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Malware Goes Mobile by Mikko Hypponen

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Malware Goes Mobile by Mikko Hypponen MALWARE GOES MOBILE BY MIKKO HYPPONEN Computer viruses are now airborne, infecting mobile phones in every part of the globe. Security companies, cellular operators and phone makers are moving to quash these threats before they spiral out of control he day the computer security community had anticipated for years finally arrived in June 2004. I and other researchers who study malicious forms of software knew that it was only a matter of time until such T malware appeared on mobile phones as well. As cell phones have evolved into smartphones—able to download programs from the Internet and share software with one another through short-range Bluetooth connections, worldwide multimedia messaging service (MMS) communications and memory cards—the devices’ novel capabilities have created new vulnerabilities. Scoundrels were bound to find the weaknesses and exploit them for mis- chief or, worse, for criminal gain. Sure enough, three summers ago security ex- perts found the first rogue program written spe- cifically for smartphones. Dubbed Cabir, it was a classic proof-of-concept virus, clearly created to 70 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN NOVEMBER 2006 COPYRIGHT 2006 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC. INFECTION of one smartphone by malicious software—malware— could bring down others in a domino effect. COPYRIGHT 2006 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC. SMARTPHONES ON THE RISE s) 15 on MORE PHONES, MORE TARGETS The number of smart mobile devices (milli in the world has expanded dramatically de 10 dwi in recent years, and so has the amount rl Wo of malware set loose to attack them. , That mix is a recipe for disaster: as the ld 5 size of a target audience increases, so, s So too, does the likelihood that miscreant it Un programmers will attack it. And 0 audience size is expected to soar in Quarter 1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 the years ahead. Industry analysts 2003 2004 2005 2006 predict that more than 200 million smartphones will be sold in 2009. GROWTH IN MOBILE MALWARE 350 ms capture bragging rights. It caused no ra 300 damage to an infected device, other Prog than running down the phone’s battery 250 as the virus tried to copy itself to an- lware 200 other smartphone by opening a Blue- Ma wn tooth connection. The anonymous au- o 150 thor, most likely somewhere in Spain, Kn of of 100 chose to post Cabir on a Web site rather er than releasing it into the wild. But with- mb 50 Nu in two months other scofflaws had ve 0 turned it loose in Southeast Asia. It soon lati 05 06 05 06 05 05 06 04 04 . 04 . ; h h g. spread worldwide. ) ne ne ne pt pt mu rc rc Au Dec. Dec. Ju Ju Ju Se Se Even though we had been on the Cu Ma Ma page lookout for viruses such as Cabir, secu- this ) rity experts were not fully prepared to like a computer virus that can be ob- our office building and posted a guard at ( deal with it. As soon as the alert was served and dissected on a machine that the door before turning them on, lest an sounded, my co-workers and I at F-Se- is disconnected from any network, wire- unsuspecting employee walk in and catch cure, a computer security firm, started less malware can spread—in some cases, the bug. Later that year F-Secure built bottom graph inspecting the new virus, which was a even make transoceanic leaps—the mo- two aluminum-and-copper-encased lab- type known as a worm [see box on op- ment the infected phone is powered up. oratories, impenetrable to radio waves, posite page for definitions of terms]. So we took four cell phones hit by to study this contagious new form of ); LUCY READING-IKKANDA But we had no safe place to study it; un- Cabir to the basement bomb shelter in malware. Although the initial version of Cabir was relatively innocuous, some unscru- Overview/Imperiled Phones opposite page pulous malware writers rushed to mod- and ■ The first malicious software aimed at smartphones hit in 2004. Smartphones ify it into forms that are more virulent are mobile phones that permit users to install software applications from and damaging, while others began ) AND F-SECURE SECURITY RESEARCH ( sources other than the cellular network operator. crafting novel kinds of attacks. Mobile ■ — Today more than 300 kinds of malware among them worms, Trojan horses, viruses on the loose now can completely top graph other viruses and spyware—have been unleashed against the devices. disable a phone, delete the data on it or preceding pages ■ As sales of such sophisticated phones soar worldwide, the stage is being set force the device to send costly messages for the massive spread of malware. Steps are being taken to prevent that to premium-priced numbers. Within scenario, but the opportunity to block the onslaught is unlikely to last long. two years the number of viruses target- MIRACLE STUDIOS ( ing smartphones soared from one to SOURCES: CANALYS ( 72 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN NOVEMBER 2006 COPYRIGHT 2006 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, INC. more than 200, a rate of growth that roughly paralleled that of computer vi- ruses in the first two years after the first PC virus, called Brain, was released in 1986. Despite Herculean efforts to rein it Smartphones could in the in, PC malware continues at a gallop: more than 200,000 forms have been very near future make up identified so far, and today an unpro- tected PC is often infected within min- most of the world’s computers. utes of connecting to the Internet. The economic costs of the 20-year onslaught have been steep, and they are spiraling tions of smartphones that run more vices accrete more PC-like functionality. higher as old-school malware written open operating systems, Web browsers, At the same time that smartphones have for glory has given way to a new era of e-mail and other messaging clients and begun sporting features such as video “crimeware” designed for spamming, that contain Flash memory card readers cameras, GPS navigation and MP3 play- data theft or extortion. and short-range Bluetooth radios. Each ers, their prices have dropped—subsi- Mobile malware, though little more of these features offers a conduit through dized in part by network operators, who than a nuisance today, could quickly es- which malware can propagate. hope the new capabilities will encour- calate into an even more formidable Bluetooth, for example, allows cer- age customers to spend more on cellular problem than PC malware in the years tain mobile worms to spread among vul- services. Manufacturers sold more than ahead unless the security community, nerable phones by mere proximity, al- 40 million smartphones last year, and cellular network operators, smartphone most like the influenza virus. A Blue- industry analysts expect to see 350 mil- designers and phone users all work to- tooth-equipped smartphone can identify lion units in service by 2009. gether to hold it in check. The history of and exchange files with other Bluetooth In the medium term, these devices PC malware is humbling, but it offers devices from a distance of 10 meters or may be adopted most quickly in emerg- lessons that will help us to anticipate more. As victims travel, their phones can ing economies, where computer owner- some of the ways in which mobile virus leave a trail of infected bystanders in writers will strike next and to take steps their wake. And any event that attracts to thwart them. a large crowd presents a perfect breeding A Malware Primer ground for Bluetooth viruses. A Rising Tide A particularly nasty form of Cabir, PHISHING SCAM i n 1988 many computer experts dis- for example, spread so rapidly through Fraudulent Web page, e-mail or text missed viruses as inconsequential novel- the audience at the 2005 world track and message that entices the unwary ties. That assessment proved regrettably field championships in Helsinki that sta- to reveal passwords, financial details or other private data. naive. For mobile malware, the time is dium operators flashed warnings on the now 1988, and we have a brief window big screen. Most smartphones can put SPYWARE in which to act to avoid repeating the Bluetooth into a “nondiscoverable” mode Software that reveals private mistakes of the past. that protects them from invasion by information about the user or One such mistake was to underesti- worms. But few users avail themselves of computer system to eavesdroppers. mate how quickly malware would grow this feature. While giving a talk at a TROJAN HORSE in prevalence, diversity and sophistica- computer security conference this spring, A program that purports to be tion. Prevalence is a function of both the I conducted a quick scan of the room useful but actually harbors hidden population of potential hosts for virtual and found that almost half the profes- malicious code. pathogens and of their rate of infection. sionals in the audience had left the Blue- VIRUS The target population for malicious mo- tooth radios in their phones wide open. Originally, computer code that inserts bile software is enormous and growing The proportion is even higher among the itself into another program and by leaps. There are now more than two general population, so these devices of- replicates when the host software billion mobile phones in the world. fer a disturbingly effective vector for in- runs. Now often used as a generic It is true that the great majority of visible parasites. term that also includes Trojan horses and worms. these are older cell phones running And this host population is growing closed, proprietary operating systems rapidly.
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