W. Wilson Goode: the Black Mayor As Urban Entrepreneur Author(S): John F

W. Wilson Goode: The Black Mayor as Urban Entrepreneur Author(s): John F. Bauman Source: The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 77, No. 3 (Summer, 1992), pp. 141-158 Published by: Association for the Study of African American Life and History, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2717558 . Accessed: 22/03/2011 22:08

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http://www.jstor.org W. WILSON GOODE:THE BLACK MAYOR AS URBAN ENTREPRENEUR

By John F. Bauman*

Philadelphia'sblack communitytook root two centuriesago in the late 18th century when the city harboredone of young America'slargest free black populations. Yet, it was not until 1983, after Los Angeles, Detroit, Newark, and Chicago, that Philadelphiaelected a black mayor, W. Wilson Goode. Goode's mayoralty, 1983- 1990 [a year and a half of his second term remain as this is written] began auspi- ciously;it shortly bogged down in controversy.The Philadelphia Inquirerin Janu- ary 1990 questionedwhether another black candidatecould win the city's mayoralty, "not after Wilson Goode."1The ecstasy and any of Goode's political career must be understoodnot only within the context of the historyof Philadelphia'slarge and economicallyoppressed black communitythat came of age politically in the 1980s, but also within the frameworkof urbanpostindustrialism, the postwartrans- formationof Philadelphiafrom a center of manufacturingto a centerof information processingand corporatemanagement.a Mayor Goode confrontedthe enormous,schizophrenetic task of trying to operate effectivelyin both worlds.Yet, he was much more comfortablein the worldof pos- tindustrialeconomics than the worldof politics.Unlike Chicago'sHarold Washing- ton or Los Angeles's Thomas Bradley, Goode won the Philadelphiamayor's office not as a seasonedpolitician groomedin precinct and ward level politics, but as a manager-technocrat,a modernurban entrepreneur. In Philadelphiathe black experience had by 1980 producedactive black neighborhoodpoliticians such as John Street, CharlesBowser, and Lucien Blackwell,and a coterieof strongreligious leaders active politically,but few politiciansof the Washingtonor Bradleystripe able to use the establishedpolitical machineryto forge effective political coalitions.3 Goode'sroute to the mayor'soffice started with the bonanzaof communityaction programscreated under PresidentLyndon Baines Johnson'sGreat Society. Those programsenabled bright college educatedblacks such as WilsonGoode to engage in political entrepreneurship,that is communityorganizing to secure federal housing and other urban developmentfunds for neighborhoodbetterment. When in the 1980s Philadelphia'sblack populationreached "critical mass" politically, Goode stood at the thresholdnot as a politician,but as a shrewdmanager-entrepreneur, a technocrat,highly adept at leveragingpublic and privatedollars on behalf of community growth. Goode'scommunity action credentialsappealed to the large black community;his manager-entrepreneurialskills appealedto the city's white business establishment.4Goode, therefore, fit the mold of the modernmayor as "development

* John F. Baumanis Professorof Historyat CaliforniaUniversity of Pennsylvania 142 JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY officer",to use David Goldfield'swords, whose main job was to orchestratecentral city growth in a multi-centeredurban region.5However, as this chapter explains, the black mayor as urbanentrepreneur confronted a peculiarlyenigmatic challenge - to promoteeconomic development goals while living up to the popularimage of the black mayoras naturallysensitive to urbansocial problems,in Goode'swords to the "humandimension." Meeting both the economicdevelopment and the social needs of the ethnicallydiverse and raciallypolarized metropolis has historicallychallenged and confoundedurban political leaders. As this study demonstrates,it was particularly onerousfor a black mayor lacking adequatepolitical resources.

Philadelphia in 1983

In 1983, the year Willie Wilson Goode was elected the 126th and first black mayor of the city, Philadelphia,like other rust belt cities, was still enduringthe agonizing transformationfrom industrialismto postindustrialism.Economically, it barely resembledthe place where almost forty years earlierjubilant Philadelphians celebratedthe end of World War II. The QuakerCity at that time boasteda siza- ble, albeit aging, manufacturingbase, including Disston Saw, Stetson Hat, the BromleyCarpet Mills, and ContinentalCan. By 1983, most of that manufacturing base had disappeared.Between 1947 and 1970 the centralcities of America'sthirty- three most populousmetropolitan areas lost 80,000 manufacturingjobs. During the 1970s Philadelphiaalone lost 150,000 manufacturingjobs. Manufacturingjobs declined 47 percent in the center city and Northern Liberties where once garment mills, leather, food processing,and metal manufactoriesflourished. The trend continued throughoutthe 1970s. Althoughthe city then still had a largerproportion of its workersin manufacturing(28.1 percent) than did the nation as a whole, a decade later in 1980 the proportionhad droppedto under21 percent,a full percentage point below the national averageof 22 percent.7 Rather than a manufacturingcenter, Philadelphiain 1983 portrayeditself as "an intensedynamic marketplace for people,goods, services,ideas, information,and real estate."The city believedthat it was "uniquelypoised within the regionto capturea large share of the growth in the service economy."8When plannersand politicians spokeof the city as a dynamicmarketplace, they meant the downtownthat by 1983 had already emerged as a place of modern office buildings and hotels sharing a common streetscape with gracious 18th and 19th century townhousesnow fre- quently convertedinto fine restaurants,antique shops, and clothing boutiques.Gal- lery I and Gallery II, a glamorouscenter-city shopping mall, stretchedthree blocks along east MarketStreet. Plans were unfoldingto transformMarket Street west of City Hall into a canyon of office towers rivalingNew York City. However,not everythingabout Philadelphiain 1983 glitteredlike the downtown. Typical of the postindustrialcity, Philadelphiamirrored the dichotomybetween the urbanworld of fabulouswealth and anotherof grindingpoverty. Against the pano- rama of shimmeringglass office towers,high class restaurants,and half-milliondol- lar townhousesstood molderingslum neighborhoodswhere islandsof publichousing eruptedout of an urbansea of deterioratedoften abandonedrow housing.Many of URBAN ENTREPRENEUR 143 the city's poorest black families lived in these aging neighborhoodsof north and west Philadelphia. A partialexplanation of Philadelphia'sneighborhood decline could be found in its changingdemographic profile. As the city's manufacturingbase erodedin the postwar years, 1950 - 1980, its populationdeclined 19 percent from over 2 million in 1950 to 1.68 millionin 1980. The populationthat remainedwas older (25 percentof the city's householdswere headed by a personover age 65), blacker (39 percent), and poorer (20.1 percent of persons below the poverty line in 1980, comparedto 15.4 percent in 1970.)9 Wilson Goode's election in 1983 as the city's first black mayor followedalmost inexorablyfrom this changingpostwar demography. The great migrationof blacks to the city that began duringWorld War I acceleratedduring and after WorldWar II. A combinationof declining Europeanimmigration, white suburbanization,the modernizationof Southernagriculture, and continuedheavy black citywardmigra- tion created a deepeningpattern of black ghettoizationin northernindustrial cities such as Philadelphia.Philadelphia's black populationrose astronomically.Between 1950 and 1970 the city's non-white populationrose 74 percent from 376,041 to 653,791. Althoughthe city's black populationincreased more graduallyin the 1970s - up only 14,913 - the white populationdeclined 295,633. By 1980 blacks repre- sented 37.9 percent of the city's population.10 None of the luster of the city's renewingdowntown spilled over into the aging neighborhoodsthat surroundedthe CentralBusiness District (CBD). The proportion of Philadelphiafamilies in these graying areas living below the poverty line increased from 11.2 percent in 1970 to almost 17 percent in 1980. Nationally the number of families living in poverty actually droppedslightly during the decade from 10.7 percent of the populationto 9 percent." Poverty in Wilson Goode's Philadelphiaoverwhelmingly concentrated in the all- black neighborhoodsof North and West Philadelphiawhere from 1940 to 1980 the black proportionof North Philadelphiaincreased from 37 percent to over 75 percent. In North Philadelphianeighborhoods such as East and West Poplar, which were 94-96 percentblack, in 1980 unemploymentexceeded 15 percent,median in- comes rangedfrom $4,300 to $6,300, and over 20 percentof the populationlived in poverty.Recently, Universityof Chicago sociologistWilliam Julius Wilson traced the roots of extreme urban povertynot only to such historic forces as racism, but also to black joblessnesscaused in large part by major structuralchanges in the urban economy that significantlydiminished the demand for low and marginally skilled labor and to the correspondingproliferation of the female-headedfamily. The numberof Philadelphiahouseholds headed by females rose 41 percent in the 1970s to account for one out of every five city householdsby 1980; however,that year over a thirdof the householdsin black North Philadelphiawere female-headed. Women headed over 25 percentof the families in West Philadelphia.12 Many of the problemsand issues that confrontedPhiladelphia neighborhoods in 1983 and shapedthe firstadministration of WilsonGoode emerged from this dichotomy of wealth and poverty,of white versus black, of scintillatingdowntown versus deterioratinginner city neighborhoods.A Citizens Survey of 7,800 Philadelphia householdspublished by the city PlanningCommission in 1980 underscoredthe so- 144 JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY cial divisions. The survey found race to be "an important determinant influencing attitudes ... toward many issues and problems." Generally, Philadelphians listed crime/vandalism, unemployment, and high taxes as the leading problems facing the city. However, unemployment and abandoned/run down housing most concerned blacks, while whites listed taxes, crime, and poor public transportation as the most serious problems. City-wide, 82 percent of the respondents felt safe in their neighborhoods by day; less than 47 percent believed they were safe at night. Blacks as well as whites favored solutions such as gang control, improved police protection, repair of vacant housing, and youth employment services. This dichotomy had equal significance in 1983 as part of Philadelphia's dual personality. On the one hand, as has been shown, Philadelphia bore the vestiges of the old industrialism, a large black, Hispanic and Asian population, extensive regions of poverty, and an aging, crumbing infrastructure. On the other hand, the city's downtown of still vital banks and offices, theaters, and historically preserved neighborhoods indicated that it was advancing toward its goal of being a regional corporate center and the hub of information processing and service delivery in the Delaware Valley. Philadelphia businessmen begged for a political climate free of interracial and interethnic conflict, a climate, that in the fashion of cities such as Baltimore, Boston, and Atlanta, wel- comed large-scale office development and economic growth. Business executives rea- soned too that the city's sizeable black population made a black mayor inevitable. In Wilson Goode the city's business elites espied the black leader who could transcend discord and move Philadelphia into its "World Class Future."13

Blacks and Politics in Philadelphia

Since the 19th century in Philadelphia a few black politicians had served as cli- ents of white bosses. In the 1920s black politicians such as Ed Henry kept the city's black vote in line for Boss William S. Vare's powerful Republican machine. How- ever, black political consciousness began building in Philadelphia after the mid 1930s. During the Great Depression and President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, Philadelphia's economically stricken black community increasingly mobilized behind Democratic political leaders such as Crystal Bird Fauset and organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People (NAACP) and the National Negro Congress to oppose job discrimination and press for decent relief and public housing. In 1936, taking the advice of the black editor of the Pittsburgh Courier, Robert L. Vann, Philadelphia blacks turned Lincoln's picture to the wall and voted for Franklin Delano Roosevelt. However, until 1951 many blacks, particularly those residing in the city's poorest wards, continued to vote for the Republican machine in local elections.14 After World War II Philadelphia blacks, led by the NAACP and the Urban League, continued to fight for equal employment opportunity and against housing and other forms of discrimination. Although during and after World War II blacks moved into the ranks of the city's manufacturing labor force, the erosion of the city's industrial base undermined opportunity there. The city's liberal, pro-development, Democratic reform administrations of Joseph Clark (1952-1956) and Rich- URBAN ENTREPRENEUR 145 ardson Dilworth (1957-1961), while committed to improving intergroup relations, emphasized urban renewal policies that abetted the rise of the second ghetto.16 As Eugene Ericksen and William Yancey have observed, black families moved into the city's old, nonindustrial, streetcar suburbs left undefended by white ethnics.16 These were neighborhoods barred from investment by Federal Housing Administration redlining policy and likely targets for renewal. Moreover, recent studies have shown that by the mid-1950s these urban renewal and public housing policies had galva- nized white working class opposition to black residential advancement, therefore, hardening ghetto lines. By 1960 the tide of wartime and postwar black migration, the changing regional economy, and the adverse effect of urban renewal and public housing policies, concentrated black poverty in the growing black belts of north and west Philadelphia.17 Not only was the new black ghetto poor, it was powerless. Although blacks repre- sented a key constituency of the Democratic machine that replaced the Republican organization in 1951, they were not incorporated into the party either through patronage or through the slating of black candidates. James Tate, the President of City Council who succeeded Dilworth as Mayor in 1961 and served two terms, 1962-1972, symbolized the ascendancy of the city's Irish, and alienated both white liberals and blacks. Likewise, Frank Rizzo (1972-1979) bore the standard for the city's large Italian neighborhoods fearful of black encroachment.18 However, as John Allswang has observed, history undermined the foundation of the traditional political machine. In Philadelphia the effect of both an expanded civil service and the racial and ethnic tensions of the 1960s and 1970s combined to erode the strength of party machinery. While blacks remained Democratically aligned, the church more than the party structure seemed to nourish black political aspirations and leaders. The ethnographer Arthur Huff Fauset emphasized the political importance of black religion in his 1944 Black Gods of the Metropolis. After World War II black clergy such as Leon Sullivan, Joshua Licorish, and William Gray, Sr. were prominent figures in the struggle for black economic and civil rights in Philadelphia.19 In July, 1964, seething frustration and rising black anger exploded in three days of rioting in North Philadelphia. The 1964 riot sharpened black political consciousness and catalyzed among black Philadelphians the spirit of militance captured in the popular slogan "Black Power." Girded by black pride and energized by black power, Philadelphia blacks demanded a stronger voice in community affairs, better housing conditions, tenant rights, and participation in urban renewal decision making. The new activism produced a spate of organizations in the black community and a political base for the rise of young black politicians. In North Philadelphia the North City Congress became a political force; meanwhile, in West Philadelphia, a neighborhood organization such as the Paschall Betterment League was headed in 1966 by a young black housing activist named Wilson Goode.20 This black militance of the 1960s produced strident voices in the black community such as Cecil Moore's, but not increased political leverage in City Hall. Al- though by 1983 blacks comprised 39 percent of Philadelphia's population, they had made only halting progress toward consolidating a political base and translating it into concrete political gains. In any case, by 1983 the black population was strong 146 JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY enough numerically to demand a prominent political role in the city. It was that year that William Green, Jr., under pressure from a rival candidate, promised to appoint Wilson Goode to the post of Managing Director. It was the highest position to be held by a black in the history of Philadelphia city government.2

W. Wilson Goode

Wilson Goode's emergence on the Philadelphia political scene fit neatly into the history of black politics in Philadelphia. He rose to political prominence out of the tumult of the 1960s and the Great Society community-building effort that followed. A Baptist elder who thought seriously about a career in the ministry, Goode had a natural bridge to the black church. He also emerged at the moment when Philadel- phia machine politics seemed exhausted when, appropriately, the son of one of Phil- adelphia's premier Irish politicos, William Green, Jr., dismayed by his inability to control an unruly City Council, declined a second term and chose his managing director, Wilson Goode, as his successor. Described in 1984 as a "powerful looking, thick-set politician, who seemed to have been born wearing a dark business suit, and possessed of an upper body that could almost be overdeveloped, and arms and legs that pump like pistons,"22Wilson Goode's rise to political stardom in Philadelphia resembled the mythological odys- seys of poor boy protagonists in Horatio Alger novels. Born in 1938 on a tenant farm in Seaboard, North Carolina, Goode was the son of a sharecropper who moved often to escape oppressive landlords. Goode recalled living with his mother, father, and four brothers and sisters in a shabby farmhouse, heated only by a pot belly stove and illuminated by kerosene lamps. When Wilson was 15, his father moved the family north to a row house in southwestern Philadelphia. His father took a job in a paper box factory, his mother worked in a laundry. "The quality of our life didn't improve much," observed Goode, "we traded in the farm for a piece of sidewalk."28 An honors student at Philadelphia's John Bartram High School, Goode worked for a year before attending Morgan State University in Baltimore where he studied history. After graduating in 1961, he considered accepting a fellowship for graduate study at the University of Wisconsin. However, Goode's marriage in 1960 to the former Velma Helen Williams and the birth of their first child influenced his decision to spend two years in the army. A member of the Reserve Officers Training Corps while at Morgan State, Goode entered the Army as a First Lieutenant in the Military Police. According to Mike Mallowe, Goode apparently enjoyed the regi- men of military life. More importantly, according to Mallowe, the Army experience strengthened Goode's self-confidence and prepared him for a career in big city government.24 Finishing his tour in the military, Goode returned to Philadelphia where he worked briefly as a manager for a building maintenance firm, then as an insurance adjuster, before taking a job in 1967 with the Philadelphia Council for Community Development (PCCD), a Great Society, non-profit, anti-poverty agency. Goode took the executive directorship in 1971 when the PCCD was about to lose its funding; he URBAN ENTREPRENEUR 147 securedFord Foundationmoney and redirectedthe agency towardproviding technical assistance to neighborhoodgroups seeking federal housing money. During the ten years that Goode directedthe PCCD, 1969-1979, he helped secure for the city about $60 million in federal grants, which aided the constructionand improvement of over 2,000 units of housing.For many of the same years he also servedas Presi- dent of the Paschall BettermentLeague (PBL), a neighborhood-basedagency pro- moting neighborhoodquality. Meanwhile, Goode engaged in part-time graduate study in public administrationat the Universityof Pennsylvania'sWharton School, where in 1968 he earned his Master'sDegree in Public Administration.2 His graduatestudies and his accomplishmentswith both the PCCD and the PBL earned Goode solid credentialsas an expert on urban affairs. He was also able to build his reputationas both an efficientmanager and a strongadvocate for community action and neighborhoodimprovement. Goode's community work also involved quietingracial tensionsand promotingsocial justice. In 1966 he was instrumentalin diffusing racial violence at the John Bartram High School, and a year later he forced Mayor Tate to abide by the minorityhousing provisions of the federalurban renewal law. At Tate's Blue Ribbon Committee hearingsinto the effectivenessof the PhiladelphiaAntipoverty Action Committee,Goode gave impressivetestimony on the failure of the antipovertyact to have a sufficientimpact on poor black families in the city. He called for strengtheningand broadeningPAAC, making it a more effective voice helping empowerpoor people.'Although middle class, Goode continuedto live in the black West PhiladelphiaPaschall neighborhoodwhere his parents had moved the family in 1953 and where in 1967 he and his wife Velma had bought a house. There he became very active as a deacon of Paschall'sFirst Baptist Church.26 Goode's stature as an intelligent, forceful, yet mainstream,spokesman for community bettermentin Philadelphiarose steadily throughoutthe 1970s. He obtained membershipand boardposts in numerousprominent city organizationssuch as the HousingAssociation of the DelawareValley, the YMCA, the NAACP, the Fellow- ship Commission,and the City BicentennialCommission.27 His non-militant,entrepreneurial approach to racial bettermentwas rewardedin the 1970s when he moved from community-levelto statewideprominence. In 1977 GovernorMilton Shapp appointedGoode to the Public Utility Commission(PUC). After only 22 months on the commissionhe was elected chairman.As chairman, stated Goode, his challenge "was to make the PUC a reputableagency, where the consumerwill have input."To accomplishthat he invited consumersto town meetings held aroundthe state. It was, however,an eventful tenure. Goode joined the PUC amidst the nationalenergy crisis triggeredby the harsh winterof 1976-1977. Fuel shortagesforced school and plant closings nationwide,producing the layoffsof 1.6 million workers. Two years later the Organizationof Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) suddenly escalated crude oil prices, causing mile-long waiting lines at gas pumps. Then in March, 1979, the large Pennsylvanianuclear power facility locatedat Three Mile Islandin the SusquehannaRiver Valley failed, releas- ing a cloud of radioactivegas. Goode headed the investigationof the TMI incident and used the occasion to flay the utilities industry for lack of imaginationabout energysafety and conservation."My impressionof the utilities,"charged Goode, "is 148 JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY that they are too often content with just doing enough to keep the [PU] Commission from insisting upon more," Goode, therefore, linked his name not with the improvement of black neighborhoods, but, as the champion of lower utility bills, a battler for the conservation of and efficient use of scarce energy resources.28 William Green took office as mayor of Philadelphia in January of 1980, inheriting from his predecessor, Frank Rizzo, a bloated municipal payroll, mountainous city debts, and a black community broiling at eight years of insensitive, if not oppressive, city government.2 By appointing Wilson Goode as his Managing Director, Green not only assuaged the black community, but he entrusted the politically delicate - but necessary - job of slashing the city payroll and restructuring the city budget to an economy-minded, black bureaucrat. Goode performed magnificently as Manag- ing Director, making the job front page news. Indeed, the press adored the workaholic Goode, touting him as a "true professional," and "one of the best things about the Green administration."80In the name of honest government and efficiency Goode fired superfluous city officials, laid off 994 police and firemen, reduced the size of the city automobile fleet, shredded city credit cards, installed performance budgeting in city offices, and lectured city department heads about management by objectives. In his first year Goode trimmed the city payroll by 5.3 million dollars and cut a potential $140 million deficit to $9.3 million. In the following year, under Goode Philadelphia showed a $30 million surplus.38 He fared less well with his plan for achieving energy savings by converting city trash into steam and by weatherizing public buildings. Nor did the ex-houser Goode forge a solution to what he called "the city's greatest crisis," housing. His "creative" housing program to use rehabilitation dollars to increase the supply of low-rent units failed to outpace the loss of inexpensive shelter to abandonment and demolition.32 Nevertheless, Goode's accomplishments as the hard driving 95-hour a week, managing director of Philadelphia were sufficiently impressive to win him widespread rec- ognition. "Is This the Way to Run a City?," Black Enterprise inquired rhetorically before rapturously praising Goode's management of Philadelphia. Both the New York Times and the Philadelphia Inquirer exalted Goode as a "new style," budget- minded, liberal Democrat. The city's business community was especially impressed.33

Goode's First Mayoralty

In November, 1982, Mayor "Bill" Green, an anti-machine Democrat tired of bat- tling City Council, announced his intention not to run for re-election. Inspired by Harold Washington's victory in the 1982 Chicago mayoral contest, and by his own popularity as managing director, Goode entered the mayoral primary. Goode's oppo- nent in the spring primary was ex-mayor Frank Rizzo, attempting a political come- back. Rizzo bet his political fortune on parlaying an anticipated 8 percent share of the black vote with a solid core of white support. He failed. Goode built a primary victory by sweeping 95 percent of the black vote, and winning a 22 percent share of the white ballots.34 URBAN ENTREPRENEUR 149

In Novemberthe 45-year old Democrat,Goode, faced a three way race against the 40-year old Republicanex-chairman of the PhiladelphiaStock Exchange,John Egan, and a 37-yearold, ex-Democrat-turned-Independent,Thomas Leonard. From the start Goode led the race. While his opponentscharged each other with sabotag- ing the other's candidacy,the unscathedGoode claimed the political high ground and ran a dignified,non-acrimonious, non-racial campaign to assure white liberals and the city's businesscommunity that he was as mainstreamas his pin stripe suits and WhartonSchool educationsaid that he was. Nothing about Goode'scampaign resembledthe roughand tumble racial slugfest that HaroldWashington had fought to capturethe mayor'soffice in Chicago.Goode, in fact, judiciouslyavoided the race issue, spurningall help offered by the city's black activist leaders.35 Goode campaignedas an urban entrepreneur,not a politician. To achieve his numberone goal of restoringthe urbanjob base by stimulatingeconomic growth, Goode promisedto create a roundtablecomprised of economic,business, labor, and neighborhoodleaders and to aggressivelymarket Philadelphia as a place to do business. Accordingly,he pledgedquick action on the constructionof the long debated downtownconvention center. Rebuildingthe urban economy,reforming the city's tax structure,and making governmentmore cost effectivealso highlightedhis plat- form. Goode promisedto install zero-basedbudgeting, create a Departmentof Com- merce, and resolveat long last the impasseblocking cable televisionin the city. He also announcedplans to improveneighborhood services, to attack the city housing problem,especially homelessness, and to cure the plague of abandonedhousing - all promisesmeant to appeal to his largest constituency,the black community.3 Although as a candidate Goode cultivated the image of the non-political,cost- cutting manager,unlike HaroldWashington, he chose to run with - not against- the crumblingpolitical machine. Early in his campaign he stated that he intendedto honor the rule of patronage.In one of his first acts as a candidateGoode consoli- dated his politicalsupport by winningthe backingof 67 of the city's 69 ward leaders and by successfullycourting the backingof the city's labor unions. Rizzo even gave Goode his blessing.37 And on election day so did most of Philadelphia.Goode's vigorous campaigning, especiallyin the largely Jewish neighborhoodsof the city's Northeast,paid off. His expectedlyheavy supportfrom the black neighborhoodsof North and West Phila- delphiamaterialized. On November8, buttressedby a heavyvoter turnoutin a city where Democraticvoters outnumberRepublican 4 to 1, Goodegarnered 55 percent of the city vote. Egan got only 37 percentwhile Leonardtrailed with just 8 percent. Goode carried almost half of the Jewish vote and nearly a quarterof those voters who had supportedRizzo in the primary.Consistent with his campaign,Goode pro- claimedhis victorya triumphfor the city and for.pluralism. "All of us," said Goode in his victorynight statement,"from all neighborhoods,from all walksof life, white, black, Asian, Hispanic,all of us workingtogether can solve the problemsfacing our city. 38 150 JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY

Goode in the Mayor's Office

Upon taking office in January, 1984, Goode outlined an ambitious 81-point agenda that mirroredboth his entrepreneurialambitions and his concern for the social and physical bettermentof city neighborhoods.In line with his technocratic thinking,he proposedreorganizing the parkingand redevelopmentauthorities, nego- tiating a cost-savingcontract with the city's uniformedemployees, unsnarling the administrativered tape preventingcable televisionin the city, buildingthe convention center and a trash-to-steamplant, and creatinga climate favorableto business. But Goode also called for plans to help the homeless,find jobs for ghetto teenagers, and improvecity neighborhoods.39 His first year seeminglyvindicated the effectivenessof his no-nonsense,manage- rial style. He successfullyreorganized the parking and urban renewal authorities and forced the housingauthority to providetwenty-four hour serviceon requestsby tenants for repairsin public housing projects.In what Mike Mallowe of Philadel- phia Magazine labeled a "brilliantmove," Goode resolvedthe cable televisionand conventioncenter impasse by foisting the decision upon City Council. In late 1984 Goode not only saved the PhiladelphiaEagles footballteam from movingto another city, but also presidedover the ribboncutting for the downtowncommuter tunnel that finally establisheda rail connectionbetween the city's "mainline"western suburbs and the growingsuburban communities north of the city. Apparently,only the defeat of his trash-to-steamplant scheme by outragedSouth Philadelphians,who objected to its location in their backyard,prevented Goode from having a perfect season.40 Goode introducedto city governmenta novel, some called it refreshing,management style. (It was a style that ultimatelynearly destroyedhim politically.)Rather than leaning upon the advice of key advisors,Goode soliciteda wide range of opin- ions on policy issues from, among others, friends, experts,businessmen, and neighborhoodgroups. Once havingassembled a diversityof opinionson policy, the mayor withdrewto the sanctuaryof his office to make his decision in lonely isolation.41 For many in city planning,especially those interestedin making center city the rival of Boston and Baltimore,Goode's managementstyle seemed liberating.Bar- bara Kaplan, the executivedirector of the PhiladelphiaPlanning Commission, ob- servedthat Goode encouragedlong-range planning, not only by invitingplanners to give him their best ideas, but also by boldly inserting himself into the planning process.Goode, she argued, exhibited"a planningframe of mind" not seen in the city since the balmy days of MayorJoseph Clark. And like Clarkand Dilworth,the entrepreneurialGoode articulated an expansivevision of the downtownas a thriving service-orientedhub of the Philadelphiametropolitan region. It was a vision shared by his businessman-ally,developer Willard Rouse III. Goode chargedthe planning commissionto producea plan for center city developmentand attended all three town meetingson the subjectthat the commissionheld in 1987. The final plan com- pleted in late 1987 affirmedGoode's plan to expandgreatly the service,information processing,and office functionsof the downtown.More importantly,it sanctioned Rouse'salready approved 60-story One LibertyPlace tower by identifyingroom for URBAN ENTREPRENEUR 151

50 million additional square feet of office space. Goode had actively defended Rouse's proposal to erect a modern office tower, which in defiance of city tradition exceeded the height of the William Penn statue atop City Hall. Other central city projects encouraged by Goode included the convention center, a $500 million Inter- national Terminal at the airport, Mellon Bank's impeccable restoration of the Lit Brother's Department Store building, and the multi-million dollar city waterfront development at Penn's Landing.42 But Goode's effort to infuse Philadelphia's downtown with the economic vitality and pizzazz rivaling Baltimore and Boston did not foreclose attention to the city's flagging neighborhoods. In tandem with his long-range plans for the center city, the mayor commanded a study of North Philadelphia. Like the planning for center city, the North Philadelphia effort involved numerous town meetings with neighborhood groups and interested City Councilmen such as John Street often chaired by the mayor and held at 7:00 Saturday morning. Not published until late 1987, the North Philadelphia Plan dealt with every facet of life in the deeply blighted region. Among the subjects intensively examined in the plan were teenage pregnancies, literacy, job opportunity, crime, and housing.43 However, entrepreneurial mayors and planning departments have historically been more successful orchestrating physical renewal than social rehabilitation. And while hope existed that a booming central city would produce social and economic gains for the city's low-income populations, poverty and squalor persisted. At the same time Goode strove to demolish 21,000 of the city's abandoned houses, and over 8,000 homeless bedded down atop steam vents, on mission cots, or in city jails or shelters. In September, 1984, the courts received testimony on whether city shelters could serve as a legal address for voting purposes. Solutions to the city's horrendous housing problem clearly eluded the administration, leaving Goode to applaud "Main Line" charity drives to supply "blankets to the poor."44 In May 1985 a housing-related issue exploded into violence, shattering the credibility of the Goode administration. Long before Goode took office, Philadelphia's abundance of vacant and abandoned housing enticed squatting and the emergence of groups proposing radical, antiestablishmentarian solutions to the plight of the city's truly disadvantaged black population. In 1978 one such group, called MOVE (not an acronym - it apparently stood for nothing) a small, but militant, inner-city sect, led by John Africa, who promulgated a back-to-nature philosophy, occupied a house in the city's Powelton area. The ensuing violent standoff between MOVE and both the police and fire fighters resulted in the death of a police officer. In 1982 John Africa moved with his clan into his sister's West Philadelphia house at 6221 Osage Avenue. The house sat amid a quiet, middle class black neighborhood. Although at first the MOVE family lived peaceably with their neighbors, very shortly the police received complaints about noise and the horrible stench of garbage and excrement emanating from the house. Conditions worsened by June, 1984 when MOVE erected a loudspeaker atop the house and began haranguing the neighborhood with obscenities and violent rantings. As early as August, 1984, the police tactical squad commenced plotting a strategy to force MOVE out of the house.46 MOVE tested Goode's decision making style, which while apparently effective for city planning purposes, proved disastrous in dealing with an entrenched and deter- 152 JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY mined radical sect barricadedin a West Philadelphiarow house. Accordingto his later testimony,Goode initially saw MOVE as a problemfor his police chief and managingdirector, not himself. He knewvery little, if anything,about specificplans for police action against the group. During the weeks precedingthe May 18 police assault on MOVE's Osage Avenue bastion, John Africa and his clan made life in- creasinglymore unbearablefor the middle class West Philadelphianeighborhood. Fear of a confrontationimmobilized Goode. Although his versionof the events of May, 1985 clashed with that of his Police Commissioner,Gregor Sambour, and his Managing Director, Leo A. Brooks, facts assembled substantiatedthat notwith- standingthe serious political and racial issues at stake in the confrontation,Goode did not knowthat the police plannedto use a helicopterto dropan incendiarydevice on the roof of MOVE'sfortified Osage Avenueheadquarters. Goode admittedly had disassociatedhimself from the decision making process. The tactical decision to drop the bomb left eleven people dead and sixty-onehomes on Osage Avenue smol- dering ruins.4 Once touted as the manager-saviorof Philadelphiaand brieflycourted by 1984 DemocraticPresidential Candidate, Walter Mondale,Wilson Goode's credibility lay in tatters in the fall of 1985. Once his staunchestsupporter, in Octoberthe Phila- delphia Inquirereditorialized that "by unveilinga choreographyof disaster,"the MOVE affair had "slid open the windowof incompetence"on the Goode administration.47By OctoberGoode not only faced the scathingreport of his self-appointed MOVE Commission,chaired by PSFS head M. Todd Cooke,which brandedGoode "grossly negligent" in his handling of the MOVE affair, but federal prosecutors investigating corruption in the Philadelphia police force handed down 26 indictments. With Goodemired in politicalquicksand, political columnist Mike Mallowewrote the administration'sepitaph. "At this juncture,"wrote Mallowe,"the thoughtmight be a little premature,the idea of resignationmight be crossingGoode's mind with increasingfrequency. Richard Nixon did it because he had no choice. Goode still has options, but they are beginningto fall away like so many autumn leaves."48 Indeed, Mallowe'sepitaph was premature.Goode seemedundaunted by the complaints of his critics. In March 1986 he publiclyand tearfullymourned the terrible loss of life and propertyresulting from the MOVE debacle and confessedthat he had been remiss in delegating such awesome decision making responsibilityto his subordinates.He also promisedto have the sixty-one destroyedhouses rebuilt and the burned-outresidents moved in by winter.49However, this chapterin the MOVE affair also provednightmarish. Goode chose a contractorto rebuildthe Osage Ave- nue homes with an embarrassinglycheckered background. The city ultimatelyde- clared him in default and selected a second contractor.It was not until July, 1986 that any families returnedto Osage Avenue.Originally estimated at $110,000 each, the final cost of each of the sixty-one newly built homes exceeded $135,000.50 As families began moving into their new homes on Osage Avenue, Goode faced yet another crisis. On July 1, 1986 the city's 15,000 uniformedand 13,200 non- uniformedworkers walked off the job. Goode grudginglyconceded some groundon wage demandsbut steadfastlyrefused to have the city straitjacketedon contracting out services, and he demandedthe right to audit union health and welfare books URBAN ENTREPRENEUR 153 prior to orderingany back paymentsto the fund.61Trash rotted on city sidewalks, public librariesand museumswere closed, and despite the hot July sun, recreation centers and city pools stayed locked. But, to the applauseof the Philadelphia In- quirerand most city residents,Goode defiantlystood his ground.He identifiedcity- owned vacant lots and other areas where residentscould dump their trash;to help city people escape the swelteringheat, he orderedcity fire hydrantsadapted with sprinklers;and he used managementpersonnel to staff the critical water and sewer departments.Only the doors of the city museums and libraries remained fully locked. Ultimately, the union capitulated,accepting a modest wage increase and surrenderingon the city's right to audit its health and welfare books.62 Goode'shandling of the non-uniformedworkers strike restoredsome of his credibility lost in the MOVE crisis. By December,1987, Goode had weatheredthe political stormenough to be firmlyin the race for a secondterm. In fact, a monthearlier he receivedthe unanimousendorsement of the city's most prominentelected black officialsincluding U.S. RepresentativeWilliam Gray, City CouncilPresident Joseph Coleman,and councilmenJohn Street, Lucien Blackwell,and John White, a group collectivelycalled the "Big Six."63Business and civic leaders moved back into the Goodefold, pointingout that Goodehad at last put MOVE behindhim. In addition, they cited Goode'seffective handling of the municipalworker's strike. Moreover,the State Legislaturehad finally approvedfunds for the city's $468 million convention center. Furthermore,the city's economy,stalled underGreen, generated 33,000 new jobs under Goode. A half dozen new office towers, includingRouse's One Liberty Place, recast the urbanskyline. Despite city plannerEdmund Bacon's strenuous ob- jections, the Rouse tower brokethe informalban on structuresexceeding the height of the William Penn statue atop city hall tower.64 Ironically, political entrepreneurGoode's achievements notwithstanding,the MOVE affair left his liberal credentialsin disreputeas he planned his reelection campaign.The MOVE debacle forced him to lean more heavily on the black vote, and therefore,the importanceof the black leadershipendorsement. His black support, plus his downtownbusiness alliance, enabledhim to overcomea primarychal- lenge from PhiladelphiaDistrict Attorney EdwardRendell. Although Rendell was endorsedby the Inquirerand secured89 percentof the white vote, he lost to Goode in the May 1987 primary.Analysts attributedthe loss to the lowest white voter turnoutin sixteen years.55 The November 1987 mayoralelection pitted Wilson Goode against his long-time nemesis,the Democrat-turned-Republican,Frank Rizzo. Both candidatesattempted to sidestep the issue of race. Goode directed the voter's attention to his $4 billion dollar achievementsin downtowndevelopment and talked about clean streets, while Rizzo hammeredaway at Goode'sresponsibility for the MOVE tragedy.Goode also resurrectedRizzo's mayoral record, lambastingthe ex-mayor for police brutality and racial insensitivity.None of these tactics seemed to excite voter interestin the campaign.An independentpoll of 600 white Philadelphiansfound that fully 38 percent of those surveyed viewed themselves as voting against rather than for the candidates.66 From the moment the political battle lines were drawn, Rizzo versus Goode, many railedagainst the choice. The race was assailedas "a turnoff,"as offering"no 154 JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY choice,"as featuringa "blunderingblack versusa blunderingwhite."67 Voters must choose "between two evils," between "Godzilla and Mothra," complainedPaul Maryniak of the Philadelphia Daily News. Only belatedly the Philadelphia In- quirer endorsedWilson Goode, quoting in its defense the words Edward Rendell used in finally coming out for Goode. "His disappointingrecord paled," said Rendell, "in comparisonto the chaos, division,political dictatorship,and fiscal in- sanity that typifiedeight years of city governmentunder Frank Rizzo."68 On November2 Goode won his secondterm as mayorof Philadelphia,but by less than 2 percentagepoints. In the end race emergedas the key factor despite MOVE. Blacks overwhelminglyvoted for Goode;whites for Rizzo.59 Goode had enteredthe Philadelphiamayor's office in 1983 as a manager-technocrat capableof transcendingthe issue of race despitethe city's embeddedethnic and racial divisions;however, it was a solidly racial vote that returnedhim to office in November 1987. And, although his January 1990 inauguraladdress conjuredup Penn'sQuaker image of a city that worksfor all of its people,the specterof MOVE hauntedGoode's rhetoric. For example, Goode acknowledgedRouse's One Liberty Center and the strength of Center City economic developmentonly to exhort his audiencethat "economicgrowth is more than office towers,ports, expressways,air- ports and skyscrapers .... As we boast about breaking through the skyline," in- toned Goode, "too many have stood in the soup line." Goode dedicatedhis second administrationto "breakingthe cycle of hopelessness,to provid[ing]self worth and self sufficiencyand to restor[ing]family stability."60 Two years later Democraticpoliticians in Philadelphiaspeculated that "a black candidatecan't win in Philadelphia,not after Wilson Goode."A poll revealedthat 66 percentof Philadelphiansviewed him unfavorably.Disaffected blacks remained in the city and in the party. Whites left the city or becameRepublicans. There were 201,000 fewer registeredDemocrats in 1990 than in 1983. Many white Democratic strategistsbelieved that race had become the most importantissue in city politics and that white working-classvoters saw the party as black - that is, concernedonly about the problemsof the black poor, not the white middle class.61 Therefore,despite his entrepreneurialcredentials and dispassionatemanagement style, Goode had failed to transcendthe race issue and broadenhis political base. His administrationfloundered most conspicuouslyin resolvingthe historic tension betweenfostering economic growth and servinghuman needs for health, safety, and welfare. The glass towers and posh malls bedeckingGoode's glittering downtown left unbridgedthe wideningsocial chasm separatingthe rich city from the poor;nor did skyscrapersserve to bind togetherthe racially and ethnicallyfragmented parts of the city, a goal Goode had set for his administration.62Since the 19th centuryas Seymour Mandelbaummade clear in his study of Boss Tweed's New York, urban politiciansaided by the political machine had functionedto interconnectthe frag- mented metropolis.Goode inheritedpolitical machineryin shambles. Rather than forge a new political coalition of blacks, Hispanics, and the new army of service workers,the non-politicalGoode aligned himself with the downtown-orientedbusi- ness and professionalcommunity that had orchestratedPhiladelphia's first renais- 3ance in the 1950s. These were the people who had applaudedand encouraged Goodewhile he was Green's ManagingDirector; they urged him to run for mayor, URBAN ENTREPRENEUR 155 and as an urbanentrepreneur Goode felt a kinshipwith them. In the end, however, as the MOVE incident illustrated,Goode's entrepreneurialand technocraticskills, while attractiveto the downtownbusiness community, proved a feeble substitutefor politicaltools in negotiatingthe difficultsocial terrainof the postindustrialcity. For example, they offered no insight into the problemof the urban underclass.Tragi- cally, Goode nearedthe end of his administrationviewed as the woundedhead of a black party.The reconstructionof politicsin Philadelphia,the creationof new political coalitions able to govern the postindustrial city, awaited a future administration.63

NOTES

See "Black Party Image Splits Democrats,"Philadelphia Inquirer,January 14, 1990; and Gary Nash, Forging Freedom: The Formation of Philadelphia's Black Community, 1720-1840 (Cambridge, 1988);see also, W. E. BurghardtDuBois's classic, The PhiladelphiaNegro: A Social Study (New York, 1967). 2 John P. Mollenkopf, The Contested City (Princeton, New Jersey, 1983). 3 CarolosMujnoz, Jr. and CharlesHenry, "Rainbow Coalitions in FourBig Cities:San Antonio,Den- ver, Chicago,and Philadelphia,"Policy Studies (Summer 1986), pp. 598-602;this study uses the term "UrbanEntrepreneur" in the sense that it is used by John Mollenkopfin The ContestedCity. The urban entrepreneuras mayoremerged, people such as David Lawrenceof Pittsburgh,Joseph Clark of Philadel- phia, John Collinsof Boston,saw themselvesas developmentcoordinators orchestrating federal and pri- vate investmentin the city. They also helped build a strong Democraticcoalition aroundthe urban growththeme. 4 On the Great Society and blacks see BernardJ. Friedenand MarshallKaplan, The Politics of Neglect: Urban Aid from Model Cities to Revenue Sharing (Cambridge, 1975); also Mollenkopf, The Contested City, pp. 87-138; and William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy (Chicago, 1987), pp. 130-131. 5 See David Goldfield'schapter "The Future of the Urban Region,"in Daniel Schaffer,ed., Two Centuriesof AmericanPlanning (Baltimore, 1988), pp. 315-16. Goldfieldhere clearlyportrays the modern mayoras an urbanentrepreneur. 6 "Goode Takes Oath for Second Term," Philadelphia Inquirer, January 5, 1990. On manufacturingeconomy of Philadelphia,see Philip Scrantonand Walter Licht, Work Sites: Industrial Philadelphia, 1890-1950 (Philadelphia, 1987); Franklin Survey Company, Street and Busi- ness Occupation Atlas of Philadelphia and Suburban Philadelphia (Philadelphia, 1946); Philadelphia City Planning Commission (PCPC), Economy of Center City: Working Paper (Philadelphia, 1985), found in Temple Urban Archives,Temple University,Philadelphia [Hereinafter TUA]. 8 John H. Mollenkopf, The Contested City. 9 PCPC, Economic and Social Indicators for Philadelphia Census Tracts, 1980: Technical Informa- tion Paper, in TUA; William Robbins,"Study of PopulationFinds Older, PoorerPhiladelphia," New York Times, August 7, 1983. 10 On wartimeand postwarmigration and the emergenceof a second ghetto, see John F. Bauman, "Blacksversus Ethnics in RenewingNorth Philadelphia,1940-1960," paper delivered at AnnualMeeting of the Organizationof AmericanHistorians, Washington, D.C., 1990;and PCPC,Household and Hous- ing Characteristics of Philadelphia, 1980: Technical Information Paper, in TUA; also John F. Bauman, Public Housing, Race, and Renewal: Urban Planning in Philadelphia, 1920-1974, (Philadelphia, 1987), pp. 84-89. " PCPC, Economic and Social Indicators for Philadelphia, TUA. 12 John F. Bauman,Edward K. Muller,and Norman Hummon,"Public Housing, Isolation, and the UrbanUnderclass: Philadelphia's Richard Allen Homes, 1941-1965,"Journal of UrbanHistory (Forth- coming); William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged; PCPC, Households and Housing Character- istics of Philadelphia, 1980. Technical Information Paper, in TUA. 156 JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY

13 PCPC, Citizen Survey. City of Philadelphia, Technical Information Paper, 1980, in TUA; Gold- field, "The Future of the Metropolitan Region," p. 315. '4 Charles A. Ekstrom, "The Electoral Politics of Reform and Machine: The Political Behavior of Philadelphia's Black Wards, 1943-1969," and Oscar Glantz, "Recent Negro Ballots in Philadelphia," both in Mirian Ershkowitz and Joseph Zikmundt, eds., Black Politics in Philadelphia (New York, 1973); and Vincent P. Franklin, "Voice of the Black Community: The Philadelphia Tribune, 1912- 1941," in Pennsylvania History (October 1984), pp. 261-279. '1 Bauman, Muller, Hummon, "Public Housing, Isolation, and the Urban Underclass;" and Bauman, "Blacks Versus Ethnics in Renewing North Philadelphia." 16 Arnold Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (Cambridge, 1983); Bauran, Public Housing, Race, and Renewal. 17 Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto; Bauman, Public Housing, Race, and Renewal; and Eugene Ericksen and William Yancey, "Work and Residence in Industrial Philadelphia," Journal of Urban His- tory (February 1969), pp. 147-183; Kenneth Jackson, "Race, Ethnicity and Real Estate Appraisal: The HOLC and the FHA," Journal of Urban History (August 1989), pp. 419-453. 18 See Munoz and Henry, "Rainbow Coalitions," pp. 600-601; on ethnicity and political fragmenta- tion, see Ericksen and Yancey, "Work and Residence in Industrial Philadelphia," and Peter O. Muller, Kenneth C. Meyer, and Roman Cybriwsky, Philadelphia: A Study of Conflicts and Social Cleavages (Cambridge, 1976). '9 John Allswang, Bosses, Machines, and Urban Voters; Munoz and Henry, "Rainbow Coalitions," 600; Arthur Huff Fauset, Black Gods of the Metropolis: Negro Religious Cults in the Urban North (Philadelphia, 1971). 20 Lenore Berson, Case Study of a Riot: The Philadelphia Story (New York, 1971); Philadelphia Bulletin, August 14, 1969; Jane Shoemaker, "A Life of Family, Church, Service," Philadelphia Bulletin, December 5, 1979. 21 Joe Davidson, "Is this Any Way to Run a City?," Black Enterprise, February 1982. 22 Mike Mallowe, "The No-Frills Mayor," Philadelphia Magazine, December 1984. 23 Thad Martin, "Mayor Goode," Ebony (May 1984); Mallowe, "No-Frills Mayor," pp. 169-170; Gunter David and David Runker, "Wilson Goode: Compassion for the Underdog," Philadelphia Bulle- tin, December 14, 1979. 24 Shoemaker, "A Life of Family, Church, Service"; Mallowe, "No-Frills Mayor;" Roger Cohn, "Wil- son Goode Has Something to Prove," in Today Magazine, Philadelphia Inquirer, July 25, 1982. 25 Mallowe, "No-Frills Mayor;" David and Runker, "Compassion for the Underdog;" Cohn, "Wilson Goode Has Something to Prove." 26 "Poverty Program Misses Whites, PAAC Panel Told," Philadelphia Bulletin, July 5, 1967; Ibid, August 14, 1969, June 14, 1967, October 15, 1968; Shoemaker, "A Life of Family, Church and Service." Goode's residence in a socio-economically mixed neighborhood was typical in a city where residential barriers to black movement remained in place; for an examination of the consequences of that pattern, see Douglas S. Massey, Gretchen A. Condran and Nancy A. Denton, "The Effect of Residential Segre- gation on Black Social and Economic Well-Being," Social Forces (September 1987), pp. 29-55. 27 "Biographical Sketch of W. Wilson Goode, 12/5/79," mimeographed, in TUA; also Philadelphia Bulletin, November 21, 1970, October 24, 1970, April 4, 1970. 28 Quote on utilities from, Philadelphia Bulletin, October 24, 1979; "Mayor Goode," Ebony (May 1984); Shoemaker, "A Life of Family, Church and Service." 29 On Rizzo, see Joseph R. Daughen and Peter Binzen, The Cop Who Would be King: Mayor Frank Rizzo (Boston, 1977). 30 David and Runker, "Wilson Goode: Compassion for the Underdog;" Claude Lewis, "Mayor Picked a Couple of True Professionals," Philadelphia Bulletin, January 18, 1981; Cohn, "Wilson Goode has Something to Prove." 31 Philadelphia Bulletin, February 19, 1980, January 9, 1981; "Green Team Gets Good Grade for 1st Term," Ibid., January 27, 1981; Ibid., February 3, 1981; Joe Davidson, "Mayor Green's 81 Budget: A $1 Million Surplus," Ibid., March 23, 1981; Ibid., April 22, 1981. 32 Joe Davidson, "Philadelphia Aids Few in Crisis on Housing For Poor," Philadelphia Bulletin, May 21, 1981; Thomas Hine, "Housing Situation Dismal Goode and Urban Experts Tell Conference," Ibid., November 1, 1981; Joe Davidson, "Philadelphia Unveils Housing Plan," Ibid., March 1, 1981; "8000 URBAN ENTREPRENEUR 157

Homeless in Philadelphia Plan to Use Shelters as Voting Address," New York Times, September 11, 1984. 33 Davidson, "Is This Any Way to Run a City;" "At the Helm of the City," Black Enterprise, Febru- ary 14, 1983, p. 13; "Philadelphia Is 'on the Move,' Mayor Says of First Year," New York Times, January 7, 1985. 34 Philadelphia Inquirer, November 9, 1983; John Anderson and Hillary Hevenor, Burning Down the House: MOVE and the Tragedy of Philadelphia (New York, 1987), pp. 62-67. 36 Philadelphia Inquirer, November 9, 1983; "At the Helm of the City," Black Enterprise, February 1984, p. 13; "Black Mayors," Ebony (August 1984), p. 86. 36 New York Times, November 10, 1983. 37 Philadelphia Inquirer, November 9, 1983; New York Times, November 6, 10, 1983. 38 Philadelphia Inquirer, November 9, 1983. 39 Philadelphia Inquirer, January 5, 1984; New York Times, January 5, 1984. 40 William Robbin, "Philadelphia is 'On the Move': Mayor Goode in His First Year," New York Times, January 7, 1985. 41 Mallowe, "No-Frills Mayor;" Mike Mallowe, "The Friends of Wilson Goode," Philadelphia Maga- zine, October 1985, pp. 127-128. 42 Telephone Interview with Barbara Kaplan, Executive Director of Philadelphia Planning Commis- sion," December 8, 1987; Telephone Interview with Richard Tyler, Historic Preservation Officer, Phila- delphia Planning Commission, December 2, 1987; Martin, "Wilson Goode," Ebony Vol. 39, May 1984, 45; Vernon Loeb, "Skyline Carries Stamp of Both Candidates," Philadelphia Inquirer, October 27, 1987. 43 PCPC, Plan for North Philadelphia (1987), TUA. 44 Mallowe, "No-Frills Mayor," p. 239. 46 Note that in the wake of the MOVE disaster, Wilson Goode convened a panel to hold hearings on the events leading up to the decision to drop the bomb on the Osage Avenue house. The extensive tran- scripts generated by the MOVE hearings have been deposited at the Temple University Archives, Temple University, Philadelphia. See "Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations of Philadelphia Special In- vestigation Commission," and "Philadelphia Special Investigation Commission: Report of Commissioner Charles W. Bowser," and "Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Bruce W. Kauffmann," all in Temple Law Quarterly (1986), pp. 339-3417; See also, Larry Eichel, "D.A.: Goode Wanted No Details," Phila- delphia Inquirer, October 23, 1985; "Philadelphia Moves On," Black Enterprise, August 1985, p. 19; and Anderson and Hevenor, Burning Down the House. 46 Eichel, "D.A.: Goode Wanted No Details;" Jonathan Rubenstein, "There Are More Questions for Mayor Goode" and David Zuccino, "Goode is Contradicted on Picking Siege Team," Philadelphia In- quirer, October 23, 1985; Ibid., October 24, 1985. 47 On unveiling of incompetence, see Philadelphia Inquirer, October 24, 1985; also "Philadelphia Moves On," Black Enterprise, August 1985, p. 19. 48 See Mike Mallowe, "The November of His Years," Philadelphia Magazine (November 1985), pp. 31-32; also "Time to Clear Up," The Economist, October 5, 1985, p. 27; Wallace K. Stevens, "Mayor Goode's Once-Solid Path Turns Rocky in Philadelphia," New York Times, October 23, 1985. 49 William K. Stevens, "Philadelphia Mayor Apologizes for Confrontation with Radicals," New York Times, March 10, 1986. 50 "New Homes Arise," Philadelphia Inquirer, October 24, 1985; "At Last a Family Comes Back," Ibid., July 19, 1986; "Mayor Condemned," The Economist, March 15, 1986, p. 24. 6' "City Employees Walk off Job," Philadelphia Inquirer, July 1, 1986; "Goode Should Stand His Ground," Ibid., July 2, 1986; Ibid., July 19, 1986. 52 Philadelphia Inquirer, July 20-21, 1986. 63 "Goode Gets Key Support," Philadelphia Inquirer, October 21, 1986. 4 Russell Cooke, "Goode: A Year of Recovery," Philadelphia Inquirer, January 4, 1987. 66 Philadelphia Inquirer, October 20, 1986, October 27, 1987. 66 H. G. Bissinger, "A Rizzo Strategy," Philadelphia Inquirer, October 3, 1987; Tom Infield, "Both Men are Buoyant After Mayor Debate," Ibid., October 8, 1987; "Rizzo-Goode Call one Another Liars," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, October 13, 1987; Albert Neri, "Can Goode Survive Move Disaster," Ibid., October 29, 1987; "Voters Guide," Philadelphia Inquirer, October 27, 1987, 4P. 158 JOURNAL OF NEGRO HISTORY

67 Paul Maryniak, "Choosing Between Two Blundering Idiots," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, October 17, 1987; William K. Stevens, "In Goode-Rizzo Contest, Voters Count Flaws," New York Times, October 18, 1987. 58 Maryniak, "Choosing Between Two Blundering Idiots," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, October 17, 1987; Rendell quoted by Stevens in "Goode-Rizzo Contest," New York Times, October 18, 1987; "Voters Guide," Philadelphia Inquirer, October 25, 1987. 56 Matthew Purdy, "A New Kind of Black Politician," Philadelphia Inquirer, September 20, 1987; Tom Infield, "Goode Relentlessly Pursues Crucial White Vote," Ibid., October 3, 1987. 60 "Goode Takes Oath for Second Time," Philadelphia Inquirer, January 5, 1988. 61 Dick Polman, "Black Party Image Splits Democrats," Philadelphia Inquirer, January 14, 1990. 62 The dichotomy between the economic development goal of urban planning and public administration and social objectives is the theme of Daniel Schaffer's edited volume, Two Centuries of American Planning. 63 See Seymour J. Mandelbaum, Boss Tweed's New York (New York, 1965); and Polman, "Black Party Image Splits Democrats."