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Article: Watanabe, H. orcid.org/0000-0002-8377-0195 (2018) The political agency and social movements of Japanese individually-affiliated unions. Economic and Industrial Democracy. ISSN 0143-831X https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X18789794
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The political agency and social movements of Japanese individually-affiliated unions
Journal: Economic and Industrial Democracy Manuscript ForID EID-18-1108.R2 Peer Review Manuscript Type: Original Article
political agency, social movement unionism, precarious work, individually- Keyword: affiliated unions, Japan
Country: Japan
In contrast to dominant enterprise unions, individually-affiliated unions in Japan such as community and general unions are eager to ameliorate precarious working conditions of non-regular workers and regular workers in small- and medium-size enterprises. While these unions have assisted workers in resolving labour disputes in similar ways despite their small power resources, they have been different in terms of effectiveness in affecting public policy and improving working conditions of those workers. Abstract: This article addresses the question of why this difference exists from the perspective of unions‘ strategies, especially those related to ”political agency‘ and ”social movement unionism‘. The article conducts case studies of three individually-affiliated unions for young, female and migrant workers respectively, and argues that political agency and social movement unionism have contributed to the different performance among those individually-affiliated unions.
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1 2 3 The political agency and social movements of Japanese individually-affiliated unions 4 5 6 7 Abstract 8 9 10 11 In contrast to dominant enterprise unions, individually affiliated unions in Japan such as 12 13 14 community and general unions are eager to ameliorate precarious working conditions of non 15 16 regular workers and regular workers in small and medium size enterprises. While these 17 18 unions have assisted workers in resolving labour disputes in similar ways despite their small 19 For Peer Review 20 power resources, they have been different in terms of effectiveness in affecting public policy 21 22 and improving working conditions of those workers. This article addresses the question of 23 24 why this difference exists from the perspective of unions’ strategies, especially those related 25 26 27 to ‘political agency’ and ‘social movement unionism’. The article conducts case studies of 28 29 three individually affiliated unions for young, female and migrant workers respectively, and 30 31 argues that political agency and social movement unionism have contributed to the different 32 33 performance among those individually affiliated unions. 34 35 36 37 Key words 38 39 40 Political agency, social movement unionism, precarious work, individually affiliated unions, 41 42 Japan 43 44 45 46 Introduction 47 48 49 50 Against a background of economic stagnation after the collapse of the bubble economy in the 51 52 53 early 1990s and the intensified economic competition from neighbouring Asian countries, 54 55 Japanese employers urged the government of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to 56 57 58 1 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Economic and Industrial Democracy Page 2 of 37
1 2 3 implement a structural reform to revive the economy. In response, the LDP government has 4 5 implemented labour market deregulation, mostly in non regular employment such as 6 7 temporary agency work but also in regular employment by deregulating working time 8 9 regulation (Author, 2012, 2014). These deregulatory measures have had negative impact on 10 11 the working conditions of many workers, but especially those of non regular workers and 12 13 14 regular workers in small and medium size enterprises (SMEs). 15 16 The working conditions of non regular workers and regular workers in SMEs are 17 18 characterized precarious, and many of these workers are ‘working poor’, who receive salaries 19 For Peer Review 20 as low as the amount of government social assistance (around 2 million Japanese yen per year, 21 22 which is around US $18,000 at the exchange rate of $1 = 110 Japanese yen). As reported by 23 24 media and unions, non regular workers and regular workers in workplaces that are not 25 26 27 organized by unions have particularly suffered from poor working conditions such as illegal 28 29 dismissal, employers’ refusal to renew a contract, no payment of salary, forced deterioration 30 31 of working conditions, harassment and so on. Although the Japanese labour market is 32 33 characterized ‘dualistic’ and the working conditions of regular workers in large companies 34 35 are better than those of non regular workers in terms of job protection, pay, fringe benefits 36 37 and so on, those regular workers have also experienced deteriorating working conditions as a 38 39 40 result of excessively long working hours and job intensification, partly due to a greater use of 41 42 ‘management by objectives’ and performance based pay (Author, 2014; Imai, 2011). A 43 44 recent case of suicide committed by an employee of Dentsū Corporation, the largest Japanese 45 46 media and advertising company, is a notorious case. Matsuri Takahashi, a young female 47 48 employee who graduated from Japan’s most prestigious University of Tokyo, committed a 49 50 suicide as a result of exhaustion and depression from excessively long working hours (Asahi 51 52 53 Shimbun, 2016). 54 55 56 57 58 2 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Page 3 of 37 Economic and Industrial Democracy
1 2 3 In contrast to dominant ‘enterprise’ unions, which are the basic unit of mainstream unions 4 5 in Japan, ‘individually affiliated’ unions such as community and general unions, which any 6 7 individual workers can join irrespective of their company affiliation, are eager to ameliorate 8 9 poor working conditions of non regular workers and regular workers in SMEs who remain 10 11 unorganized. While these individually affiliated unions have assisted workers in resolving 12 13 14 labour disputes in similar ways despite their small power resources, they have been different 15 16 in terms of effectiveness in affecting public policy and improving the working conditions of 17 18 those workers. This article addresses the question of why this difference exists from the 19 For Peer Review 20 perspective of unions’ strategies, especially those related to ‘political agency’ and ‘social 21 22 movement unionism’. The article conducts case studies of three representative individually 23 24 affiliated unions for young, female and migrant workers respectively, and argues that political 25 26 27 agency and social movement unionism have contributed to the different performance among 28 29 those individually affiliated unions. 30 31 In the context of significantly weakened power of labour unions vis à vis employers 32 33 against a background of low economic growth and the spread of neoliberalism, labour 34 35 scholars have examined factors that may be able to revitalize unions and identified ‘social 36 37 movement’ as a way to revitalize the labour movement (Engeman, 2015; Serdar, 2012; 38 39 40 Sullivan, 2010). According to these scholars, unions should reorient their political strategies 41 42 to social movement (including unions’ alliance with civil society organizations). In a similar 43 44 vein, this article identifies social movement as a way to revitalize the labour movement but 45 46 also emphasizes the importance of ‘political agency’ such as unions’ political lobbying and 47 48 policy proposals to the government. 49 50 This article conducts case studies of three Japanese individually affiliated unions that 51 52 53 organize young, female and migrant workers respectively: ‘Shutoken Seinen (Tokyo 54 55 Metropolitan Youth) Union’, ‘Women’s Union Tokyo’ and ‘Zentōitsu (All united) Workers 56 57 58 3 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Economic and Industrial Democracy Page 4 of 37
1 2 3 Union’. These unions are chosen for case studies as well known individually affiliated unions 4 5 in Japan that represent the three major groups of precarious workers (young, female and 6 7 migrant) in labor markets under neoliberalism. Compared to other individually affiliated 8 9 unions, they have been more successful in drawing attention from the mass media. This 10 11 article focuses on workers who suffer from precarious working conditions, and young, female 12 13 14 and migrant workers are among the most disadvantaged among all workers. Interviews were 15 16 conducted with these unions between March 2013 and September 2017, and questions were 17 18 asked about the size of their human and financial resources, their worker organizing and 19 For Peer Review 20 negotiations with employers to solve labour disputes, and their social movement unionism 21 22 and political actions such as lobbying and policy proposals. Interviews were semi structured 23 24 and lasted for an hour or so, and a large number of documents on these unions’ activities such 25 26 27 as the minutes of annual general meetings and newsletters were obtained through interviews. 28 29 The findings from a comparative analysis of the activities of these unions show the 30 31 importance of effective engagement in social movement and exercise of political agency for 32 33 individually affiliated unions to influence public policy and ameliorate the precarious 34 35 working conditions of an increasing number of workers in Japan. 36 37 This article is structured as follows. After reviewing the literature on labour revitalization 38 39 40 and unions’ social movements and political agency in the next section, the article shows 41 42 insufficient response by mainstream unions, composed of enterprise unions, industrial 43 44 federations and Japan’s largest national centre Rengō (Japanese Trade Union Confederation), 45 46 to the deteriorating working conditions. The article then conducts case studies of the three 47 48 individually affiliated unions and shows how effectively these unions may be able to 49 50 influence public policy and ameliorate precarious working conditions, if to a small extent, 51 52 53 depends on their effective engagement in social movement unionism and exercise of political 54 55 56 57 58 4 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Page 5 of 37 Economic and Industrial Democracy
1 2 3 agency. The conclusion summarizes the main findings of this article and considers their 4 5 limitations and implications for labour revitalization and work precarity. 6 7 8 9 Labour revitalization and unions‘ social movements and political agency 10 11
12 13 14 Labour revitalization has become a main concern for scholars of labour politics and industrial 15 16 relations as a result of the labour decline caused by the spread of neoliberalism and 17 18 employers’ attempts to promote labour market flexibility and reduce labour costs (Author, 19 For Peer Review 20 2014; Suzuki, 2004: 9). Governments in many industrialized countries have implemented 21 22 labour market deregulation in response to employers’ demands, and unions have lost their 23 24 power vis à vis employers to a significant extent. In this context, scholars have examined 25 26 27 factors that may contribute to union revitalization. From the perspective of union density as 28 29 the primary power resource of unions, worker organizing is essential (Esping Andersen, 30 31 1998; Huber and Stephens, 2001; Korpi, 1983). However, in many occasions, extensive 32 33 organizing has become difficult as a result of the change in the industrial structure such as 34 35 deindustrialization and the spread of the service sector (Holgate, 2015: 434). In addition, 36 37 several scholars have criticized this perspective as ‘union density bias’ by pointing out, for 38 39 40 example, a lack of strong movement identity among union members, especially when it is an 41 42 employment condition to become a union member (Milner and Mathers, 2013: 134; Sullivan, 43 44 2010: 151). Scholars have also mentioned limited potential of business oriented unionism 45 46 based on service provision to union members and claimed union activities beyond the 47 48 workplace through social movement unionism have the potential to revitalize the labour 49 50 movement (Engeman, 2015; Frege and Kelly, 2003; Heery, 2005: 94; Holgate, 2015: 434 51 52 53 437; Ibsen and Tapia, 2017). 54 55 56 57 58 5 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Economic and Industrial Democracy Page 6 of 37
1 2 3 Social movement unionism is based on unions’ social movement style campaign, 4 5 including coalition formation with civil society organizations, aimed at achieving social 6 7 justice, including decent working conditions. By forming a coalition, unions and civil society 8 9 organizations may achieve mutual gains: unions may benefit from increased membership 10 11 through worker organizing and greater financial resources, and civil society organizations 12 13 14 may be able to depend on unions’ capacity building and organizational resources (Symon and 15 16 Crawshaw, 2009: 146). The rise of social movement unionism has been attributed to by the 17 18 increase in migration and greater ethnic diversity, the feminization of work and a growing 19 For Peer Review 20 number of non regular workers, who remain difficult for mainstream unions to organize 21 22 (Heery et al., 2012: 148). Social movement unionism has been observed in several cases such 23 24 as the demand for higher minimum wages by non regular workers and the improvement of 25 26 27 working conditions by migrant workers. In the US, for example, the Service Employees 28 29 International Union (SEIU) has formed a coalition with civil society organizations to engage 30 31 in the ‘Justice for Janitors’ campaign in Los Angeles since the late 1980s by organizing low 32 33 wage migrant workers (Erickson et al., 2002; Milkman, 2013: 659). In the UK, Britain’s 34 35 largest union Unite and a civil society organization London Citizens UK have engaged in a 36 37 living wage campaign called the ‘Justice for Cleaners’ based on social movement unionism 38 39 40 since 2001 (Lopes and Hall, 2015; Tapia, 2013; Tapia and Turner, 2013). In France, the 41 42 Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT), the largest national centre, has formed a coalition 43 44 with civil society organizations and engaged in a campaign to help legalize sans papier 45 46 undocumented workers (Taipa and Turner, 2013). 47 48 Although social movement unionism may have contributed to union revitalization to some 49 50 extent, scholars have questioned its effectiveness by pointing out, for example, unions’ 51 52 53 difficulty to sustain the expanded membership from social movement unionism because of 54 55 low retention rates of members (James and Karmowska, 2016; Milkman, 2013). It has also 56 57 58 6 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Page 7 of 37 Economic and Industrial Democracy
1 2 3 been mentioned that coalition between unions and civil society organizations may be difficult 4 5 to sustain (Heery, et al. 2012; Taipe, 2013: 668). In this context, while recognizing the 6 7 potential of social movement unionism, some scholars argue that unions’ political agency (in 8 9 the form of political lobbying, policy proposal, mass protest and so on) still matters 10 11 (Engeman, 2015: 446; Serdar, 2012: 404; Simms and Holgate, 2010). For example, the union 12 13 14 called the International Association of Mechanists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) helped 15 16 black car drivers of Elite Limousine Plus in New York City, who were mostly South Asian 17 18 immigrants and whose working conditions were very precarious, set up their own local union 19 For Peer Review 20 (‘Local Lodge 340’) to improve the drivers’ wages and working conditions. IAM and Local 21 22 Lodge 340 exercised political agency by lobbying the National Labor Relations Board 23 24 (NLRB) and won an NLRB decision that reclassified the drivers as employees, rather than 25 26 27 independent contractors (Ness, 2005: 150 155). Another example is the living wage 28 29 campaign called ‘the Boston Jobs and Living Wage Campaign’ led by the Association of 30 31 Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) in coalition with unions such as the 32 33 SEIU and worker centers such as Jobs with Justice. The coalition exercised political agency 34 35 by utilizing a variety of tactics such as lobbying the mayor and city council members (‘inside 36 37 track’) and organizing public rallies (‘outside track’) to win a living wage ordinance (Luce, 38 39 40 2004: 57 60). There are also cases where worker centers exercised political agency in 41 42 coalition with unions by engaging in political advocacy and persuading political elites to take 43 44 action to eliminate social injustice (Goldberg, 2014: 274 279; Milkman, 2014: 13 22). 45 46 According to these scholars, social movement unionism alone may not be enough for 47 48 labour movement revitalization and unions also need to exercise political agency. These 49 50 scholars emphasize the importance of political engagement in the context of employers’ 51 52 53 offensive for greater flexibility in neoliberal economy (Engeman, 2015: 446; Gumbrell 54 55 McCormick, 2011: 304 305; Luce, 2004: 25 27; Ness, 2005: 2 3; Sullivan, 2010: 149 151). 56 57 58 7 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Economic and Industrial Democracy Page 8 of 37
1 2 3 From the theoretical perspective of unions’ power resources, both political agency and social 4 5 movement unionism may be considered as strategies aimed at increasing their power to 6 7 influence public policy. Although these strategies do not guarantee unions’ success in 8 9 influencing policy, they are complementary and are likely to be more effective when 10 11 combined together. In addition, collective bargaining with employers has become less 12 13 14 effective and the power disparity between workers and employers has become wider. As a 15 16 result, unions need to exercise political agency and engage in social movement unionism at 17 18 the same time. In other words, to compensate for the reduced amount of ‘structural’ power, 19 For Peer Review 20 unions need to increase ‘associational’ power by exercising political agency and engaging in 21 22 social movement (Serdar, 2012: 404 405; Sullivan, 2010: 148). This article aims to contribute 23 24 to the literature on labour revitalization by showing the importance of not only social 25 26 27 movement unionism but also unions’ political agency for improving working conditions in a 28 29 comparative case study of three Japanese individually affiliated unions. 30 31 Japanese unions have experienced the decline of power resources, similar to unions in 32 33 many other industrialized countries, in the context of economic stagnation and intensified 34 35 economic competition (Author, 2012, 2014). Labour and industrial relations scholars have 36 37 discussed whether union revitalization may be possible and examined unions’ organizing of 38 39 40 regular workers in SMEs and non regular workers, whose number has increased significantly 41 42 as a result of labour market deregulation (Author, 2015; Nakamura, 2007). However, both 43 44 academics and union practitioners have pointed out a lack of concern among ‘enterprise’ 45 46 unions about the poor working conditions of an increasing number of workers such as illegal 47 48 dismissal, non payment of salary and long working hours. Enterprise unions are mainly 49 50 concerned about maintaining companies’ competitiveness through cooperation with 51 52 53 management to protect the jobs of union members, who are mostly regular workers in large 54 55 companies (Author, 2015; Fukui, 2005; Kawazoe, 2015; Kinoshita, 2007; Kotani, 2013). As a 56 57 58 8 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Page 9 of 37 Economic and Industrial Democracy
1 2 3 result, national centres such as Rengō and some industrial federations have experienced 4 5 difficulty to organize regular workers in SMEs and non regular workers despite their efforts 6 7 to represent the interests of these workers and restore unions’ social relevance (Author, 2015; 8 9 Hayakawa, 2006; Kumazawa, 2013). 10 11 In this context, scholars have discussed the possible role of non mainstream, individually 12 13 14 affiliated unions in revitalizing the labour movement and ameliorating precarious working 15 16 conditions (Fukui, 2005, 2012; Kumazawa, 2013; Royle and Urano, 2012; Suzuki, 2008, 17 18 2012; Urano and Stewart, 2007, 2009; Weathers, 2010). Individually affiliated unions in 19 For Peer Review 20 Japan include ‘general’ unions (gōdō rōso), which are industrial and craft unions that mostly 21 22 organize regular workers in SMEs and non regular workers, and ‘community’ unions, which 23 24 are community based, individually affiliated unions that organize the same types of workers 25 26 27 as those organized by general unions (Kojima, 2017: 5). In the case of community unions, 28 29 ‘community’ is defined as a group of people who belong to the same geographical area and 30 31 share similar identities or interests (Holgate, 2015: 436). In contrast to dominant enterprise 32 33 unions, general and community unions accept individual workers irrespective of their 34 35 company affiliation. These unions are eager to realize social justice by rectifying unfair, often 36 37 illegal, treatment and human rights violation of workers, in contrast to a majority of 38 39 40 enterprise unions. 41 42 Individually affiliated unions mostly represent the interests of workers who are in 43 44 precarious positions. Unlike regular workers in large companies who are located within the 45 46 institutions of collective bargaining (even though they are decentralized in Japan), workers 47 48 under precarious conditions without such institutional recourse are often the leading agency 49 50 of political movements and worker mobilization (Meyer, 2016). Scholars and practitioners 51 52 53 have discussed Japanese individually affiliated unions’ organizing of young workers 54 55 (Guyonnet, 2011; Kawazoe, 2015), female workers (Broadbent, 2007, 2008; Kotani, 2013) 56 57 58 9 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Economic and Industrial Democracy Page 10 of 37
1 2 3 and migrant workers (Kremers, 2014; Royle and Urano, 2012; Torii, 2010; Urano and 4 5 Stewart, 2007). However, although scholars and practitioners have examined individually 6 7 affiliated unions’ activities such as their engagement in individual labour disputes and their 8 9 potential to contribute to union revitalization, there has not been extensive analysis on their 10 11 political agency and social movements in relation to labour revitalization and the 12 13 14 improvement of working conditions (with a few exceptions such as Kremers 2014). In 15 16 addition, compared to a large number of academic works on the organizing of migrant 17 18 workers outside Japan, there seems to be only a small number of academic works in English 19 For Peer Review 20 on the organizing of other marginalized workers such as young and female workers (such as 21 22 Broadbent 2007, 2008) and their political agency and social movements. This article aims to 23 24 fill these gaps by conducting case studies of three representative individually affiliated 25 26 27 unions in Japan for young, female and migrant workers respectively and analysing their 28 29 political agency and social movements based on the most recent data. The next section briefly 30 31 discusses labour decline and deteriorating working conditions in Japan and the insufficient 32 33 response by mainstream unions, followed by a section on the case studies of those three 34 35 individually affiliated unions. 36 37
38 39 40 Labour decline, deteriorating working conditions and the response by mainstream 41 42 unions 43 44 45 46 Japanese workers, both regular and non regular, have experienced deteriorating working 47 48 conditions as a result of the reduced power resources of labour unions since the 1990s. Union 49 50 density has been declining, and currently only less than 20 per cent of workers are unionized 51 52 53 (see Figure 1). It is true that, despite low union density, unions in countries such as France 54 55 have great capacity to mobilize workers and achieve high percentages of collective 56 57 58 10 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Page 11 of 37 Economic and Industrial Democracy
1 2 3 bargaining coverage (Milner and Mathers, 2013; Sullivan, 2010: 148). In Japan, Shuntō 4 5 (Spring Wage Offensive) an indicator of union power acted as a mechanism to spread a 6 7 wage increase achieved by unions in large companies to unorganized workers in SMEs. 8 9 However, Shuntō has lost its function to a significant extent as a result of the decentralization 10 11 of wage bargaining (Nakamura, 2007: 8 10; Miura, 2012: 100 102). In addition, as a result of 12 13 14 labour market deregulation since the 1990s, the number of non regular workers has increased 15 16 significantly, now almost 40 per cent of the workforce (see Figure 2). This has made it more 17 18 difficult for unions to expand their power resources, as it is more difficult to organize non 19 For Peer Review 20 regular workers, especially temp workers whose employers are not user companies but temp 21 22 agencies. These unorganized non regular workers have particularly suffered from poor 23 24 working conditions. 25 26 27 28 29 Figures 1 and 2 here 30 31 32 33 In this situation, the largest national centre Rengō began its attempt to organize non 34 35 regular workers as well as regular workers in SMEs as a strategy to revitalize the labour 36 37 movement (Hayakawa 2006: 73 83). For this purpose, Rengō established ‘Soshiki Kakudai 38 39 40 Sentā’ (Organizing Centre) in its headquarters and decided that 20 per cent of its budget 41 42 would be allocated to organizing activities (Interview, Rengō, April 2014). Rengō also 43 44 supported its local centres called chiiki yunion (Nakamura and Miura, 2005: 198 202). 45 46 However, worker organizing increased only slowly. In response, Rengō established the Pāto 47 48 Kyōtō Kaigi (United Front for Part time Workers) in 2006 and the Hiseiki Rōdō Sentā (Non 49 50 regular Work Centre) in 2007 to increase the organizing of non regular workers. Although 51 52 53 the union density of part time workers increased from 2.7 per cent in 2001 to 5.6 per cent in 54 55 2010, the percentage remained low. Despite being the largest national centre, Rengō’s 56 57 58 11 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Economic and Industrial Democracy Page 12 of 37
1 2 3 financial resources are limited, as enterprise unions collect union fees directly from union 4 5 members and only a small portion of these fees go to industrial federations and then Rengō 6 7 (Suzuki, 2004). As a result, Rengō has not been able to persuade a majority of enterprise 8 9 unions, which are more interested in representing the interests of regular workers in large 10 11 companies and protecting their jobs, to organize non regular workers (Kinoshita, 2007). In 12 13 14 addition, it is doubtful if Rengō has really committed itself to the improvement of the 15 16 working conditions of non regular workers. For example, although the Japanese Community 17 18 Union Federation (JCUF, Zenkoku Union) is a Rengō’s member union federation with a large 19 For Peer Review 20 number of non regular workers, Rengō has not provided any financial support to the JCUF 21 22 despite its announcement to strengthen individually affiliated unions under its umbrella to 23 24 revitalize the labour movement. 25 26 27 It is true that the recent changes in the workforce composition have prompted some 28 29 enterprise unions to engage in organizing non regular workers (Mouer and Kawanishi 2005: 30 31 226). However, many enterprise unions have resisted organizing non regular workers, as their 32 33 members are more interested in receiving material benefits and services from unions instead 34 35 of paying union fees for organizing non regular workers (Suzuki, 2004: 16). In addition, 36 37 enterprise unions tend to consider non regular workers an employment buffer against 38 39 40 economic recessions (Mouer and Kawanishi, 2005: 127). Union leaders in enterprise unions 41 42 also share a business philosophy of economic competitiveness and productivity with 43 44 management and are not enthusiastic about organizing non regular workers (Rengō, 2012). 45 46 As the executive positions of enterprise unions are often a pathway to corporate executives, 47 48 union leaders tend to think industrial relations from a management viewpoint and do not deal 49 50 with the issue of precarious working conditions of non regular workers (Kumazawa, 2013: 51 52 53 155, 159). 54 55 56 57 58 12 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Page 13 of 37 Economic and Industrial Democracy
1 2 3 Worker organizing has not progressed as much as Rengō and some industrial federations 4 5 have desired. There are significant institutional barriers to worker organizing such as the 6 7 dominance of enterprise unions in the labour movement. As seen above, enterprise unions, 8 9 especially those in competitive sectors, are institutionally embedded in cooperative industrial 10 11 relations with management and prefer continuing partnership with employers to organizing 12 13 14 non regular workers (Suzuki, 2004: 19). This has prevented Rengō and some industrial 15 16 federations from promoting worker organizing to a significant extent. In this context, 17 18 individually affiliated unions have gained scholars’ attention as actors that may have the 19 For Peer Review 20 potential to revitalize the labour movement and ameliorate the precarious working conditions 21 22 of non regular workers and regular workers in SMEs who remain unorganized. 23 24
25 26 27 Case studies of the political agency and social movements of individually-affiliated 28 29 unions 30 31 32 33 Japanese individually affiliated unions have identity as an agent to achieve social justice such 34 35 as decent working conditions for all workers, which is different from the identity of 36 37 mainstream enterprise unions as an economic actor to achieve material benefits for union 38 39 40 members, who are mostly regular workers in large companies (Fukui, 2005, 2012; 41 42 Kumazawa, 2013; Suzuki, 2008, 2012; Weathers, 2010). While general unions have existed 43 44 since the now defunct Sōhyō (General Council of Trade Unions) was the largest and most 45 46 influential national centre (disbanded in 1989), the first community union, Edogawa Union, 47 48 was formed in 1984, and a national federation of community unions called the ‘Community 49 50 Union National Network’ (CUNN) was formed in 1990 after the dissolution of Sōhyō and the 51 52 53 establishment of Rengō in 1989 (Author, 2015). Currently more than 70 community unions 54 55 and general unions with around 20,000 union members in total are affiliated with CUNN. In 56 57 58 13 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Economic and Industrial Democracy Page 14 of 37
1 2 3 2002, around 10 community unions formed the Japanese Community Union Federation 4 5 (JCUF, Zenkoku Union) as part of CUNN and joined Rengō so that their voice would be 6 7 reflected in government labour policy through Rengō’s participation in policy making in the 8 9 advisory councils (shingikai) of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (Author, 2015). 10 11 The significance of JCUF in the Japanese labour movement may be its positive impact on 12 13 14 Rengō’s attitude towards non regular workers and regular workers in SMEs (Author, 2015). 15 16 Japanese individually affiliated unions represent the interests of non regular workers and 17 18 regular workers in SMEs who are not organized by enterprise unions and aim to resolve 19 For Peer Review 20 individual labour disputes (Fukui, 2012). By performing these roles, individually affiliated 21 22 unions have helped ameliorating the precarious working conditions of those workers to some 23 24 extent (Author, 2015). While individually affiliated unions have attempted to overcome the 25 26 27 limits of enterprise unionism and redefine the objectives of the labour movement as the 28 29 improvement of the working conditions of all workers, few of them have been active in 30 31 forming coalition with civil society organizations (Suzuki, 2012: 70). If they do, it is often on 32 33 an ad hoc basis, partly because of the underdeveloped civil society in Japan (Fukui, 2005; 34 35 Kojima, 2017; Suzuki, 2008: 493 494). 36 37 Japanese individually affiliated unions represent a variety of workers but some of them 38 39 40 have organized a certain type of marginalized workers. For example, Shutoken Seinen Union 41 42 (Tokyo Metropolitan Youth Union) has organized young workers among others, Women’s 43 44 Union Tokyo has organized female workers, and Zentōitsu Workers Union (All united 45 46 Workers’ Union) has organized migrant workers among others. A large number of these 47 48 workers are non regular workers and individually affiliated unions have helped these workers 49 50 under precarious working conditions to resolve their labour disputes because of non existence 51 52 53 of unions in their companies or indifferent attitude of enterprise unions (Author, 2015). 54 55 Japanese individually affiliated unions are similar in most respects, such as their willingness 56 57 58 14 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Page 15 of 37 Economic and Industrial Democracy
1 2 3 to accept individual workers as union members irrespective of their company affiliation, their 4 5 attempts to realize social justice despite small human and financial resources, and their 6 7 usefulness for individual workers to resolve labour disputes. However, despite being typical 8 9 individually affiliated unions, the three unions mentioned above are different in the degree of 10 11 engagement in social movement and exercise of political agency. The following case studies 12 13 14 are aimed at showing how effectively individually affiliated unions are able to influence 15 16 public policy and ameliorate precarious working conditions, if to a small extent, depends on 17 18 the degree of political agency and social movement unionism. 19 For Peer Review 20 21 22 Shutoken Seinen Union 23 24
25 26 27 Shutoken Seinen Union (SSU, Tokyo Metropolitan Youth Union) is a community union that 28 29 was established in 2000 and is affiliated with Zenrōren (National Confederation of Trade 30 31 Unions), the second largest national centre in Japan. According to SSU’s Annual Meeting 32 33 Report 2015, there were around 360 members as of December 2015 (the number remained 34 35 similar in the last 5 years), and SSU announced its intention to promote worker organizing 36 37 and expand its membership to 500 members by increasing the number of full time organizers 38 39 40 from 2 to 3 (Shutoken Seinen Union, 2015). SSU established the Shutoken Gakusei Union 41 42 (Tokyo Metropolitan University Students’ Union) in September 2013 and Shutoken Kōkōsei 43 44 Union (Tokyo Metropolitan High School Students’ Union) in August 2015 to ameliorate the 45 46 poor working conditions of university and high school students who are part time workers. 47 48 As union fees from members who are mostly under precarious working conditions are not 49 50 enough, SSU has also intended to expand the membership of ‘Shutoken Seinen Union o 51 52 53 Sasaeru Kai’, a group of mainly labour scholars and lawyers who support SSU financially by 54 55 paying an annual membership fee, from the current 1,200 members to 1,500 members to 56 57 58 15 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Economic and Industrial Democracy Page 16 of 37
1 2 3 strengthen its financial base (Interview, Secretary General, SSU, March 2016). With this 4 5 financial support, SSU has engaged in labour counselling and achieved a high settlement rate 6 7 of labour disputes (Interview, Secretary General, SSU, March 2016). 8 9 SSU has been engaged in social movement by strengthening a link with civil society 10 11 organizations to urge the government to raise the minimum wages for the working poor. For 12 13 14 example, SSU has participated in a campaign called ‘Fight for 1,500 yen’ organized by a civil 15 16 society organization ‘Aequitas’ (meaning ‘fair’ in Latin) since October 2015 (Interview, 17 18 Secretary General, SSU, August 2016. See also Asahi Shimbun, 2017). The campaign built 19 For Peer Review 20 upon the ‘Fight for 15’ in the US fast food industry, which sought $15 per hour pay rates for 21 22 workers in fast food and other retail sectors in coalition between unions such as SEIU and 23 24 civil society organizations such as New York Community for Change (Milkman, 2013: 660). 25 26 27 Japanese minimum wages are low from an international perspective and are only around 800 28 29 yen (around $7 at the exchange rate of $1=110 yen) on average and only around 900 yen 30 31 (around $8) even in Tokyo, where the minimum wage is the highest. 32 33 34 35 The minimum wages in Japan are hardly high enough for young workers to survive, 36 37 especially when they have dependents such as children to support. We participated in 38 39 40 demonstrations organized by Aequitas to demand the minimum wage of 1,500 yen but 41 42 we also had held several demonstrations to demand higher minimum wages even 43 44 before Aequitas was formed. In fact, some main members of Aequitas are from our 45 46 union (Interview, Secretary General, SSU, August 2016). 47 48 49 50 The ‘Fight for 1,500 yen’ campaign, which was based on social movement unionism, was 51 52 53 successful in involving not only civil society organizations, labour unions, and concerned 54 55 citizens including labour scholars and lawyers, but also the politicians of welfare oriented 56 57 58 16 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Page 17 of 37 Economic and Industrial Democracy
1 2 3 opposition parties such as the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the largest opposition party 4 5 at that time, the Japan Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party (Interview, 6 7 Secretary General, SSU, August 2016). 8 9 In addition to the minimum wages, SSU has urged the government to improve social 10 11 welfare service for the working poor and unemployed, including easier access to 12 13 14 unemployment insurance, by forming a coalition with civil society organizations. For 15 16 example, SSU joined a campaign organized by the Han Hinkon (Anti Poverty) Network at 17 18 the end of 2008 to set up a haken mura (temp worker village) and provided food and housing 19 For Peer Review 20 support to those temp workers who were dismissed and became homeless during the global 21 22 financial crisis (Kawazoe, 2015: 3 4; Yuasa, 2009: 75 76). 23 24
25 26 27 Our campaign in coalition with Han Hinkon Network had relatively strong impact on 28 29 the Japanese society in that the campaign was effective in publicizing the existence of 30 31 precarious jobs and working poor through the coverage of mass media. This prompted 32 33 the participation in the anti poverty campaign not only by mainstream unions such as 34 35 Rengō but also by the politicians of the DPJ and other opposition parties (Interview, 36 37 Secretary General, SSU, April 2013). 38 39 40 41 42 Apart from the haken mura campaign, SSU organized a campaign called the ‘Call for 43 44 Housing Democracy’ in coalition with civil society organizations and requested the 45 46 government to increase the provision of public funded houses and housing benefits to the 47 48 young working poor (Interview, Secretary General, SSU, March 2016). 49 50 SSU has also exercised political agency by lobbying politicians and bureaucrats. For 51 52 53 example, SSU participated in ‘in nai shūkai’, political meetings with opposition members of 54 55 the Diet (Parliament) in Diet buildings, to discuss labour laws and working conditions of 56 57 58 17 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Economic and Industrial Democracy Page 18 of 37
1 2 3 young workers and proposed their policies to Diet members. In addition, SSU made policy 4 5 requests to relevant ministries such as the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare and the 6 7 Labour Bureau of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government to improve the working conditions of 8 9 young workers in terms of minimum wages, job protection, working hours, job training and 10 11 so on (Interview, Secretary General, SSU, August 2016). 12 13 14 However, with a small number of exceptions such as calling a greater public attention to 15 16 the existence of poor young workers, SSU’s social movement unionism and political actions 17 18 have hardly had significant impact on the government labour policy and the amelioration of 19 For Peer Review 20 precarious working conditions of young workers. Japan’s minimum wages are still far from 21 22 the SSU’s target of 1,500 yen and the recent rises in wages are mostly a result of the 23 24 declining population and labour force supply and the difficulty for employers to secure a 25 26 27 sufficient number of workers (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2017). The government’s housing 28 29 benefits to poor workers also remain scarce. According to the former Secretary General of 30 31 SSU, insufficient political engagement and social movement due to small power resources 32 33 are part of the problem of little policy impact and remaining precarious working conditions. 34 35 36 37 We have suffered from small financial resources partly because we do not receive any 38 39 40 financial assistance from Zenrōren, with which we are affiliated. However, Zenrōren 41 42 itself does not have much money, as union fees are collected by enterprise unions first, 43 44 then part of fees goes to industrial federations, and then finally to Zenrōren. This 45 46 practice should be changed so that the national centre can collect union fees directly. 47 48 Zenrōren’s Non Regular Worker Centre does not have any organizers either and they 49 50 hardly engage in social movement as Sōhyō did. In addition, Japan’s social 51 52 53 movements are centred on civil society organizations, and labour unions, including 54 55 56 57 58 18 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Page 19 of 37 Economic and Industrial Democracy
1 2 3 individually affiliated unions, are not involved enough. Their political engagement 4 5 has not been enough either (Interview, Secretary General, SSU, April 2014). 6 7 8 9 The dominance of enterprise unions is a historical legacy of Japanese labour movement 10 11 that reflects strong political power of employers backed by pro business LDP government. It 12 13 14 has had negative impact on the working conditions of non regular workers and regular 15 16 workers in SMEs. In addition, individually affiliated unions such as SSU have had difficulty 17 18 in organizing a large number of these workers, as they usually recruit members on an 19 For Peer Review 20 individual basis through labour consultation rather than rely on conventional mass 21 22 recruitment in a workplace. With small power resources, SSU has not been able to exercise 23 24 sufficient political agency through social movement and failed to improve the working 25 26 27 conditions of young workers significantly. 28 29 30 31 Women’s Union Tokyo 32 33 34 35 Women’s Union Tokyo (WUT, Josei Yunion Tokyo) is a community union that was 36 37 established in 1995 to create a union for women for the reason that male dominated unions 38 39 40 did not heed women’s particular concerns such as gender discrimination based on the sexual 41 42 division of labour and women’s precarious working conditions (Interview, Secretary General, 43 44 WUT, September 2013). Unlike SSU and ZWU, WUT is not affiliated with any national 45 46 centre. According to its 2013 Annual Convention document, WUT conducted 5464 cases of 47 48 labour counselling on such issues as dismissal, unpaid salaries and sexual harassment and 823 49 50 cases of negotiations with employers to solve labour disputes from the time of its 51 52 53 establishment until January 2013 (on average 364 and 46 cases per year respectively. 54 55 Women’s Union Tokyo, 2013a). However, the number of labour counselling started to 56 57 58 19 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Economic and Industrial Democracy Page 20 of 37
1 2 3 decline in 2008 and it was around 100 cases in 2013 and 2014. In the same manner, the 4 5 number of negotiations with employers to solve labour disputes started to decline in 2010 and 6 7 it was around 15 in 2013 and 2014 (Women’s Union Tokyo, 2015). 8 9 Around a quarter of new members who joined WUT between February 2012 and January 10 11 2013 were engaged in labour disputes and WUT achieved a high settlement rate of disputes 12 13 14 (Women’s Union Tokyo, 2013a). However, this high settlement rate has not contributed to 15 16 membership increase (Women’s Union Tokyo, 2013b). WUT had around 250 members in 17 18 January 2004 but suffered from a low retention rate of around 30 per cent from the time of its 19 For Peer Review 20 establishment until January 2004 (Women’s Union Tokyo, 2013b). This already small 21 22 number of union members further decreased recently and WUT had only around 120 23 24 members in September 2013, a decrease of more than 50 per cent (Interview, Secretary 25 26 27 General, WUT, September 2013). This low retention rate is a result of a large number of 28 29 members who left the union after the settlement of their own labour disputes. Paying a union 30 31 fee also became more difficult for union members who engaged in low paid precarious 32 33 employment that was growing in Japan’s stagnant economy, especially after the global 34 35 financial crisis in 2008 (Women’s Union Tokyo, 2013b). 36 37
38 39 40 Apart from providing labour counselling and engaging in negotiations with employers 41 42 to solve labour disputes, we have not been able to organize workers sufficiently or 43 44 provide services such as assistance in housing when our members are unemployed or 45 46 sick as a result of our small financial resources and a lack of coordination with civil 47 48 society organizations. This has also negatively affected the retention rate of our 49 50 members (Interview, Secretary General, WUT, September 2013). 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 20 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Page 21 of 37 Economic and Industrial Democracy
1 2 3 As a result of a small amount of human resources, WUT’s full time staff members as well 4 5 as volunteers have suffered from work overload in labour counselling and negotiations with 6 7 employers to solve labour disputes. A small amount of human resources also meant 8 9 insufficient financial resources due to a small amount of union fees (Women’s Union Tokyo, 10 11 2013b). As a result, WUT was able to hire only one full time staff member with 12 13 14 compensation (instead of two staff members it used to hire before), and then had no full time 15 16 staff member (Women’s Union Tokyo, 2015). This financial hardship has caused a vicious 17 18 circle and WUT has not been able to organize women workers sufficiently despite the 19 For Peer Review 20 significant fall of membership (Interview, Executive Officer, WUT, March 2016. See also 21 22 Broadbent, 2008, 165). 23 24
25 26 27 We understand that coalition with civil society organizations may be useful for 28 29 organizing women workers, and we have been in the network of civil society 30 31 organizations for empowering women such as the Action Centre for Working Women 32 33 and the Equal Treatment Action 21. However, the level of cooperation has been low 34 35 due to our financial hardship (Interview, Executive Officer, WUT, March 2016). 36 37
38 39 40 As seen in the interview above, WUT has not been able to engage in social movement 41 42 sufficiently, even with other women organizations. Women’s movement in Japan has been 43 44 fragmented and lacked coordinated effort among women’s unions and other feminist 45 46 organizations (Women’s Union Tokyo, 2013b). 47 48 In addition to suffering from the low level of engagement in social movement, WUT has 49 50 hardly exercised political agency. It is true that WUT has aimed to engage in political 51 52 53 activities by, for example, participating in meetings with opposition Diet members and 54 55 joining demonstrations in front of Diet buildings to oppose an amendment to the Temporary 56 57 58 21 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Economic and Industrial Democracy Page 22 of 37
1 2 3 Agency Work Law (Interview, Executive Officer, WUT, March 2016). However, WUT’s 4 5 engagement in political lobbying has been at extremely low level and WUT has lacked 6 7 institutionalized access to policy making venues for proposing its desired policies as a result 8 9 of a lack of coordination with other women organizations and the relevant bureaus in the 10 11 Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (Women’s Union Tokyo, 2013b). Japanese working 12 13 14 women suffer ‘dual burden’ of work and family responsibilities to a greater extent than 15 16 working women in other countries. This is partly because of weakness of laws such as the 17 18 Equal Employment Opportunity Law and the Part time Work Law that are supposed to 19 For Peer Review 20 protect working women from gender discrimination in the labour market. The recent 21 22 government proposals such as ‘equal pay for equal work’ are also more about achieving 23 24 economic growth by utilizing female workers to a greater extent rather than realizing gender 25 26 27 equality per se. In this institutional context, WUT has hardly contributed to improving the 28 29 working conditions of female workers by engaging in social movement and exercising 30 31 political agency. 32 33 34 35 Zentōitsu Workers Union 36 37
38 39 40 Zentōitsu Workers Union (All united Workers’ Union, ZWU) is a general union that was 41 42 established in 1970 and is affiliated with the smallest national centre Zenrōkyō (National 43 44 Trade Union Council). Since the current Chief Executive Officer became a full time 45 46 organizer in 1989 and started reforming ZWU in 1992, ZWU has sought the ideals of 47 48 diversity among workers and decent working conditions (Torii, 2010: 45 47). ZWU has 49 50 around 1,000 Japanese members who pay union fees regularly, and around 3,000 non 51 52 53 Japanese members who do not necessarily pay union fees regularly. In addition to the Chief 54 55 Executive Officer who acts as a full time organizer with help from a few voluntary organizers, 56 57 58 22 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Page 23 of 37 Economic and Industrial Democracy
1 2 3 there are two full time staff members in ZWU’s office (Interview, Chief Executive Officer, 4 5 ZWU, March 2016). As in the cases of other individually affiliated unions, ZWU has 6 7 provided labour counselling to workers, many of whom are migrant workers, and has been 8 9 engaged in a large number of negotiations with employers to solve their labour disputes. In 10 11 addition, ZWU has provided migrant workers with such services as language interpretation 12 13 14 and negotiation with immigration offices on, for example, necessary documentation and 15 16 illegal overstay by some migrant workers. 17 18 ZWU established a foreign worker sub section (gaikokujin rōdōsha bunkai) in 1992 to 19 For Peer Review 20 organize an increasing number of foreign workers, who were mostly from Asian countries 21 22 such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Iran (Torii, 2010: 48). Compared to the two other 23 24 individually affiliated unions mentioned above, ZWU’s membership is large (around 4,000 25 26 27 members of ZWU vs. around 360 members of SSU and around 120 members of WUT). This 28 29 is partly because of ZWU’s active engagement in social movement targeted at migrant 30 31 workers, although ZWU has more workplace based locals than the two other unions. ZWU 32 33 has formed an institutionalized coalition with a civil society organization called Ijūren 34 35 (Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan, SMJ) by becoming a core member of SMJ 36 37 (Interview, Chief Executive Officer, ZWU, March 2016). In fact, the Chief Executive Officer 38 39 40 of ZWU and the Secretary General of SMJ are the same person, and ZWU has relied on SMJ 41 42 for organizing migrant workers. SMJ was established in 1997 and is a nationwide umbrella 43 44 organization of around 90 civil society organizations (including Christianity and women 45 46 organizations) and 300 individual members, with the aims to protect migrant workers’ human 47 48 rights and their livelihoods by engaging in political advocacy, networking and publicity 49 50 (Torii, 2010: 44). 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 23 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Economic and Industrial Democracy Page 24 of 37
1 2 3 In order to promote social networking, SMJ has organized the ‘National Forum’ and 4 5 the ‘National Workshop’ alternately every year, with support from ZWU. Around 6 7 1,000 people participated in the National Forum and around 100 people participated 8 9 in the National Workshop each time. We have organized these meetings so that 10 11 members of other civil society organizations, unions, and concerned citizens, lawyers 12 13 14 and academics can discuss issues related to migrant workers and the ways to improve 15 16 their working conditions (Interview, Chief Executive Officer, ZWU, March 2016). 17 18 19 For Peer Review 20 In addition, SMJ has promoted international networking by organizing and participating in 21 22 campaigns related to migrant labour with Asian and other international civil society 23 24 organizations (Torii, 2010: 50 51). 25 26 27 ZWU has also been engaged in political activities through institutionalized coalition with 28 29 SMJ. For example, they have organized mass political demonstrations to demand the 30 31 government to improve migrants’ working conditions. In addition, ZWU has pressured the 32 33 government to adopt policies aimed at improving the working conditions of migrant workers 34 35 in coalition with SMJ by lobbying the relevant government ministries such as the Ministry of 36 37 Justice, which has the main jurisdiction in immigration control, and the Ministry of Health, 38 39 40 Labour and Welfare, which has the main jurisdiction in labour standards and worker 41 42 protection. 43 44 45 46 We hold meetings with ministries in charge of immigration and migrants’ working 47 48 conditions twice a year to discuss relevant policies, and some of our political lobbying 49 50 was effective. For example, when we discussed the poor working conditions and 51 52 53 human rights violation of foreign technical interns, some of our policy proposals were 54 55 adopted in the relevant law (Interview, Chief Executive Officer, ZWU, March 2016). 56 57 58 24 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Page 25 of 37 Economic and Industrial Democracy
1 2 3 4 5 SMJ set up a network for foreign technical interns (gaikokujin ginou jisshūsei) in 2001 to 6 7 improve their working conditions. This SMJ’s network had 14 organizations under its 8 9 umbrella and 71 individual members in 2008 (Kremers, 2014: 732). Foreign technical interns 10 11 are particularly vulnerable to exploitation by employers as a result of their status as ‘interns’, 12 13 14 not ‘workers’, and insufficient protection by the Labour Standards Law and other relevant 15 16 labour laws (Interview, Chief Executive Officer, ZWU, March 2016). However, as a result of 17 18 a recent change in the regulations related to foreign technical interns with the enactment of 19 For Peer Review 20 the Foreign Technical Intern Law in 2016, employers are now subject to legal requirements 21 22 such as their duty to pay technical interns the salaries equivalent to those for domestic 23 24 workers. As a result, the use of foreign technical interns is under stricter control than before 25 26 27 but this is part of policy demands for which SMJ and ZWU have lobbied the relevant 28 29 ministries. However, there are still a number of issues to be addressed more properly in the 30 31 Law such as low wages of interns, the number of interns to be accepted and the scope of 32 33 intern work. In this respect, the Law is far from being satisfactory from ZWU’s and SMJ’s 34 35 perspectives. 36 37 ZWU and SMJ have also lobbied politicians and held meetings with Diet members who 38 39 40 are sympathetic to migrants and interested in issues related to their precarious working 41 42 conditions. Through this process, they have been recognized as experts on immigration issues. 43 44 For example, the Chief Executive Officer of ZWU, who was also the General Secretary of 45 46 SMJ, and an SMJ member who was in charge of foreign technical internship were invited to 47 48 the Diet (House of Representatives and House of Councillors respectively) to provide their 49 50 opinions on migration. 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 25 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Economic and Industrial Democracy Page 26 of 37
1 2 3 I was invited by the House of Representatives as the General Secretary of SMJ to 4 5 provide an opinion on immigration when the House held discussion on an amendment 6 7 to the Immigration Control Law in 2009. I think this demonstrates our policy impact 8 9 to some extent. In addition, I received a TIP (Trafficking in Persons) Report Hero 10 11 Award from the US State Secretary John Kerry. The Award recognized our hard work 12 13 14 to help foreign technical interns who suffered from extremely poor working 15 16 conditions, which sometimes involved human trafficking (Interview, Chief Executive 17 18 Officer, ZWU, March 2016). 19 For Peer Review 20 21 22 As seen above, ZWU has exercised political agency by engaging in social movement in 23 24 coalition with SMJ. Through an institutionalized form of political lobbying and policy 25 26 27 proposals aimed at relevant politicians and government ministries, ZWU has exercised 28 29 influence, if to a small extent, on public policy related to migrant workers in a way to 30 31 improve their working conditions. 32 33 34 35 Comparison of the three individually-affiliated unions 36 37
38 39 40 The three individually affiliated unions examined above (SSU, WUT and ZWU) share 41 42 similarities in that they have suffered from small human and financial resources compared to 43 44 enterprise unions, difficulty in organizing a large number of workers and the low retention 45 46 rates of union members. However, they have engaged in social movement and exercised 47 48 political agency in different degrees and had different impact on public policy related to 49 50 working conditions. In the case of ZWU, it has formed a coalition with SMJ and exercised 51 52 53 political agency by lobbying politicians and maintaining institutionalized access to 54 55 government bureaucracy to discuss relevant immigration and labour policies. As a result, 56 57 58 26 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Page 27 of 37 Economic and Industrial Democracy
1 2 3 ZWU has been able to influence the relevant public policy in a way to improve the working 4 5 conditions of migrant workers, if to a small extent. 6 7 It is true that the working conditions of migrant workers, especially technical interns, were 8 9 very poor and the Japanese government needed to address this issue in the face of 10 11 international and domestic criticisms. It is also true that the government had an incentive to 12 13 14 improve the working conditions of migrant workers at least to some extent to increase the 15 16 number of those workers and cope with labour shortage in Japan. However, despite being still 17 18 insufficient, the 2016 Foreign Technical Intern Law stipulated some obligations for users of 19 For Peer Review 20 technical interns to abide by, such as their duty to pay technical interns the wages equivalent 21 22 to those for domestic workers. These obligations were part of what ZWU had demanded in 23 24 coalition with SMJ. 25 26 27 In contrast to ZWU, WUT has not been active in social movement and exercised little 28 29 political agency. As a result, WUT has hardly had any impact on public policy aimed at 30 31 improving the working conditions of women workers. Recent government proposals such as 32 33 ‘equal pay for equal work’, which may benefit female workers who constitute a majority of 34 35 non regular workers, were made mainly with an aim to achieve economic growth through 36 37 greater input of female labour force, rather than for the sake of improving the working 38 39 40 conditions of female workers. Although a large number of male young workers and migrant 41 42 workers suffer from precarious working conditions as women workers do, those male 43 44 workers do not need to experience the dual burden of work and care responsibilities and 45 46 gender discrimination in the labour market. This difficult situation for women workers is 47 48 likely to have had a negative impact on WUT’s capacity to organize female workers and 49 50 influence public policy. However, with greater political agency through social movement 51 52 53 unionism, WUT would have ameliorated women’s poor working conditions to a greater 54 55 extent. For example, WUT could have been more strategic in strengthening the network with 56 57 58 27 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Economic and Industrial Democracy Page 28 of 37
1 2 3 civil society organizations for empowering women such as the Action Centre for Working 4 5 Women by allocating more resources for recruiting women workers who visit those 6 7 organizations and mobilizing them in political engagements. 8 9 SSU is located in the middle position in this respect. On the one hand, SSU has engaged in 10 11 social movement and exercised political agency to a greater extent than WUT. As mentioned 12 13 14 above, SSU has participated in campaigns aimed at raising minimum wages, helping the 15 16 working poor and increasing housing benefits to young workers in coalition with civil society 17 18 organizations. SSU has also exercised political agency by participating in political meetings 19 For Peer Review 20 with Diet members of opposition parties more frequently than WUT and making policy 21 22 proposals to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare and the Tokyo Metropolitan 23 24 Government’s Labour Bureau. However, unlike ZWU, SSU has not been able to establish 25 26 27 institutionalized access to policy making venues for discussing public policy with national 28 29 and Tokyo government officials and its policy impact has been more limited. Through 30 31 comparison among the three individually affiliated unions of SSU, WUT and ZWU, it may 32 33 be possible to identify a positive link, if to a small extent, between unions’ exercise of 34 35 political agency through social movement unionism and their impact on public policy aimed 36 37 at ameliorating precarious working conditions of non regular workers and regular workers in 38 39 40 SMEs. 41 42 43 44 Conclusion 45 46 47 48 This article has conducted case studies of three individually affiliated unions in Japan for 49 50 young, female and migrant workers to assess their impact on public policy and the working 51 52 53 conditions of those in precarious positions. The article has claimed that the ways they have 54 55 exercised political agency and engaged in social movement unionism resulted, if to a small 56 57 58 28 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Page 29 of 37 Economic and Industrial Democracy
1 2 3 extent, in the different performance of these unions in terms of the effectiveness in 4 5 influencing relevant public policy and improving working conditions. This finding 6 7 contributes to the literature on union revitalization by pointing out the importance of unions’ 8 9 political agency and social movements for ameliorating precarious working conditions. With 10 11 stronger political agency and social movement unionism aimed at addressing the concerns of 12 13 14 workers who suffer from precarious working conditions, unions may be able to organize a 15 16 larger number of non regular workers and regular workers in SMEs and revitalize the labour 17 18 movement with greater power resources and social recognition. 19 For Peer Review 20 As for the limitations of this article, it is unlikely that the results based on a comparative 21 22 analysis on three individually affiliated unions in Japan have external validity or can be 23 24 generalized to other countries that have different industrial relations in terms of the most 25 26 27 representative types of unions (enterprise unions vs. industrial unions, for example), the level 28 29 of centralization of collective bargaining and so on. However, as the three unions are quite 30 31 similar to other individually affiliated unions in Japan in terms of small power resources, 32 33 active involvement in the resolution of labour disputes and so on, the results may be 34 35 applicable to other individually affiliated unions in Japan. In addition, the determinants and 36 37 effects of union power may be heterogeneous across industries and firms, as seen between 38 39 40 manufacturing and service sectors and between large firms and SMEs. However, the three 41 42 unions in this article, or more broadly individually affiliated unions in Japan, represent 43 44 workers irrespective of their company or industrial affiliation, so the results of the article may 45 46 also be applicable to other individually affiliated unions in Japan. Finally, the causal link 47 48 between ZWU’s political agency through social movement and its policy impact may not be 49 50 clear or significant, as there were some other factors that affected policies relevant to migrant 51 52 53 workers such as international criticisms of their poor working conditions against the Japanese 54 55 56 57 58 29 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Economic and Industrial Democracy Page 30 of 37
1 2 3 government. However, a small number of relevant legal changes reflected ZWU’s policy 4 5 requests at least. 6 7 The findings of this article imply that unions’ greater exercise of political agency through 8 9 social movement unionism may contribute to better working conditions and labour movement 10 11 revitalization, if to a small extent. In contrast to SSU and WUT, which did not exercise 12 13 14 sufficient political agency and could not successfully influence public policy related to 15 16 minimum wages, temporary agency work and so on, ZWU was relatively more successful in 17 18 influencing public policy related to migrant workers. However, even with stronger political 19 For Peer Review 20 agency and social movement unionism, the power resources of individually affiliated unions 21 22 are likely to remain small as long as their organizing method depends on the recruitment of 23 24 individual workers through labour consultation rather than collective worker recruitment 25 26 27 based on a workplace unit. This suggests the importance of greater political agency and social 28 29 movement by ‘mainstream’ unions, most dominant of which are enterprise unions in the 30 31 Japanese case. However, mainstream unions are mostly concerned with job protection of 32 33 regular workers in large companies. Unless mainstream unions change this attitude by giving 34 35 up their vested interests, there is little scope or hope for unions to ameliorate precarious 36 37 working conditions. In this era of neoliberal globalization (despite its declining influence 38 39 40 with the recent rise of right wing populism), ‘solidarity’ among workers is essential for 41 42 unions to revitalize the labour movement and improve the working conditions of all workers. 43 44 45 46 References 47 48 49 50 Asahi Shimbun (2016) Dentsū karōshi mienu kakushin, 27 October. 51 52 53 Asahi Shimbun (2017) Saitei chingin jikyū 1500yen nara, 15 April. 54 55 Broadbent K (2007) Sisters’ organising in Japan and Korea: The development of women 56 57 58 30 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal Page 31 of 37 Economic and Industrial Democracy
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1 2 3 Figure 1 4 5 Union density in Japan 6 7 8 40 9 35 34.8 35.4 10 34.4 32.2 30.8 11 30 28.9 12 25 25.2 23.8 13 20 21.5 18.7 18.5 17.4 14 15 15 10 16 (%) density Union 17 5 18 0 19 1960 1965For 1970 Peer 1975 1980 1985Review 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 20 21 Year 22
23 24 Source: Basic Survey on Labour Unions, 2016, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare. 25 26 27 28 Figure 2 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 1 59 60 http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/eid-journal