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commentary

railway project between Sirte and , which was it is fragmented and by some analysts considered a rag- suspended in 2011. Furthermore, an influence on Lib- tag army. In the East, it consists of former Gaddafi army ya’s hydrocarbon industry is desirable for Moscow. In units, which defected (like the Saiqa Special Forces) or 2009, Russia was already close in signing a major gas disintegrated very early during the revolution, newly contract with Gaddafi. This would have allowed the established formations and various militias. The air Russians to dominate the European gas market even force and the navy constitute mostly of what was left more than what is already the case. over from the old services. In Tripolitania militias from Zintan and the “Noble Tribal Army” are considered part Although Russia voted for UNSCR 2259 in December of the LNA, but their loyalty to Haftar is doubtful. In 2015, welcoming the “Libyan Political Agreement”, its , the 12th Infantry Brigade is the core force of the backing has remained somehow lukewarm. Moscow southern branch of the LNA, but it follows mostly its insists that without an endorsement of the “Government own agenda. It consists mainly of fighters from former of National Accord” by the HoR, the previous govern- Gaddafi loyalist tribes. ment is still in charge. As the LNA is severely overstretched after suffering Russian private companies support the LNA with severe casualties in Benghazi, its military strategy does demining & security experts, technical expertise for so- not foresee a direct conflict with Misrata in the near phisticated equipment, spares, pilots, and air transport. future. Although Misrata’s forces have lost in Sirte Delivery of equipment, which is subject to the UN arms around one-fourth of their combat strength, which at its embargo, is made through third states (e.g. four Mi-35P peak numbered 22,000 fighters, the city is still the most helicopter gunships probably via the UAE). powerful military force in western Libya. The many In the future, it can be expected that Russia will urge for a Misrata-descendants living in the ’s coastal lift of the UN arms embargo, while providing direct sup- cities would be a threat for the LNA’s rearward areas. A port short of lethal weapons and ammunition. Those will military occupation of Misrata itself would be unrealis- continue to be shipped through third countries. Further- tic anyway. Furthermore, it is doubtful that all the east- more, it will enhance its intelligence support to the LNA. ern units of the LNA would follow an order of Haftar for The influence of General , commander of an offensive against Misrata. the LNA, is frequently exaggerated. Although there is The probable immediate objective of the LNA is to no doubt that he is a very powerful figure, he has his consolidate its control over northeastern Libya and the limits and is not irreplaceable for the East or the LNA. hydrocarbon infrastructure in the Sirte Basin. Originating from the , a noble, but less important The added value of Russian support is that the LNA will smaller tribe, Haftar is aware that his position relies on be able to consolidate more quickly and keep the initia- the support of eastern tribal leaders and the military tive. This will allow Haftar to stabilize the situation in establishment. On several occasions, he already needed the east and eventually later on also to gradually expand to revise decisions under pressure from tribal elders. its influence to the south. A direct Russian intervention Although currently, Haftar is Russia’s most important is unlikely. Deploying a force to Libya would be logis- military partner in Libya, support to Haftar is certainly tically much more challenging than in Syria. The Rus- not an end in itself. As history proves, Moscow does not sian navy would not be able to sustain a considerable care about who is in charge, as long as he fits into the 7 force capable for land attack off the Libyan coast for a plan. Russia would support any proxy considered useful very long time. Most important, this would have a very to achieve its objectives.

negative impact on the relations with the U.S. at a time, ©ISPI201 The LNA is not a homogenous army in a western sense, when the prospects for a better cooperation are bright.

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commentary

Keeping the difficult situation in northern Tripolitania in powers in the country. However, Misrata proxies like mind, neither Misrata can have an interest in an all-out the “Defend Benghazi Brigade” and LNA units, as the war against the LNA. Maybe this is a chance for direct 12th Infantry Brigade will do their best to drag their

negotiations between the two most important military “masters” into a major confrontation.

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