The Role of FCC Precedent: Analyzing Signal Boosters through the Prism of Past Services/Products of Uncertain Legality

Erik Kemp, Vivek Ganti, Oluwatobi Adesanoye, Sharat Ganesh

[email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

A capstone paper submitted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters in Interdisciplinary Telecommunications at the University of Colorado, Boulder, 2 May 2011. Project directed by Professor Brad Bernthal.

1 Introduction

Signal boosters are today a technology of uncertain legality; they are defined by the FCC as “devices that amplify and/or distribute wireless signals to areas with poor signal coverage, such as tunnels, subways, large buildings, and rural areas [1]” and as “low power transmitters used to enhance communications in areas in which signals are weakened by terrain or man-made obstacles [2]”. Issues surrounding the installation of and right to use signal boosters are hotly contested before the FCC. Parties ranging from consumers, to wireless carriers, to booster manufacturers have voiced their respective concerns [1]. This research focuses on two FCC precedents - the 1968 Carterfone decision and the Low Power FM Order of 2000 - which share similarities to signal booster matters of today. These two precedents both involved technologies and services which were considered to be of uncertain legality and were later legalized by the FCC and by Congressional action in landmark decisions. These precedents inform the FCC on how these devices should be regulated. The first case is the Carterfone case of 1968 which presented a new dimension to the regulatory treatment of foreign network attachments, as the FCC granted consumers the freedom to buy and use Customer Premises Equipment (“CPE”) manufactured by non-Bell affiliated companies on the carrier’s network. This case has similar reach today as signal boosters are considered foreign attachments as they are not a part of the provider’s network. Keeping in mind the technical discussion of network harms on the provider’s network in the Carterfone decision, this research analyzes the potential technical impact of signal boosters on cellular providers’ networks. This paper explains why signal boosters should be treated by regulators as allowed foreign attachments, as in the Carterfone case. Additionally, drawing parallels from the subsequent cases relating to the Carterfone decision, this paper emphasizes the need for a well- defined certification regime to avoid potential network harm. The second case is the 2000 Low Power FM radio case, which addressed issues related to potential interference, including contour overlap between incumbent and new entrant radio stations, as well as protection of rights of incumbent commercial radio stations from interference. The Low Power FM case raised issues which are relevant today with respect to signal boosters, and in particular, how they should be treated. In the face of interference concerns, this paper discusses policy rationales behind the Low Power FM precedent, including preservation of FM spectrum integrity, the support for localism, and overcoming financial barriers of entry. Drawing

1 parallels from these policy goals that prioritize public interest, this paper proposes that signal boosters be permitted to operate, given a framework with measures to prevent or mitigate potential interference. This research is relevant for three main reasons. First, the topic of signal boosters is a divisive issue in the US wireless industry and currently awaits a decision from the FCC. The analysis presented in this research paper should help inform how the decision concerning the regulatory treatment of signal boosters should be made. Second, the FCC struggles to make principled decisions that are consistent with past precedents. Drawing from the similarities of past cases, this research sheds light on the relevance of precedence and how it can be applied to a current issue in signal boosters. Third, with respect to past decisions that seem in some respect like they are relevant to this one, both in hindsight and due to the benefit of time, the efficacy of past policy decisions can be examined to discover whether the principles articulated in those decisions achieved the intended results or what unintended consequences were offshoots from those decisions. This way, deductions can be made for either repeating those principles or otherwise. This research focuses on cellular signal boosters and the impact that prior cases have on this issue. This paper does not involve field testing to analyze the technical aspects of signal boosters, nor does it analyze the potential economic impact that regulation might have. These elements are relevant but are outside the scope of this paper. Instead, this paper focuses on the policy analysis of the 1968 Carterfone decision and the Low Power FM Order of 2000. This paper is divided into seven sections. Following this introduction, Section 2 focuses on the research methodology and defines the framework for analysis. Section 3 presents the background on the technology of signal boosters and further emphasizes the two key issues facing this technology today. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the Low Power FM Order of 2000 and the Carterfone case of 1968, respectively, focusing on the case background, the key issues surrounding it and how they apply to signal boosters. Section 6, proposes how these two precedents can assist the FCC in decision making with regards to signal boosters. Finally, Section 7 provides a conclusion on what the appropriate course of action will be with respect to the signal boosters’ case and provide an understanding on how precedents can impact decision making in the FCC.

2 Research Methodology

The framework for analysis is divided into three phases. First, this paper studied the technology and outlines the key issues of signal boosters [1]. Second, a review academic literature and proceedings at the FCC concerning the two precedent cases was conducted. The goal of the second phase was to understand the core issues with each of the precedents, including the rationale or principles that bolstered the final decision and how well the decision met its target objectives or otherwise in a post-decision phase. Third, the relationship(s) between the principles supported in the two precedents and the current issue with signal boosters was analyzed. This research focused on highlighting supporting principles that were relevant to signal boosters, as well as stating those principles that were of a countervailing nature and did not lend credence to application in the context of signal boosters.

2 3 Signal Boosters in the U.S. Wireless Industry

Signal boosters are devices that act as “dual-path amplifiers that pick up signals from an existing cell site (donor cell) and amplify them. The booster then beams the amplified signals outward to an end user or subscriber. Simultaneously, it picks up the signals from mobiles in the booster coverage area, amplifies them and beams them back to the donor cell” [44]. The signal booster industry in the United States is comprised of providers that are spectrum and non-spectrum licensees. The latter, one of which is Wilson Electronics comprises the larger portion. The current state of the market involving these devices is that they are mostly purchased off-the-shelf without any form of licensee consent; they are then installed as plug-and- play without requiring any form of installation expertise. They are primarily used in areas of poor reception. The stakeholders involved in this issue are the signal booster manufacturers, wireless carriers, the FCC, and the consumers who are debating an ideal resolution to the issue. The major contention with the current operation of these devices as raised in the Petition by Bird Technologies [8], is that what began as business service or licensee-only installations have now translated into an easily accessible, off-the-shelf consumer product generating a lot of concerns from all the parties earlier mentioned.

3.1 Background

Calls for the regulation of signal boosters began in 2005 with a Petition for Rulemaking by Bird Technologies Group seeking amendment to Section 90.219 of the Commission’s Rules [8]. The formal proceeding at the FCC began five years later with the release of a Public Notice Seeking Comment by the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau. The FCC in 1996 adopted rules concerning the use of signal boosters under Part 22, 90, and 101. These rules required that licensees using boosters correct any harmful interference1 caused to other systems, established maximum permissible effective radiated power level, and allowed licensees to use boosters without additional authorization from the FCC. However, prior to the adoption of these rules, under Part 90 Private Land Mobile Radio Service rules, boosters were only permitted on “ten 450-470 MHz frequency pairs in the Business Radio Service for communications related to servicing and supplying of aircraft at certain specified airports [9]”.

3.2 Key Issues

1. Balancing divergent interests

One of the key issues regarding signal boosters is finding a common ground between the divergent public interests of consumers in ubiquitous cellular coverage and public safety functions, the interests of carriers in receiving adequate returns on their investments in spectrum and infrastructure, and for signal booster manufacturers in preserving a growing industry. As documented by AT&T Inc. [10] and Verizon Wireless [11], from the carrier’s perspective, a major problem associated with signal booster use is interference and the cost of detection both in financial and manpower terms due to the sporadic nature of these devices. There is a burden of enforcement on carriers beyond what the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau

1 47 C.F.R § 1.907: Interference that endangers the functioning of a radio navigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a radio communications service operating in accordance with the Radio Regulations.

3 interference reporting tool2 provides. This makes a case for safeguarding the interest of carriers. The interest of signal booster manufacturers stems from the assertion by Wilson Electronics [12] that carriers only approve either high-cost channelized amplifiers or their own carrier manufactured proprietary products – which may not be affordable for low-income users. They contend that a regulation that empowers carriers in deciding what product gets approved may lead to discrimination. This would hamstring innovation, time-to-market, and the growth of the booster manufacturing industry. The interest of consumers lies in the potential for signal boosters to meet the demand for ubiquitous wireless service particularly in underserved rural or fringe reception areas. By extension, expanded use of signal boosters has the capacity to close the gap between the demand and supply of last-mile broadband, one of the cardinal goals outlined in the National Broadband Plan. This is a potential alternative to the capital extensive build-out of cell towers which is likely to face other constraints such as environmental and zoning restrictions [13]. Additionally, signal boosters could help provide critical emergency wireless service to its principal users such as E911, Priority Access Service (PAS), and Emergency Alert Service (EAS). These have been identified as crucial public interest public safety obligations of wireless carriers according to CTIA – The Wireless Association [14]. For example, first responder emergency assistance after a vehicular accident is delayed in poor cellular reception areas [12].

2. Delineation of installation authority and rights for protection

Two key issues concerning signal boosters are: the clarity of rights for the installation and use of these devices, as well as where the burden of responsibility should be placed when interference issues arise. A direct result of this was the Petition for Declaratory Ruling by CTIA, for signal boosters to be classified as “illegal per-se” when installations are carried out without licensee approval. Though 47 C.F.R § 1.903(c) says no separate authorization is required for subscribers to operate of fixed and mobile stations in wireless radio services, the interpretation of what a mobile station constitutes is a point of debate. The language of 47 C.F.R § 22.923 suggests that repeaters cannot be categorized as mobile stations. It is clear from the FCC’s Report and Order [9] that licensees are exempt from requiring additional authorization to install signal boosters. Currently, the FCC’s Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) and designated third party Telecommunication Certification Bodies (TCB) certificate signal boosters but it is evident that this procedure has not helped in resolving interference issues in real-world deployments.

4 Low Power FM Order of 2000

In the previous section, the background and key issues with signal boosters was presented. In finding application of the Low Power FM (LPFM) Order to those key issues, this Order provided a framework for addressing potential interference issues on the FM spectrum band, and derived a balance between the rights of incumbent and new LPFM stations regarding the operation of LPFM stations. The subsequent sections provide the background of LPFM, key issues regarding contour overlap between incumbent commercial and new LPFM stations, protection of rights of incumbents during interference, financial barriers to entry, and the applicability of the Order to signal boosters.

2 Cellular Telephone Interference Reporting Form at http://www.fcc.gov/eb/CTIX/

4 4.1 Background

In January 2000 the FCC issued a Report and Order (“R&O”) in which Low Power FM (LPFM) service was created and authorized for non-profit educational organizations, state, local governments and non-government entities that would provide non-commercial public safety radio services [15] and who “hold no attributable interest in any other broadcast station” [16]. The goal of the Order was to “to create a class of radio stations designed to serve very localized communities or underrepresented groups within communities [16]”. The FCC had previously created a low-power Non-Commercial Educational (NCE) Class D FM service in 1948 to serve as “inexpensive means of encouraging the FM broadcasting service [17]”. However, following the demand for NCE FM licenses, opposition from the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) on the grounds that it would undermine FM spectrum integrity [18, 43], the agency later concluded that Class D stations constituted an inefficient use of spectrum and eventually imposed a permanent freeze on Class D applications in 1978 [43]. The agency also removed any form of protection against interference for Class D stations [17]. Low-power FM broadcasting was outlawed in the years that followed until its re-creation in 2000 as a result of the FCC’s R&O. This Order also established minimum distance separation for co-channel, first-, second- and third-adjacent channels to commercial full-power FM stations.

4.2 Key Issues

1. Contour overlap between incumbent and new entrant radio stations

The issue of interference to existing FM radio stations and the need to preserve the FM spectrum band was critical in the topic of licensing low-power FM services. The FCC initially declined to adopt standards to protect either full or low-power FM stations operating on third adjacent channels of +/- 60 KHz but had to modify this rule after the Congressional action contained in Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act of 2000. Under the new interference standard adopted in the FCC’s Second R&O, interference on third-adjacent channels to existing stations was prohibited. According to the R&O, “prohibited interference occurs when the interfering contour of one station overlaps the protected contour of another station”. The FCC also declined to authorize 1000W LPFM stations.

2. Protection of rights of incumbent radio stations during interference

In cases of interference, another question that arose was the proper allocation of rights in resolving interference issues. The need to create a framework for protecting the investments of incumbents and their spectrum license rights in relation to addressing the burden of enforcement was a critical piece required in the creation of the Low Power FM service.

3. Financial barriers of entry

According to the Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act of 2000, the FCC found that at the time, “recent extensive consolidation of radio stations into large commercial groups, combined with the financial challenges of operating full power commercial stations, limited the broadcasting opportunities of highly localized interests [19]”. In reality, because full-power commercial stations operate at higher transmit power; their financial outlay in terms of

5 infrastructure is higher than for low-power stations. This prohibitive cost made market entry difficult for non-commercial interests [43].

4.3 Applicability to Signal Boosters

The operation of signal boosters and LPFM strike the same chord concerning potential interference issues to incumbents. In terms of the installation, low power FM is different from signal boosters because the former can be described as a solely licensed business service as opposed to signal boosters that have now become more of a consumer product. The Low Power FM Order of 2000 and provisions contained in Parts 73 and 74 of Title 47 of the US Code of Federal Regulations, addressed the issue of interference from low-power FM stations. In particular, Chapter 73 of Title 47 of the U.S Code of Federal Regulations provides interference protection for full-power commercial stations from LPFM stations and places the burden of resolution on LPFM stations (Appendix B). In another respect, the operation of signal boosters presents a key issue in interference detection and service rule enforcement. The FCC authorizes FM booster stations, which provide “fill-in” service by retransmitting the signals of a primary broadcast station similar to signal boosters though with full licensee approval. According to 47 C.F.R § 74.1283b, FM boosters stations are required to provide identification using call signs which consist of the call sign of the primary station followed by the letters “FM” and the number of the booster station being authorized. This reveals that primary licensed broadcast stations have an accurate knowledge of the location of FM booster stations as identifiable by their call signs, latitude and longitude location (Appendix C). A plausible solution would be to engineer these devices to provide some form of identification so that their locations can be pinpointed. This ID information can then be sent to a carrier’s network at intermittent intervals for mobile devices that present a bigger challenge for detection.

5 Carterfone Case of 1968

In the previous section, an analysis of the Low Power FM Order in the light of its applicability to signal boosters was discussed. The subsequent sections provide the background and key issues of the Carterfone decision, regarding the contrast of the wireless to the wireline phone industry, principles of regulatory intervention, foreign attachment of Customer Premises Equipment and network harm, and the applicability of the Order to signal boosters. Similar to how the Bell system controlled who could connect to its network, today's wireless carriers also strictly control foreign attachments to their networks. This section provides an analysis of today's foreign attachment restrictions by the wireless industry, particularly as they relate to signal boosters, and whether or not the Carterfone decision of 1968 is applicable or warranted in the treatment of this matter.

5.1 Background

The Carterfone was a device created by Thomas Carter that connected users from a two way mobile radio system to those using the Public Switched Telephone Network (“PSTN”). While it acoustically connected to the PSTN, it electrically connected to the base station creating a patch between the users of radio and the PSTN when the callers on the radio and the telephone were connected to the base station. For decades, the telephone industry in the United States was

6 monopolized by American Telephone and Telegraph Co. (AT&T) as it was vertically integrated in the telephone service and terminal equipment markets. The Carterfone decision of 1968 was a milestone decision that would change the face of the telecommunications industry in the U.S. This decision gave the “right to attach” customer provided equipment to the telephone network [23]. Basing its ruling partly on the prior Hush-A-Phone case [22] and stating that there was “no material distinction between a foreign attachment such as the Hush-A-Phone and an interconnecting device such as the Carterfone”, the FCC permitted the attachment of foreign devices to the AT&T network as long as they qualified certain standards [24]. The decision, initiated by a private antitrust action brought to the FCC by Thomas Carter accumulated complaints against AT&T. In response, the FCC deemed tariff FCC No.132, which essentially banned the attachment of any non-telephone-company-provided equipment to the network, “unreasonable” [21, 26-27]. The FCC ruled that users have a right to attach devices to the telephone system as long as the device does not adversely affect the operations of the telephone company or the usefulness of the telephone system to other users [23, 30]. AT&T’s request that telephone companies serve as the sole arbiter to determine what may connect to the network was denied [31]. The FCC, however, gave the telephone companies the right to issue reasonable standards that devices connecting to the network must meet [32]. The FCC placed the burden of compliance with these and any revised standards upon the manufacturers of devices such as the Carterfone [26].

5.2 Key Issues

1. Wireless industry contrast to wireline telephone industry

FCC Commissioner Robert M. McDowell presented three key points regarding the Wireless industry that he believes make it a very different case from the pre-Carterfone telephone industry. Firstly, the Bell telephone system was a government regulated subsidized monopoly as opposed to today’s U.S. wireless carriers. Secondly, unlike the telephone market scenario in the 1960’s, today’s U.S. wireless carriers are not vertically integrated into the equipment markets. Lastly, today’s wireless carriers are not subject to price regulation in the market, “which otherwise might encourage them to seek profits in complementary markets” [25].

2. Principles of regulatory intervention

Litan and Singer, in the “Economics of Wireless Net Neutrality”, lay out four general principles they feel must be followed when proposing regulatory intervention: (1) there must be clear evidence of market failure, (2) there must be clear evidence that the intervention is likely to be better than the status quo, (3) all the benefits and costs are taken into account, and (4) the proposal should draw lessons from earlier regulation of that market [28]. The authors feel that proponents of open networks have failed to establish these four principles and as such, the FCC should deny their proposals for open networks [28].

3. Foreign attachment of customer premise equipment and Network Harm

A major concern of the telephone companies was the idea of foreign attachments to the telephone network, defined as any equipment or device not expressly approved by the carrier [20]. In 1976, during congressional testimony, Mr. John DeButts, then President of AT&T,

7 stated that terminal equipment comprises a large part of the telephone network, and therefore, great care should be exercised in regard to what terminal equipment is allowed in order to prevent harm to the network. [30]. Prior to the Carterfone decision, customers who wanted access to the telephone network were tied to the terminal equipment and repair service of the telephone company. If a consumer failed to subscribe to these policies they would not receive telephone service [29]. Another major concern of the telephone companies is defining “harm to the network”. Proponents of open networks, such as Skype, are seeking a definition of network harm that is narrowly defined by the FCC, whereas the wireless carriers would prefer a definition that allows them to prevent applications and equipment that might be harmful to the network [26]. The telephone companies claimed that interconnection would cause the quality of the system to deteriorate. The National Association of Science identified four potential harms that are caused by interconnection: hazardous voltage, excessive signal power levels, improper network control signal, and line imbalance [25]. While customer-provided equipment can have an adverse effect on the system, telephone company-provided equipment has been shown to do the same. [32].

5.3 Applicability to Signal Boosters

The FCC has applied the Carterfone “right to attach” ruling outside telephony markets well after 1968. In 1998, the FCC extended its Carterfone policy to cable television when it recognized the right of consumers to use cable-ready televisions and to buy set-top converters in lieu of the sole option of leasing one from their cable television provider [33]. The FCC has applied the consumer’s right to attach navigation devices based on its Carterfone policy: “Subscribers have the right to attach any compatible navigation device to a multichannel video programming system”. Additionally, the FCC has stated that the Carterfone decision applies to “other technologies and service markets despite the likelihood that non-telephone networks raise other, possibly more complex, operational matters than telephone network attachments” [34]. It is important to note that wireless devices do not simply “attach” to wireless networks, but are rather a component of the network itself [36]. As Verizon Wireless noted in its comments to the Skype petition, “a wireless network is comprised of both cell sites and mobile stations” and “a network’s effective coverage areas can only be defined in relation to the design and power levels” of the fixed and mobile portions of that network [37]. Moreover, wireless providers are responsible for ensuring that the operation of mobile devices on their networks do not cause harmful interference to other users and must comply with numerous social obligations imposed by the Commission. Dissociating handsets from their networks would make these tasks more difficult and lead to significant public interest harms [35]. . Wireless service providers work extensively with equipment manufacturers to ensure excellent service quality on their networks. These efforts are aimed at ensuring that there is no in-band or out-of-band interference and are also designed to ensure that provider-approved devices work optimally on their associated networks through the use of vocoders and over-the- air service and provisioning [38]. In the Skype proceeding of 2007, parties provided substantial evidence that introducing numerous unknown and uncertified devices onto the network could lead to increased interference on the customer’s own network and on competitor networks, impairing service for other users [39]. In one example, an unauthorized signal booster “negatively impacted nearly 200 surrounding cell sites within the New York Metropolitan area, which resulted in tens of thousands of blocked calls” [40-41].

8 6 Key Takeaways

As evidenced throughout this paper, the application of the Carterfone case to the wireless industry, and signal boosters in particular, is not a perfect fit. However, there are parallels, such as right to foreign attachment, management of network harm, and public benefit that makes it an intriguing case warranting further research. The analysis of the Low Power FM case offers a mechanism for balancing the divergent interests of consumers and carriers. This can be achieved by providing a framework that guarantees that concerns of interference are met in effective and efficient equipment design as well as establishing the clarity of accountability for interference remediation/resolution. This paper makes four recommendations to the FCC on the regulatory approach to the issue of signal boosters. First, the FCC should issue interim rules proposing stronger signal booster certification requirements that allow foreign attachments (read signal boosters) to wireless carrier networks while addressing the issue of network harm. Second, the paper recommends that the FCC act out of public interest as it is one of its key underlying principles. This set of rules would allow for the enhancement of public safety and E911 services by ensuring coverage in fringe reception areas of wireless carriers. Third, this paper proposes the FCC protect the property rights of the incumbent wireless carriers over licensed spectrum. Fourth, this paper recommends against an outright ban on signal boosters as it would be a heavy handed approach that would stifle innovation and growth in the signal booster industry.

7 Conclusion

It is important for regulators to consider the analysis of the precedents detailed in this paper as they determine the regulatory issues of signal boosters. The analysis of interference in the Low Power FM case, as well as foreign attachment and network harm in the Carterfone decision in this paper focused on their application to signal boosters. While this paper focuses on the parallels drawn from the precedents to signal boosters, the analysis can also be extended to technologies/services of uncertain legality in the future. As an issue of current nature requiring redress by the FCC, the recommendations made in this paper, including the creation of interim rules are important to address immediate concerns of the stakeholders involved. Owing to the dearth of academic research, a wider encompassing set of rules and guidelines should not be issued by the FCC until further research is pursued by neutral third-parties. It is the purpose of this paper to begin bridging this gap and sparking interest in further academic research on this technology.

Appendix A: Low Power FM Order of 2000 Post-Decision Results

The graph below shows the number of LPFM licenses issued by the FCC after the Report & Order of January 2000.

9 LPFM Licensing Profile from 2001 - 2011 200 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 No. of LPFM Licenses LPFM of No. 40 20 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Number of LPFM Licenses 2 76 116 188 140 111 98 61 35 37 2 Year of Licensing

Figure 1: LPFM Licensing Profile from 2001 – 2011 Source: http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/lpfm/index.html

A total of 866 L1 licenses, 37 Construction Permits have been issued by the Audio Division of the FCC’s Media Bureau to LPFM applicants with 43 pending applications till date (year of licensing is assumed to be based on filing number). The graph above shows an upward trend in LPFM uptake from 2001 to 2004. This reveals the increasing interest from non- commercial educational and public safety entities to embrace the provision of LPFM service. This period gives a picture of the positive results that followed the FCC ruling authorizing LPFM broadcasting. The last and only filing window for LPFM applications was closed in 2003 [42]. This is a primary factor for the downward trend in the years following. Other factors may be due to the strict minimum channel adjacent channel separation rules, Height Above Average Terrain (HAAT), field strength contours, and market saturation within the available FM channels.

Appendix B: Responsibility for Interference Resolution in Low Power FM

Table 1: Protection from Interference [Online] Available: http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2010/octqtr/47cfr73.514.htm Item Details Interfering party Existing non-commercial Educational (NCE) FM station Protected party New low-power FM station Responsibility to resolve Non-commercial Educational (NCE) FM station interference

Table 2: Interference to Input Signals of FM Translator or FM Booster stations [Online] Available: http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2010/octqtr/47cfr73.827.htm Item Details Interfering party Low-power FM station Protected party FM translator or FM booster station Responsibility to resolve Low-power FM station

10 interference Low-power FM station suspends operation unless Action taken upon interference is resolved to the satisfaction of the interference complaint complainant LPFM licensee absolved of responsibility if complainant Exemptions refuses to permit application of remedial techniques to demonstrate interference elimination

Table 3: Interference Protection to Full Service FM Stations [Online] Available: http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2010/octqtr/47cfr73.809.htm Item Details Interfering party Low-power FM station Full-power commercial station on co-, first-adjacent Protected party channels Responsibility to resolve Low-power FM station interference Low-power FM station suspends operation within 24- Action taken upon hours unless interference is resolved to the satisfaction of interference complaint the complainant LPFM licensee absolved of responsibility if complainant Exemptions refuses to permit application of remedial techniques to demonstrate interference elimination

Appendix C: FM Booster Station Identification

Figure 2: FM Radio Database Query [Online] Available: http://www.fcc.gov/mb/audio/fmq.html

References:

[1] Federal Communications Commission (2010, Jan. 6). [Public Notice] Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Seeks Comments on Petitions Regarding the use of Signal Boosters and other Signal Amplification Techniques

11 Used with Wireless Services (WT Docket No. 10-4) [Online] Available: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/proceeding/view?z=zjvv1&name=10-4 [2] Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (1997, May 21). [Memorandum Opinion and Order] In the matter of: Amendment of Parts 22, 90, 94 of the Commission's Rules to Permit Routine Use of Signal Boosters (Docket No. 95-70). [Online] Available: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=1842530001 [3] CTIA - The Wireless Association. (2006, May 1). White Paper on the harmful impacts of unauthorized wireless repeaters [Online]. Available: http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Repeater_White_Paper_Final_050106.pdf [4] Telecommunications, 47 C.F.R. [Online] Available: http://www.access.gpo.gov/cgi- bin/cfrassemble.cgi?title=201047 [5] Telegraphs, Telephones, and Radiotelegraphs, 47 U.S.C. [Online] Available: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/47/usc_sup_01_47.html [6] Telecommunications Act of 1996, Public Law No. 104-104; 110 Stat. 56 (1996). [Online] Available: http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/tcom1996.pdf [7] Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151.1 (1934). [Online] Available: http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/1934new.pdf [8] Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (2005, Aug. 18). [Petition for Rulemaking by Bird Technologies] In the matters of: Amendment of Section 90.219 of the Commission's Rules With Regard to the Routine Use of Signal Boosters (WT Docket No. 10-4). [Online] Available: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020355519 [9] Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (1996, June 5). [Report and Order] In the Matter of: Amendment of Parts 22, 90, and 94 of the Commission's Rules to Permit Routine Use of Signal Boosters (Docket No. 95-70). [Online] Available: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=1630790001 [10] Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (2010, March 8). [Reply Comment of AT&T Inc.] In Re: Petitions Regarding the Use of Signal Boosters and Other Signal Amplification Techniques Used with Wireless Services (WT Docket No. 10-4) [Online] Available: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020394964 [11] Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (2010, Feb. 4). [Comment of Verizon Wireless] In Re: Petitions Regarding the Use of Signal Boosters and Other Signal Amplification Techniques Used with Wireless Services (WT Docket No. 10-4) [Online] Available: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020385708 [12] Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (2009, Nov. 3). [Petition for Rulemaking by Wilson Electrnoics] In the Matter of: Amendment of Part 20 of the Commission's Rules to Establish Standards for the Certification of Mobile Power Amplifiers or Handset Amplifiers for Use in the Commercial Mobile Radio Services (WT Docket No. 10-4) [Online] Available: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020355583 [13] Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (2010, Feb. 12). [Comments by the Association of Public Safety Communications Officials International, Inc.] In the Matter of: Petition Regarding the Use of Signal Boosters and Other Signal Amplification Techniques Used with Wireless Services (WT Docket No. 10-4) [Online] Available: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020386442 [14] Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (2007, Nov. 2). [Petition for Declaratory Ruling of CTIA - The Wireless Association] In the Matter of: Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Unlawful Sale and Use of Cellular Jammers and Wireless Boosters and Repeaters (WT Docket No. 10-4) [Online] Available: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020355532 [15] 47 C.F.R. § 73.853: Licensing requirements and service [Online] Available: http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/cfr_2010/octqtr/47cfr73.853.htm [16] Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (2000, Jan. 27). [Report and Order] In the Matter of: Creation of Low Power Radio Service (MM Docket No. 99-25). [Online] Available: http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/comment/view?id=5006113241 [17] Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (2000, Jan. 27). [Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order] In the Matter of: 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review -- Streamlining of Radio Technical Rules in Parts 73 and 74 of the Commission's Rules (MM Docket No. 98-93). [Online] Available: http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Mass_Media/Notices/1998/fcc98117.txt [18] A. G. Stavisky, R. K. Avery, and H. Vanhala, "From Class D to LPFM: The High-Powered Politics of Low- Power Radio," Journalism and Mass Communication Quartely, vol. 78, pp. 340 -354, 2001 [19] Radio Broadcasting Preservation Act of 2000. In House Report No. 106-567, 106th Congress, 2d Session; [To accompany H.R.3439] (2000) . [Online] Available: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi- bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_reports&docid=f:hr567.pdf [20] T. Wu. "Wireless Net Neutrality: Cellular Carterfone and Consumer Choice in Mobile Broadband," New America Foundation, Wireless Future Program, Working Paper #17, February 2007.

12 [21] M.T. Hoeker. “From Carterfone to the iPhone: Consumer Choice in the Wireless Telecommunications Marketplace,” CommLaw Conspectus: Journal of Communications Law and Policy, vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 187-229, 2008. [22] Jordaphone Corp of America and Mohawk Business Machines v AT&T, Decision, 18 FCC 644 (1954). [23] “Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv.,” 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 1968. [24] R.M. Frieden. "The Costs and Benefits of Separating Wireless Telephone Service From Handset Sales and Imposing Network Neutrality Obligations," ExpressO, Oct. 26, 2007. Available at: http://works.bepress.com/robert_frieden/5 [25] In re Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands; Revision of the Commission’s Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems; Section 68.4(a) of the Commission’s Rules Governing Hearing Aid-Compatible Telephones; Biennial Regulatory Review—Amendment of Parts 1, 22, 24, 27, and 90 to Streamline and Harmonize Various Rules Affecting Wireless Radio Services; Former Nextel Communications, Inc. Upper 700 Mhz Guard Band Licenses and Revisions to Part 27 of the Commission’s Rules; Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable Public Safety Network in the 700 Mhz Band; Development of Operational, Technical and Spectrum Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and Local Public Safety Communications Requirements Through the Year 2010; Declaratory Ruling on Reporting Requirement under Commission’s Part 1 Anti-Collusion Rule, Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,289, ¶ 1 (July 31, 2007) [hereinafter 700 MHz Report and Order]; see also Corey Boles, FCC Auction May Expand Cellphone Options, Services, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2007, at D9.700 MHz Report and Order, at 15,571–75 (statement of FCC Commissioner Robert M. McDowell, approving in part, dissenting in part). [26] A. Clay. “Unlocking the Wireless Safe: Opening Up the Wireless World for Consumers,” Federal Communications Law Journal, vol. 61, no. 3, June 2009. [27] at 421 Tariff F.C.C. No. 132 (filed Apr. 16, 1957). [28] R.W. Hahn, R.E. Litan & H.J. Singer. "The Economics of Wireless Net Neutrality," Journal of Competition Law & Economics, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 399-451, 2007. [29] J.P. Fuhr, Jr. “Competition in the Terminal Equipment Market After Carterfone,” The Antitrust Bulletin, vol. 28, pp. 669-698, Fall 1983. [30] U.S. Congress, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Competition in the Telecommunications Industry, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Communications, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1976). [31] In re Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate and Foreign Message Toll Telephone Service (MTS) and Wide Area Telephone Service (WATS), 56 F.C.C.2d 596 (1975). [32] 56 F.C.C.2d at 602. [33] R. Frieden. “Hold the Phone: Assessing the Rights of Wireless Handset Owners and Carriers,” University of Pittsburgh Law Review, vol. 69, no. 4, Summer 2008. [34] Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 13 F.C.C.R. 14775, 14778, 147780, 147786 (1998); see also 47 U.S.C. § 549 (2000), see also Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, 12 F.C.C.R. 5639, 5645 (1997). [35] See Comments of CTIA, RM-11361, (June. 15, 2007). [36] See Verizon Technical Statement in Response to Skype Petition, (Apr. 30, 2007). [37] See Comments of Verizon Wireless, RM-11361, at 30 (Apr. 30, 2007). [38] See Comments of Sprint-Nextel, RM-11361, at 7-13 (Apr. 30, 2007). [39] See Comments of Verizon Wireless, RM-11361, at 33 (Apr. 30, 2007); Comments of Motorola, Inc., RM- 11361, at 9 (Apr. 30, 2007). [40] Comments of Verizon Wireless, RM-11361, at 34-35 (Apr. 30, 2007). [41] CTIA White Paper on the Harmful Impacts of Unauthorized Wireless Repeaters, WT Docket 03-264 (filed May 15, 2006). [42] M. Eyre. (2008, Sept. 21) LPFM Filing Windows and Process [Online] Available: http://home.recnet.com/lpfm-filing [43] M. L. Robb. “Community Radio, Public Interest, the Low Power FM Service and 21st Century Media Policy”, September 2009 [44] S. Leslie, R. Jakubowski. “Low-Power Cellular Boosters”, Cellular Business, vol.5, no.9, p.38, September 1988

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