(A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 1 of 46
IN THE MATTER OF ENBRIDGE NORTHERN GATEWAY PROJECT JOINT REVIEW PANEL
WRITTEN EVIDENCE OF LIVING OCEANS SOCIETY
December 21, 2011 ______Date Submitted Signature
Barry Robinson Barrister & Solicitor Representative for Living Oceans Society Suite 900, 1000 – 5th Ave. SW Calgary, Alberta T2P 4V1 Tel: 403-705-0202 Fax: 403-264-8399 E-mail: [email protected]
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 Introduction ...... 3 2.0 Written Evidence of Stafford Reid, EnvironEmerg Consulting Services ...... 5 2.1 Spill Response Preparedness ...... 5 3.0 Written Evidence of Emma Point, Living Oceans Society ...... 16 3.1 Dispersant Use ...... 17 3.2 Concerns Regarding Northern Gateway’s TERMPOL submission ...... 18 4.0 Written Evidence of Lauri Solsberg, Counterspil Research Inc...... 25 4.1 Countermeasures Technologies for Viscous Oils that Submerge ...... 25 5.0 Written Evidence of Jackie McQuillan, Oiled Wildlife Trust ...... 28 5.1 Status of Oiled Wildlife Preparedness in British Columbia ...... 28 6.0 Written Evidence of Katie Terhune, Living Oceans Society ...... 32 6.1 Double Hull Tanker Technology ...... 33 6.2 Efficiency of Booms in Currents Greater than 1 knot ...... 34 6.3 Mechanical Response Gap Analysis ...... 36 6.4 Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development ...... 38 6.5 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council 2009 Status Report ...... 40 6.6 Fate of Bitumen Released into Water ...... 42 6.7 Financial Vulnerability Assessment for Oil Tanker Spills ...... 45
(A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 3 of 46
1.0 Introduction
1. The Living Oceans Society hereby submits the following documents as its written evidence in the matter of the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project Joint Review Panel. The following written evidence is submitted:
(a) the written evidence of Stafford Reid; (b) the written evidence of Emma Point; (c) the written evidence of Lauri Solsberg; (d) the written evidence of Jackie McQuillan; and (e) the written evidence of Katie Terhune.
2. The follow documents are submitted as attachments to these written submissions.
A: Resume of Stafford Reid;
B: “A Technical Analysis of Marine Transportation Statements for the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project, Tanker Casualty Risk Reduction and Spill Response Preparedness” (Spill Response Preparedness Report);
C: “Dispersant Use on Canada’s Pacific Coast: relevant factors and preliminary response gap analysis for the Enbridge Northern Gateway project area” (Dispersant Report);
D: Resume of Lauri Solsberg;
E: “A Review of Countermeasures Technologies for Viscous Oils that Submerge” (Countermeasures Technologies Report);
F: Resume of Jackie McQuillan; (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 4 of 46
G: “The Status of Oiled Wildlife Preparedness in British Columbia: A General Overview and an Analysis of Enbridge’s Wildlife Response Plan for the Proposed Northern Gateway Project” (Status of Oiled Wildlife Preparedness Report);
H: “Tanker Technology: Limitations of Double Hulls” (Double Hull Report);
I: Map prepared by Living Oceans Society displaying current readings taken from Canadian Hydrographic Service marine charts along B.C.’s North and Central Coast near Enbridge’s proposed tanker routes;
J: “Preliminary Mechanical Response Gap Analysis for the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project” (Mechanical Response Gap Analysis);
K: “Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development to the House of Commons, Chapter 1 Oil Spills from Ships” (Commissioner Report);
L: Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council 2009 Status Report” (Exxon Valdez Spill Report; and
M: “Financial Vulnerability Assessment: Who Would Pay for Oil Tanker Spills Associated with the Northern Gateway Pipeline?” (Financial Vulnerability Assessment)
3. The Living Oceans Society proposes to present Mr. Reid, Ms. Point, Ms. Solberg, Ms. McQuillan and Ms. Terhune as a panel at the hearing.
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2.0 Written Evidence of Stafford Reid, EnviroEmerg Consulting Services
Please state your name and business address.
4. Stafford Reid PO Box 2504 Cowichan Bay, BC V0R 1N0
Please provide your background and work history.
5. I have included my resume as Attachment “A” to this written submission
Have you previously testified before the National Energy Board (“NEB”)?
6. No.
2.1 Spill Response Preparedness
Do you submit the contents of the report entitled “A Technical Analysis of Marine Transportation Statements for the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project, Tanker Casualty Risk Reduction and Spill Response Preparedness” (Spill Response Preparedness Report) as your written evidence and was the Spill Response Preparedness Report written by you?
7. Yes. I am the author of the Spill Response Preparedness Report and I adopt it as my written evidence. The Spill Response Preparedness Report is filed as Attachment “B” to this written submission.
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What was the objective and scope of the Spill Response Preparedness Report?
8. The objective of this technical analysis was to provide Living Oceans Society with an evaluation of Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline’s proposed tanker casualty risk and reduction and spill response preparedness measures as articulated in the marine transportation component of the project application. The application volumes reviewed included: Volume 8A: Overview and General Information, Volume 8B: Environmental and Socio-Economic Assessment, and Volume 8C: Risk Assessment and Management of Spills.
9. The Spill Response Preparedness Report has two parts. Part 1 consists of detailed qualitative descriptions of the proponent’s proposed risk reduction and spill preparedness measures. All measures are then ranked according to standard government and industry practices and regulations. Part 2 lists deficiencies in Enbridge’s plans for casualty risk reduction and oil spill response preparedness.
10. This analysis does not examine the ecological, social, or economic consequences of a tanker casualty or associated spills of oil or condensate within the region, and references to the marine terminal are limited.
Please provide a summary of the Spill Response Preparedness Report.
11. In Part 1, Enbridge’s proposed tanker casualty risk reduction and oil spill preparedness measures have been evaluated and ranked according to the following criteria:
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Evaluation Criteria Evaluation Colour Rank Best Achievable Proposed measure is proven and reliable, and is above Practice (BAP) regulatory/ international law, standards, or convention. It is not necessarily required. Reflects an innovative approach to vessel casualty risk reduction and effective spill response.
Standard Practice or Proposed measure meets regulatory/international laws, Measure standards, or convention as required. The regulation/standard/convention is proven and necessary for vessel casualty risk mitigation or spill preparedness. It may be a standard industry practice.
Substandard Measure Proposed measure or current situation does not meet or Situation regulatory/ international laws, standards, or conventions; OR the regulation/standard/ convention or situation has inherent deficiencies; OR the measure proposed is contingent on a third party involvement or agreement to implement/fund.
12. There may be a Best Achievable or Standard practice proposed, but if it is contingent on a third party such as a federal agency having to provide funding support (e.g. joint partnership), then the ranking is lowered to poor (red). This addresses uncertainty in the delivery of a prevention or mitigation measure. Caveats are provided that can make a BAP or a substandard situation go either direction based on further evidence provided.
13. Summary of the Evaluation of Tanker Casualty Risk Reduction Measures
Tanker Casualty Evaluation Comments Colour Risk Reduction Rating Rank Measure (Reference Section)
Vetting of tanker Best Available Clarity is required about nominating a tanker charter companies (1.1.4.1) Practice company by the shipper/consignee. In addition, more detail is needed about on-board verification under Northern Gateway’s Tanker Acceptance Program (TAP). Though not addressed in the EIS, a third party verification of ship documentation and readiness beyond those done by a BC Coast Pilot prior to the tanker entering the CCAA for the first time is viewed by the author as another potential BAP. (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 8 of 46
Tanker Casualty Evaluation Comments Colour Risk Reduction Rating Rank Measure (Reference Section)
Insuring Standard EIS provides only educational information on standard tanker Compliance with Practice design, systems, protocols and rules the tankers must abide national laws and by. international conventions (1.1.4.2) Notifying ships Standard These notifications are part of transit and cargo pick-up agent of estimated Practice coordination with the chartered tanker and the terminal. They time of arrival of are also required by law for advanced notice of arrival. A their tankers to standard industrial practice. pilots, terminal and agencies (1.1.4.3) Boarding by BC Standard There is a lack of information on BC Coast Pilot experience Conditional Coast Pilots on a Practice related to tankers and escort tugs given that the BC coast has tanker and Note comment never had a VLCC arrive at port, yet alone under a tethered providing safe that could escort tug system Questions remain regarding who is passage services to make this a responsible to instruct the transit protocols involving the and from the substandard escorting tugs and - during an incident - to communicate the Kitimat Terminal practice. interactions between the tugs and tanker. (1.1.4.4) Choosing safe Standard The generic descriptions provided in the EIS are tanker tanker design and Practice design/system/operation requirements required under systems that International Maritime Organization (IMO) convention and include electronic regulations. chart navigation, inert gas systems, double hull design, and segregated ballast. (1.1.4.5) Having a Transport Substandard It is unclear whether a Transport Canada ship inspector will Conditional Canada Situation be stationed at the Kitimat Terminal to undertake Port State representative Control (PSC). For this reason, this is a substandard situation stationed at marine until a federal commitment is made. terminal to undertake Port State Control (1.1.4.6) Ensuring Substandard Emergency towing equipment and protocol is now standard emergency towing Situation for all oil tankers. However, openocean rescue tug capability equipment on the Note this can is currently lacking on the outer West Coast in the Northern tanker pursuant to be a BAP as and Central regions. Emergency towing is currently reliant on IMO ‘s SOLAS per enhanced a third party tug-of-opportunity arrangement. Northern regulation use of an Gateway has offered measures to improve this situation with (1.1.4.7) escort tug for its Escort Tug (See Below). ocean rescue. See below. (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 9 of 46
Tanker Casualty Evaluation Comments Colour Risk Reduction Rating Rank Measure (Reference Section)
Using of Best Use of specially designed tugs to match specific tanker sizes Conditional specifically Available and routes is above regulatory requirement. Northern designed escort Practice Gateway will also undertake both design and operational tugs with and Note caveat on protocols specific to the CCAA using Full Mission Bridge without tethers. this ranking Simulation (FMBS). However, FMBS is a theoretical (1.1.4.8) application. The BAP would need to be verified by actual field testing with ballasted tankers Using Full Mission Best FMBS for tanker routing analysis is a BAP. However, the Conditional Bridge Simulation Available conclusions of safe passage pertain to wind and current for tanker routing Practice conditions are unclear in the EIS. Additional analysis needed analysis Note caveat on to determine if there are gaps in radar observations along the (1.1.4.9; 1.1.4.16) this ranking CCAA routes. Furthermore, only field tests provide the most validated results and brings “reality” to the situations. Regular field tests are required to verify FMBS assumptions, and to test of the tug escorting protocols. Assessing tanker Substandard The option to extend the pipeline to the outer coast to use routes Situation Single Point Mooring Systems (SPMS) rather than having to (1.1.4.10) escort tankers through confined channels to a terminal berth has not been fully assessed. This includes comparing the benefits, costs and environmental risks of marine transport that is offset by extended pipeline construction and operation. FMBS is required to assess routing options to designated safe anchorages and potential places of refuge. Assessing weather, Substandard The EIS lacks rigorous evaluation of whether: oceanographic, and Situation • Marine weather forecasting is sufficiently accurate to other physical risk address tanker from the OWA to the CCAA; factors in the OWA • NOTSHIPS cover all risks; (1.1.4.11) • MCTS officer have enough real-time regional data to guide a tanker captain to a safe anchorage or an area to avoid the storm and • There is sufficient regional information and process to determine a place-of-refuge should the tanker be disabled or damaged and in need of repair or to reduce marine. Weather and oceanographic conditions (currents, temperatures, salinity) needs to be linked to spill response equipment and tracking effectiveness. (See Response Gap Analysis under response) Relying on current Standard For several areas, the nautical (hydrographic) charts for the Conditional nautical charts for Practice Northern and Central coast are based on old surveys that have tanker transits in Note that this a limited level of detail and accuracy compared to modern the outer waters of could develop standards. This would make this a substandard situation. the Central and into a However, the Canadian Hydrographic Services has initiated a Northern coastal substandard program to update nautical charts in the area by 2012. There regions, and the situation. is a challenge to coordinate improvements with navigational CCAA. aids and updating nautical charts. (1.1.4.12) (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 10 of 46
Tanker Casualty Evaluation Comments Colour Risk Reduction Rating Rank Measure (Reference Section)
Relying on current Substandard Several additional navigational aids are recommended in system of Situation conjunction with improvements to several existing ones to navigational aids ensure optimum safe tanker transits. These improvements for transiting rely on a third party and stakeholder acceptance. New navaids tankers. will need to be shown on updated nautical charts. (1.1.4.12) Relying on the Substandard The EIS noted several improvements to increase tanker safety current vessel Situation in the vessel traffic system, such as more calling-in-points traffic system for and installing a marine radar system at Wright Sound. The transiting tankers. current situation is substandard in that improvements are (1.1.4.13) reliant on a third party (e.g. Canadian Coast Guard) to fund and operate. Using harbour tugs Standard Using harbour tugs at an oil terminal to assist the berthing of at Kitimat Terminal Practice vessels is a standard industrial practice. for tanker to assist berthing. (1.1.3.14) Providing Best The proposed availability of the escort tugs with enhanced Conditional enhanced Available ocean rescue capability will not only serve transiting tankers capability by escort Practice related to the Northern Gateway Project, but will also be a tug(s) for ocean Note caveat on benefit to the shipping industry. However, there needs more rescue services of a this ranking refined vessel drift analyses on the outer West Coast, as well tanker or a major as more clarity around place-of-refuge decision-making. vessel not-under In addition, a comprehensive training program for tug crews control (e.g. loss of on high seas ship rescue is required. The proposed system is power, steerage) still a tug-of-opportunity arrangement. As such, protocols (1.1.4.14; 1.1.4.7) need to be in place on what to do with a tanker in escort that requires the tug to undertake rescue services. This factor and the lengthy time to reach the OWA calls for several escort tugs to be made rescue capable to offer a meaningful benefit. Using Full Mission Best Full Mission Bridge Simulation (FMBS) is a significant new Conditional Bridge Simulation. Available technology to simulate navigational challenges and control for training. Practice systems and it can be used as a training tool. The EIS does (1.1.4.16) Note not provide a firm commitment or plan to use FMBS to train conditional tanker and tug captains and BC Coast Pilots. Therefore a comment conditional BAP. Using whale Best A BAP because it is above regulatory requirement. However, Conditional spotters to Available there is a concern that taking an alternative route may be minimize marine Practice counter to the objective of reducing the navigational risk of a mammal Note tanker casualty and spill. There is a question encounters by comments that of practicality of attempting to maneuver around whales, and transiting tankers. could make the safety of taking an alternative route. This measure could 1.1.4.18) this a be substandard. substandard practice. (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 11 of 46
Tanker Casualty Evaluation Comments Colour Risk Reduction Rating Rank Measure (Reference Section)
Using designated Substandard A tanker captain forced by nature or a vessel malfunction to anchorages and Situation find a safe anchorage or holding area on the West Coast is a other undesignated high risk activity. areas for tankers to The matter of safe anchorages needs to be more fully weather out a storm evaluated to include analysis of historical sea and weather before entering the conditions data to estimate how frequent a tanker would be CCAA, to facilitate required to undertake alternative transit measures. Full BC Coast Pilots Mission Bridge Simulation analysis should also be done boarding, or for an along routes taken to designated anchorages or alternative emergency. channels that MCTS may provide clearances to use. The (1.1.4.17: 1.1.4.19) assessment should address the adequacy of marine weather forecasting and real-time data available in proximity (and within) designated anchorages, potential places-of refuge and holding areas for emergency situations. The analysis needs to address potential ecological and community impacts in these areas in the event they will be used to mitigate environmental impact (e.g. to undertake tanker repairs, and/or lightering (removing) of oil or condensate). Providing for and Substandard The EIS does not fully address disclosure of risk reduction transparency of Situation measures undertaken during Northern Gateway’s marine marine vessel transportation operations and programs, such as results of casualty risk tanker vetting, status of training undertaken, incidents of reduction near-misses or noncompliance to regulations and company information and procedures. Without transparency, agency and public data during marine confidence cannot be assured and opportunities for transportation “continuous improvement” cannot be tracked or guaranteed. operations. There is no detailed discussion about (1.1.4.21) public/government/industry oversight committees to garner understanding and to promote common values for environmental protection. Industry/citizen oversight arrangements in BC are currently poor. Preparing and Best A proactive measure to reduce tanker casualties. However, distributing a Port Achievable additional proactive communications should be explained. Information Book Practice and DVD to tankers companies and their agents. (1.1.4.22)
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14. Summary of the Evaluation of Spill Preparedness and Response Measures
Oil Spill Preparedness Evaluation Comments Colour & Response Practice Rating Rank (Reference section) Integrating aspects of Standard Preparing a General Oil Spill Response Plan, as well as crisis management, Situation specific plans for the Kitimat Terminal oil transfer emergency response and operations, and for marine vessel movements in the response operations in CCAA is an important but standard industry practice and General Oil Spill is required by federal/provincial regulation. Response Plan, as well as developing specific plans for the terminal and marine vessel operations. (1.2.1.1) Establishing a stand- Best The spill response preparedness threshold proposed alone marine response Available exceeds the federal standards for a Tier 4 oil handling capability of 250 cubic Practice facility of 50 cubic meters. meters of a petroleum product spill at the Kitimat Terminal. (1.2.1.2) Entering into a Substandard The current and newly revised Response Organization contractual arrangement Situation planning and preparedness standards by Transport with a Response Note: the Canada will not meet the expectations or interests of the Organization certified situation public, environmental NGOs, provincial government, by Transport Canada to refers First Nations or even the shipping and oil handling provide response specifically industries. A review of the draft 2010 Environmental services at the terminal to the current Response Standard shows no evidence of any substantive and for each of the and revised change from when they were first established 1995. They tankers or support federal spill do not reflect lessons learned from spill events. vessels in the CCAA planning and Deficiencies in the federal RO standards are in the tactical and in the OWA. preparedness areas of: (1.2.1.3: 1.1.2.4) standards in •Wildlife rescue and rehabilitation; which •Managing a large oil spill workforce; Canada’s •Final oily waste disposal; Response •Alternative response methods such as insitu oil burning Organizations and dispersant use; and are required •Response to petroleum products not defined as “oil” to meet in order to be certified by Transport Canada. (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 13 of 46
Oil Spill Preparedness Evaluation Comments Colour & Response Practice Rating Rank (Reference section) Providing initial on Best The placement of response equipment in caches at four Conditional water tactical response Available locations throughout the CCAA will provide response (i.e. vessels, booms and Practice times from 6 to 12 hours initial on water operations that skimmers) with exceed federal Response Organization standards for both deployment times and response times and for overall oil recovery capacity. oil recovery capacity However, on-water response is just part of the spill exceeding federal response preparedness requirements stipulated in standards. Canada’s response standards which are low for (1.2.1.4; 1.2.1.5) undertaking wildlife rescue, managing oily waste to final disposal, managing a large workforce, using alternative technologies (dispersants, in-situ oil burning), and responding to condensates. This BAP is conditional on Northern Gateway proving they can exceed these federal standards for these activities. Having escort tugs Substandard Emergency tug towing and on-board firefighting provide emergency Situation capability is an important aspect of vessel casualty/spill towing and firefighting This risk reduction. However, there is no mention of other capability. evaluation critical salvage operations such as lightering, patching, (1.2.2) reflects the stability analysis or information on the company that will lack of full provide these salvage services. Canada does not require “salvage” or have a standard for salvage as part of a vessel’s capability. emergency response plan. Assessing the nature of Best The Geographic Response Plan areas need to be expanded Conditional oil spill spread, coastal Available beyond Kitimat Arm to include the CCAA and OWA. resource/community Practice The latter is particular important for designated exposures, and spill Note caveats anchorages and potential places of refuge. response measures on this required such as oil spill ranking. sensitivity mapping (1.2.3.2), geographic response plans (1.2.3.1), and oil spill trajectory modeling (1.2.3.3). (1.2.3) Providing first and Best The party accountable for the overall delivery of response Conditional extended response Available depends on the source of the oil spill. Though Northern capability by Northern Practice Gateway has committed to providing a “first” and Gateway and its Note caveats “extended” response capability, this may not necessarily designated Response on this mean it will assume the ultimate position of “Responsible Organization. ranking. Party” (RP) with full authority and accountability for (1.2.4) incident management, funding the response, and paying compensation. For a tanker sourced spill, the RP is the tanker company. There is no guarantee that Northern Gateway’s supplementary equipment or other support resources will be used. Though the tanker company is legally required to have an arrangement with a certified Response Organization, it is not legally required to use their services. (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 14 of 46
Oil Spill Preparedness Evaluation Comments Colour & Response Practice Rating Rank (Reference section) Establishing an Incident Substandard A substandard situation exists because of: management system Situation • A lack of specific information within the EIS on used by Northern Note: this incident management, Gateway and by their situation is • A divergent response approach of the BC Ministry of chartered tanker substandard Environment representing the lead agency for the companies. largely due to provincial government, and the Canadian Coast Guard, (1.2.5) current representing the lead agency for the federal government, institutional and issues in • A lack of an explicit commitment to specifically engage major vessel local and provincial governments, and First Nations into casualty and incident management at a command level. spill management in B.C. Providing emergency Standard Emergency training of company personnel is a standard training to terminal and Practice industrial practice and required as part of federal and/or tug personnel, and provincial laws for spill response planning and contractors. preparedness. (1.2.6) Providing emergency Best Outreach to coastal communities to provide emergency training to coastal Available training is beyond regulatory requirements. The EIS lacks communities. Practice any specifics on the nature of this training. Training has (1.2.6) the potential to benefit coastal communities if: 1) emergency management is taught to facilitate integration with the RP and other agencies during a spill, 2) courses reflect the logistical challenges of spill response in remote areas, and 3) lessons provide immediate benefits such as improved emergency capability within the community for other threats such as fire, search and rescue, storms, etc. Having financial Standard For tankers with a cargo of “persistent” oil, there are Conditional arrangement for funding Practice multiple sources of funding available for both managing response, pay damage Note caveats the tanker casualty (rescue/ salvage), spill response, compensation, and other in comments assessments, and compensation. For a cargo of costs incurred for an oil where this condensate, the funds are limited to P&I club insurances or condensate tanker could be a which would primarily be directed towards tanker spill. substandard casualty management such as salvage. Regardless of the (1.2.8) situation. amount of funds, a financial performance assessment should be done for various incident scenarios to ensure the RP does not exceed its limits of financial responsibility which would result in the incident being turned over to government to manage and fund. A transfer of command would lead to a substandard situation. (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 15 of 46
Oil Spill Preparedness Evaluation Comments Colour & Response Practice Rating Rank (Reference section) Undertaking fate and Substandard The EIS does not adequately address the fate and effect of effect analysis of oil Situation products being transported, the efficacy of response products being equipment or of oil trajectory tracking. In particular, the transported by oil EIS does not adequately explain whether diluted bitumen tankers. will emulsify, sink or both. Furthermore, the technical (1.2.3.3) data reports introduce a fourth product which is a bitumen diluted with synthetic oil. The researchers assume that its behaviour will be similar to bitumen diluted with condensate. Lastly, the studies do not include any references to real incidents involving the products they are transporting by tankers to compare/test their findings on both fate/effect and on response efficacy. Undertaking spill Substandard The EIS does not provide an analyses to measure specific response gap analysis Situation periods whereby an area’s sea conditions would preclude (1.2.7) safe or effective deployment of oil spill response systems (referred to as a “response gap”). Historical data about an area’s wind, sea state, temperature, and visibility are used to analyze and compare to the operating limits of the mechanical oil spill response equipment being considered - mainly booms, skimmers and vessels. Mitigating social Substandard The EIS does not commit Northern Gateway to go impacts to coastal Situation beyond effective spill response, environmental impact, communities. mitigation, and to pay compensation to reduce and redress (1.2.9) potentially significant and long-lasting social and cultural impacts to coastal communities from a large spill.
15. In Part 2 of the report, additional deficiencies were identified in Enbridge’s plans for tanker casualty risk reduction and spill preparedness measures. Deficiencies include areas where insufficient information was provided by the proponent or clarity is needed. Please see the Spill Response Preparedness Report for further details.
16. Enbridge’s Northern Gateway Project is being planned despite many inherent institutional (policy/regulatory) challenges related to tanker casualty and spill incident management, as well as many technical (operational) limitations related to vessel casualty risk reduction and spill response preparedness in British Columbia. These limitations need to be recognized and addressed.
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3.0 Written Evidence of Emma Point, Living Oceans Society
Please state your name and business address.
17. Emma Point, Living Oceans Society PO Box 320, 235 First Street Sointula, BC V0N 3E0
Please provide your background and work history.
18. At date of submission, I am the Energy Campaign Researcher for Living Oceans Society. I have worked at Living Oceans Society for 9 months, where my role is to research issues related to existing and proposed oil tanker traffic on the British Columbia (B.C.) coast. Previous to becoming an employee with Living Oceans Society, I was contracted by the organization to prepare a briefing report on the current status of shipping in B.C.
19. I have a Masters of Environmental Studies (2008) from Dalhousie University. My research at Dalhousie was focused on the quantification of environmental impacts of food production systems through the application of life cycle assessment methodology. I have a Bachelor of Science in Environmental Sciences (2004) from the University of Guelph, with a major in environmental geography.
Have you previously testified before the National Energy Board?
20. No.
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3.1 Dispersant Use
Do you submit the contents of the report entitled “Dispersant Use on Canada’s Pacific Coast: relevant factors and preliminary response gap analysis for the Enbridge Northern Gateway project area” (Dispersant Report) as your written evidence and was the report written by you?
21. Yes. I am the author of the Dispersant Report and I adopt the Dispersant Report as my written evidence. The Dispersant Report is filed with this written submission as Attachment “C”.
Please provide a brief summary of the Dispersant Report.
22. Enbridge’s General Oil Spill Response Plan proposes the use of dispersants in the event of a spill. However, factors that affect the efficacy of dispersants (e.g. oil type, application timing, water temperature, water salinity) have not been evaluated for the Northern Gateway project. Furthermore, Enbridge has provided no quantitative response gap analysis for dispersants based on weather conditions in the marine operating area. An assessment of dispersant efficacy and an estimated response gap is crucial to adequately assess the risks posed by this project.
23. In Part I of the Dispersant Report, factors that affect dispersant effectiveness are explored in the context of the Northern Gateway project. Of all the factors that affect dispersant efficacy, oil type is the most important. No field trials have been conducted to determine if dispersants will be effective on diluted bitumen spills from Enbridge’s proposed project. With respect to application timing, Enbridge’s estimated response times may not fall within the relatively small window of opportunity for effective dispersant application. Winter water temperatures are well below the ideal water temperature for dispersant effectiveness and summer water salinities in the upper channels of the proposed tanker routes are too low for effective dispersant use. (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 18 of 46
24. Part II of the Dispersant Report presents a preliminary response gap analysis for dispersants. A response gap is the portion of time that a response method is impaired or impossible based on defined operating limits. Operating limits exist for both application and efficacy of dispersants. The response gap analysis was based on wind speed and wave height operating limits for aircraft dispersant operations proposed by S.L. Ross Environmental Research Ltd. The preliminary response gap analysis determined that dispersants will often be an ineffective oil spill response strategy in Enbridge’s proposed marine project area. Across all buoy locations, dispersant response is either impaired or impossible an average of 51.37% of the time due to wind conditions alone. With respect to waves, two scenarios were considered. When waves are assumed to be less than 0.6 metres within 48 hours of dispersant application, dispersant response is either impaired or impossible 40.14% of the time due to wave height conditions alone, averaged across all buoy locations. When waves are assumed to be greater than or equal to 0.6 metres within 48 hours of dispersant application, dispersant response is either impaired or impossible 8.13% of the time due to wave height conditions alone, averaged across all buoy locations. The preliminary analysis did not assess the response gap resulting from the combined effects of wind and waves, thus offering a very conservative response gap estimate.
25. Based on the information reviewed and presented in this report, chemical dispersants are not likely to offer an effective oil spill strategy in the marine operating area. This is due to the preclusion or impairment of dispersant application and efficacy as a result of inherent project-related factors, oceanographic conditions, and regional weather patterns.
3.2 Concerns regarding Northern Gateway’s TERMPOL submission
Was the following written evidence researched and written by you?
26. Yes, the deficiencies identified as follows were researched and written by Emma Point of Living Oceans Society.
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Please describe your concerns regarding Northern Gateway’s TERMPOL submission?
27. The TERMPOL Review Process (TRP) is a voluntary measure undertaken by a proponent prior to the construction and subsequent operation of a new or modified marine terminal involving the bulk carriage of oil, chemicals or liquefied natural gas. The original TERMPOL Code, published in 1977, was designed to “precisely and reliably” measure risks and mitigation factors associated with the location and operation of marine terminals for oil tankers. The code was updated in 1982 and 2001 to include other vessel types and relevant navigational issues.1
Deficiencies Noted in Northern Gateway’s TERMPOL Submission
28. A major component of the TRP is the Route Analysis, Approach Characteristics and Navigability Survey. The purpose of this survey is to assess ship and route safety.2 TRP also requires a study of Channel, Maneuvering, and Anchorage Elements “to determine the suitability of existing channels for the design ship(s) and to identify those areas of concern where navigation requires particular attention”.3
29. With respect to both of these TERMPOL requirements, Enbridge’s proposed project is inadequate. Four examples are cited below. The first two examples are relevant to the Route Analysis, Approach Characteristics and Navigability Survey. The latter two examples are relevant to Channel, Maneuvering, and Anchorage Guidelines of the TRP.
1 Transport Canada. 2001. Termpol Review Process. TP743E. At Foreward (pg 2. of PDF) 2 Ibid. At Part 3-4 (pg. 25 of PDF) 3 Ibid. At Part 3-11 (pg. 32 of PDF) (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 20 of 46
Route Analysis, Approach Characteristics and Navigability Survey Navigational Aids
30. Components of the Route Analysis, Approach Characteristics and Navigability Survey include, inter alia, information relevant to navigational aids, including proposed improvements to existing aids.4
31. Navigational aids provide vessel masters with visual cues to ensure safe navigation. However, Enbridge’s TERMPOL submission has noted existing deficiencies in navigational aids along the proposed tanker routes.5 Based on advice from BC Coastal Pilots, Enbridge has recommended the installation of additional navigational aids, in conjunction with improvements to several existing ones. These improvements are recommended to be in place prior to the first tanker call at the Kitimat terminal.6
32. However, the Canadian Coast Guard’s Navigational Aids Services is the body responsible for managing and maintaining the network of navigational aids in the region7 and thus Enbridge has no direct control over their implementation or improvement. Enbridge’s proposed improvements are subject to consultation with other stakeholders such as the BC Chamber of Shipping, and then require final approval from the BC Coast Pilots, Pacific Pilots Authority and the Canadian Coast Guard.8
4 Transport Canada. 2001. Termpol Review Process. TP743E. At Part 3-5 (pg. 26 of PDF) 5 Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines. 2010. Exhibit B23-6 - TERMPOL Survey and Studies, Section 3.5 and 3.12 - Route Analysis, Approach Characteristics and Navigability Survey, A1Z6J0. Section 5: Navigational Aids and Vessel Traffic Services. At pg. 5-7 to 5-10. 6 Ibid. At pg. 5-9 7 Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines. 2010. Exhibit B3-24 - Volume 8A: Overview and General Information – Marine Transportation (Part 2 of 3) - A1T0H4. Section 4: Considerations due to Project-related Additional Traffic. At pg. 4-20 8 Ibid. At pg. 4-25 (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 21 of 46
Nautical (Hydrographic) Charts
33. Data sources for the TERMPOL Route Analysis, Approach Characteristics and Navigability Survey include, inter alia, applicable nautical charts as listed in the annual edition of the Canadian Notices to Mariners.9
34. The Canadian Hydrographic Service (CHS) of Fisheries and Oceans Canada is responsible for publishing official nautical (hydrographic) charts. The charts provide detailed information on water depths, navigational hazards, aids to navigation, and vessel traffic control schemes.
35. At present, many existing charts are out of date and provide a limited level of detail compared to modern navigational standards. The older charts of B.C.’s north and central coast region require updating to accommodate the new class of vessels calling at Kitimat, as well as those associated with the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project.10 In 2009, CHS began a program to resurvey the navigational routes of the north and central coast and are revising existing nautical charts accordingly. These updated (and in some instances new) nautical charts are scheduled to be available in 2012.11
36. However, given that many of the improvements to navigational aids will occur after revision of the nautical charts, changes to navigational aids may not be noted on the latest navigational charts published by CHS.
9 Transport Canada. 2001. Termpol Review Process, TP743E. Section 3.5. At Part 3-5 (pg 26 of PDF) 10 Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines. 2010. Exhibit B3-24 - Volume 8A: Overview and General Information – Marine Transportation (Part 2 of 3) - A1T0H4, Section 4: Considerations due to Project-related Additional Traffic. At pg. 4-19 11 Ibid. At pg. 4-24 (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 22 of 46
Channel, Manoeuvring, and Anchorage Elements
Anchorage Elements
37. The lack of approved and emergency anchorages on the approach and in the vicinity of Kitimat Harbour has long been noted as a deficiency of the location. The 1977 TERMPOL assessment of Kitimat Pipelines Ltd.’s (KPL) proposal noted that proper anchorage was not available in the vicinity of the berth and this was identified as one of several obstacles requiring attention for the project to be considered feasible from an engineering standpoint.12
38. Channel, Maneuvering, and Anchorage Guidelines of TERMPOL recommend the following for anchorages: • Anchorages and emergency containment areas should be located as close as is practicable to the channels they serve and relate to site-specific conditions. • The bottom in anchorage areas should provide a good holding ground. • The depth should be not less than the maximum draught of the design ship plus 15% and not more than 100 meters. • The radius of each anchorage berth should be not less than one half nautical mile (925 m).13
39. The only approved anchorage suitable for large vessels on the proposed vessel route is the Anger Anchorage near the northeast end of Principe Channel. There are no approved anchorages suitable for large vessels in the vicinity of the proposed marine terminal.14
12 Transport Canada. 1977. TERMPOL Assessment of the Navigational and Environmental Risks Associated with the Proposal of Kitimat Pipe Line Ltd. to Construct a Marine Oil Terminal at Kitimat, B.C. TP 851. At pg. 30 13 Transport Canada. 2001. Termpol Review Process, TP743E. Channel, Maneuvering and Anchorage Guidelines. At Appendix 2-2 (pg. 86 of PDF) 14 Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines. 2010. Exhibit B23-6 - TERMPOL Survey and Studies, Section 3.5 and 3.12: Route Analysis, Approach Characteristics, and Navigability Survey, A1Z6J0. Section 10: Anchorage Possibilities. At pg. 10-3 to 10-4 (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 23 of 46
40. Enbridge has proposed a number of potential anchorages to remedy this substandard situation. However, Enbridge’s proposed anchorages in Kitimat Harbour and Kitkiata Inlet do not meet the minimum swing circle and/or minimum depth requirements of TERMPOL guidelines.15 Neither of these anchorage areas has been approved by the Canadian Coast Guard. A proposed anchorage at the head of Ursula Channel is within TERMPOL requirements, but is located far from the proposed vessel routes (17-25 nm). In addition, suitability of the Ursula Channel anchorage is subject to hydrographic confirmation and a seabed survey of anchor holding qualities.16
41. Emergency anchorages have been proposed for vessel use in an emergency, to avoid an incident, or to wait out inclement weather, but they are limited in size, offer limited protection from weather, and/or offer less than ideal bottom conditions. For instance, use of emergency anchorages located on the approach to Triple Island pilot station is not advisable during inclement weather and rough seas.17 Proposed emergency anchorage in Nepean Sound has not been reviewed by the BC Coastal Pilots, nor has a seabed survey been conducted.18 Caamano Sound/Laredo Channel proposed emergency anchorage is exposed to south-easterlies and weather from the northwest. Caamano Sound/ Estevan Sound proposed emergency anchorage is not suitable for use in inclement weather.19 The only suitable emergency anchorage areas are in Browning Entrance and the northern portion of Hecate Strait.20
Channel Design
42. Channel, Maneuvering, and Anchorage Guidelines of TERMPOL state that “good channel design practice dictates avoidance of “S” curves”.21
15 Ibid. At pg. 10-4 to 10-7 16 Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines. 2010. Exhibit B23-6 - TERMPOL Survey and Studies, Section 3.5 and 3.12: Route Analysis, Approach Characteristics, and Navigability Survey, A1Z6J0. Section 10: Anchorage Possibilities. At pg. 10-7 17 Ibid. At pg. 10-8 18 Ibid. At pg. 10-9 19 Ibid. At pg. 10-11 20 Ibid, pg. 10-8 21 Transport Canada. 2001. Termpol Review Process, TP743E. At Appendix 2-2 (pg. 86 of PDF) (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 24 of 46
43. The proposed northern tanker route would take vessels through Lewis Passage, Wright Sound and into Douglas Channel.22 Passage through these waterways necessitates that vessels manoeuvre through a navigationally-challenging “S” curve, despite TERMPOL guidelines that advise against this. Compounding the risks associated with navigating an “S” curve, Wright Sound is at the junction of six navigable channels, two of which form the north-south corridor of the Inner Passage.23 At this junction, there exists a high likelihood of encountering other traffic.
44. In this location, the Queen of the North Ferry sunk after striking Gill Island in 2006.
22 Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines. 2010. Exhibit B23-6 - TERMPOL Survey and Studies, Section 3.5 and 3.12: Route Analysis, Approach Characteristics, and Navigability Survey, A1Z6J0. Section 2: Tanker Routing Options. At pg. 2-16 to 2-18 23 Ibid. At pg. 2-17 (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 25 of 46
4.0 Written Evidence of Lauri Solsberg, Counterspil Research Inc.
Please state your name and business address.
45. Lauri Solsberg 8-2471 Marine Drive West Vancouver, BC V7V 1L3
Please provide your background and work history.
46. I have included my resume as Attachment “D” to this written submission
Have you previously testified before the National Energy Board?
47. No.
4.1 Countermeasures Technologies for Viscous Oils that Submerge
Do you submit the contents of the report entitled “A Review of Countermeasures Technologies for Viscous Oils that Submerge” (Countermeasures Technologies Report) as your written evidence and was the report written by you?
48. Yes. I am the author of the Countermeasures Technologies Report and I adopt the Countermeasures Technologies Report as my written evidence. The Countermeasures Technologies Report is filed with this written submission as Attachment “E”.
(A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 26 of 46
Please provide a brief summary of the Countermeasures Technologies Report.
49. Living Oceans Society is concerned about the state of preparedness for oil spill detection and response in the event of a spill of viscous, heavy oil that might submerge (e.g. sink or become suspended in the water column) from the Northern Gateway project. A literature review of the current state of spill detection and countermeasure technologies required to respond to sunken or submerged oil was conducted and is summarized in this report. In brief, it is unlikely that available response technologies can be successfully applied to significantly control a spill of suspended or sunken oil.
50. Due to their unique properties, heavy oil mixtures pose specific challenges to oil spill responders in both fresh and saltwater environments. Heavy oils can exhibit a range of possible fates once spilled including floatation, suspension in the water column, and sinking. This literature review and summary is based on the assumption that – in the event of an oil tanker spill related to the Northern Gateway project – diluted bitumen could potentially become suspended in the water column or sink once the lighter fractions volatize and emulsification and sedimentation occurs.
51. Spill summaries, workshop reports, and working group literature (post 1990) dealing with viscous and/or submerging oils was reviewed. Efficacy of countermeasure technologies were sorted according to basic spill control phases: detection and monitoring, containment, removal, transfer, and storage. Although various oil types are referenced in the countermeasure technology literature, only those having a high viscosity and/or the potential to submerge were included in this assessment.
52. While advances have been made in both recovering and transferring viscous oils, locating, controlling, and removing sunken oil remain daunting tasks. Currently available spill response technologies can be deployed to contain, skim, transfer, and store highly viscous oils, providing the oil remains at or quite near the water surface. If oil becomes suspended in the water column, currently available response technologies will not (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 27 of 46
significantly control the spill. For sunken oil, strategies have not progressed beyond the conceptual stage.
(A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 28 of 46
5.0 Written Evidence of Jackie McQuillan, Oiled Wildlife Trust
Please state your name and business address.
53. Jackie McQuillan #3 4856 207th Street Langley, BC V3A 2E3
Please provide your background and work history.
54. I have included my resume as Attachment “F” to this written submission.
Have you previously testified before the National Energy Board?
55. No.
5.1 Status of Oiled Wildlife Preparedness in British Columbia
Do you submit the contents of the report entitled “The Status of Oiled Wildlife Preparedness in British Columbia: A General Overview and an Analysis of Enbridge’s Wildlife Response Plan for the Proposed Northern Gateway Project” (Status of Oiled Wildlife Preparedness Report) as your written evidence and was the report written by you?
56. Yes. I am the author of the Status of Oiled Wildlife Preparedness Report and I adopt the Status of Oiled Wildlife Preparedness Report as my written evidence. The Status of Oiled Wildlife Preparedness Report is filed with this written submission as Attachment “G”.
(A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 29 of 46
Please provide a brief summary of the Status of Oiled Wildlife Preparedness Report.
57. The Oiled Wildlife Trust (OWT) is made up of the primary non-governmental organizations involved in oiled wildlife contingency planning and response in British Columbia. The cumulative experiences of the OWT organizations, in previous spill responses, have exposed substantial shortcomings in the ability to effectively respond to oiled wildlife incidents. In the Status of Oiled Wildlife Preparedness, the issues preventing an efficient and well-orchestrated wildlife response in B.C. are discussed. As Enbridge’s proposed Northern Gateway Project would bring with it a significant threat to terrestrial and coastal wildlife species, also discussed are the substantial inadequacies of the proposed oiled wildlife response plan specific to this project.
Challenges and Limitations of Oiled Wildlife Response in British Columbia
58. The OWT believes all oiled wildlife deserve a response effort in order to prevent wildlife suffering as well as ongoing environmental contamination, however industry and government regulators often do not agree. The result is a delay in the activation of an oiled wildlife response or complete lack thereof.
59. British Columbia lacks all of the major resources required to conduct a swift and efficient wildlife response including localized facilities, equipment and trained personnel. The absence of designated funding for oiled wildlife response is a significant impediment to prompt oiled wildlife response as government and industry struggle to decide who is financially accountable each time there is an oiled wildlife incident.
60. Divergent management and communication structures among government regulators in B.C. often result in the delayed activation of a wildlife response or inefficiencies in how it is carried out.
(A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 30 of 46
61. Government regulators involved in decision-making and oversight of oiled wildlife response often lack an understanding of the process and complexities of oiled wildlife rehabilitation.
62. While many nations have adopted legislation to mandate oiled wildlife response, Canada has not; here, oiled wildlife responses are policy-driven and extremely variable in nature.
Wildlife Rehabilitation Challenges Specific to Northern Gateway
63. The proposed Northern Gateway pipeline terminus locations and tanker routes are adjacent to numerous provincially, federally and globally significant bird populations, including species that are sensitive in a rehabilitation setting. Oiled wildlife casualties in one of these areas could have devastating consequences for these populations.
64. Rugged shorelines, high winds and currents in areas potentially impacted by a spill may all preclude uncomplicated beach capture of impacted wildlife. Many coastal areas along the proposed tanker routes are accessible only by air or boat presenting further challenges to rescuing contaminated wildlife.
65. The lack of local resources for oiled wildlife response in the vicinity of the Northern Gateway pipeline and terminus may hamper successful wildlife response efforts.
66. As the proposed volume of oil to be transported by tankers along the B.C. coastline is extraordinary, a single mishap could potentially impact enormous numbers of birds.
67. Oiled wildlife response planning needs to be equally robust for terrestrial and marine environments. Currently, Enbridge has not included plans for sufficient resources to respond to an inland spill, especially in remote regions, which include the majority of the pipeline route.
(A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 31 of 46
68. Significant resources would need to be invested in the development of professionally trained local personnel in all areas potentially impacted by a spill to ensure a swift wildlife response.
69. It is unclear what factors would determine when a wildlife response effort is initiated.
70. The Response Organization that is called in to mitigate environmental damage following a spill has little responsibility for (and, in most cases, little capacity for) a wildlife response.
71. Information regarding the effects that condensate has on contaminated wildlife is absent. Similar highly volatile chemicals cause serious and often fatal physical effects.
72. Currently there is no clearly defined legal fiscal responsibility for oiled wildlife response in British Columbia. The effects of a delay as government and industry try to determine who will be financially responsible may be particularly troublesome in this ecologically sensitive region.
Conclusion
73. British Columbia lacks the infrastructure, equipment, and necessary local professional response capacity to respond to most spills. A clear system of communication between government regulators and other stakeholders in oiled wildlife response has not yet been established, and there is no financial plan in place prior to a spill to address oiled wildlife requirements. While provincial and federal policies guide oiled wildlife response, these policies lack the depth that legislation would provide to ensure all oiled wildlife receives equal protection. These substantial inadequacies all contribute to British Columbia’s lack of preparedness to respond to oiled wildlife disasters. Until these inadequacies can be addressed, significant oiled wildlife casualties will be expected in the event of a spill.
(A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 32 of 46
6.0 Written Evidence of Katie Terhune, Living Oceans Society
Please state your name and business address.
74. Katie Terhune Living Oceans Society 235 First Street Sointula, BC V0N 3E0
Please provide your background and work history.
75. I am the Energy Campaign Manager for Living Oceans Society. I have been employed by Living Oceans Society for two years and am accountable for the development and implementation of the organization’s Energy Campaign. In this position, I work in the capacity of a researcher, writer, and environmental advocate for healthy oceans and healthy coastal communities.
76. I have a Bachelor of Science with Distinction in Geography and a minor in Environmental Studies from the University of Victoria. The majority of my past work experience pertains to habitat protection and restoration in riparian, estuarine and coastal environments.
Have you previously testified before the National Energy Board?
77. No.
(A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 33 of 46
6.1 Double Hull Tanker Technology
Do you submit the contents of the report entitled “Tanker Technology: Limitations of Double Hulls” (Double Hull Report) as your written evidence and was the report written by you?
78. Yes. I am the author of the Double Hull Report and I adopt the Double Hull Report as my written evidence. The Double Hull Report is filed with this written submission as Attachment “G”.
79. The Double Hull Report is based on publicly available documents (including peer reviewed articles and grey literature) written by parties independent of Living Oceans Society. It represents a summary of information as articulated by these parties.
Please provide a brief summary of the Double Hull Report.
80. Following the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, double-hull tanker technology was widely regarded as the solution to preventing future catastrophic oil spills. The United States and the International Maritime Organization subsequently enacted regulations requiring all new tankers to be constructed with double hulls. The acts also set phase out schedules for all single-hull vessels by 2010. As such, Enbridge has committed to ensure that only double-hull tankers will service the marine terminal associated with the Northern Gateway Pipeline Project.24
81. However, evidence shows that double-hull tankers are not a panacea for oil spill prevention. They may reduce the severity of an oil spill from a grounding or low energy collision, but they are susceptible to a range of design, construction, operation, and maintenance issues, some which may actually increase the risk of an oil spill.
24 Exhibit B1-2 - Vol 1 – Gateway Application – Overview and General Information (Part 1 of 2) - A1S9X5, Section 2.5.5 Oil and Condensate Tankers, page 2-8 (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 34 of 46
Furthermore, double hulls do not address the role of human factors in tanker casualties which have been attributed to as much as 80 percent of oil discharges worldwide.
82. In August 1989, the U.S. Coast Guard testified to Congress that even if the Exxon Valdez had been double hulled, the spill would have only been reduced by 60 percent at most, perhaps only 25 percent. Therefore, even under the best case scenario, 4.4 million gallons of oil would have still leaked into Prince William Sound, which by all measures is still a catastrophic spill.
83. This Double Hull Report filed concurrently discusses these issues in greater depth, with the objective to highlight limitations associated with double-hull tankers.
6.2 Concerns regarding the efficacy of booms in currents greater than 1 knot
Please describe your concerns regarding the efficacy of booms in currents greater than 1 knot.
84. In their General Oil Spill Response Plan, Enbridge notes that the most effective method of containing oil spills on water is to use floating booms25. Booms are manufactured in a wide variety of designs, sizes and materials for different applications (e.g. offshore, inshore, river, harbour) and for maximum performance under a specific set of waves, current and wind conditions.
85. However, Enbridge also states that “current speeds must be less than 1.0 m/s” (approximately 2 knots) for containment booms to work26 and even slower (0.5 m/s or 1 knot) for self-inflating and fence booms to work27.
25 Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines. 2011. Exhibit B021 – General Oil Spill Response Plan, A28715. Section 8.4: Containment. At pg. 8-5. 26 Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines. 2011. Exhibit B021 – General Oil Spill Response Plan, A28715. Section 7.4: Containment – Control Points. At pg. 7-3. 27 Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines. 2011. Exhibit B021 – General Oil Spill Response Plan, A28715. Section 8.4: Containment. At pg. 8-6. (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 35 of 46
86. The susceptibility of booms to water currents is noted elsewhere, with Fingas (2004) stating that “conventional booms will fail at a current of 0.5 m/s (1 knot) regardless of the boom’s design or other conditions”28. Exxon Mobil (2008) states that “[boom] performance ranges from excellent in calm, low current waters to poor in high waves, wind, and current conditions29.
87. The term critical velocity defines the speed of the current flowing against the boom above which the boom may fail. The critical velocity defined by Fingas (2008) is lower than that stated by Enbridge in their General Oil Spill Response Plan. Exxon Mobil does not state a critical velocity for booms.
Locations where Current May Exceed 1 Knot
88. A map created by Living Oceans Society submitted as Attachment “I” to this written submission displays current readings taken from Canadian Hydrographic Service marine charts along B.C.’s North and Central Coast near Enbridge’s proposed tanker routes. Current readings range from 0.5 knots to 6.0 knots. At high current locations, it is unknown whether available boom technology will be able to contain oil without fail.
Boom Failure Mechanisms for Heavy Oils
89. With heavier oils, boom failure will most likely occur via “critical accumulation” whereby the oil, which tends to accumulate at the leading edge of the boom, is swept underneath the boom. This accumulation can be reached at current velocities even lower than the critical velocity30.
28 Fingas, M. 2004. Weather Windows for Oil Spill Countermeasures. Environmental Technology Centre, Environment Canada. At pg iii. Accessed December, 2011 from: http://www.pwsrcac.org/docs/d0002500.pdf. 29 Exxon Mobil. 2008. Oil Spill Response Field Manual. At pg. 5-10. Accessed December, 2011 from: http://www.crrc.unh.edu/dwg/exxon_oil_spill_response_field_manual.pdf 30 Fingas, M. 2004. Weather Windows for Oil Spill Countermeasures. Environmental Technology Centre, Environment Canada. At pg. 6. Accessed December, 2011 from: http://www.pwsrcac.org/docs/d0002500.pdf. (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 36 of 46
Boom Deflection Mode and High Current Watercourse Booms
90. There is evidence that booms may be used in currents exceeding critical velocity by deploying the boom at various angles to the current31. In this “deflection mode”, the oil is simply deflected to less sensitive areas where it can be collected. Presumably, effective deflection of oil warrants that spill response crews adapt boom arrangement as currents increase and decrease, and change direction over time. However, in marine environments with reversing tides “repositioning a boom can be difficult and time-consuming”32.
91. Enbridge has also noted that specially designed high-current watercourse booms may be available33. However, it is unknown whether these specialized booms will be employed by the Western Marine Canada Response Corporation, or available for use on Enbridge’s emergency response tugs in the lengths necessary to combat a large oil spill in fast moving waters.
6.3 Mechanical Response Gap Analysis
Do you submit the contents of the report entitled “Preliminary Mechanical Response Gap Analysis for the Enbridge Northern Gateway Project” (Mechanical Response Gap Analysis) as your written evidence and was the report written by you?
92. Yes. I am the author of the Mechanical Response Gap Analysis and I adopt the Mechanical Response Gap Analysis as my written evidence. The Mechanical Response Gap Analysis is filed with this written submission as Attachment “J”.
31 Ibid. At pg. 5. 32 Exxon Mobil. 2008. Oil Spill Response Field Manual. At pg. 6-10. Accessed December, 2011 from: http://www.crrc.unh.edu/dwg/exxon_oil_spill_response_field_manual.pdf. 33 Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines. 2011. Exhibit B41-25 Northern Gateway Response to Living Oceans, Raincoast and ForestEthics IR No. 1 – A2E8L1. At pg. 4 of PDF. (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 37 of 46
Please provide a brief summary of the Mechanical Response Gap Analysis.
93. Enbridge’s General Oil Spill Response Plan for the proposed Northern Gateway project includes the use of mechanical recovery methods (e.g. booms and skimmers) for oil collection activities in the event of a spill into the marine environment.34 However, Enbridge has provided no quantitative assessment of the expected efficacy of mechanical response in their application. An assessment of proposed oil spill response systems is crucial to adequately assess the risks posed by this project.
94. To address this inadequacy in Enbridge’s application, a preliminary mechanical response gap analysis was performed and is described in this report. The analysis was based on mechanical response limits proposed by Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC35 compared to wave height observations from weather buoys located in the proposed marine operating area.
95. It is a preliminary analysis in that it assesses response operating limits for mechanical equipment compared to wave height observations only. A more comprehensive analysis should incorporate additional environmental conditions that can affect oil spill response (e.g. wind, temperature, visibility and currents).
96. The preliminary mechanical response gap analysis determined that booms and skimmers are likely to prove ineffective for much of the year in the proposed marine operating area based on wave height alone. Because this response gap does not include response limitations due to wind, visibility, temperature or currents, it offers a very conservative response gap estimate. Response is impossible due to waves 30.37 percent of the time when averaged across all buoy locations. Response is either impaired or impossible due to waves 61.15 percent of the time across all buoy locations. The impairment of, or
34 Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines. 2011. Exhibit B21-2 - General Oil Spill Response Plan - Enbridge Northern Gateway (March 2011) - A1Y3Y8, Section 8.5 Mechanical Recovery, pg. 8-7 35 Nuka Research and Planning Group, LLC. 2007. Response Gap Estimates for Two Operating Areas in Prince William Sound; Report to Prince William Sounds Regional Citizens’ Advisory Council. Retrieved from http://www.pwsrcac.org/docs/d0034200.pdf. (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 38 of 46
inability to use mechanical cleanup methods substantially increases the risk posed to marine ecosystems and coastal resources in the event of a spill.
6.4 Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development
97. Filed with this written submission as Attachment “K” is a report entitled “Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development to the House of Commons, Chapter 1 Oil Spills from Ships” (Commissioner Report).36
What was the objective of the Commissioner Report?
98. “The objective of the audit was to determine whether Transport Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard (Fisheries and Oceans Canada), and Environment Canada have taken reasonable actions to implement legislated and other measures to prepare for and respond to pollution from ships in Canada’s marine environment.”37
Please describe the main conclusions from the Commissioner Report.
99. The following paragraphs are taken from the Commissioner Report:
“We examined whether Transport Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, and Environment Canada have taken reasonable actions to prepare for and respond to pollution incidents caused by ship-source oil and chemical spills in Canada’s Arctic, Pacific, and Atlantic Ocean waters, and the Gulf of St. Lawrence.
We found that, while Transport Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard have done risk assessments related to ship-source oil spills, the approaches to conducting these assessments have not been consistent or systematic, nor are there formal processes for
36 “Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development to the House of Commons – Fall 2010. Chapter 1: Oil Spills from Ships” (Commissioner Report). Available online at: http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl_cesd_201012_01_e.pdf 37Ibid., pg. 30 (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 39 of 46
ensuring that risks are being reassessed on an ongoing basis. As a result, the knowledge of risks in Canada regarding ship-source oil spills, which is important for emergency planning, is neither complete nor up to date. Furthermore, the emergency management plans of the Canadian Coast Guard and Environment Canada, which are important federal players when responding to ship-source oil spills, are not all up to date.
While the Canadian Coast Guard is delivering training and conducting exercises for dealing with ship-source oil spills, it does not have the systems necessary to ensure that its training and exercise programs are being delivered in a nationally consistent manner. The Canadian Coast Guard, the lead federal agency for responding to ship-source oil spills, has not conducted an assessment of its ship-source oil spill response capacity since 2000. While concerns have been raised regarding the state of the Coast Guard’s oil spill response equipment, given the lack of recent capacity analyses and the lack of up-to-date knowledge on risks, the Coast Guard does not know if its ship-source oil spill response capacity is appropriate to address those risks.
Transport Canada assesses private sector certified response organizations to ensure that they meet criteria set out in the Canada Shipping Act, 2001. This includes verifying that these organizations have (among other things) up-to-date emergency management plans, adequate training and exercises, and the equipment necessary to respond to ship-source oil spills of up to 10,000 tonnes. Similar procedures do not exist for ensuring the Canadian Coast Guard’s readiness to respond to spills.
The Coast Guard lacks complete and reliable documentation on responses to ship-source oil spills, which affects its ability to know how well it is achieving its objectives of minimizing the environmental, economic, and public safety impacts of marine pollution incidents. Limitations associated with the system the Coast Guard has in place to track oil spills also prevents it from conducting reliable trend analysis on ship-source oil spills in Canada.
(A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 40 of 46
Recommendations were made by a public review panel to the federal government 20 years ago to put in place a national regime to deal with ship-source spills involving hazardous and noxious substances. Such a regime is not yet in place and is not expected to be implemented before 2013. In the meantime, Canada lacks a formal framework for responding to chemical spills, including clear roles and responsibilities.
We have identified a number of important gaps—ranging from emergency planning to documenting spill responses. Overall, we conclude that these gaps need to be filled by the federal government in order to provide assurance that its planning, systems, and procedures are reasonably supporting preparedness and response efforts regarding ship- source oil and chemical spills in Canada’s marine environment.” 38
Please describe your concerns regarding the state of preparedness in Canada to respond to pollution incidents caused by ship-source oil and chemical spills in Canadian waters.
100. The above inadequacies suggest that the Canadian federal government is not prepared to respond to ship-source oil or chemical spill. While preventing a ship-source spill is paramount, the federal government must still be prepared to react should a spill occur.
101. The federal entities assessed in the audit (i.e. Transport Canada, Environment Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard) all agree with the audit results and recommendations. However, whether progress has been made to address these inadequacies is unknown.
6.5 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council 2009 Status Report
102. Filed with this written submission as Attachment “L” is a report entitled “Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council 2009 Status Report” (Exxon Valdez Spill Report).39
38Ibid, pg. 34 39 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council. 2009. Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council 2009 Status Report. Accessed December 2011 from: http://www.evostc.state.ak.us/Publications/AnnualStatus.cfm (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 41 of 46
Please provide a brief overview of the 2009 report.
103. The 2009 Status Report seeks to present a broad overview of the Exxon Valdez oil spill as it is also the 20th anniversary report. It includes details on the spill, the subsequent settlement, the Restoration Plan, progress in research, monitoring, restoration and habitat protection, the effect of the spill on human communities, and improvements made to oil spill prevention and response since the spill.40
Please highlight your concerns related to the long-term effects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill.
Persistence and toxicity of Exxon Valdez Oil
104. Twenty years after the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, “[oil] persists in the environment and, in places, is nearly as toxic as it was the first few weeks after the spill.” 41
105. This was not expected at the time of the spill nor for years afterward. It was assumed that the oil would decrease over time and lose its toxicity due to weathering. Ten years after the spill, beaches in Prince William Sound appeared clean. However, extensive surveys in the last decade have shown subsurface oil remaining at thousands of locations throughout the Sound. In 2003, it was estimated that 21,000 gallons of subsurface oil remained in mid and low intertidal areas. Additional surveys have documented Exxon Valdez oil over 450 miles away.42
106. The remaining oil is “decreasing at a rate of 0-4% per year, with only a 5% chance that the rate is as high as 4%. At this rate, the remaining oil will take decades and possibly centuries to disappear entirely.” 43
40 Ibid, pg 2. 41 Ibid. pg. 10. 42 Ibid. pg. 10. 43 Ibid. At pg. 12. (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 42 of 46
Recovery of injured resources and services
107. Several species and services have not fully recovered from the initial damage caused by the spill. Two species are listed as “not recovered,” ten species and four services as “recovering,” five listed as “unknown,” and ten listed as “recovered.” 44 Recovering services, which depend on spill-affected natural resources, include commercial fishing, passive use, recreation and tourism and subsistence.
6.6 Concerns Related to the Fate of Bitumen if Released Into Water
Please describe your concerns regarding the fate of bitumen if released into water.
Sunken Bitumen in the Kalamazoo River, Michigan
108. In July 2010, Enbridge’s 6B pipeline near Marshall, Michigan ruptured, leaking diluted bitumen into Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River. An unknown volume of this oil sank, and responders are still dealing with the submerged oil more than a year after the spill occurred. This raises questions about the fate of bitumen in both freshwater and saltwater environments in the event a pipeline leak or tanker spill from the Northern Gateway project.
109. In their Response Plan for Downstream Impact Area, Enbridge states that some of the spilled oil submerged and “is deposited on to the sediment in depositional areas in the Kalamazoo River and Morrow Lake”45. The United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Spring 2011 re-assessment noted the presence of “substantial pockets of submerged oil” in Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River and that “more than 220
44 For a list of species, see chart of page 16 of Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council 2009 Status Report. 45 Enbridge Line 6B MP 608 Pipeline Release Marshall, Michigan. Supplemental Modification to the Response Plan for Downstream Impact Area (the Plan) Strategy and Tactics for Permanent Recovery of Submerged Oil & Oil- Contaminated Sediment. September 11, 2010. At pg. 4. Accessed December, 2011 from: http://www.epa.gov/enbridgespill/pdfs/finalworkplanpdfs/enbridge_suppplemental_modification_RP_downstream_i mpacted_area_20100911.pdf (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 43 of 46
areas of moderate-to-heavy contamination, covering around 200 acres of river bottom, requires cleanup”46.
110. When diluted bitumen is released into water, the lighter fraction evaporates.47 During the Michigan incident this “[made] the heavy mixture even more heavy as it moved down the creek and down the river,” as noted by the EPA Incident Commander of the oil spill. He further noted that [the bitumen] had an increased tendency to sink” and “[i]t’s the nature of the mixture of the oil that caused it to sink”48. The EPA Incident Commander also noted that “[t]his is the first time the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has had a diluted bitumen spill of this size, and responders are “writing the book” on how to respond.”49
111. The EPA Incident Commander also explained that the EPA, the state, and industry did not anticipate spending so much time figuring out how to deal with submerged oil50. According to the Director of the Calhoun County Health Department, “We could be chasing [the submerged oil] for years to come”51.
46 Environmental Protection Agency. 2011. Cleanup Continues; Focus on Submerged Oil. http://www.epa.gov/enbridgespill/pdfs/enbridge_fs_20110811.pdf 47 S.L. Ross. 2010. Exhibit B16-31- Technical Data Report: Properties and Fates of Hydrocarbons Associated with Hypothetical Spills at the Marine Terminal and in the Confined Channel Assessment Area- A1V8F9. At pg. 3-4 (pg. 22 of PDF). 48 Kalamazoo River oil spill responders 'writing the book' on submerged oil clean up. The Kalamazoo Gazette. July 24, 2011. By Fritz Klug. http://www.mlive.com/news/kalamazoo/index.ssf/2011/07/kalamazoo_river_oil_spill_resp.html 49 Ibid. 50 Kalamazoo River Oil Spill: One Year Later (Video). The Kalamazoo Gazette. http://www.mlive.com/news/kalamazoo/index.ssf/2011/07/kalamazoo_river_oil_spill_resp.html 51 Long-term impact of Kalamazoo River oil spill unknown, scientists have no spill to compare it to. The Kalamazoo Gazette. July 25, 2011. By Fritz Klug. http://www.mlive.com/news/kalamazoo/index.ssf/2011/07/long- term_impact_of_kalamazoo.html (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 44 of 46
Potential Submergence of Cold Lake Bitumen from the Northern Gateway Project
112. Cold Lake Bitumen diluted with condensate was modeled in the fate analyses for hypothetical spills associated with the Northern Gateway Project.52 Included in this analysis was a measure of density, which determines how buoyant oil is in water. If an oil’s density exceeds that of the surrounding water, the oil will sink53. The density of sea water varies according to temperature and salinity.
113. Environment Canada data indicate that Cold Lake Bitumen has a density greater than 1.0 g/mL between 0oC and 15oC.54 Once diluted with condensate, Cold Lake Bitumen attains densities lower than 1.0g/mL.55,56 However, the condensate fraction of the diluted bitumen is expected to evaporate once spilled into water,57 and the density of remaining bitumen will subsequently increase. The density of Cold Lake Bitumen (prior to dilution) suggests it will submerge (i.e. become suspended in the water column or sink) once the condensate fraction evaporates. The time period required to cause submergence has not been provided by Enbridge. Measurement of evaporation for Cold Lake bitumen diluted with condensate was concluded after two weeks of exposure, at which time 17 percent of the condensate had evaporated and densities of 0.981 g/mL and 0.990 g/mL were reached (at 15oC and 1oC, respectively).58
114. Extrapolating laboratory exposure time to actual ocean exposure time is challenging. Many heavy oils have the potential to reach densities equivalent to seawater but are not
52 S.L. Ross. 2010. Exhibit B16-31- Technical Data Report: Properties and Fates of Hydrocarbons Associated with Hypothetical Spills at the Marine Terminal and in the Confined Channel Assessment Area- A1V8F9. At pg. 3-8 (pg. 26 of PDF). 53 Ibid. At pg 2-3 (pg. 15 of PDF). 54 Environment Canada, Emergency Science and Technology Division. 2001. Oil Properties: Cold Lake Bitumen. Accessed December 2011 from: http://www.etc- cte.ec.gc.ca/databases/OilProperties/pdf/WEB_Cold_Lake_Bitumen.pdf. At pg. 1. 55 Environment Canada, Emergency Science and Technology Division. 2001. Oil Properties: Cold Lake Blend. Accessed December 2011 from: http://www.etc- cte.ec.gc.ca/databases/OilProperties/pdf/WEB_Cold_Lake_Blend.pdf. At pg. 1. 56 S.L. Ross. 2010. Exhibit B16-31- Technical Data Report: Properties and Fates of Hydrocarbons Associated with Hypothetical Spills at the Marine Terminal and in the Confined Channel Assessment Area- A1V8F9. At pg 3-9 (pg. 27 of PDF) 57 Ibid. At pg. 3-4. 58 Ibid. At pg. 3-9. (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 45 of 46
observed to do so because of a short observation time in the laboratory.59 For example, heavy oils with the potential to submerge are expected to do so within 10 days in a laboratory setting; however, it is suspected that 30 days may elapse before an equivalent increase in density occurs at the ocean surface.60
115. Research is currently underway at the Environmental Science and Technology Centre of Environment Canada to “examine the cause and effects of density changes in heavy petroleum oils that prompt just-buoyant oils to become over washed and sink and the physical and chemical causes for their refloatation”.61 The analysis includes bitumen as a test oil. Publication of this research is expected to be in early 2012 (K. Mandsager, Coastal Response Research Center, pers. comm. Dec. 12, 2011).This analysis will provide additional insight into the submergence potential of bitumen and should be consulted once available.
6.7 Financial Vulnerability Assessment for Oil Tanker Spills
116. Filed with this written submission as Attachment “M” is a report entitled “Financial Vulnerability Assessment: Who Would Pay for Oil Tanker Spills Associated with the Northern Gateway Pipeline?” (Financial Vulnerability Assessment).62
59 Lee,S., MacKay, F., Bonville, E., Joner, E. and Shiu, W. 1989 (unpublished). A Study of the Long-term Weathering of Submerged and Overwashed Oil. Environmental Protection Directorate. At pg. i. 60 Ibid. At pg. i. 61 Coastal Response Research Center. 2008. Investigation of Physical and Chemical Causes of Heavy Oil Submergence – Project Bulletin. Accessed November 2011 from: http://www.crrc.unh.edu/progress_reports/hollebone/hollebone_projectsummary.pdf. At pg. 1. 62 “Financial Vulnerability Assessment: Who Would Pay for Oil Tanker Spills Associated with the Northern Gateway Pipeline?” (Financial Vulnerability Assessment) Matthew Bolton. Environmental Law Centre, October 2010. Available online at: http://www.elc.uvic.ca/press/documents/2010-02-06-Tanker-Spill-Financial- Vulnerability-Assessment_Jan15%2011.pdf (A37851) Living Oceans Society Hearing Order OH-4-2011 File No. OF-Fac-Oil-N304-2010-01 01 Page 46 of 46
Please provide a brief summary of the Financial Vulnerability Assessment.
117. The Financial Vulnerability Assessment reviews the current laws in Canada that dictate the amount of money available for compensation, clean up costs and natural resource damages in the event of an oil spill from a crude oil tanker. The report concludes that the funding and compensation scheme that exists under Canadian law would be remarkably inadequate in the event of a catastrophic oil spill.
118. The total amount available for compensation, clean-up and natural resource damages would be approximately $1.33 billion CAN. Yet clean-up costs alone for the Exxon Valdez disaster exceeded $2.5 billion USD in 1989. The cost for compensation and natural resource damages for the Valdez spill was judged to be at least $1 billion USD. Thus, the total for cleanup costs, compensation and damages for the Valdez disaster was at least $3.5 billion USD.
119. In light of the massive potential clean-up costs, compensation costs and natural resource damages from a major oil spill on the B.C. coast, the $1.33 billion CAN that is currently the total amount payable in Canada is starkly inadequate. (A37851)
Stafford Reid Curriculum Vitae Principal - EnviroEmerg Consulting Services July 10, 2010
EnviroEmerg Consulting Profile Services Currently specializes in emergency management with particular experience and 3520 Glenora Road, Duncan skills in spill response and assessment. A 35 year career in environmental British Columbia, CANADA management that has involved a wide range of disciplines and accomplishments V9L 6S2 that includes, but not limited to, environmental impact assessment for major projects, corporate policy and planning, and habitat protection and emergency 250 748-3710 [email protected] preparedness. EnviroEmerg.ca Experience PRINCIPAL CONSULTANT - EnviroEmerg Consulting Services, Cowichan Bay, B.C. CANADA. (2007 to present). Established consulting business that focusses on emergency management (all risk) training, shoreline cleanup assessment techniques for marine temperate and tropical environments, and risk assessments. EMERGENCY PLANNER - Ministry of Environment, Emergency Program, Victoria, B.C. CANADA. (1990 to 2007). Responsible for preparing environmental response policies, procedures, plans, guidelines, and cooperative agreements to maintain and to establish a province response capability for routine and major oil and hazardous material incidents, and to liaise with industry and agencies on emergency preparedness. PROJECT ANALYST - Ministry of Environment, Planning and Assessment Branch, Victoria, B.C. CANADA. (1980 to 1990). Responsible for assessing at technical, policy and strategic levels the environmental implications of major projects in British Columbia. AQUACULTURE BIOLOGIST (2 year secondment) - Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Victoria, B.C. CANADA. (1985-1987). Responsible for administering applications for marine fish farm development in British Columbia and establishing a policy foundation for the industry's orderly development. PROJECT BIOLOGIST - Ministry of Environment, Fish and Wildlife Branch, Fort St. John, B.C. CANADA (1977-1978). Responsible for undertaking fish and wildlife habitat protection in the field during coal exploration in Northeast British Columbia. RESEARCHER - Ministry of Recreation and Conservation. Fish and Wildlife Branch, Victoria, B.C. CANADA (1974-1976) Responsible for assessing and monitoring the use of pesticides in British Columbia and undertaking fish and wildlife habitat protection. (A37851)
EnviroEmerg Consulting Education Services Masters of Science at University of Calgary (1980). Specialized in resource 3520 Glenora Road, Duncan management and environmental policy with courses that included environmental British Columbia, CANADA law, economics, planning, botany and wildlife management. Master's thesis: An V9L 6S2 Environmental, Social and Economic Analysis of Mitigation and Compensation for Fish and Wildlife Losses. 250 748-3710 [email protected] Bachelors of Science at University of Victoria (1974). Majored in biology with EnviroEmerg.ca courses that included zoology, ecology, botany, marine biology and oceanography.
Assets An ability to integrate the specialized approaches of environmental management such as resource and land use planning, impact assessment, monitoring, habitat protection and emergency response; A broad outlook on resource and environmental matters when identifying issues and preparing management strategies; A pragmatic approach towards achieving effective environmental planning, issue resolution, and project coordination; A thorough knowledge of institutional systems and legislative requirements for resource management; A comprehensive understanding of the environmental consequences of projects such as industrial development and of disturbances such as spills and pollution.
Skills Presenting information is reports, briefs and meetings; Negotiating with people from agencies and industry; Facilitating group discussion; Using computer technology; Coordinating complex projects.
Accomplishments Prepared regional-level plans and operational guidelines and other resources for environmental emergency response preparedness; Contributed to coastal resource planning and inventory programs; Wrote national and international agreements on environmental protection; (A37851)
EnviroEmerg Consulting Participated as representative on national and international task forces and councils on environmental protection; Services 3520 Glenora Road, Duncan Prepared strategic plans for preventing and responding to major spills; British Columbia, CANADA Wrote submissions for government review of major industrial projects; V9L 6S2 Prepared policies and procedures for an environmental emergency management program; 250 748-3710 Designed procedures for onsite management of environmental impacts from [email protected] industrial development; EnviroEmerg.ca Coordinated assessments of major mining, transportation, hydroelectric and industry projects; Wrote corporate management plans providing strategic direction for government; Participated in mariculture guideline and policy formulation. Personal Born April 25, 1952. Canadian Citizen. Referrals
Craig Dougans: Principal of Global Stratagem Consulting - (604) 313-7871, [email protected], www.stratagemconsulting.ca Mark West: Principal of EmergWest.com Consulting - 604 785-5256, [email protected], www.emergwest.com Laurie Boyle: Emergency Planner, BC Ministry of Environment, Emergency Management Program - 250-387-8319, [email protected], www.env.gov.bc.ca/eemp/