BOOK REVIEW ESSAYS

THE EYE OF COMMAND As such, this book has the potential to be of interest to by Kimberly Kagan those involved with the of periods later Ann Arbor, Michigan than ancient Rome. This makes it an example of that University of Michigan Press, 2006 still all-too-rare bird, the interdisciplinary study, which 271 pages, US$24.95 (trade paperback) I commend Kagan for having the courage to undertake. ISBN 0-472-03128-7

Reviewed by Brian Bertosa Excluding the introduction and conclusion, the work can be divided into two roughly equal halves, he author of this carefully crafted work, the first dealing with Ammianus, and the second with Kimberly Kagan, has a PhD in ancient Caesar. In each, there is a brief but informative section history and has taught at a number of aimed at the non-specialist reader that places each prestigious American universities, including Roman author into his historical, and, perhaps more the United States Military Academy. As importantly, historiographical context. I found these Tsuch, she has had academic experience with military sections to have just the right amount of detail, but a affairs both ancient and modern, and this is closely note of caution must be sounded at this point, for these reflected in the volume under review here. For The Eye of are the only places in the text that actually deal with Command can, in a sense, be viewed as history per se.3 The remainder of two books in one. In the main, it the study of each author consists constitutes an in-depth examination of detailed, sometimes literally of the narratives of two ancient line-by-line, analysis of the language4 Roman army officers, Ammianus they use in order to demonstrate Marcellinus, and the well-known Julius how their narratives constitute examples Caesar, to show how their respective of, in Ammianus’ case, the “face narrative styles represent two very of battle” approach, and in Caesar’s distinct approaches to the writing of case, the “eye of command” approach. military history. Ammianus, a relatively Forming the centrepiece of the low-ranking staff officer, is shown work, these analyses are strongly to be an exponent of the “face of recommended to anyone doing academic battle” approach, first expounded work on the narrated in in the 1976 work of the same name by Ammianus or Caesar, with equal Sir John Keegan.1 This soldier-centric applicability to those whose emphasis viewpoint, which emphasizes the is primarily historical or literary. experience of small-unit tactics by the individual soldier or junior officer, That being said, the non-classicist is regarded by Keegan as the proper should not feel deterred from making approach to be taken by historians a go of these portions of the text, wishing to understand the reality of for I found that Kagan’s analysis combat. The writings of Caesar, by is paced such that it usually has contrast, serve as an example of the the tendency to move on to something “eye of command” approach (a term, new before tedium or boredom sets presumably, of Kagan’s coining), which, by virtue of its in. Lest that be thought to be due to a fortunate commander-centric viewpoint, affords historians a congruence of Kagan’s interests with my own, this much broader knowledge base than that of the individual tendency unfortunately breaks down in her last chapter, combatant by which to reconstruct a given battle.2 Kagan dealing with Caesar’s account of the battle of Gergovia propounds this approach as the preferred method for in 52 BC. For some reason, the reader is here presented historians seeking to understand higher-order phenomena, with geographical minutiae of a type quite uncharacteristic such as causality in battle. of the rest of the book, suitable more for an academic journal, or a book intended for a specialist readership. The other component of this book, appearing in Admittedly, the terrain around Gergovia is more complex various locations in the text, takes the form of a closely than the other battlefields examined in the text, reasoned critique of Keegan’s Face of Battle in favour but the morass of detail the reader is forced to wade of the author’s “eye of command” theoretical construct. through, particularly in the endnotes, is out of all proportion Drawing upon material as diverse as Clausewitz and to this difference, making parts of this particular chapter modern chaos theory from the sciences, this portion a difficult read. of the work is not restricted to the chronological boundaries of Ammianus and Caesar, whom Kagan, Another irritant, perhaps inevitable in a work spanning given her background in ancient history, has chosen in disciplinary boundaries, concerns terminology. In my case, order to illustrate the difference between the two approaches. difficulties arose from the terms generic causality, adduced

86 Canadian Military Journal ● Summer 2007 BOOK REVIEW ESSAYS by Kagan as a fundamental of the “face of battle” approach the theatre of which he writes. As can be imagined, all to battle narration, and critical causality, a term derived of the tenets of Kagan’s “eye of command” approach from Clausewitz and a feature of the “eye of command.” to battle narration are covered, indeed, I would say I found the definitions that accompanied these terms masterfully, in Allen’s accounts of the battles in the Burma on their first use vague and inadequate. In the case of theatre. And his book is only one of many works of military the first term, which figures more prominently in the history post-Keegan that do so.8 While Kagan can text, what understanding I have of it came only through certainly take credit for identifying the “eye of command” sheer repetition of examples of its use. Similar comments concept in the capacity of a concept, and for giving it apply to the author’s attempt to differentiate between a name, I suspect that many practitioners of military episodes, supposedly a feature of “face of battle” narratives, history, particularly those outside academia, have either and events, the proper grist for the mill of critical lost or are losing no sleep over their failure to engage causality. Nevertheless, such constructs by no means with the “eye of command” theoretical construct. And dominate those parts of the work devoted to a critique of I believe this holds true for Keegan’s Face of Battle, Keegan, and appear even less frequently in the portions for that matter. devoted to Ammianus and Caesar. Therefore, those who, like myself, are not convinced of the suitability of theory Which brings me to the crux of my disappointment to the study of the humanities need not be deterred from with Kagan’s book. Ensconced within the field of ancient engaging with this otherwise thought-provoking work. history, situated in the context of the current bibliography in that discipline, she is probably on safe ground. A far graver difficulty in my view with The Eye of This is certainly the impression given by the review Command lies in its overall premise, and how that of Kagan by Michael B. Charles, an ancient military premise relates to the wider field of military history. historian writing in the Bryn Mawr Classical Review,9 Essentially what Kagan does is to put forth her “eye of who highlights none of the problems brought forward command” approach to the study of battle – commander- in this essay. But pitching the book, and the concept centric, knowledgeable of a battle’s main events and how of the same name that underlies it, as a viable, indeed, they contribute to the eventual outcome – as a much-needed necessary alternative to Keegan’s Face of Battle demands alternative to soldier-centric approaches based upon a familiarity with the scope of the latter work’s influence, Keegan’s Face of Battle. For this to be so, one would lying largely in the realm of military history postdating expect that nothing written since Keegan in the field the ancient period, that is simply not there. Why this of military history had shown any sign of using, albeit would be so is quite perplexing. Academic parochialism, unknowingly, the “eye of command” approach. This may in the form of a belief that nothing outside the field very well be true in Kagan’s specialty, ancient history. of ancient history is worth engaging, is impossible in Of the examples she gives of books written since Keegan, the case of an author possessing the versatility to tackle all cleave to his “face of battle” methodology. Victor Keegan, Clausewitz, and chaos theory. Alternatively, Davis Hanson, for example, waxes effusive about it has been suggested to me that the cause may be nothing Keegan in his 1989 Western Way of , and is rewarded more than a different set of books on Kagan’s shelf as with an introduction written for the book by Sir John compared to my own,10 i.e., unwitting, as opposed to wilful, himself.5 But can this pattern be seen in the field of unfamiliarity. Either alternative strikes me as a poor military history more broadly defined? foundation for a conceptual foray with ramifications in another discipline. Nevertheless, I hesitate to state that Sitting in the military history section of my personal Kagan would have done better to confine her work to the library is a copy of Louis Allen’s 1984 Burma: The analyses of Ammianus and Caesar. For a work of a dual Longest War, 1941-45.6 This mammoth tome discusses nature such as this one can, of course, have more than the conflict in Burma at every imaginable level, from the one readership suited to it, and so, I would also recommend political and the grand strategic, to the most hair-raising this book to theoretically-informed students and scholars “face of battle” accounts.7 At the level of the individual of more recent periods of military history, particularly battle, a more suitable point of comparison with Kagan, any who might question the temerity of one whose avowed the battle for Meiktila, for example, is reconstructed purpose is to knock Sir John Keegan off the pedestal using official histories; memoirs, both published and upon which he seems to have been placed. Only time unpublished, of generals, lower-ranking officers, and even will tell if Kagan succeeds. a civilian attached to the Japanese army; intelligence bulletins; and personal communications with the author by former participants. It should be pointed out that Brian Bertosa is an independent scholar whose articles have appeared many of these sources are written in Japanese, the author in The Canadian Military Journal, the Journal of Military History, having served as a Japanese-speaking intelligence officer in and War and Society.

Summer 2007 ● Canadian Military Journal 87 BOOK REVIEW ESSAYS

NOTES

1. John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: period of Caesar, Adrian Keith Goldsworthy, 8. Lest I be accused of ‘comparing apples to J. Cape, 1976) and numerous subsequent The Roman Army at War: 100 BC-AD 200 oranges,’ inasmuch as Allen is not listed as having printings, including even an audiobook. The (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) and a PhD and was not published by an academic reprint edition currently in print appears to be for Ammianus, Hugh Elton, Warfare in Roman press, I have pulled from my shelf David M. Glantz London: Pimlico, 2004. Europe, AD 350-425 (Oxford: Oxford University and Jonathan M. House, When Titans Clashed: 2. Kagan would have us understand the “eye of Press, 1997). How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, command” as distinct from what she calls the 4. English in the main text, Latin primarily in the Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1995): House “traditional command-centered approach” (p. 10), endnotes. has the PhD, Glantz is fluent in Russian, and their which was the bête noire of John Keegan and a 5. , The Western Way of War: work contains enough critical causality to satisfy major impetus for the writing of his Face of Infantry Battle in Classical Greece, 2nd edition. even Kagan, I should think. Battle. For the purposes of this review essay, I will (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 9. Michael B. Charles, review of The Eye give Kagan the benefit of the doubt on this point, California Press, 2000). Curiously, another of Command, by Kimberly Kagan, Bryn but it must be stated that, after careful reading example given by Kagan, Goldsworthy’s Roman Mawr Classical Review 2007.02.33, . construct, I can see little substantive difference of Caesar, Kagan’s archetypal “eye of 10. I owe this insight to Professor Hugh Elton, between the two. command” historian. Department of Ancient History and Classics, 3. Readers interested in furthering their knowledge 6. Louis Allen, Burma: The Longest War, 1941-45 Trent University, who graciously gave up some of of the historical background of each of the (London: J. M. Dent, 1984; London: Phoenix his time to discuss Kagan’s book with me. All ancient authors examined in The Eye of Press, 2000). other ideas in this review, whatever their merits, Command would do well to consult, for the 7. Keegan is included in Allen’s bibliography. are my own.

WHOSE WAR IS IT?: of Canada, as well as a professor of history at York HOW CANADA CAN University, Granatstein has had a long and distinguished SURVIVE IN THE career as a military historian, much in demand by POST 9/11 WORLD the television networks for commentary on military by J. L. Granatstein affairs. He is the past Director of the Canadian War Toronto: Harper Collins, 2007 Museum, and the recipient of numerous honours, 256 pages, $34.95 (hardcover) including appointment as an Officer of the Order of ISBN-10: 0002008459 Canada. Granatstein has published over 60 books, including Reviewed by Kim Krenz the well-known Bloody Victory, a pictorial history of Canada in the Second World War, The Generals, a magisterial account read this book while crossing of Canada’s commanding officers Canada by train. The trip in that conflict, and, notably, the left me stunned by the size recent Who Killed the Canadian of this enormous country. The Military? book brought home the task Iahead for Canadians who must In Whose War Is It?, his manage and defend Canada in the most recent publication, Granatstein years to come. frankly admits that he has reached the age when he feels at liberty Jack Granatstein is the doyen to unburden himself in an honest of that small group of Canadian and direct manner of the concerns military historians, including Desmond that have accumulated over a Morton, Douglas Bland, David lifetime of thought and reflection. Bercuson, and a few others, who, He sees that, even in the face since the early-1960s, have been of current positive trends, Canada fighting a vigorous rear guard is in a parlous state. He singles action against the neglect and decline out six problems that the country of the Canadian Armed Forces needs to confront if it is to at the hands of successive federal survive the 21st Century. These arise governments. A graduate of the from the misleading mythology that Collège Militaire Royal de Saint- Canada is predominantly a peacekeeper, Jean, and the Royal Military College

88 Canadian Military Journal ● Summer 2007