Navigation Published by Gard AS 2

A selection of articles previously Navigation published by Gard AS 2

Introduction 4 Loss of anchors and chain 5 Ports and places of refuge in South Africa 8 Limitations of a vessels’ anchoring equipment 10 Communication in pilotage passage planning 11 Harbour towage and pilotage 12 ECDIS - Charting the future of navigation 14 Anchoring within Malaysian waters off Singapore 16 Dangerous anchoring in the Singapore area 17 Damage to fixed objects when manoeuvring in confined waters 18 “What if...?” – Planning for the unexpected before an emergency develops 19 Pilot error survey 22 What happens to the pilot after a casualty? 22 Don’t fall asleep on the job - No let-up in fatigue-related casualties 23 Is the pilot a part of the bridge team? 25 Navigation through the entrances to the Baltic Sea 27 Operations in extremely cold climates 28 Winter season in Northern Baltic Sea 30 Anchoring - Getting into a safe haven or into a potential disaster? 31 “Pilot on board!” 33 Pilot on the bridge - Role, Authority and Responsibility 35 Who is to blame? 39 Hydrodynamic interaction between ships 40 Wash damage 41 Hull and Machinery incident - The innocent victim (of an unsuccessful berthing manouevre) 42 Hull and machinery incident - Consequences of a blackout 43 The interface between hull and machinery insurance and P&I from the P&I claims handler’s perspective 44 Lloyd’s Open Form continues to adapt and change: LOF 2011 46 Operating in ice 48 Safety culture - Incidents resulting from human error 51 The evolution of the York-Antwerp Rules – On hold until 2016 53 UK Hydrographic Office’s ECDIS workshops 54 Hull and machinery incident – Voyage planning and grounding 56 Reminder: Pilot transfer arrangements - revised requirements applicable to existing ships 57 The Netherlands - Revised North Sea shipping routes come into force on 1 August 2013 58 New Panamax vessel requirements 59

This booklet contains a collection of major concern. Human error is the to improve the performance of the loss prevention materials relating to cause behind at least 80 per cent of shipping industry: navigational accidents, training and all navigational accidents. This figure other issues which have been published seems to be the generally agreed Education, training and crew selection by Gard over the last five years. The industry wide. is paramount to obtain and keep high compilation may be used for individual quality crew. Lack of positive corrective studies, as parts of training schemes, or Several factors have been pointed out action is a common direct cause of as individual topics in safety meeting or as possible reasons for the increasing accidents. education. number of human error incidents: Situational awareness is a term used There is a growing concern within - Integrated and complicated bridge to describe what is missing within the industry about the increase in systems the bridge team when this happens. navigational claims. The pattern seems - High traffic density To achieve such awareness it is to be a steady number of claims per - High commercial pressure necessary to conduct teamwork and ship but the severity of each claim - Larger and faster ships communication training. increases every year. In the last 4 years - Reduced manning alone, Gard has seen a doubling in - Increased administrative tasks on The human being is the only intelligent the value of the claims paid as a result board barrier in our systems and only the crew of navigational errors. Navigational - Increased number of inspections can halt the current development and incidents represent approximately 40 - Fatigue protect the value of ships, cargo and per cent of the numbers of all claims - Lack of experience environment. and 50 per cent of the costs. - Lack of competence - Poor decision making There is a human error behind the majority of navigational claims. The The discussion about these factors will occasional technical failure, normally continue as long as ships ply the seas resulting in limited damage to piers but there are some areas that need and ships’ sides are rare and not of to be addressed by ship operators

Disclaimer

The information contained in this publication is compiled from material previously published by Gard AS and is provided for general information purposes only. Whilst we have taken every care to ensure the accuracy and quality of the information provided at the time of original publication, Gard AS can accept no responsibility in respect of any loss or damage of any kind whatsoever which may arise from reliance on information contained in this publication regardless of whether such information originates from Gard AS, its shareholders, correspondents or other contributors.

Gard News 201, Loss of anchors and February/April 2011 chain

Anchor windlass and chain stopper.. Photo courtesy of Aker Pusnes AS.

Gard has noted an increase in cases the time to pay attention to every part scrap the length of chain or to replace a of lost anchors. The Club experiences of the chain. Gard’s advice to vessels’ single link by a joining shackle. about one case per 200 ships per year masters and superintendents is to take and class societies experience about an active part in the inspection, and not An anchor chain is composed of twice as many: one anchor lost per 100 just to leave it to the yard and the class lengths of 15 fathoms (27.5 metres) ships a year. surveyor. Class societies will require the joined by kenter shackles, as well as common chain links to be measured at a “fore-runner” next to the anchor. Most Gard cases involving lost anchors the ends, where they are most worn, It is relatively rare for a swivel or a are P&I-related. More and more port and allow a reduction of up to 12 per kenter shackle to break, but if a worn authorities require that lost anchors cent of the diameter. chain has to be replaced, the “fore- be removed from the sea bed, so runner”, consisting of swivel, large link these cases become “wreck removal” Second-hand chains are on offer in the and joining shackles, should also be operations. There are fewer cases market, but one should not buy them renewed. The spile pin, i.e., the conical related to hull and machinery insurance, without a certificate of quality. Consult pin locking the kenter shackle parts as the value of the lost anchor and the class society. One should also be together, is important. It is hammered chain is normally lower than the aware that chains and anchors have in and sealed by a lead pellet, and this applicable deductibles. been offered with false class certificates. has to be done in a proper way. Be sure The low price may be an indicator. to buy only quality goods with proper The weakest link certificates. Gard has looked at the technical In addition to reduction by wear reasons behind loss of anchors, and and corrosion, one of the common Lost spile pins noted that anchors may be lost due problems of anchor chain is loose or The pin of the anchor shackle to breakage of a common chain link, lost studs. The studs are there to keep (D-shackle), which links the “fore- joining shackle, swivel, anchor shackle the sides of the common links apart runner” to the crown shackle of the or crown shackle, and also through during pulling, to avoid that the chain anchor, is sealed in the same way breakage of the anchor itself. One or “kinks”, and they also add weight to as for kenter shackles. There have both flukes may break and, surprisingly, the chain. If a stud is lost, the strength been several cases where a chain in also the solid anchor shank. of the link is severely reduced. It is good condition comes up without common to see loose studs being the anchor and without the pin of “A chain is only as strong as its weakest welded up, but one should be very the anchor shackle. The spile pin, link” is an old saying, and when a part careful in doing so. The class society securing the main pin of the shackle, of the chain breaks it may be due to should always be consulted, the seems to fall out relatively often, and wear and corrosion or to over-stressing amount of welding should be limited, Gard’s investigation saw two reasons of that part. Class societies require and the link should be both pre-heated for that. One is found at the shipyard anchors and chain to be ranged in and slowly cooled down afterwards. where the chain was fitted. The conical dry-dock every five years and that is In many cases it would be better to shape of the spile pin must match the

© Gard AS, July 2014 6 This anchor was almost lost due to the pin of the anchor shackle (D-shackle) falling out. The spile pin, securing the main pin of the anchor shackle, is missing. (Photos courtesy of Ole Martin Terjesen).

hole in the shackle parts perfectly, so this is a question of quality at the manufacturers. Sealing the hole of the spile pin used to be done in the shipyard by hammering in a lead pellet with a special tool, but today this is sometimes done by pouring melted lead into the hole. That lead may shrink during cooling, and needs a hammering to serve its purpose. That is not always done.

The other reason for lost spile pins is found on board. Most anchors, if not all, will hammer within the hawse pipe while on voyage in heavy seas. The repeated hammering may at times loosen the spile pin of the anchor shackle and cause it to fall out. The anchors should be secured as tightly as possible by tensioners or turnbuckles/ lashing wire, etc., to reduce anchor movements on voyage.

Breakage If parts of an anchor break, there are good reasons to suspect defects of the cast metal, like inclusions and fissures, but it can also be caused by uncontrolled dropping of the anchor on a rocky seabed. Gard has also seen some anchor shanks breaking off, and that has been a surprise. Normally one would expect a chain link to part under strain long before the anchor shank. Examinations of the remaining part of the broken shanks have revealed a brittle metal structure, caused by insufficient annealing at the makers’. The anchor shank and anchor crown are made of cast steel, which requires a long heat treatment after casting. The manufacturers may have speeded up the production, cut time and temperatures needed for heat treatment, and that may not have been discovered by the authorities involved in testing and certification. If an anchor shank breaks, Gard recommends sending the remaining part to a test facility and comparing the results with the certificate.

Operational circumstances As for operational circumstances when anchors are lost, some happen during normal anchoring, if one is not able to control the speed of the drop by the windlass brake, or if the anchor is dropped while the vessel is still moving forward. Anchors and chains may also be lost when anchoring in an area exposed to bad weather, if the vessel starts drifting. In such situations, there

© Gard AS, July 2014 7 is of course also a risk of losing the The efficiency of the windlass brake rules will only require the vessel to have vessel, or causing collisions, which have is extremely important, and worn an anchoring equipment designed to happened more than once. A vessel brake band linings should be replaced hold the vessel in good holding ground, dragging its anchor also risks causing without delay. Also, be aware that when and are based on the assumption that damage to pipelines and cables on the the lining is worn, this makes the band a scope of chain cable between 6 and seabed, a very expensive affair. Anchors more “roomy” and a full braking force 10 is used. Such a scope, being the have also been lost when anchoring in will not be obtained by tightening ratio between the length of chain paid too deep water and when attempting the brake spindle alone. On large out and the water depth, is just not to stop a vessel as a last resort in a windlasses there is an arrangement obtainable for large ships in some of black-out situation. at the lower part, to adjust the brake the deeper designated anchorages. band. Service people working for a With these limitations in mind, and the Gard also has some cases of anchors windlass manufacturer report that this type of incidents mentioned above, it dropping out while at sea, obviously is hardly ever done by the crew. It is becomes apparent that some masters a result of inadequate securing. If an just a case of reading the maintenance may at times put too much trust in their anchor drops out while the vessel is booklet and acting accordingly to vessel’s anchoring equipment, and that under way, it has overcome the chain- obtain a better braking efficiency. they should be more proactive and put stopper, the lashing-wire/tensioning out to sea more often when the weather arrangements and the windlass brake, Class rules deteriorates. or these have not been correctly The rules regarding specifications of engaged. If an anchor has dropped out anchoring equipment are established The full text of the rules for anchoring while at sea, this would normally be felt by the class societies. It is important equipment can be found at the by a smaller vessel’s behaviour, such to be aware that these requirements IACS website at www.iacs.org.uk/ as loss of speed or tendency to steer are minimum requirements, and also document/public/Publications/Unified_ to the side of the anchor. However, to be aware of assumptions made in requirements/PDF/UR_A_pdf148.PDF. Gard has experienced cases where the the calculations used. Class societies Gard has addressed these rules in Loss personnel on the bridge blames a loss stress that anchoring equipment is only Prevention Circular No. 12-10, which of speed on the conditions of waves intended for temporary mooring of a can be found at www.gard.no. and winds, or the lack of efficiency of vessel, within a harbour or a sheltered the engine, instead of going forward area, when awaiting berth, tide, etc. It to check the securing of the anchors. is also underlined that the equipment Approaching ports or shallow passages is not designed to hold a ship off a fully with an anchor in tow can become very exposed coast in bad weather or to expensive if cables and pipelines on the stop a vessel from drifting. The class seabed are pulled off or damaged.

Gard News 201, Ports and places of February/April 2011 refuge in South Africa By Alan Reid and Mike Heads, P&I Associates (Pty) Ltd, Durban, South Africa

vessels, together with certain ports, provided certain requirements can be met.

There are three possible places of refuge on the South African coast: 1. St Helena Bay - a deep water bay but exposed to the wind from the northwest 2. False Bay - very good area that offers much protection 3. Algoa Bay - good shelter only from the west

In addition, there are eight commercial ports in South Africa: Saldanha Bay, Cape Town, Mossel Bay, Port Elizabeth, Coega, East London, Durban and Richards Bay.

Anchoring a vessel at will is illegal A shipowner or master can not simply anchor a vessel along the South African Nautical chart of Valsbaai (False Bay). coastline at their own will. Various pieces of legislation have been passed The subject of ports and places of km of coastline that splits the Atlantic to prevent this: refuge around the world has steadily and Pacific Oceans. At certain times of - The Marine Traffic Act, Act 2 of 1981; become a topic of much debate among the year this length of coastline can be - South African Maritime Safety various interest groups, especially after one of the most dangerous stretches Authority Act, Act 5 of 1998; the breaking of the PRESTIGE off the of coastline in the world, especially - Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) coast of Spain. when one takes the weather, currents Regulations 2004, which incorporate and rugged rocks into account. It is for Regulation X 1-2/9 of SOLAS (ISPS); No doubt when the PRESTIGE accident these very reasons, that it is important - Marine Pollution (Control and Civil occurred there were several issues at to have a plan in place and to be aware Liability) Act, Act 6 of 1981; stake regarding what should be done of the options available to the country in - Wreck and Salvage Act, Act 94 of 1996; with the vessel and what steps should order to deal with potential ecological - Merchant Shipping Act, Act 57 of 1951 be taken by the various authorities. catastrophes should one ever arise. (as amended); After the incident some experts argued The coastline is littered with wrecks - National Ports Authority Act, Act 12 of that if the vessel had been taken into stretching back hundreds of years and, 2005. a port or place of refuge the resultant therefore, the next maritime casualty oil spill could have been controlled. could be imminent. The Marine Traffic Act deals with a This is not the first time that such a vessel entering and departing from debate has occurred, since the issue is A sensible and commercial international waters and states that highly sensitive. The PRESTIGE case, approach there are regulations regarding the however, does illustrate the need for a To deal with the scenario of a ship in immobilising, laying up, stopping or sensible approach when dealing with difficulty, the South African government anchoring outside harbours or fishing ships in difficulty. In the case of the MSC has passed legislation and approved harbours. It is an offence under the Act NAPOLI, a decision had to be taken the appointment of the South African for any vessel to lay up on the South on what to do with the vessel after she Maritime Safety Authority (SAMSA) to African coastline without the necessary developed a crack, and it was decided consider their options, together with permission. Permission to lay up a vessel that a beached landing would be the other local marine experts, on the must be given by the relevant minister best solution in order to limit and procedures to follow should a vessel run through SAMSA, who may demand, inter control the damage to the environment. into trouble. alia, that various conditions be met. For example, SAMSA may demand that a tug It is against this background that South South Africa has adopted a very be made fast to the vessel at all times Africa has looked at its contingency sensible and commercial approach to throughout the duration of the lay-up. plans in order to deal with ships in the issue of ships in difficulty and the The tug would therefore be able to move difficulty and what it should do if faced need to have ports and places of refuge the vessel in case of an emergency. If she with any of the above scenarios. available for a vessel in case of an is made fast, then there is little delay in emergency. There are places of refuge moving or relocating the vessel should South Africa is surrounded by 2,798 available in South Africa for deep draft the need arise.

© Gard AS, July 2014 9 SAMSA’s role should act with utmost good faith which may eventually be abandoned by SAMSA also has the power to demand when dealing with SAMSA. A failure the owners. Having suitable insurance that the master or owner of the ship to disclose a particular fact may lead in place provides a level of protection post security to the satisfaction of to a vessel being barred from gaining should an unfortunate event or risk arise SAMSA in an amount determined by refuge. during the period of refuge. SAMSA for the recovery of any costs incurred by SAMSA in enforcing any Where a vessel’s structure has been Both SAMSA and TNPA recognise and condition applicable to the immobilising compromised, SAMSA will want to accept Club letters of undertaking from or laying up of the ship, or in the inspect the vessel and assess the IG clubs. The wording of this letter has exercise of its powers under the Act. problem before granting permission for been agreed upon with the clubs and the vessel to get close to the coast. is only a slight variation of the standard SAMSA have the authority to prevent a IMO wording for ports of refuge. The vessel coming towards the coast to seek Once permission has been granted, it variation is that it incorporates South refuge and this authority stretches to may be subject to certain conditions, for African law. all bays and anchorage areas. Although example: the ports are operated by the Transnet - The vessel may be requested to Resources National Ports Authority (TNPA), they produce a valid hull and machinery South Africa is fortunate to have various will often turn to SAMSA for advice and insurance certificate. resources available on its coastline to assistance. Before a vessel can seek - The vessel may be requested to assist vessels in difficulty or which may refuge at a place or port in South Africa, produce a valid P&I insurance certificate have to lay up. South Africa was the first SAMSA must first give their authority, of entry. country to recognise the need to have a and if it is a port, then TNPA will also - All fuel bunkers and black oil (including tug solely for the above purpose, which have to be consulted and give their contents of engine sumps) may have to resulted in the rest of the world also approval. SAMSA will always consider be removed from the vessel. introducing emergency towing vessels the safety of life as being paramount - The vessel must be attended to by an (ETV). and the Maritime Rescue Co-ordination adequately powerful salvage tug that Centre in Cape Town co-ordinates all has to be made fast. Two salvage companies have offices rescue activities with the harbour master - A salvage contractor must be in Cape Town with fully equipped at the nearest port. The next priority appointed by owners (the contractor warehouses. Resources are available to is the environment. Once the above should be an International Salvage provide, inter alia, fenders and transfer factors have been taken into account, Union member). hoses. one would then give consideration to - An operational plan must be prepared the safety of property. and approved by SAMSA Co-operation is paramount - A suitable guarantee might be South Africa, as a coastal state, does South Africa has always had an excellent requested. recognise the need for vessels to seek approach to the subject of vessels refuge and in general will assist in this seeking a port or place of refuge and The request for valid insurance process. However, it is imperative that SAMSA should be commended for certificates is a new development and the requirements of the authorities are their role in such matters. SAMSA an essential one. If vessels want to make met and that the owners, the ship and have a difficult function to fulfil and use of our coast, then owners must their respective insurers co-operate at it has always been our advocacy that understand that South Africa needs all times. shipowners looking to utilise South to protect itself from having to incur African waters as a place of refuge and bear the costs of removing vessels

Loss Prevention Circular Limitations of a vessels’ No. 12-10 anchoring equipment

Gard has seen an increasing number of also assumed that the vessel can use ships dragging anchors in bad weather cases involving lost anchors, and from a scope between 6 and 10, the scope that Masters have at times placed too class societies we learn that as many being the ratio between length of chain much trust in their vessel’s anchoring as one anchor per 100 ships is lost paid out and water depth. However, equipment. Today’s weather forecasts annually. The reasons for loss of anchors large ships at deep anchorages do not are usually very reliable and Masters and chain are many, and include have sufficient chain onboard to reach should more often choose to weigh lack of seamanship and inadequate scopes of such magnitude. anchors and go out to sea in time if maintenance, but also instances of the heavy weather is forecast. chain and anchor breaking, leaving a If a ship is at anchor in ballast condition, question mark as to the quality of such the Master should also bear in mind parts as provided by the manufacturers. that wind forces acting on his ship may The full text of the rules for anchoring be much larger than the calculations equipment can be found in the In Gard, about one in 200 ships a have accounted for, as larger ship document “Requirements concerning year has an anchor related claim. side areas are now exposed, while the mooring, anchoring and towing”, Most of these are due to the loss of measurements entered in the formula by searching the web pages of anchors at designated anchorages was taken from the summer load water the International Association of where the authorities require the lost line. Vessels in ballast will also be more Classification Societies: www.iacs. items to be removed, thus resulting vulnerable if they have to move away in org.uk, or directly in www.iacs.org.uk/ in a “wreck removal” case. The more bad weather, as both the steering and vdunifiedrequirements/ur_a_pdf148. serious and very costly cases are when the propulsion may be affected. pdf. a vessel starts dragging its anchor in bad weather, and where this leads to Class societies make it clear that the collisions with other vessels, groundings use of the anchoring equipment is and loss of the ship, or to damage to only for the temporary mooring of a cables and pipelines on the seabed. vessel, within a harbour or a sheltered area, when awaiting berth, tide, etc. Strength and limitations of It is particularly emphasized that the anchoring equipment equipment is not designed to hold The rules for anchoring equipment, a ship off a fully exposed coast in the grade, length and size of chain, bad weather or to stop a vessel from number and weight of the anchors, drifting. The anchoring equipment, as the strength of the chain stoppers and designed in accordance with the class the power of the anchor windlasses rules, will only hold the vessel in good and the brakes, are established by the holding ground, while the holding class societies. They can be found in power is significantly reduced in poor the rules of the individual societies, holding ground. or in the unified rules of IACS, the International Association of Class Recommendation Societies. It is important to be aware If a vessel is anchored in an area that these are minimum requirements, exposed to weather, it is necessary to and to know the assumptions made in have a policy as to when to leave. There the calculations. have been cases when Masters have been under commercial pressure not For each vessel the class society will to leave the anchorage, and disasters calculate an Equipment Number have happened because the Master by using a formula, where the was tempted “to wait and see until displacement of the vessel, the breadth the morning”, although the weather of the ship and the height from the forecast was bad. In making his decision summer load waterline to the top of the whether to stay or to leave, the Master uppermost house, as well as the profile should also be aware of the limitations view area of the hull, superstructures of his anchoring equipment. Some and houses above the summer load Masters may not have full knowledge waterline are included. Thus, the forces of these limitations, however, they are on the ship by current and wind from laid down by the class societies in their both the front and the sides are taken rules for calculating the dimensions, into account. The formula is based weights and strengths of the anchoring on an assumption that the speed equipment. of the current may reach 2.5 m/sec, and wind speed of 25 m/sec, which With the mentioned limitations in represent quite high forces, but it is mind, it can be seen from cases of

Gard News 200, November 2010/ Communication in January 2011 pilotage passage planning

Good communication between master ECDIS This becomes even more important and pilot continues to be paramount. In many areas pilots use their own with the impending implementation of The article “Master/pilot exchange electronic chart systems, displaying the full ECDIS regulation. And why not also of information”, published in Gard passage on a laptop or similar device use emails to send the waypoint details News issue No. 154, focused on the that they bring with them on board in advance? importance of good communication and connect to the vessel’s AIS pilot between master and pilot, a problem plug. Use of such aids to navigation, Advance information leaves only which was also highlighted in the if combined with reduced planning minor technicalities to be discussed or articles “Pilot on board!” in Gard News and bad communication between confirmed at the time of pilot boarding issue No. 181 and “Is the pilot a part of bridge team and pilot, further reduces and ensures that the bridge team’s full the bridge team?” in Gard News issue the ability of the OOW to monitor attention can be immediately directed No. 185. In the following article Gard the pilot’s intentions regarding the towards navigation. News revisits the topic once again.1 vessel’s track, changes of course and to question any decisions made by the This is probably the way forward: Ideally the pilot, the master and the pilot. communication of the pilot’s intended officer of the watch (OOW) should passage plan in advance of the actual discuss and agree on the intended Nowadays most vessels are equipped operation, which would facilitate input passage plan in pilotage waters with ECDIS or ECS as aids to navigation of the plan in the ship’s anti-grounding prior to commencing the passage. and support to conventional paper monitor system, the ECDIS. This would Unfortunately, this is often not done chart navigation.2 When the passage is also allow the bridge team to familiarise in accordance with bridge team properly represented in these electronic themselves with the intended passage management principles. For the systems, it is possible to enable a plan and be in a better position to master and the ship’s crew to be able number of automatic alarms, which add monitor the pilot’s actions. to supervise the pilot’s performance, to the safety of navigation. However, for or even question the pilot’s actions, these safety barriers to be effective, the Footnotes they all have to be aware of the pilot’s passage plan must be properly agreed 1 See also the article “Harbour towage and intentions. between vessel and pilot. pilotage”, elsewhere in this issue of Gard News. 2 See article “ECDIS - Charting the future of navigation” elsewhere in this issue of Gard Pilots prevent far more accidents than In some areas pilots send passage plans News. they cause. Nevertheless, when a pilot or passage planning information for a boards a vessel there may be pressure particular port to vessels in advance. on both the pilot and the bridge This proactive communication enables team in terms of time. As a result, the the vessel’s bridge team to prepare passage plans of the pilot and the and enter the expected passage in the on-board bridge team may not be on-board systems prior to the arrival consistent with each other. There may of the pilot, including activating the be a lack of communication between safety settings on the vessel’s ECDIS/ the bridge team and the pilot regarding ECS. When the pilot arrives on board, the intended passage, which may the bridge team is already aware of his significantly reduce the safety of the main intentions and should be able operation. to quickly discuss and agree on the passage plan, including any possible Recent findings in incidents deviations from the original plan. investigated by Gard involving pilots However, this should not replace the showed that common elements were all-important master-pilot exchange of present in most of these cases: information.

(1) information had not been shared by Given the technology available today, the master and the pilot, the transmission of intended passage (2) there had been insufficient time for planning information in advance the ship’s crew to familiarise themselves of the vessel’s arrival by the pilot, with the pilot’s intended passage plan, pilotage authority or other responsible (3) the pilot boarding ground was body through a simple e-mail would frequently closer to the harbour significantly add to safe navigation and entrance compared with the charted would assist the pilot in becoming a boarding ground. more integral part of the bridge team.

Gard News 200, November 2010/ Harbour towage and January 2011 pilotage By Yves Beeckman, Marine Superintendent, URS, Antwerp.

It is generally assumed that tug board or the ship’s lines to the tug. to remind the crew of the risks of operations are routine for ships’ crews (most commonly for tug’s lines: thin handling tow wires and to discuss the and that mooring parties will handle heaving line from the vessel to pick procedures. them efficiently and swiftly. As a result, up a larger size messenger rope master-pilot exchanges do not usually from the tug, which can be led to the During the operation address this issue. However, in order warping drum of a winch in order to The commands used by the officer to ensure effective harbour towage heave on board the tow wire. When in charge should be clear and well operations, it is essential that the using ships’ ropes, the other option is understood by the deckhands; standard relevant information is exchanged to lower a ship’s rope or send it over terminology may be developed, subject between the master and the pilot with a heaving line. Most tugs will, to the ship’s working language. beforehand, so that the mooring however, not take a lowered line when parties can be called to their stations underway), only when departing from The crew should wear leather working in time, fully briefed on the details of the berth gloves or gloves made from equivalent the operation. Daily experience in a - position for passing over the heaving materials when handling a tow wire, harbour towage department shows line (throw from the ship’s shoulder, never cotton gloves. Very loose work that, unfortunately, the number of which fairlead the heaving line should clothing should also be avoided. less-skilled mooring parties is on the be taken through) Overalls should be tight, especially increase. This lack of skill may result - maximum speed for securing the tug, around the wrists and ankles. in delays in securing a tug, putting so the bridge team can monitor time pressure on the crew and thereby - bollard pull of the tug(s) Many serious personal injury incidents increasing the risk of personal injury - VHF channels to be used for working in mooring areas involve parting lines. or of the vessel sailing in unsafe with the tugs It is therefore important to note that conditions, for instance in dense traffic, a “snapback zone” exists when a before the tug is ready. Information required to be passed mooring line is under tension. Crews from master to pilot should take that into account during Exchange information beforehand The master should provide the operations and it may be a good idea The tug information can be exchanged following information to the pilot: to indicate these areas permanently on during the voyage under the pilot’s - SWL of the mooring / towing the deck. As soon as the tug is secured, advice, as opposed to being exchanged equipment all crew stand back from the snapback at the time of pilot boarding, when - Which fairleads are suitable for zones. Crew members should also be there are other navigational priorities securing the tugs. If they are off centre warned to beware of hands and fingers: to be addressed. At the start of the and only one tug is to be used, this sudden jerks in the tow wire while towing operation the parties should all must be specifically brought to the taking the line on board or releasing the be at their mooring stations in good attention of the pilot. tug can easily lead to personal injury. time and have the heaving lines ready - Pushing point strength, if known. If at the correct/required position. The no pushing points are indicated on the The officer in charge must always be master should discuss the ETA at the hull, but the ship has a reinforced belt in visual contact with the tug during rendezvous point and ensure that he all around, it is important to convey this securing up, so he can exchange hand musters the crew on time, allowing for fact to the tug master. signals with the tug crew, which is the distances to the mooring stations to usually better than trying to handle a be covered in time, without the need to What the crew should know walkie-talkie VHF in windy conditions. run. If the operation is to take place at The officer in charge must ensure There are ships in which the bulwarks night, the crew should have ample time that the mooring party knows which are so high that the tug crew can not to wake up and prepare for the period bollard(s) will be used for the tug(s), see anybody on the (forecastle) deck out there, possibly in adverse weather how the messenger line will be led of the vessel, or anything that goes on conditions. towards the warping drum and how the there. In such conditions, it is absolutely tow wire will be stopped off in order essential to have one person in a Information required to be passed to allow the strain to be taken off the specific location for signalling visually from pilot to master messenger line and the soft eye to be to the tug. The crew should always Due to the different types and sizes of put over the bollard. They should also signal to the tug when the tow wire is tugs, there are many different types of be aware of the releasing procedure. secured and the tug can safely start harbour towage manoeuvres, so the applying power. Status of the tow master should find out the following In order to avoid disruption, if there wire should also be confirmed to the details from the pilot in order to pass has been a crew change, the new crew master (secured, in the water, propeller them on to his crew: should familiarise themselves with the cleared). - ship’s lines or tug line mooring equipment before taking their - type of tow wire (steel, synthetic, size, stations for the first time. Only a suitably weighted heaving indication of their size) line should be used. Monkey’s fists - method of getting the tow wire on Regular meetings should be held should not have additional weight,

but a heaving line should not be sharp bend in the tow wire under load, be recovered from the water before thrown without a monkey’s fist. The which might cause it to snap. The tow the tug can make a new approach latter may be blown away and may wire should never be stopped by simply (to secure up with its spare towing be impossible to get across to the putting it on deck and standing on it; wire). When making speed through tug. The crew should have a second the wire is too heavy and you may be the water, this will be a difficult job for heaving line ready to throw in case the thrown off your feet or dragged along. the mooring party, because once the first one should end up in the water. Very serious injuries will result in most messenger line is entirely on board The ship’s crew should always warn the cases. The crew should also beware of or on the warping drum, it will be tug crew before sending the heaving “snaking” messenger lines when they much more difficult, probably even line across. The crew should never are released and run out. They could impossible, to wind the remaining use a thick messenger line to throw to seriously hurt someone upon impact. towing wire in on the warping drum. In the tug, instead of a normal heaving this case, a stopper must be used, and line: the weight of the line coming Normally, the bow tug will have no a (second) messenger line tied to the down may injure the tug crew; it is also problems when the tow wire is released towing wire further down the line, and more difficult to tie two messenger in one go; the tug will be moving away then winding the wire on board can lines together (a rope messenger from the vessel and there will be little be resumed. This process may have to line will typically be a three strand risk of the tow wire ending up in the be repeated a considerable number polypropylene rope of 24mm diameter). tug’s propellers. However, the crew of times. It will probably be necessary, should always try to obtain confirmation if conditions allow, for the vessel to A tow wire should never be grabbed from the tug of how they want this reduce speed. This is a dangerous from below, but always from above.1 If done. The stern tow wire must always operation and great care must be taken the wire has to be released quickly in be released in a controlled way (slacked when carrying it out. an emergency, it is always easier to just away by means of the messenger line, release your grip on the wire and let in co-ordination with the tug crew). Footnotes gravity do the work than to pull your When you let it go in one motion, it 1 Towing wires typically have the fingers away from underneath the wire. will most probably end up in the tug’s following dimensions: for 45 ton bollard propellers. pull: 42mm diameter; for 65 ton bollard The messenger line must never be pull: 48mm diameter; for 80 ton bollard disconnected from the tow wire. As Tug emergency “let go” pull: 54mm diameter. an alternative, after securing the procedures wire over the bitt, the shackle can be Tugs working on a towing winch have a disconnected from the soft eye of the “let go” system. The ship’s crew does tow wire and reconnected immediately, not have to do anything to disconnect over the wire behind the soft eye, as the wire; that will be done by the tug a “running” shackle. This provides a master. He will set his winch drum free means to give sufficient power to the and let the wire run out, until it breaks tow wire to create enough slack so that from its securing bolt on the winch the soft eye can be lifted easily from the drum, while he manoeuvres his tug to bollard. If this is not done, the shackle safety. connecting the messenger line to the tow wire should not be allowed to However, this leaves the ship’s crew with become jammed between the bollard a problem: the vessel will be trailing and the tow wire. This would cause a up to 140m of steel wire, which has to

Gard News 200, November 2010/ ECDIS - Charting the January 2011 future of navigation

An Electronic Chart Display and not fitted with ECDIS will be required is designed to meet the requirements Information System displays a ship’s to retrofit the equipment “at the of marine navigation. An ENC meets position on electronic nautical charts first survey”, in accordance with the the standards set by the International in real time with very little effort on the applicable schedule above. Although Hydrographic Organization (IHO) and part of the navigator, and is generally the “first survey” may not coincide with uses a data format defined by IHO, hailed to be an invention set to dry-docking, owners should be aware known as S-57. revolutionise and vastly improve the that substantial work could be involved safety of navigation. in retrofitting this equipment, which Although ENCs are available for most could take the ship out of service. IMO frequently used routes and ports, it Amendments to the International has recommended that consideration may be some time before ENCs cover Convention for Safety of Life at Sea should therefore be given to carrying all navigational areas, especially more (SOLAS) Chapter V, Regulation 19 (V/19) out the necessary modifications remote parts of the world. If ENCs are make the carriage of an Electronic in dry dock before the mandatory not available for a certain area, ECDIS Chart Display and Information System implementation date. The agreement may be operated in Raster Chart (ECDIS) mandatory for ships flying of the ship’s flag administration would Display System (RCDS) mode. The the flag of contracting states.1 The be required to postpone retrofitting RCDS mode uses Raster Navigation amendment will come into force on 1st beyond this date. Charts (RNCs), which are digital copies January 2011. of paper charts and are issued officially. Existing ships that will be permanently The use of RNCs requires the approval The following ships must be fitted taken out of service within two years of of the flag state, and the vessel is also with ECDIS if engaged in international the applicable implementation date required to carry an approved portfolio of voyages: may be exempt from its application. charts (APC), for use together with RNCs. - passenger ships of 500 GT or upwards constructed on or after 1st July 2012; The mandatory carriage of ECDIS Regular updates are available for ENCs - tankers of 3,000 GT or upwards already applies to high-speed craft and RNCs. This information is normally constructed on or after 1st July 2012; built after 2008, with the requirement available in digital format, but manual - cargo ships, other than tankers, of applying from 2010 to high-speed craft updating is also possible. Manual 10,000 GT or upwards constructed on built before 2008. updates would normally be emergency or after 1st July 2013; updates which may be provided by way - cargo ships, other than tankers, of Chart carriage requirements of warnings using systems like Navtex 3,000 GT or upwards but less than From 1st January 2011 carriage of or Marine Notices. Remote updating 10,000 GT constructed on or after 1st ECDIS will be accepted as compliance may also be a possibility. It is of extreme July 2014; with the carriage of nautical charts importance that the performance of - passenger ships of 500 GT or upwards requirement in SOLAS V/19, paragraph the ECDIS is not compromised during constructed before 1st July 2012 must 2.1.4, as long as the ECDIS meets the installation of updates. be fitted not later than the first survey latest IMO performance standards2 on or after 1st July 2014; and the ship has in place a back-up If an ECDIS uses unofficial charts, - tankers of 3000 GT or upwards system as required by IMO and the it no longer complies with SOLAS constructed before 1st July 2012 must flag state. An electronic chart display requirements, and enjoys the same be fitted not later than the first survey system that does not meet IMO ECDIS status as an ECS. ECDIS will provide a on or after 1st July 2015; requirements is called an ECS, and continuous warning if the chart in use - cargo ships, other than tankers, of does not fulfil the SOLAS chart carriage has not been issued officially. 50,000 GT or upwards constructed requirement. before 1st July 2013 must be fitted not Limitations later than the first survey on or after 1st In order to comply with chart carriage In addition to alarms and alerts July 2016; requirements ECDIS can only use generated by ECDIS to indicate - cargo ships, other than tankers, of SOLAS-approved charts (official charts).3 system malfunctions, ECDIS provides 20,000 GT or upwards but less than To meet SOLAS requirements the chart automatic route checking in the 50,000 GT constructed before 1st July must be issued by or on the authority planning stage and automatic alarms 2013 must be fitted not later than the of a government, a hydrographic and alerts to respond to set parameters first survey on or after 1st July 2017; office authorised by a contracting during the route planning and - cargo ships, other than tankers, of state or another relevant institution so monitoring stages. Irrespective of the 10,000 GT or upwards but less than authorised. chart on display, ECDIS will generate 20,000 GT constructed before 1st July alerts with reference to the largest scale 2013 must be fitted not later than the Electronic Navigation Chart (ENC) is available of the relevant chart. However, first survey on or after 1st July 2018. the database used with ECDIS. ENCs as the ECDIS automatic alarm function are vector charts, issued officially is lost when it is operated in the As can be seen from the above, ECDIS by or on the authority of a state, RCDS mode, it is recommended that will become mandatory for certain authorised hydrographic office or other a corresponding paper chart is used new ships on delivery. Existing ships relevant government institution and for ensuring that the best situational

© Gard AS, July 2014 15 awareness is achieved, as the ECDIS errors or discrepancies which would Read more about ECDIS screen size restricts the size of the chart have been noticed if watch-keeping More detailed information is available display. guidelines and bridge management from the IMO, IHO and BIMCO procedures were correctly adhered to. websites and from various books ECDIS is an aid to navigation that is Such lapses have often led to accidents published on the topic, such as ECDIS liable to malfunction or power loss. that should have been avoided. The and Positioning by Dr Andy Norris, As such, it is required that a vessel human should be in control at all times. published by the Nautical Institute. should have an approved back-up for ECDIS that meets IMO and flag state Training Footnotes requirements. The two most common ECDIS is a very useful navigation tool, 1 As set out in regulation V/19, back-up systems are expected to be but does not replace the navigator. Paragraph 2.10. either an approved portfolio of paper ECDIS is designed to make navigation 2 In the EU, ECDIS compliance with the charts or an additional ECDIS. If ECDIS safer and to reduce the workload on latest IMO performance standards is is used as a back-up, the back-up navigators by replacing paper charts denoted by a label on the equipment should be connected to an electrical with an electronic system capable of comprising a wheel. In addition, the source independent of the primary useful automatic functions. However, label will denote the International ECDIS and should have independent the efficiency and usefulness of the Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) GPS input. Like the primary ECDIS, it is equipment is defined by the operating standard to which the equipment a requirement that the back-up system skill of the navigator, his understanding is approved. IEC is an independent contains up to date information. The of the information displayed, his approval required by flag states; the back-up should be so arranged that in appreciation and management of any standard for ECDIS is IEC 61174. case of ECDIS failure the transition to shortcomings of the equipment and 3 As defined by SOLAS V Regulation navigation using it should be as smooth his ability to make optimum use of the 2.2. as possible and should not in any way information in order to ensure safe 4 Report No: 2007-0304, rev. 01. compromise the safety of navigation. navigation. This can only be achieved by proper training. Although ECDIS is a sophisticated piece of equipment, and may have ISM and STCW make it incumbent on the facility to display and use data the owner/operator of the vessel to from various other equipment, ensure that their navigating officers including overlay of information such are adequately trained to ensure as radar targets and information, AIS safe operation of their ships. There information, etc., its primary function is are many sources of ECDIS training, to facilitate route planning and route such as maritime colleges, specialist monitoring to ensure that a vessel gets flag state-approved training centres, safely to her destination. Even though courses run by the manufacturers of the additional information available may the equipment, etc. As functionality be useful to navigation, it may clutter and operational controls of equipment the display or result in information may vary considerably depending on overload that may serve to distract the the make and model of the ECDIS, navigator or lull the navigator into a training should be not only generic but false sense of security. Non-chart data also specific to the equipment to be should be used judiciously, and the used, and of a structure that recognises operator should be aware of how to the complexity of the equipment. It is activate the function that will instantly quite normal for port state inspectors disable all non-chart data. to check that the ship’s personnel are adequately trained to perform their As an example, ECDIS is not a duties; navigating officers using ECDIS replacement for radar, GPS or other will need to provide the inspector with navigational systems. The radar should satisfactory evidence of such training. continue to be used for anti-collision. Certificate of successful completion Cross-checks should regularly be of the ECDIS course should be carried out to verify the integrity of government-approved. ECDIS, such as, but not restricted to, verification by visual references The above amendments to SOLAS and in poor visibility by radar. Most have been introduced on the back importantly, lookout by sight and of results of studies carried out by hearing should be maintained as various organisations. A DNV technical required by the “Collision Avoidance report4 indicated that the use of ECDIS Regulations”. If these simple important may reduce grounding frequency by rules are not followed, the navigator 11 per cent to 38 per cent. This was could quite easily lose situational based on the actual current and near- awareness and fail to notice any future ENC coverage at the time the deviations that may result in dire report was issued. One would hope consequences. Over-reliance on that with continuing improvement electronic systems is quite common. in ENC coverage a high reduction It is easy to be lulled into a sense of in groundings will be seen. One complacency, especially when there would also hope that with proper has been no cause for concern over training the human-machine interface extended periods. Such complacency would operate at levels high enough leads to the navigator being out of the to achieve results far better than loop to the extent that he fails to notice predicted.

Earlier this year we addressed the for up to two years, for contravening Marine Department appears to prefer problems of anchoring in congested the ordinance. to deal with a local registered shipping areas off Singapore.1 In this circular we agent rather than with a P&I Club address the problems encountered The Marine Department of Malaysia representative, and will only accept a when anchoring within Malaysian waters has recently amended the Merchant Letter of Undertaking from shipping off Singapore. So far, three vessels Shipping Ordinance to also include agents while waiting for security covered by Gard have been arrested vessels engaged in activities such as: guarantees to be issued by a bank, and fined for not having notified a. Laying up which may take up to five working days. Malaysian authorities of their arrival and b. Welding and other hot works anchoring outside the outer port limits c. Anchoring in non-anchorage areas Recommendations of Tanjun Pelepas and Johor ports and d. Any form of underwater operations Fines for non-payment of harbour dues for non-payment of light dues. etc. are not covered by Gard Rule 47 The Marine Department of Malaysia and are therefore outside the P&I cover. It is well known that there are no advises4 that notification to the Director Our advice to Members and clients “international waters” outside of Marine can be made at the nearest entering Malaysian Territorial Waters Singapore waters; ships are either port office during normal working is to arrange for notification of arrival in Singapore, Malaysia or Indonesia. hours. As for the payment of Light and the payment of dues through a When anchoring off Malaysia, it should Dues, this is regulated by Act 250, Malaysian shipping agent. be borne in mind that Malaysian Federation Light Dues Act 1953,5 which territorial waters extend 12 nautical states that “every ship which in the Footnotes miles from the baseline, if not limited by course of a voyage enters any port or 1 Gard Loss Prevention Circular No. other State boundaries. place within Peninsular Malaysia, other 11-09: Dangerous anchoring in the than ships exempted, shall pay light Singapore area. Amendments to The Merchant dues as prescribed.”6 2 MDC Legal Advisers, “The Merchant Shipping Ordinance 1952 Shipping Ordinance 1952”, MDC Section 491B of the Malaysian Merchant Risk of fines Publishers Printers, 1996. Shipping Ordinance 19522 stipulates It should be noted that once vessels 3 MYR = Malaysian Ringgit. which ships must notify the Director of have been arrested for non-payment of 4 Marine Department Malaysia, Marine of activities within Malaysian light dues, it can be rather expensive Malaysian Shipping Notice MSN waters. The Director may impose terms to obtain their release. A rate of 15/2009, dated 13 Oct 2009. and conditions including fees on the Registered Net Tonnage x MYR 0.20 5 Laws of Malaysia, Act 250, Federation activities permitted. The owner, master X 10 has been levied as a penalty. Light Dues Act 1953, reprint 2006. or agent of the ship may be found Authorities may request a bond of MYR 6 Additional information can be found guilty of an offence, as well as risking a 50,000 issued by a local registered at Marine Department Malaysia www. fine of MYR 100,0003 or imprisonment bank, prior to releasing the vessel. The marine.gov.my/

Loss Prevention Circular Dangerous anchoring in No. 11-09 the Singapore area

The Maritime and Port Authorities of Singapore (MPA) recently called a meeting with representatives of the P&I Clubs to discuss particular problems of dangerous anchoring in the Singapore area.

Vessels not anchoring within Singapore port limits are, for commercial reasons, opting to anchor in outer port limit areas (OPL). The East and West OPL areas used for anchoring are, however, rather narrow spaces situated between the port limits and the traffic separation scheme (TSS) through the Singapore Strait. These areas are becoming very congested, being popular with owners for the purposes of bunkering, taking supplies, change of crew, repairs or just waiting for cargo operations. Due to the congestion, some anchored vessels are straying into the TSS, and are thus violating the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea (COLREG). The MPA states that vessels in breach of COLREG Rule 10 (g) by anchoring in the TSS are being reported cables and pipelines, the owners of and pipelines, or by dragging anchors to their respective flag administrations. the cables/pipelines are informed of across such equipment are very costly It appears from the vessels having been the vessel’s particulars, to enable them to the Club. reported, that Singapore authorities to make a claim against the vessel, also seem to report vessels anchored in should any damage occur. OPL is a There have been a number of contact Precautionary Areas for being in breach “loose” term, but the Eastern OPL damages between ships at anchor of COLREG. is considered bound to the north by in OPL areas during recent months, Johore Port limits and to the south by mostly in the East area. For anchoring When it comes to bunkering at the westbound TSS. It should be noted in congested areas, full alertness is Singapore, and the tendency to bunker that this 5 mile long area is very narrow required and anchoring at night should in OPL areas, it should be noted that and there are several submarine cables be avoided if possible. In locations such the risks factors concerning both running the length of it. as the congested Singapore OPLs, wind bunker quality and quantity have been and tidal currents must be considered; considered higher in OPL areas than We have also been advised that the an anchor watch should be kept at all from suppliers operating within the MPA is in discussion with Malaysian times and the engine at the ready. For much more regulated port limits. There and Indonesian port authorities, in the time being, when anchoring off are also two bunker anchorages in the order to reach an agreement for vessels Singapore, the key message is extreme western sector of the Singapore Port, anchoring in the TSS, or damaging caution. located conveniently close to the TSS, subsea cables and pipelines, to where vessels of 20,000 GT and above, be penalised by the State having For further information on anchoring in staying less than 24 hours, may take jurisdiction over the area. general please see the following Gard bunkers at reduced port dues. Vessels publications other than gas tankers and chemical Gard News 193 What if... ?’ - Planning tankers, with a draft of 11.5 meters The problem of congestion of vessels for the unexpected before an or less, may also be exempted from off Singapore is not easy to solve, emergency develops compulsory pilotage at these bunkering but there is always the possibility of Gard News 177 Anchoring - Getting stations. seeking designated anchorages inside into a safe haven or into a potential Singapore port limits. Vessels should disaster? The MPA has also pointed to several not anchor in the TSS or Precautionary Gard Loss Prevention Circular No. instances of damage to subsea cables Areas, and care should be taken not 14-08: Anchoring and deteriorating by incorrect anchoring and has alerted to anchor too close to subsea cables weather conditions the P&I Clubs to this problem. When a and pipelines. Claims for damage Gard Guidance to Masters, section vessel is anchoring too close to charted caused by anchoring in way of cables 2.14.3 Anchoring.

Loss Prevention Circular Damage to fixed objects No. 6-09 when manoeuvring in confined waters

Gard has recently seen a noticeable the vessel’s draft, trim and windage Unfortunately, during these periods of increase in cases involving significant characteristics must also be taken into increased risk, additional precautions contact damage to fixed objects by consideration when discussing the appear not to have been taken. vessels manoeuvring in confined vessel’s manoeuvrability. Pre-sailing and pre-arrival checks on waters, mostly within port. Fixed objects manoeuvring systems are important, include berths, docks, locks and shore 3. No agreed manoeuvring plan especially after a long ocean passage side equipment such as cranes. The Just how the vessel will manoeuvre or stationary period. Less obvious contact damage has resulted in some when in close proximity to fixed objects factors involve squat and/or interaction. very large claims for the repair and/or is often not planned and/or agreed Although a loss of manoeuvring loss of use of such objects. Outlined in advance within the bridge team capability will inevitably make contact below are five of the most common and/or with the pilot.4 This not only avoidance more difficult, exercises factors, in Gard’s experience in cases concerns the location that the vessel and drills can be used to test back-up involving contact damage to fixed is proceeding to/from, but also other systems, including use of the ship’s objects in confined waters.1 These fixed objects which the vessel will anchors. Having something in reserve incidents also risk harming people and pass within critical close proximity. is important, but being able to put the environment (e.g. pollution from Often, insufficient time is invested in that reserve to effective use is equally breached oil tanks), and the ship itself advance to consider how the vessel important. is often left with expensive repairs and can be expected to behave, given its loss of trading time. manoeuvring characteristics and the Recommendation prevailing conditions. The closest points It is better to abort the manoeuvre 1. Prevailing and forecast of approach are often not calculated as and make a second attempt than to conditions not properly assessed are critical bearings, transits and ranges fail on the first. During drills, exercises The cumulative effect of wind, sea, to assist in determining the limits of the and tests of equipment prior to arrival, current and tidal conditions on the ship safe manoeuvring parameters. the Master should ensure that the may not have been fully appreciated. crew is able to respond at any time As a result of the above factors the 4. Poorly executed manoeuvre to an emergency situation related vessel can experience difficulties in Even the best ship handlers to manoeuvring. Tasks should be manoeuvring in a controlled fashion occasionally get it wrong, although it properly defined and assigned to and within safe parameters. Insufficient is perhaps surprising how very wrong qualified personnel, and the Master allowance has been made for the forces in some cases. Excessive speed is a should ensure that the company acting on the ship. These can easily turn common factor as is pilot error and procedures are fully understood by out to be greater than expected and the bridge team can be reluctant to everybody involved. Effective and beyond the capabilities of the ship and, intervene when the pilot is clearly clear communication is important. due to the unforeseen effects of the making mistakes. The Master should closely monitor the prevailing and/or forecast conditions, manoeuvres and should not hesitate to insufficient tugs would have been 5 Communication with tugs, terminals comment, give advice, or even abort employed to handle the vessel. There and mooring crews leading to an approach if he is uncomfortable with are instances where manoeuvrings in misunderstandings has also been the situation. confined waters should be deferred a contributory factor. Even where a until conditions have improved. This manoeuvring plan is agreed, prevailing also includes cases of reduced visibility. circumstances can require the plan to be changed and there may be little 2. Unfamiliarity with the ship’s time to react to new situations. In manoeuvrability particular, changes in wind conditions Meeting between the MPA and the A pilot will know the local waters best, and the movements of other vessels P&I Clubs and their representatives in however, the master is more familiar often create problems. In a number with his vessel’s manoeuvrability. Due of cases it appears that aborting the Singapore, 26th June 2009. 1 See also “Bumps and scrapes can be costly!” to the rotation of crew, familiarity with manoeuvre to try again has not been from Gard News 183. the ship’s own manoeuvring systems considered or has been left too late. 2 Some shipowners have sought to standardise can be lacking, and, as technology equipment across vessels in their fleet and to and computerisation is becoming 5. Loss of manoeuvring capability always assign senior officers to the same class ever more prevalent, training may be The loss of engines, propulsion, of vessel. 3 See “Master/pilot exchange of information” needed to ensure that crew members steerage, or thrusters is, perhaps from Gard News 154. are familiar with the vessel’s systems.2 surprisingly, a less common factor 4 See Guidance to Masters 2.13.4 Navigation It is important to include information than those mentioned above. There in confined waters – Bridge Resource as to the vessel’s manoeuvrability in are instances where such a loss has Management. the master/pilot information exchange occurred immediately before/after 5 See also Loss Prevention Circular no. 04- 00: Pilot on the bridge - Role, authority and before the commencement of the manoeuvring systems have been, or responsibility. pilotage.3 The effect of changes in are due to be, repaired or overhauled.

Gard News 193, “What if...?” – Planning for February/April 2009 the unexpected before an emergency develops

We plan very well for situations which chose to remain at the anchorage of the two pilots was in his final phase we know will cause us problems. The despite it not being a recommended of training for the ship type/berth and situations which we tend not to plan anchorage in the circumstances and he had the control of the vessel. It was for very well, and which therefore despite deteriorating (but forecast) night and the shore Doppler readout catch us by surprise, are those where weather conditions, which increased the was not working. The approach speeds, the potential for harm has not been potential risk of windlass failure. Such angles and bow/stern distances were foreseen or is considered too remote. failure did indeed occur due to shock therefore communicated to the pilot loading and the crew were unable to by VHF (one can imagine the difficulty). Things could have been different for slip the anchor due to tension on the The vessel was not brought under over 1,500 people who lost their lives in bitter end. Had the master considered control before she made her final that incident if the master and officers the potential problems (i.e., the “what approach to berth and investigation of the TITANIC had asked themselves ifs…?”), he would probably have left suggests that she exceeded the (amongst other things): “what if the ice the anchorage and rode out the storm. maximum angle (three degrees) and has progressed further south so as to Another recent case was the subject speed (21 ft/minute) of approach, affect our intended course?”. of an investigation by the Australian making contact at about six degrees authorities, who found that the master and a speed of 60 feet/minute (which In today’s busy world, especially on did not appropriately ballast the interestingly increases the berthing ships, there is little time to stop and vessel and did not weigh anchor until force by a factor of nine). Insurers often think about potential problems, to ask it dragged in very bad (but forecast) do not get to hear about cases where “what if…?”. There are response plans weather. The investigation report went the master intervened and stopped the and checklists available for emergency on to find the master had incorrectly pilot, aborted the approach and started situations which have the clear potential assumed that the port authority would again. Of course, it is a difficult situation to cause the crew and ship harm – for instruct ships to put out to sea when for masters, but there is a need to be example, steering gear failure and fire. conditions were bad – he probably did decisive, especially since it is he and the However, many serious incidents start not ask himself “what if they do not, owners who are most likely to bear the life when there is no emergency as and what if my anchor does not hold?”. brunt of the consequences of a pilot such, and develop into emergencies error. It should be kept in mind that the because the potential for harm has not The obvious common factor in these master is in command of the vessel’s been foreseen or has been considered two incidents is that both vessels were navigation at all times with only one too remote. Instead of asking ourselves at anchor. In contrast to cases where exception: when transiting through the “what if…?” we tend to persuade vessels have been caught out by bad Panama Canal. ourselves that something bad will not weather when alongside a berth and happen. In the wider context, asking when the ship’s crew will often be very A United States Coast Guard “what if…?” is very much a part of busy, these two cases suggest that investigation report into the grounding situational awareness. The development potentially dangerous scenarios are of a bulk carrier serves as a good of bridge resource management has simply being overlooked, even during example of the need to be strong when done much to address deficiencies the more relaxed (perhaps too relaxed) a pilot has the control of the vessel. The in situational awareness, by stressing periods when at anchor. report concluded that the pilot, who the importance of a team approach. failed to give a helm order at a turn in However, if the members of a team are What if…? – Pilot error a channel, asserted his responsibility too preoccupied with tasks at hand, or Pilot error is probably not the first on the bridge by refusing to honour other human factors (such as fatigue) thought to come to mind when a the master’s request to sign the pilot are at play, there will be a much greater pilot walks onto the bridge. Perhaps it exchange card. The report went on chance of potential emergencies (or should be – they are not expected to to say that the pilot’s authoritative “what ifs…?”) not being considered at make mistakes, but they do. A recent presence on the bridge created an all. five-year study of claims in excess atmosphere wherein the mate did of USD 100,000 recorded by each of not feel he could “speak up” or What if…? – The weather the Clubs in the International Group “challenge” the decision of the pilot. There is a lot of current debate about of P&I Clubs revealed that some 262 climate change and storms which are claims were caused by pilot error, What if …? – Risk of collision more severe or sudden than forecast. with an average cost per incident of Asking “what if…?” where there is a Claims experience, however, suggests USD 850,000.1 Several cases from risk of collision should be natural for that in many cases the crew simply Gard’s claim files have been previously the bridge watch-keeper. Unfortunately, underestimates the effects of weather featured in Gard News.2 In a recent on the ship. A case mentioned in a case, the shipowners’ dock damage 1 See article “Pilot error survey” in Gard News recent UK investigation report serves as liability resulted in a payout of several issue No.186. a useful example. A tanker was in ballast million dollars. The case involved the 2 See article “Pilot on the bridge – Role, (riding high) and dragged its anchor berthing of a partly laden VLCC. The authority and responsibility” in Gard News issue across a gas pipeline in bad weather. vessel had three tugs, the tide was No.160. The report concluded that the master slack and the wind light. However, one 3 “Rubicon – The point of no return”.

© Gard AS, July 2014 20 the growing number of navigational accidents suggests that this is not the case. In a recent incident it was fortunate that both crews escaped unharmed and that there was minimal pollution. However, one of the vessels was badly damaged and foundered, requiring an expensive salvage operation of ship and cargo. The incident is described in Image 1, below.

In Image 1 the two vessels are seen approaching each other in a routing scheme. Vessel A is heading south and vessel B is heading north-east. Both are roughly following the route as depicted by purple wavy lines, which meet south- east of a buoy marking the westerly edge of the route. The intention of vessel A was to alter to starboard at the buoy to follow route X as opposed involve damage to engines, often close to land (she was 46 nautical miles to route Y. Unfortunately, vessel B was on board new ships, indicating that from the closest point of land – an not sure which route vessel A intended machinery systems are not becoming island). The superintendent agreed to follow. As the vessels closed, vessel more reliable. Any vessel with an with the proposed action to repair the A altered course to starboard as engine problem, especially a new and engine, but it soon became apparent intended and very shortly after that expensive one close to the shore, that external assistance would be vessel B altered course to port. The generates a certain level of concern. necessary. The first tug arrived some incident resulted in insurance claims Even vessels that at first find themselves 30 hours after the engine had failed, totalling in excess of USD 20 million and far off land in no immediate danger by which time engine repairs had been perhaps it could have been avoided can end up perilously close when stopped due to the danger posed had the bridge team on vessel B asked repairs do not progress as expected. to the crew by the extremely rough themselves “what if vessel A intends to In some cases repairs carried out by weather. A second tug arrived ten alter to starboard to route X rather than crew are unsuccessful and external hours later, but never connected a carrying straight on to follow route Y?” assistance is called in to save the day. line, and after a further three hours the and the bridge team on vessel A asked In others assistance is not called for first tug’s line had parted. The weather themselves “what if my intentions (in or does not arrive in time and vessels prevented other attempts to connect terms of which route I intend to take) find themselves in trouble. A classic tow lines and, despite the use of the are unclear?”. The investigation into the example of the latter was featured in vessel’s anchor as she approached incident concluded that neither vessel an article in Gard News issue No. 1813 shallower water, she eventually made timely contact with the other to in a case where the chief engineer’s grounded some 53 hours after the arrange for a safe passage. optimism as to when repairs would engine had initially failed. be successfully completed was shared The above collision was one in which by the master for too long. When the It is perhaps questionable whether, both vessels had plenty of time to react, master finally sought external assistance in this case, a state of emergency but that may not always be the case. there were no vessels or tugs available existed at the time the engine failed, In another collision case investigated in the area that could possibly reach the particularly given the remote location by the Danish authorities, the vessels vessel in time. The vessel grounded and and bad weather. Either way, asking were passing on reciprocal courses in a became a total loss, luckily without loss “what if …?” at that moment might one mile wide deep water route. One of life. have bought some extra time. of the vessels suffered a steering failure at the moment of passing and even the A multitude of “what if …?” questions Planning for the unexpected – double hull of the other vessel, a tanker, arise and ought to be considered Problems could not prevent a large spill of fuel in such cases, quite apart from the How do you plan for something you do oil from one of her cargo tanks. What obvious one as to when external not foresee happening? Often there is could the tanker have possibly done? assistance can reach the ship. For no checklist or response plan specific to The investigation report concluded that example, what if the engine fault has each exact situation and it is impractical a contributing factor was the decision been wrongly diagnosed, what if the to produce checklists and plans for of both vessels to use the route, when wrong spare part is on board, what every eventuality, every “what if …?”. there was a note on chart saying that if someone gets injured during the Indeed, checklists can be dangerous the route should only be used by ships repair? because they may omit to refer to which, because of their draft, are unable crucial considerations specific to the to safely navigate outside. By using the A very tragic case of another vessel circumstances. Perhaps at the end of route, the closest point of approach grounding after unsuccessful repairs every checklist the question “have you (CPA) between the vessels was was the subject of an investigation by considered other eventualities?” should considerably less than if they had used the US authorities. The vessel found be added. the recommended direction of traffic itself in extremely bad weather in a very flow and the available time for evasive remote part of the world and several Another problem is that sometimes action considerably reduced. crew members died during evacuation there may be very little time to take from the vessel. Soon after the engine action, and that is particularly relevant What if …? – Repairs at sea failure the ship’s superintendent was to pilot error. However, before the If recent media reports are to be called by the master and told that the pilot embarks, the plan can simply believed, many incidents today vessel was in no immediate danger or be to identify the critical aspects of

© Gard AS, July 2014 21 the pilotage where the bridge team not consider “what if…?” scenarios and ship vital extra time. Even if your own will have to be particularly alert. The will not react properly in a developing ship has what is considered to be the plan can also involve reminding the situation. Training, exercises and drills best crew, the much debated skills’ whole bridge team that pilots can are good opportunities to test crew shortage and ever-expanding world make mistakes and that it is therefore reaction to scenarios that have the fleet raises questions about watch- important for the team to be mentally potential to develop into an emergency. keepers on other vessels, pilots and alert and prepared to speak up if there It is also possible to encourage people whether they will behave as expected. is any concern over the pilot’s orders. to think in terms of “what if …?”. One As for the weather, it can always do Perhaps a final consideration to a way to do that is to give positive praise the unexpected and perhaps climate pre-pilotage plan would be whether for challenging attitudes and prudent change will make forecasting even less or not to proceed with the pilotage. If, over-reaction. So if a junior officer reliable. for example, the weather conditions challenges a senior officer on his choice become marginal or the master is not of course he should be praised, even Two small words, “what if …?”, are fully satisfied with the pilot’s plan (or if the junior officer’s concern turns out worth keeping in mind. even his competence) he may deem it to be unfounded. The junior officer prudent to hold back and to re-assess should not be chastised. If the master’s the situation. decision to take an extra tug is not wholly unreasonable, his action can be Many situations, such as those supported. mentioned in the above cases, occur on ships every day and although each At the moment a situation does situation will be different, time will often arise, which calls for a plan, it will be permit a plan to be developed to deal important to bring together minds with a situation from the moment it to discuss “what if…?” scenarios. In becomes real. many of the cases mentioned above, the deck officers could have had a Planning for the unexpected – quick brainstorming session before Barriers they found themselves in a developing It is important to recognise potential situation which required them to react barriers to planning for the unexpected without a plan. In cases involving and, perhaps more importantly, to engine failure, the session would carrying out plans. Amongst many that obviously involve the engineers and the could be mentioned, the following value of shore staff involvement should examples are given: not be underestimated, since they – Language and cultural differences – are likely to be less distracted by the These can generate reluctance within situation itself. An agenda for a “what the bridge team to speak up if there if…?” brainstorming session might is concern in a particular situation. include the following: The pilotage case involving the bulker – situation description grounding mentioned above is a good – what are the main dangers/risks to the example. crew/vessel? – Shore staff support – Even if only – what could change that would perceived, a suspicion may exist on increase/ alter the danger/risk? the vessel that the shore staff will not – what are the worse case scenarios? support a decision taken on the vessel, – what is the plan? for example not to proceed with a – what is the back-up plan? pilotage. – what if …? – Customer satisfaction – The need to avoid upsetting a charterer by taking a In a collision situation, a brainstorming longer route. session is less likely to be practical, but – The need for speed – To quote a the officer of the watch should not be recent UK investigation report on afraid to discuss potential problems a major casualty, “speed and quick with the lookout, e.g., “do you think turnarounds appear to have become that vessel clearly understands our the focus of the industry at the expense intentions?”. of the safe operation of its vessels.” – The desire to save money – For a The investigation of near misses is vessel without her engines far off land worth a mention. These can be vital in one can appreciate the temptation terms of detecting whether any barriers to attempt repairs before calling exist and may provide an opportunity in potentially expensive external to do something about them before assistance. a near miss becomes an emergency which is out of control. Planning for the unexpected– Solutions Conclusion Perhaps the most important solution is Asking “what if …?” in a developing mental preparation. If crew members situation on board a ship and planning have their minds preoccupied with accordingly may make the difference other things, or have persuaded as to whether or not that situation themselves that something bad will not develops into an emergency. At the happen, then chances are that they will very least, it may buy the crew and

Gard News 186, Pilot error survey May/July 2007

International Group of P&I Clubs floating objects was USD 400,000. The each pollution incident involving pilot reports on pilot error-related report recommends better training or error the average cost was USD 1.8 claims briefing of bridge team management million. The report recommends better The Pilotage Sub-committee of the to operate with the pilot on board, training or briefing of the bridge team International Group of P&I Clubs (IG) especially in relation to passage management to operate with the pilot has published a report on claims over planning. on board, with emphasis on the master/ USD 100,000 involving pilot error. pilot exchange of information. Information pooled by IG Clubs relating Collisions involving pilot error to 260 such claims has been included in accounted for 24 per cent of claims by Groundings are the most expensive the study, which covers the period from number and 24 per cent by cost. On pilot error claims. They are more than 20th February 1999 to 20th February average there were 14 collision cases four times as expensive as pollution 2004. per year involving pilot error and the claims and almost 20 times more average cost of each case was USD expensive than FFO claims. Important observations 800,000. The report recommends The average number of incidents per bridge teams to keep a proper look-out The IG is currently maintaining a year involving pilot error was 52. The and not to forget that their eyes are still database of pilot error incidents from frequency did not increase from year the most sophisticated aid to do so. 21st February 2004 to the present and to year. The average cost of each claim thereafter. over the five year period was USD Groundings, pollution and general 850,000. The average cost did not average/salvage cases involving pilot The complete report can be increase from year to year either. error each accounted for about three downloaded from the IG website at per cent of the incidents by number. www.igpandi.org under “News and Claims for damage to fixed and floating There were on average two incidents Information”. objects (FFO) involving pilot error in each of these categories every year. accounted for 65 per cent of claims by Groundings accounted for 35 per cent number (37 claims per policy year) and of all incidents by cost. The average 33 per cent by cost. The average cost cost of each grounding involving pilot of each claim for damage to fixed and error was USD 7.85 million and of

Gard News 186, What happens to the May/July 2007 pilot after a casualty?

A glimpse at pilot error from a different One should therefore believe that – the timing of turning was wrong; perspective. pilots involved in casualties do not – other waiting vessels made him over- get any reproach as a consequence of hasty in his operations. When a vessel with a pilot on board their faults. However, some (or perhaps is involved in an accident, the usual most) pilots’ associations have their Due to the above, the pilot was practice is that the pilot leaves the own internal investigations following a suspended from business for 21 days. vessel as soon as possible, often casualty, although very seldom is one He was degraded to a lower rank for being replaced by a new pilot. Hence, made aware of sanctions imposed. three months, including a salary cut examination or questioning is avoided. In a particular recent collision case, of USD 1,000 per month for the same The pilot is “the shipowner’s servant”, Gard received a copy of the relevant period. In addition, he was forced to and faults or errors made by the pilots’ association’s investigation, take navigational simulator training at pilot are generally covered by the which proved that some pilots in fact his own expense. shipowner’s insurance policies. Only in are properly sanctioned. In the case major casualties can one expect that in question, the pilots’ association’s Notwithstanding, the damage to the the pilot will be forced to give evidence investigation concluded that the pilot vessels had to be covered by the and to be cross-examined. In these was responsible for: shipowner’s insurers. cases, the normal procedure is for the – wrong understanding of the distance pilot to demand a written letter of between his vessel and the moored indemnity from the shipowner prior to vessel with which it eventually collided; any hearing. – his approach was too fast;

Gard News 186, Don’t fall asleep on the job - May/July 2007 No let-up in fatigue-related casualties

Fatigue at sea is a problem which needs This is not to say that any or all of these problem remains a serious one. Despite all urgent attention. objectives are, by definition, wrong or the attention and publicity the problem is dangerous. It is, however, undeniable not going away. Indeed, with the growth A serious problem that cutting costs is often the easiest to in world trade and consequent expected There continues to be a sharp and detailed achieve of these three objectives and it increase in the number, size and value of focus on seafarer fatigue. The Centre for is sometimes the case that the greatest ships, it is a major concern that not only are Occupational and Health Psychology at and possibly disproportionate emphasis is fatigue-related casualties going to be with Cardiff University in Wales has recently placed on the cost factor. us for the foreseeable future, but also that (November 2006) published an 87-page they are likely to increase. report into seafarer fatigue.1 The Nautical As mentioned in the 2002 article, it is Institute is concentrating several of its natural for shipowners, operating in a Bridge Watchkeeping Safety Study forthcoming “Alert!” bulletins on this very competitive environment, to wish to In July 2004 the UK’s Marine Accident issue. Other industry and industry-related keep their operating costs to a minimum. Investigation Branch (MAIB), published organisations, notably the International Thus many owners will crew their ships a report entitled “Bridge Watchkeeping Transport Workers’ Federation, have with no more than the minimum number Safety Study”. The report may be found carried out studies into this problem. of people required by the Standards of at www.maib.gov.uk/publications/safety_ Five years ago an article in Gard News2 Training, Certification and Watchkeeping studies.cfm. Gard strongly recommends reported on fatigue-related casualties and Convention (STCW). This is perfectly every shipowner and operator to read this pointed out that all sides of the industry legal and they are quite entitled to do report, especially those operating in the were expressing concern about fatigue in so. Understandably, very few owners will, short sea and container trades. Based on seafarers, especially officers. The article voluntarily, place themselves at what they its own investigations into many casualties said that “there are signs that the fatigue would see as a commercial disadvantage around the UK coastline, the MAIB takes problem is getting worse, not better.” by employing more crew than they are the view that, in certain trades at least, the What – if anything – has changed since legally obligated to do. minimum manning levels and required then and how? hours of rest provided for in STCW are Unfortunately, evidence collected in insufficient to prevent fatigue-related Regrettably, the answer seems to be recent years by many organisations inside casualties continuing to occur. Particular “very little”. If anything, increased and and outside the industry in relation to reference is made to the system of a six- increasing commercial pressure within the fatigue-related casualties suggests that the hours-on/six-hours-off watch practised on shipping industry means that companies and individuals in these companies are continually required to provide the best 1 Copies can be obtained from Gard. Alternatively, further information may be obtained by e-mailing the author at [email protected]. possible service, in the shortest time 2 “Are we tired of hearing about fatigue-related casualties?” in Gard News issue No. 166. available and at the lowest cost possible.

© Gard AS, July 2014 24 many short sea vessels, where the master dual roles. The chief officer was on watch Conclusion and chief officer – the only two deck when he fell asleep. He was alone on the Are all masters and chief officers who take officers on board – each stand two watches bridge, despite the provision within STCW a watch without being properly rested in one 24-hour period. These watches are that “the OOW may be the sole lookout in criminally negligent? No, of course they are in addition to all the other tasks which daylight conditions” (our emphasis). The not, but there may be many who would, these officers have to perform. The MAIB chief officer woke up only when the vessel from their own experience, support the comments that “as ships operating with went aground. conclusion that, particularly on certain just two bridge watchkeepers including trades, they are consistently overworked the master, working in opposite watches, Investigations indicated that the chief and are unable to obtain the hours of rest are likely to have fatigued OOWs, and the officer had become fatigued shortly before stipulated by STCW. In such circumstances, masters of these vessels are frequently the incident during periods of intense work it is difficult to avoid the conclusion unable to discharge all of the duties and had been unable to obtain enough reached by the MAIB that, in certain trades, required of them, the need for more than proper rest before the voyage. When he the requirements of STCW may not be two watchkeepers is obvious”. This view fell asleep, there was nobody on the bridge good enough to prevent more officers is shared by the Nautical Institute, which, to wake him up. The vessel was not fitted falling asleep while on watch. in Bulletin 13 of its “Alert!” magazine, with a “dead man’s alarm”. Nor was she says that “in these cases, the solution is required to be. When one adds in the fact that, as the simple: increase the manning to remove examples show, the OOW is often the the master from the watchkeeping roster For the reasons stated above, it is not only person on the bridge and there is no and consider an alternative watchkeeping known what the final cost of this incident alarm which operates so as to alert either pattern”. The MAIB believes that their will be. However, the master has been the OOW or anyone else to the fact that research “illustrates that the hours of work prosecuted by the UK authorities (the there is nobody navigating the vessel, one and lookout requirements contained in MCA) for breach of one section of the has a recipe for disaster. The examples are STCW 95, along with the principles of safe Merchant Shipping Act 1995 and, having merely the tip of the iceberg. manning, are having insufficient impact in pleaded guilty, he has had to pay a fine their respective areas”. and now has a criminal record in the UK. If owners, insurers and legislators wish to The MCA has indicated that it also intends remedy the problem, an industry-wide The report contains recommendations to bring criminal charges against the approach is needed. It has been shown to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency shipowners. that, where the will exists, agreement (MCA), the agency responsible for can be reached and legislation enacted implementing the UK government’s It is too early to say what the total financial quickly. The MAIB report was published maritime safety policy throughout the cost will be. It is, however, likely to be in July 2004. The MCA appears to have UK, to take the findings of the report to significant. This ignores the human cost to accepted its views and recommendations, the International Maritime Organisation the master and chief officer. and the IMO was looking at the issues of (IMO) with a view to reviewing the seafarer fatigue, work and rest hours and guidelines on safe manning for vessels Example 2 the appropriate levels of safe and minimum operating a “master and mate” system A small (approximately 6,000 GT) container manning. and the requirements of STCW relating feeder vessel ran aground on an island in to a designated (and dedicated) lookout, the Aegean Sea. This vessel had cover for The secretary general of the IMO working as an integral part of the bridge loss of hire with Gard, but her P&I cover suggested that particular attention should team. was with another Club. As in the previous be paid to the levels of safe manning so as example, the chief officer was the OOW to ensure that watches and watchkeeping Gard has seen many cases which mirror the and was alone on the bridge at the material hours are correctly performed and problems identified by the MAIB. A couple time. Due to fatigue, he fell asleep, the observed. The International Shipping of examples will suffice. vessel failed to change course as planned Federation, representing many of the and grounded at full speed. The vessel world’s leading shipowners, reportedly Example 1 sustained serious bottom damage. Oil from called for STCW to be reviewed and This is the “classic” case of a sole officer her bunker tanks was spilt. An LOF salvage brought up to date, taking into account of the watch (OOW) falling asleep while agreement was signed with salvors. The developments in ship operation and on watch. The vessel, a small short-sea vessel was re-floated and repaired. technology since the convention came into general cargo trader, entered with Gard for force. P&I risks, was on a voyage from Iceland to The vessel was out of service for over 94 the UK. While passing between the north days. The bill for the repairs and costs It is therefore disappointing to see reports of Scotland and the Orkney Islands during associated therewith came to around EUR 2 of a recent meeting of the IMO sub- the early hours of the morning, a time at million. The amount awarded to or agreed committee on STCW stating that there which the human body is perhaps most to be payable to the salvors is not yet was apparently “a lot of opposition at that vulnerable to falling asleep, the OOW did known. Nor is the amount paid by the P&I meeting, mainly on financial grounds” exactly that. As a result, the vessel failed Club for the oil pollution or for any other to amending the existing regulations. to change course and went aground on third party liabilities, but it is clear that the According to the reports, certain countries, an island. The vessel sustained substantial cost to owners and their various insurers which one might expect to be at the damage to her bottom. A salvage contract, arising from the chief officer’s fatigue and forefront of safety at sea, have opposed on LOF terms, with SCOPIC incorporated, the lack of anyone (or anything) to alert any tightening of the rules and in fact was signed with a salvage company. The either him or another member of the crew may be seeking changes which could well amount of the salvage award remains to be to the problem was substantial. exacerbate the fatigue problem. established or agreed, as does any cargo claim. In addition, the chief officer was criminally Fatigue at sea is a problem which continues prosecuted by the Greek authorities for to affect shipowners and operators, their The vessel operated with seven crew (one causing oil pollution. He was found guilty customers, the environment, insurers and more than stipulated in her Safe Manning and sentenced to 18 months in prison. The most importantly, the people on board. Certificate). The master and chief officer sentence was appealed and suspended. Gard believes it is a problem which needs operated a “watch-on/watch-off” system. Nevertheless, he too has a criminal record. urgent attention. Whether it receives it Many of the other crew members had remains to be seen.

Gard News 185, Is the pilot a part of the February/April 2007 bridge team? By Captain Erik Blom Master of the M/V BLACK WATCH, Fred. Olsen Cruise Lines

Hopefully the answer to the above environmental and other factors for – To help bridge team members question is yes, but this comes at a setting different watch conditions, but interact with and support the master price. as a minimum on ships with crews of and/or the pilot. more than 6-7, the bridge team (BT) I have been a Captain for the last 20 consists of the master, the officer on Pilot’s responsibilities years, starting in the Royal Norwegian watch (OOW) and a sailor as helmsman The pilot is on board to assist in Navy, later becoming a pilot on the and lookout. With several shipping navigation and manoeuvring. The Norwegian coast, until I decided to companies, especially within the cruise exchange of information between change trade and became a cruise and oil industry, additional crew joins master and pilot does not shift the vessel captain. Over the years I have the BT. responsibility for the safety of the vessel worked on and managed a lot of from one to the other. bridges, some well-functioning and the The BT’s responsibility is to ensure odd ones not working at all. a well-functioning Bridge Resource Fatigue Management (BRM). Some of the main Chapter VIII (Fitness for duty) of the 1 Most readers will certainly know the objectives of BRM are: STCW Convention sets limits on purpose of a well-functioning bridge – To assist the ship master in managing the hours of work and minimum rest team. Hopefully gone are the days the vessel’s bridge team for each requirements for watchkeepers. when the Captain – with a capital C – voyage so that personnel are rested, took all the decisions without discussing trained and prepared to handle any A pilot’s work environment (irregular with anyone, and not listening to advice situation. and lengthy working hours, working from others. On bigger ships the master – To help the ship master recognise at night, unpredictable duty rosters, now has a team around him on board to workload demands and other risk and travelling to and from their jobs) support him in his decisions: the bridge factors that may affect decisions in can significantly contribute to fatigue. team. setting watch conditions. Moving a large vessel in confined – To ensure bridge team members waters is a high-risk task and the pilot Bridge team and its responsibilities are trained and aware of their assigned to that task has a responsibility There are many combinations of responsibilities. to the state, the port authority and the ship’s master.

1 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-keeping for Seafarers, 1978.Pilots are managers of high-risk

© Gard AS, July 2014 26 situations that require intense greet each other is the key to how the the correct heading for the approach. concentration and skill levels so that any rest of the passage will be. The pilot has After the exchange of information decrease in performance can potentially (maybe) done this passage hundreds summarised above I always clearly lead to a catastrophe. A pilot error of times and the master – not having inform my bridge team with the phrase caused by fatigue can endanger the been here before – has made his own “Pilot has the conn” and in turn my ship, crew, port and the environment. assumptions on how the approach OOW and helmsman acknowledge the should be handled. information: the closed loop. Only national rules apply to pilots and they are not subject to the same I have experienced pilots embarking The “closed loop” is a communication regulations as the ship-board crew. I at the breakwater, not giving us time protocol where information is given, have met pilots who have been on the to meet and greet at all, forcing me repeated by the receiver and normally run for more than 36 hours without a more or less to disregard the pilot as confirmed by the issuer. This is the only decent nap, and I can assure you it there is no time to discuss or exchange way one can be sure an order is being does not bring back happy memories. information. This is very often the case followed and is a vital part of the bridge in Mediterranean ports where you only team management. Having observed Communication have a breakwater and a berth or two. this from all sides, it is obvious to Communication can not be overrated. The pilots are just there as an advanced me that you can minimise the risk It is the most vital part of bridge team linesman showing us where to berth. of misunderstanding if the “closed management. Communication with This is a very unsatisfactory situation as loop” is working. In a Canadian study pilots and their organisation starts the pilot is not integrated with the BT where 200 accidents were related to already during passage planning. and sometimes just creates clutter to human error, 84 (42 per cent) involved Some countries have pages and pages the organisation. misunderstanding between pilot and with information within our planning master and some could probably have material, and the information often In general the pilots are on the bridge been avoided if the “closed loop” ends with the statement “…failing to in due time in order to allow for a protocol had been used. report… might cause x hours’ delay”. thorough “handover”/information If the master/ship has not been to the exchange. In this case the master Language port before the stress level within the has a vital role in making the pilot I have recently returned from a voyage BT begins to rise. feel welcome, and the pilot needs to to the French part of Canada. In the St remember how it was coming into a Lawrence River ships the same size as The next crucial point of contact is new (complicated) port for the first mine always have two pilots on board when the OOW uses the VHF to report time. taking one hour watches. As in many to Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) or pilot other countries, a new generation of station. Most stations are very friendly A lot of information has to be pilots is being trained and in addition and helpful, but others do not reply at exchanged between the pilot and the to the two pilots we had apprentices all when ships try to comply with the master in a relatively short time, when on board. It was too easy for them to compulsory rules to report the required the master normally has “the conn” and fall back on speaking French between number of hours before arrival. The the ship is moving in confined waters themselves instead of speaking English OOW has been informed via passage (to have “the conn” is to have sole and in turn creating two “bridge plan that he must get in touch with the responsibility to control, or direct by teams”, which should be avoided. pilot station by a specific time otherwise order, the movements of a ship, i.e., to the ship might be delayed. If there is give proper steering and engine orders Sometimes it is not possible to avoid no reply he will continue with repeated for the safe navigation of the ship). two teams due to communication calls on all possible means, dive back difficulties, either on the crew or on the into the publications to double check Typically the following information is pilot’s side. Based on my experience, the passage plan information and take to be exchanged between the pilot most pilots speak more than good the focus away from his main duty – to and master during the approach: enough English, but as a pilot conning navigate. This in turn again increases ship details; originating authority; a ship heading for Mongstad oil the stress level. manoeuvring details; propeller details; terminal I have experienced that my main engine details and equipment helm orders had to be translated into Then the pilot boat is approaching. defects; berth and tug details; local three different languages before they Being a former Norwegian pilot myself weather and sea conditions; details of were executed by the helmsman. In that I know how important it is to have passage plan, including navigational situation it was difficult to establish a optimum conditions for the pilot boat hazards, abort points and emergency closed loop. when the pilot is boarding. It can look plans; local regulations, including VTS very calm down there from the bridge reporting, maximum allowable draft, The pilot is a vital part of the wing, but being in the pilot boat is a etc.; ship’s agent; year built; IMO bridge team different story. Very often the pilot boat number; cargo type (IMO codes if Provided a few essential premises are master has a specific heading he wants dangerous cargo); last port; etc. taken care of, the pilot is a very vital us to steer. Coming into the UK is a part of the bridge team. pleasure: they are always very polite At this stage it is very important that the using phrases such as “Please, Sir” and chemistry between the pilot and the In my opinion, fatigue, language “Captain”. Others merely observe the master is good. Otherwise it might lead barriers, lack of chemistry, an open loop formalities and make you feel ill-at- to dangerous situations. and, last but not least, cell phone calls ease. This is not a good start as you are from the pilot’s family are threats to waiting for a person from that particular The next step is transition of “the ships’ safety. pilot boat to come up on the bridge conn” from the master to the pilot. I expecting him/her to be a part of the have met pilots coming on the bridge “Welcome on board, Mr Pilot. Coffee bridge team. and, without acknowledging anyone, or tea?” giving the helmsman orders based on Eventually the pilot is on the bridge. the ship’s heading when he left the How the master and the pilot meet and pilot boat, not realising we were on

Gard Loss Prevention Circular Navigation through the No. 02-06 entrances to the Baltic Sea

This circular is based on a recent letter industry’s attention to IMO resolution practices and procedures to neglect an received from The Danish Maritime MSC.138 (76) and indicating that a IMO recommendation. These ships will authorities highlighting the increased number of ships are disregarding the be reported to the maritime authority in number of navigational accidents recommendations. According to a the ship’s flag state. in Danish waters, and Gard’s own safety study conducted by the Danish experience with similar accidents in the Maritime Authority, during the period The following documents are available same area. from 1st January 2002 to 30th June 2005 at www.gard.no under News in the Loss alone, 22 ships grounded in the Great Prevention section: As members and clients are aware, Belt and none of these ships had a pilot · The Danish Maritime Authority Letter. IMO resolution MSC.138 (76) provides on board at the time. · IMO resolution MSC.138(76) recommendations on navigation · Intertanko model charterparty clauses through the entrances to the Baltic The Danish Maritime Authority letter in recognition and support of IMO res Sea, namely the Great Belt (Route T) illustrates and emphasises that it is MSC 138(76). and The Sound. The recommendations highly recommended to utilise the include the use of pilots for certain expertise and local knowledge of pilots, General information on Pilotage in types of ships in high traffic density and that as a minimum, vessels sailing the Baltic can be found at the Baltic waters. The purpose of IMO resolution through the Great Belt or The Sound Pilotage Authorities Commission MSC 138(76) was to provide those follow IMO’s recommendation on website at: http://www.balticpilotage.org responsible for the operation of navigation through the entrance of the and http://www.pilotage.dk ships with recommendations on safe Baltic Sea. navigation through the entrances of Vessels to which the IMO the Baltic Sea with the objectives to Denmark has also launched a recommendations do not apply are ensure safety, prevent human injury or procedure whereby all vessels entering advised to navigate with extra caution loss of life, and to avoid damage to the Danish waters without ordering a through the entrances to the Baltic Sea, environment, in particular the marine pilot in accordance with the IMO i.e. the Great Belt (Route T) and The environment, and to ships and their recommendation will be contacted in Sound. A guide to navigation in Danish cargoes. order to draw their attention to the waters can be found a http://www.dma. recommendations on the use of pilots. dk/Publications/Sider/Mainpage.aspx. t In a letter to the International Group When a ship does not comply, the of P&I Clubs, the Danish Maritime master will be informed that Denmark Authority has drawn the shipping finds it inconsistent with safe navigation

Gard Loss Prevention Circular Operations in extremely No. 10-01 cold climates

Introduction weather damages to vessels and their piping system. Operations in extreme cold equipment. Gard Services has also – Deck-mounted winches and other environments are perhaps the most tried to obtain information based on sensitive equipment should be demanding and challenging that a experiences gained by shipowners covered to avoid icing from freezing vessel and her crew may experience. operating in extreme cold environments spray. Hydraulic equipment should The extreme cold reduces the crew’s on a frequent basis. The following list is also be started several hours before efficiency considerably. In addition, not meant to be exhaustive, but should use, in order to achieve proper oil sensitive deck-mounted equipment and serve as a reminder, as temperatures temperatures on hydraulic hoses before pipelines are often at risk of damage in the Northern Hemisphere are again they are exposed to high pressure. In if precautions are not taken in time. very low. some cases it is recommended to keep There is also the risk that ice damage to the equipment going constantly. Check vessels may result in oil spills. Deck mounted equipment that the lubeoil has the necessary – Frozen pipelines are perhaps the specifications for these climates. Damage related to extreme cold and most common damage that occurs. The – Consider stowing mooring ropes and navigation in ice occurs every year. They pipelines should be properly drained pilot ladders below deck to prevent are more frequent at the beginning of a well in advance. Do not forget fire freezing and reduce the chances of ice cold period, and vessels entering such hoses and couplings, which in some build up. waters infrequently are more exposed cases may become inoperative if not – If possible, ballast tanks should be than other vessels. Extreme cold causes properly drained. Exposed piping filled with water with a high salinity (and damage to cargo, vessel equipment and should be insulated to prevent freezing consequently lower freezing point). injuries to the crew, while navigation in where necessary. Furthermore, to avoid freezing of the ice causes damage to the hull, propellers – Periodically purge air lines on deck to air pipes, the ballast level should be and/or rudder. remove water condensation. dropped. Frozen air pipes may cause – Fresh water piping systems are severe damage both to tank structure An article in Gard News issue No. 1271 particularly at risk of freezing. Consider and pumps alike. outlined guidelines to prevent cold circulating water in the fresh water – All spare electricity should be used

1 “Navigation in ice – Cold weather procedures”.

© Gard AS, July 2014 to avoid damage to the rudder 29 to heat the accommodation and – Remove ice and snow from and propeller blades. It may be compartments exposed to the ice and hatchoaming top before closing the advantageous to run the engines ahead cold (fore peak, etc.). Be aware of the hatches. Otherwise, this may later melt, to wash away ice around the propeller fire danger if industrial heaters or gas and create leakages. Leakages may also and rudder before attempting to run torches are used. Keep doors closed to be created by water freezing between astern, which again should be kept retain the heat. the hatchcover panels. to a minimum to avoid the rudder or – Engine ventilators may in some cases propeller being exposed to solid ice. be turned off (but remain open) to Crew – Especially in ballast condition, the avoid freezing of sensitive equipment in – Low temperatures reduce the crew’s cooling water inlets may be chocked the engine room. physical ability, effectiveness, and can with ice. This can subsequently lead – Ice on deck should preferably be impair judgement. Proper clothing is to a loss of cooling water. Engine crew removed with wooden ice mallets, therefore essential to maintain crew must be properly briefed and made to avoid damage to the hull paint safety and awareness. aware in order to avoid such situations. coatings and also to prevent frozen – Review rotation of watches for – For vessels with high air draft or and brittle metal from breaking. It is crewmembers working in excessively exposed rigging, icing can affect the also recommended to keep sufficient cold areas to ensure exposure is kept at stability of the vessel. Therefore, stocks of glycol and salt to remove and a minimum. vessels may need to lay by and remove prevent ice build up. – Always brief the crew properly in ice with mallets or other suitable tools. – Safety equipment should be checked advance of any operation that is not frequently, including safety hand lines, carried out on a regular basis. The shipyard if rigged. Remember the fresh water – If the vessel is at the repair yard or tanks in the life boats. Navigation in ice dock, the vessel’s crew should check – Move anchors periodically in order – A considerable amount of information all items at risk of cold damage, and to prevent chains and winches from on ice conditions and navigation in not leave this to the yard or sub- freezing. ice is available on the Internet. For contractors. – Alterations in speed and/or course example: – If the vessel is at the repair yard as should be considered to reduce the – Featured resources, including ice a result of damage, and additional effects of freezing spray. maps and alerts is collected in the damage is incurred due to extreme – Deck and navigation lights can easily Loss Prevention Spotlight on http:// cold whilst at the yard, the additional be damaged by the cold and ice, and www.gard.no/ikbViewer/HPUBSHFU damages will be subject to a separate should be checked frequently to ensure 20650989 claim and will in many cases, be below they remain in proper working order. – Local meteorological stations are the applicable deductible. This applies more than willing to share important to both hull and machinery and loss of Cargo holds information when contacted. Ice hire. Several types of cargo are exposed charts are also received on the weather to contamination from water, and facsimile receiver. Bunkers low temperatures may in some cases – Instructions from icebreakers and local – Whilst at port or at the repair yard increase the condensation problem. authorities should be carefully followed. in locations with an extremely cold – If cargo ventilation (if installed) is If you are taking shortcuts and are climate, it is imperative that heavy fuel used, snow and moist cold air may lead caught by the ice it may be difficult to oil bunkers remain properly heated to condensation and should not be receive timely assistance. at all times in order to retain enough blown into the cargo holds. – The effect of current on ice should viscosity to be pumpable and to be – When cleaning the holds, keep the not be underestimated. If you are used. If the fuel oil is not kept at the use of water to an absolute minimum. caught in the ice with the current in an proper temperature, it could take days Sweep holds properly in advance of unfavourable direction, this may expose before it is heated sufficiently to be using water. Use pre-heated water the vessel to collision, grounding or used and, will thus delay the sailing of whenever possible. Prevent dirty other types of contact damage. the vessel. water from aggregating and freezing – Reversion of propellers in ice should by removing excess water in locations be done carefully and controlled where freezing could occur.

Gard Loss Prevention Circular Winter season in No. 02-04 Northern Baltic Sea

The 2002/2003 winter season was the in ice, are involved in a collision. – Rule 13 – Overtaking vessel worst on record since the winter of However, the above “knock-for-knock” – Rule 17 – Action by stand-on vessel 1987. Our statistics appear to indicate practice is only used in “standard” – Rule 27 (a) (i) – vessel not under that the preceding relatively mild cases caused by difficult ice conditions. command (stopped) to show two red winters may have lulled seafarers into If gross negligence or other similar lights a false sense of security. How this and causes are involved, other methods of future winters will unfold remains to be apportioning blame will be used. The Finnish/Swedish “Rules for seen, but shipowners and operators Winter Navigation” require would be well advised to ensure that Analysis of the collision cases shows (a) Strict watch keeping both visually their seagoing personnel are well aware that the vessels involved are very often and especially by radar and immediate of the planning, preparation and care blamed for not complying with the notification by VHF radio when loss of required while navigating in ice. applicable rules; The International speed is experienced. Regulations for Preventing Collisions Approximately 30% of all averages at Sea, 1972 (COLREGS 72), and the (b) In case of stoppage: which occurred in connection with Finnish/Swedish “Rules for Winter – Immediate signalling in case of failure navigation in ice in the Baltic Sea during Navigation”. of other means of communication the past winter season, were collision – Immediate engine manoeuvring cases. This is a substantial number and The Finnish/Swedish “Rules for Winter – Immediate rudder manoeuvring leads us to again remind shipowners of Navigation” are endorsed by Germany, the issues involved. Denmark and the Baltic States. In Recommendation addition to directing navigation during When navigating in ice or in the vicinity The most common cause was collision the winter period in Finland and of ice, shipowners must ensure that between vessels in an ice convoy. Sweden, these Rules set the standard their onboard personnel are well Under normal circumstances blame has for ice navigation in the Baltic, including aware of the regulations governing been apportioned equally between navigation in ice in conjunction with such navigation. Furthermore, masters the colliding vessels. Otherwise, in icebreakers in the majority of the Baltic. must be advised of the requirement determining liability, emphasis was to ensure proper compliance with placed on: For further details about the “Rules the governing regulations and also of 1. How the watch keeper had been for Winter Navigation” please see the the utmost care required in order to alerted by the vessels involved, Finnish Maritime Authority’s home page promote safe navigation. 2. How vessels ahead and abaft had at http://portal.liikennevirasto.fi/sivu/ been warned by the vessel which was www/e/professionals/winter_navigation This circular has been produced with stuck or slowed down in the ice, the valuable assistance 3. Distances kept between the vessels, Navigation when the vessel is part of former Hull Claims Manager, Captain and of course of a convoy is a risky operation, and John Hammarén in Finland. 4. The ice situation in general. the crew must be alert and maintain a proper lookout at all times. It is In some collision cases, and in particular essential that all relevant regulations when an assisting icebreaker is are properly complied with. Breach involved, the case may be settled on of COLREGS 72, especially the below a “knock-for-knock” basis. This means mentioned rules, appears to be the that both parties cover their own cost most common cause of collisions: of repairs. The same principle may also – Rule 5 – Proper look out be used or agreed upon between the – Rule 6 – Safe speed parties, when two merchant vessels, – Rule 7 – Risk of collision assisting each other when navigating – Rule 8 – Action to avoid collision

Gard News 177, Anchoring - Getting into February/April 2005 a safe haven or into a potential disaster?

Over the years Gard has seen incidents the design holding power, or if the remaining 700 tonnes. At 1540 hrs, the where serious casualties have resulted additional chain stoppers are not in chief officer of the vessel boarded the from anchoring problems. Many of proper shape and fit for use. feeder vessel and noted the draft of his these incidents have been caused as vessel was 11.12 m forward and 10.52 m a result of inadequate manning and/ Two incidents are described below, aft. The trim at the head surprised him. or improper watch arrangements on from which important lessons can be He was concerned that they were not the bridge and/or in the engine room. learned. able to attain the 45 cm stern trim. He This article describes some incidents checked his calculations and in addition related to anchoring and discusses Incident 1 he requested that the ballast tanks be lessons learned from them. Often such Having arrived at port to load, a strong sounded since he believed that the ship incidents have resulted in subsequent east to south-easterly wind prevented should not have had a head trim at the grounding. the vessel from commencing cargo time. At 1600 hrs the first officer notified operations via feeder vessels. On the master of his concern. Being on the high seas, with lots of the following morning, the master leeward space to land is every master’s received orders from his agents to At 1615 hrs the aft draft was checked delight. With a firm hand on the wheel proceed, with pilot embarked, to a again. It remained at 10.52 m despite and an alert lookout, combined with more protected location to commence continuous loading into No. 7 hold. well-run machinery, he can have a cargo operations. However, British They then realised the vessel was comfortable rest without being awaken Admiralty Charts of the area were not aground and loading was suspended at by unfamiliar vessel movements. particularly detailed. The pilot had 1620 hrs. The ship’s heading remained only a photocopy of a larger scale local steady at 289 degrees. At 1800 hrs the Lying at anchor, on the other hand, may chart. steering gear was extensively damaged cause any master a fitful sleep. with the rudderstock protruding At around 1600 hrs the port anchor of approximately 20 cm above the Any small boat skipper knows his the vessel was dropped approximately steering flat. boat by the signals he gets through on the 50 m contour line on the his various senses, and he senses photocopy map. The vessel had eight The following causes contributed to immediately when something is amiss. shackles of chain (approximately 220 this incident:– When the wind veered, Larger vessels give the same signals, m) in the water. The master estimated the anchor position changed from but they become more distorted and turning radius of about two cables. being in the lee of the land to being on are not so easily recognisable. Hence, a the windward side of the land, a most more rational and meticulous approach The vessel was moored on a heading unfortunate position to be anchored in. is required to safeguard the operation of 150 degrees and, in the master’s At that point in time it would have been of the vessel. estimation, outside the 20 m contour prudent to change anchor position line should she swing right round. The towards the other shore. The experienced small boat skipper will vessel’s echo sounder transponder – Eight shackles of chain for 33 m know immediately when his vessel is was situated in the bow of the vessel anchoring depth was somewhat about to drag anchor, thus enabling him and when she initially anchored it was excessive. The recommended ratio to counter the effects before becoming observed that there were 33 m of water is three to four times the depth adrift. On a larger vessel such operation indicated under the keel. depending on depth and holding takes time, hence an alert watch, which ground. can prepare for contingencies in case The pilot assured the master that the – Neither the vessel nor the pilot had of a shift in weather or other conditions, vessel was on good holding ground the proper charts with the required is a must. It is therefore of utmost and that the loaded draft would be 11.8 contour details of the location where importance to pick your anchoring m. The master was satisfied that the the vessel was finally anchored. spot carefully, taking into consideration ship was anchored in a good position. – The vessel’s crew made incorrect prevailing winds and currents, nature of On the final day of loading (four days assumptions as to the consequences anchoring surface, the topography both later), the wind had shifted to the west to the ship if she swung about. The ashore and underwater, the duration of and the vessel was now on a heading crew should have taken continuous stay, the density and proximity of traffic, of 289 degrees. The master’s intention soundings at the location they were restraints that may be imposed by the was that the ship should arrive at its anchored since limited information was state of the engines and anchoring discharge location with an even keel. available. equipment. The importance of Therefore, the plan was to complete – The ship’s crew were over-confident maintaining the anchoring gear in good loading with a trim by the stern of 45 of the pilot’s assessment as to the water condition can not be over-stressed. The cm. In order to achieve this, it was depth of where the ship was anchored. condition of the gear must be carefully agreed that the last 700 tonnes of cargo This should have led them to be more checked prior to anchoring. There is were to be used for trimming purposes. diligent. no point in a good holding ground, if the anchor brake lining is worn and At 1520 hrs the feeder vessel gave Incident 2 only able to function at a fraction of notice to commence loading the The ship approached the loading port

© Gard AS, July 2014 32 and was directed by the harbour master the ship did not stop drifting. By the the basics of anchoring is often the root to a nearby anchorage. The master time the engine was started, the ship cause of these accidents. The following was asked whether he would like the was stranded. key factors should be considered assistance of a pilot. The master politely carefully, and their importance and rejected the offer and proceeded to the The ensuing refloating operation was consequences must be communicated anchoring position. very expensive and the loss of time to the ship’s crew: and repairs to the ship were even more – Bottom conditions and depth of water The vessel anchored in a position 7.5 expensive. versus length of anchor chain. cables (approximately 1,400 m) from – The importance of detailed maps and the shoreline, which was a sandy beach. The following causes contributed to this local knowledge. The echo sounder indicated the depth incident: – How to handle inaccurate or lack of of the water to be 31 m and the master – A pilot has local knowledge and is information. ordered five shackles (approximately familiar with anchoring positions. The – Positioning aids: use, precision and 140 m) on deck. The wind was a light refusal of a pilot in this case may have errors. breeze from south-west and everything contributed to the choice of a less – Change in prevailing conditions: wind, looked rather smooth. The master rang attractive spot to anchor. currents, tides, draft, traffic density. finished with engines. A combination – It is important to find an anchorage – The point of no return off the lee anchor watch and fire guard was with the most suitable bottom shore. established on the bridge. conditions. Sand is usually a good holding ground but here the ground History shows that humans Initially the vessel was supposed to was a combination of sand and rock underestimate the potential start loadingthe next day, but loading and the vessel probably anchored on consequences of developing situations. was delayed due to problems at the rocks. The lack of consideration for Accident studies demonstrate that terminal. In the meantime the weather common wind and current direction signals and indications of something forecast was indicating stronger winds when deciding where to anchor may wrong happening are constantly from north-west. The harbour master have caused the dragging of anchors. ignored by watch-keepers. It is also informed the ships at anchor that – The watch-keeping system must be important to impress on a ship’s strong winds were expected. adequate to handle a situation that complement that recognising and might occur, such as the one described. appreciating such signals and During the early hours of the next day There should always be a qualified indications is the first step towards the wind force increased rapidly. The individual on the bridge, someone avoiding a casualty. It is also important anchor watch, who was alternating who can initiate necessary action to have in place a system which between the bridge and fire guard duty, when needed. If the anchor position is identifies and provides necessary registered the increase in wind but did exposed, do not hesitate to keep the training on an ongoing basis. not react. After another 15 minutes, as engine room on standby. An ordinary he arrived on the bridge he realised start-up routine takes at least half an the ship was not in the position it was hour and this is time you do not have in supposed to be. He contacted the chief an emergency situation. mate who arrived on the bridge some – If the weather is deteriorating it minutes later. He realised immediately is often much easier to leave your the seriousness of the situation and anchoring position in good time instead contacted the engineer on duty and of staying there until you are forced to ordered an emergency start of the main leave, which may be too late. engine. The first mate was sent on deck in order to let go of the other anchor. Important factors and loss The wind was continuing to increase prevention and the shore line approached rapidly. Experience from accidents during The second anchor was dropped but anchoring shows that a lack of focus on

Gard News 181, “Pilot on board!” February/April 2006

Gard News looks at some aspects of contact damage (typically collisions with So in situations where the navigational the relationship between pilots and piers, etc.). Despite more advanced risk exceeds a given limit, national seafarers. technology, the implementation of authorities respond by sending a STCW 95 and a strong focus on the pilot on board. This is where the Areas of risk human element as well as fatigue, challenges start: to a large extent “Despite the pilot’s duties and the expected decline in number of bridge team management training responsibilities, his presence on accidents per year has not taken focuses on co-operation among the board does not exempt the Master place. In addition, the tendency is that bridge team and less emphasis is and the OOW from their duties and accidents are more severe and more placed on situations where “outsiders” responsibilities for the ship’s safety.” expensive than ever before. are introduced. Bridge manuals refer This is quoted from the IMO Code of to “pilot to pilot navigation” and Nautical Procedures and Practices, and As indicated above, a pilot is sent on little or nothing is said about how to should be well known to seafarers. It board because the national authorities act when the pilot has embarked. In is, however, a fact that a large portion have assessed that there is an increased short, the pilot is expected to deliver of navigation-related accidents occurs risk in the area. This risk can be related the service he is paid to deliver and when a pilot is on board. The reason to navigational hazards, geographical limited consideration is given to his for this is obvious: the pilot is sent on areas that are vulnerable to pollution, co-operation with the bridge team. board because the national authorities there can be special regulations related For that reason in many situations one consider the area an increased risk, to the cargo that the ship is carrying. In does not achieve the desired increased and in increased risk situations there some countries the master’s experience level of safety; on the contrary, the will always be accidents. However, it is is assessed, after a number of pilot- responsibility for navigation is simply Gard’s clear understanding that pilots assisted port calls the master may be transferred from one person to another. prevent far more accidents than they approved for entry without pilot. There cause, but the picture is complex, and can also be other reasons related to, Communication there is reason to study this in more for instance, military installations in the In accidents where a pilot is involved detail. area. It is also important to note that there is one factor that is frequently pilot requirements are at each individual present: limited or no communication Navigation-related accidents are country’s discretion. Rules may and will between the master and the pilot. traditionally split into three main therefore vary from country to country. There may be language problems and groups: collisions, groundings and misunderstandings, unclear instructions

© Gard AS, July 2014 34 to the bridge personnel about how The impact of commercial pressure briefing, monitoring of the pilot’s to monitor the pilot’s actions and should not be underestimated. This activities and communication between the bridge personnel may be over- may result from a variety of reasons: pilot and officer of the watch (OOW)/ confident about the pilot’s abilities. In – the terminal wishes to maximise master. Exchange of information is also some situations the pilot may not be utilisation of the piers and requires mentioned in the IMO Code of Nautical familiar with the particular design of effective (high speed) approach to the Procedures and Practices: “The the navigational systems available on terminal; master and the pilot shall exchange board. Very often these accidents may – some pilots are paid per pilotage and information regarding navigation be avoided if there are clear instructions increase speed for that reason; procedures, local conditions and the available from the ship management on – charterers require maximum ship’s characteristics”. how to handle situations with pilots on utilisation of the ship, and under keel board. clearance may be challenged. This Conclusion occurs particularly in river passages. In summary, much progress will be Lessons learned The availability and suitability of achieved by implementing some simple It is possible to extract some lessons tugs and mooring boats should also steps in the ship procedures: from the above examples. be considered: in many situations – Active use of pilot cards for transfer of these are too small or too few for the ship information. Voyage planning used to be a critical purpose, but are accepted due to the – Implementation of company factor and the common response from commercial pressure. procedures for pilot handling. the crew was “why should we plan the – Making bridge teams aware of passage when the pilot always brings Cultural differences should also be cultural challenges that may occur when with him an alternative passage plan?”. considered. The pilot is perceived as a pilot is on board, and giving them It is Gard’s experience that this has an authority and in many cultures it is the confidence and authority to seek improved: electronic charts have made difficult to correct or even question clarification when in doubt. it easy to adjust the ship’s voyage plan a decision made by an authority. – Taking into consideration the according to that brought on board by Corrections to obvious errors may commercial pressure that may be the pilot and attention from port state therefore be delayed and in some cases imposed by pilots, charterers and control officers has put this item on not put forward at all. Reluctance to get terminals. the agenda. It is also imperative that involved in a situation has contributed the pilot be briefed about the vessel’s to several severe marine accidents. In Bon voyage! manoeuvring capabilities. This includes particular, this may be a problem when rate of turn, propeller arrangement, the master is not on the bridge. It is output on the various manoeuvring therefore important that all members orders and general ship data. In short, of the bridge team have the necessary any information that can improve the authority and confidence to interfere pilot’s performance must be available. if they are in doubt. This can only be Many shipowners have developed so- achieved by active leadership and called “pilot cards” for that purpose. involvement by the master. The IMO These have proved to be effective and Code of Nautical Procedures and greatly appreciated by the pilots. Practices also states: “If in any doubt as to the pilot’s actions or intentions, Language barriers have been and the officer in charge of the navigational will continue to be a challenge; these watch shall seek clarification from the can be related to communication pilot and, if doubt still exists, shall between the pilot and the crew, as well notify the master immediately and take as understanding the communication whatever action is necessary before the between the pilot and assisting parties master arrives”. such as shore staff, mooring boats and/ or tugs. Very often these barriers can be Common understanding greatly reduced by a thorough review The first step to reduce the risk of of the passage prior to commencing navigation-related accidents when it. The pilot can also be requested to a pilot is on board is a common communicate with external parties in understanding by the bridge team a common language, or to translate of the risks involved. These include his communication with them for the geographical hazards as well as cultural bridge team. Many accidents are and management-related challenges. rooted in surprises and unexpected Introducing company “pilot handling situations that could have been avoided procedures” in the ship management if the pilot and the bridge team had a system has proved to be effective. In common understanding about how the addition to voyage planning, these passage would be carried out. should include routines for pre-voyage

Gard Loss Prevention Circular Pilot on the bridge - No. 04-00 Role, Authority and Responsibility

Introduction As the vessel approached the terminal, proper situational awareness. As you are aware, many navigational all verbal communication between the (5) The Master was over-confident as to incidents leading to groundings and pilots and the tugs were in the local the abilities of the pilot. collisions involve pilots. The primary language (non-English) that was not problems involve the role, responsibility understood by the Master. The aft tug Case 2: Grounding at mooring and authority of the pilot onboard. This was made fast after the vessel entered Having arrived at port to load, a Loss Prevention Circular focuses on the breakwater and was quite close to strong east to south-easterly wind 4 case study examples of pilot aided the berth. prevented Vessel 2 from commencing grounding and collision followed by cargo operations via feeder vessels. general guidance on the prevention of The forward tug approached while the On a following morning, the Master these types of incidents. vessel was only 50 metres from the received orders from his agents to berth. Furthermore, before the line proceed, with pilot embarked, to a Case 1: Collision with terminal could be made fast on the vessel, the more protected location to commence dolphin tug started pulling on the line, thereby cargo operations. However, British At 0200 hrs, Vessel 1 was given the entire line was run out and was Admiralty Charts of the area are not instructions to leave a pre-designated no assistance to the vessel. The two particularly detailed. The pilot had only anchorage and proceed to load remaining tugs were of no assistance a photocopy of a larger scale local chart. cargo at the terminal. The vessel was at all. underway at 0254 hrs and two pilots At 1606 hrs the port anchor of the vessel boarded at 0354 hrs. The vessel entered As a result, the vessel lost control and was dropped approximately on the the breakwater with the Master on the could not be stopped before colliding 50 m contour line on the photocopy bridge. with the mooring dolphin. Extensive map. The vessel had 8 shackles of chain damage was caused both to the ship (approximately 220 m) in the water that, The vessel made routine visits at that and to the mooring dolphin. the Master estimated, gave a distance location thus the Master thus felt of about two cables from the anchor comfortable with the berthing routines. The following causes contributed to this to the stern of the vessel and thus The vessel passed the breakwater at incident: provided a turning radius of about two 8.5 knots even though the maximum (1) The vessel’s speed was excessive cables. permitted speed was only 5 knots. when trying to connect to the tugs. (2) There was a lack of communication The vessel was moored on a heading Although the Master observed that they between the pilot and the master of 150° and, in the Master’s estimation, were exceeding the maximum speed, at many stages while transiting outside the 20 m contour line should the Master did not attempt to bring this the channel. There was little or no she swing right round. The vessel’s echo to the attention of the pilots. information exchanged regarding the sounder transponder is situated in the docking plan and how the 4 tugs were bow of the vessel and when she initially Four tugs were requisitioned to to be put to use and coordinated. anchored it was observed that there assist the vessel in berthing at the (3) The Master did not insist that pilot were 33 m of water indicated under the terminal. Due to the excessive speed not exceed the maximum allowable keel. of the vessel, the tugs had difficulty speed as it entered the breakwater. maintaining speed to keep up with (4) The pilot, when communicating with The pilot assured the Master that the the vessel as she made her way to the the tugs, was speaking a language that vessel was on good holding ground and terminal. was not understood by the Master. This that the loaded draft would be 11.8 m. made it difficult for the Master to have a The Master was satisfied that the ship was anchored in a good position.

On the final day of loading (four days later), the wind had shifted to the west and the vessel was now on a heading of 289° . The Master’s intention was that the ship should arrive at its discharge location with an even keel. Therefore, the intention was to complete loading with a trim by the stern of 45 cm. In order to achieve this, it was agreed that the last 700 tonnes of cargo were to be used for trimming purposes.

At 1520 hrs the feeder vessel gave notice to commence loading the

The vessel had not made the engines ready for passage at the time the pilots boarded. They had determined that the vessel had approximately 12 hours more than necessary to make the passage. The Master was aware that some pilots would not take the vessel through the passage at night and told the pilot that departure could be postponed until daybreak.

The pilot assured the Master that it was safe to sail at night. The Master then suggested that they take a route where the channel was wider. However, the pilot preferred and recommended another passage. This passage was remaining 700 tonnes. At 1540 hrs, the the land, a most unfortunate position recommended for day passage only Chief Officer of the vessel boarded the to be anchored in. At that point in time and required a number of sharp turns to feeder vessel and noted the draft of his it would have been prudent to change navigate. However, due to commercial vessel was 11.12 m forward and 10.52 anchor position towards the other shore. pressure, night passage for the route m aft. The trim at the head surprised (2) Eight (8) shackles of chain on 33 suggested by the pilot was allowed. him. He was concerned that they were meters depth was somewhat excessive. not able to attain the 45 cm stern The recommended ratio is three to four The Master and pilot exchanged more trim. Loading was suspended while he times the depth depending on depth information about the vessel and then checked his calculations. In addition, and holding ground. the Master ordered the engines to be he requested that the ballast tanks be (3) Neither the vessel nor the pilot had prepared for departure. At 2100 hrs the sounded since he believed that the the proper charts with the required crew was called to their manoeuvring ship should not have had a head trim contour details of the location they stations and began unmooring. At 2137 at the time. At 1600 hrs the First Officer finally anchored. hrs full manoeuvring speed was ordered notified the Master of his concern. (4) The vessel crew made incorrect and executed. assumptions as to the consequences to the ship if she swung about. The Five persons were in the wheelhouse: At 16.15 hrs the aft draft was checked crew should have taken continuous the Master, pilot, apprentice, OOW and again. It remained at 10.52 m despite soundings at the location they were the helmsman. The OOW used one of continuous loading into no. 7 hold. They anchored since limited information was the radars when unoccupied by one of then realised the vessel was aground available. the pilots and plotted fixes on the chart and loading was suspended at 1620 hrs. (5) The ship’s crew were over-confident on average of every 5 minutes. The ship’s heading remained steady with the pilot’s assessment as to the at 289° . At 1800 hrs the steering gear water depth of where the ship was A number of minor manoeuvres were was extensively damaged with the anchored. This should have led them to made between 2127 hrs and 2218 hrs. rudderstock protruding approximately be more diligent. At 2218 hrs, the ship prepared to make 20 cm above the steering flat. a 60-degree turn to port at 11.5 knots. Case 3: Grounding while At 2225 hrs, the pilot began the planned The following causes contributed to this navigating port turn by ordering a 10 degrees port incident: At 2040 hrs Vessel 3, a pilot and his rudder. Having observed the vessel’s apprentice at the wharf boarded the reaction to this rudder angle was not (1) When the wind veered, the anchor general cargo ship. The vessel had quick enough, the pilot increased the position changed from being in the lee completed loading at approximately rudder angle to 20 degrees. The rate of the land to being in the lovart side of 1600 hrs and was preparing a transit to of turn increased but after the turn was completed, the vessel ended up closer to the shore on her starboard side than was intended.

From this moment on, the Master became particularly vigilant and closely monitored the rudder orders. He did not communicate his concern to the pilot. There was little or no time to exchange opinions on this matter since the vessel was approaching another tight turn of 50 degrees to starboard to pass between two islands.

At the required location, the pilot issued a 10 degrees starboard rudder at a point at a point where one of the

© Gard AS, July 2014 37 islands was 3.5 cables (0.55 km) ahead pilots boarded the vessel and when without any significant incident other of the vessel’s wheelhouse. The Master the ship got underway was quite short than the vessel encountering some considered this rudder angle may be particularly since they had 12 hours concentrations of fishing vessels. have been insufficient to obtain the more than necessary to make the transit required rate of return but hesitated to the next port. After the change of watch at 0000 hrs, to change the pilot’s orders. He did (2) The pilot insisted transiting a personnel on the bridge comprised of however make sure the rudder indicator direction that was recommended for day the second officer, who the OOW, Pilot needle moved to the requested 10° to travel. The Master should have insisted 1, and the quartermaster who was at starboard. in following the recommended route. the helm. The visibility had been good However, he was also familiar with the until approximately 0100 hrs when the The pilot observed that the vessel pilot since he had made routine visits to vessel entered a light haze. The radars was slow to react to his order of 10° this location and felt over-confident in had been placed on the 12-mile range starboard rudder and ordered a 20° the pilot’s recommendations. at the time. By 0125 hrs, the visibility starboard rudder. Neither the time nor (3) There was a significant breakdown had decreased to about 150 metres. No the vessel’s exact position was recorded of communication between the Master dedicated lookout was posted. when this order was given, however, the and the pilot. Once the first order for distance to the island was decreasing. 10 degree rudder didn’t result in the At approximately 0113 hrs the vessel required rate of change in direction was reported its position to the local Marine Having heard the pilot’s last order, made, the Master should have been Communications and Traffic Service the Master ordered the rudder hard aware that another 10 degree rudder (MCTS). The vessel also stated that their to starboard. The Master’s order was order in the second turn would not ETA to the point where the next course repeated by the pilot and was executed acquire the desired results. He should alteration was planned was 0240 hrs. by the helmsman. The bow of the vessel have communicated this to the pilot cleared the island and kept sweeping and/or discussed the manoeuvring Communication between the pilot and to starboard. However, the vessel’s characteristics: (1) during the pre-voyage the OOW was conducted in English and port side was observed to be quickly briefing, (2) after the first 10 degree there were no communication barriers. approaching the island. rudder order that was changed to a 20 degree rudder, and/or (3) just after The OOW had been recording the At 2231 hrs, with the island’s northern the pilot’s second 10 degree rudder position of the vessel at approximately tip several metres off of the vessel’s port command. 15-minute intervals on the chart in use. side and ahead of the wheelhouse, the (4) There was a lack of fundamental The pilot did not refer to those positions pilot ordered the rudder hard to port seafaring skills used for the tight turning nor did he refer to the chart to refresh and stop engine. A slight vibration was manoeuvre to starboard. A standard his memory. The pilot carried a personal felt followed by the distinct touch of a practice of reducing the speed of the course book that he used to navigate hard object. Some seconds later, air was vessel, commanding the turn, and the vessel. This book had no provisions heard escaping from the tanks. then bringing the vessel back up to for recording of ETA or the actual time manoeuvring speed should have been of course alternations. The pilot relied Although no oil was spilled in the water, used. solely on his memory to keep track of the vessel was ascertained to have the vessel’s position. damage to her side shell plating. The Case 4: Grounding while shell plating was punctured in several navigating At approximately 0130 hrs, the pilot places allowing seawater to ingress into At 1300 hrs Vessel 4 departed partially saw on the radar, what he believed, to an empty ballast and fuel tanks. loaded with two pilots on board. The be the entrance to the passage and pilots agreed to alternate their watch. began the required course alteration to The following causes contributed to this Pilot 1 was to conduct the vessel starboard. The pilot did not reconfirm incident: between 1300 and 1800 hrs and Pilot 2 the vessel’s position prior to the course (1) There was a lack of proper voyage between 1800 and 2300 hrs and so on. alteration. The OOW took a range and planning. The time between when the From 1300 to 2300 hrs the passage was bearing of a point of land and noted these values on the chart. Before the

OOW had time to plot the vessel’s Recommendations and Lessons planning stage. In addition, the Master position on the chart, the pilot began a Learned and/or OOW should communicate course alteration. The OOW returned to (1) The Master is in command of the ship manoeuvring capabilities during the the conning position and ensured the at all times with only one exception: voyage, as necessary. The Master and helmsman promptly executed the pilot’s when transiting through the Panama OOW should never feel hesitant to orders. Canal. Therefore, it is always the duty discuss these matters with the pilot if of the Master and OOW to keep a they feel it necessary to do so. Shortly after reaching the new heading, situational awareness of all activities the pilot realised that the vessel was of the pilot. Although the pilot is most (6) Ensure that the vessel is equipped not on the proper course and ordered knowledgeable about local waters, it is with the necessary updated charts for a hard-a-starboard helm in the hopes the responsibility of the Master/OOW the intended voyage. It is not sufficient of bringing her around but this was to verify position through proper use of to rely on the pilot to provide this unsuccessful and the vessel grounded charts, radars and other position fixing information. at 0135 hrs. devices and follow local rules on speed and routing. Depth soundings were taken in the area (7) The OOW should always closely of the grounding and it was determined monitor the activities of the pilot. Many (2) Voyage planning is crucial in all that the bow was firmly aground and the times, the pilot will not necessarily situations including when pilots are on stern was afloat in deeper waters. The communicate with the OOW regarding board. Sufficient time should be allowed vessel sustained extensive damage to the vessel and/or voyage. The OOW for proper communication between the shell plating and internals in way of stem should not hesitate to communicate Master, pilots and OOWs. This voyage to No. 3 double-bottom tanks. with the pilot on any relevant matters plan should include every important regarding the vessel or the voyage. activity starting from the embarkation The following causes contributed to this of the pilot, in and out of the berth, and incident: finally the disembarkation of the pilot. (8) The OOW should not only be (1) There was a substantial lack of bridge diligent with regard to his duties to resource management (BRM). The ensure the pilot’s orders are properly OOW and/or the Master should have (3) If the pilot is to command tugs followed but also to monitor the pilot’s been more diligent about ensuring and/or personnel at a berth in a activities. If the OOW has concerns that the OOW was there to reconfirm language that is foreign to the crew, regarding the pilot’s activities, he should decisions made by the pilot. This could the Master must demand that the pilot contact the Master immediately. have been done through better verbal communicates with the Master and/or communication between the pilot and OOW in a common language the OOW. (9) The vessel should have clear procedures and instructions to Master’s (2) The pilot did not reconfirm his (4) When the piloted voyage is taking mental model of his position before and OOWs on what to do with a pilot the vessel through narrow waters, you onboard. These should be included as making the critical turn. The OOW, should mark “wheel-over” points either did not have the proper situational part of the ships safety management on the chart or at the radar screen in system (SMS). awareness with regard to the vessel’s order to know when you are reaching position. The pilot did not reconfirm “points of no return”. This helps to the vessel’s position prior to the course allow the pilot, Master, and/or OOW to (10) BRM is an important activity to alteration. When the pilot gave the keep a better situational awareness. ensure safety. Any BRM training should order to turn, the OOW only focused include how to handle the change in upon whether the helmsman made communication, command, and control the turn. He didn’t reconfirm that they (5) The ship’s crew is normally the when a pilot takes over navigation of turned at the proper location. most knowledgeable regarding the the ship. (3) The weather played a marginal manoeuvring capabilities of the ship. role in the grounding. However, as Detailed descriptions of the ship’s a precaution, the vessel may have manoeuvring characteristics should considered placing a dedicated lookout. be communicated during the voyage

Gard News 173, Who is to blame? February/April 2004

Useful lessons can be learned from the stationary objects. order to reduce the speed of our ship. following incident, which could happen anywhere, any time, with almost any “Mr Mate, can you prepare to receive The master finally realises that there is ship. the first tug on port bow? We will have no way he can avoid hitting the berth starboard side alongside.” (Two other and orders full astern. Because of the The incident tugs are also ordered but this is not full astern manoeuvre, the ship does an “Good afternoon, Mr Captain. I’ll take mentioned by the pilot). uncontrolled starboard turn and hits the over. Starboard 10, come to two five six berth with a speed of 2 knots, making degrees and full ahead.” “Aye-Aye, sir”, says the mate. a 3-metre long gash on the starboard bow and causing extensive damage to “Starboard 10 to two five six degrees, The pilot contacts the tugs on the VHF the berth. full ahead. She is all yours, Mr Pilot.” again (still in the local language) and, as he is talking, his mobile phone rings. What went wrong We are on board an ordinary tanker, The mate calls the master, who enters The situation described above could on an ordinary day, approaching an the bridge after a couple of minutes. happen anywhere, any time, with a lot ordinary terminal somewhere in the He consults the radar and although it is of ships trading the seven seas of today. Western Hemisphere. The weather is many years since the last time he was in grey but the visibility is not too bad, this harbour, he feels somewhat uneasy Can we learn something from this although it is early evening. The speed with our present speed, as we are incident? is slowly increasing and the last light rapidly approaching the inner part of – The vessel’s speed was excessive. of day is rapidly disappearing. The the harbour. The master is tempted to – When trying to connect to the tugs atmosphere on the bridge is relaxed. ask the pilot to reduce the speed, but the ship’s speed was too high. for some odd reason he does not. The – There was lack of communication “Full speed, Mr Pilot, 14 knots.” pilot orders half ahead and continues between the pilot and the master at to talk in his mobile phone. We are many stages while transiting the fairway. “Full speed. Thank you, Mr Captain.” approaching the berth and the master There was little or no information is more and more anxious about the exchanged regarding the docking plan The pilot and the master continue speed, so he politely suggests the pilot and how the three tugs were to be put talking about everyday matters such as to reduce the speed. The pilot explains to use and co-ordinated. the weather, how long they are staying that there is another ship waiting to – The master did not insist that the at the berth, etc. leave the berth and he has to board it pilot should reduce the speed as they as soon as possible. approached the harbour area. “I’m leaving the bridge”, says the – The pilot, when communicating with master. “I have to prepare some papers The first tug is closing in on port bow the tugs, was speaking a language that before we berth. The second mate will and is ready to receive the heaving line was not understood by the master. This assist you. If you need me, just tell him from the ship. The second mate, who made it difficult for the master to be and he will get hold of me.” has just left the bridge, is now on the fully aware of the situation. forecastle making his first attempt at – The master was over-confident of the The voyage continues and the pilot the heaving line, but misses the tug. abilities of the pilot. gives instructions regarding the He sees that they are now alarmingly – And guess what: the pilot will of necessary course alterations, as the close to the berth and hurries to do his course blame the master for interfering fairway becomes gradually narrower. second attempt. This time he succeeds in his efforts to manoeuvre the ship The ship is still at full speed. and reports back to the bridge that safely alongside because he ordered the line from the tug is on board and full astern! The pilot calls the harbour master (in secured. At the same time the pilot, his native language) and tells him that who has just finished his telephone call, Recommendations and lessons ETA (estimated time of arrival) will be is at the bridge, hectically instructing learned in half an hour. He also gives the three the tugs on how to berth the ship, still – The master is in command of the ship tugs waiting to assist berthing the ship in the local language – this time with a at all times with only one exception: an update on the situation (also in his raised voice. when transiting through the Panama native language). There is no request Canal. Therefore, it is always the duty for translation from the second mate The tugs seem to have problems of the master and the officer of the and no information is volunteered by keeping up with the speed of our ship watch (OOW) to be aware of all actions the pilot. and this is communicated to the pilot. of the pilot. Although the pilot is more The distance to the berth is rapidly knowledgeable about local waters, We continue full ahead. Traffic diminishing and the pilot asks for slow it is the responsibility of the master/ increases as we enter sheltered waters. astern. The master, who is really getting OOW to verify the position through the The background lights from the nervous now, orders slow astern and proper use of charts, radars and other harbour area make it difficult to see even increases this to half astern. The position fixing devices and follow local the difference between moving and pilot orders the aft tug to start pulling in rules on speed and routing.

© Gard AS, July 2014 40 – Voyage planning is crucial in all manoeuvring capabilities during the – Bridge resource management (BRM) situations including when pilots are voyage, as necessary. The master and is important to ensure safety. Any on board. Sufficient time should be OOW should never hesitate to discuss BRM training should include how to allowed for proper communication these matters with the pilot if they feel handle the change in communication, between the master, pilots and OOWs. it necessary to do so. command, and control when a pilot This voyage plan should include every – One should ensure that the vessel is takes over navigation of the ship. important activity starting from the equipped with the necessary updated embarkation of the pilot, entry and charts for the intended voyage. It is not Who is to blame? exit from the berth and finally the sufficient to rely on the pilot to provide Who is then to blame? In practice, both, disembarkation of the pilot. this information. master and pilot, but it is important to – If the pilot communicates with tugs, – The OOW should always closely keep in mind that as the master is in etc., in the local language (which is monitor the activities of the pilot. Many command of the ship, he is the one who likely), the master should ask him to times the pilot will not communicate gets the blame! explain what was said in a common with the OOW regarding the vessel language (probably English). and/or voyage as necessary. The OOW – When the voyage under pilotage should not hesitate to communicate takes the vessel through narrow waters, with the pilot on any relevant matters one should mark “wheel-over” points regarding the vessel or the voyage. either on the chart or at the radar – The OOW should not only be diligent screen in order to know when “points with regard to his duties to ensure that of no return” are reached. This helps the pilot’s orders are properly followed, the pilot, master, and/or OOW to have but should also monitor the pilot’s better situational awareness. activities. If the OOW has concerns – The ship’s crew is normally the regarding the pilot’s activities, he most knowledgeable regarding the should contact the master immediately. manoeuvring capabilities of the ship. – The vessel should have clear Detailed descriptions of the ship’s procedures and instructions to masters manoeuvring characteristics should and OOWs on what to do with a pilot be communicated during the voyage on board. These should be included as planning stage. In addition, the master part of the ship’s safety management and/or OOW should communicate system (SMS).

Gard News 173, Hydrodynamic February/April 2004 interaction between ships

The United Kingdom Maritime and contributory factor in marine casualties extremely helpful Marine Guidance Coastguard Agency Marine Guidance and hazardous incidents. An awareness Note No. 199 (M), which provides Note No. 199 (M) contains advice on of the nature of the pressure fields advice on the causes of hydrodynamic the causes of hydrodynamic interaction round a vessel moving through the interaction and the measures that can between ships and the measures that water and an appreciation of the effect be taken to reduce its effect. Gard can be taken to reduce its effect. of speed and the importance of rudder recommends that owners bring the action should enable a vessel handler to contents of Marine Guidance Note When two ships operate in close foresee the possibility of an interaction No. 199 (M) to the attention of their proximity, like for instance when situation arising and to be in a better navigators. The full text of the note is performing ship-to-ship re-fuelling, position to deal with it when it does available from https://www.gov.uk/ cargo transfer between moving ships, arise. During passage planning depth government/uploads/system/uploads/ or when harbour tugs assist ships in contours and channel dimensions attachment_data/file/282279/mgn199. port, they will be attracted to each should be examined to identify areas pdf other and consequently collision might where interaction may be experienced. happen. Hydrodynamic interaction The United Kingdom Maritime and between ships continues to be a major Coastguard Agency has issued the

Gard News 142, Wash damage July 1996

During the last ten years the thousand dollars of damage to the the vessel to prove that he proceeded Association has registered about 30 shore installation plus a claim for million with safe speed under the present claims per year resulting from wash of dollars for pollution caused by the circumstances and without the risk of damage. Vessels are frequently involved broken hoses. causing damage to other vessels or in cases described as “wash damage” property in the area. A surge effect when they are sailing in rivers and other High speed vessels like liners and between the vessels could also easily narrow waters. The allegation is that a deep draft vessels are often involved in happen when vessels are passing in vessel proceeded at too high speed wash or surge-damage claims. When a narrow waters. One of the vessels, and that the displacement of water vessel is proceeding with high speed, usually the smallest, could be pushed caused the waves to rise and fall which serious wave effects could cause away by the bow-wave and afterwards had the effect of causing other vessels damage even if the vessel is relatively sucked against the hull of the other started to move alongside the quay. far from the vessels moored alongside vessels, or the other vessels could lose If the effect is too strong or a vessel or other objects ashore which could be steering and collide with a third vessel not properly moored or if the mooring damaged. Damage could be caused or run aground. facilities ashore not sufficiently strong, even if the vessel is proceeding with the mooring lines will break or bollards a speed less than the prescribed limit When passing in waters where other may be pulled out of their bases. within the river or port area. There vessels could be exposed to the wave Damage may also be caused to fenders are many factors which may affect effect it is always of importance to and to the quays when the vessel is the creation of waves or the extent notice whether the vessels alongside pressed against the quay or dolphins. of damage caused. There is often an are moving and whether their mooring allegation that the vessel causing the lines were properly attended to or slack. Gangways connected to the vessel can damage passed too close to the other It is also important to record the speed easily be damaged or pushed against vessel or vessels moored alongside. If of one’s own vessel, as well as the time loading or discharging equipment the river is narrow and the vessel deep and approximate distance to the object ashore which, as a consequence, also drafted the effect of the displaced if something unusual is observed or may sustain damage. In a situation water will increase. notice of damage received from other where a tanker connected to loading or vessels. The wave effect of one’s own discharging hoses or chicksan arms is What is considered safe speed for vessel could also be influenced by other affected by wash from a passing vessel, the vessel to steer and manoeuvre vessels passing or one’s own vessel the loading arms may be pulled out of can, under certain circumstances, could be held liable for wash caused by position and break. The consequences be found excessive when looking at another vessel. could be a claim for several hundred the consequences vis-à-vis the other vessels. It will be up to the master of

© Gard AS, July 2014 42 When our local correspondents are Propeller wash claims also frequently propeller could also cause excavation called in to assist they will ask for log occur. When approaching the berth and of the ground under or in close vicinity extracts, speed and course recorder in an attempt to stop the vessel in time, to the berth. Passenger ferries often tapes, report from the vessel and other excess propeller wash may be caused. have their landings close of the centre information which may be of help to This could easily damage mooring of cities where pleasure boat marinas reconstruct the sailing at the time of the boats or tugs which will be affected usually are situated. Boats in these alleged incident. They will also try to by the increased current and can be could easily be affected by the wash interview the pilot and get all possible pushed against the quay or dolphins caused during manoeuvring to berth. information from local authorities who or other vessels nearby. Small boats may have taped VHF Communications can even be filled with water which About 40 per cent of the wash claims and radar observations. When there could cause them to capsize and result registered over the last few years is an allegation of damage caused to in personal injury or death. Propeller occurred in US waters and 35 per cent a vessel it may also be of importance wash during mooring or unmooring in North European waters. to find out whether other vessels in could also cause other vessels moored the area did experience any problems alongside to start moving and collide during the passage of the suspect with a third vessel or damage shore vessel. property. The current caused by the

Gard News 162, Hull and Machinery May/July 2001 incident - The innocent victim (of an unsuccessful berthing manouevre)

The situation arose when a Client’s but without the original crane capacity. detailed operational area throughout vessel (the first vessel) was tied up, Once the crane was completed the the handling of the claim, had to be port side alongside, undertaking vessel was deviated for refitting and documented through memos, minutes cargo operations. Two of the crane rigging. Eventually the vessel was back of meetings, etc. Because the decisions jibs were protruding outside on the in trade in the same condition as she and actions in question were of the seaboard side, well lit and marked. was before the incident took place. sort that are traditionally taken rather The stevedores and crew were having informally in shipping companies, it a meal break when another vessel (the A simple matter to most, repairs became quite difficult to document second vessel) approached in order to are carried out and paid, and the them. dock starboard side alongside behind “wrongdoer” indemnifies the innocent the stern of the first vessel. However, party for the loss and damage. But not Thus, the requests meant a lot of time something went terribly wrong and the so simple! and effort had to be spent to search for well-planned manoeuvre ended up in documents or interview people in order total disaster. The approaching vessel Although there was agreement to recapitulate the relevant facts. hit the two jibs of the first vessel’s crane between the parties as to the liability in succession, leaving one of the cranes of the other vessel, a lengthy debate This incident shows that, even in what inoperative and the other in need of took place about the decision appears to be the most straightforward immediate repairs. taken regarding repairs and the of cases, it is of paramount importance reasonableness of the actions. In spite to be able to document one’s actions The two vessels endured the of various joint surveys throughout the and decisions and to keep records inescapable after-effects of a major repair process, further documentation accessible. claim: surveyors and lawyers attended, was requested. statements and reports were to be prepared. Exchange of securities, Records had to be made available choice of law and jurisdiction occupied regarding every decision, strategic and the claims handlers on both sides. operational, which had the slightest Investigations into possible repair connection with the decision to repair solutions were carried out. Eventually, the crane or run the vessel without owners of the first vessel and their the crane temporarily, the company’s insurers elected to have the repairs scrapping policy, the use of redundant carried out abroad. The decision was cranes after scrapping of other vessels based on past experience and local in the fleet, chartering of substitute knowledge. Hence, the crane most tonnage. Decisions taken on various badly damaged was shipped for levels in the organisation over a span repairs. The vessel continued trading, of several years, or actions taken on a

Gard News 176, Hull and machinery November 2004/January 2005 incident - Consequences of a blackout

this particular design, which is very common.

All the engineers on board this particular vessel were quite sure that the emergency generator was in good working condition, as it was regularly tested. The problem was that during the last test they had forgotten to switch back to automatic mode.

The pilot was on board and the vessel was outbound in a narrow river. Everything was normal until the vessel had a problem with the fuel supply for the auxiliary engines which resulted in a blackout and again shutdown of the main engine and loss of all power (all three auxiliary engines were running on diesel oil). Since the emergency switch was on manual mode, the generator did not start, which again resulted in loss of steering gear power, and the situation suddenly started to be critical.

Before the blackout the vessel speed was approximately five knots. The master lost all steering power and the vessel turned to starboard and “luckily” ended on a sand bank.

The engineers managed to solve the fuel supply problem very quickly and found out why the emergency There are many reasons for a blackout, from either shaft generators or auxiliary generator had not started. The vessel one of them being human error. engines through the main switchboard. was moved with the assistance of tugs In case of a blackout, the vessel in and was taken to anchorage to carry Blaackouts are every mariner’s question was also equipped with an out underwater hull inspections. nightmare, especially if they occur in emergency generator with a separate narrow waters with lots of traffic or emergency switchboard in a separate No damage to the hull was found but during canal passages or in harbour room. The emergency generator the vessel had to stay in anchorage for entrances. Even in open waters, delivered power to the steering gear, 24 hours because of the investigations blackouts can be a problem during emergency lights, etc. Such emergency being carried out by the coast guard. periods of heavy weather. There generators are normally designed have been several cases during canal with a switch on a switchboard, which There are still a lot of vessels trading passage or in harbour entrance where indicates “automatic” or “manual with this particular “design weakness”. a blackout could have led to serious mode”. During normal trade the switch Vessels with this design should have breakdown. will be on automatic mode. The manual routines to avoid incidents like the one is only used for manual start and described above, which could lead to The incident reported below was testing. major breakdowns and unnecessary caused by crew negligence on a vessel costs. Needless to say, one should also heading from one of the rivers in the The normal practice is that the ensure that such routines are followed Gulf of Mexico leading to the Panama emergency generator is tested once a properly. Canal. The vessel was loaded with week by being started with the switch in explosive cargo bound for the Far East. manual mode and then switched back to automatic, otherwise the emergency During normal sea trade on motor generator would not start in case of a vessels the electric power is supplied blackout. A lot of vessels today have

Gard News 178, The interface between hull May/July 2005 and machinery insurance and P&I from the P&I claims handler’s perspective Gard News has a look at the cover of cargo on board the other vessel, and markets,3 and since the P&I for collision liability and liability for persons on board the other vessel insurance will respond to the liability contact damage to third party property who may sustain injury, or other parties that falls outside the hull insurance, under the most common standard hull affected by the consequences of the the P&I underwriter must obtain terms and the P&I Rules, and considers collision, e.g., by the escape of bunker information as soon as possible in order how the two types of cover interact in oil from the other vessel. to properly assess the exposure and practice. protect his interests. All standard hull conditions cover Introduction collision liability, but English terms Some shipowners have placed full (four- P&I insurance is primarily intended to cover only three-fourths. Hence, under fourths) collision liability under their P&I cover a shipowner or operator’s liability English conditions it is envisaged that insurance. This collision liability cover to others and it generally excludes the assured will place insurance for the would be the most comprehensive damage to the insured’s own property.1 remaining one-fourth liability elsewhere liability cover, because all third party Hull and machinery is basically – typically added to the P&I insurance. liability arising out of the collision insurance for the client’s ship as its Such addition must be explicit in the would in principle be covered without primary asset. Where the two types P&I terms of entry. restrictions or monetary limitations. of insurance interact is in the area of However, the shipowner would still collision liability and liability for contact Under the Norwegian Marine Insurance need his hull and machinery insurance damage to third party property. Plan, a shipowner may insure his full to deal with the loss of or damage to (four-fourths) collision liability with the his own vessel. Is it necessary for those handling P&I hull underwriter, but even in such a case claims to understand the basics of there are certain liabilities arising out of Standard hull and machinery conditions hull and machinery terms? For those a collision that would not be covered, also provide cover in respect of liability handling liability for property claims, e.g., liability in respect of death or arising out of the striking by the insured the answer is a definite “yes”. Hull personal injury sustained by persons on ship of third party property other than and machinery and P&I are often the other vessel, or liability for pollution a ship. The insurance covers the risk complementary when it comes to arising out of a spill from the other of loss or damage caused by physical collision liability and liability for damage vessel.2 contact between the hull or the insured to piers, loading cranes and other third vessel (or equipment permanently party property. As a matter of fact, A limitation that applies to all standard affixed to the vessel) and third party the first need of protection insurance hull conditions is that the owner is property, for example a pier or buoy. (the “P” in P&I) arose because hull insured for collision liability up to Americans sometimes refer to such underwriters in the mid-1800s were the insured value of the vessel, but incidents as “allision” but this is not a not prepared to cover more than no further. In certain circumstances, universal term. FFO (damage to fixed three-fourths of shipowners’ collision the collision liability may exceed that and floating objects) is the shorthand liability. Mutual insurance associations insured value, in which case the P&I for striking damage under the English of shipowners evolved to protect each insurance will respond. This is the so- terms. other in respect of losses arising out called “excess collision liability cover”. of bearing one-fourth liability as self- Whereas collision liability is sometimes insurance. Another intriguing aspect is that apportioned three-fourths/one- there are variations in the standard fourth between hull and P&I, the FFO Liability arising out of Collision or hull conditions in different markets liability risk is very rarely split in this Striking on the extent and type of collision way. Standard English hull conditions Collision liability means the liability liability cover. One example: if the exclude the FFO liability risk, which of the insured to third parties who other vessel sinks as a result of the the shipowner would then add to sustain injury, damage or loss as a collision and a wreck removal is ordered the P&I insurance. Under Norwegian result of the collision of the insured by the authorities – would the hull conditions, the FFO liability risk is vessel with another vessel. Such third cover respond to the collision liability usually placed under the hull insurance. parties can be the owner of the other proportion of the wreck removal costs? The same goes for German conditions, vessel involved in the collision, owners The answer will differ across conditions which also provide cover for damage to third party property caused by the movement of the insured vessel even absent any physical contact – e.g., 1 Rule 63 of Assuranceforeningen Gard’s 2005 Rules for Ships excludes damage to the ship or any property damage caused by a wave part thereof unless it forms part of a claim for confiscation under Rule 49. Rule 50, however, allows created by the insured vessel passing at recovery where the member is the owner of the damaged property and would have been liable excessive speed. had the property been owned by a third party. 2 Liability for the cost of cleaning the other ship oiled in a collision, however, is covered by hull insurance to the same extent hull insurance covers collision liability. 3 For example, Norwegian and German hull conditions include removal of the wreck of the other vessel as a collision liability. English and Swedish conditions do not.

© Gard AS, July 2014 45 Again, the cornerstone of the P&I covered. The member is covered for risks with either hull and machinery insurance is that it responds to liabilities the risks specified in Parts II, III and IV or P&I? A vital factor will always be that are not covered under the hull of the Rules as are agreed between the price, but there are other important insurance. Hence, the P&I insurance member and the Association. P&I cover factors as well. From a claims handling would cover “wave damage” liability for collision, striking and damage to standpoint, there are certain benefits when the ship is insured on English hull property begins only where standard of placing the full collision and FFO conditions. hull terms leave off. This is made liabilities with one insurer that ought explicit in Rule 71.6 not to be overlooked. There are also variations in standard hull conditions across markets as to the Rules 36, Collision with other ships,7 In a serious collision or FFO incident, scope of cover for liabilities not caused and 37, Damage to fixed or floating the interplay between the shipowner by collision or striking as defined above. objects,8 cover the liability not covered and affected underwriters is of vital Examples are property damage caused by the hull insurance. Further, Rule importance. Several aspects must be by the use of the ship’s equipment in 39, Loss or damage to property,9 will considered and co-ordinated at an the course of operations, for instance pick up liability for property damage early stage. One such aspect is security the dragging of a sub-sea fibre cable that is not customarily covered by for claims to third parties in order to by the ship’s anchor or the damage to standard hull terms. For example, prevent the arrest of the insured ship. terminal equipment by the ship’s crane. liability for damage to third party Such an arrest may cause material Again, the P&I insurance will respond to property caused by the ship’s use of losses as it will delay the inspection liabilities that fall outside the terms of equipment is not covered by standard and repair of the ship, which may the hull insurance. hull terms. Thus, damage to the dock increase the exposure for the hull and caused by the ship’s cargo gear while loss of hire underwriters. Hence, there Comparison of conditions engaged in cargo operations would will usually be some pressure on the It is beyond the scope of this article be a P&I liability. Because standard hull underwriters to provide security. The to set out all the variations in standard conditions differ, and because P&I is more “patchy” the conditions of cover, hull conditions around the world, but designed to pick up liability only where the more difficult this is likely to be. some of the more important differences standard hull terms leave off, the P&I between English, German and claims handler must know the facts of Sometimes the P&I underwriter is Norwegian conditions are tabled below. the incident and the terms of the hull requested to provide a P&I Club letter policy before deciding whether the of undertaking (LOU) to cover liability P&I cover for collision, striking and particular property claim falls within the that should properly fall on the hull other property damage P&I cover. underwriters, e.g., in a collision case The P&I insurance is designed as a where the hull underwriters cover named risk cover, where only risks that Claims handling considerations three-fourths of the liability. One reason are positively mentioned in the terms What considerations drive a shipowner is that an LOU from an International of entry and the Club’s Rules will be to place collision and striking (FFO) Group Club is more often accepted

Summary of conditions for collision and FFO cover under main hull and machinery terms available

English – ITC Hull 834 German – D.T.V.5 Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan (and other Scandinavian hull terms)

Running Down Clause (RDC): Collision (RDC) and striking (FFO) Collision (RDC) and striking (FFO) Three-fourths to be covered by covered by hull and machinery terms covered by hull and machinery terms. hull and machinery terms, plus liability for damage caused one-fourth to be covered by P&I. by movements of the vessel or Fixed and Floating Objects (FFO): navigational measures including wave Four-fourths to be covered by P&I damage.

4 The Institute Time Clauses, Hulls, 1.10.83 (ITCH 83) remain the most widely-used version of English conditions. Under their latest version (International Hull Clauses 2003) four-fourths RDC and FFO are optional. 5 Deutschen Transportversicherungs Verband; DTV Hull Clauses 1978, revised in 1982, 1984,1992 and 1994. 6 “Rule 71 Other insurance The Association shall not cover: Liabilities, losses, costs or expenses which are covered by the Hull Policies or would have been covered by the Hull Policies had the Ship been fully insured on standard terms (…)”. 7 “Rule 36 Collision with other ships The Association shall cover liability to pay damages to any other person incurred as a result of a collision with another ship, if and to the extent that such liability is not covered under the Hull policies on the Ship, including: – one fourth of the liability incurred by the member; or – four fourths of such liability; or – such other fraction of such liability as may be applicable and have been agreed with the Association (…)”. 8 “Rule 37 Damage to fixed or floating objects The Association shall cover: (a) liability for loss or damage to any fixed or floating object by reason of contact between the Ship and such object, when not covered under the Hull Policies (…)”. 9 “Rule 39 Loss or damage to property The Association shall cover liability for loss of or damage to property not specified elsewhere in Part II of these Rules.”

© Gard AS, July 2014 46 than letters of undertaking from the different markets – all of which are incident from the underwriters involved hull underwriters, and can be arranged subject to varying credit ratings and when the need for assistance arises? more quickly and with less cost. Gard’s enforceability terms – is not attractive There is more to this equation than policy in these circumstances is that for Gard when attempting to assist a the insurance compensation at the a P&I Club LOU can be “injected” as shipowner member in need. end of the day. Immediate, attentive security for liabilities covered by the and specialised casualty handling that hull underwriters if Gard Marine has In such cases, Gard P&I will charge a is well co-ordinated under insurance claims lead on the hull policy. Gard P&I bail fee of one per cent of the security arrangements that are seamlessly will do so against a letter of counter- amount. An additional bail fee of one aligned will save money. Gard P&I and security from Gard Marine covering all per cent per annum will start to accrue Gard Marine are both in the position of hull underwriters. No bail fee will be if the Gard LOU is pending one year being able to provide the full range of charged by Gard P&I from Gard Marine after it was issued. insurance and service that shipowners in such a case, but Gard Marine will need to sleep easy when it comes to require adequate counter-security from Conclusions collision and FFO risks. each of the other hull underwriters for Effective claims handling in high value their respective shares of the potential property cases rests on the ability of the liability and charge a bail fee from each claims handler to understand how the of them. facts of the incident may interplay with different hull conditions. In essence, If, on the other hand, the hull insurance where should a loss fall at the end of is placed elsewhere, Gard P&I may be the day? When the interplay between prepared to issue an LOU as security hull terms and P&I is determined early, for any liability cover by hull, but only there will be more effective decision- against adequate counter-security making regarding the roles of the from one provider (lead hull, bank various insurers. Before deciding on or other financial institution) with an placing the RDC and FFO risks with acceptable credit rating. The collection a particular hull underwriter, owners of a multitude of counter-securities from should consider the service aspects various underwriters who participate that come with the insurance; i.e., on the hull “slip” in sometimes very what will be the likely response to the

Gard News 203, Lloyd’s Open Form August/October 2011 continues to adapt and change: LOF 2011

Gard News summarises changes Branch (SAB), whose role is to provide a LSG agreed that arbitrators’ awards incorporated into the new LOF 2011, reputable and secure framework within or appeal awards and reasons should launched on 9th May 2011. which the LOF arbitration process can be made more widely accessible via a operate. Since 1908 the actual wording subscription to the appropriate area Introduction of LOF has been revised eleven times. of Lloyd’s website.3 A new clause 3 has The Lloyd’s Standard Form of Salvage The curious can find the years of been added to LOF 2011 (on page two) Agreements (Lloyd’s Open Form revision marked on the bottom left- under important notices, subject to the or LOF) is well recognised as the hand corner of page two of LOF.1 conditions set out in new clause 12 of leading international standard salvage LSSA Clauses. The Council of Lloyd’s is agreement. Since its formal inception New developments - LOF 2011 now entitled to make available awards in January 1908, LOF has undergone Following meetings held by Lloyds or appeal awards and reasons on its several revisions in order to meet the Salvage Group (LSG)2 in 2010 and website 21 days after publication of the intervening and changing law and March 2011, the following amendments award, unless: circumstances, severity of maritime to LOF 2000 and LSSA Clauses have accidents, concern over damage to been agreed. The new LOF is known as 1) An appeal has been entered against the environment and the needs and LOF 2011. the award and, if so, the award and concerns of the shipping and salvage reasons will only be made available on industries. Accessibility of awards - another Lloyd’s website either after the notice move towards transparency of appeal has been withdrawn or the LOF, Lloyds Standard Salvage and LOF arbitrators’ awards or appeal appeal arbitrator has issued his appeal Arbitration (LSSA) Clauses and awards and reasons have traditionally award; Procedural rules are all administered been confidential to the parties by the Lloyd’s Salvage Arbitration involved; however, in March 2011 the

© Gard AS, July 2014 47 2) If any party to the award has applied salvors receiving their remittance. A resolved without the parties resorting to the arbitrator to withhold the new clause 13 has been added to to arbitration, the requirement for the publication of the award on the Lloyd’s LSSA Clauses stating that it will now be provision of security for arbitrators’ fees Agency website. If so, the arbitrator sufficient for notice of arbitration etc to will help satisfy any concerns as to the may withhold the award if he/she be provided to those that gave salvage arbitrators’ exposure to the potential considers that there is good reason for security on behalf of cargo interests non payment of arbitrators’ fees. The deferring or withholding accessibility (usually the cargo insurers) as opposed changes described above once again of the award. It is envisaged that this to owners of each unrepresented signify LOF’s ability to adapt and will be done where other litigation is in cargo interest. It is hoped that this change to the needs and concerns of progress and reasons for the award may will significantly reduce the number of the shipping and salvage industries. impinge thereon. notices that are required to be sent. Footnotes Notification to Council of Lloyd’s LSSA Clauses - New clause 14 1 See article “ Lloyd’s Open Form It has generally been the case that LOF In several cases, salvors were able continues to adapt and change” in was agreed and services successfully to reach an amicable settlement Gard News issue No. 197. rendered without any notification to with “represented” cargo interests, 2 The Lloyds salvage Group (LSG) the SAB. This was mainly because but were left with no option but to consists of representatives from Lloyds, salvors and salved interests were able obtain an award against remaining International Salvage Union, Property to reach a quick amicable settlement unrepresented cargo interests, thereby Underwriters/IUMI, International Group and therefore did not require the incurring additional costs. A new clause of P&I Clubs, International Chamber services of the SAB and the LOF 14 has been added to LSSA clauses of Shipping, Intertanko, Admiralty arbitration system. However, it was providing that if a settlement is reached Solicitors Group, Association of felt that the number of such cases between the salvors and at least 75 Average Adjusters and Claims/Brokers. has increased over recent years and per cent by value of salved cargo, an 3 Details of how to apply for it has become very difficult to gauge arbitrator can approve that settlement subscription to the website can be the actual level of use of LOF. A new and order that the agreement should obtained from the Salvage Arbitration clause 4 has been added to LOF 2011 be binding on the remaining cargo Branch (www.lloydsagency.com). (on page two) under important notices. interests thus avoiding the need to Salvors are now required to notify the arbitrate solely against a small minority Council of Lloyd’s within 14 days of their of cargo interests. It is envisaged, engagement and forward the signed however, that an arbitrator will have LOF 2011 agreement or a true copy to be persuaded that settlement was thereof to the Council of Lloyd’s as soon reasonable before he makes such an as possible. order.

Security for arbitrator’s and LSSA Clauses - New clause 15 appeal arbitrator’s fees In some cases, there were concerns It has generally been the case that that costs incurred in collecting salvage salvage security, which traditionally security from low-value container laden covers fees and/or costs of the cargo interests were disproportionate arbitrator as well as Lloyd’s, was to their proportion of any salvage award provided direct to the salvors. There or settlement. A new clause 15 has was some concern that salvage security been added to LSSA Clauses providing was being provided in a form that is that cargo with a salved value below not acceptable to Lloyd’s or has not a figure to be agreed can be omitted been provided at all raising concerns from the salved fund as the cost of on the level of arbitrators’ exposure to including these cargoes is likely to be the potential non payment of fees. New disproportionate to their liability. The clauses 6.6 and 10.8 have been added logic here is to avoid extensive costs to LSSA Clauses providing the arbitrator being incurred for what would be very (clause 6.6) and appeal arbitrator little return. It will be interesting to see, if (clause 10.8) respectively with power this clause is invoked by salvors, exactly to order one or more of the parties to where the level of the value will lie. provide security for arbitrators’ fees in a sum or sums and in a form to be Conclusion determined by the arbitrator. The potential effect of LSSA Clauses 13, 14 and 15 is to reduce the cost Container vessels - Special of collecting salvage security and provisions in relation to salved obtaining an award against the cargo in containers containerised cargo interests. The LSSA Clauses - New clause 13 accessibility of arbitrators’ awards or The Arbitration Act 1996 requires appeal awards and reasons is another notices to be given to the owners of step towards making the LOF process the salved property, which in container more transparent and is likely to lead vessel cases can be several thousand. to more consistency between decisions Some may not have insurance, or may in much the same way as reporting otherwise be unrepresented. It has court cases assists users of the judicial proved expensive and difficult to trace system. The requirement of notification and contact every unrepresented cargo to Lloyd’s of every LOF case will assist owner of a laden container to keep in better gauging the actual level of them advised and as a result this has use of LOF. Whilst it is hoped that delayed any hearing and ultimately salvage remuneration issues can be

Late in the melt season - spring or summer, depending on the location - first year sea ice in particular can become quite ‘rotten’. Its strength reduces much more rapidly than its thickness until the final stages of melting. The same thicknesses of ice can have very different strengths in autumn, winter and spring, which is one of many factors complicating safe navigation in ice. In general, ice is a very complex material that can react to apparently similar loads in very different ways, sometimes shattering dramatically and at other times only crushing locally.

Climate change will not lead to the complete disappearance of sea ice any time soon. Winter ice will remain present in large quantities throughout the Arctic and in most of the other seas where it is now found, although the ice season may become somewhat shorter. Climate change is reducing the volume of multi-year ice in the Arctic, which may have significant effects on the In this article, Andrew Kendrick been positive. Over the years I have economics and risk levels associated summarises his own observations on expanded my ‘ice library’ to include with Arctic operations in the next few how to view the risks of operating many more volumes on accidents and decades. At the same time, there are in ice, and how to ensure that these disasters, ranging from vividly imagined actually larger numbers of icebergs in risks are kept to acceptable levels. retellings of famous events such as the many regions of polar and adjacent This involves understanding the ice, Franklin and Shackleton expeditions waters than has been the case in the selecting the right approach to ship to very dry technical reports on ice past, as glaciers move and calve into design, and providing the operators damage and sinkings in all the ice- the sea at faster rates. Large bergs can with enough experience, training and infested oceans and seas of the world. themselves calve off smaller bergy bits information to match their actions to and growlers. As is well known, about the needs of the voyage. Ice 90 per cent of any type of ice or iceberg All ice is not created equal, and both is submerged. An (idealised) 10 m cube Introduction heredity and environment have strong of ice could therefore have a mass of When I was a boy, one of my favourite influences on what ice can do to a ship. 1,000 tonnes but only a 1 m freeboard books was Walter Lord’s “A Night to Most of the ice that a ship encounters is and very little radar cross-section. In Remember”; the story of the TITANIC. sea ice, formed from salt water. The ice even a modest sea state, this will be The book included a fold-out plan of crystals themselves are fresh water, but effectively undetectable either visually the great ship, so I could follow how brine is trapped in the ice and both the or by radar. the flooding developed, understand brine pockets and the irregular crystal the increasing difficulties of launching structures constitute areas of weakness. Ice hazards the inadequate lifeboats, and (perhaps Ice can become harder as it ages, if the There are three principal mechanisms a few years later) understand how a brine drains out and the ice refreezes by which ice can damage a ship. The combination of design and operational into a more homogeneous matrix. This first is by the ship - hull, propeller, decisions had led most of the partial melt and refreeze is one of the rudder, or other appendage - hitting passengers and crew to disaster. processes that make multi-year ice in the ice. Icebreaking is a succession of polar regions much more dangerous ice impacts, but the largest impacts Despite my early interest in the than first year ice in areas such as the are not the result of continuous TITANIC, I had never expected to Baltic and the Gulf of St Lawrence. icebreaking. They occur when the spend the most interesting part of Glacial ice is very old, fresh and ship hits something heavier than the my career dealing with ships in ice. extremely hard. The best way for ships surrounding cover - a multi-year floe, a This was another low probability, high to handle glacial ice is to avoid it. large ridge, or the edge of the ice if the consequence event, though in this ship has been in open water, a lead or case the consequences have mainly an icebreaker track.

© Gard AS, July 2014 49 In the second mechanism the ice can hit the ship itself. This is a more common hazard for offshore structures, but ships have also been damaged and sunk by wave-induced impacts, or by being hit by large and mobile floes or bergs. Some ships have also had chunks of glacier or large iceberg fall onto them, which in almost all cases is the type of accident that justifies a Darwin award for extreme stupidity.

Finally, there is convergence or pressure. Ice fields are often quite mobile, and can first trap a ship and then exert increasing loads on the sides. Many early explorers, whalers, and other voyagers into ice-covered waters found their ships ‘nipped’ and then crushed by ice pressure. Nansen and some others recognised that this could be avoided by using egg-shaped - and strong - hulls that would be extruded upwards before the pressures became structurally dangerous. However, this is only a realistic option for smaller ships.

Extreme pressure events may cause damage, but quite moderate pressure can bring powerful icebreakers to a stop, or beset them in drifting ice. While there may be no immediate damage risk, ships can be carried into more dangerous areas or may even have to be abandoned after reaching their limits of endurance.

The limitations of rules We still know much less about ice than in some trades and, even more, the interest, and an increasing amount of about many other ship design drivers, introduction of new technologies such activity, in bringing natural resources although we have learnt a great deal as podded propulsors, can change out of the Arctic. These resources about how to design some types of the game in ways that the developers include ores and mineral concentrates, ships to be safe and effective in some of the rules may not have anticipated. oil and gas. In some cases shipping may ice conditions. As an example, the much greater use the same routes and even ships manoeuvrability in ice of ships with of similar size, but these ships may be The Finnish-Swedish (Baltic) ice class podded propulsors can lead to higher used in quite different ways. Producing rules have been developed over a loads on some areas of the hull, and to LNG requires expensive plants, and period of 80 plus years, based partly damage as a result. The rules did not storage of the product is difficult. on theoretical models but much more and could not predict this. This leads to a requirement that LNG on experience. The structural and tankers should be able to operate fast powering requirements continue to be In other ice-infested waters there are and reliably in the most severe ice tweaked, but for ships of similar size even more challenges. The International conditions that are going to be found and configuration to those that have Association of Classification Societies along a route. Similar considerations been used in the Baltic, design to the (IACS) has now promulgated Unified would apply to Arctic container ships, rules will not lead to any surprises. Requirements for Polar Class Ships if the Northern Sea Route or “over This does not mean that ships will not (URs) to replace the previous hodge- the Pole” options do become serious suffer some level of damage, especially podge of national and classification transit options. These types of ship for those with lower ice class than society rules and standards. These will have ice impacts energy levels 1ASuper. They also may from time to URs represent the state of the art in much higher than anything we have time become stuck. The overall Finnish- knowledge of how to design against direct experience of, even with nuclear Swedish system, in which icebreaker ice loads (declaring an interest, I was icebreakers. Below the waterline, the services and navigational control are one of those involved in drafting them). way in which submerged ice pieces as important as the design rules, is However, they are deliberately quite will bounce along the hull has also not designed to be cost-effective rather vague in suggesting what Polar Class been experienced at full scale, or much than 100 per cent reliable. is appropriate to any area or season or researched by analytical or physical service - there is too much variability models. For these types of operation, For any ships that are not “traditional”, to allow for dogmatic statements on the designers have to be very cautious however, even in well-travelled seas what class should be selected without a about applying any rule system blindly. such as the Baltic, designers need to firm understanding of the nature of the be very careful about just “designing operation and the hazards of the route. The challenges of operation to the rules”. The advent of larger ships There is currently a very high level of Returning to the TITANIC, it has been

© Gard AS, July 2014 50 claimed that the owners boasted that is still a very specialised skill, and The biggest danger - as in many areas “God himself could not sink this ship”. forecasting remains difficult; but many of human activity - is overconfidence As another of my mentors once, more polar operations take place with very in our knowledge and capabilities. accurately, warned me, “you can make poor visibility. Modern technology helps Operations in ice are at the frontiers a design foolproof, but not sailorproof”. to mitigate this hazard. of our understanding, and warrant However, I have great sympathy for the cautious approaches to every aspect of operators of ice-going ships, because Risk management their conduct. the designers, researchers and training Whenever a new shipping service in institutes have never really been able ice is envisaged, it is an extremely About the author to give sailors a good understanding good idea to undertake some form of Andrew Kendrick is Vice President, of what the capabilities of their ships risk assessment to identify the new (or Operations of STX Canada Marine Inc., actually are. A very experienced ice modified) hazards that will be faced, and a professional ocean engineer and navigator of my acquaintance once and to select appropriate means of naval architect with over 30 years of told me that there are three speeds risk mitigation. My own experience of experience. His work with ice-capable for operation in polar ice - slow, dead these exercises is that they need to be ships has encompassed design, applied slow, and dead stop. This was certainly kept within a relatively small group of research and development projects, appropriate for the relatively low ice participants, but at the same time need and participation in the development class ships he was familiar with, but is to include a broad range of experience of rules, standards and numerous not adequate for the new generation and real domain expertise. They guidance documents for design and on polar shipping. should also draw on both enthusiasts operation in ice-infested waters. and skeptics for the project - perhaps The Russian administration requires insurers could play an active role on the ships to have “ice passports” (now sceptical side of more teams. certificates) that provide curves of safe speeds for ships in various ice Risk assessments will not necessarily conditions. This is an excellent concept, provide precise answers to questions but there is no generally accepted way such as “how strong is strong enough?” of generating such curves. Furthermore, or “how fast is too fast?” because we the great variability in ice conditions are still lacking some basic knowledge - strength, thickness, concentration, of how ships behave in ice. Generally, floes size, etc. - gives any set of curves though, approximate answers are a very limited range of validity. Several good enough for planning and applications have also been made of design purposes, as long as they are instrumentation systems intended to then coupled with properly cautious give warning of when local (or global) operation. hull stresses are reaching dangerous levels. This also has drawbacks. In my In the medium and longer term, there personal experience the damaging is a continuing need for research and loads have an uncanny ability to be data collection into many aspects of where the sensors are not. However, ice operation. In the 1970s and 1980s both sensors and certificates can play much of the groundbreaking work in a useful role and represent modest ice technology was funded directly by costs when set against the very large government bodies, and found its way expenditures involved in building quite rapidly into the public domain as ice class ships, and the even greater a result. Recently, practice has shifted liabilities in the event of significant towards industry funded projects, damage. with some positive but other more regrettable consequences. It takes ever It is also absolutely crucial to invest in longer for safety-related information to the right sailors and in good quality be published, or even to have proper ice information. The Canadian and levels of peer review. This leads to a lot Russian governments require the use of reinvention of wheels, not all of which of ice navigators on many voyages are actually round. When a theoretical in the Arctic, and most experienced model is being used as the basis for owners and operators do this even any risk assessment, two key questions when it is not mandated. To date, that should always be posed are, firstly, there are no international standards what form of full-scale validation can for how to qualify as an ice navigator, be provided, and, secondly, what is the and there is a heavy reliance on the use range of validity of the approach. of ex-icebreaker captains, a species with a very finite supply. This is widely Conclusion regarded as being a major area of It is quite possible to operate safely concern for future ice operations. in almost any ice conditions found in the world’s oceans, using ships with The ice information situation on appropriate designs and equipment, the other hand has been improving crewed by skilled and experienced substantially in recent years, with mariners, and supported by good the advent (amongst other things) quality information. However, it is all of satellite sensing, enhanced too possible to make poor decisions communications, and specialised ice in any one of these areas, and to run radar. The interpretation of ice images unacceptable risks as a result.

Gard News 207, Safety culture - August/October 2012 Incidents resulting from human error

Gard’s claims handlers see a large rotation of discharging, tank cleaning a) they would have realised the number of claims every day and and loading. They are in for a busy two potential danger of the situation sooner although these may vary a lot in nature days at the port. and would have corrected the pilot in and size, from small petty claims to time to prevent a dangerous situation, very serious ones, there are common So far so good, but the trouble starts or features present in them that may be when the second officer makes the pilot b) they would have intervened and worthy of some reflection. aware of a green buoy on the port bow, taken more adequate steps when it was which should have been to starboard. obvious that the pilot had erred and It is no secret among claims executives At the same time there is a large echo panicked. that in claims of all sizes and types on the radar further ahead on the port certain common features can usually be bow, which obviously indicates a large There are unfortunately a number of observed: vessel on an opposite course. The claims which seem to be attributed to 1. The lion’s share of claims can be second officer observes that the pilot the master and the OOW (officer of the attributed to human error of some sort. gets very nervous as he gives a rudder watch) relying too much on the pilot 2. Claims caused by human error occur order to port, which eventually leaves and not monitoring and questioning in spite of what seems to be adequate the green buoy on the starboard bow, his instructions. The pilot is only an efforts by operators to prevent them, but also the large echo on the radar. advisor and guide to the OOW and i.e., management and quality systems. Now the situation is picked up by the the responsibility and liability for the 3. The largest claims are sometimes master and the chief officer and they navigation and manoeuvring of the those which can most clearly be ask the pilot what is going on. The pilot vessel rest with the master and the OOW attributed to human error. replies that he made a mistake about even when the pilot is on the bridge. the position in the river. The master Some practical cases can serve to gets nervous about the approaching Grounding illustrate how the human element plays vessel appearing on the radar, which A vessel is under way on an ocean a role in claims. This article describes a is now also physically visible. The crossing with course set out from few examples taken from real incidents, master orders full ahead and hard start to end. The course is set out and involving high-quality managers to starboard, which is immediately the voyage planned on a small scale and owners who have strong focus executed. At this point the VTS also planning chart. The course is set to on quality management, which will picks up on the situation and calls the pass some small groups of mid-ocean probably be of interest to readers. vessel on the VHF. As the vessel makes islands and the CPA (Closest Point of a sharp turn to starboard, its port Approach) is considered and thought Collision and grounding quarter makes contact with the bow to be well on the safe side. On a nice A loaded chemical tanker of about of the approaching container vessel tropical night with calm seas and good 5,000 TDW is inward-bound on a river. and then steers directly against the visibility, the vessel makes its approach The river is navigable by a deep- riverbank where it runs aground before to pass one group of islands well on the water channel about 500 m wide and the officers on the bridge are able to port side some time after midnight. clearly marked with light buoys, with correct the course and reduce speed. mud banks on each side. The river The chief officer observes during the is covered by Vessel Traffic System Human error last two hours of his 1600-2000 hrs (VTS) and pilotage is mandatory. The What actually happened in the case watch that a slight breeze and current vessel is about midway in the six-hour described above was that the pilot are working together to set the vessel passage from pilot station to berth. misinterpreted the radar and thought slightly off course and towards the Fog is limiting visibility to some two that the bend in the river was further islands ahead. He therefore makes a cables (365 m), which is roughly three ahead than it actually was. Suddenly correction to the course to compensate times the vessel’s length. The vessel is realising his mistake, he panicked and for the drift and setting to keep the proceeding at 10 knots and the pilot is gave a hard to port rudder order so as vessel on its intended course. When giving rudder orders varying between to avoid grounding, but disregarding handing over the watch at 2000 hrs, the rudder angles and courses. the approaching vessel ahead. It was chief officer makes the second officer later found that stopping the engine aware of this. The second officer is on look-out and and performing an easier port rudder stand-by duty on the engine telegraph manoeuvre would have led the vessel The second officer continues to plot and is also monitoring the helmsman to pass the meeting vessel port to the positions throughout his watch and making sure the pilot’s rudder and port and well clear of the riverbank to observes that the vessel is still drifting course orders are followed. The pilot starboard. somewhat off course to the effect of relies to a large extent on the radar in making the CPA to the islands ahead his navigation. The chief officer, who has It is probable that had the vessel’s less safe than planned. He therefore the navigation watch, and the master officers on the bridge taken a more makes some minor course adjustments are at the back of the bridge discussing active part in the navigation of the vessel to compensate for drift and setting. At the upcoming port call and plans for during that particular passage then: midnight the watch is handed over to

© Gard AS, July 2014 52 the first officer, who is also made aware It is also possible that proper look-out covered by the hot work permit. The of the drift and the course adjustments. and use of radar could have been an result is a big explosion and loss of lives At 0040 hrs the vessel runs aground issue. On the other hand, the island and major damage to the vessel. at full speed on the beach of a small was very low and it is arguable that it low atoll. The beach is mainly sand could not have been spotted visually Conclusion and pebbles and slopes at a low angle in time in the dark tropical night. It is The above examples are not unique. into the sea so the vessel suffers minor unclear whether and why the island The list goes on, with a number of damage but can not be re-floated was not seen on the radar, but it is a small and large cases within all claims with its own power. A costly salvage known fact that radars are subject to segments apparently caused by lack operation follows. a lot of interference in tropical waters of attention and/or lax attitude to and it could be that both the rain and standards of safe operation. Human error sea clutter settings had been adjusted The positions were plotted in the same to deal with that, thus at the same time Much has been written and said about small scale planning chart covering removing or diminishing the radar safety culture and the crux of the the entire ocean where the voyage image of the island. problem can probably be summed was planned and the course set out. up as doing the right thing at the In a small scale chart it is difficult to Other claims right time, firstly preventing and then accurately measure small distances The above examples focus on responding to minor and major and observe small deviations from navigation, which is possibly where incidents with potential for damage to the course between hourly plots. The one sees most clearly the impact of the life, environment and property. reason for using a small scale chart was human element. There are, however, a probably that it was not considered number of other claims types where the Operation of ships is full of regulations, necessary to conduct “millimetre” human element is often seen to play a instructions and guidelines which navigation when crossing the ocean. significant role. officers and crew are expected to The island on which the vessel know and adhere to. The ISM Code grounded was marked on the chart in In some claims of a more technical has to a large extent codified what is use, but only as a small dot and the nature sometimes shortcuts and known as good seamanship. A culture course was set to pass at what seemed omissions in maintenance and of safety may perhaps be achieved to be a safe distance. operation have consequences such through written instructions, but in as engine breakdowns, in some cases the end it is a question of a common The drift and current, however, worked followed by groundings or collisions. mind-set throughout the organisation. together to set the vessel off course Management ashore and on board towards the island and it is painfully One issue that springs to mind is the need not only ensure that the formal obvious that the corrective actions recommendations for fuel treatment that skills are in place but also ensure, taken by the navigation officers were come with the analysis reports of fuel, encourage and inspire the necessary not adequate. which in some claims are not adhered attitudes to achieve the safety to. This can result in complex and objectives. Statistics prove beyond It can be concluded that the grounding technically difficult claims to deal with. doubt that investing in a good safety would not have happened if: culture provides results and pays off in a) a large scale chart had been used for Human error may also play a role in the long term. It is the lack of a safety position plotting since it would then more tragic cases, such as explosions culture that is costly, not safety itself. have become apparent that the course and fires, often with severe injuries and was heading gradually towards the even fatal consequences. The classic island, and/or example is where a hot work permit is b) a much wider passing had been given for a specific location on board a planned in the first place, and/or tanker in ballast and, after conclusion of c) a considerable safety margin had the relevant welding work, it is decided been applied when the corrections on the spot that while they are at it, were made to compensate for drift they will also do some minor welding and setting. work in another location, which is not

Gard News 209, The evolution of the February/April 2013 York-Antwerp Rules – On hold until 2016 By Richard Cornah, Chairman, Richards Hogg Lindley, Average Adjusters and Marine Claims Consultants, Liverpool.

No support at CMI 2012 meeting for Marine Insurers (IUMI) expressed their sanctioned at the then forthcoming York-Antwerp Rules amendment. dissatisfaction with many aspects of 2012 CMI meeting in Beijing. In the general average, both in terms of the event, compromise proposals put The concept of general average and the cost of the procedures and the misuse forward by a CMI working group and York-Antwerp Rules are sometimes seen that operators of sub-standard ships were the British Marine Law Association as a throw-back to past times that have considered to be making of the system. which modified or put to one side little relevance to the modern shipping the more contentious aspects of the and commercial environment. However, They therefore proposed a radical 2004 Rules relating to salvage and the arguments for an abolition or change whereby general average crew wages, were not supported significant restriction of general average would be limited to common safety at the meeting. Many maritime law have been met with the realisation that only, and all costs relating to ports of associations and industry bodies felt general average losses and expenses refuge would be excluded. CMI agreed there had been insufficient time for would not go away, simply because the that these concerns and proposals consultation. concept that had been used to identify should be looked at closely and and distribute them was extinguished discussions took place at subsequent However, many present, including or curtailed. The same risks would CMI meetings, leading up to their 2004 shipowners’ representatives, felt that continue to exist and would need to be conference in Vancouver. the compromises suggested would allocated between the parties under provide a framework for a new set of the contract of affreightment, and There was little support in the rules that could meet with general arrangements then made for insurance preliminary meetings or at Vancouver acceptance. of that exposure with property or for the radical restriction to the liability insurers. “common safety” concept, with The working group therefore delegates taking the view that the recommended to the CMI Executive Unlike international conventions that existing system for dividing costs at a Council “that it should appoint a are at the mercy of ratification by port of refuge was widely understood new International Working Group on individual states, the York-Antwerp and generally worked well. The General Average, with a mandate to Rules are incorporated into virtually advantage that was recognised was that carry out a general review of the York- all bills of lading and therefore apply action can be taken promptly within a Antwerp Rules on General Average, as a matter of contract, thus achieving known framework, leaving legal issues and, noting that the York-Antwerp Rules uniformity on a truly global scale. to be sorted out later; any change 2004 had not found acceptance in the would be likely to increase the number ship-owning community, to draft a new Since the first rules were formulated of costly disputes, particularly relating set of York-Antwerp rules which met in 1860 by an international group of to the abandonment of voyages. the requirements of the ship and cargo owners, insurers, adjusters and other owners and their respective insurers, interested parties, the rules have However, delegates supported a with a view to their adoption at the 2016 been updated periodically. Initially, number of incremental changes CMI Conference”. as the success of the project became proposed by CMI that included the apparent, the changes were largely to exclusion of salvage, a reduction The new working group includes increase the scope of the rules, thus in allowances for crew wages and representatives from the International securing greater uniformity with each temporary repairs, and amendments Chamber of Shipping and IUMI, and new version. Since 1924 the scope to allowances for commission and others attending in an individual and format of the rules have remained interest. The new 2004 Rules were capacity, including Richard Cornah of recognisably the same, but periodic passed without the support of The Association of Average Adjusters amendments continued to be made shipowners’ bodies, which felt that the and Michael Harvey of Association to meet changes in the commercial changes were premature and unhelpful. Mondiale de Dispacheurs. Given the shipping environment. New versions The absence, for the first time, of a time that is now available, the working were agreed in 1950 and 1974 and the consensus among all interests was group has the opportunity to carry out 1994 revision saw important changes reflected in a very limited adoption of a “ground up” review of all aspects relating to environmental issues. The the 2004 Rules in bills of lading, and the of general average. In addition to revisions are overseen by the Comité 1994 Rules remained the most widely topics discussed previously, the group Maritime International (CMI), made used. will need to consider the impact of up of some 50 national maritime law ever larger container vessels, the associations, which since 1947 has Compromise – By 2016? introduction of the Rotterdam Rules effectively been the custodian of the CMI were concerned that this situation and the increasing intervention of York-Antwerp Rules. was contrary to the objective of national and international authorities in uniformity and, during the latter part managing casualties. Dissatisfaction of 2011, began preliminary discussions Following the introduction of the with interested parties to see if a 1994 Rules the International Union of compromise set of rules could be

Gard News 210, UK Hydrographic Office’s May/July 2013 ECDIS workshops

Help is at hand for the integration of now holds over 12,000 Electronic Digital integration workshop ECDIS into shipping fleets. Navigational Charts, including unique The first workshop, Admiralty Digital coverage for over 200 of the world’s Integration, provides a nine-stage step- Maritime navigation is going digital. biggest and busiest ports. Over 200,000 by-step process to ensure the ECDIS Revisions to the Safety of Life at Sea pieces of information are triple-checked is compliant, safe and efficient. This (SOLAS) regulations requiring the every year, making sure that the workshop has been delivered world- carriage of Electronic Chart Display and available navigational data is as safe as wide during 2012 attracting over 1,000 Information Systems (ECDIS) on the possible. representatives of the shipping industry. commercial shipping fleet are ushering Due to its popularity it will continue to in a new era of voyage planning and The key to the digital transition is early be presented in 2013. navigation that relies upon digital preparation. With dozens of ECDIS charts. However, whilst the adoption of models on the market and differing flag Captain Paul Hailwood, an digital navigation may be mandatory, state and class society requirements internationally-respected expert it is not simple. To comply with the on ECDIS Type Approval certificates, on ECDIS and integrated bridge revised regulations in a safe, timely and installation standards and approved operations, who leads the workshop, efficient manner, shipping companies training, there is a huge amount for explains what delegates can expect: need to plan ahead for the integration owners and operators to think about. “Many shipping companies are of ECDIS into their fleets. The picture will continue to evolve daunted by the prospect of preparing during 2013 as shipping companies for ECDIS and under-estimate the The revised SOLAS regulations focus on the practical aspects of how time required to properly plan for the requiring the carriage of ECDIS on compliance is not only achieved, but integration of digital navigation into most large vessels mark a historic also demonstrated. their fleet. Our workshop will not only change to the way that ships navigate. help shipping companies to understand ECDIS carriage becomes mandatory With all this in mind, 2013 is set to be how to comply with the revised SOLAS for different ship types and sizes on a a significant year in the transition to regulations, it will also help them to rolling basis that began in 2012 and will digital navigation, with the pace of arrive at the optimal ECDIS solution be complete in 2018.1 change expected to rapidly accelerate that is right for their fleet, right for their as the shipping industry responds to crew and right for their operations”. The transition to digital navigation has the scale of the challenge that it faces. not only required action by shipowners, At every stage, there are important In the workshop delegates are taken operators and officers, it has also decisions to be taken by shipowners through the nine stages that they need placed a greater responsibility on and operators over the right approach to follow in order to achieve a safe and those charged with producing accurate to take towards integrating ECDIS, efficient transition to digital navigation. navigational data in a digital format, with serious repercussions if the wrong ready for use on ECDIS-equipped choices are made. This is why the The nine-step process for a safe and vessels. The UK Hydrographic Office UKHO has developed two workshops efficient transition to digital navigation. (UKHO) is working harder than ever to to assist shipping companies with the meet the needs of the global fleet. The transition to digital navigation.2 Stage 1 Admiralty Vector Chart Service (AVCS) The first step in the process is to identify the key SOLAS compliance dates for your fleet. Different vessel types and sizes face different compliance deadlines, with existing vessels required to install ECDIS before their first survey once the regulations are in force.

Stage 2 With the key compliance dates established, owners should then conduct an initial ECDIS risk assessment that identifies the general risks faced by their fleet during the ECDIS adoption process. This should take on board the views of both seafarers and shore staff, with the purpose of establishing a strategy for the adoption of ECDIS, including a time line.

The nine-step process for a safe and efficient transition to digital navigation.

© Gard AS, July 2014 55 Stage 3 Again, ships’ officers should be years and continues to set the global The third stage in the process is to involved in this process, with necessary standard for navigational data, with plan for ECDIS training. Ensuring that refinements made to ECDIS operating its Admiralty paper and digital chart seafarers are compliant and confident in procedures. and publication services used on the the use of ECDIS is perhaps the biggest majority of international commercial challenge of the digital transition. Stage 8 ships. AVCS, which now holds Between now and 2018, it is estimated Once ECDIS training, procedures and over 12,000 Electronic Navigational that up to 200,000 officers must installation are complete, the flag state Charts, offers the widest official chart undertake generic and type-specific will need to approve the ECDIS as the coverage available for major shipping ECDIS training. It is vital to ensure that primary means of navigation for each routes and ports. The UKHO is also any course is approved by a marine ship. Each vessel will then be ready to playing a vital role in supporting administration on the STCW white list make the transition from paper charts the shipping industry’s transition to and is accepted by the flag state of the to ECDIS. This transition can take place digital navigation, including its ECDIS vessel on which the officer will serve. over several months, in order to build workshops. It is also important that the relevant up officers’ experience and confidence. ECDIS manufacturer approves type- The mandatory carriage of ECDIS is just specific training. Stage 9 one item on the task-list of the shipping The final step in the process is to industry’s hard-pressed Superintendents Stage 4 implement ECDIS on board. A good and Fleet Managers. However, a Once the shipowner has chosen an way to support this process is to place successful digital transition that uses ECDIS manufacturer, they must ensure an ECDIS-experienced officer on board ECDIS to its full capacity can deliver the correct installation of ECDIS. It to assist with the implementation, much more than regulatory compliance. is important to verify that the ECDIS mentor other officers and develop By enhancing situational awareness on Type Approval certificate is acceptable common standards. the bridge, ECDIS can deliver improved to flag state and to comply with both safety and operational efficiency, with flag state and classification society Policy and procedures workshop the commercial benefits that follow. requirements for the installation process The second workshop, Admiralty itself. It is also necessary to consider Guide to policy and procedures for the For more resources to assist with back-up systems, redundancy and on- operational use of ECDIS, is a response the transition to digital navigation, going maintenance of ECDIS. to the requests from those attending including the Admiralty ECDIS the first workshop for more detail and workshops taking place throughout Stage 5 assistance with regulatory requirements 2013, visit www.admiralty.co.uk. Alongside the installation of ECDIS, and development of ECDIS policy and each shipping company needs to procedure. Footnotes establish safe and efficient ECDIS 1 See article “ECDIS implementation” operating procedures that are To achieve SOLAS carriage in Gard News issue No. 208. appropriate to its business, its policies requirements for the use of ECDIS as 2 The UK Hydrographic Office is the and its operational needs, as well a primary means of navigation, the power behind the Admiralty brand as being suitable for its vessels. ship’s Safety Management System shall of global navigational products and Such ECDIS procedures should include procedures for the operational services, which is the official provider of be incorporated into the Safety use of ECDIS. This workshop utilises the workshops. Management System. the expertise of the UKHO to assist shipping companies to achieve this Stage 6 important requirement. Just as safe navigation has always relied upon accurate paper charts, shipping Legal requirements for the adoption companies operating an ECDIS must of ECDIS may appear complex and ensure the use of up-to-date official vary with interpretation. The workshop Electronic Navigational Charts (ENCs). will clarify these issues and provide a Where ENCs are not available and checklist of items and issues required by flag requirements can be met, Raster international standards. This will assist Navigational Charts, which are exact the shipping companies to prepare for digital copies of paper charts, may be any port state inspection or third party used. This requires ships to properly audit relating to the ECDIS. manage their charts, using a tool such as the Admiralty e-Navigator PC Policy and procedures for the application. This is the easiest way operational use of ECDIS should be to include the Admiralty Information developed through a structured risk Overlay, which is displayed as a layer on analysis process. The workshop will top of the electronic chart, highlighting identify the hazards associated with Admiralty Temporary and Preliminary the operation of ECDIS and control Notices to Mariners, along with measures to adopt to minimise the navigationally significant differences risk. Although the shipping industry between ENCs and paper charts. is an expert at risk assessment, it is identifying the hazards and control Stage 7 methods which require expertise in Having already undertaken a fleet-wide ECDIS. The UKHO is well placed to risk assessment, shipping companies provide this expertise. should then conduct individual ship ECDIS risk assessments in order to Conclusion identify the hazards and procedures The UKHO has been charting the specific to the vessel and its ECDIS. world’s oceans for more than 200

Gard News 211, Hull and machinery August/October 2013 incident – Voyage planning and grounding

A grounding with valuable learning The next OOW, the Chief Officer, not marked on the chart. Determining points. arrived on the bridge, read the such a small passing distance on an Master’s Night Orders, checked the overview chart was unsatisfactory and The incident GPS and noted from the cross-track did not conform to the company’s During preparation for departure from error display that the vessel was on instructions of clearing distances when a loading port, the 2nd Officer of a the course line. He then sat on the a vessel was in open waters. cargo vessel was assigned a number pilot’s chair immediately adjacent to of different tasks. Once the loading the radar display. It was very dark and Although the bridge team was aware was completed he was called on deck he was unable to assess the visibility. that they would be passing close to to assist with the bunkering, search Before stepping down, the 2nd Officer some islands, they were not aware of for stowaways and carry out draught informed him about the course and when that event would take place. The checks. However, he did not have which waypoint was up next. The small marking of critical areas on the charts sufficient time to complete the full group of islands and the presumed would have assisted the bridge team in passage plan for the voyage ahead. In rain shower observation were not maintaining good situational awareness the time available, he prepared a table mentioned. of the hazards ahead. of waypoints for the route and entered the waypoint coordinates into the GPS The Chief Officer then glanced at the Both the 2nd Officer and Chief Officer receivers. A quick brief took place prior radar screen and saw a large echo were not aware that their vessel to departure, focusing only on the very close ahead. He assumed it was was heading towards the group of upcoming pilotage and tug operation. generated by a heavy storm cloud. He islands. This was because there was no then felt the ship hit something. The indication on the plotting chart to alert During the first morning of the voyage vessel had hit an island and had run them of the dangers ahead. It appeared the 2nd Officer replaced the coastal aground. The ship had grounded on that the bridge team was focused on chart with the overview chart, which the only group of islands present within following the GPS track superimposed covers the Pacific Ocean, and marked hundreds of miles. on the radar screen instead of the route on the chart and on the monitoring the vessel’s position in plotting sheet. He noted that between The financial impact of the incident relation to surrounding hazards. Some two of the waypoints the course line was severe for owners and insurers. hours before the grounding, the 2nd passed close to a small group of The incident led to the total loss of the Officer noticed a large defined echo islands some days into the voyage. The ship and cargo, the escape of the ship’s on the radar screen which he failed to planned passing distance was assessed bunkers and possible damage to the identify or investigate as a possible by the 2nd Officer to be 10 NM, which environment as a result, but, fortunately, land mass. This important information was believed to be an acceptable no loss of life. was not passed to the Chief Mate and passing distance. On the local overview neither did the Chief Mate notice it on chart the course line almost touched Lessons learned the radar screen. the islands because of the small scale. The officer of the watch was following on the plotting sheet and did not Bridge resource management On the fourth evening of the voyage consult the BA chart which was Several companies have adopted the Master completed his Night Order available on board. No-go areas were the concept of bridge resource Book in the usual manner, without any not marked on the plotting sheet. The management to address performance reference to the approaching islands. course took the vessel directly over the variability. The positions marked on the plotting island. A number of contributory factors sheet showed that the vessel was were present, but this article will focus Bridge resource management is often making progress in accordance with on “passage planning and positioning” defined as effective management the plan. During the 2nd Officer’s night and “bridge resource management”. and use of all resources, human and watch, he suddenly observed a large technical, available to the bridge team. echo on the radar screen on the port Passage planning and positioning The objective is to ensure the planning bow. He assumed this had to do with When the 2nd Officer had initially and execution of a safe passage. One the weather forecasted on the weather drawn the course line on the overview of the most important aspects of bridge routing map and suggested to the AB chart, he made an error in plotting the resource management is its potential present that they could expect some waypoint that was close to the island. protection against human error. Bridge heavy rain showers. Binoculars were This resulted in a course line indicating resource management is not limited used to verify the information, but it that the vessel would clear the group or confined to the execution of the was too dark to see anything. The 2nd of islands by about 10 NM. If the passage plan, but is intended to be Officer noted that the assumed rain correct waypoint had been plotted, applied throughout the entire process, shower was passing clear down the port the resulting course line would have including the planning of the passage. side at a distance of about 5 NM. No indicated that it passed directly over further investigations were made. one of the islands. No-go areas were

© Gard AS, July 2014 57 Reminder: Pilot transfer Gard Alert, 21 June 2012 arrangements - revised requirements applicable to existing ships Revised requirements covering • Installed replacement equipment see IMO Resolution A.1045(27). An some safety aspects of pilot transfer shall, insofar as is reasonably updated poster reflecting the revised arrangements have been introduced practicable, comply with all aspects of requirements has been prepared through changes to SOLAS Regulation the revised requirements. by the International Maritime Pilot’s V/23 and apply to “equipment and • Other existing installations will not Association (IMPA). The updated poster arrangements for pilot transfer which be affected as long as they are in is reproduced below. are installed on or after 1 July 2012”.1 compliance with the old requirements. Footnotes Although the revised requirements Gard’s Members and clients should 1 The revised SOLAS Reg.V/23 was adopted affect primarily new ships, i.e. ships familiarise themselves with the by the IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) constructed on or after 1 July 2012, revised requirements for pilot transfer during their 88th session, see MSC.308(88) or for which the building contract is arrangements as stipulated by SOLAS dated 3 December 2010. The term “installed on placed on or after 1 July 2012, some of Regulation V/23. For ships fitted with or after 1 July 2012“ should in this context refer to a contractual delivery date for the system to the requirements also apply to existing mechanical pilot hoists or shipside the ship, or if this is not available, the date it ships constructed before 1 July 2012. doors opening outwards, replacements was actually delivered to the ship. However, this and modifications should be carried does not apply to equipment and arrangements The revised requirements for existing out in order to ensure compliance also installed on or after 1 July 2012, which is a ships in summary: after 1 July 2012. All replacements replacement of equipment and arrangements provided on board existing ships before 1 July • Mechanical pilot hoists shall not be and modifications should be carried 2012. Reference is also made to IMO MSC.1/ used. out in close co-operation with the Circ.1375 “Unified Interpretation of SOLAS • Shipside doors used for pilot transfer Classification Society and Flag Regulation V/23”. shall not open outwards (applies to Administration. ships constructed before 1 January 1994, and must be modified not later For details of all relevant requirements than the first survey on or after 1 July for pilot transfer arrangements, please 2012).

© Gard AS, July 2014 58 The Netherlands - Revised Gard Alert, 2 May 2013 North Sea shipping routes come into force on 1 August 2013 Extensive changes have been • Areas around objects such as Members and clients are also reminded announced to the routeing system in platforms have been reconfigured. that updated nautical charts must be the Dutch North Sea. The North Sea • Introduction of ‘areas to be avoided’ available on board before the changes is one of the world’s most densely and ‘precautionary areas’. Vessels take effect. New nautical charts and trafficked sea areas and the changes will not be allowed to sail in ‘areas to ENC’s are due to be released in mid- are made in order to ensure the future be avoided’, while vessels sailing in June 2013. safety of shipping and improve access ‘precautionary areas’ will be requested to the main Dutch ports. to navigate with care. Further information on the forthcoming changes can be found on the The changes will come into force on 1 From April 2013 onwards, maritime website of Rijkswaterstaat (part of August 2013 at 00:00 UTC (02:00 local traffic will regularly receive messages the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure time) and include: focusing on the revised routes and and the Environment): www.rws.nl/ • Introduction of a new Traffic Members and clients are recommended newshippingroutes. Separation Scheme (TSS) in the to advise their Masters operating in the approaches to Ijmuiden. Vessels sailing area to monitor the messages through in opposite directions will have separate the usual channels. Notices to Mariners sea lanes. will be published on the websites of • Routes are located further from the Netherlands Hydrographic Office the coast. (www.hydro.nl) and the United Kingdom • Reduced number of route Hydrographic Office (UKHO) (www. intersections. ukho.gov.uk). • Relocation of anchorage areas.

All vessels arriving at the Panama Canal, (TFW)2 drafts greater than 12.04 metres Members and clients should also note whether for docking or transiting, must and approved for transit of the new that, once the new locks are operational comply with Maritime Regulations for locks. (late 2014 or early 2015), vessels the Operation of the Panama Canal New Panamax: All vessels with transiting the Canal for the first time, and the authorities’ Notice to Shipping dimensions greater than Panamax or whether newly-constructed or newly- No. N-1-2012, “Vessel Requirements”, Panamax Plus that comply with the size modified, are subject to inspection and dated 1st January 2012. and draft limitations of the new locks; prior review and approval of vessel’s namely, 366 metres in length by 49 plans. Vessels without prior approval In Advisory Note No.A-28-2012, dated metres in beam by 15.2 metres TFW and/or not in compliance with Canal 23 November 2012, the Panama draft. requirements may experience delays or Canal Authority (ACP) outlines the be denied transit. requirements applicable to vessels • Vessel Requirements Section 8 - intending to transit the new locks Construction, number and location of Footnotes upon completion of the current chocks and bits. 1 For further details and current status Canal expansion project.1 These new of the Panama Canal expansion project, requirements primarily involve changes Details of the new requirements please see the webpages of ACP. to: can be found at http://www. 2 Tropical Fresh Water of Gatun Lake, pancanal.com/common/maritime/ density 0.9954 tons/m3 at 29.4oC. • Vessel Requirements Section 2 - Size advisories/2012/a-28-2012.pdf and are and draft limitations of vessels, with the of particular interest to shipowners and introduction of two new designations: operators with existing Post-Panamax Panamax Plus: All Panamax vessels vessels and/or with plans for large authorized for Tropical Fresh Water newbuildings.

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