Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 31, April, 1985 Iran, Iraq, Page 33560 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved. Land battles Attacks on shipping and on civilian targets Concern over treatment of prisoners of war

Summary and key dates

Attacks by both sides on Gulf shipping (July 1984 to March 1985). Iranian offensive in Meymak Heights (October 1984). Iraqi attacks near Basra and Qasr-e-Shirin (). Failure of major Iranian offensive in southern sector (March). Diplomatic mediation efforts (July 1984 to March 1985). Concern over possible use of West German pesticides plant in Iraq to produce nerve gas (August 1984). UN report on treatment of prisoners of war in Iraq and Iran (Feb. 22, 1985). Renewed attacks on civilian areas (March).

After several major land battles in late 1984, the Iraqi Army in March 1985 successfully turned back a major Iranian offensive aimed at cutting the strategic to Basra highway. While observers generally agreed that the balance was shifting in favour of Iraq (due mainly to widespread foreign support and to an improved economic situation—see 33495 A), the Iranian government insisted on continuing the war, although after the failure of its offensive it appeared to have dropped its demand that President Saddam Hussein of Iraq be overthrown.

Attacks by both sides on Gulf shipping

The stepped up its attacks on foreign shipping travelling to or from Iran during this period. Most of these attacks, apparently using Exocet missiles fired from French-supplied Super Etendard aircraft, were directed against oil tankers inside the Iraqi-declared “war zone” (extending from the Shatt el-Arab to 60 miles south of the main Iranian oil terminal at Kharg island—see map on page 33057). Iran responded with increased air attacks on traffic to Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the (UAE), which had all expressed broad support for Iraq. This resulted in the staging of joint air defence patrols by the Kuwaiti and Saudi Air Forces (at least one Iranian aircraft having been shot down by the Saudis in June—see page 33059).

An Iranian ship in the northern Gulf was damaged by an Iraqi attack on July 19, and on Aug. 7 Iraqi aircraft damaged a Greek tanker south of Kharg island, which was itself attacked in an Iraqi air strike two days later. On Aug. 11 Iraq claimed to have hit five ships in a convoy approaching the Iranian port of Bandar Khomeini [see map], and also to have shot down three Iranian fighters which had been providing air cover for the convoy. The crew of a Cypriot tanker were evacuted by Iranian helicopters on Aug. 23 after the ship had been set on fire in an Iraqi attack south of Kharg.

While Iraq claimed more successful strikes than were confirmed independently, the Iranian government never publicized its own attacks; Iranian responsibility was therefore surmised from the nature of the targets hit, from the direction of the attacks and from (occasional) identification of Iranian aircraft involved.

Two Panamanian tankers were hit by missiles believed to have been fired from Iranian jets on Aug. 18 and 27 respectively, both attacks taking place to the east of Qatar. After an Iranian tanker had been hit on Oct. 16, Iranian bombers attacked a diving support ship near Qatar on Oct. 19, killing at least three members of the crew. Survivors were rescued by United States naval units which had been patrolling in the vicinity.

Iraqi air attacks on shipping were intensified during December and early January.

At least nine ships were reportedly hit, including a Greek tanker, which was hit twice on successive days, a Liberian-registered tanker on which two crewmen were killed and a Norwegian tanker which was hit by a missile some distance south of the “war zone”, resulting in a formal protest to Iraq from the Norwegian government. Iran responded with attacks on an Indian tanker carrying Saudi oil on Dec. 24 and on a Spanish tanker headed for the Saudi oil terminal at Ras Tannura two days later.

It was reported during December that Iran was currently completing construction work on a makeshift terminal at Sirri island, in the southern Gulf, to which oil would be brought from Kharg in a shuttle service operated by small tankers travelling close to the Iranian coastline, thereby obviating the need for large foreign tankers to risk the journey into the northern Gulf.

The increased incidence of attacks on tankers near Kharg was reflected during December by a rise in insurance charges, with Lloyds of London quoting rates for the northern Gulf of 12 per cent for hulls and 5 per cent for cargo.

The incidence of attacks on shipping declined slightly during the first three months of 1985, although pressure was maintained by both sides. Lloyds reported on that a total of 127 ships had suffered confirmed hits in the Gulf since the outbreak of the war.

Iraqi aircraft hit a West German supply ship near Kharg on Jan. 20, and two days later carried out a strike on a Dutch salvage tug well south of the “war zone”, this being the first occasion on which such a vessel had been attacked. On Jan. 27 a Greek tanker travelling between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was hit by a missile presumed to have been fired from an Iranian aircraft. Two Greek tankers in the Kharg area were damaged in Iraqi attacks in early February, and on Feb. 14 one crewman was killed when a Greek ship was attacked off Bushire (an Iranian port further south); the ship subsequently exploded and sank while being towed into port. Iranian air attacks damaged a Kuwaiti container vessel and a South Korea tanker north of Abu Dhabi (UAE) on Feb. 18–19, and on Feb. 22 a Saudi ship was struck by a missile north-east of Qatar. A Liberian-registered tanker was hit by an Iraqi missile while travelling from Kharg to Sirri island on . A tanker carrying crude oil from Kuwait was hit by an Iranian missile off Qatar on , while on the same day Iraqi aircraft attacked a tanker and an oilfield supply vessel off Kharg. Two further tankers, one Italian and one Maltese, were hit by missiles near Kharg on . Two days later, a Panamanian tanker on charter to the Kuwait National Oil Company was hit as it travelled south from Kuwait. The majority of forces on both sides during late 1984 and early 1985 remained concentrated in the southern sector, along the border from Al Qurnah southwards to the Shatt al-Arab, and it was in this area that the predicted Iranian offensive was thought likely to take place. In anticipation of this, Iraq continued work begun in April 1984 [see page 33057-58] on the construction of artificial lakes, involving the flooding of marshes and dry land on both sides of the border from an area around the Majnoon islands southwards towards Basra. Iraqi aircraft also flew periodic sorties against the Iranian troop concentrations in the area. Mr Hossein Moussavi, the Iranian Prime Minister, insisted on Sept. 3 that the Iranian offensive had been delayed “due to tactical reasons” only, and he added that “both the war and our diplomatic efforts will continue until the realization of our aim” to overthrow President Hussein.

Earlier, on July 27, Hojatolislam Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Speaker of the Majlis (Iranian parliament) had suggested that Iran was willing to follow “the diplomatic way” of achieving its war aims, and that President Hussein might be deposed “through a qualified tribunal”. No further explanation of this comment was given.

A limited Iranian offensive was launched on Oct. 18 against Iraqi positions on high ground in the Meymak Heights area, just inside the Iranian border some 50 miles south-east of Mehran [see map]. The avowed aim of the operation was to remove the threat of Iraqi artillery from villages and army positions around the town of Dehloran, in a valley to the east of the heights. After five days of heavy fighting, the Iranians succeeded in dislodging the Iraqi units from most of their positions along the heights, although further progress was limited by Iraqi counter-attacks.

In what was seen as an attempt to harass preparations for an Iranian offensive in the southern sector, Iraqi ground forces attacked Iranian positions opposite Basra on Jan. 28, 1985, making use of a corridor of dry land between two flooded areas to move tanks and armour across the ground between the lines. Iran acknowledged the attack but claimed that it had been beaten back. A further Iraqi attack was launched the following day against Iranian units in the vicinity of Qasr-e-Shirin, a town lying on the Iranian side of the border 25 miles north-east of Khanaqin, in an area where Iranian forces had reported some successes in early 1984 [see page 33057]. On Jan. 31, the Egyptian newspaper Al Ahram alleged that the Iraqi operation had been facilitated by reconnaissance information from either US or Soviet satellites.

Iran launched a major offensive on , 1985, involving an estimated 100,000 men grouped in seven divisions, in an attempt to establish a bridgehead across the Tigris river and seize control of part of the strategic highway running from Baghdad to Basra. The initial thrust was aimed in the direction of the towns of Al Qurnah and Kahla [see map on page 33057; Kahla lies some 20 miles to the north of Al Qurnah].

Iraqi communiqués acknowledged the Iranian offensive and tacitly admitted that Iraqi forces had been forced to retreat. Towns in the vicinity were evacuted, and roads closed to all but military transport, as reinforcements, including units of the elite Republican Guard from Baghdad, were moved up to the front line. By , Iranian soldiers had fought their way to the banks of the Tigris, and a small advance party succeeded on in establishing a tenuous bridgehead close to Al Qurnah. Military observers noted that in establishing the bridgehead Iran had used tactics very similar to those employed by Gen. Ariel Sharon when he had led an Israeli contingent across the Suez Canal during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war [see page 26174]. Both operations had consisted of advances by small infantry units supported by armour which had broken through a gap between two of the enemy's army corps.

The Iranian advance was, however, hampered by the nature of the terrain, which was for the most part unsuitable for tanks or other heavy vehicles. The close concentration of Iranian infantry also came under increasingly heavy attack from Iraqi aircraft and helicopter gunships, which encountered little opposition from either Iranian air power or anti-aircraft guns.

Iraqi forces succeeded in containing the advance on March 17, on which day they were also reported to have surrounded or driven back those Iranians who had crossed the Tigris. Over the next few days the Iranians were forced to retreat to positions occupied prior to the launch of the offensive. Baghdad radio broadcast a statement on calling on the Iraqi people to celebrate victory in “the greatest battle of the war”, adding that they “were born to conquer the Persians”.

From the first days of the offensive, Iranian officials had, as before, accused Iraq of employing chemical weapons [see below and page 33058]. Although Iraq continued to deny having done so, doctors treating injured Iranian soldiers in hospitals in West Germany, Britain and Belgium confirmed on that a number were suffering from symptoms identical to those caused by the use of mustard gas. The US State Department reported on that preliminary evidence in its possession supported this assertion, and it added that Mr George Shultz, the US Secretary of State, had condemned the use of all chemical weapons during a meeting on with Mr Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Both the use of chemical weapons and the continuing raids against civilian targets were denounced by Sr Javier Pérez de Cuellar, the UN Secretary-General, on , following separate meetings in recent days with Mr Aziz and an Iranian Foreign Ministry official.

The war was discussed at a meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization's mediation committee on July 18–19. The committee called upon both sides to end attacks on Gulf shipping, and authorized its president, Sir Dawda Jawara, President of The Gambia, to visit Baghdad and (the Iraqi and Iranian capitals respectively) as part of an effort to seek common ground between the two countries.

Discussions on the war also took place during a meeting in Damascus on Aug. 5 between President Assad of Syria (an ally of Iran) and Shaikh Sabir al Ahmed al Jabir as Sabah, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister. Shaikh Sabah's visit coincided with that of Mr Moshen Rafiqdust, the Iranian Minister of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, although the two men were not reported to have met. [Relations between Kuwait and Iran had been severely strained since bomb attacks in Kuwait in December 1983—see 32692 A]

Mr Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, announced on that he had sent two envoys to see Iraqi and Iranian leaders and to discuss possible ways of ending the war. After meeting with the envoys, President Hussein announced on that he was prepared “to reach a just and comprehensive peace, in accordance with principles of international law, mutual respect of sovereignty and non-interference in each other's affairs”. In a televised address on the same day, however, Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian leader, insisted that the war must continue “until the international community accepts Iran's right to punish the aggressor”.

A report of the US Senate foreign relations committee, published on Aug. 27, 1984, stated that both the US and Soviet governments had increasingly shifted their stance from impartiality to support for Iraq. The report noted that 11,500 US troops were currently stationed in the Gulf. Members of the committee had visited Iraq and other Gulf States, but not Iran.

A meeting of Foreign Ministers of Arab League states, which took place in Baghdad on Aug. 26, called on the Syrian and Libyan governments (both of whom were members of the League, but whose Ministers did not attend the meeting) to change their stance of hostility towards Iraq. [For the subsequent visit to Baghdad by King Hussein of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt, see page 33565 below.]

Following claims by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that a pesticides manufacturing plant which had been supplied to Iraq by the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in December 1983 could be used to produce the nerve gas tabun, the West German government announced on Aug. 7 that it would tighten controls on the export of all chemical manufacturing equipment. The government subsequently made repeated but unsuccessful requests to the Iraqi government for permission to send a team of experts to the plant in order to verify its usage. [Iraq had earlier been widely accused of employing chemical weapons, including tabun, against Iranian troops—see page 33058; 32689.]

It was reported at the end of November that a consignment of advanced French Mirage F-1 fighter aircraft, equipped to carry Exocet missiles, had recently arrived in Iraq.

Mounting concern among the international community over the treatment of prisoners of war (POWs) in Iran and Iraq came to a head in October.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported on Oct. 25 that its representatives had witnessed an incident at a POW camp near Susangerd when Iranian guards shot rioting Iraqi prisoners; six POWs had been killed and 35 wounded. Mr Alexandre Hay, the current president of the ICRC, called on those states which were signatories of the Geneva Conventions (which in part provided for the humane treatment of POWs —see 10198 B; 10639 A—and which had been signed by Iran) to compel the Iranian authorities to observe the requisite convention's provisions.

The Iranian government stated on Oct. 27 that the riot had been provoked by the ICRC representatives, and that three prisoners had been shot while trying to escape, while the remaining three had been killed by their fellow-POWs. After further Iranian statements attacking the ICRC and accusing it of espionage, Mr Hay stated on Dec. 7 that the Iranian government was mounting a “campaign of slander of unprecedented violence” against the ICRC, and on the same day it was reported that ambassadors of European Community member countries in Tehran had been instructed to seek a meeting on the matter with Dr Ali Akbar Vellayati, the Iranian Foreign Minister.

A UN request to send a team to look into the alleged abuses of POWs in both countries was approved by the Iraqi and Iranian governments in mid-December.

The UN team visited both countries during January, inspecting POW camps and also civilian areas allegedly damaged by recent shelling. (In this connexion it reported clear evidence of shell damage at sites inspected in Iran, but was less certain as to the origin of damage viewed in Iraq.) Its report, published on Feb. 22, concluded that both states had “systematically violated the Geneva Convention” in their treatment of POWs. Finding that Iraqi POWs in Iran had been physically maltreated and subjected to political indoctrination, the report nevertheless emphasized that the most serious abuses had been inflicted on Iranian POWs in Iraq, who had suffered widespread torture, including “whipping, beating with truncheons or electric cables, assaults on sexual organs and kicks, often on a part of the prisoner's body which had been wounded”.

In response to the report, the Iranian government stated on Feb. 24 that it was willing to release all sick or disabled Iraqi POWs. On the same day, the Iraqi government said that it was prepared to implement an exchange of POWs (which had been recommended by the report) together with other recommendations, on the condition that the UN security Council agreed on a programme which would be binding on both sides. The report was discussed on at a security Council debate, which had been demanded by Iraq prior to the report's publication.

During the period December to February, the Iranian government made repeated claims that Iraqi aircraft were carrying out raids on civilian targets, thereby violating the June 1984 moratorium on such raids, which had been agreed in response to an appeal from Sr Perez de Cuellar [see page 33059].

In particular, Iraqi aircraft were said to have attacked the construction site of a nuclear power plant at Bushire in mid-February and also a major steel complex at Ahwaz in early March. After several warnings of retaliation, Iranian artillery shelled Basra on , provoking several days of mutual shelling and bombing of major towns, including Dezful, Bakhtaran and Isfahan in Iran and Mandali, Basra and Margasur in Iraq. Both Baghdad and Tehran suffered small-scale air raids on March 11. After repeated appeals from Sr Pérez de Cuellar, both sides agreed to halt attacks on civilian targets from midnight on March 12. However, it was reported on March 14 that an Iranian long-range missile attack on Baghdad the previous day had been followed by Iraqi air strikes which killed 17 people in Tehran and Tabriz.

Over the next few days Iraqi aircraft raided several towns and cities in Iran, including Tehran, Qazvin, Dezful and Andimeshk. On March 17 the Iraqi government declared that it would henceforth regard all Iranian airspace as a war-zone, warning that this could lead to the shooting down of civilian airliners. The announcement, which led to an increase in the rate of departure of foreigners from Tehran, resulted in the majority of foreign airlines suspending all flights to Iran. Baghdad was again struck by Iranian missiles on March 18 and 24, while Iraqi raids against Iranian towns, including Tehran, continued. The Iraqi government had initially insisted that the attacks on Baghdad were caused not by Iranian missiles but by explosives planted by saboteurs. Military observers, however, ascribed the attacks to Soviet-made Scud missiles (a relatively inaccurate long-range weapon dating from the 1950s), and on President Hussein acknowledged that the Iranians had used missiles which he claimed had been “supplied by some Arab traitors” (this being seen as a reference to Syria and Libya).

A further Iranian attack on Baghdad was launched on March 27, and on the following day, in the heaviest attack on civilian targets during the war, Iraqi aircraft raided nine Iranian cities, causing heavy civilian casualties. The attacks were well-publicized in the Iraqi press, which also reported a warning from President Hussein that further raids would follow “in order to end the war”.— (International Herald Tribune - Times - Guardian - Le Monde - Financial Times - New York Times)

(Prev. rep. 33056 A)

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