The Orthodox Church and Its Palestinian-Christian Identity

THE ORTHODOX CHURCH AND ITS PALESTINIAN-CHRISTIAN IDENTITY

LEONARD MARSH*

A. THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN ITS HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SETTING IN JERUSALEM AND PALESTINE: A BRIEF SURVEY

The unity of the earliest Christian community in the Holy Land had, by the ﬁrst Muslim conquest of Palestine in 638 CE, been undermined by the Christological controversies of the fourth and ﬁfth centuries.1 Despite these divisions, and a growing estrangement between the Latin West and the Greek East, as well as ‘Oriental’ Christianity, there had been until the onset of the Crusader period reasonably good relations among these groups. The early Islamic period saw an important cultural development, with Christians beginning to pray in Arabic, the language of their rulers. All kinds of Chris- tian literature were translated into Arabic, including the Bible, liturgical texts, patristic texts, and other ecclesiastical works.2 The fall of Jerusalem, followed by the development of the Latin Crusader kingdoms, meant greater alienation among Greek and Latin traditions within the Church. From Sala- din’s capture of Jerusalem, until its Ottoman absorption, the city was gov- erned by the Ayyubids and Mamluks from Egypt. The prominent position

* Leonard Marsh is an Anglican priest in a London parish. He has a specialist interest in the contemporary theological and political movements within the Palestinian Christian community in Jerusalem and the Holy Land. He read History and Theology at the Uni- versity of Hull. After training for ordination he undertook postgraduate research and study at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He has published many articles on Palestinian Christianity. 1 Francis E. Peters, Jerusalem, The Holy City in the Eyes of Chroniclers, Visitors, Pilgrims and Prophets from the Days of Abraham to the Beginnings of Modern Times (Princeton NJ, 1985). 2 Anthony O’Mahony, ‘Palestinian Christians: Religion, Politics and Society, c. 1800- 1948’, in Palestinian Christians: Religion, Politics and Society in the Holy Land, ed. A. O’Mahony (London, 1999), pp. 9-95, p. 11.

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of the Latin Church weakened, and there developed the struggle between the Latin and Orthodox Churches for the control of the Holy Places, which remains such a pronounced factor in the consciousness of the Orthodox Church of the Holy Land. After the fourteenth century, many different communities organised themselves in the Holy Places: Latins, Greeks, Armeni- ans, Georgians, Syrians, Nubians, Copts, Ethiopians, and Maronites. How- ever, struggle over these sites mainly involved the Armenians, the Greek Orthodox, and the Latins, since the others were too poor to be signiﬁcant players.3

1. Under Ottoman Rule The Ottoman victory at Constantinople in 1455 and the capture of Jerusa- lem in 1517 increased the influence of the Orthodox Church. The Armeni- ans and the Orthodox were recognised as millets, or communities, whereas Latins were supported by powers with which the Ottomans were in conflict.4 Although Christian communities of different traditions existed, only Ortho- dox and Latin millets, along with Armenians and Ethiopians, had significant standing before the nineteenth century. Extraordinary challenges in the nineteenth century meant that the Otto- man administration strengthened its provincial (Sanjak) organisation, leading to the Sanjaks of Jerusalem and Gaza realising greater importance.5 The Christian world also showed a growing interest in the Holy Land, from Ethiopia, the Americas, Russia, Germany and Britain. Russian involvement with the Orthodox grew alongside French influence among the Latin, East- ern and Oriental Catholic communities.6 The emerging pattern of the San- jak framework owed a great deal to the importance of Jerusalem and the

3 Ibid, p. 15. 4 Anthony O’Mahony, ‘The Religious, Political and Social Status of Christian Communi- ties in Palestine’, in The Christian Heritage in the Holy Land, ed. A. O’Mahony (London, 1995), pp. 237-256; id., ‘Les chrétiens palestiniens: Politique, droit et sociéte, 1917-1948’, in De Balfour à Ben Gourion – La France, L’Europe occidentale et la Palestine, 1917-1948, eds. Dominique Trimbur & Ran Aaronsohn (Paris, 2008), pp. 357-406. 5 Ibid, p. 245. 6 Sotiris Roussos, ‘The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and Community of Jerusalem. Church, State and Identity’, in The Christian Communities of Jerusalem and the Holy Land, ed. A. O’Mahony (Cardiff, 2003), pp. 38-56.

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Holy Land to Christians in general, but its institutional expression should be noted. The jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate had existed since Roman times and covered Western and Eastern Palestine.7 As the Ottoman Empire declined, new inﬂuences were brought to bear in the Middle East. Russia increasingly displayed ambitions to become a new focus for Orthodoxy. This was part of a larger vision, seeing themselves as a ‘third Rome’, and from 1843 Russian inﬂuence became more obvious. This was demonstrated particularly through the organisation known as The Impe- rial Palestine Society, with its activities in education and welfare among the Arab Orthodox.8

2. The British Mandate in Palestine (1917-1948) Up until the First World War, two Empires, the Ottoman and Russian, sustained Eastern Orthodoxy, and Orthodoxy was part of the fabric of these states.9 The mandate administrations of Britain and France, the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire following the Armistice of Mudros (30 October, 1919), greatly affected the Christian communities. Instead of dealing with a single Islamic authority, Britain and France had to confront different political realities. Alongside this development, the emerging Arab nationalism in the region complicated Christian loyalties, since it cut across ecclesial identities.10 The British mandate policy towards the religious communities under their jurisdiction continued the Ottoman policy of autonomous rights. A 1922 census, the ﬁrst undertaken in Palestine, and designed to test the relative numerical strength of different communities as the basis for proportional

7 O’Mahony, ‘Palestinian Christians’, p. 23. 8 Anthony O’Mahony, ‘Palestinian-Arab Orthodox Christians: Religion, Politics and Church-State Relations in Jerusalem, 1908-1925’, Chronos, 3 (2000), pp. 61-91 p. 27. See also D. Tsimhoni, ‘The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate Jerusalem during the Formative Years of the British Mandate in Palestine’, Asian and African Studies, 12 (1978), pp. 77-122; Helen Bryer ‘Arab Orthodox Christians of Jerusalem and Palestine in the Inter-war Period: A Study in Religious and Political Identity and Church-State Relations’, in Christianity in the Middle East: Studies in Modern History, Theology and Politics, ed. A. O’Mahony (Lon- don, 2004), pp. 232-262; Laura Robson, Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine (Austin, 2011). 9 O’Mahony, ‘Palestinian Christians’, p. 27. 10 Ibid, p. 28.

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representation for a proposed legislative council, revealed significant findings. Christians comprised 9.6% of the total population. According to this census, the Christian community was strongly urban (76%). The largest Christian community in the British mandate census was Greek-Arab Orthodox. How- ever, it declined in proportion to the general Christian population from 45.7% (39,727) in 1922 to 43.5% (33,369) in 1931.11 Since the middle of the nineteenth century the Palestinian Christian community had been in a process of continual change and fragmentation. Con- flict within the Greek-Orthodox community, between the Greek hierarchy and the Arab Orthodox, concurrent with increased institutional commitment among other Christian churches, finally led to Arab Orthodox affilia- tion with Latin, Eastern Catholic and Protestant forms of the Church. Further difficulties for the Greek Orthodox patriarchate during the British mandate period were created by the refusal of the British authorities to allow financial help for the Greek patriarchate from Greek government sources. Serious difficulties for the patriarchate were soon to follow, including the loss of revenue from Romania and Bessarabia owing to the upheavals of the First World War. The Greek patriarchate sought to deal with these financial difficulties by selling land, notably land in and around Jerusalem, to Zionist land agen- cies.12 A British commission of enquiry rejected Greek interference but urged consideration to be given to the interests of the Arab Orthodox community. The Greek clergy continued to control the patriarchate and manage its property and income. The British continued to support Orthodox interests, wish- ing to maintain the arrangements for the Holy Places that had existed under Ottoman rule known as the ‘status quo,’ until a permanent solution could be agreed upon.13

11 J.B. Barron, Palestine: Report and General Abstracts of the Census of 1922 (Jerusalem, 1923). 12 Roussos, ‘The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate’, p. 46. See also Sotiris Roussos, ‘Patriarchs, Notables and Diplomats: The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem in the Modern Period’, in Eastern Christianity: Studies in Modern History, Religion and Politics, ed. A. O’Mahony (London, 2004), pp. 372-387; ‘The Greek Orthodox Community of Jerusa- lem in International Politics: International Solutions for Jerusalem and the Greek Ortho- dox Community in the 19th and 20th Centuries’, in Jerusalem: Its Sanctity and Centrality for Judaism, Christianity and Islam, ed. L. Levine (New York, 1999), pp. 482-493. 13 Ibid., p. 45.3

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3. Under Jordanian and Israeli Rule The British Mandate ended on 14 May, 1948, when the state of Israel was proclaimed and Arab forces entered Palestine. The impact of what Palestin- ians call al-Nakba (the Catastrophe) was to be experienced throughout Pal- estinian society, including among Palestinian Christians. The United Nations Resolution of 29 November 1947 provided for an international regime for Jerusalem. This was viewed with suspicion by the Orthodox patriarchate, which held to its belief in its position as guardian of the Holy Places. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza created an alarming new situation, nonetheless the patriarchate carried on its traditional policy of cooperation with the civil or governmental powers, continuing its aim of maintaining its pre-eminent position regarding the Holy Places. Meanwhile, the Israeli authorities imple- mented state policies to promote the Jewish character of Jerusalem, promot- ing and protecting Jewish Holy Places which had been ignored under Otto- man rule and the British mandate, as well as the ‘status quo’ arrangements.14 The Israeli occupation has led to social and economic dislocation, with Christian Palestinians increasingly drawn into secular nationalism as a solution to the Palestinian Christian dilemma. The sociologist Bernard Sabella has demonstrated, in his study of Palestin- ian Christian demographics, the numerical decline of Christian Palestini- ans.15 In 1996, there were 26,473 Greek Orthodox Palestinians out of a total of 50,000 Christians in East Jerusalem. The occupied territories of Israel and Jordan were estimated in 1992 to contain 145,000 Orthodox under the jurisdiction of the patriarchate.16 High educational achievement in foreign qualiﬁcations, relative prosperity and relatives abroad, have increased the propensity of Palestinian Christians to emigrate. The development of the Palestinian Authority created a new context for Palestinian Christians. Alleged land sales brought the patriarchate into the forefront of the national issue for Palestinians. Further challenges for the

14 Ibid., p. 49. 15 Bernard Sabella, ‘Palestinian Emigration from the Holy Land’, Proche-Orient Chrétien, 41 (1991), pp. 74-85, p. 75. See also, ‘Socio-economic Characteristics and Challenges to Palestinian Christians in the Holy Land’, in Palestinian Christians: Religion, Politics and Society in the Holy Land, ed. A. O’Mahony (London, 1999), pp. 82-96. 16 Ibid., p. 76.

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patriarchate included the signing of the ‘Fundamental Agreement between the Holy See and the State of Israel’ on December 30, 1993. The main concern here was the possibility that the Vatican would attempt to use the terms of the agreement to enhance Latin rights at the expense of the patriarchate’s role regarding the Holy Places.17 The Israeli government’s policy of furthering Israeli prominence in Jerusalem, undermining Church autonomy, placed the patriarchate in the unusual position of being in conﬂict with state policy. Nevertheless, the general policy of cooperation with legal government authority continues. From the seventh century, the patriarchate has sought to maintain its privileges, especially regarding the Holy Places, by a policy of cooperation with state authority whether the government was Arab, Ottoman, British, or Israeli.

B. PALESTINIAN ORTHODOX CHRISTIANS AND THEIR CHURCH: THE REVIVAL OF THE OLD/NEW QUESTION OF ECCLESIAL IDENTITY AND ‘ARABISATION’

A recurring theme in the history of Orthodoxy in the Holy Land has been the relationship between the ethnically Greek hierarchy and the Arab culture of the ‘lower’ clergy and laity of the Church in Jerusalem and the Holy Land. By the time of the first Muslim conquest of the Holy Land, Christians were already in a situation of internal conflict, because of the theological disputes which eventually led to the formation of different Christian communities. The Greek Orthodox patriarchate of Jerusalem had been established in 451 CE and so has a claim to being the oldest Christian community in the Holy Land. Since Roman times, the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate had extended over what was known as Palestina Prima, Secunda and Tertia. The concept of Filastin, the land of Palestine, had early been of significance to the Orthodox Christians. The patriarchates’ governing authority is the Confraternity of the Holy Sepulchre. The Confraternity’s structure originated from the patriarchate of Dositheos in 1662, although its actual existence can be traced much earlier

17 Sotiris Roussos, ‘The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem: Church-State Rela- tions in the Holy Land between the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict’, in Christianity in the Middle East, pp. 219-231, p. 223.

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to the Fifth Century CE. The guardianship of the Holy Sites, vested in the Confraternity from the Byzantine period, has been central to its self-understanding. Members of the Holy Synod are chosen from the Confraternity which is a monastic order. The Patriarch and the membership of the Con- fraternity is Greek, and this gives a distinctive element to the character of the patriarchate. During the period of the Ottoman Empire, the millet system meant that the population of the Empire were administered on a religious basis rather than according to linguistic or territorial criteria. There was little attempt to create a uniform population so that ‘No Inter-communal solidarity or social integration evolved in Ottoman society’.18 During the course of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman hegemony faced increasing problems, opening the way for Russian political and ecclesiastical involvement to emerge, although the Ottoman authorities attempted to assist the Greek clergy to avoid this influence. The death of Patriarch Athanasios occurred in 1844. During the period of growing Russian influence, the work of the Imperial Palestine Society (established in 1882) helped Orthodox Christians in Palestine in educational and social welfare programmes. This enabled them to develop a firm identity as Palestinian Orthodox Christians. The Greek hierarchy viewed this development with suspicion. The Russian authorities persuaded the Ottoman administration to allow the Holy Synod of Jerusalem, rather than the Ecu- menical Patriarch at the Phanar, to elect a new patriarch. The Holy Synod duly elected Cyrillos, Bishop of Lydda, as the new patriarch. Cyrillos’ election has been seen to mark a new stage in the history of the Patriarchate in Jerusalem, ending its subordinate status.19 After a dispute with the Orthodox Council, Cyrillos was deposed in 1872. The deposing of Cyrillos was seen as a victory for the Greek hierarchy. A delegation was sent to Constantinople to demand a constitution for the

18 Butrus Abu-Manneh, ‘The Christians Between Ottomanism and Syrian Nationalism: The Ideas of Butrus Al Bustani’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 9 (1980), pp. 287-304, see p. 287. 19 Derek Hopwood, The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843-1914, (Oxford, 1969), p. 181. Russian Orthodoxy had a significance influence and presence among Mid- dle Eastern Christianity; see Kjartan Anderson, ‘Pilgrims, Property and Politics: the Rus- sian Orthodox Church’, in Eastern Christianity, pp. 388-430; A. O’Mahony, ‘The Greek Orthodox Patriarchates in the Middle East’, in Eastern Christianity and the Cold War, 1945-91, ed. Lucian Leustean (London, 2009), pp. 235-247.

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Greek Orthodox Church of Jerusalem, asking for a mixed council to be formed of clerical and lay members of the community to control the financial affairs of the patriarchate. Other demands included the admission of Arab Orthodox to the Confraternity of the Holy Sepulchre, lay involvement in the election, as well as improvements in welfare and education among the Arab Orthodox. This movement for ‘constitutionalism’ was gaining ground in the attitudes among the laity of different Eastern churches.20 The conflict arising from the deposition of Cyrillos, together with educational work, including the opening of teacher training colleges under the auspices of the Russian Imperial Orthodox Society,21 further alienated the Arab Orthodox laity from the Greek Orthodox patriarchate. A dispute between laity and clergy was developing into a conflict between Arabs and Greeks. Greater education and self-confidence among the Orthodox laity, rooted in the Imperial Society’s schools, was leading to increasing national self-awareness among the Orthodox Arab community. Another phase in this struggle was linked to the granting of a new constitution throughout the Ottoman Empire in 1908, following the Young Turks’ Revolt. In 1910, concessions were agreed to allow a mixed council of laity and clergy to be set up. They were not allowed to be involved in the election of the patriarch, or allowed into the Brotherhood, but it was agreed that a third of patriarchal income was to be spent among the Arab Orthodox community. The continuing neglect of the Arab Orthodox community, the land sales to the Jewish development companies, and, in 1923, to the Palestinian Devel- opment Company, all led to demands for the Arabisation of the patriarchate, and leading members of the Arab Orthodox Community advocating Palestin- ian Arab nationalism. These developments were reflected in the journalism of the period. Najib Nassar is considered to have founded nationalist journalism in Palestine, and was one of the first to alert the public to the problems Zion- ist settlement in Palestine was creating. The Arab Orthodox newspaper Filas- tin, founded by the Al-Isa brothers in Jaffa, became a vehicle for the promo- tion of Arab nationalism, notably defining Palestine as a political entity

20 Richard Clogg, ‘The Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire’, in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, eds. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York, 1982), pp. 185-207. 21 See Elie Kedourie, ‘Religion and Politics’, in idem, The Chatham House Version, and Other Middle Eastern Studies (Hanover, NH, 1984), p. 328.

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covered by the jurisdiction of the patriarchate in Jerusalem. During the period of the British mandate, the British authorities were drawn reluctantly into the Greek-Arab conflict within the Orthodox Patriarchate. Patriarch Damianos continued the Patriarchate tradition of cooperation with state authority by acquiescing in the British policy of enabling a Jewish homeland to be established in Palestine. Arab Orthodox reaction found expression in the convening of the first Arab Orthodox congress, with famil- iar demands for education and welfare resources and greater participation in the affairs of the patriarchate. The British response was to establish the first Bertram-Young commission, in 1926. Its recommendations called for an Arab Orthodox to be admitted to the Confraternity, and for greater lay participation, while at the same time rejecting demands for the radical Arabisation of the patriarchate. However, the commission did accept the legitimacy of demands for greater attention to the pastoral needs of the Arab Orthodox community. Following the death of Patriarch Damianos in 1931, a second Arab Orthodox congress renewed its demands. These congresses continued to be a forum and platform for a developing national consciousness. In 1956, a fourth congress made repeated demands for greater Arab control, stopping short of complete Arabisation. This view was put forth by Syrian journalist Husayn Al-Hudhayfi, who called on the Jordan government to free the Arab Orthodox from foreign domination.22 The establishment of the state of Israel after the end of the British mandate further exacerbated the fissure between Arab and Greek interests in the Ortho- dox Church. A growing Palestinian nationalism now subsumed the conflict between the Greek hierarchy and Arab laity into the nationalist struggle. The Orthodox community was dispersed throughout Palestine and was well rep- resented in Palestinian national life. The Orthodox Church’s position in Pal- estinian national life had been enhanced by participation in the Muslim- Christian associations, which held several congresses between 1921 and 1928, with Arab Orthodox being elected to all the committees of these congresses.23 The 1967 Arab-Israeli war and subsequent Israeli occupation of Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem intensified the Arab Orthodox dilemma of

22 Daphne Tsimhoni, Christian Communities in Jerusalem and the West Bank Since 1948: An Historical, Social, and Political Study (Westport, CT, 1993), p. 38. 23 O’Mahony, ‘Palestinian-Arab Orthodox Christians’, p. 81.

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communal identity in the context of national consciousness. Christian Pal- estinians were increasingly drawn to secular nationalism, and Christians tak- ing up positions in the national movement. The controversial issue of land sales also re-emerged when the patriarchate again began to sell land to Israelis. In doing so it faced strong dissent from among the Arab Orthodox community. Further pressure on the patriarchate came in 1992 with the revival of old demands for Arab Orthodox participation through the Arab Orthodox Initiative Committee. The Intifada of 1987-1993 highlighted the need for pastoral cooperation among the different Churches. The Arab Orthodox laity had seen this neces- sity, and parish clergy were in agreement, but the Greek hierarchy remained aloof. Economic difficulties increased resentment among the laity towards the institutional Church. Palestinian Christian identity intensified in the period following the Oslo accords (1993) and the establishment of the Pal- estinian authority. The alienation of the Arab Orthodox laity and Greek hierarchy is a significant and continuing problem for the Greek Orthodox Church in Jerusa- lem and the Holy Land. Patriarch Diodoros died in 2001. The election of Patriarch Irenios brought with it a promise to end secret contracts in land sales and establish transparency in financial matters. It can be seen that throughout its long history, the patriarchate of the Greek Orthodox Church has been resolute in defending its rights, and zealous in defending its role as guardian of the Holy Places under its authority. To date, however, it has been unable to resolve the continuing tensions between Greek control of the patriarchate with the needs and aspirations of its Arab Orthodox community. This is likely to be an important issue in the future.24

C. PALESTINIAN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AS A NEW AND CONTEMPORARY EXPRESSION OF EASTERN CHRISTIAN THOUGHT

The creation of the state of Israel in 1948, and the ensuing dislocation and dilemmas facing the Palestinian Christian community, has brought about

24 Itamar Katz & Ruth Kark, ‘The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem and Its Congregation: Dissent over Real Estate’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 37 (2005), pp. 509-534.

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the remarkable emergence of an original and creative theology of liberation. These Christian theological reflections from Jerusalem and the Holy Land are an important development in enlarging our understanding of Christian- ity as a global tradition.25 Palestinian Liberation Theology has developed out of Palestinian Chris- tian experience, above all a history of expulsion and occupation. The impact of al-Nakba is exemplified by a leading Palestinian writer, Father Elias Cha- cour (b. 1939). Father Chacour is a Greek Catholic priest who chronicled his personal experience of being forced out as a child from Biram, a village in Galilee destroyed by Israeli troops in 1948, in two important texts, Blood Brothers and We Belong to the Land.26 Blood Brothers, a reflective autobiogra- phy, relates his growing radicalisation as a Palestinian Christian activist. He witnessed and documented the dislocation and oppression of Palestinians while pastor of the Greek Catholic Church in Ibillin in the Galilee. Another important contemporary Christian thinker from the Holy Land is Naim Ateek, a Palestinian Anglican Theologian. Ateek sees the 1967 war as a crucial moment in the history of the Israeli state. The occupation of Gaza, the West Bank, along with the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula was, according to him, attributed by a large percentage of Israelis and many Western Christians to ‘God’s powerful intervention on the side of Israel and against the Arabs’.27 Ateek realises that the Bible itself can and has been used as an ideological tool in asserting a religious basis for Zionism, although it is originally a secular movement. Arguably, the Bible has been used in a way to support injustice and inequality. Understood in a literal way, the Bible appears to Palestinians to justify their enslavement and to undermine their hopes for a national homeland. When Christians recite the ‘Benedictus’, including the words ‘Blessed be the God of Israel’, Ateek asks what this means.28 Which Israel is being

25 See the recent study by Laura Robson, ‘Palestinian Liberation Theology, Muslim-Chris- tian Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict’, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, 21 (2010), pp. 39-50. 26 Elias Chacour (with David Hazard), Blood Brothers (Grand Rapids, MI, 1984); (with Mary E Jensen), We Belong to the Land (San Francisco, 1990). 27 Naim Ateek, ‘The Emergence of a Palestinian Christian Identity’, in Faith and the Intifada, eds. Naim Ateek et al. (Maryknoll, NY, 1985), pp. 1-8. 28 Naim Ateek, Justice and Only Justice: A Palestinian Theology of Liberation (Maryknoll, NY, 1990), p. 76.

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referred to? What redemption is being promised, and to whom? One problem facing Palestinian Christian theology is simply an issue of how the Bible itself is to be understood by Palestinian Christians. An important question arises: Is God partial to the Jews, and is the God of the Bible a God of justice and peace? For Ateek, the ‘authentic’ word of the Bible and the ‘meaning’ of Biblical texts can only be found in Jesus Christ himself. Christ is the key to understanding the Bible and God’s action in history. It is only in Jesus Christ that ‘objective’ knowledge of God is found.29 If theological suppositions and assertions exist in the Old Testament which conﬂict with the understanding of God which Christians believe are revealed in Christ, then these suppositions or assertions must not be considered revelatory. Ateek identiﬁes different traditions in the Hebrew Bible that he evaluates only according to the revelation given in Jesus Christ. One tradition is essentially tribal in nature, based on the election of the Jews to be God’s people, and allowing for expulsion from the land. For Ateek, these traditions have a value in a negative way: they clarify what God is not.30 Ateek declares a preference for the prophetic strand in Hebrew scripture, in the context of faith in a God who is committed to the underprivileged, the disadvantaged, and the vulnerable: a theology of hope and compas- sion.31 He observes that Eastern Christians have experienced a heavy price historically because they share the name ‘Christian’ with Crusaders of a previous epoch, living as a minority in the Middle East.32 He sees the Church in Israel-Palestine in terms of a rich heritage of Orthodoxy, Cathol- icism and Protestantism. Most Arab Christians are united by a common faith, even if some Church hierarchies may be preoccupied with past differ- ences.33 Ateek also sees the theological implications of his exegesis as a matter of faith in an inclusive God of truth, justice, and peace; regarding the Incarnation as the basis for Christian involvement in the world and the conscience of a nation.34

29 Ibid., p. 38. 30 Ibid., p. 39 31 Ibid., p. 134. 32 Ibid., p. 135. 33 Ibid., p. 152. 34 Ibid., p. 157.

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In a lecture on the future of Palestinian Christianity at the Sixth Interna- tional Sabeel Conference (November 2-9, 2006), The Forgotten Faithful: A Window into the Life and Witness of Christians in the Holy Land, Ateek called for a greater recognition of the importance of working ecumenically, high- lighting the urgent need to articulate a theology and strategy for relations with other faiths, especially Islam. Ateek acknowledged the Orthodox Church as the original Church of the Holy Land, the Church of our ances- tors. Strikingly, Ateek also noted ‘the relationship between the Greek hierarchy and the Palestinian clergy must be addressed if we ever hope to strengthen the Christian presence and witness […] the fact exists that most of the local Orthodox clergy have not had the beneﬁt of a solid theological education’.35 It should be noted that Ateek is not alone in addressing hermeneutical problems regarding the Bible and Palestinian Christian experience. Former Latin Patriarch Michel Sabbah wrote a pastoral letter in November, 1993, entitled ‘Reading the Bible Today in the Land of the Bible’.36 Patriarch Sab- bah noted that we have to struggle in order to maintain and build peace with justice. Interpreting the Bible is a demanding task. Such interpretations concern our very national and personal identity as believers because unilateral, partial interpretations run the risk, for some, of bringing into question their presence and permanence in this land, which is their homeland. Questions to be addressed include ‘What is the relationship between the Old and New Testaments?’ The narrative of the Bible includes stories of violence and gen- ocide, resembling recent history which may be attributed to God. How is this to be understood? What is the relationship between ancient Biblical history and contemporary history? Is Biblical Israel to be identiﬁed with the state of Israel? What are the meanings of the promises, the covenant, and,

35 Naim Ateek et al. (eds.), The Forgotten Faithful (Jerusalem, 2007), pp. 143-144. 36 Michel Sabbah, Reading the Bible Today in the Land of the Bible (Jerusalem, 1993). See also L. Marsh, ‘The Theological Thought of Michel Sabbah in the Context of the Chal- lenges to the Christian Presence in the Holy Land’, in The Catholic Church in the Con- temporary Middle East, eds, A. O’Mahony & J. Flannery (London, 2010), pp. 253-262. For a wider context see L.Marsh, ‘Palestinian Christianity: A Study in Religion and Poli- tics’, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 5 (2005), pp.147-166; ‘Palestinian Christians and Liberation Theology’, in Christianity and Jerusalem: Studies in Modern Theology and Politics in the Holy Land, ed. A. O’Mahony (Leominster, 2010), pp. 69-91.

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speciﬁcally, the promise and gift of the land to Abraham and his descend- ants? Does the Bible justify current political claims made on its behalf? Could we be victims of our own salvation history, which seems to favour the Jewish people and condemn others? Patriarch Sabbah rooted his pastoral letter in the Constitution on Divine Revelation of the Second Vatican Council. In this understanding, the Bible is a divine and human word revealed to a community. But it comes to us clothed in linguistic, literary, cultural, historical and geographical terms which, after all, are human. We must not ask of the Bible what it cannot give. Patriarch Sabbah presents the Bible as a matter of progressive revelation and, in accordance with the Council, documents and notes the importance and value for Palestinian Christians, with others concerned with Biblical criticism, in interpreting the Bible for our time. Other Palestinian Christian theologians share these concerns regarding Biblical interpretation. Mitri Raheb, pastor of the Bethlehem Christmas Church and director of the International Meeting Centre in Bethlehem, has observed that until the middle of the nineteenth century, the Palestinian churches interpreted the Bible allegorically or typologically. This is no longer possible. The advent of Zionism has made the Old Testament a political text, and made the Bible problematic the moment the modern state of Israel was formed.37 Raheb has also addressed the question of the Qur’an from an Arab Christian perspective.38 His intention is to have an understanding of Muslim scripture which would provide the basis for a Christian-Muslim relationship within contemporary Arab society. Raheb notes the signiﬁcance of the language of the Qur’an. ‘It is an Ara- bic text’.39 This language is shared by Muslims and Christians in the Arab world, a shared common space between two religions. He believes there is a sense in which the Qur’an may be said in Christian perspective to represent

37 Mitri Raheb (tr. Ruth C L Gritsch), I Am A Palestinian Christian (Minneapolis, 1995), p. 59. For the background to Protestant thought, from which Raheb makes theology from this perspective see, Michael Marten, ‘Anglican and Presbyterian Presence and Theology in the Holy Land’, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 5 (2005), pp. 182-199. 38 Mitri Raheb, ‘Contextualising the Scripture Towards A New Understanding of the Qur’an-An Arab Christian Perspective’, Studies in World Christianity, 3 (1997), pp. 180- 202. 39 Ibid., p. 182.

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an Arabisation of the Biblical message.40 The Prophet speaks from his context and offers a thoroughly contextualized rendering of the Abrahamic message. Raheb contrasts the linear understanding of ‘salvation history’, which may be said to be Biblical, with the Qur’anic concept of a decentralised interpretation of God’s action in the history of human communities. Raheb suggests that Muhammad intended to establish a local Arabic ‘liturgy’ com- parable to that of previous Jewish and Christian recipients of scripture.41 It was only after the Hejira from Mecca to Medina in 622CE that Muhammad employed the terms Tawrat and Injil to denote two separate scriptures that were deemed to be partial representations of the word of God. It is worth noting that such Palestinian reflections on Biblical and Qur’anic scripture have been characterized as forms of ‘Palestinian Marcionism’ and described as ‘the Islamisation of Christianity.’ In a polemical chapter of her book Bat Ye’or regards the search for a common ground between Muslim and Chris- tian scholars as having led to a ‘de-Biblicizing’ of the Bible.42 A question inevitably presents itself, why has Greek/Arab Orthodoxy in the Holy Land generally not produced theological scholarship of the kind illustrated by the Palestinian theologians cited above. It may be that historical factors have prevented the development of such a tradition. Many important figures from the Orthodox tradition have been strongly identified politically with Arab and Palestinian nationalism, and this may have served as an alternative to intellectual engagement with Palestinian theological developments. George Antonius’ book The Arab Awakening (1938) profoundly influenced a developing Arab nationalism as Palestine was slipping from Arab control.43 The Bertram-Young commission reporting on the controversies between the Patriarchate and the Arab Orthodox community underlined the strength of this identification. ‘The dearest thought to every young local Orthodox Chris- tian is that he is an Arab, and his most cherished aspirations are those of Arab nationalism, which he shares with his fellow Muslim countrymen’.44

40 Ibid. 41 Ibid., p. 189. 42 Bat Ye’or, ‘The Islamization of Christianity’, in Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis (Madison NJ, 2005), pp. 211-224. 43 George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (London, 1938). 44 Anton Bertram and J.W.A. Young, Report of the Commission appointed by the Govern- ment of Palestine to inquire and report upon certain controversies between the Orthodox Patri- archate of Jerusalem and the Arab Orthodox community (London,1926), pp. 57-58.

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An example of this identification would be Kahlil al-Sakakini (1878- 1953). Despite being active in the Palestinian national congresses and the supporter of an independent Arab state, he came to believe that Islam would have a dominant role in the nationalist movement.45 Other important figures from the Orthodox background would include political activists like George Habash (1926-2008), founder of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; general secretary until 2000. He claimed to hold together Ortho- doxy, Marxism, and Palestinian nationalism. It may well be argued that the identification with the Arab nationalist cause in Palestine has been channelled into exclusively political conduits, alongside the struggle for Arabisation of the Greek Orthodox patriarchate. Lack of educational opportunity and the theological instinct for an autocephalous character for the Church in the Orthodox tradition has been the framework for Orthodox Christians in Palestine in inculturating their ecclesial identity.

D. ORTHODOX REVIVAL IN CONTEXT

Prospects for Orthodox revival in the Holy Land will need to take into real- istic account a number of factors. Orthodoxy in the Holy Land has shared in the numerical decline that has affected all the Christian Churches in the region. The Christian communities have shared disproportionately in the tendency to emigrate. This tradition of emigration has existed since the nineteenth century. Adverse political and socio-economic factors have been a continuing disincentive for individuals and families to remain in Palestine and any attempt to build a sustained and long-term future. ‘The extent of Christian decline is best understood by the fact that in 1944 there were 29,350 Christians living in Jerusalem; today Jerusalem’s Christian population is only 35% of what it used to be 50 years ago’.46 It is possible that the Orthodox community has suffered losses to other Christian communities in Israel/Palestine. Greater educational opportunities, together with an absence of the Greek Orthodox/Arab Orthodox conﬂict

45 O’Mahony, ‘Palestinian Christians’, p. 51. 46 Bernard Sabella, ‘Palestinian Christians: Challenges and Hopes’, in The Holy Land; Holy Lands and Christian History (Woodbridge, Sussex, 2000), pp. 373-397.

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may have favoured Latin and Greek Catholic communities and some Prot- estant Churches. It remains difﬁcult to evaluate this possible phenomenon because of a lack of statistical information regarding inter-Christian conver- sions. Intermarriage between Muslims and Christians is rare in Palestine/ Israel. However, the number of mixed marriages between Christians of different denominational backgrounds has increased. It has nevertheless been suggested that the pressure of secularisation may have resulted in a hardening of denominational boundaries.47

E. ECUMENICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Following the ﬁrst Intifada, 1987-1991, and the years after the Oslo accords, signiﬁcant development in cooperation between the Churches of the Holy Land has been observed. A historical background of intense rivalry has increasingly given way to a pragmatic ecumenism, with Church leaders join- ing together in advocacy regarding issues of public concern, especially in matters of justice, peace and the question of the position of Jerusalem. This cooperation has resulted in a more self-conscious Arab identity among the Churches. This has been limited to the areas of social, economic and political matters, rather than in the areas that affect doctrine or the position of the Holy Places.48 The patriarchate certainly advocates cooperation ‘with the other Christian communities regarding issues of common Christian concern, and partici- pates in the inter-Christian and religious dialogue and is a member of the World Council of Churches’.49 The patriarchate is also a member of the Middle East Council of Churches which has questioned the legitimacy of such movements as Christian Zionism.50 The Intifadas have caused

47 See the article by P. Loffler in Orientalische Christen Zwischen Repression Und Migration: Beitrage Zur Jungeren Geschichte Und Gegenwartscage, ed. Martin Tamcke, Studien zur Orientalischen Kirchengeschichte, 13 (Münster, 2001), pp 53-63. 48 See D. Christiansen, ‘Palestinian Christians’, in The Vatican-Israel Accords: Political, Legal, and Theological Contexts, ed. Marshall J Breger (Notre Dame, IN, 2004), pp. 309-339. 49 Archbishop Aristarchos, ‘The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate’, in The Forgotten Faithful, eds. Naim Ateek et al. (Jerusalem, 2007), see p. 78. 50 See, for example, Middle East Council of Churches, What Is Christian Zionism? (Limas- sol, Cyprus, 1998).

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solidarity among Christians to be seen as vital. The 2005 Easter message by the leaders of the Christian communities has been seen as historic.51 While the Orthodox Patriarchate has modified to some extent its tendency to cooperate with state authorities as the Arab-Israeli conflict has intensified, land disputes have given the Arab Orthodox the ‘opportunity for a common national agenda with the Palestinian Christians in Jerusalem and the Pales- tinian territories.’52 This issue has the continuing potential to divide the patriarchate from its Arab Orthodox faithful and other Palestinian Churches.

F. O RTHODOXY AS A HOLY LAND CHURCH

The Orthodox Church of Jerusalem is generally acknowledged as the ‘original’ Church of the Holy Land. It remains the largest Church of the Holy Land and many Christians now belonging to other churches have their origins in the Greek Orthodox Church. The patriarchate sees itself as descendant of James, brother of the Lord.53 The Greek Orthodox Church is also the dominant custodian of the Holy Places in the Holy Land; its unbroken presence in the two most important churches, the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem (in Greek and Arabic, the Church of the Resurrection) and the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, naturally fortiﬁes the authority of the patriarchate.54 The Church continues to live with the tensions of ethnic division between the Greek hierarchy and the Arab Orthodox faithful as well as the parish clergy. This compounds the unresolved question of the relationship between a local Orthodox expression of the Church and global Orthodox tradition.55 This is a question made more complex by the arrival in recent years of Russians who are nominally Jewish but are Russian Orthodox in background, further diversifying the Orthodox community. This new Christian reality in Israel has come about through Christian immigration from the former Soviet Union. These immigrants identify in

51 Harald Suermann, ‘Palestinian Contextual Theology’, Al-Liqa 5, pp. 7-26. 52 Sotiris Roussos, ‘Eastern Orthodox Perspectives on Church-State Relations and Reli- gion and Politics in Modern Jerusalem’, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 5 (2005), pp. 103-122, p. 113. 53 Archbishop Aristarchos, ‘The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate’, p. 75. 54 Roussos, ‘Eastern Orthodox Perspectives’, p. 117. 55 Sabella, ‘Palestinian Christians’, pp. 373-397.

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some way as Jews on entering Israel. It is difficult to know the nature of their religious identity and their true numbers. A figure for 1999 states that of about 86,000 new immigrants in that year 53% were not Jewish according to Jewish Law, not having Jewish mothers, 38% did not even have a Jewish father.56 While it is difficult to know how many Russians in fact identify as Chris- tians, the 27,600 non-Arab Christians registered by the Central Bureau of Statistics is likely to be an underestimate, given the propensity to conceal religious affiliations in the former Soviet Union and fear that revealing this identity could lead to citizenship being revoked.57 The future for this new Christian identity in Israel is uncertain, but the Greek Orthodox patriarchate in Jerusalem has taken it sufficiently seriously to appoint a Russian priest of Jewish origin, Alexander Winogradsky, sent by the Ecumenical Patriarch, to minister to Russians.

G. THE CHALLENGE OF ISLAM

The relationship of Palestinian Christianity to Islam needs to be seen in the context of the Middle East as the birthplace of the three Abrahamic faiths. Palestinians have a kinship and a shared pride in Arab culture. The growth in awareness of Arab culture and its political dimensions owes much to Arab Christians who were founders of secular Arab political movements. Commentators have frequently stressed the good relations and common experience of Muslims and Christians in the Holy Land, and there is a reason for this: the centuries of co-existence and the present Arab-Israeli conﬂict affect the entire population. Christian welfare institutions have served both communities. Islam’s recognition of the importance of the Holy Places to Christians, and the predominantly urban nature of the Christian presence, has produced communities living in proximity to each other without conﬂict. The fact that being a Christian has not been seen to detract from a Palestinian national consciousness, and the tradition of

56 David M. Neuhaus, ‘Jewish Israeli Attitudes Towards Christianity and Christians in Contemporary Israel’, in World Christianity: Politics, Theology, Dialogues, eds. Anthony O’Mahony and Michael Kirwan (London, 2004), pp. 347-371. 57 David M. Neuhaus, ‘New Wine Into Old Wineskins: Russians, Jews and Non-Jews In The State of Israel’, The Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, 57 (2005), pp. 207-236.

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autonomy in religious matters inherited from the Ottoman millet system, all these factors are evinced to explain good Muslim-Christian relations.58 We ought also to be aware of public agreements such as the first Alexan- drian Declaration (January, 2002) between Muslim, Jewish and Christian leaders in the Holy Land, in which they pledged themselves to a search for a just peace.59 Nevertheless, particular problems continue to arise at different points. The Nazareth mosque dispute in the period leading to millennial celebrations, and the papal visit of Pope John Paul II, are reminders that tensions ignite in some circumstances. In this specific example, there was the perception that the Israeli government was exacerbating conflict with the intention of creating Muslim-Christian hostility among the Palestinian population. The Greek patriarchate already had come into conflict with a Jewish group’s attempt to occupy patriarchal property with the seizure of St. John’s Hospice in 1990. The potential for conflict among the Abrahamic faiths over ‘sacred’ space, and its implications for interfaith relations have been explored.60 Nur Masalha points out that the intensification of Israeli de-Arabisation policies in the old city of Jerusalem, and its sacred geography, led to the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September, 2000. In a volatile situation, mutual suspicion can develop, especially where secular nationalism is perceived as having failed. Radical Islamists in such situations increase Christian appre- hension.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND REFLECTIONS

The future of the Orthodox Church of Jerusalem and the Holy Land cannot be separated from the fate of the other Christian traditions in Pales- tine/Israel and the wider Middle East. If there is to be renewal within Palestinian Christianity, a number of issues will need to be addressed. For

58 See, for example, Saliba Sarsar, ‘Palestinian Christians: Religion, Conflict and the Struggle for Just Peace’, Holy Land Studies, 4 (2005), pp. 27-50. 59 Ibid., p.117 60 See Nureldeen Masalha, ‘Jewish Fundamentalism and the “Sacred Geography” of Jeru- salem in Comparative Perspective, 1967-2004: Implications for Interfaith Relations’, Holy Land Studies, 3 (2004), pp. 29-67.

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the Orthodox Church, the dichotomy between the Greek leadership of the Church and the Arab Orthodox clergy and laity will need to be acknowledged and acted upon. A preoccupation with the custodianship of the Holy Places also saps energy. While this is understandable in a Church with deep roots in tradition and possessed of a self-consciousness of authority linked to sacred space, this orientation towards the past in theology, culture and tradition inevitably undermines attention to the present and the future. While a better ecumenical context can be observed since the first Inti- fada, greater efforts need to be made to widen and deepen the ecumenical involvement of the Churches beyond the special issues resulting from the Arab-Israeli conflict. A renewed commitment to serving the laity at a grass roots level will involve the Orthodox Church in greater attention to the pastoral, educational and welfare needs of its people, and better theological education for its clergy. Any future for Palestinian Christianity must also be a future in the context of Islam. Theology that reflects and comprehends this dimension of reality needs to be better articulated, as well as the task of building relationships of dialogue with Islam and Juda- ism. The Greek Orthodox Church of Jerusalem and the Holy Land has throughout its history been prepared to cooperate with the prevailing political authority. This mindset has been effective to some extent in maintaining the dominance of the Greek Orthodox patriarchate, particularly in resisting the incursions of other Christian traditions. In the present situation, however, a renewed commitment to spiritual independence incultur- ated and belonging to an authentic Holy Land Christianity needs to be more widely reflected among its clergy and people. The autocephalous nature of Orthodoxy as a tradition could enable engagement with the particular dilemma it now faces, and, while acknowledging its participation in a global Orthodox experience, enable it better to face the challenges of the future.

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Abstract

This article surveys the Orthodox Church in its historical and political setting in Jerusalem and Palestine, from the earliest times, through Ottoman rule, the British Mandate in Palestine, and under Jordanian and Israeli authorities. It examines Palestinian Orthodox Christians, particularly the revival of the Old/ New question of ecclesial identity and ‘Arabisation’. Palestinian Christian The- ology is explored as a new and contemporary expression of Eastern Christian thought. The present situation for the Orthodox Church is considered in several contexts, including the contraction of church communities; pastoral concerns; the challenge of Protestant, Latin, Greek Catholic and Anglican churches; Orthodoxy as a Holy Land Church, as well as the challenge of Islam within Palestinian Arab society. The future of the Orthodox Church of Jerusalem and the Holy Land is viewed as inseparable from the fate of other Christian traditions in Palestine/Israel and the wider Middle East. Issues including ecumenical dimensions and relationships with Islam are evaluated. The autocephalous nature of Orthodoxy is seen as a resource to enable it to engage with its dilemmas in the Holy Land, and as a global church.

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