sudanHuman Security Baseline Assessment issue brief Small Arms Survey Number 3 (2nd edn.) November 2006—February 2007

Anatomy of civilian disarmament in Recent experiences and implications

espite the end of the second and the Sudan People’s Liberation armament and security improvement Sudanese civil war in Janu- Army (SPLA), now operating under the efforts in . These lessons ary 2005, South Sudan has auspices of the fl edgling Government are particularly timely given that the D 3 remained volatile and insecure. This of South Sudan (GoSS), is actively con- United Nations, together with govern- is due, in part, to the widespread pro- ducting it. In some instances, its efforts ment and non-governmental partners, liferation of small arms in the hands have had devastating consequences for is preparing major conventional DDR of both armed groups and civilians. human security. and community security programmes But while the Comprehensive This Issue Brief examines two recent for 2007. Peace Agreement (CPA) calls for the experiences of civilian disarmament in The Issue Brief fi nds that a range of disarmament, demobilization, and re- Jonglei State. Both interventions gen- internal and external pressures are integration (DDR) of so-called Other erated weapons surrenders but had acting on the SPLA that continue to Armed Groups (OAGs),1 it provides substantially different human security steer it towards a militaristic and coer- comparatively little guidance on the outcomes. By looking closely at the cive approach to civilian disarmament. question of disarming civilians.2 Yet local contexts, design, and execution of These pressures must be taken into civilian disarmament is an essential these two campaigns, important lessons account in evaluating its past efforts step in bringing security to the region, are highlighted for future civilian dis- and anticipating future campaigns. It

A UN observer surveys civilian small arms surrendered in Akobo, Jonglei State, in August 2006. © Mohamed Nureldin Abdalah/Reuters

www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 1 targeting civil- What is civilian ians. Before more comprehensive, disarmament? pacifi c civilian Civilian disarmament is a generic con- also fi nds that due to current constraints disarmament can be achieved, a deeper cept that encompasses a wide variety in the mandates and capacities of var- understanding of local dynamics affect- of interventions. These range from ious UN agencies on the ground, the ing the SPLA’s approach, and the un- tightened regulatory mechanisms for international community is poorly posi- willingness of certain communities to private arms possession and forcible tioned to support a voluntary approach disarm, is required. fi rearms seizures, to public awareness

2 Sudan Issue Brief Number 3 (2nd edn.) November 2006—February 2007 and sensitization campaigns and Coercive disarmament is only sel- hand over their weapons, arguing with weapons buy-back, collection, and dom undertaken by the UN, specifi cally some justifi cation that they needed destruction programmes. Along with by the Department of Peacekeeping them to defend themselves against DDR, civilian disarmament is increas- Operations, pursuant to a Chapter VI neighbouring Murle, who retained ingly considered to be a mainstay of or VII mandate. In Sudan, there remains their weapons. Simultaneous disarma- post-confl ict recovery programmes.4 considerable debate within the UN ment was not on offer. Within this broad spectrum of acti- over whether all SPLA disarmament A rash of minor skirmishes between vities, practitioners and analysts distin- initiatives are coercive or not. the white army and the SPLA erupted guish between coercive and voluntary during the early stages of the disarma- efforts: ment campaign in January 2006.9 Civilian disarmament in Crucially, clashes included members Coercive civilian disarmament is often northern Jonglei (December of a group within the South Sudan pursued as part of crime reduction, Defence Force (SSDF) led by Simon peacekeeping, or peace support opera- 2005—May 2006) Gatwitch that had joined the SPLA tions. It is usually administered exclu- The SPLA-led disarmament campaign following the Juba Declaration. In the sively by security structures—including in northern Jonglei6 was launched ensuing mayhem, SPLA forces were formal law enforcement, military, or against a backdrop of simmering ten- scattered, many dying of thirst and peacekeeping personnel. In many cases, sions over common property resources hunger. Wutnyang Gatkek, a spiritual arms are collected and destroyed, and politicized inter-ethnic rivalries.7 leader of the Nuer from Fangak and, while in others, weapons are recycled Problems emerged in December 2005 more critically, a former white army into newly reconstituted armed forces after Lou and Gawaar Nuer pastoral- member, was one of the fi rst people or policing services. ists requested permission from the killed when he went to Yuai on behalf Voluntary civilian disarmament is Dinka Hol and Nyarweng from Duk of the SPLA to sell the disarmament decentralized, and often combines both county to graze cattle on their lands. programme.10 His death amounted to collective and individual incentives. It The Dinka civil authorities requested a symbol of the SPLA’s ineffectiveness may be conducted as part of a formal that the Nuer pastoralists surrender in convincing local youth to turn in crime or peacekeeping intervention or their weapons before grazing their their weapons. It also threatened the can be designed to accompany a devel- livestock. The Lou Nuer summarily onset of inter-clan confl ict between the opment programme. Such activities refused, noting that disarmament had Nuer and the Dinka, further intensifying frequently employ amnesties, weapons never been a precondition. Informal demands within the SPLA for military buy-backs, or ‘weapons for develop- meetings were held with representa- retaliation. ment’ activities. tives of the white army,8 the Dinka from Following the white army attack , Nuer from and on the SPLA, the Juba leadership of Whatever the material and devel- Fangak counties, and the Jonglei State the SPLM/A was seized with the issue. opment incentives provided in either government. During these meetings it GoSS Security Committee members type of effort, a crucial difference is was stressed that a forcible campaign were divided between those calling that coercive disarmament carries the would take place if weapons were not for swift retribution against the white threat of punitive measures for non- surrendered voluntarily. army, and those urging restraint. These compliance, while voluntary efforts do One reason many civilians were tensions mirrored deeper splits, between not. Nevertheless, voluntary disarma- reluctant to disarm was that the terms supporters of the previous SPLM/A ment is often combined with, or in some of the campaign were never entirely leader John Garang and those of his cases precedes, coercive disarmament clear. Compensation was offered by successor, Salva Kiir, the current presi- of the same community. This point is the Jonglei governor, Philip Thon Lek, dent of the GoSS. particularly relevant in the case of recent a Nyarweng Dinka from Duk county, A conference on 27 February– civilian disarmament efforts in South for voluntarily returned arms, but 7 March was rapidly organized in the Sudan. details concerning the source of these heart of Lou Nuer territory to convince There is no standard template for funds were lacking. Not surprisingly, the white army to surrender their arms civilian disarmament. But lessons the Lou and Gawaar Nuer refused to to the SPLA voluntarily. The result was learned reveal that efforts should be embedded in an appropriate norma- tive framework, be preceded by a sensitization campaign, and combine GoSS Security Committee members were divided clear criteria for surrendered weapons. Adequately resourced procedures for between those calling for swift retribution against compensation and weapons destruc- tion are also preferable wherever the white army, and those urging restraint. possible.5

www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 3 nity security approach,15 but others By most standards, the human costs of disarmament within UNMIS remain fi rmly focused on conventional DDR of armed com- in northern Jonglei were high. batants as prescribed by the CPA. Moreover, the military component of UNMIS was unable or unwilling to engage in civilian disarmament in far from encouraging. Meanwhile, August 2006, owing to persistent inse- northern Jonglei. Military Intelligence of the Sudan curity and the presence of mines and Armed Forces (SAF) reportedly began unexploded ordnance in the area. to take advantage of the escalating There is considerable uncertainty Civilian disarmament in tension by stirring up violence in neigh- over what will happen next. Though bouring Upper Nile State and supply- Governor Philip promised compensa- Akobo (March—August 2006) ing the white army with weapons and tion for voluntarily surrendered Prior to the disarmament campaign in ammunition, even while allegedly weapons, it was never clarifi ed who the north of the state, between 2004 and destroying symbolic stocks for the UN would provide compensation and in 2005 a small UN contingent worked Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).11 what form. Local authorities would like quietly with local government admin- The wider consequences of the co- to receive collective (i.e. development) istrators and SPLA counterparts to ercive disarmament campaign did not benefi ts for turning over their commu- develop what was expected to be a fully emerge until later, in May 2006. nity’s weapons. Major priorities identi- voluntary civilian disarmament in A major confrontation occurred in the fi ed include schools, clinics, and water , to the south-east. There triangle of Motot, Karam, and Yuai on systems. Meanwhile, many households they identifi ed pilot areas, and by July 18 May when at least 113 white army continue to believe that weapons pos- 2005 a project involving the SPLA, fi ghters were killed12 against one SPLA session is an inalienable right, though civil authorities, women, and youth soldier, after which the white army they supported the disarmament. organizations was established. Key realized it could not defeat the SPLA. By most standards, the human costs preconditions included security guar- In their retreat, the white army plun- of disarmament in northern Jonglei antees, appropriate compensation, dered cattle and property from civilians. were high. Though it is impossible to and a neutral third party to broker The pursuing SPLA also carried out establish the exact numbers, an esti- voluntary civilian disarmament. Due widespread looting, including that of mated 1,200 white army and 400 SPLA mainly to capacity limitations, the UN the white army members in fl ight. The soldiers were killed over the course of was unable to play a more robust role. decisive defeat of the white army drove the campaign. Offi cials from SPLM Akobo commissioner Doyak Chol, them into retreat toward Dolieb Hill Nyirol County report at least 213 civil- with vocal support from Jonglei Gov- in Upper Nile State. But rather than ian deaths. There was pervasive looting ernor Philip, put the civilian disarma- follow them, the SPLA called a meeting and houses were burned in the villages ment programme in motion in early of chiefs and local authorities on 20 of Karam, Gogoak, and Chuai Dok, 2006. In the wake of the violence in May to organize disarmament. Chiefs which were perceived as the centres northern Jonglei, he had to work rapidly mobilized their communities, of resistance. Another unanticipated fast. Sources indicate that SPLA com- and weapons were passed through consequence of the coercive disarma- mander Bol Kong initially gave Chol them, to local authorities, and then on ment was chronic food shortages: the two weeks to generate visible results to the SPLA. white army raided cattle and goats before Kong would move the army in Measured in terms of weapons from the community while the SPLA and do the job himself—with possibly collected, the northern Jonglei disarma- also lived off the land during their the same outcomes as in northern ment was a success. The two-month interventions. Jonglei. Doyak and Philip petitioned campaign was described by local UNMIS, despite its early support, the Juba leadership for traditional authorities as 95 per cent effective. The did not participate in or actively sup- authorities, teachers, and youth lead- UN estimated that 3,300 weapons were port the disarmament in northern ers to be primarily responsible for acquired.13 Local SPLM authorities Jonglei. As noted above, the UN does undertaking disarmament—without claim that they and the chiefs acquired not typically engage in coercive civilian direct SPLA involvement. 3,701 weapons in the Nyirol area disarmament. Furthermore, in the case In March 2006, after intense bouts of alone—a signifi cantly higher number of Jonglei, certain UN components held violence, a ceasefi re was arranged than contended by the UN.14 Some of to a narrow reading of UN Security between local Lou Nuer and Murle these weapons were taken by the Council resolutions and the CPA, which chiefs in Akobo.16 Against a backdrop SPLA to unknown destinations, others focuses heavily on DDR of armed of internal SPLA tensions, the NGO are reportedly still being held locally. groups—not civilians. Certain key Pact-Sudan mediated a peace process Disarmament of other areas, such as actors within the UN’s integrated DDR between the Lou Nuer and Murle Ayod, was still incomplete as of late Unit have readily endorsed a commu- chiefs in May and June 2006.

4 Sudan Issue Brief Number 3 (2nd edn.) November 2006—February 2007 Civilians carry weapons to a disarmament collection point in Akobo, August 2006. © Mohamed Nureldin Abdalah/Reuters

A plan for reciprocal disarmament the fi rst time.18 Others, including the had joined the SPLA and that disarma- began in July 2006, organized through SPLA itself, are less positive in assess- ment could proceed. chiefs and administered by county, ing its success. According to former Most chiefs taking part in the civilian payam, and community-level disarma- SSDF offi cials now with the SPLA, disarmament process were anxious to ment committees. Schoolteachers were less than one-quarter to only ‘a small convince the SPLA that an effective, trained to safely clear, register, and fraction’ of the actual number of weap- peaceful, and voluntary process could store the weapons in ten disarmament ons in the area were collected.19 take place in Jonglei. They were also centres. ‘Mobilization teams’ were The impending Murle disarmament keen to regain authority in their com- also created, and public sensitization had weighed heavily on both the GoSS munities and reduce the infl uence of the programmes were launched, supported and UN actors in the region. Unlike white army. Further, UN engagement in by the UN, with many travelling along the Lou Nuer of Akobo, who are the process was held to add legitimacy the Pibor and Agvei Rivers. aligned with the SPLM/A, the main and ensure that meetings, communica- The Akobo disarmament pro- leader of the Murle, Major-General tions equipment, and safe transporta- gramme generated some important and Ismael Konyi, was aligned with the SAF tion of weapons would take place. From visible successes. By 30 July, an estimated at the time and was a senior fi gure in the UN perspective, participation in the 1,400 serviceable rifl es, machine guns, the SSDF. This alliance persisted despite Akobo campaign provided UNMIS rocket-propelled grenades, and mortars repeated efforts by many in the SPLM/ with a pilot for voluntary civilian were turned in.17 Despite concerns A, chiefs, and members of the interna- disarmament, though there were con- that SAF-backed Murle militia might tional community to convince Ismael cerns internally that most agencies disrupt civilian disarmament by agi- to join the SPLA and reduce the likeli- and state entities were insuffi ciently tating locals to resist the process, it took hood of more coercive, and probably prepared.20 place relatively peacefully. According violent, disarmament. The Murle The Akobo disarmament experience to observers, weapons are no longer leadership, fi nally recognizing that highlights the confl uence of coercive carried openly and the authorities have disarmament could not be postponed, and voluntary disarmament. Though asserted control over the territory for announced on 22 September that it it was designed as a voluntary process,

www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 5 Akobo residents held no illusions about close to former leader John Garang Countering northern agitation. The what lay ahead should they refuse to and those surrounding Salva Kiir. The SPLM/A is acutely conscious that the participate voluntarily. Thus it is not SPLA military high command remains SAF has for years infi ltrated, infl uenced, correct to interpret the Akobo disarma- dominated by Bor Dinka ‘Garangists’, controlled, and supplied a range of ment campaign as an exclusively vol- while the SSDF members who went armed groups in the South. Khartoum’s untary process.21 into the SPLA as a result of the Juba continuing support for ‘rump’ SSDF But it was the implied, rather than Declaration are largely Nuer, support and other elements has led senior the de facto, coercion that played a Salva, remain deeply suspicious of the SPLM/A offi cials to approach unknown decisive role in the overwhelming par- Garangists, and were upset by their civilian groups with a high degree of ticipation of civilians. It should also marginalization during the northern suspicion.24 Certainly, some or all of be noted that the UN found itself in a Jonglei disarmament. Suspicion of the the armed groups opposed to the delicate situation, as it is unable to objectives of the SPLA disarmament SPLM/A are viewed as fi fth column- endorse anything less than a fully was even greater in the countryside, ists to be eliminated. voluntary process. home to many in the SSDF and to the Territorial aspirations. SPLM/A-led white army. disarmament appears to be part of a Narrow militaristic orientation of broader struggle against the SAF in the Factors affecting the the SPLM/A. The SPLM/A, though northern and oil-producing borderlands, SPLA approach to civilian embracing a political agenda, has long where the national army is increasingly disarmament been dominated by a militarist ideology, taking up offensive positions. Before was led by military men, and gave scant the SPLA can confront this challenge, A range of factors are shaping SPLA attention to political struggle, including it has to ensure the security of its terri- decisions to engage in civilian disarma- administration and the development tory and eliminate elements that may ment in the South. Some of these are 23 of a guiding political ideology. From be under the infl uence and direction internal to the SPLA itself. Others are the movement’s inception in 1983 it saw of the SAF. external, and tied to the broader aspi- itself as engaged in a revolutionary Legacy of inter-tribal mistrust. The rations of various groups in the region, struggle that would lead it to victory. northern Jonglei disarmament cam- including the SPLA. In order to ensure Military offi cers take the lead in dealing paign reawakened memories of the that tragic mistakes are not repeated, with all manner of problems, particu- horrifi c attack on the Bor Dinka in 1991 it is crucial that the UN, donors, and larly in the countryside, and their by the Nuer that occurred after the others acknowledge and understand approach is likely to be authoritarian SPLM/A leadership split between Riek these competing motivations. Some, and ultimately to involve the use of Macher and Garang, himself a Bor but not all, are listed below: force to implement decisions. It is Dinka. There is little doubt that the contrary to an approach expected by a Internal factors pain and anger have not been resolved civilian administration; and it was and continue to affect relations between The SPLA is overstretched and suffers such an approach that dominated the Dinka and Nuer as a whole. While from weak command and control. In northern Jonglei disarmament. there is little evidence that, as some the wake of former SPLA leader John have claimed, this legacy shaped the Garang’s death, there has been a scram- External factors violent response of the SPLA to the ble for positions, tensions with the SSDF, Hegemonic ambition. Ever since the white army’s attack, these sentiments settling of old tribal scores, in-fi ghting signing of the CPA, the SPLM/A has are likely to have surfaced during its between the Dinka heartland and Lakes been eager to assert its hegemonic course. State, and the usual challenges of trans- position in the South. It won its forming a rebel group into a conven- present status through negotiations tional army. Some progress has been with Khartoum that excluded all other Conclusions made in military restructuring, includ- southern actors, some of whom were The issue of civilian disarmament was ing the provision of supplies and in angry at being left out. The SPLM/A not adequately addressed in the CPA, some cases the provision of ‘incentives’ leadership felt that the safest route yet it remains a key requirement for 22 to certain staff ; but is worth under- to absolute authority was to force future stability in South Sudan. The scoring that SPLA forces deployed to friends and enemies alike to accept widespread possession and use of northern Jonglei to disarm civilians that its army alone had the right to small arms and light weapons among were forced by lack of supplies to sub- retain weapons. The SPLM assumed civilians exacerbates local insecurity sist on cattle from local inhabitants—a that only the strong presence of its and inhibits the infl ux of development major factor contributing to discontent army would convince southerners to assistance and personnel to the region. in the region. turn over their weapons; hence the To date, the civilian leadership of Persistent tensions within SPLA threat of violence, or its actual applica- the GoSS has yet to moderate the heavy- leadership. A deep rift divides those tion, was part of the process. handed tactics of the SPLA, whose

6 Sudan Issue Brief Number 3 (2nd edn.) November 2006—February 2007 tral Upper Nile’ region, although it is not The GoSS has not set out a comprehensive civilian part of Upper Nile State. 7 The account of the northern Jonglei dis- armament campaign and its descent into disarmament plan that the international community violence is based largely on Small Arms Survey (2006). can legitimately support. 8 ‘White army’ denotes loose collectives of armed civilians (typically youth) who mobilize in response to local concerns. It is predominately composed of Nuer. actions are infl uenced by deep internal to a fi erce debate within the UN about 9 Coercive and uneven disarmament was also being carried out by the SPLA along political and tribal confl icts. The absorp- whether it can fully support similar the Sobat and Baro river system, which tion of the Nuer-dominated SSDF into efforts. As of the time of writing, these reportedly resulted in a handful of deaths the army, and the resistance to it from issues have not yet been thoroughly among civilians and SPLA members. 26 Dinka in its ranks, is the latest factor aired or resolved. 10 See Pact-Sudan (2006). affecting the dynamics of disarmament. 11 See Small Arms Survey (2006). At the same time, the GoSS has not 12 The numbers are disputed. In an interview set out a comprehensive civilian dis- Notes conducted in January 2007, a payam admin- armament plan that the international This Issue Brief was authored by HSBA istrator in Yuai reported that 228 people community can legitimately support. team members and benefi ted from consul- had lost their lives. Although discussions are under way tations with Sudanese government repre- 13 Ibid. 14 SPLM offi cials, Nyirol County (Motot, 26 for cooperative disarmament through sentatives and UN offi cials. the Community Security and Arms Con- August 2006). 25 15 There is no standard defi nition of what trol programme, the SPLA’s current 1 The CPA stipulates that no armed groups constitutes a ‘community security’ pro- de facto strategy is primarily a military allied to either party may continue to exist. gramme. In practice, it refers to a host of one: to do what it must to neutralize OAG members have the choice of either interventions designed to generate safe, being integrated into the SPLA or joining the SSDF, eliminate all armed civilian weapons-free environments in post- a variety of services (such as wildlife or groups in the South, and position itself confl ict contexts. Such interventions may the civil service) and being disarmed. This to confront the SAF in the border and combine military and policing activities Issue Brief focuses on the disarmament of oil areas. Many within the SPLA un- with customary authority structures and armed civilians, not OAGs. questionably believe that reaching pre-existing local security arrangements. 2 The CPA’s only reference to civilian dis- these goals calls for all the tools of The UN is increasingly pursuing commu- armament is in section 14.6.5.15 of the nity security programmes to complement war, including coercion and violence agreement on permanent ceasefi re and DDR, including in Haiti and Sudan against civilians. security arrangements implementation (Muggah, 2005; 2006). Viewed in this light, the UN’s cur- modalities (31 December 2004), which 16 Local peace committees claim that 60–70 rent stance on civilian disarmament in empowers the Ceasefi re Joint Military people had been massacred between Jan- South Sudan cannot be maintained. Committee (CJMT) to ‘monitor and verify uary and February 2006. Because its mandate is tied to the CPA, the disarmament of all Sudanese civilians 17 The UN offi cial closest to the process, UNMIS may only monitor and observe who are illegally armed’. This passage David Lochhead, contends that, given disarmament activities, rather than gives rise to two particular problems. First, there is a lack of clarity about what con- the relatively small number of young men actively engage in them. Its local repu- stitutes ‘illegal’ in this context, since gun in the community, the 500 that joined the tation suffered greatly when it offered laws have not yet been enacted in South SPLA and hence kept their weapons, and no offi cial condemnation of the violence Sudan. Second, the boundary between the number of gun-owning men who were accompanying disarmament in north- civilians and armed groups is far from out of the community at the time of the ern Jonglei. clear, as the case of the so-called white intervention, the programme generated Following that episode, the UN was army—ad hoc groupings of armed civil- high returns of weaponry. Commissioner eager to associate itself with what it ians—demonstrates. Doyak contended that fewer than 200 hoped and expected would be peace- 3 In accordance with the CPA, the SPLM weapons remained in private hands at ful and voluntary disarmament in controls 70% of positions in the GoSS, the time this research was carried out. 18 Communication with David Lochhead, Akobo. The collaboration among the the other southern parties 20%, and the National Congress Party 10%. November 2006. UN DDR Unit, UNDP Sudan, and lead- 4 See Small Arms Survey (2005) and Muggah 19 See Small Arms Survey (2006). ing local offi cials boded well—and (2006). 20 Communication with senior UN DDR when widespread violence did not take 5 See Faltas et al. (2001) and Muggah (2005). offi cials. place, the success of the effort was 6 The area referred to here as ‘northern Jon- 21 An UNMIS (2006) press release announcing widely proclaimed. glei’ includes Wuror and Nyirol counties the conclusion of the Akobo campaign But the campaign was in fact far less of Jonglei State. This region formed a part greatly overemphasizes the voluntary than fully voluntary, and this has led of what was formerly known as the ‘Cen- aspect of the effort.

www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan 7 22 Ongoing pre-registration of SPLA will —. 2006. ‘Emerging from the Shadow of War: HSBA publications probably generate a register as a basis for A Critical Perspective on DDR and payrolls, which will also allow for budget- Weapons Reduction in the Post-Confl ict Sudan Issue Briefs ing and potential downsizing. Period.’ Journal of Contemporary Security Number 1 September 2006 23 See Small Arms Survey (2006). Policy, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 190–205. Persistent threats: Widespread human insecurity 24 For an account of ‘rump’ SSDF since the Pact-Sudan. 2006. April Summary Situation in Lakes State, South Sudan, since the Comprehen- Juba Declaration, see Young (2006). Report on Upper Nile. 9 May. sive Peace Agreement 25 This would likely involve the presidency, UNMIS. 2006. ‘Sudan: The UN Hails the Suc- Number 2 October 2006 police, Interior Ministry, DDR, SPLA, cessful Completion of Community-driven Armed groups in Sudan: The South Sudan Defence UNDP, UNMIS, and NGOs. Disarmament in Akobo, Jonglei State.’ 22 Forces in the aftermath of the Juba Declaration 26 Communication with senior UN DDR August. offi cials. Small Arms Survey. 2005. ‘Managing “Post- Number 3 November 2006–February 2007 confl ict” Zones: DDR and Weapons Reduc- Anatomy of civilian disarmament in Jonglei State: tion.’ In Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons Recent experiences and implications at War. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Bibliography Number 4 December 2006 —. 2006. SPLM/A Disarmament in Jonglei and Faltas, Sami, Camilla Waszink, and Glenn No dialogue, no commitment: The perils of deadline its Implications. Unpublished HSBA back- McDonald. 2001. Removing Small Arms from diplomacy for Darfur ground paper. Geneva: Small Arms Society: A Review of Weapons Destruction Survey. and Destruction Programs. Occasional Paper Young, John. 2006. The South Sudan Defence Sudan Working Papers No. 2. Geneva: Small Arms Survey. Forces in the Wake of the Juba Declaration. Number 1 November 2006 Muggah, Robert. 2005. ‘No Magic Bullet: A HSBA Working Paper 1. Geneva: Small The South Sudan Defence Forces in the wake of the Critical Perspective on Disarmament, Arms Survey. Juba Declaration, by John Young Demobilization and Reintegration and Weapons Reduction during Post-Confl ict.’ Number 2 February 2007 Commonwealth Journal of International Violence and victimization in South Sudan: Lakes Affairs, Vol. 94, No. 379. State in the post-CPA period, by Richard Garfi eld

HSBA project summary The Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment The HSBA project is supported by Foreign Affairs and (HSBA) is a two-year research programme (2005– International Trade Canada and the UK Government Global 07) administered by the Small Arms Survey, an Confl ict Prevention Pool. independent research project of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. It has been developed in cooperation with the Canadian Credits Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UNMIS, the UN Development Design and layout: Richard Jones Programme, and a wide array of international and Suda- ([email protected]) nese NGO partners. Through the active generation and Cartography: Jillie Luff, MAPgrafi x dissemination of timely empirical research, the HSBA project works to support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programmes, security sector Contact details reform (SSR), and arms control interventions to promote For more information or to provide feedback, contact security. The assessment is being carried out by a multi- Claire Mc Evoy, HSBA project coordinator, at disciplinary team of regional, security, and public health [email protected]. specialists. It will review the distribution of armed violence throughout Sudan and offer policy-relevant advice to Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment redress insecurity. Small Arms Survey Sudan Issue Briefs are designed to provide periodic snap- 47 Avenue Blanc shots of baseline information. Future issues will focus on a 1202 Geneva variety of issues, including armed groups, the trade and Switzerland transfer of small arms into and out of Sudan, and victimiza- Tel.: +41 22 908 5777 tion rates. The HSBA also generates a series of timely and Fax: +41 22 732 2738 user-friendly working papers in English and Arabic, avail- able at www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan. Visit www.smallarmssurvey.org/sudan

8 Sudan Issue Brief Number 3 (2nd edn.) November 2006—February 2007