Letter of 10 April 2017 from the Prime Minister, The
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Letter of 10 April 2017 from the Prime Minister, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in conjunction with the Minister of Security and Justice and the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, to the House of Representatives on attempted campaign appearances by Turkish ministers In this letter the government wishes to provide the House with further factual information concerning the attempted campaign appearances by Turkish government ministers and the events surrounding them, which took place on or around 11 March 2017. It will also take this opportunity to respond to the written questions from MPs Louis Bontes and Joram van Klaveren (ref. 2017Z03705 and ref. 2017Z03537), Pieter Omtzigt (ref. 2017Z03668) and Raymond Knops et al. (ref. 2017Z03864). Over the past several weeks various Turkish ministers have travelled to Europe in order to campaign on the referendum, to be held on 16 April, on amending the Turkish constitution. On 3 March, the government learned that Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu intended to visit the Netherlands on 11 March in order to campaign on this referendum among Turkish-Dutch nationals. The government responded by informing the Turkish government that it considered official visits by Turkish ministers for this purpose undesirable. The Dutch public arena is not an appropriate forum for representatives of foreign governments to conduct political campaigns in their official capacity. This letter elaborates this standpoint below in greater detail. What is more, such campaign appearances would also entail the risk of exporting additional tensions to the Turkish-Dutch community. The government has expressed its concerns in this regard on numerous occasions. Between 3 and 11 March there were frequent contacts between the Dutch and Turkish authorities concerning Mr Çavuşoğlu’s planned visit. The government indicated that Mr Çavuşoğlu would in any case not be welcome in his official capacity, but that arrangements could be made for a visit by him as a private individual. While discussions were still in progress on the details (with a view to maintaining public order) of a visit as a private individual, Mr Çavuşoğlu appeared on CNN Turk on the morning of Saturday 11 March and threatened the Netherlands with economic and political sanctions if his aircraft should be prevented from landing. The government considered these public threats an unacceptable step, coming as they did after a week of difficult discussions and unilateral announcements of visits by Turkish ministers, in which Turkey had shown a disregard for the Netherlands’ wishes concerning these visits, wishes prompted by justified concerns regarding public order. In response, the decision was made to revoke the landing rights of Mr Çavuşoğlu’s aircraft. 1 In the course of Saturday 11 March, reports reached the government that the Turkish Minister of Family and Social Policy, Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya, was on her way from Germany to the Netherlands in order to address a gathering in Rotterdam. The Turkish authorities at senior civil service level were immediately informed in response that Ms Kaya was not welcome in the Netherlands for this purpose. They were also informed that no Turkish government minister would be welcome in the Netherlands to campaign on the referendum in the run-up to 16 April. The Turkish authorities ignored this clear message. Ms Kaya arrived in Rotterdam by car from Germany on Saturday evening, accompanied by other Turkish representatives. At no time did the Turkish authorities demonstrate any willingness to provide information about the minister’s travel plans, despite repeated Dutch requests. In fact, deliberate efforts were made to mislead the Dutch authorities so as to ensure that Ms Kaya could travel to Rotterdam without hindrance. The government contacted the Turkish authorities several times during the evening of 11 March to make clear the seriousness of the situation. It should be emphasised that under international law Ms Kaya does not enjoy any special status in the Netherlands. International law grants a special status only to (1) heads of state, heads of government and foreign ministers, (2) diplomatic and consular staff who have been accredited or whose appointment has been notified to the Netherlands, and (3) foreign officials on official missions, for which an invitation from the Netherlands is required. Ms Kaya did not fall within any of these categories. In discussions with the Turkish authorities, the message was always clearly conveyed that Ms Kaya should leave the Netherlands immediately. Fearing a serious public order disturbance, the Mayor of Rotterdam had already by that time issued an emergency order for the area around the Turkish Consulate-General, and a police cordon had been placed around it. The police cordon prevented Ms Kaya from reaching the Consulate-General, and she and her entourage were held back by the police in the vicinity of the building. Despite repeated indications by the government to the Turkish authorities that her presence in the Netherlands was undesirable, and despite repeated requests by the Rotterdam police for her to return to Germany, Ms Kaya refused to leave the country. The Turkish authorities insisted that she be given access to the Consulate-General, a demand that the Dutch authorities rejected. 2 The minister’s security guards repeatedly behaved in an uncooperative manner in the course of the discussions that she and her entourage had with the police. The police experienced this behaviour as particularly threatening because there were indications that the minister’s entourage might be carrying firearms. The police on the spot assessed the situation as possibly involving armed and dangerous persons, which meant that arrest teams would be needed in order to safely carry out detentions. Towards midnight, on orders from the Public Prosecutor, the members of the minister’s entourage were arrested on suspicion of violating the Firearms, Ammunition and Offensive Weapons Act, and were searched for firearms in order to secure the situation. No firearms were found. This group of 14 persons was then brought to the headquarters of the Rotterdam Police. There it emerged that the Turkish Chargé d’Affaires ad interim and the Turkish Consul-General from Deventer were part of the group. As soon as this became clear they were both released. After almost six hours, Ms Kaya eventually decided to cooperate with her return to Germany. She then travelled to the German border with a Dutch police escort. Her entourage was later escorted to the German border as well. To ensure that Ms Kaya would not have to cross the border without her entourage, her car and escort made a stop in Nijmegen. The government is convinced that it acted in accordance with international law. The actions of the Turkish government representatives, as described above, made any attempt to find an alternative solution impossible. In response to Mr Omtzigt’s questions about the possibility of banning campaign activities, the government would note that a foreign government official does not have a right to enter the Netherlands in order to carry out political activities. Once present in the Netherlands, however, a foreign government official does have the right to freedom of expression. Under the European Convention on Human Rights, the exercise of that right may be subject to restrictions if there are sufficient grounds, for example in the case of political activities carried out by government representatives while in office, whatever the form of government in their country. Article 53 of the European Convention on Human Rights, incidentally, allows states to provide a higher level of protection for human rights and fundamental freedoms. For example, the Dutch Constitution provides that no prior approval may be required for a meeting on the basis of the opinions being put forward at it. That provision applies to all meetings. A meeting may however be forbidden in advance in specific circumstances and conditions to combat or prevent disorders. 3 The events described above have led to a deterioration in the Netherlands’ bilateral relations with Turkey. Since 11 March the Turkish president and several Turkish ministers have made extreme public statements about the Netherlands. The government considers it highly inappropriate for the Turkish authorities to express themselves in such a way about a friendly country and fellow NATO member state. The government has expressed this view publicly. The events of 11 March have also left their mark in the Turkish-Dutch community, which even before this incident had been experiencing a heightened level of tension since the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016. The government would emphasise that all members of this community who have the right to vote in the Turkish referendum must be able to choose freely how they vote. The government has no evidence at this time that the Turkish diplomatic and consular missions in the Netherlands are attempting to interfere improperly in Turkish citizens’ choices. If any specific evidence emerges of such attempts, the government will address the matter immediately in order to put a stop to them. Members of the Turkish- Dutch community should also feel equally free, as citizens of the Netherlands, to take part in Dutch political life. In this light the government is concerned about indications that in fact not everyone does feel free to do so. It would point out that criminal complaints can be lodged in cases of intimidation. The government will continue to work to de-escalate tensions with Turkey, and is confident, on the basis of over 400 years of Dutch-Turkish friendship, that our two countries will succeed in doing so. At a later date the government will send the House its previously promised letter concerning the motions adopted and undertakings made following the attempted coup in Turkey. The motions include those introduced by MPs Sybrand van Haersma Buma et al.,1 Emile Roemer et al.,2 Malik Azmani et al.3 and Malik Azmani et al.4 1 Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives, 2016/2017, 32824, no.