J.P.H.S., Vol. LXVII, Nos. 1 & 2 7

TRUST-BASED RELATIONS IN SULTANATE POWER POLITICS

FOUZIA FAROOQ AHMED Assistant Professor, Department of History, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan e-mail: [email protected]

Trust and distrust were the edifice on which the relational matrix of the (1206-1399/605-801) power structure was constructed. Every sultan promoted trusted elements within nobility that he nurtured through an active process of procurement and selection. Present article takes into account trust-based relations in the Delhi Sultanate and the process through which nobility was acquired, cultivated and sustained. The treatment of trusted elements can be juxtaposed with the treatment of distrusted elements in order to understand power relations among the ruling elite. The article argues that although the sultans made every possible effort to promote trusted nobility however, they could never completely trust them and this distrust resulted in an extremely centralized and highly unstable power-structure that was knitted around the personality of the sultan and the power structure crumbled as soon as the latter disappeared.

Key Words: The Delhi Sultanate, Trust, Distrust, Bureaucracy, Nobility

The behavioural and relational dynamics of power politics in the Delhi Sultanate (1206-1399/605-801) reflects well upon the socio-economic construction of its polity. The behavioural tendencies such as trust, distrust, loyalty and betrayal that were embeded into traditions and norms became the distinguishing features of the Sultanate’s political structure. These patterns also had an innate impact on distributional dimensions of power that are centralization, hierarchy and administrative system. 8 Trust based Relations ...

Though social binaries of foreign and natives are ingenuous constructs but they help understand the socio-cultural difference between the Delhi Sultans and their subjects that was the premise for the latter to trust non- native Muslims. Interaction between the rulers and the ruled was controlled and rather restricted. The rulers supported an urban culture and did not interfere in traditional Indian rural society or its caste structure. As an alternative, they established new urban centres and the natives who lived there were usually slaves captured in war.1 Under the Olberli rulers,2 the locals were not trusted with main administrative jobs.3 This anti-local prejudice prevailed till the end of Delhi Sultanate. One of the most well- known Delhi Sultanate historians, Ziya al-Din Barani, who wrote during the era of Tughluqs (720-815/1320-1412), disapproved of the Sultan Muhmanad b. Tughluq’s policy of trusting the indigenous people.4 Even the locals had few reasons to relate to their Muslim sultans and generally remained apathetic. The locals residing in villages routinely acquiesced to sultans’ rule.5 It was only on rare instances that they posed opposition by declining revenue demands.6 The Delhi Sultanate’s thin social base was the urban populace of Delhi and other garrisons.7 It was customary for the social base to remain involved in political issues of the Delhi Sultanate. It was due to the flimsy social base of the Delhi Sultanate, the government was susceptible to rebellion and intrigue. Politically strong relatives never let the sultan feel secure as they had their own claims to the throne due to the non-existence of any definite law to regulate succession. Multiple mutually antagonistic factions of nobility also wanted control of the state apparatus. Also, the native political elite could overthrow government machinery with their local clout. The sultans often pre-empted hostility towards their devious family by either killing them or physically disabling them to a level that they become disqualified to lay claim on the throne under Islamic shari‘ah. Natives generally remained unnoticed or were neutralized through expeditions if it was an economic or strategic requirement.8 Civil and military bureaucracy was the power base of the government and was also the intermediary between the rulers and their subjects. No governance was possible without their effective support. The sultans therefore harboured a class of trusted confidants and officers to sustain their rule. Harbouring trusted elements was the most important task of each sultan who nurtured and sustained trust deploying different strategies. The umara9 were the edifice on which the Delhi Sultanate power structure rested. Nonetheless, the tussle between the rulers and their J.P.H.S., Vol. LXVII, Nos. 1 & 2 9 nobility was such that the supremacy of one was only possible at the cost of the other. It did not suit the nobility to have a very strong ruler who could limit their liberties and jeopardize the survival of certain factions within them. During the reign of weaker sultans the nobility became more powerful. Such nobility was to blame for most of the mishaps that befell the sultans. These misadventures included enthronement of puppet rulers, aggressive dethronements, and cold-blooded murders and public executions of the sultans.

How many sultans were there in the Delhi Sultanate and their tenure?

1206-1399 27 or 30 as three additional people claimed to be sultans

Total numbers of years: 194 21 = 6 Years or Less 6= Over a Decade

Causes of death

Natural 6

Accidents/ unknown 8 circumstances/ suspected murders

Explicit Murders by Umara 13

Stayed alive long after being None. ( In post-Timurid invasion: deposed from the office of Shah Alam of Sayyid Dynasty is the Sultan [Razia, for example an example). survived to make another bid for the throne, as did Ibrahim bin Firoz Khalji].

Table earlier used in Ahmed, Fouzia Farooq, Muslim Rule in South Asia: Power and Religion in the Delhi Sultanate (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016).

Thus, the rulers often found themselves at the mercy of the nobility that they trusted and patronized. 10 Trust based Relations ...

The Sultanate ruling elite decided the matters of succession and disregarded the will of the deceased rulers.

Issue of succession

The only instance where the Muhammad bin Tughluq was an will of a sultan was honoured. heir apparent of his father. Some historians accuse him of patricide as his father wanted to change his will in favor of another son. No contemporary source has noted this incident however.

Attempt for dynastic continuity The strong sultans made a special effort to train their heirs in the arts of military and politics but they did not survive. For instance, son of Shams al-Din Nasir al-Din Mahmud died in a battlefield and so did the son of Balban Shahzadae Prince Mohammad. Sometimes these strong sultans became convinced that their heirs were not good enough and they deposed them such as the case of Khidr Khan, the son of Ala al-Din Khalji

Succession pattern 1. Son 2. Daughter 3. Former slave and son in law 4. Father in law 5. Cousin 6. Grandson 7. Nephew

Table earlier used in Ahmed, Fouzia Farooq, Muslim Rule in South Asia: Power and Religion in the Delhi Sultanate (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016). J.P.H.S., Vol. LXVII, Nos. 1 & 2 11

As the table shows, the enthronement of Sultan Muhammad b. Tughluq (725-752/1325-1351) was an exceptional event in the history of the Delhi Sultanate since except him no heir apparent was able to rise to the throne. Muhammad was rumoured to have killed his father Sultan Ghiyath al Din Tughluq to become a sultan.10 The strong rulers did train their sons as successors but none survived to succeed. Iltutmish’s son Nasir al-Din Mehmud died during the last years of his father’s regime. Balban’s son died fighting on the frontline. Ala al-Din Khalji himself deprived his son Khidr Khan from the successorship11 as according to Barni, Malik Kafur had poisoned father’s ears against his son. We don’t find much details about Muhammad b. Tuqhluq’s offsprings as well. Why no heir survived to be a successor? The nobility had a role to play as after the death of a strong ruler nobility naturally looked for docile sultans who would not control them the way a strong ruler controlled them. After the death of a sultan, it was not his will but the nobles and ladies of harem who decided about the next ruler. During the reign of comparatively weaker rulers, the core territories of the Delhi Sultanate were administered through anarrangement that looked like an oligarchy rather than a monarchy. The sultans usually appeared as puppets who were enthroned and dethroned on the whims of the ruling elite. The control of the provinces was lost and their administration appeared as tawaif ul muluki.12 In modern political systems —— legitimacy is derived from people’s will and decentralization, ideally leads to accountability and power sharing. Nonetheless, in pre-modern political system generally and the Delhi Sultanate particularly the opposite of centralization was not decentralization that exists in the modern political system. In the reign of a weak ruler, disintegration of the power structure translated into tawaif ul muluki which was temporarily political condition of oscillation between centralization and anarchy. In tawaif ul muluki multiple mutually antagonistic war lords either declared their autonomy or manoeuvred as de facto rulers in their own territories under the banner of the ruler. These nobles used power in a manner identical to that of any strong Delhi Sultan, and competed with other groups for increasing power, which augmented violence and chaos. In such times the Mongol hoards invaded the core regions of the Delhi Sultanate.13 The ruling elite was most empowered during the interregnums. In Delhi Sultanate each strong ruler tried to convert his personal rule into a dynastic rule nonetheless his novice progeny had no match for the veteran officers who had proved themselves excelling in the art of survival in the volatile power structure of the Delhi. 12 Trust based Relations ...

During the reign of the weak rulers, the strongest ethnic group among the nobility replaced the former and established an entirely new dynasty. The dynastic transition occurred in the form of a coup since the new ruling group had either proved their military competence against the Mongols or were incharge of some other important military task earlier; for instance, in the times of Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Balban (664-85/1266-87) the Khalji Afghans were responsible for policing Delhi, its fortifications and surrounding territories. After the death of Balban his grandsons were unable to control the nobility and were replaced by the Khaljis.14 The rise of Khaljis was due to the privilege they received during Balban’s reign which culminated in their political and financial power vis-à-vis other factions of nobility.15 The dynastic transition happened when individuals were supported by groups and persons without substantial support-base in the ruling elite seldom succeeded. For instance, Balban- i-Kushlu Khan during post Iltutmish interregnum,16 Malik Kafur (715/1316)17 and Khusraw Khan (720/1320) during post Ala al-Din Khalji interregnum18 could not endure as they had little support among the ruling elite. The history of the Delhi Sultanate was a continual struggle between the ruler and their ruling elite to overpower each other. Each ruler employed both time-tested and sometimes novel measures to minimize the power of his ruling elite. These strategies reveal the behavioural and relational dimensions of power politics in the Delhi Sultanate. For many rulers, killing rivals was a necessary measure following their enthronement. Each new sultan attempted to purge the existing ruling elite in order to stifle any resistance. Unwanted groups were often secretly eliminated amid suspicion of adverse reaction from the ruling elite. For example, when Sultan Ghiyath al-Din Balban (664-85/1266-87) wanted to expand into Lahore he had his cousin Sher Khan, the governor of that region, secretly poisoned.19

Dynastic transition Rise of a particular group to power

Qutbis to Shamsis (AD 1210) Iltutmish emerged as primus inter pares among Qutb al-Din Aybeg’s umara. He was enthroned one year after his master’s death. J.P.H.S., Vol. LXVII, Nos. 1 & 2 13

Shamsis to Ghiyathis (AD 1266) Ghiyath al-Din Balban emerged as primus inter pares among the umara of Nasir al-Din Mahmud son of Shams al-Din Iltutmish. He replaced Nasir al-Din.

Ghiyathis to Khaljis (AD 1290 ) Ghiyath al-Din Balban introduced Afghans as a new ethnic group within the power structure in order to limit the Turks and Tajiks. The Khaljis were given the forts and policing responsibilities around Delhi. Four years after the death of Balban, Khaljis took over the state apparatus.

Khaljis to Barado tribe (AD 1320) Qutb al-Din Mubarak Shah had allowed Khusraw Khan (of Barado tribe) to bring his kinsmen from which was a new ethnic element. Who made an unsuccessful attempt to seize the state apparatus.

Khaljis to Tughluqs (AD 1320) Ghiyath al-Din Tughluq was the warden of north western frontier of the Delhi Sultanate where Ala-al-Din Khalji had placed his most reliable officers and had provided them with abundance of resources.

Table earlier used in Ahmed, Fouzia Farooq, Muslim Rule in South Asia: Power and Religion in the Delhi Sultanate (London: I.B. Tauris, 2016).

In order to overtly display displeasure, unforgettable and exemplary punishments were extended to the nobles who had little support in the ruling elite. When Ghiyath al-Din Balban’s trusted slave Toghril Khan 14 Trust based Relations ...

rebelled in Bengal he and his supporters were killed in such a way that the spectacle of the punishment drained life out of many people.20 The rebels were skinned, their corpuses were stuffed with hay and were hanged in the main market of Lakhnawti.21 Nonetheless, this iron fist policy was for officers who lacked sympathizers with in the ruling elite. The purging of the nobility resulted in a power vacuum. This vacuum was filled in by importing trust worthy individuals into the realm. Each sultan encouraged different ethnic groups from outside the Sultanate to join the Sultanate bureaucracy and integrated them as his trusted personal powerbase. This strong personal powerbase helped the sultans to centralize power. The trustworthiness of this powerbase was ensured if it relied solely on the sultan for its survival. Therefore, émigrés and slaves were the most sought after elements. These groups of émigrés and slaves were divided due to ethnic and cultural identities and were mutually hostile. They competed for sultan’s favour and were generally loyal to their patron, the sultan, to whom they owed their existence and survival. The sultan decided about their life and death, promotions and dismissals, marriages and socialization. A successful sultan personalized the government machinery through trust-based relations and centralized power by promoting diversity

Patrimonial relations

In his major work Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology,22 Max Weber explained various types of traditional authority including patrimonialism, prebandalism and sultanism. From his conceptual construct, the Delhi Sultanate qualifies as an example of patrimonial rule. The Delhi Sultanate had a standard patrimonial bureaucracy where power structure was knitted around the personal resolves of the ruler due to the weakness of the bureaucracy. It was because of their dependence for their existence and survival that nobles remained loyal to the sultan. The sultan reciprocated by ensuring a constant flow of political, economic and social favours towards his nobles in lieu of loyalty. Patrimonial rule suited the Delhi Sultanate for multiple reasons. First, it was an agricultural mode of production where the resources were exchanged under the barter system. The nobility was paid in kind rather than cash, either in the shape of a share in the land produce, or J.P.H.S., Vol. LXVII, Nos. 1 & 2 15 through tributes, and gifts taken from peasant producers. The nobility felt obliged for every facility it availed and every favour it received. In patrimonial system, the nobility was delegated semi-autonomous governing powers by the sultan. The nobility bore the cost of their administration, and mostly the cost of their military expenditure, that they generated from the assigned land. The patrimonial nobility who became patron in this set up used its office as personal position and its staff as personal staff. Thus, this system encouraged centrifugal tendencies since the central government found it challenging to raise the taxes imposed on the hinterlands, keeping the economy mainly on subsistence level. Slaves and émigrés were the best choices to include in patrimonial nobility due to their alienation and social uprootedness.

Slaves in the Delhi Sultanate nobility

Under the Olberli rule, the elite slaves were generally acquired through slave trade.23 These slaves were usually of high quality and had noble lineage. Shams al-Din Iltutmish (r. 607-33/ 1210-36) sent merchants to Baghdad, Samarqand, Bukhara and Tirmiz to buy Turkish slaves on his behalf. He began to purchase slaves when he was the muqta of Baran.24 In Sultanate historical sources, there is no mention of an extensive training programme as mentioned by C. E. Bosworth in his work on the Ghaznavids.25 It seems impertinent to think that these slaves would have undergone an extensive training programme. For instance, Ghiyath al-Din Balban (665-685/1266-86) was a junior Shamsi slave and within few years after his purchase he acquired a high status in the government.26 In the case of promotions, the sultans seem to follow Qutb al-Din Aybeg (r.603-7/1206-10) who immediately hired Iltutmish (r. 607-33/1210-36) to the governorship of Gwaliyor.27 The role of slaves was very pivotal during Olberli rule, Iltutmish (r. 607-33/ 1210-36) and Balban (665-685/1266-86) were elite military slaves. Even, the role of the slave during the weak rulers became that of the kingmakers. Slaves neither worked as a monolithic cohesive group, nor did they ever exclude the freemen from their ranks. All of them worked for their vested interests.28 These court intrigues proved to be disastrous for the Olberli rule, where except for Iltutmish (r. 607-33/ 1210-36) and Balban (665-685/1266-86) none of the ruler was able to consolidate his/ her rule. 16 Trust based Relations ...

THE WEAK RULERS: POST-ILTUTMISH INTERREGNUM

Name Years Duration Cause of death

Jalal at Tur Razia 1236-40 4 years Rebellion

Behram Shah (638-639/ 2 Years Killed by nobility 1240-1241)

Ala-al Din Masud (639-643/ 4 years Replaced and 1241-1246) killed by nobles

Nasir-al Din Mehmud (643-664/ 20 Years Obscure 1246-1266) circumstances of death

THE WEAK RULERS: POST BALBAN INTERREGNUM

Name Years Duration Cause of death

Muiz ud din 1287– 1 3 Years Replaced and Qaiqabad February killed by nobles 1290

Shamsuddin 1 February 3 Months Obscure Kayumars 1290 – 13 circumstances June 1290 of death

The issue of legitimacy of the slaves as the rulers recurred during the Olberli rule. Shahab al-Din Ghuri’s (545-603/1150-1206) slave successors, Taj al-Din Yildiz, Nasir al-Din Qubacha, Baha al-Din Toghril and Qutub al-Din Aybeg (r.603-7/1206-10), proclaimed themselves as the sultans after their master’s death. None of these had the definite sovereignty as Aybeg’s (r.603-7/1206-10) talented slave successor, Iltutmish, enjoyed later. Iltutmish (r. 607-33/ 1210-36) was able to earn a reputation and credibility as a consolidator of the Sultanate and the line of Iltutmish (r. 607-33/ 1210-36) was considered the only legitimate group for the throne, up till the death of Jalal al-Din Firuz Khalji in 695/ J.P.H.S., Vol. LXVII, Nos. 1 & 2 17

1296. Thus, the principal reason due to which, Shamsi slaves did not venture to become sultans in the post-Iltutmish era was, the issue of legitimacy. As, in this era, only the family link, either through blood or matrimony, gave the individuals legitimacy to rule. Balban-i-Kushlu Khan’s rebellion is a clear indication for this phenomenon.29 Similarly, Ikhtiyar al- Din Aytegin30 and the free noble Qutulugh Khan,31 when established matrimonial links with the Shamsi family were considered potential contenders to the throne. Even Balban (665-685/1266-86) took over and acquired legitimacy as the father-in-law of the deceased sultan. He ascended to the royal seat, when no male heir of the Shamsis was left to rule. Besides, his successful military and administrative career had established him as the primus inter pears. So powerful and exceedingly disunited were these slaves, that their rivalries threatened the very integrity of the Sultanate. During the reign of Nasir al-Din Mehmud, serious inter-slave rivalry between Balban (665-685/1266-86) and Kushlu Khan, evoked the possibility of a Mongol attack on the Sultanate.32 Nevertheless, Balban was reinstated and the Mongol attack was averted. Roughly, a decade later, he braced the Delhi Sultanate as a sultan, with all his skills to dictate and command. With the rise of the Khaljis, there was a discernible shift in the ethnicity of the slaves. The role of Turk slaves also receded in background.33 There are a number of reasons why Turk slaves were not employed with the same keenness as they were employed in the earlier days of Sultanate. These reasons range from the lack of trust of the Khaljis on the Turks slaves, to easy accessibility of the Indian captives. Also there was a visible shift in the technology, since the sultans now relied more on paiks and elephants then the Turk mounted archers. The Indianization of war tactics must have been another reason for growing emergence of the Indian slaves.34 Tughluqs retrieved the Turks into the Sultanate, as Muhammad b.Tughluq had several thousand Turk slaves.35 Nevertheless their influence was not the same as it was under the Olberli and majority of the slaves were natives. The next ruler Firuz Shah (r.752-88/1351-87) promoted a slave culture that remains unparalleled in the Indian history. The slaves were given such privileges that were not even available to the free borns. Due to the slave recruitments, many free unemployed men voluntarily submitted themselves to slavery. On elite level, slavery was always more of a superior government service. Firuz Shah’s mass slave recruitments confirmed the institution as a symbol of trust and loyalty. 36 18 Trust based Relations ...

The slaves multiplied vastly under the Khaljis and the Tughluqs. These slaves were the result of purchase, war and tax-default. Majority of these slaves were of Indian origin and were captives of war. The two qualities that enabled the sultans to attain the loyalties of these Indian slaves were absence of natal and social alienation. These slaves were neither socially dead, as India was not an unfamiliar environment for them and they could easily socialize with local people. Nor were they nataly alienated, as they could always look back towards their people for support as did Khusraw Khan (r.720/1320).37 As soon as a slave was in position and power to check his master he did it well. Like the Shamsi slaves, the slaves of weaker Sultans reduced their masters to the status of puppets. Malik Kafur (r. 716/1316),38 Khusraw Khan (r.720/1320)39 and Mallu Iqbal Khan40 managed to become the de facto rulers of the Sultanate. Slaves were a personal property of their master therefore, after the death of one Sultan they did not show loyalty to the new sultans. Immense power in the hands of slaves and their advantage of being native was the reason for this downfall of both the dynasties. Still, not all slaves were disloyal, there were many who guarded their master’s life and property including Malik Dinar, Muhamad b.Tuqhluq’s spies, Khwaja Jahan the confidant of Firuz Shah (r.752-88/1351-87) and Khwaja Jahan Sarwar in the post Firuz Shah’s era. Ala al-Din Khalji’s (r. 695-716/1296-1316) slave Malik Dinar41 who was the guardian of harem at that time debarred the Sultan’s rebellious nephew Ikhat Khan from going in, as he did not have the head of the allegedly murdered Sultan. Shortly after, Ala al-Din Khalji (r. 695-716/ 1296-1316) made a successful return to the court. The conspirers were given exemplary punishments and the loyalists were rewarded immensely for their services.42 Malik seemed to have given swift promotions. By 704/1305, this slave was akhur beg and muqti of Samana and Sunnam when he defeated the Mongol army.43 Malik Dinar later served Ala al- Din (r. 695-716/1296-1316) as the governor of Badaun, Koelah (Kol) and Kark (probably Katehar)44 and also as shihna-i-pil (keeper of elephants).45 He acquired greater ascendancy in post-Alai era, when he was given important offices. Qiwam al-Mulk Maqbul (later Khan Jahan), the governor of Multan and Tilang was a slave as well.46 Originally he was a Brahman (name Kannu) who was taken as prisoner of war during the conquest of Tilang in 722/1322.47 He entered in the service of the Sultan and converted to Islam. He was named Maqbul and subsequently given the title of Qiwam al-Mulk. Although, this person did not have the expertise of the official J.P.H.S., Vol. LXVII, Nos. 1 & 2 19

Persian, but was an administrative genius.48 Therefore, he was appointed the governor of Multan by Muhammad on the suppression of Kushlu Khan’s rising in 727-8/1327-8,49 he briefly governed Tilang until its revolt in 736/1336. Maqbul played an important role in the next reign.50 In 794/1392 Islam Khan was executed as a result of his rivalry with the Khwaja Jahan Sarwar who was now stable on his wizarat.51 Within next two years the Sultan Muhammad passed away. The Sultan was succeeded by his son Humanyun Khan as Ala al-Din Sikandar Shah. He also expired shortly, leaving the throne for his younger brother, Nasiral- Din Mahmud Shah.52 The new Sultan enjoyed little support from the nobles. Nevertheless, the faithful slave wazir Khwaja Jahan Sarwar persuaded the nobility to extend their allegiance to the young sultan.53 In May 796/1394 Khwaja Jahan was entrusted with the eastern territories from Kanauj to Bihar as na’ib in order to clear the region from reluctant Hindu chieftains. He was given an army and twenty elephants along with the title of Sultan al-Sharq. He set up his headquarters in Junpur and never returned to Delhi.54 Under the Khaljis and the Tughluqs, slaves were employed on almost every level ranging from wazirs, na’ibs, military commanders and governors to water bearers, domestic servants and spies. Following the example of their predecessor Olberli slaves, continued to command and control in both the dynasties; Kafur (r.716/1316), Khusraw Khan (r.720/ 1320), Imad al-Din Bashir, Khwajah Jahan and Mallu Iqbal Khan exercised immense authority in the name of their sultans. Kafur (r.716/1316) and Khsuraw Khan (r.720/1320) were able to gain autonomy but they failed as they did not have a strong power base to counter the Muslim nobility and public opinion. Later, the politically erratic slaves of Firuz Shah (r.752-88/1351-87) proved to be the same disaster as were Kafur (r.716/ 1316) and Khusraw Khan (r.720/1320) for the Khaljis. During this era, there is a complete absence of any systematic training or promotion programme which is similar to the Olberli period. However, Afif does mention that Firuz Shah (r.752-88/1351-87) used to give his slaves to the muqti and nobility for education and training purposes, who reared these slaves as their own children. These slave trainers were given rewards for their good training.55 Only the military triumphs of the slave commanders make one believe that such effortless achievements cannot come to the amateurs. Besides, the careers of most of the elite slaves were military which also confirms to their military training. The promotions of the slaves were dependent upon their performance, potential and above all the level of trust their masters had on them. 20 Trust based Relations ...

In the Delhi Sultanate, master had the legal authority to manumit the slaves. Slaves also fled or rebelled. Nonetheless, it seems that manumission was never a serious issue for the military slaves. The power held by military slaves enabled them to gain control over their own destinies. These slaves commonly freed themselves through a gradual shift in relations with their master. With time, they evolved from being his subordinates into being an independent military force, power brokers and even became master’s rivals in the power struggle. This opportunity of acquiring power from within the power structure was completely unavailable to the ordinary slaves. In the Delhi Sultanate, social mobility seems to have gained an exceptional momentum. The intellectually promising individuals, majority of whom were slaves, found their way in the highest echelons of power. There was no stigma attached to being slaves. Even many of the freemen were envious to the lives of the slaves. Being slave was more symbolic than practical on elite level. Coercion seems the fate of menials. Many among the defacto, dejure rulers and the potential contenders to the throne were slaves. These were the slaves who nurtured the Delhi Sultanate in its formative phase with their military achievements. Just as, the two consolidator sultans, Iltutmish (r. 607-33/ 1210-36) and Balban (665-685/1266-86) were the slaves. The Delhi Sultanate expanded to the South for the first time with the sword of the slave commander Malik Kafur (716/1316). Thus, it would not be unjust to say that it were the slaves who built the Delhi Sultanate. Nevertheless, it were the over-ambitious slaves including Balban (665-685/1266-86), Malik Kafur (716/1316) and Khusraw Khan (r.720/ 1320) who ended their master’s dynasties. The slaves aimed only to secure their own position, such as Iltutmish (r. 607-33/ 1210-36) progenies promoted Balban (665-685/1266-86) for their personal ambitions. Such slaves soon outgrow in power, usually during the last days of their masters or after their death, as it happened during the post-Shamsi era, post-Alai era and post Firuz Shahi era. These slaves could not heed to a single authority and their mutual non-compliance generally resulted in chaos and anarchy. Slave and free elements operated together for their vested interests. The inter-slave rivalries seriously impaired the strength of the Sultanate. Balban (665-85/1266-86) and Balban-i-Kushlu Khan’s rivalry brought the Sultanate on the verge of a Mongol invasion. Later, due to the inter-slave rivalries between the Tughluqid slaves the Sultanate could not be guarded against the Temuri forces.56 Therefore, the political role of the slaves may well be concluded in a single statement, that the slaves J.P.H.S., Vol. LXVII, Nos. 1 & 2 21 were the foremost among those, who built the Sultanate of Delhi as an empire with their military and administrative skills, and later destroyed it with their over ambitiousness.

Émigrés

In addition to slaves there were émigrés who could be relied upon. The Delhi Sultanate was dubbed as ‘asylum of the universe’ by the historian Minhaj us Siraj Juzjani who wrote in the times of Shams al-Din Iltutmish. The Sultan’s pro-émigré policy established the reputation of the Delhi Sultanate as a safe haven for Mongol-stricken Muslim populations from Central Asia, Persia and Arabia. Due to this policy of the sultan, the masses in Delhi remained loyal to Iltutmish even a century after his death. The subsequent sultans also continued this policy, and Ibn-i Battutah who wrote in the times of Muhammad ibn Tughluq mentioned that Multan served as a check post for the arriving émigrés who were scrutinized on the basis of their race, genealogies and talents and were subsequently welcomed or denied access in the Delhi Sultanate. Sultans made sure that there was a constant inflow of talent into the Delhi Sultanate, however, they refused the right to entry to anyone that would be a potential threat for instance Iltutmish refused fugitive Khwarzimshi prince the privilege to enter the Delhi Sultanate and saved the Sultanate from the Mongol wrath. The sultans understood the risk of having a well-rooted or monolithic nobility that could rebel conveniently. Hetero-ethnicity was the answer to this conundrum, the matrix of the government structure was laid in a way that not a single ethnic group could dominate.57 The nobility that survived long and stable reigns of some sultans was able to develop their own powerbase within the power structure which the later sultans tried to minimize. For instance after the death of Iltutmish, his progeny had a mammoth challenge of curtailing the power of various factions of Turkish nobles that had gained roots during the long and stable reign of Iltutmish. The attempts to replace the old nobility was in many cases unsuccessful and cost Iltutmish’s successors their thrones and lives. For instance Razia added officers of African origin in her royal entourage which was seen as a threat to their racial cartel by the Turkish officers, who later rebelled. Razia was dethroned and black (Abysanian) officers including Malik Yaqut were slaughtered.58 Encouraging the foreigners to join government service and to ensure a constant inflow of new ethnicities was a standard royal practice in the 22 Trust based Relations ...

Delhi Sultanate. Though the religious identity of the Sultanate nobility was predominantly Muslim, however, their ethnic and linguistic diversity kept them apart. For instance, Iltutmish’s political base was mutually hostile Turkish ahl-i-saif (the people of sword) and Tajiks ahl-i-qalam (the people of pen).59 While in Iltutmish’s era animosity among both groups remained passive however, within the six months of the Sultan’s death, the Turks slaughtered a large number of Tajiks including the son of Iltutmish’s prime minister NiÐam al-Mulk Junaidi.60 Iltutmish recruited foreigners as it was less risky to trust socially uprooted and natal alienation foreigners dependent upon the sultan for their survival. This practice continued even in the times of Muhammad b. Tughluq as one of the foremost things that Ibn-i Battutah noticed when he arrived in India was sultan’s pro-foreigners attitude. Sultan ordered that the foreigners should be addressed as aziz (Arabic meaning relative) and not as gharib (meaning stranger or deprived), and most of sultan’s bureaucracy including administrators and judges were foreigners.61

Strategically placed minorities

A strong ruler created a flimsy balance between multiple ethnic groups within the bureaucratic structure. These ethnic groups were strategically placed minorities meaning each group positioned against their potential rivals and allies. In Delhi Sultanate, while one ethnic minority was given the provincial governorship, the other group was entrusted with the financial affairs and yet another one was responsible for policing.62 The political structure was constantly evolving. It constantly re-positioned the various ethnic minorities and their duties. Arab and Persian sources use celestial metaphors to explain the political structure. The political structure was like a universe and office of sultan which was the celestial body around which the entire political structure orbited. The sultans also adopted titles such as Qutb al-Din (pole star of the faith), and Shams al- Din (Sun of the faith) to highlight the centrality of the office of the sultan. This office had a gravitational pull that kept the power structure revolving around him, in the absence of which the entire system collapsed. There were no vertical or horizontal hierarchies that could keep the system functional in the absence of the sultan. Each group had to maintain a special direct connection with the sultan in order to survive. Rivalry, otherness and jealousy among the nobility generated competition. Making strategically placed minorities divided, susceptible, alienated and paranoid. They lacked the collective will for interest articulation and interest J.P.H.S., Vol. LXVII, Nos. 1 & 2 23 aggregation. Intelligent rulers exploited these divisions successfully using different groups against one another. Patrimonial political relations enabled the sultan in harmonizing competing interests. It will be relevant to mention here that, the social, political and financial status of the umara changed with each ‘dynastic’ change; or change of sultan; or even during the era of a single sultan. For instance during Iltutmish’s reign the Turks and Tajiiks monopolized state resources. However, Balban not only purged the power structure from Iltutmish’s old nobility but also replaced it with many new racial elements, most prominent of which were Afghans. Jalal al-Din Khalji added Muslim Mongol converts into power structure and established matrimonial alliances with the group, however, his nephew and successor Ala al-Din Khalji ordered a massacre of the Mongol new Muslims as they were allegedly conspiring against the sultan. Ala al-Din added local converts as a new ethnic element in the power structure. The meteoric rise and fall of Gujrati Malik Kafur and Khusro Khan during the best explains the inter factional struggles within the nobility. Muhammad b. Tughluq trusted Khurasani, Arab and Indian elements during his reign, nonetheless, different individuals of different racial descent fell from royal favor and lost their fortunes. Nonetheless, the sultan did not make a blanket policy to exclude any particular element from his nobility.

Iqta System

In Delhi Sultanate, the level of autonomy that indigenous power bases exercised varied depending upon their proximity to the centre. The administrative core had strict implementation of policies while, in tributary kingdoms checks and balances were hardly possible. A constant power struggle between the center and the centrifugal local powers kept the political structure prone to anarchy. To limit the powers of indigenous elements, the ruler not only curtailed them but also, in order to do away with the possibility of their re-growth, supplanted them with his patrimonial nobility through the land tax administration known as Iqta system.63 Iqta means transferable land revenue assignments allotted to the Sultanate nobility. This system was a continuation of the tradition of older Muslim dynasties. It empowered the sultan by limiting the officers to the rank of revenue collectors and not land proprietor. The power of the ruler to transfer the nobles from one iqta to another kept the officers from gaining local support or to transform the region into their constituency. An remarkably efficient or ignominiously poor administration of iqta had 24 Trust based Relations ...

the same outcome: transfer of its officer incharge. It was customary for each new ruler to force the existing muqtas appointed during the previous regimes to swear oaths of allegiance. The denial or hesitation to swear the oath signaled revolt that invited wrath of the sultan. A ruler undertook numerous such expeditions. A strong sultan made sure that his land officers do not strengthen their roots on their iqtas by constantly transferring them. However, the weak rulers were unable to transfer the nobility from their assigned iqtas and the officers eventually converted their land assignments into their constituencies posing a threat to the power of the centre. In the reign of Firuz Shah (Tughluq) (751-789/1351- 1388) the iqtas were not transferred resulting in the mushrooming of regional powers. The relation between ruler and the muqtas reflect upon the ruler’s incessant endeavours to keep his bureaucratic intermediaries from transforming into a permanent landed class.64

Limiting the abilities of the nobles for interest aggregation

The rulers also attempted to limit the abilities of the nobles for interest aggregation and interest articulation through managing their social relations. The rulers restricted the social relations of their nobility including marriages and adoptions. For instance, Shihab al-Din Ghuri (569/1173- 602/1206) developed a complex network of matrimonial alliances among his officers.65 Ibn-i Battutah, the fourteenth century Moroccan traveler, reports ananalogous practice during the reign of Muhammad b. Tughluq (724/1324-752/1351).66 Under some rulers marriages without the sultan’s consent were strictly prohibited, for instance Sultan Ala al-Din Khalji (695/1296-715/1316) gave explicit orders in this regard. For nobility it was an understood that they were under strict surveillance and their daily routines were under constant check. The rulers maintained a close eye on drinking parties, where the drunk nobles criticized the government and hatched plots to dethrone the Sultan.The party proceedings were secretly communicated by the sultans’ agents to the sultan. Some rulers, including Ghiyath al-Din Balban (664/1266-685/ 1287) and Ala al-Din Khalji imposed a ban on such gatherings and other rulers maintained a watch on these parties.67 The ban imposed by Ala al-Din Khalji was extremely harsh since the violators faced exemplary punishments. While many died, the surviving often became permanently handicaps.68 The rulers successfully controlled the living spaces of their nobles and effectively kept them within the sphere of his influence. This spatial J.P.H.S., Vol. LXVII, Nos. 1 & 2 25 control also curtailed the powers of the nobility to work as a monolithic interest group. Every ruler constructed a new residential palace (qasr or koshak) and it was a standard practice that the residential quarters of the new set of nobility were developed around it. New cities neighbouring to Delhi like Siri and Kelokheri were the results of this policy to maintain the umara under a close watch.69 These motives became more obvious in the Muhammad bin Tughluq’s transfer of capital from Delhi to Deogir.70

Financial control

It was customary for the sultan to maintain a record of their nobility’s fortune, since prosperity bred dissent. The Sultanate rulers including Shams al-Din Iltutmish (607/1210-633/1236), Ghiyath al-Din Balban, Ala al-Din Khalji (695-715/1296-1316) and Muhammad b. Tughluq (724/1324-752/ 1351) were scrupulous record keepers. The nobles who hid their riches were harshly taken to task. Sultan Ala al-Din Khalji owning to his military ventures in the south had himself become wealthier than his patron and uncle, the then-ruling Sultan Jalal al-Din Khalji (689/1290-695/1296). As a noble, Ala al-Din utilized this wealth to recruit a mercenary army larger than his uncle’s army. He thus ousted Sultan Jalal al-Din Khalji by beheading him. Within the three years of becoming the sultan, Ala al-Din Khalji made sure that no one had more money than himself, he thus confiscated all the extra assets of his nobility. He had set up a network of spies in the market places to ascertain the purchasing power of his nobles.71 Like his predecessors, Ala al-Din was concerned about his subjects and officers possessing extra wealth and considered them as potential threat to the crown. Sultan Ala al-Din ordained the death penalty by way of torment for alchemists, who were thought to possess the skill of converting common metals into gold.72

Espionage system

In the absence of complete trust, espionage continued to be a pivotal mechanism applied by the sultans to preempt treachery. To keep a check on the provincial officers, the rulers appointed reporters (namah nawis) with every notable officer.73 The reporters communicated the daily proceedings of officer’s personal and professional dealings directly to the rulers. In the case of failure of an officer to communicate any significant development, the reporter was taken to task even before the noble was punished. Some rulers were rumoured to possess supernatural 26 Trust based Relations ...

powers, since they knew the most intimate information about an officer’s life. Knowledge and Information were an imperative means of power. For instance, Ibn-i-Battutah fell from sultan’s favour since he visited Sheikh Shihab al-Din Sheikh Jam while the sultan was away on an expedition on M‘abar.74 When Ibn-i-Battutah arrived in India for the first time, the news of his arrival in Multan reached the local administrator in no time.75

Reward and punishment

Sultan’s capriciousness while determining incentives or retribution fueled an air of insecurity and distrust. Bounteousness remained one of the most cherished traits of the rulers often indicated by historians in their accounts. When jubilant, the rulers granted incredible bounty upon the favourite officers.76 Sometimes, such munificence contributed to empty state treasury. In other cases there was the risk of castigation, immolation, flaying, trampling by elephant, which were so severe that the victim longed for an immediate death. This practice of reward and punishment depended upon the whims of the sultan and remained erratic. To conclude with, the asymmetrical relation between the ruler and the nobility nurtured volatility within the power structure. While the sultan nurtured trust based relations yet he trusted no one. The sultan’s officers desired for a weak sultan. A strong ruler fostered distrust among different ruling groups yet he ensured that they do not take up arms against each other. This passive and incessant hostility kept their integration into the political structure incomplete. This conscious instability in the ruling elite kept the nobles susceptible and dependent on the ruler. In the case of the death of a strong sultan Sultanate fell into interregnum also described as tawaif ul muluki (group rule) a state of multiplied violence when power was centralized in the hands of multiple mutually hostile and rival factions.

Notes And References

1. Introduction to a new edition of Elliot and Dowson (written by Muhammad Habib), History of India as Told by its Own Historians, II, Aligarh, 1952, pp. 36-82. For alternative view on urban revolution see Irfan Habib, Economic History of the Delhi Sultanate___ an interpretation, IHR, IV (2), pp. 287-288. 2. Popularly known as the Slave Dynasty (1206-1290) or Mumluks of India. In the Delhi Sultanate, historiography the word used for the tribe is Ilbari, however J.P.H.S., Vol. LXVII, Nos. 1 & 2 27

the correct pronunciation of the name of the tribe is Ölberli. For details see, B. P. Golden, “The Olberli (Olperli): The Fortunes and Misfortunes of an Inner Asian Nomadic Clan,” Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi 6 (1986[1988]), pp. 5-29. 3. For instance see, the issue of Balban’s hostility towards Kamal-i Mahyar, a son of the local Hindu slave for the post of revenue-intendant (khwajah) of Amroha. Ziya al-Din Barani, Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi (Persian), Calcatta, 1862., p. 36. 4. Barani, Târikh-i-Firûz Shâhi (Persian), pp. 484-485. In order to build his case Barani mentions several instances of breach of trust, disloyalty and revolts including: the revolt of Kanya Naik in Arangal due to which the control of the area was lost. Also he mentions another converted Muslim, who apostatized as soon as he reached Kanpala and rebelled against the sultan. Thus, the control of that region was also lost. 5. For instance see, Minhaj al-Din Abu ‘Umar Usman Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, (Persian), Lahore, n. p., 1952, p. 160. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i-Nasiri (Persian), p. 122. 9. umara’ (sing= amir) refers to the Sultanate ruling elite or patrimonial bureaucracy. The nearest English translation is “nobility” which invokes the hereditary, land- based ruling elite of medieval Europe with a largely feudal character. Since the Sultanate ruling elite was neither hereditary nor land based, and the mode of production was agrarian but not feudal, the term umara’ is preferable in this context. From this reference onwards the terms umara’ (singular= amir) and nobility (singular=noble) are used interchangeably. 10. Ibn-i-Battutah, Aja’ib al-Asfar (Urdu) Translated by Muhammad Hussain., Islamabad, NIHCR, 1983., pp. 92-93. For a similar view see also, Moinul Haq, “Was Muhammad B. Tughluq a Patricide?” Muslim University Journal Aligarh (1939). 11. Peter Jackson, The Delhi Sultanate: A Political and Military History, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 176. 12. tawa’if plural ta’ifa = group, muluki = rule or “rule of petty kings” This term appears frequently in Persian and Urdu literature produced in South Asia however; a similar term was used for eleventh century Andalusia which developed after the fall of Umayyad Caliph in the region. The era of the muluk ul tawa’if (which is also translated by Arab historians as ‘Party Kings’), to means the multitude of mutually hostile successor kingdoms of the Umayyad caliphate. Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 72. For details on muluk al-tawa’if or parakhandahshâhi see Michael Axworthy, Empire of the Mind: A History of Iran, London, Hurst & Company, 2007, p. 36. 13. For instance the end of Ghyasi Dynasty and early phase of Khalji dynasty was a time when the Mongols attacked the Sultanate most and Sultan Ala al-Din Khalji had to devise a very strong Mongol policy in order to counter it. Kishori Saran Lal, History of the Khaljis A.D. 1290-1320, Karachi, Union Book Stall, 1950), p. 81. 14. Barani, Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi (Persian), pp. 175-6. 28 Trust based Relations ...

15. Barani, Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi (Persian), p. 171: Yahya bin Ahmad ibn Abdullah Sirhindi, Tarikh-i-Mubarik Shahi, 56: Abul Qasim Firishta, Tarikh-i-Farishta, 76; Isami, Futuh-us-Salateen (Persian), pp. 205-206. K.S. Lal, The History of the Khaljis, p. 6. 16. Khurram Qadir, “The Political Theory and Practice,”, Multan, Bahaud Din Zakariya University, PhD thesis, 1992, p. 110. 17. See end notes; Isami, Futuhu’s Salatin or Shah Namah-i-Hind of Isami.(English) Translated and Edited by Husain, Agha Mahdi. Vol, I., Aligarh, University Press of Aligarh, 1976, pp. 457-458. Later peter Jackson also confirms this opinion, see, Jackson, The Delhi Sultanate, p. 175. 18. Foot notes, Ibn Battutah. ‘Aja’ib al Asfar. p. 85: Barani, Zia al-Din, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi. (Urdu) Translated by Sayyid Mu‘in al-Haq, Lahore, Shafiq Press, 1969. pp. 589-590. 19. Barani, Tarik-i-Firuz Shahi (Persian), pp, 65-66. 20. Ibid, pp. 109-110. 21 . Ibid. 22. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, Berkely, University of California Press, 1978. 23. Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Tarikh-i Fakhr al-Din Mubarak Shah, ed. E.D. Ross, London, Royal Asiatic Society, 1927, pp. 19-20. See also: M.S. Khan, ‘A Study of Fakhr Mudabbir’s Thoughts on Avoidance of Warfare’, Quarterly Journal of Pakistan Historical Society, vol. XLIII , part IV (1995): pp. 293-299.; Idem, ‘A Thirteenth Century Persian Source For the Art of Warfare in Early Medieval India’, Quarterly Journal of Pakistan Historical Society, vol. XXXVIII, Part IV (1990): pp. 293- 307. For a commentary on the religious beliefs of the Ghurids see: Anthony Welch, H. Keshani and A. Bain, ‘Epigraphs, Scripture, and Architecture’, Muqarnas, an Annual on the Visual Culture of the Islamic World, vol. XIX, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 2002, pp. 12-15. 24. Irfan Habib, ‘Formation of the Sultanate Ruling Class,’ Medieval India 1: Researches in History of India (1200-1750), ed. Irfan Habib, (1992), p. 10. 25. See: C. E. Bosworth, The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran 994-1040, New Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal Press, 1992., Chapter II discusses the patrimonial bureaucratic staff in the administrative structure and chapter III elaborates on the patrimonial bureaucratic staff in the army. C. E. Bosworth, ‘The Imperial Policy of the Early Ghaznavids’, Islamic Studies: Journal of the Central Institute of Islamic Research, Karachi, 1/3 (1962). p. 45.; See also: M. H. Syed, History of Delhi Sultanate, New Delhi, Mehra Offset Press, 2004, p. 7. 26. Jackson, The Delhi Sultanate: A Political and Military History, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 66-70. 27. Ibid., p. 26. 28. Khurram Qadir, “The Amiran-i-Chihalgan of Northern India.” Journal of Central Asia 4 (1981), pp. 59-146. see also, Gavin Hambly. “Who were the Chihilgani: The Forty Slaves of the Sultan Shams al-Din Iltutmish of Delhi.” Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies 10 (1972), pp. 57-62. 29. Qadir, “The Political Theory and Practice,” p. 110. 30. Qadir,”The Amiran-i-Chihalgan,” p. 105. J.P.H.S., Vol. LXVII, Nos. 1 & 2 29

31. He had married Iltutmish’s wife who was the mother of Nasir al-Din Mehmud. 32. Jackson, The Delhi Sultanate, p. 72-4. 33. Ibid., p. 174. 34. Ibid., pp. 174-175. 35. Ibid., p. 183. 36. Shams-i-Siraj Afif. Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi. Translated and Edited by H. M. Elliot and John Dowson., Lahore, Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2006, p. 191, Firuz Shah used slaves to consolidate his rule. Khurram Qadir, “Firoz Shah (Tughluq), A Personality Study,” Journal of Central Asia 9, No. 2, (December 1986), pp. 17-39. 37. Foot notes, Ibn Battutah. ‘Aja’ib al Asfar. p. 85: Barani, Diya’ al-Din, Tarikh- i Firuz Shahi. (Urdu) Translated by Sayyid Mu‘in al-Haq, Lahore, Shafiq Press, 1969. pp. 589-590. 38. See end notes; ‘Isami, Futuhu’s Salatin or Shah Namah-i-Hind of Isami.(English) Translated and Edited by Husain, Agha Mahdi. Vol, I., Aligarh, University Press of Aligarh, 1976, pp. 457-458. Later peter Jackson also confirms this opinion, see, Jackson, The Delhi Sultanate, p. 175. 39. Barani, Tarikh, (Urdu), p. 589. 40. Jackson, The Delhi Sultanate, p. 310: Sirhindi, Yahya Bin Ahmad Bin Abdullah. The Tarikh-i-Mubarakshahi. Translated by K. K. Basu., Karachi, Karimsons,1977. p. 166. 41. Jackson, The Delhi Sultanate, p. 175. 42. Barani, Tarikh,(Urdu), pp. 403-409. 43. Jackson, The Delhi Sultanate, p. 175. 44. Lal, The Khaljis, p. 168. 45. Barani, Tarikh,(Urdu), p. 551. 46. Ibid., p. 185. 47. Afif, Tarikh Firuz Shahi, p. 267. 48. See Notes, Ibn Battutah, Aja’ib al Asfar, p. 200. 49. Khuslu Khan was a friend of Muhammad ibn Tughluq and ruler of Sind he disobeyed the Sultan. The Sultan decided to kill him so he openly rebelled. He was killed. For details see, Ibid., p. 165. 50. Afif, Tarikh Firuz Shahi, p. 267; Jackson, The Delhi Sultanate, p. 185. 51. Ibid., p. 161. 52. Ibid., pp. 162-163. 53. Ibid., p. 164. 54. Sirhindi, Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi, p. 165; Edward Thomas, The Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi, Lahore, 1975, p. 312. 55. Afif, Tarikh Firuz Shahi, p. 193. 56. Most of the population of Delhi was enslaved and was subsequently taken to central Asia, for details see, Scott C. Levi ,”Hindu Beyond Hindu Kush: Indians in the Central Asian Slave Trade.” Journal of Royal Asiatic Society 12, Part 3 (November 2002), pp, 277-288 57. Same was suggested by Nizam al-Mulk Tusi in his magnum opus Siyasat Nama, for details see Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, Siyasat Nama (Persian), Illahabad, Lala Ram Narayan Lal, 1931, pp. 67, 80, 83, 90. Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, Siyasat Namah. trans., Urdu, Shah Hasan Ata., Karachi, Nafis Academy, 1976, pp. 119-120. 30 Trust based Relations ...

58. S. B. P. Nigam, Nobility under the Sultans of Delhi AD 1206-1398, (Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal Press, 1968, p. 30-33. 59. Irfan Habib, “Formation of the Sultanate Ruling Class of the Thirteenth Century,” in Irfan Habib (ed.), Medieval India 1: Researches in History of India (1200- 1750), Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 11-13. 60. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i-Nasiri (Persian), p. 93. 61. Ibn-i Battûtah, Aja’ib al Asfar, pp, 4-5 62. For instance, Turkish governors and Tajik officers at the centre during the post Iltutmish interregnum,. Also, Balban’s appointment of Khaljis as keepers of fortresses and policing the cities. 63. Josef W. Meri, Medieval Islamic Civilization: An Encyclopedia, vol. I, (Routledge, 2006), p. 448. 64. For instance Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq not only transferred iqtadars on their bad performance but also for their good performance which could have made them popular. Ibn-i-i Battutah, Aja’ib al-Asfar, p. 179. 65. Juzjani, Tabaqat-i Nasiri, (Persian), p. 46. 66. Ibn-i Battutah, Aja’ib al Asfar, p. 108. 67. Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi (Persian), p. 282. 68. Ibid., p. 282. 69. Barani, Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi (Persian), p. 302: Siri is one of the (six) many sub-cities of Delhi. Stephen Blake, Shahjahanabad, pp. 3-8. 70. According to Ibn-i-Battutah, the sultan was disquieted from the people of Delhi who wrote slangs on the pieces of paper and threw them inside the royal residence. This offended the ruler and resulted in the change of capital. Although, this reason neither seem authentic nor it makes any sense as a justification of such a big move. However, this is what must have been the prevalent public impression. Ibn-i-Battutah, Aja’ib al Asfar, pp. 158-159. ‘Isami, Futuh us Salatin, pp. 446-447: B.N. Roy, “The Transfer of Capital from Delhi to Dolatabad,” Journal of Indian History 20 (1941), pp. 159-180. 71. For a detailed account of the economic reforms of Ala al-Din see, Barani, Tarikh- i-Firuz Shahi (Persian), pp. 304-320. also see Irfan Habib, “The price regulations of Ala al-Din Khalji – a defense of Zia Barani, Indian Economic and Social History Review 21 (1984); pp. 393-414. 72. Barani, Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi (Persian), pp. 304-320. 73. Ibid, pp. 40-41. 74. Ibn-i-Battutah, Ajâ‘íib al-Asfar , pp. 241-243. 75. Ibid., pp. 1-2. 76. Siddiqui, Perso-Arabic Sources on the Life and Conditions in the Sultanate of Delhi, (n.p., 1992), pp. 6-9.