COMMENTARY TURKEY’S KURDISH QUESTION AND THE PEACE PROCESS

Turkey’s Kurdish Question and the Peace Process

YILMAZ ENSAROĞLU*

ABSTRACT Turkey currently is witnessing a series of events that are most likely to go down in history as truly important milestones. The country is attempting to tackle the age-old Kurdish question. Thus far, the peace process has given rise to more hope than ever. Yet, it has not been devoid of worries and concerns. Hope arises out of the fact that we are witnessing major progress that was un- imaginable until a short time ago. However, the shadow of past experiences makes it difficult to overcome reservations.

espite the lengthy history of ly rejected the existence of a Kurdish the Kurdish question, the per- identity. The Southeast Problem in- Dsistent coexistence of various cluded references to underdevelop- political approaches failed to create a ment and inter-regional disparities in mutually acceptable term to describe addition to geography and implicitly the issue at hand. Until now, various indicated that eliminating economic political groups generated their own challenges would automatically re- terms to describe the problem and solve the Kurdish question. developed policies based on these concepts. Various terms including In a short time, public opinion re- the Eastern Question, the Eastern ferred to the Kurdistan Worker’s Party * Director Problem, the Southeast Problem, the (PKK) as “the terrorist organization” of Law and Terror Problem, the Kurdish Problem, due to the organization’s adoption of Human Rights and the Kurdistan Question all come violent means in its struggle and vi- Department, of, SETA to mind. There is no question that olent attacks that harmed civilians Foundation each term rested on serious political and official targets alike. Following deliberations and certain prejudices. the emergence of the PKK, successive Insight Turkey Vol. 15 / No. 2 / Such terms as the Eastern Question governments conveniently reduced 2013, pp. 7-17 referenced geography and essential- the Kurdish question to a security

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In 2009, the AK Party issue and initiated talks focused on a government sparked “terror problem.” In response to the public debate on a PKK’s terror from below, the state developed various means to create “Kurdish opening.” a terror from above campaign that This initiative legitimized torture, kidnapping, dis- ensured an in-depth appearances, unaccounted murders, and forced migration as counter-ter- discussion of the ror measures. Simultaneous actions Kurdish question and from the PKK and the state created a long-enduring view that there was carried the issue to indeed a “terror problem” in Turkey. the mainstream

Without a doubt, the first and fore- most condition necessary to create a lasting solution is an accurate diag- powers as opposed to a question of nosis and nomenclature. In order to identity. succeed in these efforts, we must de- velop a holistic approach to evaluate Having emerged out of the residue all aspects of the matter, including its of a multi-cultural, multi-lingual and root causes, and distinguish between multi-religious empire, the Repub- the issues that gave rise to the prob- lic embraced Turkish identity as the lem itself and the set of problems that primary source of unity and sought emerged out of the main problem. to subdue all non-Turkish elements through denial. As a result of these policies, the Republican regime de- Root Causes and Relevant nied all ethnic groups, including the Outcomes Kurds, banned their native languag- es and attempted to assimilate them The problem that Turkey is attempt- through various channels. An au- ing to tackle today has a long history. thoritarian brand of secularism that Under Ottoman rule, various com- led to the Caliphate’s abolishment ac- munities with distinct languages and companied these nationalist policies. religions co-existed within the millet In this context, the government shut system where each group exercised down numerous Kurdish madrasas a certain degree of autonomy within and religious orders (tarikat) to erad- its domain. In many areas, each millet icate knowledge and tradition dating followed its own set of legal norms. back several centuries. However, the Ottoman Empire ad- opted measures to strengthen central Early on, Turkey’s Kurdish popula- authority as tensions began to arise tion reacted to these policies of de- between the Kurds and the state. Sim- nial and assimilation and rebelled ply put, it was an administrative issue against the Republic. In response to between the imperial center and local these rebellions, the state adopted

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the most severe military measures of Kurdish fighters. Particularly the and eventually exiled the Kurds to younger generations who believed various parts of the country through that they had lost everything experi- forced migration and relocation. The enced the greatest trauma of all. securitization approach and its many manifestations continued over many One of the leading factors contribut- years as the relationship between the ing to this great trauma among the Kurds and the state continuously de- Kurds is the body count associated teriorated. According to the Kurds, with the Kurdish question. While the the state became an oppressive insti- exact number of dead remains un- tution –even an enemy- that denied known, the discrepancy between the their identity and deemed it appro- accounts of Kurdish historians and priate to subject them to all kinds the official numbers is noteworthy. of atrocities. In turn, the Republican Nonetheless, even the most optimis- elite perceived the Kurds as either a tic estimates indicate that over 45,000 group of rebels and bandits or a wild people perished during 21 rebellions “kind” that needed to be disciplined over the first 14 years that followed and modernized. the Republic’s establishment. Simi- larly, over 45,000 people are believed to have died in the context of Turkey’s The Costs of the Kurdish Question anti-PKK campaign.

The Kurdish question entailed major In turn, the state allegedly spent an costs not only to the Kurds but the estimated 150 to 400 billion US dol- entire society and country over the lars on counter-terror measures. The years. Without a doubt, the Kurds most common estimate puts this had to bear the worst circumstanc- number at around 300 billion US dol- es as they were denied and ignored lars. In other words, Turkey set aside while their language was outlawed an annual 15 billion US dollars over and their names had to be changed. the past twenty years in its efforts to The state-imposed forced migration fight the PKK. The financial burden led Kurds to be forcibly removed of the counter-terror campaign un- from their homelands and to live mistakably did significant damage to among an unfamiliar people whose the regional and national economy. language they did not speak. Further- more, exile inevitably doomed them The Kurdish question did not only to unemployment and poverty. All create social and economic problems these policies devastated the Kurds in but also jeopardized the country’s po- social, economic, cultural, and psy- litical and judicial systems. The issue chological ways. The trauma became engendered two distinct legal and po- even deeper as violence and oppres- litical systems, which coexisted in the sion grew and the rising number of same country. Following the intro- dead, injured, and arrested Kurds ac- duction of military rule (örfi idare) in companied the increasing population 1925, a state of emergency (sıkı yöne-

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tim) remained in place between 1978 Resolution Attempts and 1987 and continued as emergen- cy rule (olağanüstü hâl) from 1987 to The history of government policies 2002. Simply put, the Kurds endured that created the Kurdish question various forms of extraordinary ad- and resolution attempts to address ministrative measures for decades in the issue date back to the initial years addition to a quarter century of unin- of the Republic and the single-party terrupted military rule. Similarly, the period. However, successive govern- introduction of the Anti-Terror Law ments during this period focused and various amendments to criminal their efforts on reporting the events. law, an alternative legal order was es- A significant portion of the body of tablished for this region. Moreover, reports considered the Kurdish ques- failure to resolve the Kurdish ques- tion as a matter of security and order, and recommended that the Kurds be disciplined through military mea- What really facilitated the sures and assimilated through denial, relocation, and forced migration pol- Kurdish opening, however, icies. The official reports largely in- were talks that the National formed government practices during Intelligence Agency held with the single-party period. Although Turkey’s transition into a multi-par- Abdullah Öcalan and the ty democracy and the Democratic PKK –which later came to be Party’s rise to power led to a certain degree of moderation, the govern- known as the Oslo Process ment failed to develop an in-depth approach toward the Kurdish ques- tion. Instead, the government sought tion perpetuated military tutelage to develop relations with the Kurds over Turkey’s democracy and made by incorporating local notables, such it impossible for democratization at- as the leaders of Kurdish families and tempts and reform initiatives to be- religious orders, into their parlia- come fully operational. mentary group.

A long list of factors including but not In recent years, President Turgut limited to aforementioned historic Özal’s 1991 pledge to resolve the developments transformed the Kurd- Kurdish question marked the first ef- ish question into a complex prob- fort to address the issue. While Özal lem with social, political, economic, continued his efforts, Prime Minister cultural, psychological, and security Süleyman Demirel and Deputy Prime implications. As such, it would be Minister Erdal İnönü declared that impossible to generate a lasting solu- they “recognized the Kurdish reality” tion or resolution initiative without (sic.) during a visit to Diyarbakır in a holistic approach that addresses all 1993. In response to efforts and ini- aforementioned dimensions. tiatives for a peaceful resolution from

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Sirri Sureyya Onder (L) and Pelvin Buldan (R) read Abdullah Ocalan’s message on March 21, 2013, in the southern Turkish city of Diyarbakir. STR / AFP

Özal and others, the PKK declared bakır.” However, a series of attacks its first-ever unilateral ceasefire on and political maneuvers rendered March 20th, 1993. A two-month ex- these initiatives ineffective. The ex- tension followed after one month. periences of peace advocates, includ- Two days after the PKK’s renewal of ing politicians, bureaucrats and even its ceasefire, President Özal passed military personnel, discouraged and away amidst popular claims that derailed all resolution attempts. he was assassinated in order to pre- vent him from resolving the Kurdish Finally, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan question. 40 days after Özal’s death, a was captured and transferred to Tur- PKK death squad killed 33 soldiers in key in 1999. Although the PKK de- Bingöl. This brought the first period clared unilateral ceasefires on sev- of ceasefire to end. eral occasions and even resolved to withdraw from Turkey, successive In 1996 and 1997, Prime Minister governments failed to seize these op- Necmettin Erbakan voiced his inten- portunities and even misused them tion to resolve the issue while Mesut for short-term benefits. For instance, Yılmaz pointed out that the govern- a 1999 military operation targeted ment was compelled to address the PKK militants who followed Abdul- Kurdish question as part of its EU lah Öcalan’s orders to withdraw from membership bid by stating that “the Turkey and claimed 500 lives. There road to the EU goes through Diyar- is no question that this event contin-

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ues to motivate the PKK’s current ef- behavior for great states” and thereby forts to secure legal reassurance. emphasized that they intended to re- solve the issue with more democracy, equal citizenship, and greater welfare. The 2000s: The AK Party and the Kurdish Question Erdoğan’s address represented the state’s official recognition of the Kurd- Following the AK Party’s rise to pow- ish question. However, the Prime er in 2002, initiating negotiations Minister’s statements led to diverse for EU membership represented a reactions: Positive feedback from priority item on its political agenda Kurds and pro-peace groups was met through the initial years. In this con- with harsh criticism from nationalist/ text, the government enacted a series Kemalist circles. Therefore, the gov- of reforms intended to meet the Co- ernment failed to take steps to com- penhagen Criteria. The great majori- plement Erdoğan’s Diyarbakır ad- ty of reforms (i.e. abolishing the state dress immediately. Moreover, various of emergency, decreased detention new restrictions on rights and liber- periods pending trial, abolishing the ties, including government-endorsed State Security Courts, eliminating amendments to the Anti-Terror Law legal restrictions on the Kurdish lan- and the Law on the Duties and Pow- guage, lifting the ban on Kurdish-lan- ers of the Police, were enacted over guage publications, etc.) was directly the next years while the reform agen- or indirectly relevant to the Kurdish da practically came to a standstill. question. These reforms, coupled with the credentials and background of many AK Party politicians, created The Kurdish Opening hope among Turkey’s Kurds and re- sulted in widespread support for the In 2009, the AK Party government party in Kurdish-dominated areas. sparked public debate on a “Kurdish opening.” This initiative ensured an Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 2005 meet- in-depth discussion of the Kurdish ings with intellectuals in Ankara and question and carried the issue to the his subsequent statements during a mainstream. Against the background visit to Diyarbakır received serious of lively public debate, the AK Party attention not only from the Kurds encouraged all social groups to voice but also from national and interna- their opinions and offered to work tional audiences. This marked the together toward a peaceful resolution first instance that a Prime Minister instead of making a concrete pro- of Turkey explicitly referred to “the posal. However, popular reactions Kurdish question” and announced against the initiative led the AK Par- that this was also his problem. More ty to revise the program’s name sev- significantly, Erdoğan initiated talk eral times. The government adopted of reconciliation by stating that “ig- the term “Democratic Opening” to noring past mistakes is not suitable replace the original title, which was

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followed by “the National Unity and Fraternity Project.” Although the re- The current peace/resolution form process led by Minister of the Interior Beşir Atalay failed to engage process in Turkey represents and incorporate political parties, an effort that builds upon the it made it possible for the govern- experience and the know-how ment to engage in lengthy delibera- tions with professional associations, of the Oslo Process as opposed NGOs, universities, the media, and to a new beginning public intellectuals. As such, the gov- ernment strived to receive comments from all parties willing to contribute to the process. During this period, the Agency, and former directors of the National Assembly held its first-ev- organization on February 7th, 2012. er session on the Kurdish question and its resolution while the govern- An important contribution of the ment worked to arrange for a group Oslo Process was that it eradicated of PKK militants stationed at Camp the perception that direct talks be- Mahmour in Iraqi Kurdistan to enter tween the state and the PKK were an the country. The arrival of a total of extraordinary affair and provided an 34 militants (eight from Mount Qa- opportunity for both parties to get to ndil and 26 from Camp Mahmour) know each other and their exact de- led to celebrations at Habur (Ibrahim mands. Truly, the current peace/res- Khalil) border crossing while protests olution process in Turkey represents took place across the country. an effort that builds upon the expe- rience and the know-how of the Oslo Process as opposed to a new begin- The Oslo Process ning. In other words, the contribu- tion of the Oslo Process must receive What really facilitated the Kurdish due credit for the ongoing success of opening, however, were talks that the the peace process. National Intelligence Agency held with Abdullah Öcalan and the PKK Unfortunately, the PKK attack on Sil- –which later came to be known as van, Diyarbakır and the subsequent the Oslo Process. The Oslo Process recurrence of violence interrupted marked the first instance that Turkey the Oslo Process as sound recordings engaged in direct talks with the PKK from one of the meetings was leaked and Öcalan. Furthermore, there was to ferment distrust and doubt. In no outrage when the minutes were the meanwhile, the PKK’s increased leaked through a news agency in Tur- activity was met with more military key. However, a group of disgruntled operations from the state. Still, by members of the police and judiciary the end of 2012, the PKK had failed attempted to detain Hakan Fidan, to initiate its “People’s Revolutionary head of the National Intelligence War” while the state proved unable

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A Kurdish man waves a BDP (Peace and democracy party) to eliminate the organization. Pre- al Intelligence Agency and Öcalan flag during cisely during this period, hundreds reached a certain level, two deputies celebrations of inmates –convicted PKK members serving in the current Parliament, for Nowruz, on and defendants at ongoing KCK tri- Ahmet Türk and Ayla Akat, met with March 17, 2013. als- located in various correction fa- Öcalan on January 3rd, 2013. AFP / Gürcan Öztürk cilities engaged in hunger strikes and even ‘death fast’ to call upon the gov- ernment to end Abdullah Öcalan’s The Current Peace Process isolation on the island of İmralı. Fol- lowing a lengthy interruption, the The İmralı meeting between Abdul- PKK were able to make contact with lah Öcalan and the two deputies of- their imprisoned leader and the hun- ficially initiated the current peace ger strikes ended following Öcalan’s process. On February 23rd, 2013, a press release. This was followed by second group of deputies that includ- Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statement a ed Pervin Buldan, Altan Tan, and Sır- few month later that “the state would rı Süreyya Önder visited Öcalan in re-initiate talks with Öcalan if nec- prison. Following the meeting, BDP essary.” This was an indication that officials travelled to Iraq and Europe renewed contact facilitated discus- to meet with PKK and KCK leaders. sions not only on the hunger strikes Öcalan authored three letters to the but also about the development of a PKK base on Mount Qandil, the or- lasting solution to the Kurdish ques- ganization’s European wing and the tion. Once talks between the Nation- government in Ankara following the

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preliminary meetings and had these either negotiating party to send mes- delivered through official channels. sages to one another and the broader After lengthy deliberations among public. In other words, a parallel ne- the Kurds, Öcalan made a historic gotiation is being held through var- ious media outlets, which not only increases expectations but also cre- ates a considerable amount of disin- It is possible to formation. However, the multitude of claim that the PKK’s commentators during such processes disarmament and seems to cause misunderstandings and thereby create additional chal- constitutional and lenges to the peace process. Similarly, legal arrangements to it is necessary for observers to watch their tone and avoid using a language address the Kurdish that humiliates and/or ignores the question are likely to opposite party. follow the withdrawal At the same time, there is need for third parties to serve as intermediar- ies during the peace process. Particu- announcement during Newroz cel- larly for this reason, the merits of es- ebrations in Diyarbakır: “We have tablishing certain commissions came now reached a point where guns to the public’s attention in the coun- must go silent and ideas and politics try. In this regard, a 63-member Wise must speak. We will unite in the face Men Commission was established of those who try to split us. From now from among intellectuals, academ- on, a new period begins when poli- ics, artists, and NGO representatives. tics, not guns, will come to the fore. The Commission held its first meet- It is now time for armed elements to ing with Prime Minister Erdoğan, withdraw outside the country.” The Cabinet members and bureaucrats in PKK leadership on Mount Qandil re- Istanbul on April 4th, 2013. This inter- sponded positively to Öcalan’s mes- mediary body is expected to serve as sage and declared ceasefire only days a messenger between various social after their announcement of loyalty. groups and decision-makers and to help create a fertile ground for peace- ful resolution. Quite significantly, The Peace Process and Perception Prime Minister Erdoğan emphasized Management that the Commission would work in- dependently and not on behalf of the Currently, only a handful of people AK Party or the Turkish government. are in charge of the peace process This emphasis on the body’s indepen- and have detailed information about dence heightens the public’s expecta- the negotiations. However, the media tions regarding its performance and serves as a channel for actors close to functions. Furthermore, the AK Par-

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ty proposed to establish a Parliamen- there has been considerable excite- tary Commission but this initiative ment about the responses to Öcalan’s was met with criticism from the CHP message from Qandil, Europe, and and the MHP, which announced that the BDP. Luckily, all three groups they would not assign any represen- responded positively to Öcalan’s re- tatives to this Commission. Never- quests and strengthened the case for theless, establishing a Parliamentary the peace process. Commission represents a major step to ensure the successful conclusion of However, Öcalan’s emphasis on Is- the peace process. lam and shared historic experiences created some disillusionment among Leftist intellectuals, certain Alevi Demands and Expectations groups, and part of the PKK affili- ates. It remains to be seen whether The peace process in Turkey is at its these statements represent signifi- earliest and easiest stage. Until the cant changes in Öcalan’s thinking or Kurdish opening of 2009, it was le- mere rhetoric intended to comfort gally unlawful and politically and the Turks and the state. After all, Öcalan’s past statements historically tended to feature positive and nega- It might be quite difficult to tive elements together. Still, critiques find a set of policies that will of Öcalan’s Newroz message have been extremely agitated and –more simultaneously satisfy the significantly- chose to express their Kurds and prove acceptable disapproval through such means that might jeopardize the peace process to the concerned non-Kurdish altogether. members of Turkish society It continues to be unknown what has been discussed in negotiations socially inappropriate to talk about between the state and Öcalan that the Kurdish question. Therefore, paved the way for the aforemen- there continues to be a considerable tioned developments. Nonetheless, amount of confusion among the it would appear that negotiating general public, decision-makers and parties agreed on a three-stage pro- even negotiating parties. It remains cess where ceasefire represents the unknown whether the parties have first stage. At this point, the PKK is a concrete set of expectations (end expected to withdraw its armed mil- game) for resolution or what their itants from Turkey. Although there ‘red lines’ are. It is also noteworthy seems to be principal agreement on that individual actors who collec- this step, practical uncertainties con- tively constitute a given negotiating tinue to surface in public discussions. party may at times be at odds with For instance, while the PKK insists each other and fall apart. Therefore, on some legal arrangement to facili-

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tate its withdrawal, the AK Party gov- unlikely to succeed if the Kurds insist ernment claims that there is no need on official status instead of democrat- for such legislation. However, Prime ic reforms that shall safeguard Kurd- Minister Erdoğan has pledged sev- ish identity. eral times that the PKK withdrawal would not be met with government actions similar to the military opera- The Future of the Peace Process tion in 1999. Armed PKK fighters are and Potential Risks expected to leave the country in line with Öcalan’s orders. In order for the peace process to lead the country to success and lasting It is possible to claim that the PKK’s peace, we must acknowledge and an- disarmament and constitutional and alyze all aspects of the Kurdish ques- legal arrangements to address the tion. After all, social aspects of the Kurdish question are likely to follow problem need to be addressed along- the withdrawal. However, each indi- side political and legal regulations for vidual step shall acquire substance the peace process to succeed. It might over time. Moreover, there is a con- be quite difficult to find a set of pol- siderable chance that negotiating par- icies that will simultaneously satisfy ties would actually prefer such vague- the Kurds and prove acceptable to ness. For warfare and peace process- the concerned non-Kurdish mem- es, as mentioned above, tend to cause bers of Turkish society. In this sense, considerable transformations in the undoing the taboos in the hearts and parties’ demands. After all, it is pos- minds of decision-makers may be a sible to observe that such a transfor- more important step than addressing mation will actualy taken place given society’s concerns. the history of the Kurdish movement in Turkey. Therefore, it is necessary to While the entire society must play its discuss to what extent constitutional part in the peace process, the greatest and legal arrangements for the offi- role belongs to negotiating parties – cial recognition of Kurdish identity, that is, the state and the Kurdish po- citizenship, Kurdish-language edu- litical movement. Their most urgent cation, and the strenghtening of local task is to take steps to support each governments will be able to address other in addition to engaging in com- the Kurdish question and cross it petitive negotiations. Particularly, off from Turkey’s political agenda. It leading actors from both sides must would appear that the transformation consider the remainder of society of Kurdish demands from official sta- in mind instead of themselves and tus and self-government to demo- their constituency. However, various cratic reforms constitutes a major dy- non-political institutions including namic for the peace process. The AK universities, the media and NGOs Party may easily meet these demands can and must do their part to encour- with reference to rights and liberties. age negotiating parties and persuade On the contrary, the peace process is the general public.

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