CHAPTER I THE AUSTRALIAN THEfive Australian infantry divisions in France emerged from the Passchendaele fighting late in 1917 with intense relief. The Third Battle of Ypres, notwithstanding that for them it had been, until its last stages, a particularly successful one, had been most bloody throughout and in the last stage intensely painful ; and, although constant fighting and the long training in the summer had rendered them a highly efficient force, their prospect was not bright. This battle had, for the moment, made a clean sweep of more than half their infantry. Of 55,000 casualties suffered by the two corps in 1917, over 38,000 occurred in that offensive, and before its end the anxiety of General Birdwood as to the possibility of maintaining both the four divisions of his own corps (I Anzac) and the 3rd in General Godley’s (I1 Anzac) became acute. Moreover, it was not only in numbers that a falling off seemed probable. At least one careful and devoted observer of the A.I.F. seriously feared that the coming year might find the Australian soldier past the zenith of his quality also. With enlistment in dwindling, the force would have to rely on the return to duty of its wounded and sick men. Not that these were likely to cause any perceptible change in the general physiqu+if the physical standard was lowered, it would be through the inferior physique of some of the new recruits.l The deterioration which was feared was a moral one. The A.I.F. would be feeding on itself, dependent largely upon its own used material ; and there was all too good reason to believe that, whatever may have been the experience in previous wars, the old soldier would not prove the best reinforcement in this one. Strains such as those of Pozikres, Bullecourt, and Passchendaele were apt to stretch men’s nervous control bevond the possibility of early recovery. After such stresses, it was feared, the old elasticity of the “Diggers” might never quite be regained. Even on the

I A diary of the 4and Bn. (3rd Divn.) says: “9 Jan., 1918 Nrw draft 48 Ahout 60 per cent. . . . were up to the standard of the original men. At least i . . . were unfit for service in the field, one man was sa years of age. another 49, and one 46.” (Tnese had urderstated :hen ages when enlistinlc 1 2 THE A.1 F. IN FRANCE [Oct.-Nov., 1917

Peninsula, within five weeks of the Landing, it had been found that, for a desperate effort, untried soldiers could be better than tried ones2 Moreover it was conceivable that, in such a war as this, the old soldier, even when not overstrained, might use his skill not only to defeat the enemy, but to avoid taking the necessary risks in a stiff fight; and readiness to accept risk had always been the first fighting quality of Australian troops. At that time the intention of General Plumer, commanding the Second Army in Flanders, where both the I and the I1 Anzac Corps had been fighting, was to retain I Anzac during the winter on the Broodseinde heights, with I1 Anzac on its right. Although it was not generally realised at the time or afterwards, the plan of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig, then was that they and the rest of the troops on that battlefield should keep the Germans under strain throughout the winter with occasional attacks when the weather permitted, and in the spring the Flanders offensive would be resumed with the object of forcing the German right to fall back from the coast. The initiative would thus be retained by the British for the Allies. Haig did not believe that the French Army would yet be sufficiently recovered to pass to the attack, but he considered it essential that the Allies should continue attacking. Success in Flanders, taken together with the gradual arrival of the Americans, might cause the Germans to recognise that their ultimate defeat could no longer be averted, and thus induce them to make peace. For Birdwood's divisions, therefore, the prospect was that for a second winter in succession, after a year of the heaviest fighting and excessive casualties, they would remain in the crucial sector, committed to a struggle with both the enemy and the winter mud. From their experience of the previous winter, spent on the Somme battlefield, he and his staff knew that in such circumstances not even the most careful organisation could prevent a steady drain of sickness and casualties continuing in the A.T.F. during those months in which most corps were comparatively free from them. Had the A.I.F. dBp8ts in England been receiving from Australia reinforcement drafts at the rate then prescribed by the Army

~~ ~ 'See Vol. II. 9. 215. 0ct.-Nov., 19171 THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS 3

Council, this would not have caused anxiety; but whereas, at the lowest estimate, 7,000 recruits monthly were required,n the enlistments had for some time fallen below 5,000 and were steadily declining. The vast losses at Ypres had quickly absorbed every trained Australian reinforcement in England, as well as the 6th Australian Division, which for a time had been forming there; yet at the end of October, a fortnight before I Anzac left the Ypres battlefield, the Australian divisions were 18,000 men short. From the reinforcements then training, and the convalescents then hardening, in England, Birdwood hoped to receive during the winter 28,000 men, and from the sick and wounded still in hospital another 7,000, 35,000 in all. This would wipe off the shortage and provide 17,000 to make good the winter wastage. But, by the experience of the Sonime winter, this wastage would be at least 25,000. Thus on the 1st of March, 1918, the divisions would still be 8,000 short, and the reservoir of trained reinforcements behind then] completely empty.’ That the five divisions should be plunged into the stiffest fighting early in 1918, short of men and without a reserve of fresh reinforcements to replace the casualties, was a predicament to be avoided at almost any cost, even by breaking

~ ~~~ *It will be remembered that, after Pori;res, the War Office, endorsing an estimate from Generals Birdwood aiid White, lid recommended the sending from r\u.trdhJ of a special draft of zo,ooo and thereafter the increase, for three months. of the monthly itifantry draft to as per cent. of the established strength of the units, that IS, to about 16,500. (Previously the monthly requirement for all reinforcements had been 11,790.) In an attempt to secure these reinforcements, the Australiaii Government had appealed to the peoplc, by referendum, for the introduction of conscription. When the referendum, taken in Oct., 1916, rejected conscription. the Australian Government telegraphed that the re:nforccments required could not be provided and suggested that the rd Division, which the War Ofice had threatened to break’ up, should be retained tor the time being in England as a dCp6t division to feed the other four. The War Office, however, preferred to send it to France. and asked Australia to do its hesL to maintain all five divisions. For six months after the 1916 referendum recruiting figures averaged 4.750 per month. In April 1917. seeing that in spite of this decline the five divisions were not seriously below‘ strength, the Commonwealth Government asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies to be advised of the minimum number of recruits required each month according to “present experience” of casualties. The reply, on May 24, was that the War Office required 15,000 infantry to be Bent as soon as possible, so that they could be drafted from England to France in August, September, and October, and later 5.000, to be drafted to France during November and December. On the basis of this information the Australian Governmmt had decided, in June, 1917. to launcli an effort to raise 7,000 men monthly by voluntary recruiting. The figures, bowever, still continued to fall. The Government’s efforts to maintain them are described in Volume XI. Australia During the War. No reinforcements had sailed from Australia in August or September, 1917, and, although three drafts were sailing at the end of October and a few more early 111 hoxeniber, these xould not arrive until lust before and after the new year, and, as four month, were reqriired for their training. woiild not be ready for France before the beginning of May. 4 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE 11917 up one of the divisions and using its personnel to maintain the strength of the rest. Such a step would have caused intense heartburning among the troops and also in Australia. The divisions were no longer mere accidental groupings of battalions; from harsh experience of fighting each had emerged as a definite entity, with a distinct character, firm comradeship, and fiery pride. If, despite regrets, one had to be disbanded, a vote of the force would undoubtedly have selected the youngest-the 3rd. But Birdwood never forgot that the Australian Government, which itself had formed that division in Australia when he was forming the 4th and 5th in Egypt, might be specially interested in its welfare; moreover, though it was now lowest in strength, it seemed fitter for the line than the 4th. The , which contained a larger proportion of troops from the ‘‘ outside ” States than any other division of Australian infantry, had the reputation of being, if anything, the most rugged, while the 3rd was perhaps the most carefully “ broken in.” The 4th had been more constantly used in I917 than any of the others; after Bullecourt it had been transferred from 1 Anzac to I1 Anzac for the Battle of Messines, and so had missed the long rest given to the remainder of Birdwood’s corps: but Birdwood had secured its return to I Anzac for the Third Battle of Ypres. After that offensive its commander, Major-General Sinclair-MacLagan, doubtless in order to emphasise its need of the long-promised rest, informed Birdwood that, at the moment, it was not fit for the line. There appeared, therefore, to be every possibility of this hard-fighting division being disbanded-however bitterly that fate might be resented-when a series of apparently unrelated circumstances suggested another solution. When the Passchendaele operations were ending, Piumer, preparing to reduce his several army corps to three divisions each for the winter campaign, proposed that I Anzac (Ist, znd, 4th, and 5th Divisions) should hand back the 4th Division to I1 Anzac (New Zealand, 3rd Australian, and two British divisioiis) , which would then discard its British divisions. The commander of TI Anzac. General Godley. desired some such change, but Birdwood protested to Plumer, “ Surely this is almrd,” he said. “ You will give it (the 4th) to him to 1916-171 THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS 5 train all the winter, and then give it back to me to fight in the spring, which would be unfair to the division, and to me, and to him.” Plumer replied that he had no intention of returning the 4th to I Anzac in the spring, but would then bring the two corps up to four-division strength by adding a British division to each. This plan, which Birdwood had successfully resisted before Third Ypres, was-as he had told Plumer then, and now assured him again-directly contrary to the expressed wish of the Australian Government, that its divisions should as far as possible be kept together under his command. The expression to which he referred was the outcome of a very strong persistent national feeling which originally had led to efforts for the formation of an “ Australasian Army.” In May 1916 W. M. Hughes, visiting France, had told Sir Douglas Haig that it was the wish of the Australian Government that the Anzac troops should be regarded as an army and that General Birdwood should command it.” The New Zealand Government had not supported these requests, but the British Government had intimated that every effort would be made to meet the desire for the formation of an I‘ , “ as soon as circumstances permit; and this,” the War Office had added, “has always been our intention.” Haig had refused to form that army on the reasonable ground that, at the stage that British organisation had then reached, six6 divisions were no longer sufficient for the purpose.B The alternative, of putting all the Australian divisions in Birdwood’s corps, he could not, he had said, adopt as matters stood ” without hampering the general plan of campaign. But, “ if at any future time I can see my way to employing all the Australian forces together under his command for some special operation, I will gladly do so.” He made only one “ fundamental ” proviso-“ that nothing must be done which would hamper the Imperial‘ forces in attaining the object for which the Empire is fighting.” There for the moment, in 1916, the proposal rested. But the desire for concentration in a single Australian command

8 There would have been SIX infantry divisions without the New Zealanders. for in May, 1916, the Aiistralian Government offered to provlde a slxth dlvision. It was refosed by the Aryy Couyl (see Yo1 ZZZ, e. 156). 8 In the B E F. an army had originally comprlsed as few as four dlvlsions; but by 1916 the number had risen to 8 or IO, and by 1918 the average was 14. THe meant those of Britain and dominions; by Australian usage, on the other hand, the Imperial army was that of the British Government. a 6 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [ 1914-17 was intense throughout the Australian force, particularly after the patent mismanagement at Bullecourt, and in the summer of 1917 it found expression through a new and strongly nationalist agency. This was a small group of Australian civilians in London of which the central and much the most influential figure was Keith Murdoch.8 Murdoch’s connection with several of the events to be related in this and the next volumes was unknown in Australia and even in most parts of the A.I.F., but his influence during this and later phases of the inner history of the force was so important that some explanation of his position must be given. Son of a Presbyterian minister of Camberwell in Victoria, and educated at the local grammar school, after travelling the world he entered journalism, in which he showed an outstanding capacity for seeing what news was required, obtaining it no matter what the opposition, and stating it in direct, forcible terms. In September 1914, when just twenty-eight, he nearly won the nomination of his fellow journalists for the appointment of Official War Correspondent, and less than a year later was sent vza Egypt to London as manager of the United Cable Service, and in the interests of the Melbourne Herold and Sydney Sun. Through the friendship of the then Prime Minister, Andrew Fisher, he secured a commission to inquire into certain postal matters, which gave him a semi-official status invaluable for his work, and led Sir Ian Hamilton to permit his visit to Gallipoli. The incidents of his carriage of Ashniead-Bartlett’s uncensored letter addressed to the British Prime Minister, and of his own subsequent protest against Hamilton’s conduct of the Gallipoli expedition, have already been described in this history.’ On Murdoch’s arrival in London the association of his cable-service with The Times enabled him to call on the powerful support of Lord Northcliffe, and his protest brought him into confidential relations, which he afterwards maintained, with almost every important member of the Asquith Government. He was particularly friendly with Lloyd George, whose political aims his action incidentally served ; and after the visit of Fisher’s sLiccessor.lo W. hf. Hwhes. to London

8 Sir Keith Murrloch. hfanaging director. The Herald and Weekly Times Melhourne Journnlirt; of Caniherweli, Vic ; b. Camberwell, 12 Aug . 1SS6. ’Val. 1I. fifi. 781-2. 10 Andrew Fisher had been appointed High Commissioner in London. 1916-181 THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS 7 in 1916, Murdoch became a constant intermediary between Hughes and Lloyd George, especially in any matter in which either of the principals saw reason for not using the official channel of communication, the Colonial Office. Thus Lloyd George’s pleas for Hughes’s presence at the Imperial Conference in 1917, and Hughes’s urgent request for Lloyd George’s help in arranging the sale of Australian flour in America. were sent through Murdoch. Moreover, Hughes relied almost exclusively upon Murdoch’s advice as to the political interests of himself and his party among men and oficers of the A.I.F., and, on the occasions of the two conscription referendums and of the Commonwealth elections of 1917, arranged through him the organisation of leading Australian civilians in London which carried out in the A.I.F. the campaigns for the “ yes ” vote and the “ National ” party. Murdoch established intimate relations with Birdwood, White, bIonash, and most other leaders of the A.I.F., and, despite some hesitation on the part of G.H.Q., obtained, in the interests of his newspapers, permission to visit the Australian front as war correspondent whenever, from Bullecourt onwards, the Australians were involved in major operations.ll These visits, which brought him into touch with every part of the force, from base to front line, and his subsequent relations with all ranks, there and in London, enabled him to gauge the private sentiments of the troops, and to use his influence with W. M. Hughes for what he believed to be their desires or their Iienefit. His confidential cables were sent to the Australian Prime Minister personally through E. A. BOX,’*the capablc young chief of the High Commissioner’s staff, who was Murdoch’s most intimate cons~ltant.~~ Many of the matters referred by Hughes to Murdoch, or vice versa, were really in the province of the High Commissioner, and Murdoch’s position was partly due to the sad, gradual collapse of Andrew Fisher’s mental powers ; but even stronger reasons were Murdoch’s powerful personality,

I’A similar right was thereupon asked for ty the Australian Press Association, whose correspondent, Gordon L. Gilmour (of Sydney), was accorded the same privilege “E. A. Box, Esq. Private Secretary to Prime hlinister, I~IP/I~;to High Commissioner. 1915/18; Official Secretary for Australia. in London, 1918/19. Of Trafalgar and Brighton, Vic.; b. hlelbourne. 9 Sept , 1845. lSThey appear to have been sent at first at hfurdoch’s own expense, but later at that of the National party or the Government. wliichever interest was concerned. 8 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [1917-18 and the tendency of W. M. Hughes to keep vital communications in his own hands. Tall, strongly built but slow of movement, with the dark hair and heavy brow but twinkling eyes of his Highland ancestry, Murdoch, in mind and writings, corresponded curiously with his appearance. To wield great power was one of his keenest ambitions. His diplomacy was heavy and obvious, but masterful and usually successful. Where he knew he would be allowed to do so, he went bluntly to the point. When it came to a struggle, he frankly held that it was never worth while hitting unless with sledge-hammer blows, and his confidential cables were composed similarly to his newspaper reports ; based largely on impressions, their terms were normally exaggerated but seldom failed to effect the desired disturbance. He was ardently Australian, but naturally his position and his methods-those of diplomacy and not everywhere trusted- aroused some bitter hostility. But his representations were addressed to politicians who dealt in the same currency, and his influence was used in what he, and those associated with him, believed to be the highest interests of the A.I.F. Indeed. as with W. M. Hughes and some other Australian civilians who came occasionally among them, Murdoch’s admiration of the Australian soldiery rose almost to worship, and sometimes permitted him quite frankly to claim for them privileges beyond those of their British and other comrades. In the present instance Murdoch’s action was the decisive factor in bringing about one of their cherished dreams. The incidents of Bullecourt had aroused in some Australian leaders in France the feeling that the dominion forces should have direct access to the Commander-in-Chief. There existed also among Australians in London the impression that the War Office, for its part, would handle certain matters differently if it were aware of the Australian interests involved. A soniewhat vague apprehension of these problems by Murdoch and his associates, among whom, in this matter, was the Official War Correspondent with the A.I.F., decided Murdoch and Box to urge the Australian Government to ask for the appointment of a senior Australian representative at the War Office, and also for the combination of all the Australian infantry divisions in one “ Australian Army Corps ” under Birdwood’s command, and the staffing of that corps entirely 19171 THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS 9

by Australian officers. Accordingly on July I Ith Murdoch appended to a confidential cable, concerning the proposed sale of flour to the United States, a long and urgent appeal ((on behalf of the whole of the A.I.F. in France ” for the bringing together of the five Australian divisions into a single corps. “ Our generals unanimously declare no real military considerations against it,” he added. In the matter of the (‘ Australianisation” of the staff, the officer who in the past had most persistently worked for it, Colonel Dodds, was at the moment being transferred from hlelbourne to Birdwood’s headquarters, to control, under him, the personnel of the A.1.F.l’ His influence could be counted upon. Moreover Birdwood, of his own initiative, had been steadily replacing by Australians many British officers of I Anzac and the divisions; but it was suspected that Birdwood’s natural kindliness and loyalty might render it difficult for him to displace some of his oldest associates. To force his hand Murdoch, on a suggestion from Surgeon-General Howse, advised the Australian Government to ask Birdwood to furnish the names of those British officers attached to the A.I.F. whom he considered indispensable. It was certain that he could not, without embarrassment, name more than one or two, if so many. The suggestions for the “ Australianisation ” of the forcc represented accurately an intense desire of the troops, and the Australian Government telegraphed on July 30th to the Secretary of State :la Comnlonwealth of Australia desires to invite the attention of the Imperial Government to the fact that the Australian Imperial Force, which at first consisted of only a few units, has now for some time “As D A G., A.I.F., taking the place of Colonel Griffiths, whose ill-health was causing anxiety. ‘5Actioti with respect to the staff hrd already been suggested. On 23 Jan., 19x1. the then Commandant of Adininistrative Headquarters in *don (Colonel R. hl hIcC. Anderson) bad written to the Defence Department Has it ever occurred to you to take up with the War Office the question of positions of high command being made available for our fellows in forces outside the A I.F., Whereas British soldiers secure fine preferment in our forcc, good appointments are not made available to our nicn in the British force. Why, It is manifestly one-sided.” The Adjutant-General in hlelbourne, Colonel Dodds, to whom this letter went, was then leaving for France, but both he and his successor in hlelbourne. Brig-General Sellheim, felt that the suggestion was impracticable, seeing that the A 1 F. had too few officei s of high rank H.ith the necessary qualifications. Sellheini recommended on April 4 that, before contemplating the transfer of A.I.F. officers .!o high commands in the “Im erial” army the Australian Government should aim at replacing ‘ Imperial ’ off!ceis holding ’high A.I.F. appointments by our own officers, alHays provided . . . the fighting efficiency of our troops is not thereby prejudiced ’’ No action, however, appears to have been taken until hlurdoch’s message arrived in July, and it was certainly this message that was the actual lever. 10 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [July-Sept., 1917 exceeded I~O.~OOin the fighting line.16 and that it is desirable that the national feeling with regard to their troops should be given effect to more especially in the constitution of the fighting formations and the employment of Australian officers on the staff, and also that, to ensure closer touch with Australian sentimeiits. the Comrnonwealtli should provide a senior Australian officer for duty at the War Office with regard to Australian questions . . . At the same time Birdwood was asked in a separate message to say which British officers on the Anzac staffs he considered indispensable, and was informed that the British Government had been asked to agree to the concentration of Australians under his command in purely Australian formations 'I and with Australian officers for commands and staffs." Birdwood, on receiving some weeks later a copy of the telegram to the Eritish Government, pointed out that it did not formulate any clear request for the combination of the divisions under his command. The Australian Government had in the meantime received a deprecatory reply from the Army Council, to which its previous telegram had been referred by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and, on the suggestion of Major-General Legge, the Chief of the General Staff in Melbourne, had replied as follows: Government of Australia is disappointed at the terms of your reply of II August from which it is evident that the Army Council is iiot in sympathy with the desire of this Government that Australian divisions should be grouped in one or more Australian corps, with Australian staff officers. This would be more acceptable to Australian sentiment than statement that Australian officers are regarded as inter- changeable with British staffs, which has not previously been actuallv put into practice. This telegram also was referred to the Army Council, which replied that the proposal was impracticab1e.l' Birdwood's telegram and two others from Murdoch now having come to hand, W. AT. Hughes sent a stronger representation. On

10The main Australian formations at the front in 1918 Here in France-1st. 2nd. srd, 4th, and 5th Infantry Divisions; in Palestine-the Anzac Mounted Division (including one New Zealand brigade) and the Australian JIounte.1 Division. Four squadrons of the Australian Flying Corps, two siege batterlea. three conipanies of tunnellers, six railway operating conlpanies, an I' army tioops '' company of engineers, and many medical and smaller unlts also were at the front The total of Australian fighting troops in France was 110.000. The total sticngth of the British Aimy in France Has then ~,goo,ooo,of whom ahout 1,500,ooo were fighting tTOODS 17 A single corps of five Austfrlian divisions would be unwieldy both for tactical and administrative purposes The formation of two Australian cow-- 1 e. one of two and onc of three divisions-would be " unecononii:al as regards staff and headquarters personnel.'' Sept.-Oct., 19171 THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS 11 hiurdocli’s advice (probably based on a hint from Lord Milner) he added the request that it should be referred “to my colleagues of the Imperial War Cabinet ” : I desire to emphasise point that it is strongly desired by Common- wealth Government that all Australian troops should be grouped together under General Birdwood, and that Australian troops should be com- manded and staffed by Australian officers, of whom most have had several years’ war experience in addition to former peace training in Australian permanent and militia forces. This would appeal most strongly to Australian national sentiment, it is most keenly desired by the troops, the Coinmonwealth Government presses for it ** This telegram brought action. On October 5th the Army Council18 wrote to Haig asking in view of the reiterated request of the Commonwealth Government . . . whether you consider it practicable to accede to the proposal that the live Australian divisions should be grouped in one corps Both the Anzac Corps were then engaged in Third Ypres, but on the 19th Haig replied that he would go into the matter with Birdwood at the first opportunity. Actually Murdoch had macle the same request to Haig in an interview at G.H.Q. on September Ist, and had received the reply which Haig now gave again-that, in his opinion, a corps of five divisions would be unwieldy, disorgnnising the system of reliefs. “ It would affect the general conduct of operations so adversely that I regard it as both unwise and impracticable.”20 Haig’s objection was entirely sincere. In his opinion the system of army corps of four divisions, two for the line and two to relieve them, appeared vital; he even included this principle among his chief recommendations to the British Government after the war. And now, when on October 29th he invited Birdwood, White and Howse to lunch and to confer with himself and his C.G.S., Lieutenant-General Kiggell, this consideration was obviously paramount. Haig also expressed the opinion that no one man could manage five divisions.

Birdwood’s reply was : “ If the Australian Government had IBHe added-also on information from hlurdoch-that he could not helleve that the “ strategrcal objections ” were insuperable, inasmuch as the 4th Australian Division, which had some months previously been detached from Blrclpood’s corps, had, since the Government’s telegram of Aug. zg, been returned to It much to the men’s satisfaction.” ‘9 hliirdoch. on mqiilrirp from !Trir.lies nvrrtnined thit the mntter Flrl nnt IIV Oct. 27, come before Cahinet. hut Lord AIilner had promised him that he would move in the matter if necessary. Haig received the wrong impression that hlurdoch wanted Australia to be independent of Great Britain. 12 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [Oct.-Nov., 1917 offered you its fifth division . . . with the proviso that you kept the five together, you would accept it, surely.” Haig, though he did not relish the independence of Birdwood’s attitude, was genuinely trying to meet Australian wishes and had hinted to Murdoch that the Australians might be regrouped in two corps. He also made it evident to him that he had been considering the possible advancement of Major-General Monash, whom he much admired, to the corps command, and the separation of that command from the ofice of G.O.C., A.I.F., which presumably Birdwood could still retain. It was at this stage that Generals Birdwood and White put forward a solution suggested to them by the crisis in the reinforcement problem after Third Ypres. If Birdwood’’ the 4th Division was disbanded, no objection Plan could be urged to combining the other four. Any disbandment was the last thing Birdwood wished ; but could not one of the five divisions be temporarily withdrawn and, until recruiting improved, used as a dCpdt division for reinforcing its sister divisions, if necessary? Such an arrangement had been approved in the case of the Canadian force.21 If the four other Australian divisions could be concentrated, this winter, in a quiet sector, it might be possible to bring up to strength not only them but their d6pdt division, although this would receive no new reinforcements but only its own sick and mounded returning from convalescence. When fighting began again in the spring, the first division to incur heavy casualties would change places with the one till then acting as d6pdt division. The Australian people would thus, at least, be given time to see whether, by acceleration of recruiting, the disbandment of a division could be avoided. To the delight of its authors, this proposal was cordially accepted by Haig,22who, on November Ist, decided that the

*I Its was to be brought to France as dCp6t division for the others. “It was put forward (by the leave of Second Army) in letters from General White to Brig -General . H. Davidson fzj Oct , 1gf.7)’ and from General Birdwood to Lieut..General Kiggci (27 Oct.). White wrote, I am very loth to suggest any oreferential treatment for Australian troons-the more Dartlcularlv as we were bomewhat favoured by a long rest and training period in’ the summer. This last did, I think, repay by results. But . . ns you know. these fellows of ours are not used to a tough winter (as you Scotchmen are). and a winter in conditions such as we had on the Somme last year would hit us vey hard. and might raise casualties to a degree beyond our power of replacement Generals Plumer and Harington were, of course, informed of the details of this correspondence. a

Nov., 19171 THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS 13 rst, aid, 3rd, and 5th Australian Divisions should be allotted to Birdwood’s corps, while the 4th, temporarily withdrawn to an area near Boulogne, would act as its d6p8t division. The corps would be transferred for the winter to the now quiet Messines front. Moreover, as it was to be used for the spring offensive, Haig hoped to give it. immediately before the offensive, a month’s complete rest. Its name was changed from “ I Anzac” to “The Australian Corps ”; I1 Anzac, henceforth entirely British except for the and the corps mounted troops, was renamed the XXII Corps.z3 This decision, which came as a complete surprise to the divisions emerging from Third Ypres, was everywhere hailed with delight. “ Everyone is as pleased as puiicli,” writes a diarist at corps headquarters. The 4th Division, if anxious as to its own future, welcomed its long-delayed rest. But it was in the 3rd, which had never yet been brigaded with the main body of Australian infantry, that satisfaction was keenest. Everyone was brimming over with surprise and pleasure . . . (says the same diarist recording a visit to that division oil November 6). Major Robertson24 (in command of the 37th) . . . told me after dinner, “It was almost too good to be true; we were overjoyed- delighted.” The brims of the felt hats, which, to create esprit de corps by a distinction from other divisions, General Monas11 had caused to be worn unlooped,2s were turned up the same day.

ZJIn the spring, the New Zealand Divlsion also finally left it. The Australian cyclists had gone to the Australian corps: the New Zcaland cyclists and mounted rifles were withdrawn to their division and 80 of the that bad formed pait of the II Anzac hlounted Regiment were transferred to the Australian artillery. By General Godley’s wish, in which General Birdwood concurred, there remained with it to the last two squadrons of the old 4th Aust. Light Horse Regiment who, with some British cavalry, now formed the XXII Corps hlounted Regiment. x4 Major W. F. H Robertson. 37th Bn. Stores clerk, XIelbournc Electric Supply (:a Ltd ; of Albert Park, Vic.: b. Albert Park, 17 July, 1858. “This was one of Monash’s rare slips. 3 14 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [Nov., I917 In implementing this arrangement, which, on his recom- mendation, was “ strongly favoured ” by the Army Council, Sir Douglas Haig was even better than his word. The 3rd Squadron of the Australian Flying Corps,28 then arriving in France, was allotted to the Australian Corps as the “corps squadron.” The two Australian siege batteries-previously Nos. 54 and 55 (Australian) R.G.A., but henceforth Nos. I and 2 Australian-were sent to the corps as part of its heavy artillery. Occasion was also taken to man with Australian personnel all except one of its motor-transport companies.*’ -4s for the Australianisation of commands and staffs Haig, although, like the Army Council, he indicated that he would be sorry to see all interchange excluded, accepted the Australian Government’s decision and, in this respect also, held loyally to his principle of fulfilling the dominion’s wishes so far as he could do so without injury to the common cause.28 After discussion with Birdwood, it was arranged that a number of junior Australian officers should, from time to time, be sent for experience to British brigade and divisional staffs ; but henceforth no British officers were appointed to Australian stags or commands in France, and the twenty or so who were

- ~~~ “Till then known as No. 69 (Aust ) Squadron, R F C. The Director of Alotor Trmapoit at G H 8. would not agree to convert the ‘I I; ” (I Anzac) Corps Siege Park to m Australian unit, and the point was not pressed, though doubtless the intervention of the Australian Government would have carried it. 3 Both Haig and the Army Council placed much value upon the arrangement, ag!eed to Iiy the dominions in 1907. for common service of British and dominion ofhcers upon an “ Imperial General Staff.” By this arrangement, although each of the forces concerned maintained its own staff, respoiisi1,le only to its own government, nevertheless. by exchange of literature and of a small ploportion of officers, the sepaiate staffs contrived to think and work upon identical line>, and each was known as a IJranch of the Iniperial General Staff. But-except for occasional exchanges-it had not been intended to staff the forces of any member of the Enipiie by other than its own officers. €I?ig, like the Army Council, now desiied to maintain the system of interchange. Frequent offers have been made to General Birdwood to employ Australian officers . . . on the staffs of British formations.” he wrote. “ These offers have, however, been consistently declined on the grounds that, until Australian formations are completely staffed by Aiistralian officers, no Australian officers can be spared for British formations.” The War Cabinet strongly supported interchange, “ hut without binding the Commonwealth Government in any way to receive a fixed proportion of British officers in Australian formations.” The reply from Melbourne, again drafted by Leggc. was that “ strong feeling exists in Australia that Australian units should he self-contained Conditions of service and personal chaiacters of Australian troops diffeient from British troops. Imperial conference recommended interchange as between British regular army and dominion forces. and Commonwealth still adhere to this provided that, before any such exchanges are made. Commnnwealth IS consulted Subject to this. it is desirable that Australian officers should as far as possible form staffs Australian formations.” This certainly was the wish of the troops. 1917-181 THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS 1s not members of the A.I.F. but were still holding positions in it were reabsorbed into the British Army as soon as there could he found Australians suitable to take their places.2B The Headquarters of the Australian Corps itself was still, somewhat anomalously, a British unit. Birdwood had already staffed it largely with Australians, and he now offered to have it made an Australian unit, but the Australian Government did not at the moment take up the offer, and a few British officers remained there. But Brigadier-General Coxen took the place of Brigadier-General Napier in conimand of the: corps artillery ; Colonel Foott replaced Brigadier-General Joly de Lotbinihre as Chief Engineer, and the chief staff officers of the divisions were now all Australians. On the 5th of hfarch, 1918, General Birdwood informed G.H.Q. that lie could replace the last four British commanders who were not actual members of the A.J.F.-Major-Generals walker ( ) and Sniyth (), and Brigadier-Generals Lesslie () and Hobkirk ()-and, when suitable commands fell vacant in the British Army, these leaders were transferred to them. There remained till the end of the war five exceptions-Major-General Sinclair-MacLagan (G.O.C., 4th Division), Brigadier-General Anderson (C.R.A., 1st Division), Lieutenant-Colonels Marsh ( 1st Divisional Train), Ross (later G.S.O. I, 1st Division), and DaviesS0 (32nd Battalion), all of whom had been attached to the military forces in Australia before the war, and, except Davies, had been members of the A.I.F. since its formation by General Bridgess1

'@As to the Australian forces in Palestine, where the change was not so complete, see 701. VII. pp. 255-6. 20 Brig..Gen. C. S. Davies, C.M.G., D.S.O. Employed at Royal hlilitary College, Duntroon, 1g13/15; commanded 3znd Bn., A.I.F., 1g17/18, 8th Inf Bde., A.I.F., 1g18/1g, 1st Bn., The Leicestershire Regt., 1gz7/31. Officer of Brltish Regular Army; of Lee-on-Solent, Hampshire, Eng.; b. Dunedin, N.Z., 6 Sept.. 1880. "The leading commanders and staff officers at the end of January, 1918, were (British officers In rtalics) - AUSTRALIAN CORPS HEADQUARTERS. G.O.C.: Lieut -Grn Sir W. R. Birdurood Qenersl Staff: Major-Gen. C. B. B. White (B.G.G.S.); (Operations) Lwut.-Col. A. M. Ross, (Intelligence) Major 5. S. Butler, replaced by Capt. S. A. Hunn, 14 Jan., 1~18. (hlajor Butler became chief of intelligence staff, Fifth Army.) Administrative Staff: Brip.-Gen. R. A. Carruthers, Lieut.-Col. G. C. Somerville (virc Lieut -col Ai. G. Taylor. 16 Dec.. 1917). Artillery: (B.G.RA.) BrigXen. W. A. Coxen, vice Brig.4t-n. W. 3. Napier, 8 Oct., 1917; (B.G.H.A.) Brig.-Gen L. D. Fraser. Engineere: (C E Brig.-Gen. Hon. A. C. de L. Joly de Lotbinih, replaced by Colonel C. H. Fwtt, 17 16 THE A.IF. IN FRANCE CI917-I8 Although this was a right and popular measure, all who knew them regretted to see the British officers go, and with good reason; although the A.I.F. undoubtedly owed most to the old Australian militia, its debt to its small quota of British officers was beyond computation, especially in the standards March. (C.R E Corps Troops) Lieut.-Col. E. J. H. Nicholson. Signals: Lieutkol R. if.Powell replaced by Lieut.-Col. C. II. Ii’nlsh, 19 April, succeeded ‘by Lieut.-Col. ‘I!. R. Williams, 8 June. Machine Quns: Lieut.. Col L. F. S. Hore. Mechanical Transport: Col. W. H Tunbridge. Medical: Surgeon-Gen. C. C. Mantfold replaced by Col. C. W. Barber, 8 April. Ordnance: Lieiit.-Col. E. T. Leine, vice Lirut.-Col. R. H. V. Kelly, g Dec.. 1917. Veterinary: Lietit.-Col. T. hlatson. Chemical Adviser: Capt H. W. Wilson. Postal: Capt. C. J. Fletcher. Police: Lieut.-Col. W. Smith. Camp Commandant: Malor J. 5. S. Churchill. replaced by hfaior W. W. Berry. I June. DIVISIONAL COMMANDERS. 1st: Mal.-Cen. Sir H. B. Walker. 2nd: Maj.-Gen. N. M. Smyth, V C. 3rd: Major.-Cen. Sir J. Monash. 4th: Maj.-Gen. E. G. Sinclair-MncLaaan. 5th: h1aj.-Cen. Sir J. J. T. Hobbs. SENIOR G.S.O’s OF DIVISIONS. 1st: Col. T. A. Blamey (Col. J. G. Dill held this position from mid-Sept. to IO Oct., 1917, and Lieut.-Col. J. D. Lavarack from 11 Oct. to S Nov.. during the illness of Col. Blamey). 2nd: Lieut.-Col. C. G N. Miles, vice Lieuk-Col. A. H. Brid es, 11 Dec.. 1917 3rd: Lieut.-Col. C. H. Jess, vice Lieirt.-Cul. G. H. N. Bockson. 20 Tan. (Lieut.-Col 1. D Lavarack was for a few days with the 3rd Divn.). 4th.: Lieut.-Cd. J. D. Lavarack, vice Liesit.-Col. D. 1. C. K. Bernard, 19 Dec. 5th: Lieut -Col J. H. Peck, vice Lieut.-Col. C. bf. IYagstafl, 3 Sept. (All these Australian officers were permanent officers of pre-Duntroon days. The senior grade yet reached by a Duntroon graduate was G.S.O. a.) AA. AND Q.M.C’s. 1st: Lieut.-Col. H G. Viney. 2nd: LieutXol. J. hI. A. Durrant. 3rd: Lieut.-Col. R. E. Jackson. 4th: Lieut.-Col. R. Dowse. 5th: Col J. H. Bruchc. C R A’s 1st: Brig -Gen. S. ni. Anderson 2nd: Brig -Gen. 0. F. Phillips. 3rd: Brig-Gen. H. W. Crimwade. 4th: Brig.-Cen. W. H. L. Burgess (N.Z. Staff Corps). 5th: Brig -Cen. A. J. Bessell-Browne. C.R E’s. 1st: Lieut.-Col. A. M. Martyn. 2nd: Lieut -Col. 5. AI C Corlette 3r6: Lieut.-Col. H. 0 Clogstoun, replaced by LieutXol. T. R. Williams. IZ hlarch, succeeded by Major H Rachtold I April. 4th: Lieut.-Col G. C. E. Elliott, replaced by Licu~-Col.R. 1 &e,. 6 ADril. 5th: Lieut.-Col. V. A. H. Sturdee, VICC Lieut -Col. A. B.. Cnrey, .a5 Nov., 1917. A.D’s.hl S. 1st: Col. R. B. Huxtable. 2nd: Col. A. E. Shepherd. 3rd: Col A. T. White, replaced by Col. F. A. hlaguire, 18 Jan 4th: Col. C. W. Barber, replaced by Col. A. H. Moseley, 8 April. 5th: Col. M. H. Downey. BRIGADE COMMANDERS. 1st Division: Brig.-Gen. W. B. Lesslre replaced by Brig-Cen. I. G. hlackay, 6 June (rst). Brig.-Cen. J. Heane (>nd). Brig.-Cen. H. C. Bennett (3rd). 2nd Divisidn: Brig.-Gen. R. Smith (ifla);Brig-Cen. J. Paton (6th). Bng.-Cen. E. A. Wisdom (7th). 3rd DiviBion: Brig.-Cen. C. Roseiiihal (9th) ; Brig -Gem W R. McNicoll (roth) . Brig.-Gen J. H. Cannan (11th). 4th Division: B;ig..Gen. C. H. Brind (4th): Brig-Gen. J. Gellibrand (rzth); Brig.-Gen. T. \V. Glasgow (13th). 5th Division: Brig -Cen. E. Tivey (8th) ; Brig.-Gm. C. I. Hobkirk. replaced by Brig.-Gen. J. C. Stewart, a3 March (rjth); Brig-Cen. H. E. Elliott (rgtk). A I.F. STAFF. D.A.G.: Col. T. FI. Dodds. Commandant, Admin. H.Q., London: Brig.-Ccn. T. Griffiths. G.O.C., A.I.P. Depots in United Kingdom: hIaJ.-Gen. Hon. J. W. XI’Cay. Director Of Medical Services: Surgeon Gen Sir N. R. IIowse. V.C. 1914-181 THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS 17

set by them for personal conduct. They were far from being the only ones to furnish the troops with the exalted example of an “English gentleman”-there were many such among the born Australians of the A.I.F.; but it may safely be said that the influence of the British officer, from Birdwood and Walker downward, was in this respect outstanding. Such men as R. H, Owen:* Duncan Glasfurd, and Oswald Croshaw, by their regard for duty as the paramount principle of their lives, by consideration for others which bred the same quality in return, by their noble standards whether in private or in public intercourse, exercised a continuing influence long after their service had taken its toll of their powers. Most of the British officers with the A.I.F. were men who, through experience abroad, had already shed the shell with which the middle class Englishman protects himself against strangers. They had acquired the habit of appreciating men by their qualities rather than by their adherence to forms and ceremonies, and many of the warmest encomiums on the Australian soldier are from their mouths. For his part the “digger,” when once the barrier of mere formality was lowered, and their true qualities were seen, conceived a deep admiration and regard for them. The picture of Lesslie in his shirt-sleeves on Anzac Beach; of Glasfurd tracking the firing line across the 400 Plateau; of Walker, cap tilted over one eye, radiating confidence in the feverish days on Walker’s Ridge; of Smyth directing reinforcements into Lone Pine tunnels as quietly as a ticket collector passing passengers on to a platform; of Cox at Damakjelik, yellow with sickness but unconquerably tough : of Clogstoun (of eyeglass fame) at Leane’s Trench; of Ross, Gibbs, Bernard,33 Jackson, Fa~-mar,~’Irvine, Austin, Wagstaff, Taylor,35 Hobkirk, G. C. E. Elliott, Jeremy-Taylor

I* O=.en was an Austrnlian hv hirth XJ Lieut -Cen. Sir Denis Bernard, K C B , C M G, D S O., p s c G S 0. (I). 4th Aust. Div., 1916/1;. B.G.S., Northern Command, India. 1910/34; Director of Recruiting and Orgadsation, War Office, 1934‘36. Of Castle Hacket, Tuani, Gal- May, Ireland; b. London, 62 Oct , 1852. *‘ Col. H. Ai. Farmar, C h1.G D.S.0 Lancashire Fusiliers Bde.-Major, 86th Inf. Bde (29th Div.), 1915. AA. & ‘b.M.G. 3rd Aust. 61, 1916/17. Of Bloomfield, Co. Wexford, Ireland: b. Southamptod. Eng., 15 June. 1878 36 Cen Sir hIaurice Taylor. K C B , C.M G , D S 0,p s c , R E A Q hl C , I Anzac, igidi7. Officer of British Regular Army; of London; b. London, 31 May. 1881. 88Brig-Cen A B Carey C.M.G D.S 0 R E C R E qth Aust Div. igi6/1 Officer of British’ Regular Army; oi’Hendon; Midhlcs&, Eng ; b. Fermoy, ‘Co. Cork; Ireland, 3 March. 1871. 18 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [ 1914-18

Marsh, Rowan-Hamilton and others, all of whom helped this Antipodean force with capable and devoted service-these memories are an integral part of its history. Irvine, Croshaw, and Higgon were killed leading Australian infantry, Glasfurd and Gibbs visiting them in the forward area. They were full members of that rich comradeship, and their memory is treasured by its survivors. The Australian Government’s request for the appointment of a representative at the War Office was dropped after both the Army Council and Birdwood had pointed out that the Commandant at Administrative Headquarters of the A.I.F. in London already acted as such a representative, and that the appointment of another could only cause much embarrassment to all par tie^.^' It may, however, be remarked that if the Commandant had not been so close to the War Office, it would probably have been necessary for him to maintain a senior representative there. It was thus a national force more compact than hitherto whose 3rd and 5th Divisions on November 13th began to take over from the Sth, 33rd, and 30th British A single command Divisions (VI11 Corps) the southern and northern sub-sectors of the Messines front. The sector extended froin the Lys, north of Armentihes, to the Ypres-Comines canal south of Ypres. On the 15th, when control passed to the I Anzac Corps,38 all the Australian divisions in France were for the first time united under a single command. Although the 4th Division was for the moment relegated to a G.H.Q. back area, Birdwood had the right to call for it at any time to replace an exhausted division; and, to avoid the notion that it was to be broken up, he insisted upon calling it the “ reserve division,” and treating it as such. He prayed G.H.Q. to do everything possible to help him to keep up the divisional spirit, “which is really very strong.” To that end, he begged that its artillery should not “The Army Council would have agreed; but what duties the proposed representative was to carry out is not clear. When the ??’Jar Office asked for particulars the reply, drafted by General Legge. was: While Birdwood is responsibl; for the fighting efficiency of tlie Australian Imperial Force. there are many questions concerning supply of war material from Australia. base and historical records, return of invalids to Australia. as well as subjects which are difficult to explain by cablegrams, and i.t is considered that the services of a senior Australian officer in London would facilitate decisions.” It retained this name till I Jan., 1918. Headquarters were at FlCtre (ICC Yol. XII, plate 429). Nov., 1g17-Mar., 19181 THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS 19 he taken away foi use as “army” brigades. Actually, unforeseen needs, and Haia’s-- reluctance to dispense with any force of such proved value, caused its tota! career as “ dCp6t ” or “ reserve ” divi- sion to be ended in three weeks. The division, eager for its long-promised rest, arrived at Ganiaches, near Dieppe, on November 23rd. But it had barely settled down when, on November goth, the Germans, counter- attacking after the Battle of Canibrai, broke through the British front, and on Deceni- ber 3rd the 4th Australian Positron of Aut. Divistons, end Now, 1917. Division was ordered up to PQronne as the next available reserve. Here it remained, employing its stay in the devastated area30 for much useful training, despite the bitter weather, and doing some work on the Fifth Army’s scheme of defences, until the New Year. Then, the Second Army having to send two divisions to take over part of the line from the French, the4th Australian Division was given to it in exchange, and forthwith, on January 12t11, was put into the front line of the IX Corps at the southern end of the Ypres battlefield, with its right at Hollebeke cross-roads and its left on the Bassevillebeek at “ Bitter Wood.” The Australian Corps then took over this additional sector. The arrangement, intended io be temporary, proved permanent. The Australian Army Corps thus at last comprised five active divisions; and, by the irony of chance, when three months later a great emergency arose, it was the 4th Australian Division that was first thrown into serious fighting.

The probable tasks of the corps during the winter were explained by Birdwood in two letters addressed to his divisional commanders on November 5th and 7th. The corps front aDLairl waste hv the Germans in tlierr retreat to the Hindenburg Line in March, 1917. Sre Vol. XII, glatr 430. 20 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [Nov., rg17-Mar.. 1918

would be fairly long--Iz,ooo yards-for two Tasks and Anxieties divisions ; but there would be a third division in support and a fourth in immediate reserve, and the front should not be a difficult one, since the right would be covered by the River Lys. It would therefore be held lightly though safely, and every effort would be made to build up the strength of the divisions. “Our greatest enemies,” wrote Birdwood, on the strength of his Somme experience, “ are likely to be trench feet and throat and chest complaints.” By arrangements for drying and changing socks in the trenches, and by football and other sports, cinemas, concerts, and canteens for the men in rear,‘O the health and comfort of the troops was to be particularly sought, As a result of these instructions, for the next two monfhs battalion football competitions were the supreme interest behind the Messines front. Guernsies with the regimental colours were provided from the battalion and corps funds. Sports grounds marked with flags and lined with eager crowds surrounded every camp. The battalions are just like a lot of Oxford colleges in the October term (says an Australian diarist)-more keen on their football for the moment than on anything else in the world. The competitions are mostly by brigades.“ Representatives of the Australian Comforts Fund and the Y.M.C.A., which together helped to provide Christmas gifts, extra food, sporting clothes and material, writing rooms, and entertainments, worked to a scheme organised under the A.A. and Q.M.G’s of the beveral divisions. A corps magazine, Aimie, much better suited to the taste of the “ diggers ” than the previous year’s Rismg Siiii, was produced through the ability of Lieutenant Harris4* at the corps ammunition park. whose printing section issued it. This cheerful journal was an immediate success, and sold in great number^.'^ The work and training of the Australian infantry was not hampered, as was that of the British during the winter, by the reorganisation of the divisions from a twelve- to a

‘0 Australian soldiers. throughout their service. had the advantage of the admirably efficient organisation of the British Expeditionary Force Canteens, but at this time certain special canteens also wtre organieed “The diary adds: “az Bn. starting a newspaper and a dehating society” Lieut. P. L. Harris, a3rd Dn. Journalist; of Sydney; b. Deniliquin, N.S.W., g Dec., 1885. ‘*For example, 10,ooo copies of the first issue were printed, 60,000 of the second, and IOO.OOO of the third.

\

Nov., rgr 7-Feb., 19181 THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS 21 nine-battalion establishment. The only important change- apart from those already descrihed-carried out at this time in the A.I.F. in France was the uniting of the four machine-gun companies of each division into a divisional machine-gun battalion. This-the last step in the gradual separation of the machine-guns from their original place in the infantry-was an outcome. partly of increasing specialisation, partly of the methods of 1917 by which the machine-guns had been used almost as artillery. The change was, within a few months, to be tested in warfare of a very different nature. The training, for which Birdwood hoped that each division would obtain two months out of the line,“ was, however, impeded by two circumstances. First, the division in active reserve, though stationed almost as far back as the 4th Division,45 found the authorities unable to supply it with adequate training grounds ; second, as will presently be told, the energy of the corps had eventually to be concentrated upon the fortification of its sector. However, casualties were few and, with sock-drying chambers beside the main forwxd tracks, a highly efficient laundry and baths organisation:’ and keen recreation in the back areas, there was little sickncss notwithstanding the frequent flooding of many of the front Moreover, despite the fully justified anxiety as to the adequacy of future drafts from the Australian dBp8ts at Salisbury Plain, the actual rate of their receipt was well above that for the British divisions. Thus, between November 1st and February 28th the infantry strength of the four active divisions showed the rapid rise indicated in the following figures : Nov. I. Dec. 31. Feb. 28. 1st Divn. . . 11,476 . . 12,694 . . 13,531 2nd Divn. . . 11,805 . . 12,583 . . 13,579 3rd Divn. . . 5,503 . . 11,626 . . 13,097 5th Divn. . . 10,192 . . 13,070 . . 13,577

41 Haig’s intention to give the whole corps a month’s rest before the spring offensive was. however, not carried out; it would naturally be changed when the plan for an offensive was abandoned. “In the Samer-Desvres area. See Vol. XII, plate 439. +E The most serious loss occurred in the far hack area, at Desvres. where on 16 Dec., 1917, a train carrying the 3znd Battallon to the rest area telescoped through the hreaking of a coupling. one man being killed and 64 injured. ‘7 See Vol. XII. plate 434. Ibid. plate 441.

A 22 THE A.IF. IN FRANCE [Nov., 1917-Mar., 1918

Even the infantry of the 4th Division-though at first it ieceived only its own ex-convalescents, and, on return to the front, it served in the most active portion of the sector- increased as shown below : Nov. I. Dec. 31. Feb. 28. 4th Divn. . . 9,787 . . 11,098 .. 12,021 Yet this temporary recuperation could not remove deep anxieties concerning the future of the divisions. The object of the measures adopted had been to allow time for a revival of enlistment in Australia; but in the referendum taken on December 20th the Australian people rejected conscription by a somewhat larger majority than before. The soldiers' vote, taken about December I rth under arrangements made by Adiniiiistrative Headquarters in London, was slightly more favourable than in 1910; it is believed that a majority of the troops actually in the front was against the measure, but that the vote from the camps and the transports turned the scale and prodiiced a slight majority of soldiers in favour-103,?89 being for, and 93,910 against. The reasons for the opposition among the fighting troops were apparently the

40 See Vol III, p 892. also Vol. XII, plate 432. ~~SECVof. XI, p. 409. Actually Gen. Birdwood was, at this time, quietly arranging to give home leave to a very small proportion of officers and men-about aoo monthly-by the subterfuge of sending them as *' submarine guards " on transports Is)I 7-18] THE AUSTRALI..\N CORPS 23 manner as the British were then doing, by reducing not the number of divisions, but the number of battalions in each infantry brigade.“ Only when replenishment by this method was exhausted would the disbandment of divisions be begun. The fear that the A.I.F. would be forced to “feed upon itself ” was well grounded; the present recovery of strength was not solely due to the normal course of reinforcement. It is true that some of the material still to be squeezed from staffs at the base was of first rate quality, but there was not much of it. ,4s after PoziGres, the Administrative Headquarters of the A.I.F. in London and the training staffs on Salisbury Plain were combed to obtain additional men for the front. Comparatively few could be drawn from the great offices at horse ferry-road ; the Commandant, Griffiths-once gunner, now brigadier-general-had not been the man to permit evasion of duty; most of the routine work at the London headquarters was done by ~onien,~~and the “ fit ” men were chiefly experts of the very fine staff of the pay corps, whose leaders were SO overtaxed that one after another of them broke down in health, as, in the end, did Griffiths himself. 1 A larger source than Horseferry-road was the staff of the. -4.I.F. “ base dkpSts ” at Salisbury Plain. This command was now held by Major-General M’Cay, who, after leaving the 5th Division, had been unemployed in London, and had been transferred to that command by Senator Pearce against the advice of Birdwood. Birdwood doubted whether M’Cay, notwithstanding his senior rank and great ability, was capable of maintaining content among his troops. Birdwood had therefore urged that Sir Newton Moore should be retained at the dCp6ts and M’Cay sent to Horseferry-road. M’Cay himself would have liked to control both these establishments through appointment to command all Australian troops in England. Such an appointment would have afforded the further prospect that its holder might become the administrative G.O.C., A.T.F., if, as now seemed likely, Birdwood was offered the next vacancy in the Army commands. These ambitions made hl’Cay, at the d6p6ts, a most difficult partner for

61 From four to three A somewhat similar reorganisation had been carried out by the French and Germans a year earlier 6’See Vol. XII. plate 248. 24 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE 11917 Griffiths, at Horseferry-road, who, indeed at one time begged to be taken back to France with his former subordinate appointment. But Birdwood's proposal also had its drawbacks -it is certain that M'Cay would have been as difficult in the Horseferry-road command as at Salisbury Plain. In warning Senator Pearce that M'Cay would be unsuitable as G.O.C., A.I.F., if that post were vacated by himself, Birdwood quoted an opinion expressed by the High Commissioner for Australia in London that, whereas his office worked admirably in co-operation with Griffiths, if M'Cay were in charge he himself could hardly hope to carry on. However, M'Cay was given the post at Salisbury Plain; and, after Birdwood had impressed upon him the necessity of amicable co-operation, lie filled the base dBp8t command loyally and ably. When the losses at Third Ypres brought a crisis in the supply of reinforcements, he reorganised his reinforcement and convalescent units, reducing the former from 15 battalions to IO and later to 5, and thus saving a number of the training staff. As, however, the staffs were partly formed from unfit troops, but principally from officers and N.C.O's sent over from their units in France for a needed rest, the reinforcement thus provided consisted partly of war- worn personnel. Inevitably it was from officers and men returning after convalescence that the reinforcements now largely came. And some observers were inclined to suspect that at such times the mere knowledge that men were greatly needed in France could not help having its subconscious effect upon the minds of the medical boards, with the result of lowering the standard of fitness ordinarily insisted on. Among the men returned to France, many had been wounded again and again, and there were undeniably some whose nerves or strength were unfit for the strain that was being put upon them. There is a recorded case of one who had served since the beginning of the war, and whom the original medical officer of his battalion, chancing to meet him in France returtling after many wounds, pronounced to be suffering from acute overstrain, eye-pupils dilated, and thoroughly unfit for front-line service. Another infantr~man.'~who had received his first wound shortly after

"Pte A. P. Scott (No. 1301; 5th & 57th Bns.). Prospector; of Willramstown, Vic.: b. Mirboo North, Vie., I Jan, 1889 Died 7 Aug.. 1934. 19171 THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS 25

the Landing, was, at the instance of his brother, taken out of the line immediately before a great attack into which he was uncomplainingly marching. Relieved of his heavy kit, and transferred to an easy job at a small headquarters, he was found barely to have strength even for this task, and shortly afterwards was discovered to be suffering from tuberculosis, which soon rendered him half-cripple and sixteen years later caused his death. Another source of ansiety was one affecting the A.I.F. much more than the British or French Armies, and inseparable frvni the conditions under which it had been The absence Of death penalty enlisted. By the Australian Defence Act,

which in a few disciDlinarv,I Drovisions overrode the British Army so far as Australian troops serving with the British Army were concerned, a soldier who refused to enter battle or deserted to the rear was not liable to suffer a penalty of death. The Defence Act (Section $3) said: No member of the Defence Force shall be sentenced to death by any court-martial except for mutiny, desertion to the enemy, or traitorously delivering up to the enemy any garrison, fortress, post, guard, or ship, vessel, or boat, or traitorous correspondence66 with the enemy; and 110 sentence of death passed by any court-martial shall be carried into effect until confirmed by the Governor-General. In this respect the conditions of the Australian soldier’s service differed at the end of 1917 from those of all others on the Western Front. In the British Army the death penalty, though its infliction was hedged with safeguards, was the recognised preventive of desertion and, in extreme cases, of insubordination. In the German Army it was much more rarely applied-indeed, the conditions were in some respects astonishingly similar to those of the Australian for~e~~-but

~~ 64Thi~overriding of the Army Act by the law of the dominions, so far as dominions’ troops were concerned. was provided for in the Urrtish Army Act itself. and was a basic condition on which dominion troops served with the British forces. 6) This presumably means ‘‘ or for traitorous correspondence,” etc. Innumerable quotations could be made fro,? German histories showing the difficulty of preventing “ absence without leabe through non-application of the death cenalty. Crown Prince Rupprecht in his diary of 21 Decrrnber. 1917. notes. ‘‘ The administration of discipline by the English is very rigid Whilst on our side there is known to me only a single case in which a soldier on account of aggravated refusal of duty in the face of the enemy was shot, I gather from a compilation 01 British orders which have been found. that at least 67 English soldiers have hcen shot under martial law in the period between a7 October. 1916, and 30 August 1g17.”-Mien Kriegstogebuch. 701. 11, pP. 303-4. (It mud not be assumed, however that these fipures are correct.) 26 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE t 1916 the liability existed. But the Australian soldier was not liable, and the dificulty of applying one law to him and another to the British soldiers beside whom he served had arisen immediately the troops reached France. Birdwood had then recommended that:‘ if the distinction was legal, the Commonwealth Government should be asked to remove it. Haig forwarded this request with his endorsement to the War Office. The War Ofiice apparently recognised the legality of the restriction, for, on the 9th of July, 1916, the Eritish Government cabled asking the Commonwealth to place its oversea troops under the Army Act without limitation. The Australian Govern- ment, then about to plunge into its first bitter campaign for conscription, delayed its answer. Meanwhile the intense stress of Pozieres and of the subsequent winter on the Sotnnie showed in a constantly increasing number of desertions by Australian soldiers. On the I I th of December, 1916, Birdwood again brought the matter before General Rawlinson, in whose army I Anzac was

then serving. “ I think,” wrote Birdwood, “ that the dis- cipline of the Australian troops is likely to suffer when the men realise that they are not on precisely the same footing in all respects as all other soldiers serving in France.” Rawlinson, in forwarding the request to Haig, expressed his own opinion in strong terms. In December, 1916, I Anzac had forwarded to his headquarters the files of three cases of desertion in each of which the brigadier and divisional commander had recommended that the death sentence should be carried out. As for “absence without leave,” of 182 convictions recorded that month in Rawlinson’s whole army, 130 were recorded against Australians. I cannot be responsible for the maintenance of discipline among the Australian forces under my command (Rawlinson wrote to Haig) unless the required alteration of the law is made forthwith Haig, :L fortnight before receiving this memorandum, had himself written to the War Office concerning the increasing number of Australians-young reinforcements or hardened men returning after ronvalescence--who were deserting on the journey From England to the front He now forwarded

At the end of hlay. 1316, a sentence ol death, pasaed on a scigeant of thc 1st Pionccr D~ltalio~i.was forwarded by Birdwood tn Second Army Headquarters with this rrconimendation 1916-171 THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS 27

the papers to the War Office with his opinion that desertion was “ assuming alarming proportions among the Australian troops,” and that the amendment of the Australian law was a matter “ of grave urgency.” To crown these serious state- t ments came in February 1917 a report from the police of the Fifth Army (which liad lately estended its front to include the I Anzac sector) that, of 4f prisoners who during these few weeks had escaped from custody, 30 were Australians. Orders were issued that, whesever a prisoner escaped, the officer of his guard was to be court-martialled. The Army Council on February 3rd kl‘egraphed to Australia : “ The niatter is of utmost gravity for; dicipline of whole army.” But, on the recommendation of Senator; Pearce, the Com- monwealth Government at last replied thatit liad given serious ’ consideration to the proposal for the full application of the Army Act to Australian troops oversea, but regretted that it was unable to agree. In May 19x7 the question again forced itself into pro- minence in the 4th Division. When, after its exceptionally severe trial at Bullecourt, the division was filled up with reinforcements and sent north for the Battle of Messities, the numbers absenting themselves without leave greatly increased. Gereral Glasgow, of the , the strongest commander in tlie force, and General Holmes, commander of the division, urged Birdwood to ask again for the law to be amended so as to permit the infliction of the death penalty in a few cases. The 4th Division had, while still training in Egypt, been forced to accept a large number of “ hard cases ” and ne’er-do-wells rejected by the 1st and 2nd Divisions;58 and the persistent deserters were always nien of this type-in some cases actual criiniiials who had enlisted without any intention of serving at the front. aiid ready to go to any length to avoid it.50

I’ Tee 1’01 111. p 292. ”At times action by these men called for instant treatment on unorthodox and dangcroiis lines; Init officers faced by cmrrgency had to act stlongly and take the risk \Vhcn a draft wa5 leaving Salisln~ry Plain for France. a hardened offrnder faced tlie commander of the Overseas ’Training Brigade (Colonel W. W. R. Watson) nil pimde and said he would not go unless he was carried. Watson immediitely liad him lied to an anibulance and dragged with the draft until he begged to be released In ore rase in France a man of foreign descent, under arrest, foully abused the young officer in charge of the guard, who took no notice until the man began to abuse his mother. The officer then ordered the man’s handcuffs to be removed; knocked him down again and again until he apologised and saluted; and then reported to his brigadier his own offence-that of striking a soldier Needless to say, he nas told to forget it 28 THE A.1.F IN FRANCE [I917 A few men-of a character recognised by their comrades as well as by their officers to be worthless to any community- by open refusal to go into the trenches were causing some of the younger as well as of the more war-worn of their comrades to follow their example. Sentences of death were constantly passed, but it was known to every Australian soldier that these must be conimuted ; and, harsh though some of the army prisons were, it was generally believed that all military prisoners would be released at the end of the war. With this prospect, some men “whose sense of honour was weak.” as Glasgow wrote, preferred imprisonment to f ront-line service. Rirdwood told Holmes of the Australian Government’s deci- sion, but he also forwarded these letters on May 22nd to Senator Pearce with his own opinion that possibly the infliction of the death sentence in one or two extreme cases would stop desertion. After Messines desertion in the 4th Division continued, and General Godley, in whose corps the division then was, asked that, if the Australian Government would do nothing else, it should make it known that sentences of penal servitude passed by courts-martial would have to be served and would not be terminated at the end of the war. Godley’s represen- tation went forward through Haig, who added his opinion that matters were then “ much more serious ” than at the time of his previous letters. In the first six months of 1917, he said, out of 677 convictions for desertion in the whole B.E.F. (62 divisions), 171 were in the five Australian divisions. The average number convicted in each Australian division was 34.2, and in each of the other divisions, British and dominion, 8.87. The New Zealand Government had now sanctioned the death penalty, and in the New Zealand Division only 8 men had been convicted.c0 As for “ absence without leave,” the average number of convictions in the three resting Aus- tralian divisions in the Third Army had during three weeks been 21, and in its 22 other divisions 1.9. Though Haig feared chiefly a deterioration of discipline in the A.T.F., he was also concerned with the effect of the Australian example upon his other troops. He stated-and his word was a complete

m During the war the death penalty was carried out five times in the N.2 E F. 19171 THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS 29 guarantee of per forniance-that the death penalty, if sanc- tioned by the Australian Government, would be “ very sparingly ” inflicted-only where desertion was most deliberate and an example badly needed. But he considered that, unless the Australians were put fully under the Army Act, their fighting efficiency would deteriorate “ to an extent which may gravely affect the success of our arms.” Unless this step was taken, “ I cannot,” he said, “ be responsible for the serious consequences which may ensue in the future.” Haig’s recommendation for the full application of the Army Act went on to the British Government. At the same time Birdwood, to whom Major-General Monash had made representations”’ similar to Godley’s, wrote to Senator Pearce. Rirdwood recognised that the Government, then striving, after the first rejection of conscription, to secure voluntary recruits, could not dash the enthusiasm of the nation by introducing a bill to apply the death penalty; but he suggested that, if at any time the flow of recruits was ensured by conscription, the Government should sanction not the full application of the Army Act, but the imposition of a death penalty for one off ence-desertion. G.H.Q. was not pleased with Rirdwood’s letter, since it conflicted with Haig’s ; but Birdwood’s judgment was right. The Australian Government well knew that, without much more pressing reason than was afiorded by the existing circumstances, the Australian people would not think of permitting this step to be taken. To impose the system of the death penalty upon men, who had gone out voluntarily to fight at the other end of the world in a cause not primarily their own, was not compatible with its sense of justice. The effect upon the flagging enlistment would be, as Senator Pearce wrote to Birdwood, and Hughes impressed upon the British

Government, “ disastrous.” The suggestion, Pearce wrote, “could not have come at a more inopportune time.” Theve- fore, although the Australian Government fully recognised the strength of the case, it again refused to alter the law. Actually, on the day on which Pearce wrote to Birdwood (20th September, 1917), the I Anzac Corps struck, as the

81 During part of July Monash commanded I1 Anzac in Godley’s absence on leave. 30 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [ 1917-18 spearhead, the first of the series of clean, powerful thrusts which constituted so important a part of the second phase of “Third Ypres.” Never before had the A.I.F. fought with such effect. It delivered blow after blow with complete success. But, when Haig endeavoured to continue tha’ brilliant series in the autumn rains and mud, desertion increased. It was difficult even for the company officers and N.C.O.’s to say how far the practice real!y went, but, during the dreadful period that followed the Battle of Broodseinde, 53 cases were reported by the 2nd Australian Division, which bore the chief strain,CZand the true number was probably larger. The offenders were inen who (as Birdwood wrote to Pearce) when their battalion was ordered into the trenches “quietly slipped away at night back to the rear,” where they lay up for a few days and then reported back, either to the battalion when it came out or to its “ nucleus ” camp, or were arrested. It was difficult to distinguish some of these cases from those of genuine ((strays”; and, for conviction by court- martial, it was necessary to prove that the order to go into the line had actually been given to the accused man. There is no question that the action of a few worthless men con- stantly burdened the lives of many of their comrades, caused incessant troulde to N.C.O’s and officers already weighted with battle duties, and disgraced their regiments and their nation. It was not the absence of these men from battle, but their example to the younger troops, that was harmful. Their absence was in some ways a definite advantage, but the unfairness of allowing criniinals to avoid the dangers, into which better men had to be forced, made their discharge frorn the army an impossible penalty. They had to be caught and either hauled into the line or imprisoned. One effect of this system was that the practice of suspending military sentences, largely adopted in the Eritish forces and those of the other dominions, could not be so general in the A.I.F. The result was that, according to a graph circulated in March 1918, nearly 9 Australians per 1,000 were in field imprisonment as apnst T per 1,000in the British force, and less than 2 in +‘.eCanadian,

See Vcl. IY, p SPO. 1914-1 81 THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS 31 New Zealand, and South African. Haig was impressed by these figures. although he noted that before the introduction of the suspended sentence the figure for British troops had been 5.1. A fight between Australians and Portuguese soldiers at IViniereus near Boulogne called from him the judgment that the Australians’ discipline was bad and-as his staff adviied-their convalescent d6p6ts should be kept apart from those of other troops. In spite of endless trouljle, however, feeling in the lower ranks of the A.I.F. was overwhelmingly against any change in the law relating to the death penalty, an attitude which was much strengthened by the constant reading out, on parade, by order throughout the British Army, of reports of the infliction of the death penalty upon British soldiers-a ceremony which aroused in the Australians, officers and men, only a sullen sympathy and a fierce pride that their own people was strong enough to refuse this instrument to its rulers. Birdwood’s attitude in this matter was never a harsh one; to no leader could the required power have beeti more safely entrusted. His conscience would have been tortured by the necessity of ordering the shooting of any of his men. He recognised that for some, even though niedically classed as “ fit.” service in the front line was, through excessive strain or other causes, physically or mentally intolerable. Early in 1918 he instructed battalion commanders to keep a careful look-out for such nien and have them transferred to service in back areas.63 To check desertion, the Government’s refusal to change the law having been notified to him, he was now forced back upon almost the same sanctioii that Bridges had imposed before Gallipoli. Throughout that campaign the extreme penalty for Australian soldiers had been that of return to Australia in disgrace This had ceased to be effective after Pozikes-when, for some men, return even accompanied by disgrace was only too ~elcoiiie.~~But Birdwood now asked Senator Pearce that, when nien were sentenced to death for desertion, their names, with particulars of their town of enlistment.- might lie pulhshed throughout Australia. This 6‘ In certain other cases;for,:xamyle, where. of several biothers, all except one had been killed-he sent fit men, on application. hack to Australia. See Yo1 III. pp. 870-1. 32 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [ 1917-18 arrangement was agreed to, and was promulgated in January 1918 in A.T.F. orders. The first list was cabled early in March. The second conscription referendum had then failed, ant1 with it disappeared any present chance of the application of the Army Act. So this force, from whose expected deterioration the Commander-in-Chief feared possible danger to the success of the Allies' arms, entered its fourth year of war still possessing, alone among the armies, the privilege of facing death without a death penalty to ensure firmness; for its soldiers alone, in the world war, disgrace was the supreme penalty. With the withdrawal of the divisioiis into a quiet area, desertions prac- tically ceased-the first list, cabled to Australia in March for publication, contained only two names, of men in the 2nd Division. But it was always in times of stress that the trouble cropped up, and the obvious probability was that it was merely dormant. The anxieties of those responsible for the administration of the A.I.F. were not lessened by the growing certainty that the war was approaching its final stages, and that, whatever its issue, the problem of repatriating the oversea troops would have to be faced within two years, if not before. It was General White who urged that serious thought must be forth- with devoted to this problem. He already foresaw that one of the main difficulties for Australia would be to obtain shipping at a time when innumerable other interests, British and foreign, would be clamouring for it. On the suggestion of an officer of the 3rd Divisional Signal Company, Lieutenant hkiy~nan,~~he also instituted an inquiry into the educational system established by the Canadian Corps behind their lines (and known as the " University of Vimy Ridge ") by which officers and men in that corps were already being trained for the professions and callings which they might follow in civil life.6G While these matters were being considered, serious thought was turned upon a suggestion, which had not before been taken seriously, f roni the Director of Medical Services of the A.I.F., Surgeon-General Howse. Howse had urged - ~~ Lieut -Col G L Mayman, 3rd Div. Sip Co. Telegraphist; of Brunswick, Vic ; h Carisbrook. \'IC, IJ Jan., 1888. mG.H.Q. also was taking up the question of affording some higher education to those British soldiers who wished for it 1917-18] THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS 33 that, the climate of Egypt being more suitable for Australians than that of Flanders, the Australian divisions would be more effective there, and the falling off of reinforcements would be partly balanced by decrease of illness. It was now put forward, as a further hportant consideration, that shipping would be saved. Owing to the submarine campaign, Australian reinforcements were at this time brought, by Admiralty arrangements to Egypt, and thence to England, from which, when trained, they returned to France. It had already been tentatively decided to save shipping by holding and [raining them in France ;67 and it was now argued that the convenience of all concerned would be still better met if Egypt and Palestine were made the special theatre of Australian opera- tions, the British divisions there being returned to France, so that each force would be nearer to its homeland. If the rations and clothing of the Palestine force were drawn from Australia, shipping might be saved, and the end of the war would find the A.I.F. half-way home. On January 28th Birdwood suggested this scheme in a letter to Senator Pearce, and asked that, if the Australian Government approved, it should propose the plan to the British Government. But though it had much in its favour, and the change would naturally have been welcomed by the troops,s8 the humiliation of making such a confession of weakness would have been deeply galling to many Australians. The Commonwealth Government had not adopted the sugges- tion when, in mid-April, the situation on the Western Front became acute, and Birdwood telegraphed to Senator Pearce to hold action upon it. All his divisions were by then thick in the fighting of 1918on the Western Front, and any doubts as to their strength and the possibility of their full maintenance had to be ignored.

47 To train in conjunction with the 4th Division When this ceased to he a “ dep6t division,” however, the scheme fell through. a The approaching transfer of the Australians to Egypt had been constantly rrimoured. hut the report was always held too good to be tiue