to prompt intervention.29) Farouk’s campaign for foreign intervention generated enormous excitement amongst the mutineers. Anwar Sadat, one of the coup leaders, confirmed in 1957 that it was early on the Friday that the decision was taken, with Nasser reportedly saying: ‘the king must be expelled today, or tomorrow at the latest’.30

24. The fiction of Naguib’s leadership had to be maintained for all official business, including secret diplomacy. He became a member of the Military High Committee (the new name for the Free Officers’ executive committee) in August. 25. For Hamilton’s instructions for the meeting, see: Foreign Office to Creswell, ‘Emergency/ Secret’, 24 July 1952, FO 371/96878, JE1018/229, PRO. 26. Lecture by Hamilton at the Imperial Defence College, 4 May 1960, John Hamilton Papers, Middle East Centre Archives, St Antony’s College, Oxford. 27. Although the deliberations on the night of the 24th/25th have long been highlighted in the secondary literature, the extent to which Britain’s statement at the Abbassia meeting influenced the course of events has not been given due consideration. 28. British diplomats suspected telephone interception as the means but given the subsequent trend in relations between the US embassy and the Free Officers the possibility of a tip off should not be ruled out. Creswell to Foreign Office, 25 July 1952, FO 371/96878 JE1018/241, PRO. American reports are recounted in: Franks to Foreign Office, 25 July 1952, FO 371/96878 JE1018/240, PRO. 29. Goulburn to Creswell, 28 July 1952, FO 371/96879 JE1018/273, PRO; also Minute by Morris, 29 July 1952, FO 371/96879 JE1018/273, PRO. 30. Anwar es-Sadat, Revolt on the Nile (London, 1957), p. 122

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898 BRITAIN, THE US AND THE RISE OF AN EGYPTIAN LEADER On the morning of the 26th, the royal palaces in Cairo and Alexandria were surrounded by Egyptian troops. Shots were exchanged with the palace guard at Ras el-Tin where Farouk was residing, but before long Maher, acting on the instructions of the new army command, was allowed to enter and present the King with an ultimatum signed by Naguib. Fearing for his life, Farouk readily agreed to the terms. These were to abdicate in favour of the heir apparent, six-month-old Prince Ahmed Fouad, and to have left the country by 6 p.m. that day. Shortly before the deadline, Farouk, with Maher and Caffery as witnesses, boarded the royal yacht and left Egypt for the last time. Naguib and some younger officers belatedly arrived at the landing stage and,

according to Caffery, looked resentful at missing the event. The new Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 rulers of Egypt nevertheless recognized the need to legitimize themselves and so press reports were inspired that spoke of a dignified affair presided over at the quayside by Naguib.31 Disappointed that London had rejected his recommendations on the first day of the crisis, Creswell placed on record his conviction that Britain had ‘directly contributed’ to the deposition of Farouk. The policy, he wrote, had amounted to ‘intervention by default’.32 Ironically, it was arguably Britain’s last artful involvement in Egypt’s internal politics. After the ‘July Revolution’ the United States became the main external player in Egyptian affairs, much to the frustration of British policymakers who increasingly had to struggle with the practicalities of disengagement.

II Demise of the Political Parties, July 1952–January 1953

The new structure of Egyptian politics developed in a haphazard way over several months. Maher had announced on taking office as prime minister that elections would soon be held and martial law lifted. This accorded with the military’s declared policy that they were acting as guardians of the constitution and that their involvement in politics would be brief. Talk of elections encouraged intense jockeying amongst Egypt’s political parties, with the Wafd taking the lead in pressing for the immediate recall of parliament (which had been dissolved in March). On 31 July, the newly constituted Military High Committee, emboldened by the ousting of Farouk, backtracked and announced a six-month hiatus before elections to allow the political process to undergo a period of purification. Parties were called upon to purge themselves of undesirable elements and declare publicly their hierarchies

31. For a report of Caffery’s account, see Creswell to Foreign Office, 26 July 1952, FO 371/96878 JE1018/263, PRO; see also The Times (27 July 1952) a copy of which is with: Minute by Parsons, 28 July 1952, FO 371/96878 JE1018/263 (B), PRO. 32. Creswell to Foreign Office, 28 July 1952, FO 141/1453 1011/144/52G, PRO.

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POLITICS OF NASSER’S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 899 and platforms.33 The news was coupled with the formation of a regency council for the minority of Ahmed Fouad II. The inclusion of a nephew of Saad Zaghlul, the founder of the Wafd, in the three-man body signalled an intent to appease Egypt’s most powerful political party for the delay in returning to parliamentary procedures.34 Having advised Maher to put off ‘premature’ elections and concen- trate instead on getting Egypt ‘back on an even keel’, Britain was pleased with these developments.35 The last thing London wanted was the Wafd returned to power, as always happened when free elections were held; its previous administration was blamed for the political crisis which culminated in ‘Black Saturday’. In the weeks following the coup Britain

pursued a policy of giving Maher ‘every encouragement’ to keep the Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 military under control while he sought to bring stability to Egyptian politics.36 To this end, British diplomats only dealt with the prime minister and direct contacts with the Military High Committee were not established. Naguib was viewed as moderate but little was known or found out about the younger officers behind him. Maher, in the meantime, tried to give the impression that he was in charge. Two weeks into office he was confidently telling the British embassy that within a year he could dispense altogether with army support.37 However, by mid-August Britain’s ambassador, Ralph Stevenson, who had returned to Egypt after the coup, felt that Maher was in fact little more than a ‘political instrument’ of the junta.38 In seeking to bolster Maher over the military, London had backed the wrong horse. While Britain clung to the last vestiges of Egypt’s collaborative pasha class, the United States cultivated a wide range of contacts with the new regime. The pronounced formality of the American embassy in Cairo (even by the standards of the diplomatic profession) inadvertently proved beneficial in this respect. As the first career foreign service officer to head the Paris embassy and with a quarter of a century as chief of mission behind him, Caffery had become a stickler for protocol being rigorously upheld. It was a matter of principle for him only to deal with the head of state or representatives with sufficient status.39 After 23 July this entailed transactions with Naguib but not the younger officers, leaving the ground clear for other embassy officials to cultivate relations

33. Caffery to Acheson, 31 July 1952, RG 59 774.00/7–3152, NA. 34. Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement, p. 61. 35. This advice was first proffered on the second day of the coup. See Foreign Office to Creswell, 24 July 1952, FO 141/1453 1011/96/52G, PRO. 36. Foreign Office to Alexandria, 28 July 1952, FO 141/1453 1011/138/52G, PRO; also CAB 128/25 CC (52) 75, 31 July 1952, PRO. 37. Stevenson to Eden, 2 Aug. 1952, FO 371/96879 JE1018/301, PRO; also minute by Evans, 8 Aug. 1952, FO 141/1454 1011/156/52G, PRO. 38. Stevenson to Bowker, 16 Aug. 1952, FO 141/1454 1011/156/52G, PRO. 39. For a humorous account of dinner etiquette at the Cairo embassy, see Eveland, Ropes of Sand, p. 104; more generally, see the entry on Caffery in the American National Biography (New York, 2000) by Robert D. Schulzinger.

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900 BRITAIN, THE US AND THE RISE OF AN EGYPTIAN LEADER with the real leaders of the coup.40 Caffery’s attitude that Britain was a tarnished imperial power also gave leeway to an active CIA station within the embassy which, by virtue of also having made contact with the Free Officers prior to the coup, now regarded itself as having a stake in the revolution.41 But it was William Lakeland, the embassy’s second secretary (a relatively junior official), who was most responsible for developing close relations with the junta, owing to his friendship with the similarly aged Nasser. While Caffery conducted business with Naguib, Nasser visited Lakeland’s apartment overlooking the Nile for lengthy late-night chats about policy and strategy.42 (In early, 1954 a State Department official referred to Lakeland as ‘a very thin line’ to the

‘small gang’ around Nasser, adding that there was ‘something nine- Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 teenth century or even eighteenth century about this kind of diplomatic contact’.43) The bankruptcy of British policy after the coup and the concomitant rise of American influence was vividly shown in the circumstances of Maher’s dismissal as prime minister on 6 September. Maher was sacked because of his opposition to the junta’s land reform proposals, which entailed imposing an upper ceiling of 200 feddans (approximately 200 acres) per holding. His argument was that smaller holdings would result in lower productivity and economic chaos would ensue. But he also knew that radical land distribution was the junta’s method for undercutting the political influence of Egypt’s pasha elite and estab- lishing its own links with the peasants (fellaheen). Even Britain’s prime minister, Winston Churchill, had been enthused by talk of land reform in Egypt. In a letter to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, dated 26 August, he wrote: ‘It is most important that we should not appear to be defending the landlords and pashas against long overdue reforms for the fellaheen’. He concluded: ‘There might well be a policy, in which the US

40. On 20 August, Caffery went on record as saying that the stories concerning Naguib being a figurehead were ‘untrue’: ‘he is not brilliant but he has good common sense and some qualities of leadership’. This assessment followed a dinner with Naguib and the younger officers on the 19th. ‘Aside from Naguib these young men look all to be their thirties forties. I believe that are all well intentioned, patriotic and filled with desire to do something for Egypt. On [the] other hand they are woefully ignorant of matters economic, financial, political and international’. Caffery to State Department, 20 Aug. 1952, F[oreign] R[elations of the] U[nited] S[tates], Vol. IX, [1952–1954 The Near and Middle East] Pt 2, pp. 1851–2. 41. An inflated account of the CIA’s role came via the memoirs of Copeland’s The Game of Nations. According to fellow CIA operative Wilbur Eveland Crane, Copeland’s claims were not substantiated by his chief protagonist, Kim Roosevelt. See Ropes of Sand, fn. p. 98. 42. Despite his highly significant role, Lakeland barely gets a mention in accounts of American foreign policy towards Egypt in the 1950s. This is partly because the shorthand of diplomatic historians is to equate embassies with their heads, making Caffery the metonym for the Cairo mission. Lakeland is briefly mentioned in Robert D. Kaplan, The Arabists: The Romance of an American Elite (New York, 1995): a State Department official remembers him as ‘very much a supporter of Arab nationalism, Nasser, and Sunni majority rule’ (p. 128). See also Jon B. Alterman, Egypt and American Foreign Assistance, 1952–1956 (New York, 1992), p. 3. 43. Hart to Byroade, 31 March 1954, RG 59 774.00/3–3154, NA.

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POLITICS OF NASSER’S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 901 would join, of making a success of Naguib’.44 But the Americans were far ahead of Churchill and they were not about to slow down to invite the British on board. On 3 September, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, on the advice of Caffery, issued a statement praising recent developments in Egypt. British officials were furious, partly for not being consulted beforehand but mainly because they feared that the junta would interpret the move as a blank cheque to adopt radical policies.45 Sure enough, on the night of the 5th, sixty leading politicians and palace favourites were arrested, followed the next day by the dismissal of Maher. ‘Down with the Pashas, and up with the Fellaheen!’, exclaimed Churchill, forgetting perhaps that British influence was entangled with 46

the former. An agricultural reform law was promulgated on the 7th Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 and Naguib was appointed prime minister on the 8th. Maher’s dismissal prompted a heated debate between British and American policymakers over the relative merits of their post-coup policies. The US method for discouraging extremism had focused on establishing close and friendly relations with the junta; Britain, on the other hand, had followed a more reserved line, centring on support for Maher, while also maintaining the threat of intervention as a deterrent.47 In London’s opinion the contradictory character of these policies was brought to the fore by Acheson’s statement on 3 September. By effectively removing the junta’s fear of military intervention, it snapped the main prop of Britain’s approach.48 The Foreign Office looked for a scapegoat and found one: ‘Caffery could not be worse’, minuted Eden on 9 September.49 But the root of Britain’s problems went far deeper than these personality and policy clashes. The sharp deterioration in Anglo-Egyptian relations was due to the particular mindset of the military regime. As Stevenson pointed out, to the young Egyptian officers British forces in Egypt were ‘as much an anachronism as the presence of a despotic king or parasitic pashas’.50 The conviction that the British were out to sabotage the Free Officers’ movement, witnessed by

44. Churchill to Eden, 26 Aug. 1952, FO 800/769 ME/52/64, PRO. 45. Minute by Morris, 8 Sept. 1952, FO 371/96896 JE10345/19, PRO; Acheson to Caffery, 8 Sept. 1952, FRUS, Vol. IX, Pt. 2, pp. 1857–8; also Steel to Foreign Office, 9 Sept. 1952, FO 371/96896 JE 10345/10, PRO. 46. Minute by Churchill, 7 Sept. 1952, on Stevenson to Foreign Office, 6 Sept. 1952, PREM 11/392 210–11, PRO. 47. Caffery to State Department, 9 Sept. 1952, RG 59 774.00/9–952, NA; Gifford to State Department, 8 Sept. 1952, RG 59 774.00/9852, NA; Gifford to State Department, 8 Sept. 1952, RG 59 774.00/9852, NA. 48. Bowker to Stevenson, 11 Sept. 1952, FO 141/1454 1011/166/52G, PRO. 49. See Eden’s comment on Steel to Foreign Office, 9 Sept. 1952, FO 371/96896 JE10345/18, PRO. 50. Stevenson to Foreign Office, 2 Dec. 1952, FO 371/96883 JE1018/450, PRO.

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902 BRITAIN, THE US AND THE RISE OF AN EGYPTIAN LEADER London’s backing for Maher, only served to compound this longstand- ing bitterness.51 After dropping the veil of civilian rule, the Military High Committee prepared for a backlash from Egypt’s politicians. With preliminary measures already taken (the arrests on the 5th), the regime announced on 9 September a party re-organization law which compelled the political parties to purify themselves by 7 October. By requiring the deposit of party funds and stipulating that the assets of any party not re-organized in accordance with the law would be donated to charity, the junta set its sights on the opulent Wafd. Nasser admitted to Lakeland that their main target was Fouad Serageddin — ‘a brilliant and dangerous 52

politician’. The former minister — who was one of the politicians Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 arrested — had held the finance and interior portfolios in the last Wafd government and was widely tipped as heir to the party leadership should Mustafa Nahas, a septuagenarian, resign. Nasser’s tactical acumen was again evident — tackling the Wafd without a frontal assault and separating Nahas from his chief aide. The legal measures were followed with a bid to win wider popular support for the junta. In late September, Naguib undertook a three-day tour of the Nile Delta, the heartland of the Wafd, where he was met with genuinely enthusiastic crowds. This success gave the junta greater confidence in the challenging weeks that followed. The Wafd’s ‘purification’ submission in early October boldly retained Nahas as honorary party leader, despite pressure for him to step down because of corruption allegations. The Officers had given themselves a self-imposed deadline of 8 November to accept or reject all the submissions. Meanwhile, since seizing power the junta had deliberately kept external issues off the political agenda. This approach entailed turning down Israeli peace-feelers in August on the basis that the new government needed to concentrate on its domestic position.53 Britain agreed with this prioritization and therefore did not try and re-open the defence negotiations.54 However, the luxury of the junta focusing solely on internal politics ran out in September owing to an existing timetable on constitutional developments in the Sudan where Egypt had longstanding political interests.55 In November 1951, Britain had

51. Maher’s fall, wrote Caffery to the State Department, had left Britain ‘out in [the] cold here in Egypt’. The junta ‘will not only have nothing whatever to do with them but are [also] convinced Brit[ish] are attempting to sabotage their movement’. Caffery to State Department, 8 Sept. 1952, FRUS, Vol. IX, Pt. 2, p. 1856. 52. Caffery to State Department, 10 Nov. 1952, RG 59 774.34/11–1052, NA. British officials transliterated Serageddin’s name as Sirag al-Din. 53. Michael B. Oren, Origins of the Second Arab–Israeli War (London, 1992), pp. 13–14. 54. Minute by Bowker, 7 Aug. 1952, FO 371/96933 JE1952/407, PRO. 55. Britain and Egypt held conflicting claims to sovereignty in the Sudan, stemming from various military expeditions in the nineteenth century. Joint administration had been in place since 1899 but Britain was transparently dominant. See Martin W. Daly, Imperial Sudan (Cambridge, 1991) and Glen Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire in the Middle East (Cambridge, 1991).

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POLITICS OF NASSER’S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 903 promised the Sudan a working constitution by the end of 1952.56 Rather than miss out on the opportunity to influence this process, the junta, on 18 September, informed the Americans that they were now willing to ‘move to the next stage of the revolution and consider Egypt’s international position’.57 A week later Eden offered Egypt a role in the proceedings, subject to Cairo’s acknowledgement (never before given) of the Sudan’s right to self-determination and self-government.58 Much to Britain’s surprise, on 2 November Naguib accepted these terms. As one British official put it, this truly was a ‘revolution’ in Egypt’s attitude.59 The prospect of cooperation was welcomed in London, not least because it would allow British officials finally to get to know the 60

coup leaders. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 Progress on the Sudan front, however, was slowed by mounting domestic difficulties for the Officers. On 5 November, the junta refused to accept Nahas even as the ‘honorary’ leader of a purified Wafd party. The Wafd responded by challenging the legality of the party law in the State Council.61 Meanwhile, the economic situation took a drastic downturn due to the absence of buyers for the year’s cotton crop. This was in marked contrast to the previous two years, when the start of the Korean War had stimulated cotton prices and brought relative prosperity, despite the misrule of the Wafd and Farouk.62 Many observers took it as a sign of weakness when detained politicians, including Serageddin, were released in late November to early Decem- ber. Shortly afterwards Naguib and Nahas met twice, prompting British officials to think that Naguib might be reinsuring himself against ‘extremist elements’ in the junta by assisting the Wafd.63 A British intelligence report of 6 December referred to a serious rift in the Military High Committee over the possibility of Naguib being pushed upstairs as president of a newly formed republic and Nasser taking over as prime minister.64 Four days later, in what may well have been a compromise solution, the junta annulled the constitution as a prelude to a new one being written. The drafting was to be carried out by a committee of

56. For a Foreign Office memorandum summarizing the legal aspects of the dispute, see Minute by Allen (a lawyer before entering the foreign service), 16 Jan. 1952, FO 371/96902 JE1051/11G, PRO. 57. Caffery to State Department, 18 Sept. 1952, FRUS, Vol. IX, Pt. 2, pp. 1860–1. 58. CAB 129/55 CP (52) 308, 25 Sept. 1952, PRO. 59. Minute by Morris, 20 Nov. 1952, FO 371/96913 JE1051/411, PRO; also Stevenson to Foreign Office, 2 Nov. 1952, FO 371/96911 JE1051/411, PRO. 60. Even after Maher’s dismissal Britain struggled to find out what was going on, presumably because anyone contacting its embassy was liable to be thrown into gaol or grilled for several hours. See Minute by Morris, 19 Sept. 1952, FO 371/96881, PRO. 61. For a detailed discussion of the junta’s confrontation with the political parties, see Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement, pp. 68–78. 62. Stevenson to Foreign Office, 21 Nov. 1952, PREM 11/89 10, PRO. 63. Minute by Allen, 5 Jan. 1953, FO 371/96883 JE1018/465, PRO. 64. A synopsis is given in: Caffery to Sec of State, 6 Dec. 1952, RG 59 774.00/12–1152, NA.

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904 BRITAIN, THE US AND THE RISE OF AN EGYPTIAN LEADER experts drawn from all political affiliations and the resulting document would be put to a popular referendum.65 The threat of the Wafd remained, however, especially given its past record for exploiting nationalist feelings and economic misery to gain power. On 10 January 1953, the legal case against the party law came back before the State Council. Amidst chaotic scenes, a senior Wafdist told the court that only the people could dissolve the Wafd.66 The court was adjourned on the 13th with a decision promised in February. But before a verdict could be delivered a planned counter-coup was foiled, and in the following days the court case and constitutional deliberations fell by the wayside. According to a US embassy report dated 17 January, about

twenty officers and half a dozen civilians were arrested on charges of Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 plotting against the regime. The civilians included Prince Abbas Halim and an ex-regent Rashid Muhanna (who were perhaps fearful of the newly formed constitutional committee deciding upon a republic). The military element centred around Yussif Siddiq, a member of the Military High Committee with communist links. Serageddin was arrested on charges of complicity soon afterwards. About ninety or so communist agitators were also interned. The junta saw the plot as a coalition of Wafdists, communists and royalists, a combination that required an immediate draconian response. All political parties were therefore dissolved that same day — the 17th — and their funds confiscated.67 On 23 January 1953, the six-month anniversary of the coup, the Free Officers finally abandoned the fiction that the military’s involvement in politics was going to be brief, and announced that Naguib, as ‘Leader of the Revolution’, would remain as prime minister for a further three-year period of transition. In line with this shift, the Military High Committee began to refer to itself as the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), so signalling more overtly the oligarchic structure behind Naguib. A provisional constitutional charter legitimizing the RCC was proclaimed on 10 February. To replace the factionalism of the political parties, a national movement called the ‘Liberation Rally’ was formed. Its purpose was to develop a mass popular base for the junta. Nasser was appointed its secretary general. This new responsibility was to bring the real leader of the coup to public attention as never before.

III Birth of a Republic, January–June 1953

After the abolition of political parties, the RCC’s ability to end the British occupation was widely understood as the issue that would consolidate the ‘July Revolution’. The forces of reaction knew that anything short of unconditional British withdrawal could prompt the

65. Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement, p. 76. 66. Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement, p. 77. 67. Caffery to State Department, 17 Jan. 1953, RG 59 774.00 (W)/1–1653 NR 813, NA.

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POLITICS OF NASSER’S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 905 downfall of the junta. With Britain refusing to make further concessions in the defence negotiations, the junta began encouraging and regulating a guerrilla struggle in the Canal Zone. These pressure tactics brought about an increased reliance on the Muslim Brotherhood, a politically orientated Islamic pressure group, because it alone had the irregular units trained to wage guerrilla warfare. The Muslim Brotherhood — like many other opposition elements within Egypt’s armed forces — had been represented within the Free Officers’ movement since its inception in 1949. Common bonds had helped unite the officers above their other affiliations: an education in the radical atmosphere of the military academies in the late 1930s; combat experience in the Palestine war; a

hatred of the British. While these bonds sufficed before the coup, they Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 could not keep together a coalition-style oligarchy struggling to exercise and retain power. The first group to be discarded were the communists, in part because of the fear of strikes but mainly due to the regime’s need for American support.68 Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhood had regarded the July coup as a collaborative effort and was disappointed not to have a more prominent voice in the junta.69 However, their lead role in the guerrilla war promised an improved political reward. But as Nasser realized, too much reliance on the Muslim Brotherhood — Egypt’s largest mass organization after the Wafd — risked usurpation. Egypt’s pressure tactics against the British garrison were also connected to a final push in the Sudan negotiations. Prior to the volte face of 2 November, the RCC had contacted Sudanese political parties and made agreements with them recognizing the Sudan’s right to self-determination, while also gaining their support for the immediate withdrawal of all British officials.70 The main sticking point in the subsequent Anglo-Egyptian negotiations concerned Britain’s attempts to secure safeguards for the Christian population in southern Sudan so that they would not be dominated by the Muslim northerners. However, in January 1953, the main Sudanese parties backed Egypt’s stance that the safeguards policy was a plot to maintain British influence after independence. Without mainstream support in the Sudan, Britain had little choice but to accept Egypt’s terms, and on 6 February the basis of a settlement was reached.71 Only Britain’s Conservative government now stood in the way of an agreement. With a small Commons majority of seventeen, this remained an important hurdle, especially given Churchill’s instinctive and emotional opposition to a withdrawal. ‘What happens here’, he told Eden in mid-January, ‘will set the pace for us all over Africa and the Middle East’.72 Despite Churchill’s preference for

68. See Botman, ‘Egyptian Communists and the Free Officers’, especially pp. 350–1. 69. Mitchell, Society of Muslim Brothers, pp. 103–4. 70. Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire in the Middle East, p. 34. 71. Reported in Caffery to State Department, 7 Feb. 1953, FRUS, Vol. IX, Pt. 2, p. 1983; see also minute by Bowker, 12 Jan. 1953, FO 371/102738 JE1951/52G, PRO. 72. Churchill to Eden, 15 Jan. 1953, FO 371/102761 JE1052/16G, PRO.

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906 BRITAIN, THE US AND THE RISE OF AN EGYPTIAN LEADER fighting solutions, the Cabinet accepted the realities of disengagement from the Sudan on 11 February and an agreement was signed with the RCC the next day which formally ended the condominium. The Sudanese were given three years to decide whether they wanted complete independence or a link with Egypt.73 This was a major diplomatic success for the RCC but it remained to be seen how it would affect the domestic scene. Eden was anxious to use the momentum of the Sudan agreement to push ahead in the defence negotiations via a joint Anglo-American approach, the basis of which had been agreed with the Truman administration during its last days in office in 1952. The plan was to offer

the RCC a ‘package deal’ whereby a defence settlement would be tied to Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 American military assistance, and in return Egypt would be expected to participate in a Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) and an integrated air defence scheme.74 The incoming Eisenhower adminis- tration had approved the approach and agreed to have a senior military officer leading the negotiations on the American side, so mirroring the British set up where an army commander would be the chief negotiator.75 All seemed well until 15 March when the RCC refused to negotiate with the United States because any such talks would be interpreted in Egypt as discussions for regional defence, an issue the junta would not contemplate until the evacuation issue had been resolved.76 British officials once again blamed Caffery — who would have been deliberately marginalized in the proceedings — for the Egyptian action.77 Nor did Lakeland escape notice — Creswell describing him as ‘notable for his youthful enthusiasm and idealistic, even sentimental approach to the Egyptians untempered by realism and uncoloured by any feeling of solidarity with us’.78 Thus, the outcome of the Anglo-American joint approach was disunity between the two allies, a point not missed by the Egyptian press. A cartoon in a leading Cairo daily showed Caffery leaning over the ropes during a boxing match between Naguib and Churchill, and whispering to the Egyptian leader ‘Do you want my help? ‘No thank you’, comes the reply, ‘I can deal with him myself’.79 The cumulative effect of Caffery’s behaviour was tantamount to a major shift in US policy towards Egypt — a shift that was not formalized

73. CAB 128/26 CM (53) 9, 11 Feb. 1953, PRO; and CAB 128/26 CM (53) 10, 11 Feb. 1953, PRO. For Churchill’s preference for military solutions, see CAB 131/13 D (53) 2, 11 Feb. 1953, PRO. On the agreement, see Stevenson to Foreign Office, 12 Feb. 1953, FO 371/102744 JE1051/210, PRO. 74. CAB 129/59 CP (53) 65, 16 Feb. 1953, 1953; Devereaux, The Formulation of British Defence Policy towards the Middle East, pp. 69–70. 75. Jebb to Foreign Office, 10 March 1953, FO 371/102802 JE1192130G (O), PRO; also Makins to Foreign Office, 11 March 1953, FO 371/102802 JE1192/130 (W), PRO. 76. Stevenson to Foreign Office, 15 March 1953, FO 371/102798 JE1192/61, PRO. 77. Minute by Allen, 23 March 1953, FO 371/102803 JE1192/155G, PRO. 78. Creswell to Allen, 19 March 1953, FO 371/102803 JE1192/155G, PRO. 79. Aldrich to State Department, 23 March 1953, RG 59 774.5/3–2353, NA.

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POLITICS OF NASSER’S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 907 by relevant departments in Washington. Caffery no doubt hoped that where he led the State Department would follow. But the State Department had to march in step with the Defence Department and here the overarching line towards Egypt and the Middle East (owing to existing onerous commitments in Western Europe and the Far East) was that the region was a British Cold War responsibility. This general approach should have prompted American missions in the region to support and perhaps guide the British but certainly not try and succeed them. Following the July coup, however, Caffery grabbed at opportun- ities which ran against Washington’s global priorities. A British assessment in March 1953 was that he deliberately flattered and

encouraged the coup leaders ‘in order to build up his own position, and Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 incidentally that of the US, at our expense’, and that ultimately his aim was to present himself in Washington as the power behind the throne in Egypt.80 Tellingly, on the day the joint approach was scuppered by the Egyptians he informed the State Department that Naguib had told him that as ambassador he could accomplish more in his behind-the-scenes role than as an active negotiator.81 In April, military matters rather than diplomacy dominated the respective agendas of Egypt and Britain, despite the onset of bilateral negotiations. The number of violent incidents against British personnel and equipment in the Canal Zone increased and further preparations were taken for a prolonged period of guerrilla warfare. In the middle of the month, 4,000 auxiliary police left Cairo and large numbers of these were thought to have headed to the Canal Zone; an additional 1,000 members of the Muslim Brotherhood, in armed bands of 40–50 under German ex-Nazi leaders and in civilian clothes, were also preparing for action.82 The emphasis on military issues in Britain was partly reactive to the deteriorating situation in the Canal Zone and partly due to Churchill’s assumption of control over the Foreign Office (while Eden recovered from major surgery). The prime minister had long viewed the defence negotiations as akin to ‘Munich on the Nile’ and it was apparent that he relished the idea of a fighting solution. On 22 April he instructed the Foreign Office not to make any more complaints to the RCC about inflammatory statements: ‘The more abusive and insulting they are the easier it will be for us to take a calm line and also, if need be, a strong one’.83 It was indicative of the deteriorating situation that a day earlier he had requested to see the plans for the defence of the embassy in the event of mob attack.84 The frequency of terrorist incidents reached its highest pitch at the

80. Minute by Allen, 23 March 1953, FO 371/102803 JE1192/155G, PRO. 81. Caffery to State Department, 15 March 1953, FRUS, Vol. IX, Pt. 2, pp. 2019–20. 82. CAB 131/13 D (53) 25, 21 April 1953, PRO; also Lloyd to Churchill, 21 April 1953, PREM 11/392 113–14, PRO. 83. Churchill to Creswell, 22 April 1953, PREM 11/392 119, PRO. 84. CAB 131/13 D (53) 25, 21 April 1953, PRO.

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908 BRITAIN, THE US AND THE RISE OF AN EGYPTIAN LEADER start of May in anticipation of a visit to Egypt by Dulles on the 11th. Dulles was undertaking a tour of the Middle East in order to clarify and possibly rethink America’s general approach to the region, a task made more urgent after the March debacle. The RCC viewed the visit as an opportunity to bring the Canal Zone dispute to a head in the hope that Dulles would step in as mediator. Dulles, however, was not so easily manipulated. Upon arrival he instead issued a statement backing the British view that the Suez base must be maintained on an efficient footing for future use by the forces of the free world. A meeting with Naguib, though cordial, left Dulles deeply disappointed with what he regarded as the RCC’s parochial attitude. The crux of the matter was

Naguib’s insistence that Egypt could not allow even a small number of Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 British soldiers to maintain the base after a revised defence agreement. Unable to conceal his irritation, Dulles remarked that ‘it seemed stupid [to] think that [the] great vision of a new Egypt can collapse on the point of who directs inventory-keepers’.85 Dulles’s disappointment with Egypt’s revolutionary regime helped produce a major reorientation of US policy in the following weeks. On 1 June, he informed the National Security Council that Egypt was no longer the key to the development of the West’s strength in the Middle East. The upshot was the abandon- ment of efforts to form a MEDO with Egypt at its centre, which Britain had pushed for since 1951 as a means of securing an American defence commitment to the region and resolving the Suez base dispute.86 Instead, Dulles initiated the search for a defensive arrangement of ‘northern tier’ states, which he identified as Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Pakistan.87 Details about Dulles’s attitude to the RCC had filtered through to British officials in the weeks after the Cairo visit, and the effect was to encourage Churchill in an even tougher approach towards the junta. The temporary replacement of Stevenson (who went on sick leave) with an acting head of mission specially dispatched from London signalled this intent in June. The newcomer was Robin Hankey, son of Lord Hankey who sat on the board of the Suez Canal Company and was a prominent critic of the appeasing nature of the defence negotiations. Robin Hankey was an experienced diplomat and he could be relied upon to be independent of his father’s influence. Nevertheless, the impression that he was a hard-liner remained. Before leaving for Cairo, Hankey received a personal briefing from Churchill. Hankey’s minutes of the conversation were taken by the Foreign Office as the fullest expression to date of the prime minister’s thinking on Egypt. The basic line was that

85. Caffery [for Dulles] to State Department, 12 May 1952, FRUS, Vol. IX, Pt. 2, pp. 2065–9. 86. Thornhill, ‘Britain and the Collapse of Egypt’s Constitutional Order, 1950–52’, pp. 128–9. 87. Memo of discussion of 147th meeting of NSC, 1 June 1953, FRUS, Vol. IX, Pt. 1, pp. 379–86. On regional defence planning, see Peter L. Hahn, ‘Containment and Egyptian Nationalism: The Unsuccessful Effort to Establish the Middle East Command, 1950–1953’, Diplomatic History, xi (1) (1987).

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POLITICS OF NASSER’S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 909 Britain did not need an agreement nearly as much as Naguib and hence the Egyptians should be made to do all the running. Hankey’s job, Churchill remarked, was to be a ‘patient, sulky pig’. Churchill also added that he was not afraid of physical trouble; rather, he would welcome it as it ‘would do the Egyptians no sort of good’.88 By the middle of June, the RCC was sorely aware that its tactics to get Dulles to play the role of mediator had backfired. Not only had America’s Republican administration lost interest in Egypt but Britain’s Conservative government had been emboldened in its policy of standing firm. During previous crises the junta undertook bold new moves. This occasion was no different. On 18 June Egypt became a republic. A note

passed to the British embassy on 19 June read: ‘The Council of the Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 Revolution proclaimed in the name of the people, during the night of June 18 1953, the abrogation of the monarchical regime and the end of the Mohamed Ali dynasty’. Naguib assumed the additional post of president, while Nasser took the offices of deputy prime minister and interior minister.89 This was the strongest affirmation yet that Nasser was the power behind the regime.

IV Britain’s ‘Masterful Inactivity’

Hankey’s tenure as Churchill’s ‘patient, sulky pig’ in Cairo lasted from June to November 1953. For several weeks after arriving in Cairo Hankey was followed by a media circus, the Egyptian assumption being that he was the ‘hard man’ sent in for an imminent break in relations.90 The chargé’s early impressions were telling. He felt that Nasser was trying to be reasonable but that he had a deep dislike of the British. As for the American embassy, Hankey reported that it included ‘several uncoordi- nated and inexperienced enthusiasts’ who were ‘quite unpredictable’. The main problem was Lakeland, ‘the American Oriental Secretary’ who was ‘more Egyptian than the Egyptians’. In addition, Hankey interpreted Caffery’s constant use of the first person singular when

88. Minute by Hankey, 22 May 1953, FO 371/102765 JE1052/121G, PRO. 89. Minute by Bowker, 20 June 1953, FO 371/102845 JE11913/8, PRO; Hankey to Foreign Office, 22 June 1953, FO 371/102723 JE1025/4, PRO. 90. Hankey to Foreign Office, 19 June 1953, PREM 11/629 92–93, PRO. In mid-July a short-lived crisis over a missing serviceman resulted in Canal Zone security being placed on its highest state of alert, making many Egyptians fear that British forces were about to take control of Ismailia. Hankey was blamed for the heightened tensions. The so-called Rigden affair (after the name of the missing serviceman) is detailed in: Duke to Allen, 23 July 1953, FO 371/102851 JE11914/121, PRO; Churchill to Minister of State, 15 July 1953, FO 371/102850 JE119414/87, PRO; Hankey to FO, 17 July 1953, FO 371/102924 JE1897/1, PRO; Hankey to Foreign Office, 18 July 1953, FO 371/102924 JE1897/3, PRO; Hankey to Foreign Office, 30 Aug 1953, FO 371/102853 JE11914/158G, PRO.

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910 BRITAIN, THE US AND THE RISE OF AN EGYPTIAN LEADER discussing Egyptian politics as a vanity ‘over which he has little or no control’.91 The defence negotiations were restarted (having broken down on 6 May) a few days after the first anniversary of the coup, with Nasser acutely aware that only an agreement with Britain could secure the regime’s position in the longer run. In Lakeland’s estimation, he was ready to show a ‘greater degree of political realism and maturity than ever before’.92 By the middle of August only three major issues seemed to need resolving: the duration of an agreement (Britain was pressing for at least ten years); the number of British soldier-technicians left to maintain the base; and the reactivation clause (Britain wanted automatic 93

reactivation in the event of an attack on an Arab state, Turkey or Iran). Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 A few days later a joint CIA-MI6 operation toppled the Iranian prime minister Mossedeq, a thorn in Britain’s side since he nationalized the British-owned oil refineries at Abadan in 1951. Flushed with renewed confidence, London dropped Iran from the reactivation clause but still attached the greatest importance to Turkey’s inclusion. Nasser was unable to accept the trade off, however, because of Turkey’s recent past as the Ottoman rulers of Egypt and its present membership of NATO.94 Nevertheless, another sign of progress came in early September when the RCC presented the British embassy with £95,000 for claims arising from the ‘Black Saturday’ riots.95 Hankey subsequently urged London to make more concessions, in particular seeing little point in bickering over the duration clause. The chances of the RCC lasting ten years, he wrote on 14 September, were ‘pretty slender even to the most optimistic of us’.96 The negotiations broke down again, however, on an issue neither side had foreseen. On 23 September, the British team of Hankey on the diplomatic side and General Sir Brian Robertson as the military representative returned to a subject which they considered unconten- tious — that the British technicians would be allowed to wear uniforms. Nasser, however, thought it had been understood that the technicians must wear civilian attire. What appears to have been a genuine misunderstanding translated into a personality clash between Robertson and Nasser, and the latter stormed out of the meeting.97 Caffery was furious that ‘haberdashery’ should get in the way of an agreement.98 His

91. Hankey to Bowker, 17 June 1953, FO 371/102766 JE1052/133, PRO; Hankey to Strang, 23 June 1953, FO 371/102811 JE1192/374G, PRO; Hankey to Allen, 3 Aug. 1953, FO 371/102766, JE1952/143, PRO. 92. Caffery to State Department, 2 Aug. 1953, FRUS, Vol. IX, Pt. 2, pp. 2125–6. 93. CAB 128/62 C (53) 232, 15 Aug. 1953, PRO. 94. Hankey to Foreign Office, 24 Aug. 1953, FO 371/102859 JE11915/55G, PRO. 95. Caffery to State Department, 3 Sept. 1953, RG 59 774.00/9–1653, NA. 96. Hankey to Bowker, 14 Sept. 1953, FO 371/102816 JE1192/482G, PRO. 97. Minute by Allen, 24 Sept. 1953, FO 371/102816 JE1192/486G, PRO; Caffery to State Department, 25 Sept. 1953, RG 59 774.00 (W)/9–2553, NA. 98. Caffery to State Department, 22 Oct. 1953, FRUS, Vol. IX, Pt. 2, p. 2151.

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POLITICS OF NASSER’S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 911 indiscreet comments to an Australian diplomat, who duly reported back to Britain’s Cairo embassy, that ‘the British had bungled these negotiations from the start’ prompted a further spate of Foreign Office complaints to the State Department about Caffery’s ‘personal policy’.99 The situation in the Canal Zone deteriorated still further in October and November.100 Determined not to give his backbench critics additional ammunition, Eden did his best to keep the violent and often murderous incidents out of the news.101 But he also faced opposition from the prime minister who was itching for a fighting solution in Egypt and the Sudan. In December, following riots in Khartoum, Churchill advised Eden that ‘the exit’ from all his ‘troubles about Egypt, the Suez

Canal, the Sudan, the Southern Sudan and later on in the Middle East’ Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 would be ‘found in deeds not words, in actions not treaties’.102 The riots were sparked off by the Sudan’s first elections which saw the pro-Egyptian National Union Party gain the most seats in the inaugural parliament.103 Naguib, who had been born and raised in Khartoum (where his father was posted in the Egyptian army), regarded the election results as personal victory and he began competing with his RCC colleagues in terms of patriotic statements. British officials interpreted this as a sign that he wanted to add to his official responsibilities, a point the other members of the RCC also seemed concerned about.104

V Enemies Within, January–March 1954

At the start of 1954, Nasser was in an increasingly precarious position. The longer-term stability of the regime required the evacuation of British forces from Egypt but the concessions needed to secure a defence agreement threatened to play into the hands of his opponents. The most powerful of these opponents were no longer political parties or palace cronies — they were rivals within the junta. Naguib, as head of state and prime minister, was increasingly frustrated at not having his high office and popular backing translated into commensurate powers inside the

99. Eden had hoped to get Caffery replaced as ambassador but Dulles was only willing to recall him for consultations and only then if Britain specifically requested it. ‘The President spoke to me alone but most emphatically even vehemently of his dislike of Caffery’, Eden huffed: ‘It is a commentary on his lack of grip that Caffery is still there’. Minute by Eden, 29 Oct. 1953, FO 371/102820 JE1192/590, PRO; see also Hankey to Foreign Office, 23 Oct. 1953, FO 371/102818 JE1192/560G, PRO; Minute by Allen, 23 Oct. 1953, FO 371/102818 JE1192/560G, PRO; Makins to Foreign Office, 26 Oct. 1953, FO 371/102818 JE1192/569G, PRO; Minute by Allen, 29 Oct. 1953, FO 371/102820 JE1192/590, PRO. 100. The Cabinet Defence Committee discussed the worsening situation at the end of November. See CAB 131/13 D (53) 58, 30 Nov. 1953, PRO. 101. Marginal comments by Eden on Creswell to Foreign Office, 18 Nov. 1953, FO 371/102855 JE11914/190G, PRO. 102. Churchill to Eden, 11 Dec. 1953, FO 371/102823 JE1192/656G, PRO. 103. ‘Annual Report for Sudan, 1953’, Riches to Eden, 22 Jan. 1954, FO 371/108311 JE1011/2, PRO. 104. Hankey to Foreign Office, 9 Dec. 1953, FO 371/102732 JE10345/35, PRO.

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912 BRITAIN, THE US AND THE RISE OF AN EGYPTIAN LEADER RCC. Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood, which largely shouldered the responsibilities of the guerrilla campaign in the Canal Zone, had still not received its due political rewards. In January, in related moves, Nasser embarked upon drastic action against his internal rivals, and then made a highly significant concession in the external (defence negotiations) sphere. On the 12th, the RCC announced that the Muslim Brotherhood counted as a political party and was therefore subject to the decree dissolving all political parties. The statement was accompanied by the arrest of about 500 members.105 Two weeks later, on 25 January, Nasser signalled his willingness, via Caffery, to include Turkey in the reactivation clause of a defence settlement.106

The attempted suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood was followed Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 by a surge in the number of incidents in the Canal Zone, as the organization proved it could still flex its muscles. In the space of ten days three British soldiers were murdered and two others were unaccounted for.107 Meanwhile, the trials of leading Wafdists, headed by that of Serageddin, for culpability on ‘Black Saturday’ were further indication that the RCC was emasculating possible opposition in anticipation of a defence agreement. On 27 January, the former interior minister was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment.108 Eden interpreted these moves as a sign of the regime’s weakening internal position.109 Naguib was perceived to be under threat because of his private contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood in late 1953, and he was also known to have opposed the measures of 12 January.110 Ironically, almost immediately after Nasser had made the offer regarding Turkey (his biggest concession so far) the Foreign Office began to consider reviving its old practice of making and breaking Egyptian governments. On 27 January, Eden issued a directive to the Foreign Office enquiring if there was a Wafdist or other political leader with whom Britain could get in touch, and also whether it was possible ‘to start any subversive activities in Egypt’. The African department was duly instructed to consider who Britain could back if Naguib was murdered or deposed and anarchy threatened. Likely scenarios included a new coup by a different military clique (possibly backed by the Wafd), or an extended period of mob rule followed by a seizure of power by

105. Caffery to State Department, 22 Jan. 1954, RG 59 774.00 (W)/1–2254, NA. 106. Caffery to State Department, 26 Jan. 1954, FRUS, IX, pp. 2208–9. 107. Stevenson to Foreign Office, 22 Jan. 1954, FO 371/108447 JE1193/14, PRO. 108. Caffery to State Department, 18 Jan. 1954, RG 59 774.11/1–1854, NA; Cairo to State Department, 27 Jan., RG 59 774.00 (W) 2–554, NA. Serageddin was released after three years in gaol but was imprisoned again in 1981 after reviving the Wafd in 1978. See ‘The last pasha’ [obituary] by Shaden Shehab in Al-Ahram Weekly (17–23 Aug. 2000) (495). 109. CAB 128/27 CM (54) 3, 18 Jan. 1954, PRO. 110. Minute by Morris, 18 Jan. 1954, FO 371/108319 JE1016/4, PRO; see also Caffery to State Department, 22 Jan. 1954, RG 59 774.00 (W) 1–2254, NA. Mitchell’s Society of the Muslim Brotherhood is well informed on this (p. 144).

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POLITICS OF NASSER’S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 913 either the Muslim Brotherhood or the Wafd.111 Asked for its input, the British embassy in Cairo argued against old style interference in Egypt’s internal affairs and asserted that there was, in any case, no viable alternative to the RCC.112 After signalling the Turkey offer on 25 January, Nasser wanted an immediate quid pro quo from London on the uniform issue.113 But the Conservative government — for practical and political reasons — was unable to move forward. Eden’s absence at the Berlin conference in late January and February meant that the matter did not come before the cabinet. As the key political advocate of a defence settlement with Egypt, only Eden had the authority to push through such a contentious issue.

His bid, on 9 February, to get a junior Foreign Office minister to raise Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 the issue failed.114 Worried that the ignored offer would jeopardize his influence in the RCC, Nasser pressed the Americans to try and move things along on 12 February.115 But the uniform issue was above all about British domestic politics, with Eden convinced that the Conservative party would, as a matter of prestige, insist on the right of servicemen to wear the Queen’s uniform. (Britain’s military chiefs stated that they would find no difficulty in complying with the Egyptian position.116) To the RCC, however, the dispute had a more tangible edge: whether the technicians wore a uniform or not was fundamentally about the British occupation being seen to continue or end. The answer to this question would determine the junta’s future. While the Conservative government was equivocating, the RCC underwent its severest test to date. In the third week of February the long simmering power struggle between Nasser and Naguib boiled over. The crisis began with Naguib tendering his resignation as president and prime minister on 22 February. American embassy dispatches suggested that he was influenced by his wife and presidential legal adviser, both of whom wanted him to secure extra powers.117 The timing was deter- mined by the delicate state of the Anglo-Egyptian defence talks and the impending inauguration of the Sudanese parliament, scheduled for 1 March. The RCC spent three days trying to persuade him to change his mind before finally accepting the decision on the 25th.118 News of

111. Shuckburgh to Kirkpatrick, 27 Jan. 1954, FO 371/108375 JE1056/2G, PRO. For earlier thinking, see minute by Boothby, 22 Jan. 1954, FO 371/108375 JE1056/1G; and Mason to Stevenson, 23 Jan. 1954, FO 371/108375 JE1056/1G, PRO. 112. Stevenson to Allen, 11 Feb. 1954, FO 371/108375 JE1056/3G, PRO. 113. Caffery to State Department, 26 Jan. 1954, FRUS, IX, Pt. 2, pp. 2208–9; Minute by Allen, 15 Feb. 1954, FO 371/108464 JE11912/21, PRO. 114. Eden to Lloyd, 9 Feb. 1954, FO 800/775 Eg/54/24, PRO; Lloyd to Eden, 14 Feb. 1954, FO 800/775 Eg/54/26, PRO. 115. Caffery to State Department, 12 Feb. 1954, FRUS, IX, Pt 2, pp. 2215–16. 116. See Minute by Boothby for comments of Vice Chief of Imperial Staff, 8 Jan. 1954, FO 371/108413 JE1192/59G, PRO. 117. Caffery to State Department, 25 Feb. 1954, FRUS, IX, Pt. 2, pp. 2221–2. 118. Ibid.

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914 BRITAIN, THE US AND THE RISE OF AN EGYPTIAN LEADER Naguib’s resignation was accompanied by an explanatory communiqué from the regime. After detailing the history and the aims of the revolutionary movement, the document stated that Naguib had suffered a ‘psychological crisis’ as a result of the RCC presenting him as the leader of the revolution when he was no more than the president of a committee of equals. Within six months of the revolution, it continued, he had begun demanding powers exceeding those of an ordinary member.119 In accepting Naguib’s resignation the younger officers misjudged both the attitude inside the army and the mood of the country. During the night of the 26th a counter coup within the army was attempted. It

began when officers from the armoured cavalry units, led by Khaled Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 Mohieddin, a left-wing member of the RCC, met with Nasser at the Abbassia barracks to protest against Naguib’s removal. Fearing that the army might be splitting, Nasser acceded to the calls for Naguib’s reinstatement as president and also accepted Mohieddin’s appointment as prime minister, along with their programme for restoring consti- tutional government. After the meeting, however, Nasser ordered loyal units to surround the Abbassia barracks, and Mohieddin and 41 cavalry officers were arrested. Naguib was also apprehended and held as a prisoner.120 But on the 27th it was the turn of the population to show their loyalty to Naguib. Seeing the former president as their best chance for returning to legality, the Muslim Brotherhood organized pro- Naguib demonstrations and these resulted in a genuine groundswell of support. Having underestimated Naguib’s popularity, the RCC com- pleted a humiliating U-turn and restored him to office as president of a ‘Parliamentary Republic of Egypt’ on 28 February. Mohieddin faired less well. Because the cavalry revolt had not spread to other sections of the armed forces, his claims to be prime minister were resisted and instead he was exiled to Europe as a trade delegate. Nasser became the new prime minister.121 The next month was the making of Nasser: not only was he able to reverse the climbdown of Naguib’s reappointment but he also became, in Britain’s hitherto sceptical eyes, a leader capable of both concluding a defence agreement and, even more importantly, carrying the Egyptian people with him. Nasser’s plan for avoiding a return to old-style parliamentary politics was to mount a psychological campaign that made the likelihood of widespread disorder appear inevitable. In

119. Stevenson to Foreign Office, 25 Feb. 1954, FO 371/108327 JE1018/3, PRO; Caffery to State Department, 25 Feb. 1954, FRUS, IX, Pt. 2, pp. 2221–2. 120. Caffery to State Department, 27 Feb. 1954, FRUS, IX, Pt. 2, pp. 2223–4. 121. Caffery to State Department, 28 Feb. 1954, FRUS, IX, Pt. 2, pp. 2224–5; Little, Egypt, pp. 232–3. Another member of the Free Officers who was briefly imprisoned for his role in the March crisis, Ahmed Hamroush, later wrote Qissat Thawrat Yulyu (Story of the July Revolution), published in five volumes between 1977–84. This stands as the landmark piece of Egyptian scholarship on the Nasserite revolution.

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POLITICS OF NASSER’S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 915 pursuance of this strategy all censorship was lifted on 5 March. Over the next three weeks press reports, radio broadcasts, pamphlets and word of mouth worked together to fashion a mood in which considerable violence was seen as more than a possibility. It became widely accepted that the RCC was doomed and that Naguib was being used by the Wafd to facilitate their return to power.122 In the meantime the RCC tightened its control over the lower ranks of the armed forces, especially the cavalry. Measures were also taken to neutralize the Muslim Brotherhood. Emissaries visited its leader, Hassan Hodeibi, in prison in mid-March and a deal was struck whereby Nasser promised to restore the movement’s legal status, while Hodeibi committed himself to an 123

ambivalent stance on the legalization of political parties. On 21 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 March, Lakeland and the head of the State Department’s Near Eastern Affairs section, Parker Hart, visited Nasser at his home. A two-hour long meeting ensued in which Nasser explained his tactics of letting the situation deteriorate ‘in order to demonstrate to the people what would be in store for the country if party elections were carried out now’.124 Four days later the junta announced that political parties were again legal and elections would soon be held, adding that the RCC would not itself form a political party. The revolution was to be formally declared over on 24 July. Hundreds of Muslim Brothers were also released from prison.125 That same day, Friday 25 March, Nasser initiated the activist element to his strategy. Railway, tram and bus workers in Cairo and other major cities took part in government-organized ‘spontaneous’ strikes. The strikers’ key demand was that there should be no legalization of political parties or electoral campaigning until the evacuation of British forces had been achieved. This was the first time organized labour in Egypt had been deliberately and effectively used for political purposes.126 Mass demonstrations were also staged by the old political parties calling for an immediate return to parliamentary life. On the Saturday evening — so completing the circle which began a month earlier with the cavalry protest — representatives from the Egyptian armed forces presented a resolution to the RCC declaring their opposition to the reconstitution of the political parties.127 Meanwhile, Nasser kept the US embassy well briefed. In the ‘forthcoming political melee’, Caffery informed the State Department on the 26th, the RCC would stand aloof while Naguib and the other party groups sullied themselves. The upshot would be a ‘resurgence [of] public sympathy for

122. Memo by Payne to Caffery, 25 March 1954, RG 59 774.00 3–2554, NA. 123. Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement, p. 135. 124. Caffery to State Department, 23 March 1954, FRUS, IX, Pt. 2, pp. 2242–4. 125. Caffery to State Department, 30 March 1954, FRUS, IX, Pt. 2, pp. 2252; Caffery to State Department, 3 April 1954, RG 59 774.00 (W)/4–254. 126. Caffery to State Department, 28 March 1954, FRUS, IX, Pt. 2, pp. 2247–9; Caffery to State Department, 30 March 1954, FRUS, IX, Pt. 2, pp. 2252. 127. Minute by Bromley, 29 March 1954, FO 371/108316 JE1015/18A, PRO.

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916 BRITAIN, THE US AND THE RISE OF AN EGYPTIAN LEADER the “clean” revolution leaders’, so allowing the RCC to reverse the trend towards parliamentary democracy.128 Sure enough, the next day the junta used the demonstrations to justify a reassertion of its control over the country. At 7 p.m. a statement was issued announcing the cancellation of elections, the banning of political parties, and the reinstatement of censorship. Instead, a national advisory council was to be established which would represent organizations and districts. Nasser resisted the hard-line members of the junta who wanted Naguib arrested: keeping him as president, emasculated in the confines of the RCC, was the preferred solution.129 With the crisis over, Stevenson observed that Nasser had proved 130

himself to be ‘an astute, if unscrupulous politician’. Caffery, while not Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 approving all his methods, nevertheless felt that Nasser was the ‘only man in Egypt with strength enough and guts enough to put over an agreement with Britain’.131 But Hart, a relative outsider, also struck a note of caution. He observed that Nasser was ‘determined, very smart but basically immature’:

Visiting him was not, of course, like calling on a statesman — it was like visiting a union boss in the company of two of the few men he trusted. . . I get the impression that Nasser is the fast-thinking strategist of the RCC who is but slightly acquainted with and rather uninterested in details of what is happening in his country. He concentrates his attention on following the main political currents and acting decisively to protect the regime. . . He could go one of two ways — toward a dictatorship or toward team leadership. I find myself uncomfortable in the thought that his mentality would more naturally veer toward dictatorship.132

It was a prescient assessment.

VI The Evacuation Agreement, April–October 1954

Following more disturbances in Khartoum at the start of March, Eden had come close to abandoning the defence negotiations. To forestall this eventuality, the Foreign Office arrived at the idea of using civilian contractors rather than soldiers as technicians. The plan was to inform the RCC that Britain would produce a solution to the uniform issue provided that ‘conditions of confidence’ were created in the Sudan and the Canal Zone. Eden agreed to the proposal and a memorandum was

128. Caffery to State Department, 26 March 1954, FRUS, IX, Pt. 2, p. 2246. 129. Caffery to State Department, 29 March 1954, FRUS, IX, Pt. 2, pp. 2250–1; Caffery to State Department, 30 March 1954, FRUS, IX, Pt. 2, p. 2253; Stevenson to Eden, 15 April 1954, FO 371/108316 JE1015/29, PRO. 130. Stevenson to Eden, 15 April 1954, FO 371/108316 JE1015/29, PRO. 131. Caffery to Dulles, 31 March 1954, RG 59 774.00/3–3154, NA. 132. Hart to Byroade, 31 March 1954, RG 59 774.00/3–3154, NA.

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POLITICS OF NASSER’S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 917 drafted ready for the cabinet’s consideration on 15 March.133 Although not keen on the idea, especially given the instability of the RCC at the time, the cabinet had agreed to sound out the Americans to see if they were willing to associate themselves with the scheme. The State Department’s response (contrary to Caffery’s advice) was positive.134 In line with Britain’s conditions for tabling the new offer, Nasser brought about a period of relative calm in the Canal Zone from 18 April. But with divisions remaining in the Conservative government and backbenches, Eden equivocated. In May he still hoped that the RODEO operations might be used at some future date for setting up an alternative government in Egypt. Britain’s Chief of Imperial Staff was 135

not impressed and instead pressed for an evacuation agreement. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 Frustrated by the lack of progress, Nasser lifted his controls on guerrilla raids at the end of May. A British serviceman was murdered by a mob in Ismailia on the 30th and another soldier was found shot the next day.136 The Foreign Office struggled to keep the temperature down in Parliament, with MPs asking awkward questions about how many British servicemen had been killed in Egypt. The policy was not to give full details because they would ‘produce a rather poor impression’.137 By the end of June the British government was finally prepared to push ahead with the civilian contract labour scheme. The breakthrough came when Churchill was persuaded that the political disadvantages of abandoning the position could be alleviated by linking an evacuation of the Suez base with the recent advent of the hydrogen bomb. Thus, the withdrawal from Egypt would be presented as part of a re-assessment of Britain’s strategic needs in the thermonuclear age.138 One other matter needed resolving: what should be the US’s role in the new package? Learning from previous experience, Eden decided not to seek Washing- ton’s participation in a joint approach. Instead, he sought a strong affirmation of the basis of the agreement, a tacit link between the signing of an agreement and American financial aid, and a public endorsement of freedom of transit through the Suez Canal. Eisenhower and Dulles readily agreed to these points, relieved no doubt not to be asked to gang up on the Egyptians.139 Cabinet approval for the re-opening of

133. Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, 29 March 1954, p. 155; 11 March 1954, p. 146; 12 March 1954, p. 146; CAB 129/66 CP (54) 99 13 March 1954, PRO. 134. CAB 128/27 CM (54) 18, 15 March 1954, PRO; Aldrich to State Department, 18 March 1954, IX, Pt. 2, pp. 2233–4; Dulles to Aldrich, 20 March 1954, FRUS, IX, Pt. 2, p. 2239; Caffery to State Department, 20 March 1954, IX, Pt. 2, pp. 2240–1. 135. Note of meeting between Chief of Imperial General Staff and Keightley, 27 May 1954, WO 216/867 8, PRO. 136. Minute by Street, 1 June 1954, F0 371/108454 JE1195/30, PRO. 137. Minute by Bromley, 14 June 1954, FO 371/108450, JE1193/1111, PRO. 138. CAB 128/27 CM (54) 43, 22 June 1954; see also CAB 129/68 CP (54) 187, 3 June 1954, PRO and CAB 129/69 CP (54) 206, 21 June 1954, PRO. 139. CAB 129/69 CP (54) 220, 6 July 1954, PRO; also minute by Bromley, 30 June 1954, FO 371/108419 JE1192/134G, PRO.

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918 BRITAIN, THE US AND THE RISE OF AN EGYPTIAN LEADER negotiations came on 7 July.140 Informal discussions between Stevenson and Nasser began on 10 July. The talks centred on a draft Heads of Agreement, produced by the British. Nasser immediately liked what he saw regarding the uniform problem but took exception to Britain’s attempts to extend the duration. ‘I agreed to seven years’, he commented. ‘Why change?’141 Another meeting took place on 19 July but there was no give on either side.142 On 24 July, Britain’s minister of war, Antony Head, flew to Cairo to try and tie up the final points of an agreement. For parliamentary reasons (the Conservative government had promised its backbench Suez rebels that any heads of agreement would be debated in the Commons before a

final agreement was concluded, and parliament was due to go into recess Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 at the start of August) it had been decided to concede the duration issue provided that a longer withdrawal period could be secured. Nasser was insisting on fifteen months but Britain’s military authorities wanted two years so that more stores could be saved.143 Head believed that a twenty month duration period might be acceptable on the thinking that it could be fulfilled within one month of the lapse of the Anglo-Egyptian Defence Treaty of 1936.144 On 26 July, two years to the day after Farouk’s deposition, Nasser agreed to the British terms. Reactivation of the base would be permissible in the event of an attack on Turkey or an Arab League state. An initialling ceremony — Head for Britain, Nasser for Egypt — took place the next day, 27 July 1954.145 The presentation of the settlement was vital in both countries. Head urged Nasser not to ‘crow over this as a triumph over the oppressive British’;146 but for the Egyptian leader, this was a moment of great celebration. The Egyptian press eulogized accordingly. Ever the realist, Nasser allowed just one full day of public celebrations — the 28th — before demonstrations were again banned. As expected, Wafdists, communists and Muslim Brothers opposed the agreement.147 Back in Britain the Commons voted on the Heads of Agreement on 30 July. With Labour MPs abstaining, the government secured a comfortable majority despite the opposition of 26 Conservative backbenchers.148

140. CAB 128/27 CM (54) 47, 7 July 1954; see also Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, 7 July 1954, pp. 222–3. 141. Caffery to State Department, 11 July 1954, FRUS, IX, Pt. 2, pp. 2279. 142. Stevenson to Foreign Office, 20 July 1954, FO 371/108424 JE1192/209G, PRO. 143. CAB 128/27 CM (54) 52, 23 July 1954, PRO; CAB 129/70 CP (54) 251, 23 July 1954, PRO; DEFE 4/71 COS (54) 84,21 July 1954, PRO; CAB 128/27 CM (54) 51, 20 July 1954, PRO. 144. CAB 128/27 CM (54) 53, 26 July 1954; see also Shuckburgh, Decsent to Suez, 25 July 1954, p. 230. 145. The signed document is at: Stevenson to Foreign Office, 29 July 1954, FO 371/108425 JE1192/258, PRO. The text was printed as an official white paper: Heads of Agreement: Anglo-Egyptian Defence Negotiations regarding the Suez Canal Base, Egypt, No. 1 Cmd. 9230 (HMSO, 1954). 146. Head to Foreign Office, 27 July 1954, FO 371/108424 JE1192/234, PRO. 147. Caffery to State Department, 31 July 1954 RG 59 774.(W)/-3054 NR 1158, NA. 148. The Times (30 July 1954) 8.

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POLITICS OF NASSER’S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 919 Nasser’s emergence as Egypt’s national leader (Naguib was still ostensibly president) continued with the publication of his book The Philosophy of the Revolution in September. Ghosted over the previous year by his journalist friend and confidante Mohammad Heikal, the book had a breadth of vision that surprised British officials. Stevenson saw in it a ‘humanity and idealism which one might be excused for not expecting from a man of his [Nasser’s] background’.149 ‘For a dictator’, wrote the head of the Foreign Office’s Middle East section, ‘Nasser has a rather attractive lack of subtlety and at least does not try and hold himself up as a prophet’.150 (These assessments did not stop Eden from branding the book Nasser’s Mein Kampf during the Suez Crisis of 1956).151

Negotiations for the definitive defence agreement went on until 19 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 October 1954. Issues that needed settling included the precise number of civilian contractors and their accommodation sites, what military equipment would remain in place, and the method for ratifying the treaty. The final signing ceremony took place in the Pharaonic Hall of the Egyptian parliament with Foreign Office minister Antony Nutting signing for Britain and Nasser again completing the process for Egypt.152 Without a parliament to submit the agreement to, the RCC instead used other methods for gaining the approval of the people. The rector of al-Azhar, the great mosque and Islamic university, presented himself at the hall immediately after the signing to congratulate the Egyptian delegation. Mass meetings were then held at professional organizations, trade unions and other institutions so that support for the regime could be pledged. Meanwhile, the only former prime minister to immediately congratulate Nasser was Hussein Sirri. Ali Maher was less prompt and less enthusiastic.153 The 20th and 21st were given over to public holidays in Egypt and well-organized demonstrations were staged in the main cities but they lacked the enthusiasm of the July events. Caffery put this down to the drawn out negotiations. Naguib was conspicuously absent from the celebrations.154 The final act in Nasser’s consolidation of power centred around an attempt on his life, the circumstances of which are still controversial. While addressing a mass meeting in Alexandria on 26 October, about eight revolver shots were fired at him. All missed, though shattered glass

149. Stevenson to Eden, 14 Sept. 1954, FO 371/108317 JE1015/54, PRO. The following year an article under Nasser’s name also appeared in ‘The Egyptian Revolution’, Foreign Affairs, xxxiii (2) (Jan. 1955). 150. Minute by Shuckburgh, 4 Oct. 1954, FO 371/108317 JE1015/54, PRO. 151. Mohamed H. Heikal, Cutting the Lion’s Tale: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes (London, 1986), p. 61; for Eden’s propaganda campaign in Britain during the Suez crisis, see Tony Shaw, Eden, Suez and the Mass Media (London, 1996). 152. This was again published as a white paper: Agreement regarding the Suez Canal Base, Egypt No. 2 Cmd 9298 (HMSO, 1954); on the final negotiations, see CAB 129/70 CP (54) 299, 28 Sept. 1954, PRO and Murray to Eden, 3 Nov. 1954, PREM 11/702 6, PRO. 153. Murray to Eden, 3 Nov. 1954, PREM 11/702 6, PRO. 154. Caffery to State Department, 23 Oct. 1954, 774.00 (W) NR 1205, NA.

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920 BRITAIN, THE US AND THE RISE OF AN EGYPTIAN LEADER slightly injured three bystanders. Four members of the Muslim Brotherhood were immediately arrested. Tense but in control, Nasser exhorted the crowd to stay in place and he went on to complete the speech — which was being recorded — by making political capital out of the incident: ‘Remember that, if anything should happen to me, the Revolution will go on, for each of you is a Gamal Abdul Nasser’.155 The speech was repeatedly broadcast to excellent effect. The next day demonstrators burnt down the headquarters of the Muslim Brother- hood in Cairo. Because the assassination attempt was such a boon to Nasser’s popularity, rumours quickly spread that it had been staged. Caffery rejected the ‘staging’ theory but acknowledged that the Egyptian 156

revolution at last had its ‘hero’. Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 Nasser used his new found popularity to remove Naguib from office and crack down, once and for all, on the Muslim Brotherhood. The trial of the alleged would-be assassins served as the means to this end. During the court hearings Naguib was frequently mentioned by witnesses as being in collusion with the Muslim Brotherhood. Although, in Caffery’s view, no conclusive evidence was provided, Nasser nevertheless ousted Naguib on 14 November, with a public announcement being made on the 19th.157 The British were also unconvinced by the evidence and felt that Naguib was mentioned in the trials as an excuse for ‘getting him out the way’.158 (He was to remain under house arrest for eighteen years, until released by Nasser’s successor, President Anwar Sadat in 1972.) Meanwhile, the process of imprisoning thousands of Muslim Brother- hood members was initiated, leaving Nasser without serious internal rivals. As regards external affairs, the British embassy’s annual report for 1955 (dated January 1956) best summed up the new situation: ‘Egypt was no longer compelled to frame her foreign policy in the light of the ultimate sanction represented by the presence of British troops in Egypt’.159 The post of Egyptian president was left unfilled until Nasser, following a plebiscite, assumed it on 26 June 1956, ten days after the last British troops left Egyptian soil. The rise of Nasser was ultimately a victory of power politics over grass-roots movements, of authoritarianism over pluralism. In the preceding thirty years Egypt’s civil society had been dominated by one issue — national liberation. As representatives of the people, the Wafd party had found itself — by virtue of a British-framed constitution — pitted against an over-powerful monarchy. Three decades of tensions

155. Stephens, Nasser, p. 136. 156. Caffery to State Department, 29 Oct. 1954, 774.00 (W)/10–2954 NR 1209; see also Murray to Eden, 3 Nov. 1954, PREM 11/702 6, PRO. 157. Caffery to State Department, 19 Nov. 1954, RG 59 774.00 (W)/11–1254 NR 1218, NA. 158. Minute by Street, 12 Dec. 1954, FO 371/108319 JE1016/24, PRO. 159. Trevelyan to Lloyd, 31 Jan. 1956, FO 371/118830 JE1011/1, PRO. For an overview of Britain’s subsequent relations with Nasser, see Robert McNamara, Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952–1967 (London, 2003).

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POLITICS OF NASSER’S CONSOLIDATION OF POWER 921 ensued, discrediting parliamentary politics in the process. When the Free Officers’ seized power in July 1952, the key to their immediate success was Britain’s decision not to intervene on behalf of the monarchical order. Frustration with Farouk’s misrule, a changed international environment, and fear of guerrilla warfare accounted for this momentous shift in imperial policy. Meanwhile, the July coup was viewed by its participants — which included members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the communists (Egypt’s largest extra-parliamentary organizations) — as a collaborative effort. However, over the next two years Nasser discarded many allies, particularly those who could draw upon independent mass support. While the exigencies of trying to

negotiate an evacuation agreement with Britain provided the rationale Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ehr/article/119/483/892/452423 by guest on 30 September 2021 for these actions, a growing appetite for power was also present, albeit masked by the conviction that a resumption of civilian rule would quickly lead to the return of corruption. Nasser’s eventual success in ending the British occupation, abetted by the American embassy in Cairo, finally gave a popular mandate to his personal leadership. Two years later the Suez War made him an Arab hero, paving the way for the ‘Nasserite revolution’ to be exported.

Oxford MICHAEL T. THORNHILL

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