Crimean Passions Around : An Active Pro-European Minority of Crimeans Against the Autonomous Republic’s Pro-Eurasian Authorities and an Ambivalent Majority

by Andrij Ivanec‘

21 January 2014

t is obvious: Euromaidan has already be- and supporters. Some politicians and analysts Icome a phenomenon of Ukraine’s social even believed that this experience made the and political life, even regardless of the fact Ukrainian society immune to future mass- that formally it has achieved none of its pub- scale protest actions. Such analyses, however, licly proclaimed goals - such as signing an proved completely wrong. Deepening eco- association agreement with the EU, bringing nomic problems and, specifically, the risk of to justice those responsible for the violent a default, together with a curb on civil rights dispersal of student protesters on November and restrictions of the freedom of expression, 30th, and a radical re-formatting of Ukrainian led to an escalation in the protest potential. The government on both institutional and indi- government’s decision on 21 November 2013 vidual levels. Moreover, Euromaidan has no- to suspend the preparations for an association tably changed the socio-political climate in the agreement with the EU detonated a bomb of country and is instrumental in creating a posi- public unrest manifesting many Ukrainians’ tive image of the Ukrainian people abroad. dissatisfaction with the state of the country One thing that makes Euromaidan different and their support for Euro-integration. A new from its predecessors - “the granite revolu- powerful impulse to the momentum of the tion”, “Rise up, Ukraine!” campaign, the Tax protests was given by the violent crackdown Maidan and even the Orange revolution - is its of the anti-riot police “Berkut” on Euromaid- sheer scale. A Euromaidan rally In December an student protesters. For most Ukrainians 2013 (the so-called Veche) saw a record num- it served as a turning point in their struggle ber of protesters in Ukrainian history. Accord- for Euro-integration, which became a fight for ing to Sweden’s Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, it their constitutionally guaranteed rights of per- was also the largest pro-European demonstra- sonal security and peaceful assemblies. tion in Europe. One may add that this protest Crucially, before the November events is also likely to last longer than the Orange Ukrainian society had actually reached a con- Maidan. sensus on the importance of Euro-integration. The main difference, however, lies in Eu- A characteristic detail is how even the Ukrai- romaidan’s new quality as compared to pre- nian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarch- vious Ukrainian protest campaigns. In 2004 ate voiced its support for Euro-integration Orange revolution supporters pledged their together with other churches. The govern- hope for a better life in the country with Viktor ment’s suspension of the signing of the Asso- Yushchenko, a candidate in the presidential ciation agreement with the EU was perceived election, making his name the most popular by many Ukrainians as a threat of a reversal slogan in Maidan: “Yushchenko!”. But when in its foreign policy direction. Furthermore, the elected president failed in his actions and the events at the Vilnius summit produced in excelled in his inability to act, a wave of revo- the society a psychological feeling of the loss lutionary enthusiasm was replaced by a sense of the European perspective, which could of profound disillusionment and political apa- transform Ukraine into a normal European thy on the part of orange revolution activists country and ensure for everyone a decent and

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dignified life. For a large part of Ukrainians, cally constructed movement. Ukrainian 2014 the perspective of an EU integration embod- “Euro-revolution” has demonstrated its civil ied their hope in overcoming the most acute society’s coming of age and maturity; many Ukrainian problems, such as corruption, pov- segments of civil society and their ideas ap- erty, dysfunctional state structures, and estab- pear more productive for the country than the lishing new standards in social, economic and actions and ideas of the pro-government or political life. even the opposition politicians. It is obvious, As a result, there emerged a qualitatively however, that Euromaidan’s heterogeneous new form of public protest - Euromaidan. Its civil society sector is too short of time to pro- principal difference from the Orange maidan pose its own independent political project in is that opposition politicians today are not re- the nearest future. Its activists mostly realise garded as unconditional leaders and organis- this and accept the need to work with existing ers of the masses. Civil society tends to act on politicians to achieve socially important goals. par with the political opposition and - with This is clearly a difficult task, requiring mu- limited success - to form the opposition on its tual commitment from the civil society sector own. According to public opinion polls, the and the political establishment alike. absolute majority of Euromaidan supporters But - as it has been already stated - Kiev’s joined the protests in Kiev not in response to Euromaidan is a phenomenon of national the opposition’s calls. What was an uncondi- importance. And not only because among tional loyalty to the opposition‘s presidential its activists there are representatives from all candidate in 2004 transformed ten years later, the country’s regions, including the Crimea on Euromaidan 2014, into the civil society’s and . (Significantly, Independence ambition to turn politicians into instruments Square in November-December featured the of positive changes in the country. Charac- flags of the Crimean Autonomous Republic teristically, the first rally to take place was and the , while the hungry pro- the students’ Euromaidan, followed by the testers for many days on end could treat them- Euromaidan of the political opposition in Ki- selves to Crimean plov and other dishes of the ev’s . Later these two move- Crimean Tatar cooks). Euromaidan also has its ments merged on Independence Square. The counterparts, its supporters and opponents in merger, however, is not absolute. In spite of Ukrainian regions. the opposition-initiated creation at the end of December of the All-Ukrainian Union “Maid- Euromaidan in the Crimea: an active an”, consisting of politicians and civil society minority representatives, Kiev’s Euromaidan includes more than twenty various civil groups and Euromaidans beyond Kiev sprang up in unions outside the opposition’s control. In November-December 2013 in practically all fact, it is possible to speak of the ongoing ef- regional centres and in many smaller towns. fort of Euromaidan participants to establish They are, however, of different formats. A between different civil society structures a permanent Euromaidan in city centre, with a symbiotic network model of relations and stage, exists only in Lviv; in some cities there self-organisation, against the attempts of the are tent camps, while in others only regular political opposition to build and lead a verti- activists’ meetings take place. The appearance

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of a Euromaidan in the Crimea is an expect- number of ethnic Russians is higher than the ed surprise. The Crimean peninsula consists general Crimean indicators. of two territorial administrative units - the Crimea’s ethnic composition explains its Crimean Autonomous Republic and Sevasto- widespread pro-Russian sentiment, which in pol. Both regions are traditional Party of Re- some residents of the Autonomous Republic gions (PR) and ’s electoral and Sevastopol has taken the form of Euro- constituencies. Only Donetsk and Lugansk re- phobia. However, there is also a significant gions show a higher than in the Crimea level number of Crimeans who hold opposing of electoral support for the pro-presidential views or support Ukraine’s integration into forces. Thus, for instance, in a 2012 parliamen- Europe and the Eurasian Union at the same tary election, in spite of a low turn-out, the time. Thus, already in late November 2013 received 52,3% and 46,9% of Crimea saw public pro-EU protests in such votes in the Autonomous Republic and Sevas- towns as Yevpatoria, Feodosia, Dzhankoy, topol respectively; in the second round of the and Yalta. Later similar relatively sporadic ac- presidential election Yanukovych got 78% of tions took place in Kerch. Most systematic ac- the Republic’s votes. Party of Regions mem- tions happened in Sevastopol and the capital bers enjoy a full control of the executive and of the Autonomous Republic . legislative branches of power in the Republic; From late November to early January the the Party of Regions’ outfit in the Autonomous residents of Simferopol witnessed almost daily Republic “The Regions of Crimea” holds 82 events organised by Euro-activists. On week- out of 100 seats in the local parliament. The days those were activities of a few dozens of Party of Regions also controls the absolute ma- activists on the square outside the Republic’s jority of local administrations in the region, as government building. And on weekends a well as governmental and local administrative column of a few hundreds of people moved bodies in Sevastopol. from the square to the Crimea’s parliament or It did seem that under such circumstances the Representation of the President of Ukraine there was no space for the pro-EU sentiment in in the . A number of au- the Crimea. The region, however, is by many to-caravans in support of Euromaidan drove tokens the most peculiar part of Ukraine; and along Crimean roads. Money, food, medicines the Crimean community is a multifaceted and clothes were collected for the protesters in society. The Autonomous Republic and Sev- Kiev. First protests in the Crimea took place astopol are the only regions in the country under the slogans in support of the president’s where ethnic Ukrainians are not the biggest commitment to Euro-integration and with the ethnic group, the majority of population com- demand to sign the Association agreement prised by representatives of ethnic minorities. in Vilnius. But after the events on November Crimea is also an area, compactly inhabited 29th and 30th, the views of Crimean Euro- by the Crimean Tatar people. According to the activists became more radical - they rallied 2001 Ukrainian census, the population of the with the demands to name and bring to justice Autonomous Republic of Crimea consisted those responsible for the brutal crackdown of the following ethnic groups: 58,8 % - Rus- on Maidan students, and called on the gov- sians, 24,6 % Ukrainians, and over slightly 12 ernment and - later - the president to resign. % - Crimean Tatars. In Sevastopol, the relative As for Crimean printed and electronic

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mass media, most of which are owned by pressure and open provocations. Thus, for the Party of Regions members or the state, example, the authorities in Simferopol would in their representation of the events in Kiev deliberately stage mass counter-rallies at the they largely belied the standards of objective same time and places with the Euromaidan journalism. Many of them contributed to the events. They gathered employees of state anti-Maidan propaganda campaign. Some of enterprises to take part in the rallies and de- the newspapers regularly presented the aver- ployed powerful sound equipment to silence age Crimean reader with stories on the “Nazi the opponents. On December 12th 2013, car coup” in Kiev, “Maidowns” (a nasty blend of tires of the leader of “Udar” youth organisa- the words “Maidan” and “Down”), and de- tion in Sevastopol were slashed and the words picting Euromaidan activists as hired stooges “For Maidan” sprayed on the car. A similar in- or loafers. This media propaganda campaign cident took place in Simferopol on December made Euromaidan supporters in Simferopol 21st 2013: a “Euromaidan-Crimea” coordina- resort to such means of self-organisation as tor Kovalskiy had his Mercedes damaged by personal connections and Facebook networks. unknown people, prompting a criminal inves- At the end of November they elected coordi- tigation by the police. On December 3rd 2013, nators of the “Euromaidan-Crimea” move- attackers set on fire the only Ukrainian Ortho- ment, including Serhii Kovalskiy, an activist dox Church of Kiev Patriarchate in Yevpato- of the Crimean section of Batkivshchyna, Ser- ria, whose deacon father Yaroslav Hontar had hiy Mokrenyuk, head of the Crimean section earlier left with a group of parishioners for Eu- of the non-parliamentary opposition party romaidan in Kiev. Crimean activists continue “Democratic Alliance”, an Udar activist Ismail to report of other provocations and threats to Ismailov and leader of the “Crimean centre them and their families. for business and cultural co-operation “Ukrai- In view of such situation, it may be ar- nian House” Andriy Shchekun. Although gued that regardless of its composition of three of the four coordinators are party activ- civil society and political parties activists, the ists, they were not delegated to the movement movement “Euromaidan-Crimea” is typo- “Euromaidan-Crimea” by their respective par- logically similar to Euromaidan’s civil sector ties. Moreover, in the words of Shchekun, the in Kiev. On December 4th the Headquarters leaders of Crimean sections of parliamentary of national resistance in Crimea was formed, parties were primarily concerned with send- comprising representatives of eight political ing Crimean volunteers to Kiev, rather than parties, 14 civil organisations and 11 activ- organising protest actions in the Republic. ists of the “Euromaidan-Crimea” movement. Shchekun, however, managed to convince Shchekun and Kovalskiy became coordinators young party and civil activists of the need to of the Headquarters’ Council. In late Decem- break through the information blockade and ber 2013 a former head of the Republican For- “show Ukraine and the world that there are estry Committee Anatoliy Kovalskiy chaired people in the Crimea who want to live in a the newly formed organisational committee of European society”. He is certain that they suc- the All-Ukrainian Council “Maidan” in Sim- ceeded in achieving this goal. feropol. Anatoliy Kovalskiy became famous According to Shchekun, Crimean Euro- in 2004 when he refused to sign a permission activists experienced a lot of administrative to grant large plots of land from Crimea’s na-

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tional reserves fund to businesses, controlled ans can be seen as their distinctive feature. by M. Kurochkin, a Russian businessman and facilitator between the Ukrainian and Rus- Crimean Tatars choose Europe sian governments during the 2004 presidential election. The population of the Autonomous Re- Presently, there are no readily available public of Crimea includes 270 thousand sociological data on general population sup- Crimean Tatars, or roughly 13% of general port levels for Euro-integration in the Crimea. population. Despite the apparently low pop- However, a poll conducted in December by the ulation numbers of Crimean Tatars, their na- Crimean organisation of young political scien- tional movement has played an important role tists in Simferopol revealed that out of the 400 in the Crimean and Ukrainian politics. This respondents aged 18-35 60,5% supported the has become possible thanks to the national ex- government’s decision to suspend the Euro- perience of self-organisation acquired during integration process, 24% were against it, while the long years of deportation and resistance 15% remained undecided. In case of a refer- against the communist regime, as well as the endum, 36% of young people (Ukrainian law formation of national government institu- defines people under 35 years old as “young”) tions, such as the general congress Kurultay would vote for joining the Customs Union, or a system of executive bodies - Mejlis of the and 33% - the EU. In other words, the number Crimean Tatar people and local Mejlis bodies. of young Simferopol residents who support One of the strong points of the national move- the European or Eurasian vector of integration ment is its extensive network of international is relatively the same (the difference lies with- links with Muslim and Turkic structures and in the margin of statistical error). It is quite an western donor organisations that provide optimistic result for the pro-EU supporters, support to repatriated Crimean Tatars. considering such factors as ethnic composition In the past few years there has been a no- in the Republic and the hostile media environ- table decline in support for local government ment. It is worth noting, however, that the lev- and the Mejlis among the Crimean Tatars. el of pro-EU support is likely to drop among This is evident from the increased public ac- the Crimean residents of older generations. tivities of the Mejlis political opponents and a Generally speaking, a sociological por- growing approval among some segments of trait of Crimean EU supporters resembles the Crimean Muslims of the idea of the cre- that of the whole Ukraine: although present ation of a worldwide caliphate as opposed to in all social and age groups, they are pre- the idea of upholding the Crimean Tatar na- dominantly young, running their own busi- tional interests. In practice, however, the pres- ness and Ukrainian-speaking. At least, those ent Kurultay-Mejlis system remains the most are the categories of citizens that take the popular and influential in the Crimean Tatar most active part in the “Euromaidan-Crimea” community. The level of public influence ex- events, together with political leaders and - erted by all Crimean Tatar opponents of the to a lesser degree - teachers, journalists, state current system taken together is nowhere near employees and pensioners. On the other the capacity and leverage possibilities of the hand, a significant presence of Crimean Ta- national government bodies. Moreover, last tars among the supporters of local Euromaid- year a two-tier election system to the Kurul-

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tay was changed for direct elections, which institutions. The Composition of the Council increased the number of young delegates and of Representatives of the Crimean Tatar Peo- made a positive consolidating impact on the ple under the President of Ukraine, created Crimean Tatar national movement. under Leonid Kuchma as a step to legalise The Mejlis was among the first to an- the Mejlis, has been changed to include other nounce its support for Euromaidan in Kiev Crimean Tatar figures. In the past few years, and a European civilisational choice for this was not an actively-functioning body. Lo- Ukraine. In December the most influential cal administrations in the Crimean regions, Crimean Tatar politician , presided by Donbass-born Party of Regions a Soviet-time dissident and a BYuT MP, who members, have been gradually trying to oust for twenty-two years was head of the Mejlis, Mejlis representatives from power and replace spoke in front of the pro-EU demonstrators them with more pro-government oriented in Kiev. The recently elected new head of the Crimean Tatars. The “Kurultay-Rukh” frac- Mejlis, Refat Chubarov, joined the All-Ukrai- tion has lost its right to appoint head of the Re- nian Union “Maidan” Council. Head of the In- publican Committee for Interethnic Relations ternational Section at the Mejlis Ali Khamzin and Deported Citizens at the Crimean Coun- remarks that even those political and religious cil of Ministers. The Mejlis leaders complain structures of the Crimean Tatars that oppose about the disruption of the government’s the national government refrain from running Resettlement and Reintegration programme a public campaign against the Euromaidan. which last year received the record low 10 They include the non-governmental organisa- million hryvnia from the national budget, in tion “Milliy Firqa”, the Council of Represen- spite of the officially allocated 200 million. Ali tatives of the Crimean Tatar People under the Khamzin notes that the state has been unable President of Ukraine and the presently illegal so far to establish a systematic legal basis to in Ukraine radical Muslim organisation Hizb ensure the rights protection and rehabilitation ut-Tahrir. of the Crimean Tatar people. The Mejlis’ choice in favour of Euro-inte- There is, however, a certain number of gration - which probably reflects the general Crimean Tatars who politically support the public mood among the Crimean Tatars - can Party of Regions and took part in Kiev’s Anti- be explained by the ambition to pursue the maidan. They are mostly members of “Sebat”, nation’s strategic and tactical interests. The a non-governmental organisation that unites EU, from a Crimean Tatar perspective, not participants in the land-grabbing movement. only guarantees the general democratic devel- “Sebat”s representatives state that around 800 opment of Ukraine, but also ensures a fairly of its members joined the Antimaidan in Kiev. high level of protection for national minori- A Mejlis leader Khamzin believes that the ties and indigenous peoples. Since the election number was no more than 20-30. of Yanukovych as president in 2010 this has become an important item on the agenda of The Eurasian Choice of the Autono- the Crimean Tatar leaders, since both central mous Republic’s leadership and the Rus- and regional government bodies have been sian factor gradually limiting the scope of co-operation and dialogue with the national Crimean Tatar Since the beginning of the Euromaidan

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protest movement, the Crimean authorities when it approved a proposal to the president have taken a radically negative position. It did and government of Ukraine to “consider in the not come as a surprise when on November short term the possibility of Ukraine’s joining 27th 2013 the majority of MPs in the Crimean the Customs Union”. In other words, Crimean parliament voted in favour of the Ukrainian Party of Regions members proposed to their government’s decision to suspend the sign- senior party cronies in governmental chairs to ing of an association agreement with the EU officially change the country’s foreign policy. in the name of the national security interests, For Ukraine’s commitment to Euro-integra- and condemned the “destructive actions” of tion has been enshrined in laws and its lead- “Svoboda”, “Batkivshchyna” and “Udar” par- ers continue to declare that the EU-association ties. In an appeal to the president, approved process has been only suspended. by the extraordinary parliamentary session on It is clear that a difficult economic situa- December 2nd 2013, Crimean MPs not only tion in the country and the political crisis have harshly criticised their political opponents but caused the Autonomous Republic’s establish- also called on the central government to take ment to fear for its future, advocating the use radical measures. The style of the document of force and unleashing a media war against is evident from a characteristic quote (origi- Euromaidan supporters. Furthermore, central nally in Russian): “the government is obliged authorities could use their Crimean allies’ po- to prevent an unconstitutional revanche on sition as an instrument in the general political the part of the bankrupt political forces that balance of power in the country. At the same profess radical nationalism and have already time, the Crimean leadership’s decisions and crossed the line separating it from Nazism”. It proposals, as well as those in some other re- is of interest to note that the document goes as gions of South Eastern Ukraine, can be also far as actually labelling the government’s op- seen as a symmetrical response to measures ponents as “nazis”. More crucially, however, in support of the Euromaidan movement, de- the Crimean parliament calls on the president clared and adopted by local government bod- to “stop the spread of lawlessness and anar- ies in Western Ukraine. chy on the capital’s street”, to urgently put an Until mid-December the pro-government end to the activities of the destructive forces authorities in the Crimea sought to mobilise including by introduction - if necessary - of the population in support of the central gov- the emergency state. The same parliamentary ernment by unleashing a full-fledged media session heard the parliament’s vice-speaker war. Some of the propaganda content was Hryhoriy Ioffe declare cynically: “for the borderline - to say the least - in the context of events on Maidan in Kiev, for everything that Crimea’s multiethnic community and with took place there on November 29th and 30th regard to Ukraine’s national interests. The and is going on now, those who organise such most controversial came from the Presidium “maidans”should be held responsible”. As of the Crimean parliament who on December such, he actually justified the excessive use of 12th 2013 published an appeal to the people force against peaceful protesters by anti-riot of Crimea. The document described the threat police. to the Republic’s autonomous status from the Another landmark decision of the Crime- “organisers of mass street protests in Kiev” an parliament came on December 3rd 2013, and warned that the Crimeans would be “de-

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prived of their right to speak, write or be edu- the breakup of Ukraine, the collapse of Ukrai- cated in Russian, the native language for the nian statehood, and the need for a federal ar- majority of Crimean residents”. The appeal rangement, accompanied - sometimes - by not also declared that the “Autonomous Republic so subtle separatist slogans. is in danger!”; “the fate of the whole Ukraine Opposition politicians began to voice their and the Crimean Autonomous Republic is be- concern over the threat of the Crimean separat- ing decided today” and that the “Crimea is fac- ism and the Russian factor. An ex-member of ing a choice: to put up with the forced Maidan- the Ukrainian parliament and the Mejlis head isation, or to stand up decisively against the Chubarov remarked last December that for anti-government and anti-Crimean forces”. him the threat of the Crimea’s secession had It is hardly necessary to argue here that never been more tangible. On December 14th Kiev’s Euromaidan did not voice a single de- 2013, a Svoboda MP and a member of the par- mand to cancel Crimea’s autonomous status or liamentary committee on the national security to ban the use of the Russian language in the and defence Yuriy Syrotyuk reported on the peninsula. Those are not programmatic items plans for a Russian-backed special operation for the majority of Euromaidan groups (with to declare the Crimea’s state sovereignty from the only exception of Svoboda’s position on Ukraine. According to Syrotyuk, a meeting the autonomous status which was not in any between PR members of the Crimean parlia- case raised during the Euromaidan events). ment, leader of the party “Russian bloc” and Moreover, if anything the EU integration en- representatives of the party “” sures additional guarantees for the protection had taken place in the Russian consulate in of linguistic and cultural rights of national mi- Simferopol. Allegedly, the secessionist scenar- norities. What was the motive then behind the io was supposed to be launched publicly with Crimean parliament leadership’s deliberate a demand from the Crimean Antimaidan sup- demonisation of Euromaidan? porters for a referendum on the Crimea’s state Some commentators have suggested that sovereignty. “This scenario is a contingency this was more than a simple manifestation plan in that case if Yanukovych loses control of low political culture or a method used to in Kiev and the majority in ” consolidate the pro-government forces in the - said the MP. Crimea in a complex economic and political Politicians from the above-named pro- situation. A more sinister implication was per- Russian parties do not confirm the existence ceived in similar public messages: “Nobody in of separatist plans. More in general, it is very Kiev should wrongly assume that the Crimea difficult to make a proper assessment of Rus- will tolerate the enforcement of some else’s sia’s Crimean intentions and Ukrainian action will”; as well as in the initiative of the PR dep- plans, which largely remain hidden from the uty in Sevastopol Serhiy Smol’ianinov to col- public eye. It is obvious, however, that Rus- lect signatures under an appeal to the Russian sia closely watches the situation in the Crimea, president to deploy Russian troops in Ukraine hoping to use it as a leverage of influence in to “counterbalance the army of the United Ukraine as a whole. The separatist card can be States of America and their NATO aggres- only played in the exceptional circumstances. sors”. There has been a steady increase in the Even more so after the signing by the Rus- number of articles in local printed media on sian and Ukrainian presidents on December

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17th 2013 of a deal concerned with a money What next? A no-reply question credit and gas-price reduction, which greatly reduced the risk of any possible separatist It is too early to make any conclusions scenario in the Crimea by the external forces. about Euromaidan’s results. It is obvious, on Besides, the agreement has resulted in a rela- the one hand, that Ukraine’s authorities man- tive stabilisation of the presidential power and aged to steer through a dangerous geo-politi- the economic situation in the country which is cal curve and even to achieve a relative social likely to ease the Crimean political establish- and economic stabilisation in the country. On ment’s fears of what they see as the realisation the other, the Euromaidan movement in Kiev of the worst-case scenario. and other regions has received a worldwide And yet, the ongoing political crisis urges moral support and continues to exist, albeit the pro-government forces in the Crimea to without the real resources for a radical change keep the political situation under control and of the political situation. The best-case sce- consolidate the population’s support. One of nario for the development of the situation in the methods they continue to use is the delib- the country would require reaching a set of erate escalation of artificial threats. Thus, dur- compromises between the government, the ing a press conference in Simferopol after their opposition and the society aimed at reform- return from the pro-government Antimaidan ing the country and implementing the Euro- rallies in Kiev, the activists of the Crimean Ta- integration policy. This looks like a daunting tar organisation “Sebat” declared that some- task, but is not impossible. As for the Crimean when in the first half of 2014 the USA intended Euromaidan supporters, their fate and the sit- to use the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people uation in the Crimea in general will depend as a platform for provocations in the Repub- on future developments in the country and on lic. Since the anti-Tatar sentiment remains geo-political games around Ukraine.... a lingering factor among some segments of the post-Soviet Crimean society, even a hy- translated by Vladyslava Reznyk pothetical threat of provocations may push a certain part of Crimeans to show greater sup- port for the authorities as the only stabilising force. Mejlis’ head of the international section Khamzin characterises the “Sebat” claims as untruthful and immoral. In his opinion, it is a long-shot attempt to create in the Crimean society a negative image of the future activities in support of the Crimean Tatars’ rights, en- visaged by the national government bodies as part of the commemorations for the 70th anni- versary of Stalin’s criminal deportation of the Crimean Tatar people from the Crimea.

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