MASARYKOVA UNIVERZITA FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH STUDIÍ KATEDRA POLITOLOGIE
Islamic Lone Actor Terrorism in the EU in Years 2014-2017 Bakalářská práce
Ondřej Palička
Vedoucí práce: Jakub Drmola, PhD. UČO: 439833 Obor: Bezpečnostní a strategická studia + Anglický jazyk a literatura Imatrikulační ročník: 2015/2016
Brno, 2018
Prohlášení o autorství práce Prohlašuji, že jsem bakalářskou práci na téma Islamic Lone Actor Terrorism in the EU in Years 2014-2017 vypracoval samostatně a použil jen zdroje uvedené v seznamu literatury.
V Brně, 11. 12. 2018 ...... Ondřej Palička
Děkuji vedoucímu mé bakalářské práce Jakubovi Drmolovi, PhD. za cenné rady, a především za jeho rychlé reakce na všechny mé dotazy. Dále bych rád poděkoval své přítelkyni, která při mně stála po celou dobu psaní práce, Magdě Divišové za odbornou pomoc s anglickým jazykem a v neposlední řadě svým rodičům, bez nichž bych neměl možnost tuto práci napsat.
Abstract
Islamic terrorism in the EU has been on the rise since 2014 and majority of the attacks was carried out be lone actors. This thesis focused on the current developments on the field of terrorism and aimed to find possible flaws in counter-terrorism strategies and to suggest new approaches. To achieve this goal, information on lone actor attacks in the period of 2014-2017 were gathered and analysed using the theoretical framework based on the work of Leenaars and Reed. Based on the findings, areas of counter-terrorism that needs to be focused on were identified and new approaches were suggested.
Keywords: lone actors, Islamic terrorism, terrorist attacks, EU, counter-terrorism, counter- radicalisation
Anotace
Islámský terorismus v EU byl od roku 2014 na vzestupu a většina útoků byla spáchána osamělými aktéry. Tato práce se zaměřila na aktuální vývoj na poli terorismu, za cíl měla nalezení možných nedostatků v protiteroristických strategiích a navržení nových přístupů. K dosažení tohoto cíle byly shromážděny informace o útocích osamělých aktérů v rozmezí let 2014-2017, které byly následně analyzovány s využitím teoretického rámce založeného na práci Leenaarse a Reeda. Na základě zjištění byly identifikovány oblasti boje proti terorismu, na které je třeba se zaměřit, a také byly navrženy nové postupy.
Klíčová slova: osamělí aktéři, islámský terorismus, teroristické útoky, EU, boj proti terorismu, boj proti radikalizaci Content Introduction ...... 8 Objectives and Structure ...... 9 Objectives ...... 9 Structure ...... 10 Conceptualization ...... 10 Terrorism ...... 11 Lone Actor Terrorism ...... 11 Methodology ...... 12 Limitations ...... 12 Case Selection and Obtaining Basic Information ...... 12 Scope of the Research ...... 13 Ambiguous Attacks ...... 13 Using the Database ...... 13 Data Collection ...... 14 Theoretical Framework ...... 14 Socio-demographic Information ...... 15 Psychological Background and History ...... 16 Motivation Behind the Attack ...... 16 Target of the Attack ...... 16 Modus Operandi ...... 17 Objective of the Attack ...... 17 Aftermath ...... 17 Awareness of the Intentions ...... 18 Overview of the Attacks in EU 2014-2017 ...... 18 Attacks per Country ...... 18 Deaths and Injuries ...... 19 Modus Operandi ...... 21 Lone Actors vs. Organised Groups ...... 23 Attacks Description and Analysis ...... 25 Year 2014 ...... 25 Belgium, Brussels, 24.5.2014 ...... 25 Year 2015 ...... 27 Denmark, Copenhagen, 14.2.2015 ...... 27
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France, Saint-Quentin-Fallavier, 26.6.2015 ...... 28 Year 2016 ...... 30 United Kingdom, Rochdale, 18.2.2016 ...... 30 United Kingdom, Glasgow, 24.3.2016 ...... 31 France, Magnanville, 13.6.2016 ...... 32 France, Nice, 14.7.2016 ...... 34 France, Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray, 26.7.2016 ...... 35 Germany, Berlin, 19.12.2016 ...... 37 Year 2017 ...... 38 United Kingdom, London, 22.3.2017 ...... 38 Sweden, Stockholm, 7.4.2017 ...... 39 France, Paris, 20.4.2017 ...... 40 United Kingdom, London, 3.6.2017 ...... 42 Germany, Hamburg, 28.7.2017 ...... 44 Finland, Turku, 18.8.2017 ...... 45 France, Marseille, 1.10.2017 ...... 46 Analysis Summary ...... 47 Socio-demographic Information ...... 48 Psychological Background, Target of the Attack and Modus Operandi ...... 50 Psychological Background ...... 50 Target of the Attack ...... 51 Modus Operandi ...... 51 Aftermath and Awareness of Intentions ...... 53 Aftermath ...... 53 Awareness of Intentions: Family and Friends ...... 54 Awareness of Intentions: Intelligence Services ...... 55 Counter-terrorism Suggestions ...... 55 Counter-radicalisation ...... 56 Support Liberal Mosques ...... 57 Conclusion ...... 58 Sources ...... 60
Number of Characters: 97 280
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Chart List Chart 1: Theoretical Framework ...... 15 Chart 2: Attacks per Country ...... 19 Chart 3: Deaths per Country ...... 20 Chart 4: Total Victims ...... 21 Chart 5: Use of Weapons ...... 22 Chart 6: Deaths per Weapon ...... 23 Chart 7: Ratio of Lone Actors to Organized Groups ...... 24 Chart 8: Number of Deaths ...... 25 Table List
Table 1: Analysis Summary - Socio-demographic Information ...... 48 Table 2: Analysis Summary - Psychological Background, Target of the Attack and Modus Operandi ...... 50 Table 3: Analysis Summary - Aftermath, Awareness of Intentions ...... 53
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Introduction Terrorism is by no means a new security threat, but it is evolving and the frequency of the attacks in different time periods fluctuates. Year 2014 is perceived by many as the new wave of terrorism in the EU (Guerisoli 2017). It also marks the rise of the terrorist organization known as the Islamic State which was able to seize territory in Iraq and Syria and shocked the world with its violence, propaganda and ability to attract foreign fighters and motivate lone actor terrorists.
The time period of 2014-2017 recorded rise in Islamic terrorist attacks of which lone actors perpetrated the majority. Islamic terrorism became an immense concern for European states which was even magnified by the refugee crisis that started in the year 2015 even though the total number of terrorist attacks motivated by Islam constituted only 16% of all the terrorist attacks in the EU in the year 2017. On the other hand, despite its low share, it was the deadliest type of terrorism (EUROPOL 2018).
Lone actor terrorism poses a little bit different challenges than an attack perpetrated by organized groups. Although it is not a new phenomenon, lone actors troubled state authorities and intelligence services in the past few years more than before hence there is a need for further research of this phenomenon. Moreover, Islamic State’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi resurfaced on 22 August 2018 and urged his followers to continue with lone actor attacks in the West (Sly 2018).
This thesis will aim to address the current developments in the field of terrorism in the EU with the emphasis on the lone actor attacks. First, it will try to identify all the lone actor attacks in the years 2014-2017 in order to create a compilation of useful data on the phenomenon. Second, it will conduct a qualitative analysis of the selected attacks to acquire better understanding of lone actors and to explore the areas of counter-terrorism that need to be improved. Finally, with the findings of the analysis and identification of counter-terrorism strategies that needs to be focused on, it will try to suggest, if possible, new ideas on combating the lone actor terrorism and preventing the attacks.
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Objectives and Structure This thesis should be an addition to the research of the lone actor terrorism. However, its focus will be quite narrow as it tries to address the current developments in the field of terrorism in the EU. The author feels a need for deeper research in Islamic lone actor terrorism as Islamic terrorism has been the deadliest in recent years and although the attacks may have been carried out by organized groups, perpetrators were often lone actors (EUROPOL 2018). Also, it would be only logical that different kinds of lone actor terrorism would need different counter- terrorism approaches, especially because of the different motivations and ideologies. In this chapter, the author will introduce the research objectives of the thesis as well as the structure of the whole work.
Objectives First, this thesis aims to collect data on successful lone actor attacks which were carried out in the given period and to provide a reader with the statistical overview of this phenomenon. This part will be focused mainly on basic information and numbers and it will try to provide a clear picture of where, when and how the attacks were carried out as well as display the number of attacks, fatalities and injuries.
1. Research Objective: “Creation of compilation of data which will serve as summary and introduction to the phenomenon.”
Second, the author will do a qualitative analysis of these attacks which will be based on the theoretical framework which was introduced in ICCT Report “Understanding Lone Wolves: Towards a Theoretical Framework for Comparative Analysis” written by Jan Leenaars and Alastair Reed. The framework will be adjusted accordingly to the needs of this thesis and it will be further described in the chapter Methodology. The analysis is primarily meant to better understand the perpetrators and to serve as a basis for the third and pivotal objective.
2. Research Objective: “Analysis of the selected cases via the theoretical framework which will lead to the acquisition of necessary information.”
Third aim of this thesis is to use the findings of the qualitative analysis of the attacks in order to find possible counter-terrorism strategies. To reach this goal, the author will compare the findings and will try to find similarities between the attacks and the perpetrators. Thanks to this, the author should be able to find areas of counter-terrorism which need closer attention, whether
9 they have been dealt with in a wrong way, have not got enough attention or have not been addressed at all.
3. Research Objective: “Evaluation of the obtained information in order to determine areas of counter-terrorism which need to be focused on and, eventually, suggest possible improvements for the counter-terrorism efforts.
The author is aware of the fact that the goal of this thesis is rather ambitious, and it may seem to be hard to fulfil at first glance. However, the author believes that the first objective is not a hard task and upon completion it can provide a reader with a complex compilation of useful data on the studied phenomenon which itself is a contribution to the research of lone actor terrorism. Remaining two objectives will probably be harder to achieve due to the issues which will be further described in Limitations. It is possible that the results of the analysis will confirm that the current strategies are correct and there is not much more that could be done to prevent the attacks. Nevertheless, the author believes that this analysis can shed a new light on the Islamic lone actor terrorism and thus it is worth doing this research.
Structure The structure of the practical part of this thesis will logically follow the objectives described in the previous subchapter. First chapter will introduce the statistical overview of the Islamic lone actor terrorism in the years 2014-2017. A crucial tool for this part will be the Global Terrorism Database from which the author will select the attacks and gain the basic information. The process of case selection will be further described in the chapter Methodology.
Next chapter will deal with the attacks and perpetrators themselves. Each attack will be briefly described in order to get a reader familiar with the course of the whole event. Following the description, every attack will be analysed with the use of the Leenaars’ and Reed’s theoretical framework through which the author will gather as much information as possible.
The last chapter will aim to analyse the data gathered in the previous chapter and will try to find possible counter-terrorism approaches. As it was previously mentioned, the author will try to put emphasis on strategies which need closer attention, whether they have been dealt with in a wrong way, have not got enough attention or have not been addressed at all.
Conceptualization This chapter will introduce the definitions of terrorism and lone actor terrorism. It is important to first define terrorism itself in order to be able to define lone actors. However, defining both
10 phenomena is difficult as there is no generally accepted definition which in turn makes it harder to fight terrorism.
Terrorism From the many possible definitions and characteristics of terrorism, the author has decided to choose the one presented in the United Nation’s resolution 1566/2004 as it is quite broad. According to UN terrorism is: “criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature (United Nations 2004).”
Lone Actor Terrorism Defining lone actor terrorism is even more complicated. There are not only different definitions but also different names for this phenomenon. Both definitions and names are often quite similar and there are only slight differences. Lone wolf terrorism, leaderless resistance or solo terrorism are some of another possible names describing, more or less, the same phenomenon and they differentiate mainly in the question of organization and ties of the attackers to terrorist groups (Nesser 2012).
The author has decided to take more inclusive approach in the regard of choosing both definitions and attacks. Thus, the author has decided to use the definition created by Countering Lone Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project for two reasons. First, the definition was formed through definitional workshop which was attended by more than one person which means that it is based on the consensus of more researchers. Second, the definition “is somewhat broader in order to cast a wider net. This is useful during data collection, allowing subsequent analysis to guide decisions in relation to disputed criteria (Bakker, Zuijdewijn 2016:9).”
The definition of lone actor terrorism is: “The threat or use of violence by a single perpetrator (or small cell), not acting out of purely personal-material reasons, with the aim of influencing a wider audience, and who acts without any direct support in the planning, preparation and execution of the attack, and whose decision to act is not directed by any group or other individuals (although possibly inspired by others) (Bakker, Zuijdewijn 2016:9).”
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Methodology This chapter will describe the methods used in the research. First, the author will introduce the limitations of the research. Second, the chapter will describe the process of choosing the attacks which is closely connected to the way of obtaining basic information for the quantitative analysis needed in the first part of the work. Then, it will describe the way of gathering of the information for description and analysis of the attacks. Finally, it will introduce the theoretical framework created by Leenaars and Reed and it will explain its use in this thesis.
Limitations Limitations of this thesis relate to the data collection. The author does not have access to any governmental data hence he has to rely on the open sources, news websites in particular. Unfortunately, it is probable that such sources will not always offer all the needed information.
Naturally, media aim to cover primarily large attacks which are more interesting for their consumers. This means that some attacks, smaller in scale, can have a lesser coverage and provide the author with less information. Simply said, news aims to satisfy a common reader, not a researcher.
Furthermore, it is also possible that the journalists were not able to acquire the information which are important for this research as they could have been kept secret or have been unknown at the time of the writing. Also, what is important for this research does not have to be important for the reporter.
Nevertheless, open-sources are full of information and it is highly likely that the author will be able to find most of the needed data, although probably not all of them. To overcome these problems, the author will try to find as many sources as possible in order to reach a saturation of data.
Case Selection and Obtaining Basic Information The crucial item in the process of choosing the attacks and getting the basic information will be the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)1 which is “an open-source database including information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2017 (with annual updates planned for the future). Unlike many other event databases, the GTD includes systematic data
1 https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ 12 on domestic as well as international terrorist incidents that have occurred during this time period (START 2018).”
Scope of the Research As the scale of this thesis is limited, the author had to delimit the scope of the research in certain ways. The time period of 2014-2017 was chosen to address the most up-to-date developments of the Islamic lone actor terrorism in the EU and because the year 2014 is marked as the start of the wave of the Islamic terrorist attacks in the EU. To limit the number of the attacks, the author has decided to include only successful attacks in which at least one person, besides the perpetrator, was killed. The attacks also must fulfil the criteria of the chosen lone actor definition.
Ambiguous Attacks It is also important to mention that in some cases it is complicated to decide whether the attacks fully correspond to the definition or not. In these unclear cases, the author has decided to include the attacks in the research as well. These attacks can differentiate only in little details or there can be only few details missing. However, they can still be very similar to those fully corresponding to the definition and thus the same counter-terrorism approaches could be applied. Furthermore, including these attacks means more data available for the research, making it possible to achieve better understanding of the phenomenon. If needed, decision leading to inclusion of such ambiguous attack will be explained in more detail in the chapter Attack Description and Analysis.
Using the Database Advanced search option was used to filter the database and following criteria were applied: incidents between 2014 and 2017, the region was set to Western Europe2, all three criteria in “Terrorism Criteria” tab were required to bet met and both ambiguous cases and unsuccessful attacks were excluded.
Afterwards, the attacks meeting the required criteria were sorted by the number of the fatalities and the attacks with at least one death were further classified based on the perpetrator group. The attacks with these perpetrator groups were taken into consideration: Jihadi-inspired
2 GTD does not provide an option to choose the EU as a region. Eastern Europe region includes states such as the Czech Republic or Baltic states, thus it had to be checked as well in order to cover the whole EU. However, there were no Islamic terrorist attacks in Eastern Europe in the chosen time period. For this reason, the author has worked only with Western Europe further on. 13 extremist, Muslim extremists, ISIL, AQAP and Unknown. From the total number of 293 attacks inspired by Islam 16 were chosen, based on the definition, for the sake of this research.
GTD also offers all the basic information needed for the quantitative analysis hence no other source will be used in this matter. The information is: country, fatalities, injuries and modus operandi.
Data Collection Collecting information for the qualitative analysis will be rather challenging part of the work. The author can work only with open sources which have various quality and sometimes the information can differ between the sources. To ensure the best possible outcome, the author will work with a number of sources in order to achieve a saturation of data.
Theoretical Framework The theoretical framework for the qualitative analysis of the attacks will be based on the method created by Leenaars and Reed. These two have prepared the framework in order to be able to compare the lone actors with other perpetrators acting on their own, such as school shooters or mass murderers. The author has decided to choose this framework as it covers all important aspects of the perpetrators and the attacks. Thanks to this analysis the author should be able to find similarities between the attackers and thus be able to detect the fields of counter-terrorism that need to be focused on. The analysed factors, which will be adjusted accordingly for the needs of this thesis, are the following: socio-demographic information, psychological background and history, motivation behind the attack, target of the attack, modus operandi, objective of the attack, aftermath and awareness of intentions.
3 Attacks consisting of multiple incidents (for e.g. the attacks carried out by Islamic State in November 2015) are marked as one attack. 14
Chart 1: Theoretical Framework (Leenaars, Reed 2016) Socio-demographic Information “Socio-demographic information helps to get a general picture of the perpetrator. Age, gender, ethnicity, occupation, relationship status, highest education received, and previous criminal convictions all help us begin to understand what the risk factors of the perpetrator are and the stage of life they are in (Leenaars, Reed 2016)”
Although the socio-demographic information does not aim to identify the attackers prior to the attack, as it is simply not enough to do so, it can be used to get an overall picture of the perpetrator and eventually find common factors for them. However, for the sake of this research only age, ethnicity and previous criminal convictions will be considered.
The first reason is purely practical as the scale of this research is limited, hence more important factors were chosen. While age is simply basic information, ethnicity plays an important role as it can show who is more prone to radicalisation. Criminal convictions can further tell more about the perpetrator and because the attackers are often radicalised in prison (Paolo Magri 2018).
Second, the author is aware of the limitations of open sources and of the fact that details such as occupation or highest education can be difficult to find. However, this information is arguably not as important as the chosen ones, thus excluding these factors will not harm the relevance of the research.
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The author has also decided to add a country of origin as another factor. This is specifically important in the case of Islamic lone actor terrorism as there is a question whether the attackers were born in the EU or for example used the wave of refugees to get to the EU in order to carry out an attack. The answer to this question can offer an interesting insight into the phenomenon and can help adjust the focus of counter-terrorism strategies.
Psychological Background and History “The psychological background and history further add to our understanding of the perpetrator. The codes that belong in this category are mental health status, isolation, depression and unfreezing. Mental health status is an important code to compare because it is of tremendous influence if the perpetrator was aware of his actions and was clinically sane. Depression and isolation serve as the same type of indicators as mental health status, albeit less severe. If various perpetrators are dealing with mental health issues, it raises concerns (Leenaars, Reed 2016).”
In order to simplify the work with this factor the author has decided to pay attention to the mental health status in general as it is, according to Leenaars and Reed, an important factor. For this reason, the author will look for the information about the mental health of the perpetrator and in case that there will not be any specific information about mental health issues the perpetrator will be considered as clinically sane.
Motivation Behind the Attack “The motivation behind the attack helps us understand the reasoning behind the attack. The type of the perpetrator you are dealing with varies if an attack is motivated by personal grievance, political grievance and/or ideology. Personal grievance is coded and defined as the perceived mistreatment of the individual by loved ones or the government. Political grievance is coded and defined as the perceived mistreatment of people that the individual identifies with. Ideology, when present, is coded as religious, political or single-issue (Leenaars, Reed 2016).”
This factor does not play an important role and can be excluded from the analysis because the research is concerned only with Islamic lone actor terrorism hence it is coded as motivated by ideology.
Target of the Attack “It is important to distinguish what the target of the attack is. A target can either be direct, random, or both. A target is coded as direct if there was a clear target prior to the attack or if
16 the location itself was chosen for specific reasons. A target is coded as random if there were victims that were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. Attacks by lone wolves often feature both of these targets. This is not surprising, seeing as what typically motivates lone wolves: ideology and political grievance. Seeing as a direct target often cannot be reached the perpetrator is left with a symbolic target, which means the actual casualties are often random in that regard (Leenaars, Reed 2016).”
Modus Operandi “The modus operandi of the lone perpetrator is vital as it explains how the attack is carried out. The type of weapons obtainable and preferred during an attack, how the attack was planned and carried out can all play a role in detecting similarities between different lone perpetrators. Guns are often the weapon of choice, but knives, vehicles and pipe bombs have all been utilised (Leenaars, Reed 2016).”
Objective of the Attack “The objective of the attack can be categorised into multiple categories. Revenge and the hope to provoke change are recurring themes that perpetrators aim to achieve when they launch their attack. The fact that revenge is a common theme does not mean that the reasons behind said revenge are necessarily similar across perpetrators. Revenge can be inspired by ideology and political grievance, but also by personal grievance. The reason why revenge is sought can thus vary and be either more sophisticated or simply personal in nature (Leenaars, Reed 2016).”
The objective of the attack is in this case closely connected to the motivation behind the attack. Revenge inspired by ideology could be applied to all the attacks and thus it will be excluded from the analysis the same way as motivation behind the attack. It could be argued that some of the perpetrators turn to the radical Islam and terrorism out of their personal grievance. However, at the moment of the attack, they are already radicalised, and they carry out the attack in the name of Islam which means that the revenge is inspired by ideology.
Aftermath “The aftermath is twofold. It tells us how many injuries and fatalities the result of the attack was, but also in what way the attack came to an end. Did the perpetrator surrender, were they overpowered and arrested, killed in action or did they commit suicide? The distinction of what happened and what the perpetrator hoped would happen is also important: it is entirely possible for a perpetrator to be arrested or overpowered while he hoped to die during his attack. Death tolls and injuries vary greatly between attacks (Leenaars, Reed 2016).”
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Awareness of the Intentions “The last category discusses any hints or clues that the perpetrator – either on purpose or by accident – released to the world prior to the attack. It also discusses any information that the perpetrator created before the attack and left behind for authorities to find later. It is not unheard of for perpetrators to leave behind hints that an attack is about to take place. Manifestos and journals are sometimes left behind, explaining the attack and letting the world know who they were. In an ideal scenario, the awareness of intentions can shed new light on the detection and prevention of attacks. Practically, we see that it is quite difficult to achieve such a feat (Leenaars, Reed 2016).”
This is another factor which the author has decided to adjust accordingly to this research. The main focus of this aspect will be whether the relatives of the attacker or people close to them have noticed the radicalisation or any other change in the behaviour of the individual. It is important to look at this as the radical Islamic is quite a specific kind of extremism and it is often accompanied by visible changes. The second question will be whether the perpetrator was known to the intelligence services prior to the attack.
Overview of the Attacks in the EU 2014-20174 This chapter aims to gather basic information about the lone actor terrorist attacks in the EU in the chosen time period. It will provide a reader with a comprehensive statistical overview of the phenomenon and it will be a basis for further research. The chapter will focus on attacks per country, number of deaths, injuries, modus operandi and a brief comparison of lone actor attacks and attacks carried out by organized terrorist groups.
Attacks per Country In total, 16 lone actor attacks were carried out in 7 EU member states in the course of 4 years. France has witnessed the highest number of attacks (6), followed by the United Kingdom (4), Germany (2) and Belgium, Sweden, Finland and Denmark witnessing 1 attack each.
4 All the information was taken from GTD - https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (START 2018) 18
Attacks per Country 7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
France United Kingdom Germany Belgium Sweden Finland Denmark
Chart 2: Attacks per Country
Deaths and Injuries Total number of 144 people died during the attacks, including the attackers. However, it is important to note that 87 people, more than a half of the total, died as a result of a single attack carried out in Nice in the year 2016. In France, 99 people died in 4 years, which is more than 5 times the number of fatalities in the UK, which has the second highest amount of deaths. However, 2016 Nice attack accounts for 87% of deaths in France and 81% of 107 deaths in the year 2016 which was the deadliest in the chosen period. If the 2016 Nice attack had not happened, France would be ranked third with 13 deaths in total and the year 2016 with the total death toll of 20 would be less deadly than the year 2017 with 30 fatalities.
These numbers show two things. On the one hand, lone actor attacks can be seen as quite ineffective with only few deaths overall. On the other hand, this phenomenon cannot be underestimated as only one attack can have huge impact.
It is also important to mention that out of these 144 deaths, 12 were the attackers themselves. Total number of 20 perpetrators took part in the attacks which means that more than a half of them died during the action. This means that more attackers died than victims did in Sweden, Finland and Denmark combined.
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Deaths per Country 120
100
80
60
40
20
0 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
France United Kingdom Germany Belgium Sweden Finland Denmark
Chart 3: Deaths per Country
Furthermore, it is also important to consider people who were injured, as the scale of the injuries can vary deeply and can still have a serious impact one one’s physical and (or) mental health.
The total amount of people injured during the 2014-2017 is 621 with France (439), the UK (99) and Germany (55) accounting for 95% of the total. Once again, 2016 Nice attack proved its effectiveness, injuring 433 (69%) people.
If the numbers of dead and injured were put together, the total number of 765 people killed or injured by the lone actor attack would be achieved. Although the deadly 2016 Nice attack with total number of 520 victims influences the number greatly, there is no doubt that the lone actor terrorists have affected many lives hence this phenomenon is not to be underestimated.
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Total Victims 600
500
400
300
200
100
0 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
France United Kingdom Germany Belgium Sweden Finland Denmark
Chart 4: Total Victims
Modus Operandi Another interesting factor is weapons used by the attackers. The most used ones were melee weapons (7), followed by firearms (3), vehicles (3) and vehicles in combination with melee weapons5 (3). According to the European Commission, the most commonly used weapon by terrorists in general are explosives, often home-made, prepared from accessible chemicals (European Commission 2018). However, this does not apply to the lone actors as they did not use explosives in any of the chosen attacks. Possible explanation and impacts of this difference in the use of weapons will be further discussed in the next chapter.
5 The author has decided to create a special category for this kind of attacks, as it would be complicated to divide the deaths between melee weapons and vehicles. 21
Use of Weapons 8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total
Firearm Melee Vehicle Vehicle + Knife
Chart 5: Use of Weapons
There is also a question of how effective these weapons are6. Although melee weapons are used most often, they are also very little effective, killing only 10 people, which means 1,4 victims plus 2,5 injuries per attack. Firearms are not particularly effective either, killing 7 (2,3 per attack) and injuring 8 (2,6 per attack).
The last remaining weapon, figuring in two categories, is a vehicle. Attacks in which the vehicle attack was followed by perpetrator(s) leaving the car and using knives to continue their violence resulted in 14 deaths (4,6 per attack) and 100 injuries (33,3 per attack). In cases where only vehicles were used, 103 people died (34,3 per attack) and 598 were injured (199,3 per attack). Again, it is important to note that these numbers are highly affected by the 2016 Nice attack. Nevertheless, vehicles are the deadliest weapon in the hands of lone actors and they can have far-reaching consequences.
6 In this case, perpetrators are excluded 22
Deaths per Weapon
7; 5% 14; 10% 10; 8%
103; 77%
Firearm Melee Vehicle Vehicle + Knife
Chart 6: Deaths per Weapon
Lone Actors vs. Organised Groups Finally, it could be useful to briefly compare lone actor attacks with attacks carried out by organized terrorist groups. First, there is a question of how many attacks were carried out by lone actors and organized groups in the given period. It was already mentioned that 16 lone actor attacks occurred. However, there were only 6 attacks perpetrated by the organized groups in the years 2014-2017 which means that almost three-quarters of the Islamic terrorist attacks were carried out by lone actors.
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Ratio of Lone Actors to Organized Groups
6; 27%
16; 73%
Organized Groups Lone Actor
Chart 7: Ratio of Lone Actors to Organized Groups
On the other hand, there is a second questions of how effective these attacks are. During the lone actor attacks, 144 people were killed whereas 232 people died as a result of attacks perpetrated by organized terrorist groups. This difference is probably caused by the sophistication of the attacks carried out by organized groups which were able to kill 38,6 people per attack (Kopan 2018). Meanwhile, lone actor attacks are significantly less effective, resulting “only” in death of 8,5 people per attack.
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Number of Deaths
144; 38%
232; 62%
Organized Groups Lone Actors
Chart 8: Number of Deaths
Attacks Description and Analysis This chapter is the crucial part of the whole thesis as it will analyse the attacks and provide the author with the necessary information to determine which aspects of counter-terrorism strategies need to be focused on and eventually offer possible improvements or new ideas for these strategies. In this part, each attack will be described and, afterwards, the theoretical framework will be used to analyse the attack and acquire the data.
Year 2014 Belgium, Brussels, 24.5.2014 On Saturday 24.5., a man with a bag entered the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium. He was armed with two firearms, one of them being a Kalashnikov rifle, which was used during the attack. The whole event took only few seconds and left behind 3 dead and 1 injured, who died in a hospital afterwards (La Libre 2014). Eventually, French customs agents arrested a man in Marseille, possessing weapons identical to those used in the attack, on 1 June during a chance check.
The man was named as Mehdi Nemmouche (Penketh 2014).
This attack is one of those which could be described as ambiguous because Nemmouche was a returnee from Syria hence he had links to IS. Initially, IS urged Muslims to travel to Syria but
25 when the journey there and to other states where IS operated became nearly impossible in late 2015, IS started to rely more on lone actor attacks (Callimachi 2017). This suggests that radicalisation process and motivation was probably similar to those of lone actors as well as the manner in which the attack was carried out. Simply put, it is highly likely that if Nemmouche was released for e.g. in 2016, he would have to carry out an attack in France instead of travelling to Syria. Because of these similarities the author has decided to involve this attack in the research.
Socio-demographic Information
Mehdi Nemmouche was born in Roubaix on April 17th, 1985. He is a French national of Algerian origin. Nemmouche was convicted of robbery in 2007 and also from two other criminal acts while he was already in custody. He was eventually released in December 2012 and left France later that month to join IS. While in prison, Nemmouche associated with Islamist inmates and got radicalised (Counter Extremism 2018a).
Psychological Background
Nemmouche had a criminal, violent past which is highlighted by his participation in Syrian war as a member of IS. According to Nicolas Hénin, former IS prisoner, Nemmouche beat and tortured his prisoners and talked about raping women or killing a baby. However, none of the sources mentioned any confirmed psychological problems thus he will be considered as clinically sane (Counter Extremism 2018a).
Target of the Attack
It is highly likely that Nemmouche chose the Jewish museum on purpose as he acted self- confidently which implies that he had known the place before the attack. Also, this could be supported by the fact that Muslims oppose Israel and Jews. However, the victims were random people present at the time of the attack which means that the attack is coded as a combination of a direct and random target.
Modus Operandi
Modus operandi is coded as firearm because Nemmouche was told to have two guns, one of them being AK-47 which was used during the attack.
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Aftermath
As a result of the attack, 4 people died. Nemmouche fled the scene and was arrested after a week by chance thus it can be said that he did not want to die during the attack. One of the possible explanations could be an intention to carry out other attack(s) in the future as he talked to the prisoners in Syria about his plans to carry out an attack during Paris’s July 14 Bastille Day parade (Counter Extremism 2018a).
Awareness of Intentions
According to some sources, Nemmouche’s family lost contact with him after he went to prison and were shocked by his deeds which implies that they were not aware of his radicalisation. Nevertheless, French authorities were aware of his radicalisation in prison and he was known to French Intelligence services (FRANCE24 2014).
Year 2015 Denmark, Copenhagen, 14.2.2015 On Saturday, 14.2., a young man attacked a café in the Danish capital where Free speech debate was held. He killed Finn Nørgaard, a Danish film-director, in front of the building and afterwards he tried to get inside. However, the attacker did not manage to enter the building and fled the scene. During the fight, three people were injured (Booth, Chrisafis 2015).
After midnight, the same individual attacked the synagogue where Bar Mitzvah was taking place. However, the synagogue’s security was strengthened as a result of the previous attack and the attacker was not able to enter the building again. However, during the shoot-out, one policeman was killed and two were injured (Booth, Chrisafis 2015).
In the early morning, police tracked down the man who opened fire and was eventually killed. He was identified as Omar El-Hussein (Booth, Chrisafis 2015).
Socio-demographic Information
Omar El-Hussein, 22 years old, was born in Denmark but was of Palestinian descent. During his life, El-Hussein was a criminal, arrested for possession of cannabis or for having a knife in nightclub. However, in 2013 he stabbed a young man and was arrested. He is believed to get radicalised while serving his sentence (Gunter 2015).
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Psychological Background
El-Hussein told a psychiatrist that he had a happy childhood and a good relationship with his family. He was described as a hot-tempered loner, openly hating Jews, by his classmates (Gunter 2015). Nevertheless, no mental health problems were confirmed, and the attacker is coded as clinically sane.
Target of the Attack
It is probable that El-Hussein chose both locations on purpose. Lars Vilks, a Swedish cartoonist who portrayed Muhammad as a dog, was present at the debate which implies that he was the target of the attack. The synagogue was chosen because of his hatred of Jews. However, random people died and were injured in both cases (Booth, Chrisafis 2015). Thus, the attack is coded as combined.
Modus Operandi
El-Hussein used firearms to carry out his attack. Two guns were found after his death (Booth, Chrisafis 2015).
Aftermath
The attack resulted in 2 deaths and 5 injuries. El-Hussein fled after both attacks but was tracked down by the police and killed. According to Danish intelligence, El-Hussein obtained a passport prior to the attack and it is believed that he wanted to flee the country after the attacks (Times of Israel 2015).
Awareness of Intentions
There is no mention whether El-Hussein’s family or friends knew about his radicalisation, which could by caused by the fact that this process probably took place in prison and he carried out the attack shortly after being released. However, Danish intelligence agency was warned by prison officials and El-Hussein was allegedly on the radar (BBC News 2015a).
France, Saint-Quentin-Fallavier, 26.6.2015 On Friday, 26.6., a man rammed his car to an open building containing chemicals in Air Products factory located in Saint-Quentin-Fallavier near Lyon. Policemen and firefighters who arrived at the scene after the explosion found a man who was trying to ignite canisters with flammable liquids. Later on, they also found a decapitated body and head impaled on railings.
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During the explosion, 2 people were injured. The attacker was identified as Yassin Salhi (BBC News 2015b).
Socio-demographic Information
Salhi, 35, was born in France to Algerian father and Moroccan mother. He had no criminal records prior to the attack (Rubin 2015).
Psychological Background
No clues about mental-health problems were found hence the attacker is coded as clinically sane.
Target of the Attack
Salhi was a professional driver and was one of the regular delivery drivers in Air Products. Thus, it is likely that he chose this place intentionally as it was easy for him to get inside and also because he knew of the chemicals which were the target of his car attack. Also, the victim of beheading was chosen on purpose as it was Salhi’s boss (BBC News 2015b). However, the people injured during the explosion were random victims which means that the target is combined.
Modus Operandi
In this case, the attacker used both a vehicle and a melee weapon.
Aftermath
One person was killed prior to the car attack and 2 people were injured as a result of the explosion. Salhi was arrested at the scene as he was trying to cause more damage. Later on, Salhi committed suicide by hanging in a solitary confinement (Willsher 2015).
Awareness of Intentions
According to the sources, the family and people close to Salhi were all shocked by the attack and were not aware of any radicalisation process. Salhi was placed on the French security service’s list of potential security threats in 2006. However, he was dropped from the watch list in 2008 and he was not watched since (Rubin 2015).
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Year 2016 United Kingdom, Rochdale, 18.2.2016 On Thursday, 18.2., imam Jalal Uddin was on his way home after the evening prayer and a lunch at his friend’s house. He was attacked in a children’s play area in Rochdale by a man who used a hammer to hit him in the head. Uddin was the found next morning and taken to hospital where he eventually died. The attacker was named Muhammad Abdul Kadir and his accomplice, who acted as a getaway driver, Muhammad Hussain Syeedy (Bond, Pilling 2016).
Mr. Uddin was described as a simple, religious man by the people. However, for the attackers, he was guilty of crime against God because he practised a form of spiritual healing called Ruqiya (Casciani 2016).
Socio-demographic Information
No source explicitly says that Kadir, 24 years old, and Syeedy, 21 years old, were born in the United Kingdom. However, Syeedy was addressed “of Rochdale” (Bond, Piling 2016). Furthermore, they were both in possession of a passport which means that they have to be the UK citizens (Halliday 2016). Sources also do not mention their origin, however, it is highly likely that they were both of Arabic origin due to their names and appearance in the photos. No mention about any criminal activities in the past was found.
Psychological Background
Sources also do not talk about any mental-health issues hence both men are coded as clinically sane.
Target of the Attack
In this case, the target of the attack is coded as direct. As it was already mentioned, Mr. Uddin practised a spiritual healing known as Ruqiyah which involves the use of amulets. IS perceives this practise as black magic and those who use it deserves punishment. Both men were said to develop hatred towards the imam (Bond, Piling 2016).
Modus Operandi
Uddin’s face was bludgeoned with what is believed to be a hammer.
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Aftermath
The attack resulted in death of one person. Syeedy was later arrested and eventually found guilty of murder and sentenced for life (BBC News 2016a). Kadir fled the country 3 days after the murder. He allegedly travelled to Istanbul via Copenhagen and is believed to have joined IS in Syria. Efforts to trace him proved unsuccessful (Halliday 2016).
Awareness of Intentions
Sources do not mention any signs of awareness among the friends or families. Also, none of the perpetrators was known to the intelligence services prior to the attack.
Syeedy had travelled to Syria in 2013 where he was a part of humanitarian aid convoy. It is thought that, perhaps, he became radicalised after this experience. Police have found IS-related material in his phone and home (BBC News 2016b).
United Kingdom, Glasgow, 24.3.2016 Asad Shah, 40 years old, was a shopkeeper in Glasgow and a member of Ahmadi Muslim sect7, which believes there are more prophets than Muhammad. On 24 March, a man entered Shah’s shop and asked him to deny the claim that he was a prophet. Eventually, the man attacked Shah, stabbing him in front of the shop. The man was identified as Tanveer Ahmed (Dearden, Mortimer 2016).
Inclusion of this attack could be disputable due to the fact that it is hard to decide whether it is an actual terrorist attack or not. However, the UN definition of terrorism can be applied, and it is also perceived as a terrorist attack by GTD, which is the main tool used for selection of the attacks, thus this attack will be included in the research.
Socio-demographic Information
Sources do not inform whether Tanveer Ahmed, 32 years old from Bradford, was born in the UK or moved there during his life. However, it is known that he is of Pakistani origin (Kermani, Iqbal 2017). There is also no information regarding previous criminal convictions. However, it is probable that Ahmed did not do anything against the law in the past.
7 The Ahmadiyya is an Islamic revival movement founded in 1889. The Ahmadiyya Muslim community believe that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is Messiah, the second coming of Jesus. They reject terrorism, fight for human rights or endorse a separation of mosques and state (Al Islam 2018). It is branded as heretical and Ahmadis are being persecuted mainly in Pakistan but also in other countries (TPA 2018). 31
Psychological Background
Sources do not inform about mental-health issues hence the attacker is coded as clinically sane.
Target of the Attack
Again, this target is coded as direct, because Ahmed attacked Shah on purpose. The reason for this attack was that Shah was a member Ahmadi Muslim sect.
Modus Operandi
Ahmed used a knife to stab his victim.
Aftermath
After the murder, Ahmed walked to a bus station where he was later found by the police. After his arrest, Ahmed released a statement saying he killed Shah because he claimed to be a prophet (BBC News 2016c).
In Pakistan, Ahmed developed a vast number of supporters who see him as a defender of Islam and praise him for being brave and courageous. One man said that the whole Pakistan knew who he is because of his deed (Kermani, Iqbal 2017).
Awareness of Intentions
There is no mention of awareness of intentions or of the fact that Ahmed was known to the police before the attack. It is highly likely that, due to the nature of the attack, Ahmed did not go through the radicalisation process as other attackers but was influenced by the hatred towards Ahmadis which is typical for Pakistan, his country of origin.
France, Magnanville, 13.6.2016 On Monday evening, 13.6., a police officer was stabbed in front of his house in Magnanville, a town 55km far from Paris, by a young man. After the stabbing, the man entered the officer’s house where he took his partner and their son hostage. Finally, anti-terrorist police stormed the house and killed the attacker. They found the dead body of the woman and the boy unharmed (BBC News 2016d).
The attacker was named as Larossi Abballa. During the attack, Abballa streamed a video online on Facebook in which he claimed the attack (bbc4 2016). During the siege, Abballa told the policemen that he had pledged allegiance to IS (Labbé, Caraud 2016).
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Socio-demographic Information
Abballa, 25 years old, was born in France and he was of Moroccan origin (Labbé, Caraud 2016). Abballa was arrested in 2011 and sentenced to two and a half years in prison in 2013 for recruiting jihadists. Prior to the attack, he had been also a subject of investigation into a Syrian jihadist group, but there was not sufficient evidence for his arrest (BBC News 2016e).
Psychological Background
After his arrest in 2011, Abballa said that he needed a recognition and he found comfort in religion. He also talked about the effect of the group of which he was a member and about the influence of videos on the internet (BBC News 2016e). The attacker is coded as clinically sane as there are no mentions of mental-health issues.
Target of the Attack
The police have found a list of other potential targets including rap musicians, journalists and also other police officers at the scene. Thus, the target of the attack is coded as direct as the attacker chose his victims on purpose, prior to the attack (Labbé, Caraud 2016).
Modus Operandi
Abballa used a knife to kill both of his victims.
Aftermath
As a result, 2 people died during the attack. Abdalla held Jessica Schneider and the couple’s son hostage for about 4 hours, however it is unknown when Schneider was killed. After Abballa threatened that he will blow up the building, police stormed the house and killed him (BBC News 2016d).
It is probable that Abballa intended to carry out more attacks as the police found a list of other potential victims.
Awareness of Intentions
There was no information about Abballa’s family or friends. However, the attacker was well known to the French police. Abballa was imprisoned because of his involvement with jihadist group and he was placed on S-list of individuals who are seen as a danger to security upon his release. Furthermore, he was being investigated by the anti-terrorist police and his phone was tapped at the time of the attack (BBC News 2016e).
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France, Nice, 14.7.2016 On Thursday night of July 15th, tens of thousands of people were celebrating Bastille Day, a French national holiday, on the Promenade des Anglais in the city of Nice. That was when a white truck drove into the crowd of people. The truck travelled for around 2km until it finally stopped, and a driver was shot dead by the police (Schuppe 2016).
The attacker, who had killed 86 people and injured more than 400 others, was named as Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel (Counter Extremism 2018b).
Socio-demographic Information
Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, January 3, 1985, was born in M’saken, Tunisia. He moved to Nice in 2005. He was reported by his wife for domestic abuse and he was also involved in a number of petty crimes. In March 2016, he was charged with assault with a weapon and he was given 6 months’ sentence, which was suspended (Counter Extremism 2018b).
Psychological Background
Apparently, Bouhlel had mental health issues and a history of violence. His behaviour was described as troubling and of psychotic nature. Also, a psychiatrist advised his parents that he needed a treatment. However, the psychiatrist also stated that such attack cannot be blamed on mental disorder (BBC News 2016h).
Target of the Attack
In this case, the target of the attack is coded as combined. Bouhlel deliberately chose the day and place of the attack as he knew that there will be a mass of people. Furthermore, it is also known that Bouhlel drove to the promenade in the truck few days before the attack (BBC News 2018a).
Modus Operandi
Bouhlel used a truck to carry out the attack. There were also firearms found in the truck and he reportedly shot at the policemen before he was killed (Schuppe 2016).
Aftermath
As a result, 86 people were killed and 433 were injured, which makes it the deadliest lone actor attack in the given period. Bouhlel was shot dead by the police after he stopped the truck.
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Awareness of Intentions
Bouhlel was described as secular, drinking alcohol, taking drugs, eating pork, etc. by many people who knew him. However, his friends noticed a change in his behaviour – he stopped shaving because of religious reasons and also showed them an IS’s video of decapitation (BBC News 2016h, Counter Extremism 2018b).
He was unknown to French intelligence agencies, never flagged for signs of radicalisation and he was not on France’s S-file. During the investigation, police have found IS-related propaganda on his computer (BBC News 2016h, Counter Extremism 2018b).
France, Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray, 26.7.2016 On Tuesday morning, 26.7., two young men entered a church in Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray, where a mass was being held. There was a priest – Jacques Hamel – three nuns and two parishioners present. The attackers forced Hamel to kneel, subsequently slitting his throat with a knife while performing a sermon in Arabic and recording the whole action. One of the nuns, Sister Danielle, was able to escape and call the police. After the police arrived at the scene, the attackers used hostages as human shields. However, both perpetrators were killed when they exited the church. During the attack, one person was wounded as well (Olive 2016, bbc6 2016).
The attackers, who pledged allegiance to IS prior to the attack, were named as Adel Kermiche and Abdel-Malik Petitjean (Counter Extremism 2018c).
Socio-demographic Information
Adel Kermiche, March 25 1997, was born in France to a working class Algerian family (counterextremism.com2). Kermiche tried to travel to Syria in March 2015 but was arrested in Germany. After less than two months later, he travelled again but was caught in Turkey, sent back to France and detained. In March 2016 he was released on bail and he had to wear an electronic tag (Olive 2016).
Abdel-Malik Petitjean, also 19 years old, was born in France to Algerian family as well. Although he apparently tried to travel to Syria, Petitjean returned to France and was not prosecuted (BBC News 2016g).
Psychological Background
Kermiche had shown mental health issues in his childhood and had been regularly hospitalized since he was 6 years old. Further on, he was sent to a specialist school at the age of 13. Thus, it
35 is possible that, because of these problems, he could have been more prone to radicalisation. (Counter Extremism 2018c).
Petitjean, however, did not show any signs that he suffered from such issues hence he is coded as clinically sane (BBC News 2016g).
Target of the Attack
It is highly likely that the attackers chose the target of the attack on purpose. First, it is a symbolical target. Second, Kermiche’s electronic bracelet was turned off for few hours every day hence it was also a practical decision to attack the church as he probably knew the vicinity and he had enough time to carry out the attack while his bracelet was turned off (Olive 2016). Although the priest can be considered as a direct target as well, other people, of whom one was injured, were random victims hence the target has to be coded as combined.
Modus Operandi
A knife was used to perpetrate the attack.
Aftermath
Jacques Hamel was killed and another person was injured during the attack. Both attackers were killed when they tried to leave the church with the use of the hostages as human shields.
Awareness of Intentions
Although there were no mentions of Kermiche’s family, Kermiche became radicalised after the attack on Charlie Hebdo, according to one of his schoolmates. He also stopped seeing his friends and began making contact with other extremists on the internet (Counter Extremism 2018c). As it was already mentioned, he was known to French intelligence services as he was under surveillance, awaiting his trial on terrorist charges (BBC News 2016f).
In case of Petitjean nobody noticed any signs of his radicalisation and both his mother and friends were surprised by his deed. However, he was known to French intelligence services, as he apparently tried to reach Syria, which had S-file on him. Furthermore, the French anti- terrorism police received a tip from an unnamed foreign intelligence service prior to the attack (BBC News 2016g).
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Germany, Berlin, 19.12.2016 On Monday, 19.12., a truck drove into the Christmas market taking place at Breitscheidplatz in Berlin, Germany. After the truck stopped, a man left the vehicle and fled the scene towards the near park. An ID card was later found in the truck and the attacker was identified as Anis Amri. Four days later, Amri was stopped by the police for a routine check near Milan, Italy. Finally, he was killed during a gunfight with the policemen, in which he injured one officer (Euronews 2016, Kirchgaessner 2016).
IS released a video in which Amri pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Counter Etremism 2018d).
Socio-demographic Information
Anis Amri, December 22, 1992, was born in Tataouine, Tunisia. He left Tunisia in 2011 and travelled to Italy, where he acted as a refugee, deliberately throwing away his documents. He became known to the police for a petty crime and after he was rejected for residency permit, he set his house on fire and was sentenced to four years in prison. In July 2015, he travelled to Germany where he applied for asylum (Counter Etremism 2018d).
Psychological Background
There were no mentions of any mental health issues hence the attacker is coded as clinically sane.
Target of The Attack
There is no doubt that Amri chose the Christmas market on purpose as it was certain that there will be a lot of people, but all the victims were random visitor of the market. Thus, the target of the attack is coded as combined.
Modus Operandi
Amri used a truck to carry out the attack.
Aftermath
The attack resulted in 12 deaths and 48 injuries. Amri left the scene and travelled to Italy. It is unknown whether he wanted to carry out more attacks, hide or travel to Syria.
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Awareness of Intentions
In this case, it is difficult to look for clues about the awareness of Amri’s family or friends as he left his family in Tunisia. There were also no mentions of anyone else being aware of his radicalisation or intentions. However, he was known to the federal intelligence agencies and Berlin authorities opened a file on him. Despite the investigations, authorities could not agree on whether he is likely to carry out an attack and the investigations were ended (Counter Etremism 2018d).
Year 2017 United Kingdom, London, 22.3.2017 On Wednesday afternoon, 22.3., a car mounted a pavement on Westminster bridge and drove into pedestrians. The vehicle eventually crashed into the railings after it exited the bridge. Subsequently, an attacker left the car and ran towards the Houses Parliament, where he stabbed a police officer. Finally, the perpetrator was shot dead by armed officers who arrived at the place of the attack. As a result, 6 people, including the attacker, were killed (BBC News 2017a).
The attacker was named as Khalid Masood.
Socio-demographic Information
Khalid Massod was born in Kent on 25th of December, 1964. His name was given as Adrian Russell Elms and it was changed after he converted to Islam. Masood was imprisoned multiple times in the past as he was convicted for grievous bodily harm, weapons possession and assault but he had no convictions related to terrorism. Some speculate that he could have been radicalised during his time in prison, although it is impossible to prove (Counter Extremism 2018e, BBC News 2017a).
Psychological Background
Both Masood’s mother and wife described his personality as short tempered, fierce and angry. Although the attacker was apparently of aggressive nature, there are no mentions of any mental- health problems (BBC News 2018a)
Target of the Attack
The target of the attack can be, once again, coded as combined. It is highly likely that Masood chose the place of the attack on purpose as it is a location frequented by people and it is also a symbolical target. Victims were, however, random people.
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Modus Operandi
Masood used a car as a main weapon. Furthermore, he used a knife to kill one more person after he collided with the railings.
Aftermath
The attack resulted in immediate death of 4 people, including the attacker who was killed by the police. Additionally, 2 more people died in following days due to their injuries (BBC News 2017a).
Awareness of Intentions
Masood’s wife and mother both said that they were surprised by the attack and that they were not aware of his radicalisation. However, there were indications of his intentions as he reportedly told his mother that "they'll say I'm a terrorist but I'm not" (BBC News 2017a) few days before the attack. Masood had also sent a document titled “Jihad” to a number of people shortly before the attack (Dearden 2017).
The British Prime Minister revealed that Masood was known to intelligence services but was rather a peripheral figure. No ties to IS or any other group were discovered (Counter Extremism 2018e).
Sweden, Stockholm, 7.4.2017 A truck owned by a Swedish beer company was stolen in Stockholm on Friday, 4.7.2017. After wards, a man used the truck to carry out a terrorist attack on a shopping street, Drottninggatan, where he drove the truck to pedestrians. Eventually, the attacker crashed the truck into a department store and fled the scene. During the attack, 4 people were killed and 14 were injured, of whom one more person died in a hospital after 3 weeks (Anderson, Sorensen 2017, Lough 2017).
The attacker, who was named as Rakhmat Akilov, was arrested some hours later in a northern suburb of Stockholm (BBC News 2017b).
Socio-demographic Information
Rakhmat Akilov was born in the city of Samarkand, Uzbekistan, in the year 1978. He travelled to Sweden in 2014 where he applied for asylum, but the application was rejected in December 2016 and Akilov was given 4 weeks to leave the country. Akilov did not depart and was put on
39 a wanted list in February 2017. Nevertheless, there are no other mentions of previous convictions or arrests (Counter Extremism 2018f).
Psychological Background
Sources do not offer any clues about mental-health issues hence the attacker is coded as clinically sane.
Target of the Attack
It is probable that the attacker chose Drottninggatan deliberately as it was presumable that there would be a huge amount of people. Also, it could be seen as the attack against the western style of living. As the victims were random people, the target of the attack is combined.
Modus Operandi
Akilov used a vehicle to perpetrate the attack. According to some sources, there was also an explosive device which only inflicted damage on the truck (Counter Extremism 2018f).
Aftermath
As a result, a total of 5 people was killed and 14 were injured. Akilov fled the scene after the collision but was later arrested. Finally, he was sentenced to life imprisonment, which equates to approximately 18 years in Sweden, in June 2018 and also to be banned from Sweden for life (Counter Extremism 2018f).
Awareness of Intentions
Akilov’s former colleagues described him as a normal guy, who was not particularly religious and never talked about politics or religion. However, his online presence was completely different – his Facebook page was linked to extremists and featured IS’s propaganda videos. Reportedly, he also encouraged other Uzbeks to join IS and sent propagandist videos to his relatives and other people in Uzbekistan. Akilov had also sworn allegiance to IS one day before the attack (Counter Extremism 2018f, BBC News 2017b).
Despite this, Akilov was not considered a threat by security services which dismissed him as a marginal character (BBC News 2017b).
France, Paris, 20.4.2017 On Thursday evening, 20.4., a man stopped his car next to the police bus on Champs-Élysées in Paris. He then left the car and opened fire at the police car, killing a police officer who was
40 named as Xavier Jugelé. Afterwards, he continued to fire on other police officers nearby, who were wounded. Eventually, the attacker was killed by the security forces (BBC News 2017c).
The perpetrator was named as Karim Cheurfi (BBC News 2017c).
Socio-demographic Information
Karim Cheurfi was born in north-eastern Paris on New Year’s Eve in 1977. Sources do not mention his origin. Cheurfi had a long criminal record and had spent over 10 years in prison for attempted murder. He was last released in October 2015 (BBC News 2017d, Palazzo, Chazan 2017).
Psychological Background
Karim was described as psychologically fragile by his lawyer. He was very solitary and lived with his mother (Palazzo, Chazan 2017).
Target of the Attack
It is highly likely that the attacker chose police officers as his target on purpose. Reportedly, Cheurfi wanted to kill police officers in order to avenge Muslims killed in Syria. Even though Cheurfi probably chose the place of the attack deliberately as well, the victims were random officers (Palazzo, Chazan 2017).
Modus Operandi
The attacker used an automatic weapon during the attack (BBC News 2017c).
Aftermath
During the attack, 1 officer was killed and 2 more were injured in a subsequent fight. The attacker was shot dead by the security personnel at the place of the attack.
Awareness of Intentions
There were no mentions of Cheurfi’s family or friends but his lawyer said that he never thought Cheurfi is someone who would be radicalised. He was also not flagged as a radical while in prison (Palazzo, Chazan 2017).
However, the attacker was known to the French security services. Authorities had tips that Cheurfi wanted to kill police officers. He was on the counter-terrorist service’s radar, added to a radicalisation and terror prevention and alert list but he was not on the French S-list. Hunting
41 knives and masks were found at his home but there were no links to radical Islamists and nothing justified further investigations (Palazzo, Chazan 2017, BBC News 2017d).
United Kingdom, London, 3.6.2017 On Saturday evening, 3.6., a group of three man reached London Bridge in a van where they started to target pedestrians on the sidewalk. Afterwards, the attackers abandoned the vehicle and began to attack people in Borough Market with knives. Eventually, armed officers arrived at the scene and killed all the three attackers (Holden 2017).
The attackers were named as Khuram Butt, Rachid Redouane and Youssef Zaghba (Holden 2017).
Socio-demographic Information
Khuram Butt, who was described as a ringleader, was born in Pakistan on 20th of April, 1990. He moved to the UK as a child refugee and was educated there. There were no mentions of any criminal records plus he claimed to have a Security Industry Authority licence, which involves a criminal record check. However, a criminal record would not necessarily prevent someone from obtaining the licence (BBC News 2017e, Counter Extremism 2018g).
Rachid Redouane was born in Morocco on July 31, 1986. He first arrived in the UK in 2006 but his application for asylum was rejected in 2009. He married a British citizen in 2012 and received an Irish ID and EU residence card. Redouane reportedly abused his wife but there are no mentions of criminal charges or records (BBC News 2017e, Counter Extremism 2018h).
Youssef Zaghba was born in Fez, Morocco on January 26, 1995 but he was a naturalized Italian citizen. He moved to the UK in 2016 and lived in Ilford, East London. Zaghba attempted to travel to Istanbul from where he probably wanted to continue to Syria but he was stopped at the Bologna airport. Authorities found IS propaganda in his phone but this was not sufficient evidence for his arrest (BBC News 2017e, Counter Extremism 2018i).
Psychological Background
There were no mentions of mental-health related problems for neither of the perpetrators hence they are coded as clinically sane.
Target of the Attack
It is highly likely that the location of the attack was chosen intentionally. First, the London Bridge is highly frequented. Second, the Borough Market, which is in its vicinity, can also
42 support this claim as one can assume that there will be many people on Saturday night. It can be also seen as the attack against western life-style. As the victims were random people, the attack is coded as combined.
Modus Operandi
The attackers used a van to attack pedestrians on the London Bridge and knives to continue the attack after they left the vehicle. The perpetrators reportedly tried to hire a truck which could result in even more deaths and they also had Molotov cocktails prepared in the van (Holden 2017).
Aftermath
As a result, 8 people were fatally wounded and 48 more were injured. In addition, all the attackers were killed by police officers during the action.
Awareness of Intentions
Butt’s family condemned the attack and said they were shocked by his actions. However, one of his relatives said that Butt had watched propaganda videos made by IS, wanted to travel to Syria and openly expressed extremist views at family gatherings. According to one of his friends, he was radicalised by watching YouTube videos (BBC News 2017e).
Butt was also reported at least twice to the authorities. Once, after his neighbour had a suspicion that he was trying to radicalise children in a park. Second, after a confrontation with Dr. Usama Hasan whom Butt accused of taking government money to spy on Muslims (Counter Extremism 2018g).
Thus, Butt was known to the intelligence services who launched an investigation but did not find evidence of terrorist activity and downgraded it as there was no intelligence suggesting that Butt was planning an attack (BBC News 2017e, Counter Extremism 2018g).
Redouane’s wife said that she was shocked by his actions. There are no other mentions of his family or friends. Reportedly, it is believed he travelled to Libya in 2011 and fought in the uprising against Gaddafi. However, Redouane had not been known to intelligence services prior to the attack (BBC News 2017e, Counter Extremism 2018h).
Zaghba’s mother said that there had been problems with her son after he was stopped at Bologna airport. He asked her to go to live in Syria as they have a pure Islam there (BBC News 2017e).
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Italian authorities were investigating Zaghba in 2016 but eventually ended the investigation as they lacked sufficient evidence of terrorist activity. Nevertheless, Italian services said they informed the British intelligence of the potential security threat posed by Zaghba (Counter Extremism 2018i).
Germany, Hamburg, 28.7.2017 On Friday, 28.7.2017, a man attacked shoppers at a supermarket in Hamburg with a knife. After killing one person and injuring a few more, he ran from the supermarket, injuring other people while escaping. The perpetrator was eventually overpowered by passers-by and arrested by the police (Eddy 2017).
The attacker was named as Ahmad Alhaw (BB News 2018b).
Socio-demographic Information
Ahmad Alhaw, 26 years old, is believed to be of Palestinian origin and some sources says that he was born in the United Arab Emirates. He was a failed asylum seeker but his deportation was blocked because he lacked identity documents. Alhaw sought Asylum in Norway in 2009 and moved around the EU after he was rejected. One source mentions that he was previously arrested for shoplifting. However, this could not be confirmed with any other sources (C. Burns 2017, I. Burns 2018).
Psychological Background
Some sources talk of Alhaw as being psychologically unstable. However, there were no mentions that he was not aware of his actions, he attended trial, admitted his crimes and reportedly signed a statement saying that he was a terrorist (C. Burns 2017, I. Burns 2018).
Target of the Attack
The attacker, most likely, chose the place of the attack on purpose as there is a high concentration of people. Moreover, he took the knife from the shelves in a supermarket and used it in the attack. The victims were random hence the target is coded as combined (BB News 2017f).
Modus Operandi
A knife was used in the attack.
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Aftermath
One person was killed during the attack and 7 more were injured. The attacker tried to run away but was overpowered by the passers-by and eventually arrested by the police. Although he was not charged with terrorism, Ahlaw was sentenced for life in prison in 2018 (BB News 2018b).
Awareness of Intentions
Sources do not mention Ahlaw’s family, nor friends. He was, however, reportedly known to intelligence services who had him on the radar for expressing pro-jihadi views. Nevertheless, Ahlaw was not considered a priority as the depth of his radicalisation was not clear and he was not considered as an Islamist militant (C. Burns 2017).
Finland, Turku, 18.8.2017 On Friday afternoon, 18.8., a young man attacked a woman with a knife in the Puutori square in Turku, Finland. He then continued to attack other people and ran to another square. The perpetrator was eventually stopped by the police who shot him in the leg. The attacker deliberately aimed at women - 2 were killed and 8 more injured (2 men were among injured) (Anderson 2017, BB News 2017g).
The man was later named as Abderrahman Bouanane (Yle Uutiset 2018).
Socio-demographic Information
Abderrahman Bouanane, 22 years old at the time of the attack, was a Moroccan asylum seeker. He arrived in Finland in 2016 on a fake identity but his application for asylum was rejected later that year. There were no mentions about previous convictions (Yle Uutiset 2018, Rossendahl 2018).
Psychological Background
A psychological test after the attack determined that Bouanane was clinically sane during the attack and the court ruled that he was aware on the action. Bouanane said that he could not control himself (Yle Uutiset 2018, Rossendahl 2018).
Target of the Attack
The target of the attack is coded as combined. First, it is probable that the perpetrator chose the location of the attack because it is highly frequented. Second, Bouanane chose women on
45 purpose as he was reportedly in a war against women. However, his victims were of random character (Rossendahl 2018).
Modus Operandi
Bouanane used a knife as a weapon to carry out the attack.
Aftermath
As it was already said, Bouanane was shot in the leg during the attack and arrested. He was convicted of terrorism in June 2018, being the very first terrorist convict in Finland, and sentenced for life (Yle Uutiset 2018).
Awareness of Intentions
There were no mentions of Bouanane's family or friends being aware of his radicalisation. Moreover, there are no hints that the Finnish intelligence services knew about the attacker neither. It is believed that Bouanane began to be radicalised in 2017 after he was denied asylum. He also recorded a video prior to the attack, in which he spoke of air strike against IS (Rossendahl 2018).
France, Marseille, 1.10.2017 On Sunday, 1.10., a man arrived at the Saint-Charles train station in Marseille, France. After waiting on a bench for several minutes, he attacked a woman with a knife and ran away. However, he then returned to the scene, attacked another victim and, subsequently, headed towards the soldiers who arrived at the place of the attack, eventually killing the attacker (Breeden 2017).
The attacker was named as Ahmed Hannachi (Scherer 2017).
Socio-demographic Information
Ahmed Hannachi was probably born in 1987 in Tunisia. The attacker was arrested by the police seven times, since 2005, under seven different identities. He was last arrested on 29th of September, in connection with a robbery, and released on 30th of September, one day before the attack, due to the lack of evidence. He was also known to the police in Italy, where he lived from 2008 to 2014, for petty crimes (Scherer 2017, Reuters 2017).
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Psychological Background
None of the sources mentioned any hints about the mental health related issues, although, the attacker said that: “he was homeless, divorced and without a stable job, and that he used hard drugs “(Breeden 2017).
Target of the Attack
In this case, the target of the attack is again coded as combined. Victims were random women but the location was probably chosen due to the fact that there is a crowd of people.
Modus Operandi
A knife was used as a weapon in this attack.
Aftermath
The attack resulted in death of 2 young women. The attacker was killed by the military personnel, who arrived at the scene after the killings, when he tried to attack them.
Awareness of Intentions
Ramona Cargnelutti, Hannachi’s estranged Italian wife, said that she did not believe he became a radical Islamist. She said he did not care about religion and he never entered a mosque. Cargnelutti said that the murder was more likely a robbery gone wrong. Furthermore, none of Hannachi’s identities was known to French anti-terrorist services and it was also said that he never showed signs of radicalisation in Italy. It is possible that Hannachi was radicalised by his younger brother, who allegedly fought in Syria (Breeden 2017, Scherer 2017).
Analysis Summary In this chapter, the author will put together all the information gathered in the previous section, he will compare it, and he will try to identify problematic areas of counter-terrorism which need to be focused on.
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Socio-demographic Information
Name of the Attacker Age8 Nationality (Origin) Criminal Records Mehdi Nenmouche 29 French (Algerian) Yes Omar El-Hussein 22 Danish (Palestinian) Yes French Yassin Salhi 35 No (Algerian/Moroccan) Mohammed Syeedy 21 British (Unknown) No Mohammed Abdul Kadir 24 British (Unknown) No Tanveer Ahmed 32 Unknown (Pakistani) No Larossi Abballa 25 French (Moroccan) Yes Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel 31 Unknown (Tunisian) Yes Adel Kermiche 19 French (Algerian) Yes Abdel Malik, Petitjean 19 French (Algerian) No Anis Amri 24 Tunisian Yes Khalid Masood 53 British (Unknown) Yes Rakhmat Akilov 39 Uzbek No Karim Cheurfi 40 French (Unknown) Yes Khuram Butt 27 Unknown (Pakistani) No Rachid Redouane 31 Moroccan No Youssef Zaghba 22 Italian (Moroccan) No Ahmad A. Alhaw 26 Unknown (Palestinian) No Abderrahman Bouanane 22 Moroccan No Ahmed Hanachi 30 Tunisian Yes Table 1: Analysis Summary - Socio-demographic Information The age of the attackers varies greatly between 19 and 53 years. However, the majority of the attackers were 30 or younger and only two of them were more than 40 years old. Thus, it could be said that, in general, the attackers are rather young men.
Moreover, nearly half of the attackers had previous criminal records. Even though most of the convictions were related to petty crimes, there were also cases in which the perpetrator was convicted of terrorism-related offences, such as Adel Kermiche.
If the nationality and origin of the attackers were considered as well, one can see that quite common profile of the attacker could be described as a young man coming from the second generation of Muslim immigrants, mainly from Northern Africa, often having a problem with the state authority and law.
8 At the time of the attack. 48
However, the nationality points at more important phenomenon which needs closer attention - home-grown terrorism9. Although some of the attackers arrived in Europe with the wave of the refugees or only a short time before the attack, nothing suggests that they arrived already radicalised or as the fighters of IS or members of any other terrorist group. On the contrary, most of the attackers were born in Europe, became radicalised there and attacked their own country.
Thanks to this finding, it is clear that one of the possible, and arguably potentially effective, approaches to prevent the lone actor attacks is to combat the radicalisation. Although the counter-radicalisation schemes already exist, it is obvious that there is a room for improvement. The author will tackle this problem in the next chapter. There is also a matter of radicalisation in prisons, but this problem is already known and has been addressed in the past hence it does not have to be dealt with in this research (Paolo Magri 2018).
9 Home-grown terrorists can be defined as individuals or groups who “either spent a significant portion of their formative years in the West, or their radicalisation bears a significant connection to the West” (Zekulin 2015:48). 49
Psychological Background, Target of the Attack and Modus Operandi Modus Name of the Attacker Psycho. B. Target of the Attack Operandi Mehdi Nenmouche No Combined Firearm Omar El-Hussein No Combined Firearm Yassin Salhi No Combined Vehicle+Melee Mohammed Syeedy No Direct Melee Mohammed Abdul Kadir No Tanveer Ahmed No Direct Melee Larossi Abballa No Direct Melee Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel Yes Combined Vehicle Adel Kermiche Yes Combined Melee Abdel Malik, Petitjean No Anis Amri No Combined Vehicle Khalid Masood No Combined Vehicle+Melee Rakhmat Akilov No Combined Vehicle Karim Cheurfi Yes Combined Firearm Khuram Butt No Rachid Redouane No Combined Vehicle+Melee Youssef Zaghba No Ahmad A. Alhaw Yes Combined Melee Abderrahman Bouanane No Combined Melee Ahmed Hanachi No Combined Melee Table 2: Analysis Summary - Psychological Background, Target of the Attack and Modus Operandi Psychological Background There were only few cases in which the sources talked of mental-health issues. However, it is also important to mention that none of the attackers was described as not realizing his actions and they were all fully conscious during the attack. Although the psychological state of some perpetrators could influence or add to the process of the radicalisation or decision to carry out the attack, the author is confident in saying that examined Islamic lone actors were not driven by mental-health problems and were fully aware of their actions.
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Target of the Attack Majority of the attacks, with exception of only three cases, was coded as combined. What makes the potential prevention of the attacks difficult is the fact that most of the attacks were aimed at soft targets10. There is a huge amount and variety of possible targets and, logically, not all of them can be protected. But it is possible to secure at least some of the places, which are deemed to be at the highest risk of being chosen as the target of the attack.
There is a number of security measures which could be applied. Kalvach defines three basic categories of security components: security personnel, electronic devices and mechanical devices (Kalvach 2016:16). Naturally, European countries are adapting such security measures, for e.g. barriers which should prevent the vehicular attacks or a deployment of security forces such as the Opération Sentinelle in France which deployed up to 10 000 soldiers in sensitive areas of the country (politico 2016). Similar measures can arguably lower the risk of the attacks in certain locations or reduce the impact of the attack. Unfortunately, they cannot prevent all the attacks from happening as the attacker can simply choose different location, which is not protected. Thus, these security measures are not fully reliable.
Modus Operandi Modus operandi adds to the difficulties connected with the prevention of lone actor attacks. The highest number of the attacks was carried out using the melee weapons, followed by vehicles. Such attacks are easy to prepare, to execute and they do not need a lot of planning beforehand. However, they are arguably less effective and sophisticated than attacks using for e.g. explosives.
Nevertheless, as it is almost impossible to detect an attacker who is planning a knife or vehicular attack, it is a logical choice for lone actors, which complicates the counter-terrorism efforts. Also, IS, which stood behind radicalisation of a considerable number of the attackers, urged its supporters to carry out the attacks using these weapons. In the second issue of IS propaganda magazine, called Rumiyah11, there is an article called “Just Terror Tactics” (referring to lone actor terrorism) in which the author gives advice on what kind of knife the attacker should use and how they should attack their victim (Rumiyah 2016b). In the next issue of the magazine, IS continues to advise potential attackers on “Just Terror Tactics” to use vehicles as means of the attack, describing the ideal vehicle, vehicles to avoid, applicable targets and process of
10 Soft targets can be defined as „places with high concentration of people and low degree of security against assault, which creates an attractive target, especially for terrorists “(Kalvach 2016:6). 11 Meaning Rome in Arabic 51 preparation and planning. The author also advises the attackers to acquire a secondary weapon and continue the attack, like Masood or the group around Butt in the UK did (Rumiyah 2016b).
This could be one of the reasons behind the frequent usage of these weapons. Another reason could be that gun laws in Western Europe are tighter than in, for example, the US where legally obtained firearms are used in the attacks more often (Taylor 2016).
Explosives were not used in any of the chosen attacks. The reason behind this could be that “the EU passed Regulation 98/2013 on the use and sale of explosives precursors in September 2014“(National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018). Moreover, it is arguably more difficult to construct an explosive device than to get a knife or vehicle and the attacker is also more likely to be identified before the attack as gathering of necessary precursors can rise a suspicion.
To conclude, findings about these factors cannot really help with preventing the attack. However, it is possible to reduce the risk or impact of the attack with certain security measures such as those mentioned above.
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Aftermath and Awareness of Intentions
Awareness of Intentions Name of the Attacker Aftermath (Family/Intelligence)
Mehdi Nenmouche Fled/Arrested No Yes Omar El-Hussein Fled/Killed N/A12 Yes Yassin Salhi Arrested No Yes (2006-2008) Mohammed Syeedy Arrested N/A No Mohammed Abdul Kadir Fled N/A No Tanveer Ahmed Arrested N/A N/A Larossi Abballa Killed N/A Yes Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel Killed Yes No Adel Kermiche Killed Yes Yes Abdel Malik, Petitjean Killed No Yes Anis Amri Fled/Killed N/A Yes Khalid Masood Killed No Yes Rakhmat Akilov Arrested Yes Yes Karim Cheurfi Killed No Yes Khuram Butt Killed Yes Yes Rachid Redouane Killed No No Youssef Zaghba Killed Yes Yes Ahmad A. Alhaw Arrested N/A Yes Abderrahman Bouanane Arrested N/A No Ahmed Hanachi Killed No No Table 3: Analysis Summary - Aftermath, Awareness of Intentions Aftermath There is a variety of outcomes of the attacks regarding the attackers. Only one of the attackers was able to evade the police and basically disappeared, probably to Syria. Seven perpetrators were arrested and a majority of them, 12, was killed during or after the attack. One of the reasons for quite high death toll among the attackers can be the concept of martyrdom, which is strongly rooted in Islam. Martyrdom, commonly understood as death in the way of Allah13, distinguishes a Muslim from the others in several ways, most notably by bypassing the purgatory and receiving the highest position in Paradise. Martyrs are also perceived as honourable people in the Muslim society. Thus, many of the Muslims seek a way to acquire martyrdom and waging
12 Not Available 13 However, many kinds of death have been described as martyrdom, for e.g.: death of cancer, death by drowning, death in defence of family, whoever dies as a stranger or in strange land, etc. (Haddad) 53 jihad is one of the common ways (Lawson). IS often motivates the attackers to die as martyrs, for e.g. in already mentioned Rumiyah magazine: “Having a secondary weapon, such as a gun or a knife, is also a great way to combine a vehicle attack with other forms of attacks. Depending on what is obtained, the kill count can be maximized and the level of terror resulting from the attack can be raised. This could also increase the possibility of attaining shahadah, which is the best of departures from this Dunya into the larger expanse of the Akhirah” (Rumiyah 2016b:12). Also, this is exactly how the London Bridge attack was carried out.
Another possible explanation could be the low sophistication of the attacks as it is arguably easy for security personnel to disable the attacker who is wielding only a knife. Nevertheless, these findings are not particularly helpful in combating the lone actors. The high number of deaths and concept of martyrdom in Islam suggests that majority of the attackers is not only willing to die but is hoping to die during the attack, hence it is highly likely that they will continue the violence as long as possible, until they are killed.
Awareness of Intentions: Family and Friends Unfortunately, in nearly a half of the cases there was no clue whether the family or friends were aware of the perpetrator’s radicalisation. What could add to this is the fact that some of the attackers were immigrants and their families are living in another country hence they could not know about the radicalisation or the journalists were not able to reach or identify them.
Moreover, in only 5 cases the family or friends of the attackers noticed some changes in their behaviour and only one of the attackers, Khuram Butt, was reported to the authorities. One of the simple explanations for a low awareness could be that the perpetrators can try to hide their extremist identity. For e.g. in “How to Survive in the West: A Mujahid Guide” the author dedicates the very first chapter to ideas on how to hide one’s extremist identity depending on whether they are converts to Islam, were born a Muslim or are practising Muslims. They also advise women on what hijab they should wear, etc. (A Mujahid Guide 2015). Another possibility is also that family and friends are not willing to report someone who has a close relationship with them.
In any case, the family and friends are not a reliable source of information and thus it is not a particularly effective strategy to use in combating lone actor terrorism. On the contrary, reports received by people can make the situation even more difficult as the intelligence services have limited capacities (Townsend 2017). For example, the number of tip-offs in the UK in the year 2017 rose by more than 600 % in six months resulting in more than 20 000 calls per year.
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Although the information can be potentially crucial and some of them helped to prevent an attack, such a huge number of individuals of concern means a real challenge in identifying serious leads (Smith 2017). This brings the question of whether the attackers were known to the intelligence services.
Awareness of Intentions: Intelligence Services In 13 cases, the attacker was known to the intelligence services prior to the attacker. This statistic suggests that there is a huge room for improvement. There was already mentioned a shortage of analysts in the UK’s intelligence services. The French intelligence agencies were highly criticized for their failures as well. The parliamentary commission, which was set up after the November 2015 attacks, suggested a complete overhaul of the services and creation of a single national intelligence service instead of current 6 intelligence units (Chrisafis 2016).
Although this research confirms the failures of intelligence services and their inability to prevent some of the attacks, it is important to mention that 1219 individuals, of whom at least 70514 were jihadists, were arrested in the EU in the year 2017 for terrorism-related offences (EUROPOL 2018). This is to show that despite the failures, intelligence service and counter- terrorism units still prove their worth.
The effectiveness of intelligence services is one of the aspects that needs to be improved in order to fight lone actors as well as terrorism in general. However, this problem is already well known and, as shown above, was addressed in the past hence the author will not focus on it in the next chapter.
Counter-terrorism Suggestions In this chapter, the author will propose possible changes to the counter-terrorism strategies based on the results of the analysis. The author has identified areas of counter-terrorism which need to be focused on. Some of the findings support suggestions which have already been made, such as for example those proposed by Daniel L. Byman in “How to hunt a lone wolf: Countering terrorists who act on their own” or by Edwin Bakker and Beatrice de Graaf in “Preventing Lone Wolf Terrorism: Some CT Approaches Addressed”.
As the author of this thesis aims to offer new ideas, he will focus on different approaches to counter-radicalisation and cooperation with Muslim communities.
14 „428 terrorism-related arrests for 2017 were reported without differentiating between types of terrorism “(EUROPOL 2018:10). 55
Counter-radicalisation According to the analysis, home-grown terrorism is a huge problem which implies that counter- radicalisation needs to be more effective as it is one of the few possible ways to prevent the attack, not only limit it. Naturally, counter-radicalisation schemes already exist but the author believes that their approach is wrong in relation to Islamic extremists.
To prove this, the author chose France as an example. France tried to react to the recent attacks and drafted National Action Plan to counter radicalisation. However, many criticize it as too ambitious etc. (Schwarzenbach 2018).
The author sees the biggest issue in that the plan does not consider the role of religion in radicalisation and most of the current programs are not designed to counter Islamist radicalisation. On the contrary, “the French programs are apolitical and lay, which is in line with the French Republican model that strictly confines religion to the private sphere “(Schwarzenbach 2018:31). The strategy is shaped by its centralized political system and the separation of state and religion. Moreover, the counter-radicalisation is directed solely by the French authorities (Schwarzenbach 2018).
However, the plan must consider the role of the religion as it is the crucial theme and motivation in radicalisation. Also, trying to deliver counter-radicalisation via the state authority cannot be effective as Islamists opposite it. “Prior to the 20th Century, hence, for most of the history of the Muslim Ummah, Muslims organized themselves, politically, according arrangements that primarily reflected tribal or geographical lines of demarcation. A sultan’s (political leader) authority was demarcated by the limit of his tax-collecting and rebellion-suppression ability, not according to his claim to hold sway over a territory demarcated by fictitious lines drawn on a map. Similarly, although people may have accepted the authority of a particular sultan, their ultimate allegiance was, practically, to their tribe or clan” (Shakir 2012). Thus, fundamentalists do not recognize western-type democracy which for e.g. IS describes as “manmade monstrosity” (Rumiyah 2016a:36), so it would only make sense that extremists will not be willing to cooperate with an entity which they disrespect. One could argue that counter- radicalisation plan aiming explicitly at Muslims will be discriminatory hence it could have the opposite effect. The author’s idea of cooperation between government and Muslim society combats both discrimination and state-led counter-radicalisation.
The government should cooperate with Muslim community, create the counter-radicalisation strategy together and let the Muslims deliver it to the public. First, if the state and the
56 community work together, nobody can talk of discrimination as both entities will work on the strategy equally. Second, there are many educated people among the Muslim community who can contribute to this effort plus it would be only logical that Muslims would be able to approach these strategies in a more suitable way or offer different point of view as they better understand how the community and religion works. Third, it is also likely that people will accept the counter-radicalisation from “their own” better than from the state authority which they oppose in a first place.
Many Muslims condemn the attacks and they despise terrorism, which they have called “barbaric acts” in the past. Moreover, they fear repercussions and racism so it is in their own interest to fight the terrorism in the EU (Plucinska 2016). These facts support the idea that the Muslim community will be willing to cooperate for their own sake.
This idea is also supported be the situation in the UK, where the Safe and Secure programme, backed by Muslim Council of Britain and an alternative to the government’s anti-radicalisation programme called Prevent strategy, was launched in 2018. Prevent was described as controversial, toxic and discriminatory which led to the action by the Muslim community (Siddique 2018). It would be arguably more effective if the government and the Muslim council of Britain worked together and created one official, legitimate programme. It would prevent the programme from being labelled discriminatory and it also shows willingness of Muslim community to take part in the counter-radicalisation efforts.
Support Liberal Mosques Tugay Sarac is a young, homosexual Muslim who became radicalised and was planning to travel to Syria because he was struggling with his sexual orientation. However, he discovered the Ibn Rushd-Goethe mosque, liberal mosque which was founded in Berlin in June 2017 by Seyran Ates, a feminist lawyer. The mosque takes liberal approach to Islam, lets pray man and women together and also accepts LGBT Muslims. Eventually, Sarac was completely de- radicalised and came to terms with his sexual orientation (Greenhalg 2018).
This story shows that mosques are capable of delivering the de-radicalisation programmes which have a potential to work. Also, it could be a long-term solution for dealing with extremism as it offers Muslims a new, liberal form of Islam which could, in theory, be more compatible with European values and lifestyle. Besides its own de-radicalisation workshop, the mosque is also supporting women’s rights, showing women in different roles instead of the
57 traditional subservient image of them. Nevertheless, even Ates is aware that this shift towards liberal Islam needs time (Greenhalg 2018).
Some could argue that such mosques would become new targets of terrorist attacks in the future. After its opening, the mosque was denounced by religious authorities in Turkey and Egypt and Ates received many hateful emails. However, Ates also received many emails encouraging her to carry on, the mosque remained opened and more than a year from its opening there was no attack against the mosque. Moreover, security measures for soft targets can be applied to prevent the attacks (there are security personnel guarding the mosque already) (Oltermann 2017).
Conclusion Initial collection of basic information and subsequent overview of the Islamic lone actor terrorism proved number of things. First, the effectivity of the attacks is questionable as lone actors killed only 8,5 people per attack compared to 38,6 killed by organized groups. However, 2016 Nice attack shows that even lone actor attacks can reach high death tolls. Second, the attackers choose less sophisticated weapons, utilizing mainly melee weapons and vehicles. On the other hand, simplicity of the attacks is what makes them effective as lone actors can terrorize populations unexpectedly, anytime and anywhere.
Data collection for the analysis of the attacks faced some limitations but the author was able to find most of the needed data, struggling only in case of awareness of intentions of family and friends. Nevertheless, the author is confident enough to say that the research was not particularly influenced or spoiled by lack of some data and it proved its worth in creating the common image of lone actors and identifying areas of counter-terrorism which needs improvements. Home-grown terrorism was proved to be one of the biggest issues hence counter radicalisation needs to be focused on. Both target of the attacks and modus operandi make the counter-terrorism efforts more difficult and their knowledge is not sufficient in preventing the attacks. Family’s or Friend’s awareness of radicalisation is not particularly helpful neither and there is also a question of effectivity of anti-terrorism hotlines. Although the number of arrests is rising, intelligence services have failed many times and there is a room for improvement, mainly in regard of lack of employees.
Based on the findings of the qualitative analysis, the author has decided to focus mainly on counter-radicalisation programmes as they are an important tool in preventing the attacks. He has come up with ideas to improve the current strategies and put emphasis on cooperation with
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Muslim community as he believes that it is a crucial part of delivering an effective counter- radicalisation scheme. In a pursuit of a long-term solution to the radicalisation of Muslims, support of liberal mosques and liberal Islam in general is one of the possibilities.
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