NO. 36 SEPTEMBER 2019 Introduction

Mozambique Still At Risk Despite the Peace Process, A Serious Crisis Looms Melanie Müller and Judith Vorrath

In early August 2019 the president of and the leader of the largest oppo- sition party signed a new peace agreement. This has revived the peace process between the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), which has been in power since 1994. Great challenges remain, such as the disarmament and reintegration of RENAMO fighters. Furthermore, new trouble spots have emerged: Since October 2017, a wave of vio- lence has cost the lives of well over 300 people in . Although “Islamic State” (IS) has claimed responsibility for some of the attacks, the motives and structures of the group responsible remain unclear. Its occurrence points to pro- found social cleavages and alienation between the population and the political elite. At the same time, the north of Mozambique has become a hub for the illicit economy. Criminal transactions are above all symptoms of state neglect and extensive impunity. Experience from other conflict regions shows that this constellation can have fatal consequences. For this reason, international actors including the German govern- ment should press for rapid and far-reaching measures that go beyond the official peace process.

The civil war between FRELIMO and however, the conflict broke out again after RENAMO lasted fifteen years and cost FRELIMO had been repeatedly accused of the lives of about one million people. It electoral manipulation. officially ended in 1992 with the Rome Yet the causes run deeper. Ultimately, General Peace Accord (GPA). This appeared the elite pact based on the Rome GPA to resolve a proxy war of the Cold War, crumbled because FRELIMO was able to which had pitched the liberation move- prevent the development of a more in- ment FRELIMO with its links to the Soviet clusive political system by controlling state Union against RENAMO, whose main sup- structures. The peace process has pro- porters were and the USA. The gressed once again since a ceasefire agree- subsequent process of democratisation was ment in December 2016. In February 2018, long regarded as successful. RENAMO took Mozambican President and part in most elections as a political party RENAMO opposition leader Afonso Dhla- during a longer period of calm. In 2013, kama made significant progress in nego-

Sources: for heroin routes, Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow and Mark Shaw, The Heroin Coast: A Political Economy along the Eastern African Seaboard, ENACT Research Paper 04 (June 2018); for acts of violence: Zitamar News, 13 June 2018, based on processed data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) from October 2017 to July 2019; for gas deposits and processing, BankTrack.

SWP Comment 36 September 2019

2 tiating a peace agreement. Dhlakama died a place mostly in the centre of the country. short time later, but his successor Ossufo During the past two years though, assaults Momade maintained the course of a peace- and killings have been recorded regularly ful settlement. The new peace agreement in the northernmost province of Cabo Del- was finally signed in August 2019, after par- gado. Initially, it was mostly attackers and liament had already passed an amnesty law. security forces that died during clashes, Two aspects in particular are key for but in 2018 and 2019 most casualties were implementation. First, the deconcentration civilians. The common pattern that has of political power, which is to be achieved become established is for lightly armed primarily by decentralising administrative groups to attack villages and partially or structures. Parliament has already adopted completely burn them down. In the more corresponding measures, including the than 100 attacks on civilians, there have election of governors by majority voting, been repeated beheadings, kidnappings and when they had previously been appointed rapes. Exact figures are not available, but directly by the central government. How- conservative estimates put the number of ever, whether these measures actually civilians killed as of July 2019 at over 280. facilitate more participation for the oppo- Security forces reacted to the violence sition parties ultimately depends on the with harsh, sometimes arbitrary actions. credibility of the electoral processes. After the first attack, in which the police The disarmament and integration of temporarily lost control of the town of RENAMO fighters into the Mozambican Mocímboa da Praia, hundreds of people security apparatus, as stipulated in the were arrested, including many who were peace agreement, is also at stake – a par- apparently innocent. This practice seemed ticularly delicate task. It was essential that to continue: of the 189 people brought to Nyusi and Momade were able to agree on justice in Pemba in October 2018 for vari- setting up a military commission to deal ous offences connected with the wave of with the technical issues of the integration violence, more than half had to be released process. They also arranged further con- for lack of evidence. During their counter- crete steps towards demilitarisation, which operations, security forces closed or de- has already begun. stroyed mosques and reportedly killed Although such progress points to a posi- dozens of people. Their actions are seen by tive development, Mozambique’s stability many as a reason for the escalation of vio- remains at risk. If civil society and the op- lence from 2018 onwards. position accuse FRELIMO of manipulating The government now restricts access to the registration of candidates for the parlia- the region, apparently to prevent negative mentary and presidential elections in July reporting. For this reason also, knowledge 2019, this is evidence of continuing mis- of the group held responsible for the vio- trust. What is particularly alarming, how- lence remains sketchy. Internationally it is ever, is that other sources of insecurity have often called Ahlu Sunna wa Jamaa (ASWJ) opened up alongside the old lines of conflict. or Ansar al Sunna. Locals call the group Al Shabaab (‘the youth’), although no system- atic links with the group of the same name Diffuse Extremism and in are known to exist. It is said to New Violence in the North have an ideology that is directed against the state and has Islamic fundamentalist traits. In October 2017 a police station in Mocím- However, the group’s motives remain un- boa da Praia was attacked. This event is clear, especially since it has not released commonly seen as the beginning of a new public statements on them. Along with wave of violence in Mozambique. Until state institutions such as educational facil- early 2017, acts of violence could predomi- ities, its actions have also targeted from nantly be attributed to RENAMO, and took early on the officially recognised Islamic

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3 structures in the north, which it rejects as own country. The rejection of established being too close to the state. Even though Islamic scholars points to a generational some of its leaders have been identified, conflict. The majority of those recruited for the organisation does not seem to have a military cells are young men affected by central command structure, consisting unemployment and marginalisation. instead of relatively autonomous cells of Moreover, almost all assessments of the 10 to 20 people. A total of between 350 and acts of violence in Cabo Delgado refer to a 1,500 men are thought to be organised in connection with the exploitation of natural these. resources. The region is rich in raw ma- Since June 2019 IS has claimed responsi- terials: new oil and gas deposits have been bility for several attacks in Cabo Delgado. discovered in recent years. Yet the award of Many regional experts doubt that there concessions to companies has driven parts is a close connection, and assume, that IS is of the local population off their land. Only free-riding by making use of existing struc- a small proportion of the profits from the tures. Local and regional factors in particu- extraction of raw materials flows back into lar appear to have contributed to the expan- the structurally weak north. sion of the group. Overall it seems that the Cabo Delgado Province, located far from Mozambican Al Shabaab is part of a region- the capital , has long been neglected ally intertwined Islamist extremism which by the central government. This has led to has cross-border connections, especially to high poverty rates, poor infrastructure and . The group’s radicalisation is also a lack of access to social services. FRELIMO founded on various cleavages in Mozam- has continuously lost support in Cabo Del- bique, which have deepened. gado, but RENAMO is not necessarily re- garded as an alternative there either. The wave of violence is therefore also an The Symptoms of a expression of tensions between the coun- Growing Divide try’s north and south. The harsh response of the Mozambican security forces to the In Cabo Delgado, a largely Muslim province, violence seems to have further alienated Islamic fundamentalism is not a new phe- the population from the state. It has also nomenon. However, preachers appear to fuelled rumours in the north that the gov- have intensified their activities since 2015, ernment and international companies are specifically recruiting mostly young men. exploiting (or even causing) the insecurity Some were lured into new mosques with to bring in foreign private security com- the offer of loans, and were probably only panies to protect the gas deposits discovered later mobilised for acts of violence. Accord- off the coast of Cabo Delgado in 2010. This ing to reports, young people were also interpretation may seem exaggerated, but given scholarships to Koran schools and it shows the extent of mistrust towards the sent to military training in East African central government. The illicit economy countries. flourishing in the north has also repeatedly There are many reasons why such re- been associated with the wave of violence. cruitment has been successful, including local tensions. Most of those mobilised from 2015 onwards probably belonged to the Illicit Trade and Organised Crime Mwani ethnic group; the Mwani feel dis- criminated against compared to the Makonde Mocímboa da Praia and surrounding areas group, which dominates the province. have become a hub of illegal activities and Others came from neighbouring Tanzania organised crime (OC). International atten- or other East African states. Local ethnic tion has recently focused on the extremists’ groups often feel a stronger connection to alleged income from poaching, and the southern Tanzania than to regions of their illicit trade in timber and rubies in Cabo

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4 Delgado. But there are doubts as to how Bachir Suleman, on whom the USA has im- relevant these profits are to the group, posed sanctions since 2010 for drug traf- especially when compared to donations or ficking, is regarded as the central figure in rather protection money. There is little to heroin smuggling. In Mozambique, how- suggest that the group, with its loose struc- ever, he himself and leading figures operat- ture and simple means, has managed to ing under him have never been charged for reap high profits, let alone control illicit links to drug trafficking. trade flows or routes. Moreover, some of Thus far, no high-ranking figure has these routes are long established, inter alia been prosecuted in the country, and hardly to transport drugs to Mozambique and on any heroin has been confiscated. Yet the to South Africa and Europe. Heroin, for authorities in South Africa have repeatedly example, is usually brought from Pakistan discovered heroin in cargoes of goods from to the East African coast by seaworthy Mozambique. This suggests either that con- motorised ships (dhows) and stored on land, fiscated heroin in Mozambique is being where it is repackaged and transported misappropriated or else that inspections are onwards. Due to its largely uncontrolled impeded from the outset. In their report, coastal sections, northern Mozambique is authors of the Global Initiative Against an attractive transit point. Drugs are brought Transnational Organized Crime refer to into the country at smaller landing sites the numerous links between FRELIMO and or beaches as well as via container freight the drug traffickers in question. Protection traffic, in particular through the port of from checks in the port of Nacala or on the Nacala. Like the port in Pemba, this port is road to the south enables the latter to pur- also important for the illicit trade in timber sue criminal business under cover of legal and wildlife products such as ivory, all of commercial activities. which are mainly transported to Asia. Similar structures exist in the illicit trade Some routes have also shifted to north- in timber and ivory, which mostly Asian ern Mozambique because neighbouring networks conduct on a large scale. Officially countries such as Tanzania have intensified licensed Chinese companies apparently controls. Above all, however, the shaping export large quantities of timber illegally. of the illicit economy in the north is a According to projections by the Environ- symptom of the area’s neglect by the state, mental Investigation Agency, in 2012 up to the prevailing impunity, and the close 48 percent of Chinese timber imports from intertwining of the legal and illegal econ- Mozambique were illegal. The report also omies. These conditions are not to be found revealed the close ties between Chinese in Cabo Delgado alone. However, in this timber companies and Mozambican offi- region – at the border with Tanzania – cials. Similarly, the activities of the Shui- they are concentrated and reinforced as in dong Syndicate in Mozambique were exposed a pressure-cooker. in 2017 as a result of undercover research. State actors are not completely absent, This network had increasingly smuggled but in fact exert specific influence at eco- ivory into Asia via the port of Pemba, nomically important points. Especially in where, according to a Chinese trader, the heroin trafficking and the illicit timber network was free to act because everyone trade, the leaders and main beneficiaries had been bought. In 2015, 1.3 tonnes of of organised networks are often politically ivory and rhino horn that had been dis- well-connected and protected. For example, covered in the possession of a Chinese man the bulk trade of heroin intended for transit in Maputo disappeared from police head- has long been controlled by a few actors of quarters following confiscation – obviously South Asian origin. They have the necessary with the help of several officials. international connections and at the same Naturally, illicit trade is subject to con- time operate various legal enterprises, espe- stant change. More recently, loosely organ- cially in northern Mozambique. Mohamed ised networks also seem to be active in

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5 heroin trafficking. In strategically less rele- to three Mozambican companies came from vant places, non-state actors also exercise Credit Suisse and the Russian VTB. Accord- authority. Some of these figures play an ing to a parliamentary commission’s inves- important role in the illicit trade through tigation, this borrowing violated a variety the north and are influential locally. Activ- of national laws. An independent audit by ities such as illegal logging or mining for Kroll Associates revealed that the funds gemstones provide employment for the were to be used to buy boats for coastal pro- population and some investment in local tection and to build up a fleet for tuna fish- infrastructure. According to the UN Office ing. The audit showed that the companies on Drugs and Crime, criminal groups are could not implement the projects and that also benefiting from the precarious situa- a number of products were not delivered tion created by the devastating cyclones although invoices had been issued for them. that happened in spring, and are increas- The whereabouts of 500 million US dollars ingly recruiting among the population of are still unclear. the affected areas. Current findings suggest that both some This constellation presents multiple bank executives and stakeholders on the dangers. “Al Shabaab” in the north prob- Mozambican side benefited directly from ably generates part of its income via the the deal through illegal and undeclared illicit economy, but so far it does not kickback payments. The then Finance Min- appear to be linked to organised criminal ister Manuel Chang is said to have received networks. If it manages to expand its in- seven million US dollars for his involvement. fluence, this could change. And as else- The has issued arrest warrants where, increasing competition can lead against him and seven other people. He is to violent disputes over route control. currently in custody in South Africa, await- ing a decision as to whether he should be extradited to the USA or Mozambique. Corruption and Patronage In Mozambique, the trial against other FRELIMO masterminds is eagerly awaited. The starting point for action against traf- A total of 21 defendants are on trial, includ- ficking and organised crime is not primarily ing one of the sons of , in the north. Internationally well-connected Mozambique’s former president, and two illegal businesses that generate high profits high-ranking members of Mozambique’s are mainly protected by criminal-political secret service. Given FRELIMO’s far-reaching connections in the country’s centre. In this entanglement in the debt scandal, President nexus of protective arrangements, money Nyusi is in a difficult position. Since he has repeatedly flowed to high-ranking needs the support of his party for the next FRELIMO officials. The system that was built steps in the peace process, dealing harshly by the former liberation movement to re- with the masterminds of the debt scandal main in power is certainly comprehensive. is politically risky. At the same time there is In the most recent survey of the Afroba- enormous pressure both in the country – rometer, just 27 percent of respondents said especially in the run-up to the elections in that they perceived a difference between October 2019 – and from abroad to deal FRELIMO and the state. Mozambique also effectively with the scandal. ranks 158th out of the 180 countries listed on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2018. Corruption is also More than Warning Signals: the determining factor in the biggest debt Fast Political Action is Needed scandal in the country’s history. In 2016, it was revealed that Mozambique had taken The signing of the peace agreement in early on $2 billion in officially undeclared debt August was an important step. However, through state guarantees. The loans granted throughout the preceding peace process,

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6 various problems have intensified. The cir- the north. However, these must not be lim- cumstances behind the wave of violence in ited to repressive measures or confined only Cabo Delgado, and the intertwined nature to Cabo Delgado. The Mozambican and of the illicit economy, offer disturbing par- British governments signed a declaration in allels to other conflict theatres where far- May 2019 expressing their intention to co- reaching destabilisation has already become operate militarily to counter the extremists. a reality. Mozambique may also well be a Apart from that, the security forces should case of ‘too late for an early warning’. This above all ensure that the population is makes it all the more crucial to take coun- better protected, rather than confine them- termeasures. selves to securing facilities for profitable gas First, fundamental reforms must be ini- production. Otherwise there is a risk that tiated as soon as possible. The peace process vigilante groups, which have already been cannot be confined to an elite pact between set up in local communities, will increas- FRELIMO and RENAMO. Instead, govern- ingly take justice into their own hands. ance must be improved and the democratic At this point, it seems rather unrealistic space expanded. A reform of the judicial for law enforcement authorities to take system and the security sector is essential more targeted action against leaders of to resolve the entanglement of public and the movement that are active in the north. private interests and to address massive Given the group’s decentralised nature, violations, as in the context of the debt channels of communication should be scandal. These kinds of reforms take time, explored as well as options to allow less but they should be set out in the key radical members to leave. The govern- aspects of the peace process. ment’s cooperation with the Islamic Coun- Given the high level of donor depend- cil of Mozambique, which is intended to ence, President Nyusi is under pressure to counter radicalisation in the north, may ease the close ties between his party and be a first deviation from the harsh actions state institutions. Apparently, the party’s of the security forces. Yet the Council is a connections to certain heads of criminal problematic partner as it is part of the con- networks have been loosened, at least to flict constellation. It would be important to some extent. In the timber sector, there are hold comprehensive dialogues with local tentative reform efforts and a Memoran- communities and civil society, which spe- dum of Understanding with China aimed cifically take into account the problems of at stopping illegal logging has been signed. young people. There also needs to be trust- Germany and the EU should increase the building between the police and citizens. pressure on the Mozambican government Last but not least, the government must to tackle fundamental reforms as soon as gain more detailed knowledge of the ex- possible. The personal envoy to Mozam- tremists’ organisational structure in order bique appointed by the UN Secretary- to develop a more sophisticated strategy for General in July 2019 can be a partner in Cabo Delgado. this process. Concrete information is also necessary Although about half of the population for effective action against the illicit trade, may no longer feel represented by the two which has thus far financed extremists only major parties, it is essential for Mozam- to a limited extent, but has overall caused bique to hold credible elections in October massive economic and political damage to 2019. However, these are the beginning of a Mozambique. political process, not its end. The guarantee The political influence of criminal net- of freedom of expression and freedom of works must be curbed, for example by the press, which were restricted by a law making the financing of political parties adopted in July 2018, is key. and election campaigns more transparent. Second, new responses urgently need to In the short term, significant individual be found against the wave of violence in cases of corruption should at least be made

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7 public to create a certain pressure to act. The debt scandal shows that law enforce- ment and justice abroad can play an influ- ential role as well. Mozambique’s already difficult situation has been exacerbated by the damage caused by the cyclones this year. To improve the socioeconomic situation of the population in the north and the overall economic crisis, gas production must be successful. How- © Stiftung Wissenschaft ever, it is inevitable that the revenues – und Politik, 2019 which can only be expected from 2023 on- All rights reserved wards – will need to be used to repay debts. Germany and the EU could pick up This Comment reflects on requests by civil society that repayments the authors’ views. of the money misappropriated in the debt The online version of scandal flow directly into a fund for financ- this publication contains ing development projects in the country. functioning links to other SWP texts and other relevant sources.

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SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org [email protected]

ISSN 1861-1761 doi: 10.18449/2019C36

Translation by Tom Genrich

(English version of SWP-Aktuell 46/2019)

Dr Melanie Müller is Associate in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP. Dr Judith Vorrath is Senior Associate in the International Security Division at SWP.

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