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STATE AND SOLDIER IN Redefining the Military’s Role in , , and

Wendy Hunter

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE CONTENTS

Foreword v

Summary vii

1 New Roles for Latin America’s Militaries 1

2 Argentina’s Military: Political Weakness and a Modest External Role 10

3 The Brazilian Military: Intermediate Autonomy and Diversified Missions 20

4 The Chilean Military: Political Strength and Professionalization 29

5 Conclusion 35

Notes 38

About the Author 49

About the Institute 51 v

Professor Hunter is an expert on Latin American militaries, and the following pages attest to her keen insights into an institution that has distinguished itself by serving as the of order during tur- bulent periods in the ’s history. Her extensive research on the armed forces in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile provides an excellent comparative per- FOREWORD spective on the different historical patterns of civil-military relations in these countries. More im- portantly, though, she suggests what kinds of new missions these and other civilian governments in similar circumstances can assign to their armed forces in order to integrate them into a democratic political culture under civilian control. What does this have to do with conflict and its resolution? In an era when interstate wars are giving way to more internal conflicts, many of Latin Ameri- ca’s national security threats are falling within the “gray ” between jurisdictions of the military and law enforcement. Indeed, as Professor Hunter argues, the threats Latin America’s militaries see iven the history of military intervention in these days stem less from external attacks and leftist Latin America, it is striking that today we guerrilla movements than from drug trafficking, Gcan point to no country in the region that conflict with indigenous groups, immigration, and is under military rule. Yet the success of popularly environmental assaults. In addition, as Professor elected governments should not blind us to the con- Hunter reports, the military is increasingly being tinuing political importance of the military in many deployed in nation-building duties, ranging from Latin American countries. Although apparently on distributing food and other public services in a the sidelines at present, the possibility that the mili- country’s more remote areas to repairing or con- tary will again seek to take over the reins of govern- structing a national infrastructure. ment when it hears “the knock on the barracks Professor Hunter’s report includes practical sug- door” needs continuous review. gestions for U.S. government policy in support of With the collapse of the and its sup- reducing civil-military conflict in the countries of port of leftist insurgencies around the , the Latin America. The lessons of her research may have strength of most of the insurgent movements in some salient applications to other , where Latin America has waned, thereby removing one of popularly elected governments are replacing com- the main threats for the region’s militaries. More- munist or other authoritarian regimes. One of the over, the impetus for economic reform across the re- challenges of the early twenty-first century will be to gion puts pressure on civilian governments to consolidate and strengthen the democratic forces reduce the size of their armed forces and free up that have made such dramatic advances throughout budget funds that are desperately needed the world in recent years. Forging a constructive elsewhere. between civilian governments and the mili- In such a milieu, what new missions can these tary constitutes a critical part of that challenge. This civilian governments assign to their armed forces in report provides useful insights into the state-build- order to keep them satisfied with fewer resources, ing dynamics policymakers will be addressing in the constrain their domestic role, and reinforce their years to come. submission to civilian authority? Former Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow Wendy Hunter examines this question in this latest edition in the Institute’s RICHARD H. SOLOMON Peaceworks series. PRESIDENT vii

resources that could be devoted to long-neglected social concerns. If left unattended, poverty and other social problems could well pose long-term risks to political stability as restive segments of these societies lose patience with new democratic institutions. The status of the armed forces also has conse- quences for regional peace. Whether historical na- SUMMARY tionalist conflicts will remain at bay depends on how the armed forces in these countries react to ef- forts to redefine their role vis-à-vis the state and their place in society. Latin America currently has the chance to reshape its political landscape, mak- ing it more compatible with sustaining democracy at home and securing peace and security in the re- gion and abroad. The serious implications of civil- military relations merit investigation of where Latin American militaries are headed and what de- termines the specific paths they take. The two central issues at stake with civil- military relations in the current era are the degree of subordination of the armed forces to civilian ecent years have given rise to an intense control and the substantive orientation of the re- debate about appropriate roles for Latin gion’s defense forces (namely, whether their pri- RAmerica’s armed forces: Should they re- mary focus is internal or external security). main the guardians of political stability, or should Theoretically, a military can be highly subordi- they restrict themselves mainly to external de- nated to civilian authority and have either a pri- fense? The two major challenges for the region’s marily internal or external orientation. In practice, civilian leaders are to carve out missions for their however, strong civilian control is difficult to sus- militaries appropriate to both the security environ- tain when the armed forces are oriented mainly to- ment of the post– era and to civil-military ward internal conflict. This is especially true in relations in a democracy, and to provide ways mili- countries where the armed forces have sought to taries will effectively adopt these missions. expand their role in times of domestic political and This essay examines efforts to identify such mis- economic crisis. sions and assign them to Latin America’s armed A variety of factors support Latin America’s civil- forces. It also analyzes the implications for democ- ian governments in their efforts to reform civil- racy and civilian control of specific roles for the military relations: the relatively recent wave of armed forces that are either under consideration that has swept over the region; or already under way in Argentina, Brazil, and the end of the Cold War and the widespread disap- Chile. These countries’ militaries are the most pearance of leftist guerrilla insurgencies; and the powerful in the outside of the United spread of neoliberal economic reforms that have States and have also ruled their countries for a reduced the military’s ability to command the di- lengthy period during the Cold War era. rection of these countries’ strategic economic If the region’s civilian governments do little to sectors. shape roles for the military that are compatible However, other factors may thwart reform. with democracy and civilian control, the result Many of these countries’ national security threats will be continued military meddling in civilian de- are falling in the “gray area” between strictly de- cision making and inflated defense budgets. This fined military functions and law enforcement. will increase the difficulty of the region’s govern- Drug trafficking, immigration, environmental ments to restructure their economies and free up protection, and the like are becoming more viii

significant national security issues in a region objective control of the military also allows where many traditional military concerns (for military leaders more autonomy in strictly profes- example, conflicts) have either been re- sional matters. solved or have diminished in importance. Civil-military relations in Brazil suffer from an Similarly, Latin American governments’ re- overly broad and inclusive definition of the armed newed attention to social problems and the armed forces’ role. Pressure to scale down the budget, low forces’ need for organizational justification have external threats, and numerous social and internal led to the enlargement of civic action and social de- security problems militate against an exclusive ex- velopment roles for military personnel across the pansion of the army’s energies in the direction of continent. The most recent Conference of Ameri- conventional defense and toward involvement in can Armies recognized , terror- its traditional functions of internal security and so- ism, drug trafficking, and ethnic conflict as the cial action. Such involvement does not bode well primary threats to security in the region. for Brazil’s nascent democracy in a country where The major options for Latin American militaries profound social problems remain and civilian po- at this time involve some combination of (1) con- litical institutions are traditionally weak and ventional defense of territorial integrity; (2) inter- inefficient. national ; (3) internal security, which Of the three militaries examined in this study, includes and drug interdiction; Chile’s has had the fewest civilian-imposed con- and (4) civic action and development functions. straints. Gen. ’s privileged posi- Latin America’s civilian governments have a tion during the transition to democratic rule has choice of two strategies to keep their militaries in maintained the Chilean military’s political and eco- check. Subjective control reins in military ambi- nomic strength in the postauthoritarian period de- tions in the domestic sphere by actively subordi- spite civilian attempts to prosecute officers for nating the armed forces to the control of the human rights violations committed during the government and other civilian groups. The more 1973–90 dictatorship. The military’s position has effective method of objective control attempts to allowed it a high degree of freedom in choosing its keep the military out of politics by “buying it off” missions, which are focused primarily on modern- through increased defense spending and an em- ization and external defense. Domestic missions phasis on modernization and professionalization. are largely confined to national development While objective control seeks to enhance the mili- projects. tary’s traditional focus on external defense, such a If one risk in redefining military missions is strategy is hard to justify in an era when govern- overinclusion, while another is excessive exclu- ments are trying to pare down and reorient bud- sion, the appropriate governmental policy should gets and when there are few external enemies. incorporate elements of objective control, respect- What strategies have Argentina, Brazil, and Chile ing the military’s special role in providing for de- adopted, and how effective are they? fense and adequately funding appropriate military Following a stormy period of exerting subjec- missions. In return, the military must recognize tive control over the military during the Alfonsín that it is accountable to the rule of law and must re- administration, Argentina has managed to assert a main nonpartisan in its respect for civilian high degree of authority over its armed forces and authority. diminish their domestic jurisdiction. President In Argentina, civilian leaders should stay the Carlos Saul Menem’s policies have included some course. In Brazil, they should define military roles elements of objective control by making external more clearly, more narrowly, and outside the realm defense and participation in multinational peace- of internal functions. In Chile, they should try to keeping missions central functions of Argentina’s attenuate the military’s political prerogatives, military. While such objective control has not de- while taking caution to preserve some of the objec- manded sophisticated training and weaponry, the tive control mechanisms already in place. In gen- country’s defense expenditures—going mainly to- eral, Latin America’s governments should ward salaries—still consume a large part of the continue to downsize their militaries while simul- Argentine budget. The Menem administration’s taneously encouraging military preparedness and ix

professionalism with fewer resources. In addition, levels among Latin America’s militaries, the United government officials should build up and States should be wary of pushing noncombat tasks other nonmilitary security forces and rely on only on them. Enlisting these armed forces to perform them to handle what police typically handle: stop- counternarcotics operations, for example, could ping crime and maintaining social order. draw them into other internal tasks, such as intelli- While taking measures to enhance professional gence operations, and threaten the region’s development and encourage the reduction of force nascent democratic institutions. 1

some degree of leverage vis-à-vis the officer corps, the precise missions that civilians assign to the armed forces in turn affects the sovereignty of civil- ian decision making in the future. This paper examines efforts to identify and as- sign missions to the armed forces and analyzes the EW OLES FOR implications for democracy and civilian control of N R specific roles for the armed forces that are either LATIN AMERICA’S under consideration or already under way. For the purposes of this study, I define the term role as the 1MILITARIES principal orientation of the armed forces. Roles are usually expressed in functional terms (internal or external) but, as I demonstrate in the course of this study, the term has an even greater political dimen- sion, namely, the relationship of the military vis-à- vis the state. Missions are the specific tasks assigned to the armed forces. While the military may be responsible for a wide range of tasks, cer- tain missions—individually and collectively—tend to define the military’s fundamental role in the na- tion. The service branch I examine for comparative ivil-military relations in Latin America are purposes in this study is the army, the most politi- at a crucial juncture. Recent years have cally relevant branch of the military. The countries Cgiven rise to an intense debate about the I have selected for comparison are Argentina, boundaries and appropriate missions of Latin Brazil, and Chile, which have the most powerful America’s armed forces. At stake in this debate is armed forces in the Americas outside of the United whether the armed forces should remain the States. These armed forces have also distinguished guardians of political stability when civilian gov- themselves by having ruled their countries for a ernments falter—a role that puts them at the center lengthy period during the Cold War, which con- of broader social and political conflicts histori- tributed to military dominance in several ways. cally—or whether they should shed this and related Needless to say, I do not claim that these case functions and restrict themselves to tasks confined studies should serve as exact models for how other mainly to external defense. The two major chal- countries in the region redefine their civil-military lenges for the region’s civilian leaders are to carve relations. Quite simply, the structures and histo- out missions for their militaries appropriate to ries of the region’s governments and armed forces both the security environment of the post–Cold present as many crucial differences as they do sim- War era and to civil-military relations in a democ- ilarities. ’s military is an obvious example of racy, and to provide inducements and sanctions so just how tenuous generalizations can be. Yet my that military organizations effectively adopt these purpose in linking these case studies to the region missions. seeks to highlight the common pressures most of Latin America’s civilian governments can seize these countries will face to a greater or lesser extent the opportunities presented at this current junc- and to focus the universe of policy options on ture to reorient the armed forces away from politi- those that seem more appropriate, given the his- cal activism and toward strictly military functions. tory of the continent’s armed forces’ serving as au- They can also fail to exploit the trends favoring re- tonomous actors and nation-builders, the relatively form and leave the military without a clear, legiti- recent wave of economic and political reform that mate , thereby contributing to the has swept over the continent, the decline of leftist perpetuation of the military’s tradition of domestic insurgencies in practically all of these countries, activism and interventionism. While the capacity and the lack of external threats. Put another way, of civilians to shape military missions presupposes I selected these three case studies to offer a look at 2

quite different histories of civil-military relations prerogatives eliminated or imperiled by civilian and the corresponding policies that seemed appro- governments. priate in balancing military interests against the de- On a less dramatic and more probable note, if mands of demobilization, economic reform, and civilian governments do little to shape roles for the democratization. The vast majority of the region’s military that are compatible with democracy and countries will have to confront such trade-offs to civilian control, the result will be continued mili- varying degrees in the near future. As such, my use tary meddling in civilian decision making and in- of the case studies is not to suggest a particular flated defense budgets. This will increase the model for how to redefine civil-military relations difficulty of the region’s governments to restruc- across the continent, but to isolate similarities and ture their economies and free up resources that ask simply, How should we expect other civilian could be devoted to long-neglected social con- governments to approach the issue of redefining cerns. If left unattended, poverty and other social civil-military relations, given roughly similar condi- problems could well pose long-term risks to politi- tions in the case-study countries? cal stability as restive segments of these societies Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are useful cases for lose patience with Latin America’s new democratic such a comparative analysis. Despite the presence institutions. of several common influencing factors (the end of In the regional and international sphere, back- the Cold War, the reemergence of democracy, and sliding by Latin American states on previous com- few significant external ene- mitments to nuclear mies), a distinctive set of mili- nonproliferation is ar- tary role definitions has guably the most serious begun to emerge in each could result potential outcome of country. In Argentina, the from the failure of civilian governments’ armed forces have come to as- failure to retain control sume an almost exclusive (al- civilian leaders to manage over the armed forces in beit modest) focus on W the process of trying to externally oriented roles, of correctly the demobilization redefine them. Only in which international peace- 1991, when Argentina keeping is a large component. and definition of new roles for and Brazil had presi- In Brazil, they are trying to dents capable of con- maintain activities on both the armed forces? taining the military, did the domestic and external these two countries fronts. In Chile, the armed reach a nuclear rap- forces are vigorously strengthening external de- prochement and subject themselves to inspection fense capabilities and moving away from political by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Simi- activities, despite the significant autonomy they larly, only with the “military question” at least enjoy and their persistent saber-rattling over civil- partially resolved did Argentina’s second postau- ian attempts to prosecute officers for human rights thoritarian president, Carlos Saúl Menem, act vig- violations committed during the 1973–90 dictator- orously to arrest the development of the air force’s ship. ballistic missile program. The development and What precisely are the imminent and potential export of such missiles have clear adverse implica- threats posed by Latin America’s militaries during tions for international security. Brazil has yet to this crucial period? What could result from the fail- commit itself as clearly as other countries in the re- ure of civilian leaders to manage correctly the de- gion to curbing the production and sale of highly mobilization and definition of new roles for the sensitive military technology. armed forces? In the realm of domestic politics, The status of the armed forces also has conse- worst case scenarios include recurring military re- quences for regional peace. With the advent of bellion, as witnessed in Argentina under President civilian rule in three major American coun- Raúl Alfonsín (1983–89), or a full-blown (albeit tries—Argentina, Brazil, and Chile—annual military less probable) authoritarian backlash mounted spending in these countries has dropped by by the military leadership to recover institutional roughly one-fourth. Civilian rule has led to the 3

resolution of many regional disputes as well, such then, military governments have vanished from as the clash between Argentina and Chile in 1977 the region. Only in , which witnessed an over territory at the southern tip of extreme economic crisis and a serious threat of and the in nuclear development pro- guerrilla insurgency, did a civilian president tem- grams between Argentina and Brazil. Democratiza- porarily suspend constitutional democracy (in tion and the activation of trade in the Southern April 1992) and invite the armed forces to play a Cone have also resulted in a reduction of border larger role in the government. Democratization disputes and other sources of regional tension. has emboldened citizens to contest the military’s Whether historical nationalist conflicts will remain control over issues of broad national importance, at bay depends in no small part on how the armed question the institution’s raison d’etre, and de- forces in these countries react to efforts to redefine mand justification for its consumption of scarce their role vis-à-vis the state and their place in economic resources. society. The nature of threats facing the region is impor- In short, the current juncture provides a rare tant in justifying which roles and missions the mili- chance for Latin America to reshape its political tary plays. The end of the Cold War and the landscape, making it more compatible with sus- widespread disappearance of guerrilla insurgen- taining democracy at home and securing peace cies and their external sponsors have largely invali- and security in the region and abroad. The serious dated internal security missions for Latin implications of civil-military relations merit investi- America’s armed forces. Latin America’s militaries gation of where Latin American militaries are and socio-economic elites viewed leftist organiza- headed and what determines the specific paths tions in their countries as a threat to , to they take. the extant social order, and to the military hierar- The two central issues currently at stake in civil- chy itself. As recipients of funding from various military relations are the degree of subordination Soviet-bloc countries, including , some Latin of the armed forces to civilian control (indepen- American leftist groups endorsed the notion of dent of the specific substantive roles they perform) armed struggle, directly challenging the military’s and the substantive orientation of the region’s de- institutional interest in monopolizing coercive fense forces (namely, whether their primary focus power. The U.S. government provided high levels is internal or external security). The autonomy of of support in the form of direct military aid and fa- the military from civilian control and the substan- vorable financial and trade arrangements to Latin tive roles the armed forces play are analytically dis- American governments and militaries intent on tinct issues. Theoretically, a military can be highly combating and defeating these insurgency move- subordinated to civilian authority and have either ments. a primarily internal or external orientation. In The spread of neoliberal economic reforms, par- practice, however, strong civilian control is diffi- ticularly , has reduced the military’s cult to sustain when the armed forces are oriented ability to command or influence the direction of mainly toward internal conflict. This is especially these countries’ strategic economic sectors, such true in countries where the armed forces have as , telecommunications, and energy. Mar- sought to expand their internal role in times of do- ket reforms have exposed once-protected military mestic political and economic crisis. industries and the weapons systems they produce to the dictates of competition. Moreover, countries Factors Affecting Military Missions in that are undergoing economic restructuring need the Current Era to be on good terms with the and Western financial institutions, which place severe What are the forces that militate in favor of a redefi- constraints on the development and purchase of nition of civil-military relations and a contraction sophisticated military technology they deem unac- of the armed forces’ jurisdiction in Latin America? ceptable. The first is the wave of democratization that has However, there are other factors in the region spread across the region in the last decade and a that may thwart reform. At a time when Latin half. As recently as 1978, the armed forces gov- America’s governments are eager to distance their erned in half of all Latin American countries. Since militaries from the domestic realm, many of the 4

immediate threats to national security are falling very least, conventional external defense remains within the “gray area” between strictly defined the primary official function of the armed forces in military functions and law enforcement. Drug traf- Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Their insistence on ficking, immigration, environmental protection, the continued need to combat conventional and the like are becoming more significant na- threats was made amply clear when the hemi- tional security issues in a region where many tradi- sphere’s military leaders met in Williamsburg, Vir- tional military concerns (for example, border ginia on July 24–25, 1995, for the first-ever conflicts) have either been resolved or have dimin- inter-American defense . While the United ished in importance. States displayed an ongoing tendency to under- Similarly, Latin American governments’ re- score “gray-area” threats and the need for Latin newed attention to social problems, coupled with American militaries to perform “operations other the armed forces’ need for organizational justifica- than war,” including drug interdiction, many Latin tion in an era when diminished external as well as American leaders showed resistance to the sugges- internal threats exert heavy pressures to downsize, tion that the military play a more active role in has led to the enlargement of civic action and so- these struggles. Instead, they tried to emphasize cial development roles for military personnel territorial disputes and conventional combat across the continent. The most recent Conference roles.4 of American Armies recognized economic inequal- Concrete external threats in the region are diffi- ity, terrorism, drug trafficking, and ethnic conflict cult to identify, but Latin American military officers as the primary threats to security in the region.1 are quick to point out that, just as the Soviet One analyst has summarized the dilemma this Union’s dissolution led to the outbreak of sub- poses: “How [Latin American] military institutions national ethnic conflicts on the Eurasian conti- retain a legitimate institutional function in modern nent, the waning of left-wing terrorism and democracies while at the same time defining secu- in Latin America—which had created a rity missions that assign meaningful but politically united front among Latin American militaries in unintrusive roles to those institutions is a tough the past—may now give way to interstate disputes act.”2 that were previously kept in check. The outbreak Nevertheless, civilian governments must man- of war between Peru and in early 1995 age to surmount these problems and to define re- signals, in their view, the greater potential for bor- spectable, credible, and stable nonpolitical der disputes between countries in the region. De- missions for the armed forces if they seek to break spite the overall trend toward economic the region’s legacy of military tutelage and end its integration on the continent, South America’s recurring authoritarian-democratic cycle of politi- armed forces continue to take seriously extant ter- cal rule. In the words of one author, “The military’s ritorial disputes and threats, and perhaps even ex- mission is the most critical determinant of civil- aggerate them. They persist in regarding combat military relations. . . . Mission is critical because it power as the ultimate arbiter of sovereignty and determines doctrine; doctrine, in turn, is like soft- exhibit across-the-board support for enhancing ware—it runs the military’s hardware.”3 their country’s capacity to defend itself against these threats.5 At a time when civilian leaders are Mission Options actively pursuing economic integration and cross- border ties in other nongovernmental sectors, the The major options for Latin American militaries at military remains one of the last bastions of nation- this time involve some combination of (1) conven- alism in Latin America. On the whole, civilian poli- tional defense of territorial integrity; (2) interna- cymakers appear less concerned than senior tional peacekeeping; (3) internal security, which officers about conventional defense and are less includes counterinsurgency and drug interdiction; willing to allocate the resources necessary to en- and (4) civic action and development functions. sure that the region’s militaries are viable combat organizations. Conventional Defense. Virtually all militaries in the region insist on retaining the defense of territo- International Peacekeeping. International peace- rial integrity as their predominant mission. At the keeping provides military personnel with credible 5

participation in international missions and highly that the United States has urged many Latin Ameri- valued professional experience at a time when can militaries to assume. As recently as budgetary constraints at home make it difficult for 1995, U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry many Latin American militaries to train at a stated, “The only way to deal effectively with the they consider appropriate. It also constitutes a way narco-trafficking problem is to treat it as a regional of increasing officers’ and enlisted men’s salaries, problem. . . . Military forces can provide needed which have witnessed a steady decline in recent support to our civilian law enforcement agencies years. By sending troops to far-off corners of the in fighting the drug trade. We hope to see this co- globe, various Latin American governments have operation between the police and the military and demonstrated their solidarity with the United Na- between nations wherever narco-trafficking tions as well as with the United States and other crosses .”7 Narco-trafficking is indeed a Western nations. As such, peacekeeping opera- scourge, undermining democratic political institu- tions also serve as a way for these governments to tions, seriously challenging governmental author- integrate their otherwise marginalized armed ity, wreaking violence on society, and colluding forces into their foreign policy objectives. Notwith- with insurgent groups and criminal gangs. Since standing the various benefits of peacekeeping, the late , the U.S. Army’s Southern Com- many officers remain wary of giving it too high a mand has been deeply engaged in supporting and priority. Arguing that peacekeeping detracts from coordinating U.S. efforts with host-country organi- the resources and attention devoted to the defense zations devoted to fighting narcotics trafficking.8 of their own countries, they insist that it not be- President Clinton’s selection of General Barry come the armed forces’ primary mission. McCaffrey in January 1996 to head the White House Office of Drug Control Policy is a telling Internal Security. Traditionally, Latin America’s sign of the United States’ insistence on involving armed forces have had a variety of internal security the military in narcotics interdiction. In the two functions: counterinsurgency, drug interdiction, years prior to his appointment as ’s fighting organized crime, and quelling social “Drug Czar,” Gen. McCaffrey was the commanding protest, among them. Guerrilla insurgency re- officer of the Army’s Southern Command. mains a problem in some countries, such as Peru, Fighting the drug war is imperative, but assign- , and . Subversion and counter- ing such a mission to the armed forces promises to insurgency continue to be subjects of intense dis- be counterproductive from the standpoint of scal- cussion at recent conferences among Latin ing back the military’s influence in Latin American America’s armies. Moreover, civilian governments society. A military charged with drug interdiction persist in looking to the armed forces for protec- could very well demand the right to conduct sur- tion when guerrilla groups resume their activities. veillance, to apprehend suspects, and even to ad- Counterinsurgency is by definition “geared to minister justice. Militaries engaged in such military, political, economic, and civic action” and activities typically begin to assume intelligence thus invites the military to expand its reach.6 functions, and there is a fine line between - Counterinsurgency also politicizes the institution ing the movement of drugs and keeping a watchful and inevitably leads its members to commit hu- eye on other internal social and political develop- man rights violations. The armed forces’ insistence ments.9 As is the case with counterinsurgency ef- on immunity for these violations typically un- forts, violations of citizens’ constitutional rights leashes mass social recrimination, causing top and due process are almost inevitable in a war commanders to guard the institution’s autonomy against drugs. Besides preferring to avoid such en- with even greater vigor. This lock-step sequence of tanglements, many militaries eschew the assump- military abuses, amnesty, social protest, and the tion of counternarcotics functions because of their military’s efforts to redouble its autonomy has un- numerous opportunities for corruption. U.S. ef- folded recently in Peru. Such a cycle does not bode forts to encourage Latin American militaries to be- well for making the military more amenable to come involved in the war against drugs, which civilian oversight and control in the long term. often sparks nationalist resentment over pushing Drug interdiction is among the most credible “police roles” on Latin American military officers, roles for the armed forces in the and one provides yet another disincentive for the military 6

to carve out a counternarcotics mission. In short, central social development mission has potential although drug trafficking is a serious problem, drawbacks. Expanded civic action programs, both civilian governments and the military recog- coupled with the political inclinations of many nize that the militarization of the drug war leaves Latin American militaries, have the potential to much to be desired.10 draw the institution into social conflicts. This situa- tion has unfolded in Ecuador, where civic action Civic Action. Civic action and development roles, provided an opening for the army to ally itself with such as the provision of food and health services in right-wing evangelical groups against progressive poor and remote areas, infrastructure building, sectors of the and grass-roots or- and environmental protection, would provide a ganizations representing the country’s increas- useful contribution by the military in a region ingly mobilized indigenous population.12 There, marked by poverty and inequality. All countries civic action on the part of the military has become could benefit from the human resources and logis- intertwined with the state’s desire to exercise so- tical support the military could lend to such ef- cial control over the country’s indigenous peoples. forts, especially in the absence of private sector Expanded social roles for the army also help initiatives or state-funded civilian agencies to take create a positive public image for the institution, on these tasks. Civic action also compensates the often in contrast to that of political parties and armed forces somewhat for the demise of the mili- other civilian institutions. Survey data suggest that tary-development model resulting from the aban- such an image may contribute to bolstering public donment of Latin America’s state-led development support for broader, more interventionist political policies. Civilian and military policymakers have roles as well.13 Moreover, the fact that the army given this mission more consideration in the takes on civic action often means that civilian insti- 1990s, threatening the return to a tradition among tutions capable of fulfilling social functions do not Latin American militaries that goes back to the develop. 1950s and , when modernization theorists Reservations about extensive military involve- advocated civic action roles for militaries of devel- ment in civic action are summed up well by one oping countries. The U.S. government also advo- analyst: “Whereas a larger role for the military in cated such roles and funded this type of activity as development will result in a more encompassing a means of bringing Latin American militaries in concept of security, such an expanded conception, line with the objectives of the Alliance for including development-related issues, will, in turn, Progress.11 tolerate larger military roles.”14 Domestic missions such as civic action have also been subjects of debate regarding new mis- How to Redefine Military Missions sions for the U.S. armed services. Senior public of- ficials and members of knowledgeable In the process of recasting civil-military relations about national security matters, such as Senator and defining future roles for the armed forces, Sam Nunn, have called for the U.S. military’s in- politicians and policymakers run the risk of adopt- volvement in refurbishing the country’s infrastruc- ing two mistaken approaches, either one of which ture and addressing social problems in could well provoke tension and conflict in the communities. One of the driving forces behind the short or long term. These risks loom especially renewed attention to civic action for militaries in large if drastic downsizing is not a viable option. many countries is the need for the military to make Drastic downsizing is not feasible in most Latin itself useful domestically in order to compete suc- American countries, where the military has been a cessfully for budgetary allocations. very powerful actor throughout the continent’s However, Latin America is a region where devel- history and where civilian governments lack suffi- opment missions have encouraged the military to cient power or the will to confront the institution view itself as more effective than civilians and to so directly. expand its role in development beyond that of a The first risk is that civil-military relations are mere instrument of the civilian leadership to insufficiently transformed when the search to policymaker. As such, the military’s of a find useful missions keeps the military involved 7

in activities that immerse it in broad social prob- own impulses toward a higher level of integration lems. Fighting crime, drugs, and insurgencies with the civilian world. In this connection, one perpetuates the notion of the military as the analyst of military affairs notes a lesson to be guardian of internal order, and civic action or pub- drawn from recent experiences in Latin America: lic works activities keep the armed forces in the role of “nation-builder.” Even if they are not coup- Many Latin American armies are organizing from mongering or actively trying to usurp power, the a defensive posture, in the sense that they face shrinking public resources, diminished social es- armed forces will remain a politicized institution at teem, or military defeat. In this context, it would the center of domestic strife. Expanding military be expected for any institution to withdraw, re- jurisdiction (“mission creep”) is a definite danger, group, and find ways to build walls between itself with injurious long-term effects on reorienting and the outside world. It is precisely at these mo- civil-military relations in line with democratic stan- ments that civil society must remain open to civil- dards and principles . military rapprochement, and make explicit The second risk is that civilian efforts to control overtures to this effect. The uncomfortable lega- the military and minimize its role in society end up cies of military domination may make continued isolating the institution. Such an outcome may segregation between civilians and soldiers seem stem from the economic and political imperatives the path of least resistance, but it is precisely at of the late twentieth century or from the mistaken this juncture that civilian leaders need to take the notion that all forms of military strength are neces- initiative to assure the continued vitality and need sarily dangerous for democracy.15 In any event, for senior officers to be part of the state’s future.16 marginalizing what remains in many countries the most organized institution with the greatest coer- An overly inclusive approach to military mis- cive power is obviously not a wise policy option. sions may make use of the military’s human re- Such a tendency could well ignite civil-military con- sources and logistical capacity but at the risk of flict in the short term and create the basis for fester- further role expansion. An approach that carries ing military resentment with adverse longer-term the risk of excessive exclusion reduces defense consequences for stable civil-military relations. spending in the immediate term but may plant the Because civilian elites in Latin America have his- seeds of future civil-military conflict. In light of torically viewed the military as part of an alien cul- these perilous choices, the question for civilian ture, despite the comprehensive role of the governments becomes, Are there alternatives that institution, it is particularly imperative that con- both sides can accept? temporary civilian leaders not be perceived as One alternative is to keep military budgets and downgrading the profession of arms or the social salaries at Cold War levels (or thereabouts) and status of officers. The partially correct view among allow the military to develop greater and more military officers that civilians have looked down sophisticated capabilities against intangible and on them socially and have always held the military remote enemies in exchange for the institution’s profession in low esteem (but have willingly acceptance of political subordination and a shrink- turned to the institution for a strong hand to re- ing degree of influence in the domestic sphere. Put solve political crises) has bred in the officer corps a simply, why not “buy them off,” or placate them resentment that militates against accepting civilian financially at least as a temporary strategy? In this dictates. connection, one retired U.S. military officer and In this respect, there is a threshold above which analyst of Latin American militaries points out, civilian leaders probably cannot go without pro- “The idea that the military will be provided for is voking a backlash. Even if active military rebellion one of the successes of the civil-military contract in in response to real or perceived isolation is not an the United States.” This contract includes “provid- immediate threat, the perceived contempt of civil- ing an adequate standard of living—health care, ians toward men in uniform will not facilitate retirement, housing, etc.—to ensure professional greater military openness to the idea of subordina- integrity and to discourage the armed forces from tion to civilian authority. Such an exclusionary ap- seeking financial resources from other sources.”17 proach may even work against the armed forces’ Similarly, in his guidelines for democratization, 8

Samuel P. Huntington highly recommends boost- conferring prestige on the institution and giving it ing military salaries, pensions, and benefits, using direction. the funds saved by reducing the size of the armed Objective civilian control is thought to be supe- forces.18 rior, or at least a necessary complement, to subjec- Indeed, allocating relatively high levels of finan- tive civilian control, which seeks to minimize cial resources to the armed forces would seem to military power by maximizing the relative power go a long way toward placating officers at a time of civilian groups and institutions. Instead of when they fear the virtual elimination of their insti- recognizing an independent professional military tution. Core concerns of officers at the present sphere, subjective control means that civilian time include the ability to earn salaries high groups define, oversee, and monitor military activi- enough to afford them a middle-class lifestyle and ties. However, subjective control suffers from at budgetary resources sufficient to maintain reason- least two related problems. First, “the maximizing able levels of training, education, and equipment. of civilian power always means the maximizing of the power of some particular civilian group or Objective vs. Subjective Civilian groups.”23 Since some civilian groups in Latin Control: Pros and Cons America—particularly on the right—have histori- cally supported military activism to protect the sta- The strategy of funding the armed forces well tus quo, their “control” over the institution might enough for them to carry out their professional not keep officers out of politics. For example, Peru- roles is an important aspect of the notion of objec- vian president appears to have an tive civilian control, originally elaborated by impressive level of command and influence over Samuel P. Huntington. This concept rests on the the country’s armed forces. But at the same time, assumption that the vocation of most men in uni- he has also used them as a domestic political in- form is that of arms, not politics. Civilian control is strument. Subjective control also does not allow said to be “objective” when civilian politicians pro- the military to develop its own independent com- vide the armed forces with the conditions to orga- mitment to political noninterference. By inducing nize, plan, equip, and train for combat roles the military to be less interested in politics, objec- (external defense) that reflect their special status tive control mechanisms would eventually provide as experts in the management of violence. The an additional source of military restraint should armed forces, in turn, jealously guard this sphere civilian governance falter and lead groups to of competence and autonomy in return for politi- “knock on the doors of the barracks.” cal subordination.19 At the risk of oversimplifica- Hence a strategy of control based on objective tion, adherents of objective control recommend mechanisms or professionalization might seem giving the military “new and fancy toys” in order to superior and highly useful politically, but current occupy its attention and keep it satisfied.20 conditions do not provide a propitious context for Modernization and professionalization help cre- the development of objective civilian control in ate the conditions for objective control by enhanc- Latin America. While there is no necessary corre- ing the military’s professional status.21 Both spondence between levels of spending and the pro- modernization and professionalization rest on ma- fessional status of the armed forces—that is, terial or technological improvements as well as the militaries can learn to do “more with less” and can ability to maintain reasonable levels of training, become “leaner and meaner”—higher levels of leadership, strategy, organization, and coordina- funding certainly facilitate modernization and pro- tion. Professionalization alone has not and most fessionalization. Objective control is more likely to likely will not prevent the military from engaging exist in the presence of formidable external threats in political meddling, as Alfred Stepan suggests in and ample defense expenditures. A strategy of civil- his concept of “the new professionalism,” referring ian control based on co-optation lacks feasibility in to the fact that the most technologically advanced an era when external enemies are few and when militaries of Latin America came to power in the governments are seeking to stabilize their 1960s and .22 Nevertheless, enhancing economies and reduce public deficits. Such a professionalism can help tame the military by strategy is also untenable when the first goal of 9

many politicians is to fund programs that will win to neglect the expensive modernization necessary them votes with the public rather than points with to turn Latin American militaries into more viable the high brass and when international powers combat organizations and to sanction domestic make loans and other benefits conditional upon operations instead; and U.S. pressures on Latin diminished defense expenditures. Indeed, neo- American governments and militaries to engage in liberal economic reform imposes crucial limits to operations other than war, such as drug interdic- “buying off the military.”24 tion. Despite these and other problems, the failure In any event, although the current juncture pre- of Latin America’s fledgling civilian governments sents an opportunity for civilians to provide the to provide their armed forces with clearly defined military with a clear guide to its proper conduct, missions may well invite traditional patterns of be- the cross-cutting pressures of the 1990s render dif- havior to reemerge and exacerbate the current cri- ficult a definition of military roles compatible with sis of among many of the region’s narrowing the military’s jurisdiction while simulta- militaries, a condition that is not salutary for neously achieving and sustaining the primacy of democracy or political stability. the civilian sector. Pressures of this type include Let us now turn to three cases—Argentina, the desire among many civilian governments to Brazil, and Chile—where the armed forces have as- confine military functions to defending national sumed somewhat different profiles in reaction to borders in an era that sees few tangible external recent domestic and international developments. threats; budgetary constraints that tempt civilians 10

To explain the recent constriction of the mili- tary’s domain, it is necessary to return to the past, specifically to the period of during 1976–83, the self-styled Proceso de Reorga- nización Nacional (Process of National Reorgani- zation). The armed forces’ abuse of power in this period (also known as the “”), combined ARGENTINA’S MILITARY with their devastating defeat in the Malvinas/Falk- lands War with in 1982, turned Ar- Political Weakness and a gentine society against the institution. This forced 2Modest External Role the military to subordinate itself to a new civilian regime and to assume a more circumscribed role in society, politics, and the economy, causing con- siderable conflict between the military and the civilian leadership. If Argentina’s first postauthori- tarian president, Raúl Alfonsín, ended up margin- alizing and isolating the armed forces in his vigorous efforts to subordinate them, his succes- sor, Carlos Saúl Menem, has sought to reintegrate the armed forces in Argentine society and give them direction. Alfonsín’s measures were crucial in ultimately bringing the military under control, f the three militaries under study, but their immediate result was to provoke a mili- Argentina’s is without question the tary backlash. Menem’s more accommodationist Omost subject to civilian control. It is also strategy has lowered the level of conflict between the institution with the most modest and circum- the civilian leadership and the military. scribed role; conventional defense is defined as its The following discussion of Argentina is divided main mission. International peacekeeping, logisti- into three parts. The first section describes the ex- cal support in antinarcotics operations, and com- pansive role definition for the military in Argentine munity aid in the event of national disasters are history. The dictatorship of 1976–83, which ulti- secondary missions.25 mately turned society against the armed forces and In practice, the Argentine armed forces’ sphere unleashed efforts to contract their sphere of influ- of activity is confined almost exclusively to the ex- ence, represented an extension of this pattern. The ternal arena, namely to international peacekeeping second section traces the process by which Ar- and conventional defense roles. Only under very gentina’s postauthoritarian governments have exceptional circumstances—when civilian security managed to assert their authority over the often forces are overwhelmed—do the armed forces have unwieldy military institution, shrink its jurisdic- the authority to participate in functions that come tion, and ultimately channel its members’ energies under the rubric of “internal security.” Their contri- in directions judged fitting for sustained civilian bution to drug interdiction is merely logistical. rule. The third section evaluates the country’s cur- Aside from occasional stints in disaster relief, their rent civil-military relationship and discusses re- participation in civic action/public works is practi- maining and potential problems. cally nonexistent. Compared to past eras, when Argentine and generals issued sweeping The Military: From Nation-Builder to pronunciamentos with far-reaching consequences Powerful Political Player for the political and economic order, today’s armed forces, while still an actor to be reckoned In the century between the and 1970s, the with, have assumed a much narrower scope and Argentine military evolved from playing a central exercise less authority in the economic, social, role in the final demarcation of the country’s bor- and political order of the country. ders to seizing power from elected civilian leaders 11

and sitting at the head of government. In the late than their counterparts in either Brazil or Chile in nineteenth century, Argentina’s hierarchical and diminishing the armed forces’ political, economic, unified army occupied and defeated war- and social standing and asserting authority over ring Indian populations in what became known as them, even if the country’s two postauthoritarian the “conquest of the .”26 This period was crit- governments went about this task in radically dif- ical in establishing the army’s self-image of na- ferent ways. Raúl Alfonsín waged a direct con- tional unifier and defender against not only frontation against the military and set in motion a divisive internal forces but external attack as well. redefinition of institutional roles—at the risk of The Argentine military made its first direct polit- causing leading officers to feel attacked and ex- ical intervention in a 1930 coup, arrogating to it- cluded. Conversely, Carlos Saúl Menem has gone a self the role of “guardian of the nation” and long way toward reintegrating the military and de- “supervisor of the political system.” From then on, veloping an accommodation with its members Argentina oscillated between military and civilian without relinquishing control over them. governments. As one specialist on the Argentine military writes, “After early appearances as the The Alfonsín Government: Contesting ‘watchdog’ against corruption and guardian of the the Military without Redirecting It constitution, military leaders increasingly began to impose their own rules and standards on the polit- The failings of the Proceso and the widespread ical system, until, eventually, the armed forces be- public support for reducing military influence mo- came that system’s most powerful player.”27 Over tivated President Raúl Alfonsín to assume office time, the armed forces also established for them- determined to break the institution’s political selves a huge military-industrial complex in arms, clout.29 From the time he took office in December metals, petrochemicals, shipping, and other strate- 1983, he proceeded to challenge the military on its gic industries. political prerogatives, budgetary expenditures, The most recent instance of the military’s and human rights record. Such a confrontation on chronic political interventionism took place in the so many fronts was unprecedented in a country 1976–83 dictatorship. This period was an unmiti- where men in uniform had literally gotten away gated disaster for all institutions of Argentine soci- with murder for so long. ety. The junta advanced economic policies that led With respect to institutional prerogatives, the to the demise of important industries and pro- Alfonsín administration secured the passage of nu- duced record-high levels of unemployment.28 merous reforms reducing the armed forces’ auton- Systematic state repression caused the “disappear- omy and influence.30 Laws passed during this ances” of at least nine thousand Argentine citi- period transferred decision making over impor- zens—suspected subversives and countless tant policy areas—such as the military budget, de- innocents. A desperate eleventh-hour attempt to fense production, logistics, and national defense salvage the regime’s support led Argentina into a policy—from the heads of the three service reckless war with Great Britain over the Malvinas/ branches (downgraded from commanders to . The failures, errors, and crimes “chiefs of staff”) to a civilian-led Ministry of De- of military rule—a damaged economy; extensive, fense. Additional reforms stripped the armed heinous human rights violations; and an ignomin- forces of management over public-sector defense ious defeat in war—all served as the basis for efforts firms and charged the Ministry of Defense with su- by Argentina’s subsequent civilian governments to pervising them. diminish military power and influence and reori- The Alfonsín government also succeeded in ent military missions away from the domestic passing legislation limiting military participation arena and toward external defense. By 1983, the in matters of internal security, a constitutionally armed forces were badly divided and in too weak authorized attribute the military had relied on in of a position to defend themselves against these ef- the past to legitimate its political activism. The forts. 1988 National Defense Law (No. 23.554) formed Since the return to civilian rule in 1983, elected the centerpiece of efforts to remove the military politicians in Argentina have gone much further from the realm of internal security, providing a 12

legislative separation between external defense administration, the military became a shadow of and internal security by putting the military in its former self. The days of splendor for the institu- charge of the former and making police forces and tion were most certainly over. border patrols responsible for the latter. This leg- Civilian moves to reduce the political and eco- islative change would not preclude a military bent nomic standing of the military frequently fueled on intervention from overstepping legal bound- tension in civil-military relations, most notably in aries, but it would increase the costs of undertak- the efforts to prosecute officers responsible for the ing such action. In addition to overseeing the deaths and “disappearances” during the Proceso or passage of the National Defense Law, the presi- “Dirty War.” The initial intention was to prosecute dent removed over two hundred active duty and only the top leadership and stop there; this was retired military personnel from the country’s chief largely accomplished by the end of 1985. Military intelligence agency, the Secretaría de Inteligencia y acquiescence to the trials was put to the test after Defensa del Estado (SIDE), members of the Argentine which is now directly subordi- legislature and some hu- nate to the presidency. man rights groups sought The Alfonsín government he Alfonsín government’s to extend the proceedings also proceeded with a drastic further down into the reduction in defense expendi- battle with the country’s ranks, specifically to the tures as well. The political mo- armed forces wound down level of unit commanders, tive to weaken the military inT implicating scores of junior every way possible reinforced on a fragile truce. officers. This would erode the economic incentives to cut the distinction that the the military budget and thus president initially had made reduce the country’s perni- between top officials who cious inflation and public debt. As a share of pub- had issued commands, individuals who had fol- lic sector expenditures, the armed forces occupied lowed orders, and those who had exceeded or- 32.3 percent in 1982, compared to 18.4 percent in ders. 1990.31 Stated in absolute terms, military expendi- In sum, the crux of government policy toward tures (in constant 1993 dollars) stood at $9.2 bil- the military under President Alfonsín was oriented lion in 1982 and fell to $4.9 billion by 1989.32 more toward restriction and exclusion than redi- Demobilization contributed to a large part of these recting the institution into activities and missions savings; between 1983 and 1989, the government aimed at keeping its members out of politics. De- reduced military personnel from 175,000 to militarization, not redirection through profession- 95,000.33 alization and modernization, formed the core of The budgetary cuts the government imposed government efforts during this period. This orien- on the armed forces weakened their operational tation is understandable in light of both the exten- capacity severely. The physical condition of build- sive misdeeds the military had committed in the ings and equipment deteriorated. By the late previous period and the public sentiment for pun- 1980s, finances were so tight that the work week ishing and weakening the armed forces on all was shortened and the capacity for training was se- fronts. Such a tack may even have been a neces- verely undermined by insufficient resources such sary precondition for later reintegrating the mili- as fuel and munitions.34 On any given day during tary on terms favorable to civilian rule. Efforts to this period, the barracks and army ministry were cut state resources for the institution also made empty by 2:00 p.m. Officers of all ranks were re- economic sense, given the crisis-ridden state of the ported to be “moonlighting.” be- Argentine economy and the competing demands came a part-time job rather than a profession of for public funds. singular dedication. While all of the services suf- At the same time, major sectors within the mili- fered from budget cuts, the army—historically tary perceived the policies of the Alfonsín era as a the most politically meddlesome branch—took multifront assault that stripped the institution of the biggest hit.35 In short, under the Alfonsín all prestige and deprived it of any role to perform, 13

including strictly military and professional func- his view, the blurring of the distinction results in tions. One student of the Argentine military ob- confusion about the military’s ultimate objectives. served that, “Government policies were aimed at Where military power takes on political connota- eliminating any danger posed by the armed forces tions, it is indeed unhealthy for democracy. But to either government or society. However, their where military power assumes institutional char- result was to combine steps toward political debili- acteristics—that is, when it bolsters institutional au- tation of the military with their institutional debili- tonomy in ways that enhance modernization and tation, which, in many ways, had the opposite professionalization—it may in fact facilitate the mil- effect of that intended.”36 Rather than depoliticiz- itary’s withdrawal from politics.39 Such a view is ing the institution and encouraging its reprofes- predicated on Huntington’s notion of objective sionalization, goals that enjoyed widespread civilian control, described above. support among officers, the strategy backfired Leaving the military with an ill-defined mission and led to renewed politicization and defiance and insufficient resources to reprofessionalize con- of civilian authority. tributed to the instability of civil-military relations Junior and mid-level army officers struck back under the Alfonsín government. Government pol- in three rebellions that took place between April icy in this critical period erred on the side of isolat- 1987 and December 1988. These officers became ing and excluding the unwieldy institution in an known as the (“painted faces”), effort to subordinate it. Nevertheless, the president named after the camouflage paint they applied to ended up negotiating with the military in the after- their faces. The primary and initial cause of mili- math of each rebellion, setting an inauspicious tary rebellion was the move to prosecute junior of- precedent for asserting the primacy of civilian ficers for human rights offenses. But the army’s power. Miscellaneous concessions were granted to perceived isolation, professional degradation, and the rebels, the most noteworthy of which absolved lack of mission further fueled the rebels’ campaign all officers below the rank of for human and expanded their following.37 As is the case with rights abuses, but little was done to try to design a junior officers nearly everywhere, those in Ar- role definition for the army in accordance with gentina tended to be more radical than their supe- what Argentine citizens would find acceptable and riors and were more insistent on wresting the what public resources they were willing to spend. conditions for a strong professional role from the The Alfonsín government’s battle with the coun- relevant political authorities. try’s armed forces wound down on a fragile truce. The army leadership initially did little to oppose the rebels since it, too, resented these develop- The Menem Administration’s Military ments and considered them detrimental to the in- Policy: Seeking Accommodation and stitution’s future. Its members were not willing to Integration initiate a confrontation with the government, fearing that such a move would risk further oppro- The Menem administration’s policies have been brium for the institution, but they were not above instrumental in depoliticizing the armed forces, quietly resisting civilian orders to subdue rebel- providing them with renewed prestige and profes- lion. The fact that army leaders discontinued their sional roles, and stabilizing civil-military relations. support of the carapintadas by the third and While civil-military relations under the Menem fourth rebellions, in which political and ideologi- government should not be held up as an cal issues figured more prominently than institu- model of civilian control, its policies may offer tional or professional ones, suggests that they did some lessons on how to induce military compli- not have an explicitly political agenda but, rather, ance and channel the energies of officers in apoliti- were interested in defending institutional integrity cal directions in countries where military elites first and foremost.38 have resisted subordination to civilian authority. The perceived linkage of political and institu- The key features of the Menem administration’s tional strength is something David Pion- strategy toward the military consist of conceding points to as a phenomenon that is consistently issues where implacable military hostility was misunderstood among civilian policymakers. In bound to persist, namely, human rights; upholding 14

the previous government’s efforts to weaken the defense budgets. Strengthening Menem’s capacity autonomy and standing of the institution (by cur- to hold his ground against the armed forces was tailing its political prerogatives and cutting defense the broader success of his economic policies, spending); and offering inducements to enhance namely, curbing inflation and restoring economic military compliance by encouraging peacekeeping growth after mid-1991. and other professionalizing roles. The Menem government has done little to re- President Menem’s relations with the military verse the demise of many of the military’s political began on a dramatic note. Shortly after assuming prerogatives effected under the Alfonsín adminis- power in July 1989, Menem granted a blanket par- tration. Institutional prerogatives transferred from to officers imprisoned for repression in the the military to the civilian-led Ministry of Defense Dirty War (including all junta members) and those under Alfonsín’s presidency have stayed within who led uprisings under the Alfonsín government. the ministry’s purview. The general prohibition of Having witnessed what three military rebellions military participation in internal security roles re- did to disrupt the preceding mains in place, save when administration, Menem’s first relevant civilian authorities priority was to purchase judge the situation to ex- peace with the military and f the military interpreted ceed the capability of the 41 then turn to other pressing is- Menem’s gesture as a sign of police. While not want- sues, namely, the deep eco- ing the army’s organiza- nomic crisis he had inherited. weakness and an invitation tional justification to If the military interpreted I shrink any further, many Menem’s gesture as a sign of to test the new president officers have grave reserva- weakness and an invitation to tions about reimmersing test the new president fur- further, it was mistaken. the institution in internal ther, it was mistaken. Hoping conflicts and linking sol- to extract more concessions, diers once again with the extremist elements in the Ar- repression of Argentine cit- gentine armed forces pushed their luck and re- izens, an inevitable consequence of such opera- volted for the fourth time since 1983.40 Menem tions.42 Analyst J. Samuel Fitch, who has rose to the challenge by ordering army leaders to conducted an extensive survey of attitudes among the rebellion; they complied, firing on rebel Argentine officers, documents a rather marked forces. By handling the uprising in this way, the change of sentiment toward internal security roles president bolstered his reputation for brooking no between 1985 and 1992: While 70 percent of offi- dissent and strengthened his credibility with the cers interviewed in 1985 listed internal security as military, dissuading would-be dissenters. Notably, a mission for the armed forces, by 1992 only 30 no military revolt has erupted since. percent of respondents on active duty regarded in- By the end of 1990, the fourth rebellion had ternal security as a military mission. Fitch writes, been thoroughly quashed and the leaders of the “[p]articularly among active-duty officers, there ap- Argentine junta had been pardoned. Only after the to be a widespread acceptance of the official dust settled on these events did civil-military rela- position that regular military forces are the last re- tions enter a period of accommodation. The gov- sort in cases of insurgency or internal disorder.”43 ernment now focused its attention squarely on the The military does have two other “subsidiary” or question of defining new military missions. By Jan- “secondary” missions that are internally oriented, uary 1991, the Menem administration had planted but these are highly circumscribed. The first is the seeds of reconciliation between itself and the logistical support in drug interdiction. The central military. responsibility for counternarcotics operations The subsequent stabilization of civil-military re- goes to civilian security forces, the Gendarmería lations helped President Menem uphold his prede- Nacional (border guards), the Prefectura Naval cessor’s reforms to curb the political autonomy of (coast guard), and the Federal Police.44 Even the armed forces and continue the trend of smaller though Argentina is only a transit country and not 15

a drug producer, the military has been adamant the armed forces. Regarding Argentina’s previous about not wanting to assume a larger drug inter- embrace of and nonalignment as un- diction role. Representatives of the U.S. military fitting for a country seeking to bring itself out of a have made overtures to the Argentine government decades-long economic decline, President Menem and armed forces to solicit their help in taking has advocated instead open markets, cooperative joint action against narco-trafficking.45 The security, and diplomacy. Menem’s close relation- Menem government, despite its strong interest in ship with the United States has eliminated obsta- remaining on good terms with the United States, cles to advantageous commercial and financial has consistently resisted drawing Argentina’s mili- relations, but his new internationalism has put fur- tary further into drug interdiction.46 ther pressure on the armed forces financially, re- Disaster relief is the only other internal role the stricting the types of weapons they can buy and armed forces perform. Recent examples of this ac- develop on their own. tivity include efforts by the army and air force to The austerity programs prescribed for Ar- treat people already infected and prevent further gentina by international lending institutions like contamination in the cholera epidemic that swept the International Monetary Fund and the World across Argentina’s northern during Bank have exerted downward pressure on the 1992–93. Both service branches helped transport country’s military budget. Continuing the trend to- the sick, brought thousands of liters of potable wa- ward lower military budgets, defense expenditures ter to the northern region, and set up water purifi- under Menem reached only 1.7 percent of gross cation equipment.47 Departing from a long history national product (GNP) in 1993, falling from 2.6 of civic action dating back to the beginning of the percent in 1989.53 This represents a dramatic drop —which included literacy education, med- compared to the late 1970s, when defense expen- ical services, and infrastructure development—the ditures stood at roughly 8 percent of gross domes- military now performs no civic action roles on a tic product (GDP).54 The relative decline from 1989 routine basis.48 Survey data gathered by Fitch in to 1993 corresponds to a small drop in absolute 1992 show that whereas half of the retired officers expenditures. Whereas military expenditures to- listed civic action as a legitimate military mission, taled $4.9 billion (in constant 1993 dollars), they only a quarter of the active-duty officers did so.49 fell to $4.2 billion in 1993.55 In line with cutting The recent elimination of compulsory military defense expenditures, the government reduced service has further diminished the armed forces’ force levels from 95,000 in 1989 to 65,000 in broader impact on society.50 Instituted in 1901, 1993.56 obligatory military service not only provided ade- As part of a comprehensive dismantling of pub- quate troop levels in the event of war, but also lic sector industries, the government privatized integrated and imparted a sense of patriotism to key military firms, including the arms producer Argentine citizens, who comprised high numbers .57 Other assets in the mili- of immigrants in the first half of the twentieth cen- tary’s vast real estate holdings were sold off as tury. President Menem eliminated Argentina’s well.58 Privatization has not only subjected the mil- tradition of after barely consulting itary’s weapons acquisition programs to the de- with the military leadership.51 The lack of public mands and uncertainties of a , it protest by the armed forces in the wake of this his- has also eliminated many managerial jobs for offi- toric decision was to how much author- cers and has greatly diminished the armed forces’ ity Menem had come to develop over men in impact on the economy. uniform.52 As of January 1995, Argentina left The Menem government’s drive to align its for- behind the era of the citizen-soldier and adopted eign policy unequivocally with powerful Western voluntary military service, a further step toward nations was undoubtedly the chief reason behind confining the military to a narrow professional its downgrading or elimination of high-technology sphere. projects, such as the CONDOR II ballistic missile, In the realm of economics and trade policy, the which the United States and other Western gov- strict neoliberal orientation of the Menem govern- ernments deemed objectionable. The dismantling ment has also posed various other challenges for of the CONDOR II program involved a struggle with 16

the air force, for which the project represented or- Argentina’s interest in their economic and strategic ganizational pride and a symbol of national sover- potential. While still determined to gain control eignty, but Menem ultimately prevailed. This act over the archipelago, Argentina has virtually aban- signaled an important shift in Argentina’s foreign doned the idea of doing so by military means, even policy and brought the Menem government closer though some of the country’s extreme nationalist to the United States.59 Another subsequent move groups—including some in the armed forces—still in this direction was Argentina’s decision to ad- hope for a military takeover of the islands. Re- here to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.60 cently, Argentina’s foreign ministry admitted that it Some countervailing measures have been en- would even consider paying inhabitants of the acted to conciliate the military, such as pay raises islands (who prefer to remain under British and the diversion of revenues from defense indus- dominion) to transfer the islands to Argentine try privatization to the purchase of new military sovereignty.63 In short, the foregoing develop- equipment. Also, President Menem’s emphasis on ments contribute to making military spending cooperative security—especially on confidence- an obvious target for a government seeking to building and other preventive measures—as a economize resources. means to reduce international tensions (and, by Hence, the Menem government has continued implication, to reduce the need for a large standing the trend toward downsizing that began under military) has put him in a better position to per- Alfonsín. In the decade between 1983 and 1993, suade the officer corps to accept smaller budgets military personnel fell from 175,000 to 65,000.64 and personnel levels. All in all, the Menem govern- Efforts to shape the army chain of command into a ment has continued to limit military spending as more pyramidal structure have heightened compe- part of its program to restore economic growth tition for places at the top. The seventy slots re- and stability and to restrict the construction of sen- served for generals between 1983 and 1989 fell to sitive military high-technology projects.61 forty-two in the period 1990–91, to thirty-four in Changes in objective threats facing Argentina 1992–93, and to thirty-two in 1995.65 provide no real impetus to counteract the eco- If the Argentine armed forces are in such dire nomic pressures to downgrade the military’s arse- straits, what inhibits them from expressing their nal and capacity for modernization. Chile remains displeasure and strong-arming the government to Argentina’s biggest rival, though diminished ten- redress the situation? On the one hand, leading of- sions with this country as well as with Brazil (an- ficers regard as insurmountable the political and other historical adversary) have rendered rather economic pressures to confine the goals and eco- remote the possibility of a conventional war. Ar- nomic means of the institution, short of forcing an gentina and Chile—while at the brink of war in undesirable confrontation that President Menem— 1978 over three islands in the — shielded by the support of large sectors the Argen- signed a series of agreements in 1991 that put an tine elite and middle class—would be almost sure end to most of their outstanding border conflicts. to win. Acutely aware of the armed forces’ image, In December 1991, Argentina and Brazil, the two they have noted that periods in which low military Latin American countries with relatively advanced budgets and salaries (accompanied by military nuclear programs, mutually consented to opening complaints) have been major news items are typi- their nuclear facilities to inspection by the Interna- cally followed by dips in the public’s approval rat- tional Atomic Energy Agency. The prospect of ing of the institution.66 Beyond institutional greater economic integration between Brazil and considerations, individual officers need to be con- Chile enhances the probability of continued peace cerned about their own careers when speaking in the region.62 In addition to diminished tensions out against the government. Being passed up for with bordering countries, Argentina has reestab- promotion or led into retirement in more direct lished diplomatic ties with the ways constitute genuine professional threats, espe- and has committed itself to bilateral negotiations cially in an era of such streamlining.67 aimed at resolving the historical dispute over the Beyond the disincentives for resisting civilian Malvinas/Falkland Islands. Oil exploration in the directives, the armed forces are relatively quiescent area around the islands has recently heightened because the Menem government has also offered 17

them at least the minimal amount of resources to even sponsored the creation of a peacekeeping op- satisfy their core institutional and professional in- erations training center in Argentina for troops terests. In the interest of conciliation, President from around the world. President Menem inaugu- Menem has tried to bolster military prestige and rated this center, the Centro Argentino de Entre- find external professionalizing roles for the institu- namiento Conjunto para Operaciones de Paz tion to play. Sending Argentina’s armed forces on (CAECOPAZ), on 27, 1995. peacekeeping missions through- For the Argentine government, UN peacekeep- out the world since 1990 is the centerpiece of this ing bolsters the pursuit of an international eco- aspect of Menem’s military policy.68 Peacekeeping nomic and foreign policy closely aligned with the has provided the Argentine armed forces with pro- United States. It has also given the government a fessional experience, higher salaries, and a boost way to offer the country’s historically problematic in morale, serving as a counterweight to the re- military a credible, positive, medium-expense mis- strictions that domestic financial burdens impose. sion. For the military, peacekeeping im- It also constitutes a way of portant institutional and integrating the military, mar- professional concerns, the ginalized in many other eacekeeping has first of which is morale. For an ways, into broader govern- institution that was an interna- ment objectives. provided the Argentine tional pariah less than a The idea to engage the Ar- decade ago, becoming a leader gentine armed forces in in- armed forces with profes- in UN peacekeeping boosts ternational peacekeeping P self-image and morale, of criti- operations and elevate this sional experience, higher cal importance for keeping activity to a central mission down restiveness in the bar- came directly from President salaries, and a boost in racks. Marching alongside Menem, and the U.S. troops in a Gulf War wel- provided the first opportu- morale. come-home parade—a much nity to lead them in this di- reported event back home in rection. In September 1990, Argentina—was a dramatic a little over a year into his presidency, Menem and change of profile for Argentine troops.72 Most his minister of foreign affairs decided to join the members of Argentina’s service branches welcome UN-sanctioned blockade against Iraq, sending two the ability to travel and gain foreign experience, ships, air force transport planes, and approxi- and this is especially true among the army’s sol- mately six hundred commissioned and noncom- diers, few of whom have traditionally gone abroad. missioned officers to the Gulf.69 Thereafter, Higher wages that accrue to those engaged in for- Argentina became one of the UN’s most reliable eign operations also provide relief from the dismal participants in peacekeeping operations. In financial situation plaguing most military person- 1992, Argentina sent an army battalion to , nel in Argentina.73 Furthermore, the opportunity including close to nine hundred commissioned to train and work with some of the world’s most and noncommissioned officers, with new person- highly trained militaries provides solid profes- nel rotating in and out of the region every six sional experience for soldiers eager to exercise and months. Since then, the government has sent enhance their skills.74 In Fitch’s 1992 survey of Ar- troops to places as far ranging as Somalia, Cyprus, gentine officers, 81 percent of respondents sup- Kuwait, Haiti, , and other trouble spots. ported the international peacekeeping mission, as One analyst writes, “If 1992 and 1993 rates of opposed to only 3 percent in 1985.75 Argentine involvement continue, by the middle of Officers of more advanced militaries, which the decade, over half of the military’s permanent face higher prospects of carrying out traditional personnel will have participated in international combat roles, tend not to view peacekeeping in the missions.”70 In 1994, three thousand men from same way. Among such armed forces, peacekeep- the Argentine armed services went abroad and ing is often considered a “second best” activity, per- took part in such missions.71 The government has haps even one that threatens the institution’s 18

ability to carry out more exciting and sophisticated civilian leadership has managed to assert a high operations.76 Along these lines, Robert , a level of authority over the military institution and veteran student of the Argentine military, notes to diminish its jurisdiction. The military’s principal that the military’s embrace of peacekeeping is a mission is external defense; international peace- concession to the fact that its standing in Argen- keeping plays an important secondary role. Only tine society has dropped.77 However, the scope of under exceptional circumstances does the army what encompasses peacekeeping has greatly ex- engage in internal functions. panded in the post–Cold War era. Peacekeeping President Alfonsín’s positive contributions as not only often brings military troops into a variety well as his failings lay in measures to enhance sub- of politically complicated situations, but it also jective civilian control. By transferring military pre- now can include such elements as “civil functions, rogatives to civilian institutions, Alfonsín aimed to disarming , providing security to the popu- “demilitarize” the military. However, such a strat- lation, rescuing ‘failed’ countries, organizing elec- egy caused the armed forces to feel professionally tions, launching preventive deployment, and politically marginalized and provoked their encouraging peace settlement, providing humani- members into attempting to regain institutional tarian assistance, or security for delivery of human- strength through extraconstitutional means. itarian assistance.”78 President Menem, while keeping the military’s Some Argentine officers share some of the more role definition narrow and modest, has adopted a fundamental doubts of their counterparts from strategy that includes some of the defining features more advanced militaries regarding peacekeeping of objective control. In contrast with the predeces- operations, insisting that collective security efforts sor government, the Menem administration allows should not replace the defense of sovereign terri- uniformed leaders more autonomy in professional tory as the number one goal of the Argentine matters. For example, while setting down general armed forces. At the same time, however, many of guidelines for restructuring, it has left the details of them recognize the need for noncombat activities demobilization to the military. Similarly, it has not to occupy Argentine troops, at least until resources directly tried to influence the attitudes and con- improve and the armed forces find a more credible duct of junior officers. Instead, it has made senior and acceptable set of roles to perform. In the leaders acutely aware that their own professional meantime, much of the military leadership, as well survival and ascent rests on promoting the notions as the rank and file, remain enthusiastic about of subordination and adherence to civilian author- donning the UN’s blue helmets. ity among the ranks. In these and other ways, non- In short, Argentina’s experience with peace- interference in each other’s sphere of influence keeping missions provides an important example characterizes the relationship between the Menem for new democracies seeking to reorient their mili- government and the armed forces. taries away from internal security to roles that are Beyond this “live and let live” theme in current more appropriate for democratic regimes in the government policy toward the military, Menem post–Cold War era. This is not to suggest that has gone further than Alfonsín in trying to inte- peacekeeping is a panacea for diverting the armed grate the armed forces into the government. Peace- forces from domestic political temptations, or that keeping forms a central part of the integrative it will replace the need for a careful redefinition of aspect of Menem’s military policy. By sending national military missions. But at the very least, the the armed forces on peacekeeping missions, the merits of peacekeeping operations as an interim government signals that they have a respectable, role in a transitional period should be seriously explicitly military contribution to make in the considered. sphere of foreign relations. Hence, the Menem government has introduced into its military policy Assessment of the Current Situation some basic elements of a model of objective con- trol. Even though the application of such a strategy Civil-military relations in postauthoritarian in Argentina does not involve highly sophisticated Argentina have undergone a dramatic shift. The training and weaponry, the elements that are in 19

place have helped to stabilize civil-military rela- drastic budget cuts. But doing so could very well tions and keep the armed forces’ jurisdiction disrupt the underpinnings of objective control and confined. destabilize civil-military relations. Indeed, the Argentine military has assumed a Menem’s critics also note that senior officers much lower political profile since 1990; for the have not used their decision-making influence most part, it is subordinate to civilian authority over the allocation of defense expenditures to the and oriented toward the external realm. Needless institution’s advantage. The critics contend that to say, what the armed forces perceived as “hostil- rather than accepting current realities and making ity” on the part of Alfonsín strengthens their will- their forces smaller yet more efficient, there is little ingness to accept Menem’s “friendly” efforts at rhyme or reason to the current process of restruc- subordination. There is much to be said for these turing. Reform has not been undertaken with an developments, especially in light of the institu- eye toward creating an integrated defense system. tion’s history of political unwieldiness and the Given that 80 percent of all defense expenditures tense state of civil-military relations as recently as go toward salaries, the remaining percentage during the Alfonsín government. In this respect, needs to be used efficiently.81 However, rather the experience of the Menem government may of- than coordinating their efforts, the three service fer some lessons in how to tame the armed forces branches are undertaking separate restructuring and keep them quiescent. projects. Many of the weapons being salvaged or Critics of Menem’s military policy are quick to acquired do not comprise a logical system; they are note that much “” military autonomy in not only costly but are useless from the standpoint everyday decision making within the Defense Min- of providing the country with a true measure of de- istry is one result of the president’s “hands off” fense. Expensive weapons that have been pur- posture toward explicitly military matters. This au- chased often lack the requisite human and tonomy stems in no small part from the fact that material resources to maintain them.82 “The Ar- civilians abdicate their responsibilities from the gentine military,” one analyst has commented, “is lack of either interest or knowledge, or a combina- like a trunkless elephant.”83 These outcomes—de tion of the two. To be sure, men in uniform, on ac- facto military autonomy in the area of defense and tive duty and retired, continue to set the agenda still rather ample defense expenditures—may be and the parameters of discussion over such ques- the necessary price exacted for the strategy of ob- tions as which defense programs should be devel- jective control the Menem government has fol- oped or phased out.79 lowed. Pursuing a more comprehensive process of In this connection it should be underscored reform would have to these problems, but that defense expenditures, despite reductions in doing so could well antagonize the military and recent years, still consume a large part of the coun- disrupt the accommodation that President Menem try’s budget. Even with demobilization, the de- has forged. fense budget is on par with that of education, If civilians and the military in Argentina have culture, and health combined.80 The purpose of al- succeeded in defining the military’s main mission locating financial resources on this order is ques- as external defense and greatly limiting the institu- tionable in light of the country’s diminished tion’s reach in other areas, their counterparts in external threats and poverty concerns that still neighboring Brazil have not made such a commit- need to be addressed. From the standpoint of ment. While they have circumscribed the armed social needs and efficient resource allocation, there forces’ influence over distinctly political questions, is a reasonable argument to be made for even more military roles remain relatively diversified. 20

as its Argentine counterpart, nor as privileged as the Chilean. In order to understand why the atten- tion and resources of the are spread over such far-reaching activities, it is necessary to examine the history of the institution, THE BRAZILIAN including its most recent experience in power. Such an examination should also include current MILITARY political and economic factors, especially the coun- try’s persistent weakness of civilian authority and Intermediate problems of governance.84 3Autonomy and The Military as Nation-Builder, Poder Diversified Missions Moderador, and Champion of Brazil’s World-Power Status

Since the birth of the republic in 1889, the Brazil- ian armed forces have spent the lion’s share of their resources and organizational energy in roles related to internal security as well as the overall de- velopment of the country. Beginning in the early twentieth century, the army spearheaded explo- rations in outlying regions of Brazil; planned and ilitary and civilian leaders in post- oversaw the construction of infrastructure, princi- authoritarian Brazil have openly pally roads and telecommunications systems, to Mtackled the question of what role the integrate the vast country; and established and armed forces should serve for the remainder of managed state-owned firms in strategic areas of this century and into the next. As in Argentina, the the economy, such as energy and minerals. These political and economic standing of the Brazilian roles helped to create and sustain the military’s military, as well as the nature of threats facing the self-image as an indispensable agent of national country, constitute critical determinants of what development and progress. Moreover, such roles missions the armed forces will carry out. In terms positioned the armed forces to champion the idea of their political and economic strength, as well as that Brazil, a huge and resource-rich country, was their standing in society, the Brazilian armed destined to greatness and world-power status. The forces stand midway between the Argentine and aspiration to transform Brazil into a world player the Chilean. Brazil’s armed forces have greater accounts in part for the military’s developmental clout than the Argentine military in lobbying for orientation and mania for large-scale projects, their preferred roles, but unlike their Chilean leading it to promote ventures ranging from the counterparts, they are not sufficiently influential to development and occupation of the Amazon re- be able to pick and choose what missions they are gion to the construction of a nuclear submarine. willing to perform. From the last century until now, the Brazilian Of the three militaries in question, the Brazilian military has also played a central role in quelling has the largest sphere of operations at the present internal conflicts. In the last century, army troops time, including conventional external defense, in- quashed local rebellions, including state seces- ternational peacekeeping, internal security (in- sionist movements in the 1930s. In the 1960s and cluding drug interdiction), and civic action. If the early 1970s, they assumed a counterinsurgency Argentine military has little choice but to accept a role against suspected subversives. As recently as role definition limited to modest external defense, 1995, soldiers invaded the slums of Rio de Janeiro and the Chilean armed forces can focus on making to root out criminal gangs and drug traffickers. conventional defense a primary and robust mis- Since the inception of the republic, all Brazilian sion, the Brazilian military is neither as restricted constitutions have recognized and legitimated a 21

role for the armed forces in providing domestic military presidents, Generals Ernesto Geisel law and order. (1974–79) and João Figueiredo (1979–85), to As an extension of this internal security focus, keep a firm grip on the transition back to democ- the Brazilian armed forces have historically arro- racy and to preserve important institutional pre- gated to themselves the role of poder moderador rogatives for the military in the process.87 (“moderating power”). Their leaders would justify Compared with the thoroughly discredited Argen- repeated military interventions as efforts to “mod- tine armed forces, the Brazilian military entered erate” politics or stop governments (even elected the new democratic period with considerable in- ones) from becoming too radical, generally mean- fluence over both its own institutional affairs and ing “left-leaning.” Beginning with the removal of extramilitary matters as well. However, it did not the monarchy in 1889, the army became the ulti- retain legal guarantees of the degree and kind the mate arbiter of Brazilian politics. After helping to Chilean armed forces have used to bolster their po- the oligarchic regime in 1930, the litical as well as their professional standing. armed forces threw their support to Getúlio Var- gas, responsible for instituting important state- The Political and Economic Context for and nation-building reforms in the Estado Novo Redefining Military Missions (1937–45). In the years between 1945 and 1964, Brazil’s previous period of democracy, military ac- The armed forces enjoyed considerable political tions were decisive in influencing the course of influence under Brazil’s first postauthoritarian several national political crises.85 government (1985–90), led by José Sarney. During After mounting a coup d’etat in 1964, the mili- this time, they successfully insisted on maintaining tary headed the government for twenty-one years. internal security as a central role and also made The guiding doctrine of the period, encapsulated strides to enhance their external defense capabili- in the slogan “security and development,” saw a ties. Since then, beginning with the government of close connection between ensuring social stability Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–92), the military (by stemming political mobilization) and safe- has become more vulnerable to civilian influences guarding capitalist . In the that impinge on its role definition. The diminution first decade of the dictatorship, the military regime of threats from Brazil’s traditional external ene- demobilized the radical left and greatly expanded mies and the virtual disappearance of communist Brazil’s industrial plant. The modernization of insurgencies coincided with the political weaken- and large-scale (often ecologically de- ing of the military and its subsequent struggle to structive) development projects in the Amazon maintain increasingly tenuous claims on the bud- were among the hallmarks of the economic expan- get. Together, these factors forced the military and sion that took place in these years. Despite the the civilian leadership to confront the need to rede- legacy of repression (comparatively mild in rela- fine military missions. Dependent on resources al- tion to what occurred in Argentina and Chile) and located by civilian politicians, the military could financial debt, Brazil’s military governments man- no longer dictate its own role and found it neces- aged to garner an impressive degree of public sary to justify its purpose. The following discus- support for themselves.86 The country’s bureau- sion seeks to illustrate where the process of cratic-authoritarian regime was neither as brutal as redefining military missions has led and to explain the Argentine dictatorship, nor as economically what political and economic factors have influ- successful as the Chilean. enced the specific roles assigned to and assumed The military as an institution emerged from the by Brazil’s armed forces. authoritarian governments of 1964–85 in a fairly favorable position. Notwithstanding the legacy of Conventional External Defense. Unified support financial debt, the economic successes the public exists among all branches of Brazil’s armed forces associated with Brazil’s military governments, the for expanding conventional external defense mis- comparatively low incidence of human rights vio- sions. The raison d’etre of most militaries—even lations they committed, and the public support ones that meddle in domestic politics—is to protect they managed to command allowed the last two or advance national sovereignty. Moreover, by 22

1985, being in power for over two decades had 1985. Land Force 1990 (Força Terrestre 1990), the taken its toll on the institution. After experiencing army’s plan for reorganization and reequipment, the typical strains of military rule—politicization, called for new and improved weaponry (especially factionalism, corruption, and an erosion of strictly in the area of advanced electronics), new garrisons military capabilities—many officers anticipated (particularly in the northern Amazon region), and with relief and eagerness the renewed attention be- a major increase in troops (from 183,000 to ing given to preparing for combat roles. roughly 296,000) over several years.89 The air In principle, virtually no civilian politicians take force sought to develop new air-to-air missiles, issue with this goal. In debates over military provi- telecommunications , and a subsonic jet sions in Brazil’s 1988 constitution, many progres- fighter, the AMX. Sustaining these programs would sive politicians argued that the defense of naturally require high levels of funding. territorial integrity should be the sole purpose of Since 1985, however, and especially after 1988, Brazil’s armed forces. Yet even proponents of an when the new constitution bolstered the bud- exclusively external orientation for the country’s getary powers of Congress, the pressure on de- military could not then, and still cannot now, pro- fense spending has complicated and rendered vide many concrete and compelling war scenarios difficult the realization of these ambitious plans. that directly involve Brazil. The external threats Unlike the Argentine case, this pressure stems pri- facing Brazil that demand a large and vastly marily from domestic political and economic im- equipped military are indeed few and remote, es- peratives, not from foreign governments and pecially given the resolution of previous disputes lending agencies. For example, up until it was with Argentina. Even leading officers themselves forced to abandon the program in February 1996 are hard pressed to point to tangible external ene- due to financial constraints, the ’s main goal mies, arguing instead that defense is like insur- was to advance its nuclear-powered submarine ance: something one cannot pay for only when the program. Relative to Argentina, economic restruc- need arises. But in a setting where economic re- turing in Brazil has proceeded slowly and has not sources are tight and hotly contested, politicians entailed such strict acquiescence to foreign author- find themselves reluctant to allocate funds for ities, although the Brazilian government has come such vague potential contingencies. Electoral com- under some foreign pressure to abandon its strate- petition has motivated Brazil’s patronage-oriented gic projects.90 politicians to search ever more energetically for As a share of the nation’s budget, Brazil’s mili- economic assets to distribute as political bar- tary spending has declined from 20.65 percent in rel, thereby improving their electoral chances. De- 1985 to 14.27 percent in 1993.91 Absolute military fense expenditures in Brazil yield little electoral expenditures, according to U.S. and capital; the employs few people and Disarmament Agency figures, fell from $7.5 billion is concentrated in one state. Moreover, the Brazil- in 1988 to $5.8 in 1993 (in constant 1993 dollars). ian legislature has limited influence over military Between these same years, military expenditures bases. Hence, civilian ministries that lend them- went from occupying 1.4 percent to 1.1 percent of selves more readily to pork barrel politics, such as GNP.92 Force levels for the three branches, rather transportation, education, and health, have more than taking the upward turn the services had appeal among politicians.88 The amount Brazil’s hoped for, decreased from 319,000 in 1988 to politicians are willing to allocate for defense 296,000 in 1993.93 Military officials have appears insufficient for making external combat lamented their financial constraints, complaining roles the sole or even primary mission of the that their equipment is outdated and that troops armed forces, especially the army. Without a more are unable to perform routine exercises. According extensive organizational justification, the military to one informed source, “The country’s military seems unable to ward off a loss of resources and can scarcely deploy highly trained units, downsizing. with limited air cover, for antiguerrilla operations, During the Sarney presidency, especially in its and does not have a force structure capable of en- first half, all three branches of the armed forces gaging in an international confrontation.”94 managed to make headway in technological Defense of Brazil’s Amazon border is the one modernization programs they had announced in “external” project that has commanded attention 23

and resources in the decade following the return to As part of the military’s intensified assertion of civilian rule and remains the primary security con- control over Amazonia, the armed forces initiated cern of Brazil’s armed forces at the present time. the Calha Norte (“Northern Headwaters”) project The part of the Amazon within Brazil occupies a lit- in 1985. Calha Norte involves strengthening secu- tle more than five million square kilometers and rity along the northern border through a system of represents 59 percent of all of Brazil’s territory.95 military posts, airstrips and garrisons, roads, and From a strictly military perspective, the Amazon “colonization” projects.99 Encompassing 14 per- region is vulnerable; it is sparsely populated, and cent of the nation’s territory, the Calha Norte pro- the nine-thousand-kilometer border itself is poorly ject essentially put roughly four thousand miles of defined and defended.96 Traditional geopolitical Brazil’s border under military jurisdiction, pleas- views of the river basin’s susceptibility to foreign ing the Sarney administration’s (1985–90) sup- penetration inform and reinforce current military port of military efforts to strengthen border views toward Amazonia. The armed forces may ex- defense. aggerate some recent threats, which include drug Since the early 1990s, military units have relo- trafficking; foreign guerrilla insurgents who regu- cated to the northern border from the states of the larly cross the border; prospectors from neighbor- center-south, such as Rio de Janeiro and Rio ing countries pilfering and other contraband; Grande do Sul.100 In 1992, the army created a new foreign environmental military command head- movements devoted to sav- quartered in the northern 101 ing the Amazon rom a strictly military state of Pará. President from further destruction; Fernando Collor de Mello and even the U.S. Army, perspective, the Amazon (1990–92) supported in which recently conducted principle advances in exercises along the border region is vulnerable; it is Amazonian defense that in .97 Nevertheless, F the military tried to make the defense of the Amazon sparsely populated, and the under his tenure. borders is probably the Under Collor’s succes- most credible external role nine-thousand-kilometer sor, Itamar Franco the Brazilian military could (1992–94), the military perform in the late twenti- border itself is poorly defined made progress toward an- eth century. The military in- other major defense stitution’s marginalization and defended. project, Sistema de Vig- in the sphere of Brazil’s po- ilância da Amazonia, or litical life renders its Ama- SIVAM (System for the Vigi- zon claims especially vital. The armed forces do lance of the Amazon). SIVAM is an expensive sur- not appear to have any expansionist designs in the veillance system consisting of satellites, region, but they do make much ado of anything ground-based and airborne sensors, and environ- that can be construed as a threat. There is virtual mental data-collection platforms.102 SIVAM’s radars consensus within the armed forces for fortifying will be able to monitor invasions of the country’s security in the region. airspace by planes and missiles and track the Civilians across the political spectrum also sup- movement of ships and ground troops. The pro- port strengthened security in the Amazon, at least gram has the potential for use in environmental in principle. Political groups of practically every protection, but it appears to be essentially a mili- stripe can identify with the nationalist implications tary project aimed principally at post–Cold War, of guarding the resource-rich region from foreign nonstate (“gray-area”) threats, such as drug traf- interests. Progressive forces see an added benefit in ficking and the movement of other contraband, relocating army units and their internal security guerrilla insurgencies, and recent challenges functions away from Brazil’s large urban centers to posed by indigenous peoples’ movements in the the remote Amazon region.98 In the 1989 presiden- region. tial campaign, virtually all candidates endorsed a Most signs suggest that military efforts to en- central role for the military in the Amazon. hance its mission in Amazonia will continue, but 24

even this mission is subject to political and deliberation, eleven hundred Brazilian troops em- economic constraints. The political weakness of barked on a peacekeeping operation in Angola, President Sarney, which reinforced military influ- constituting the largest Brazilian military opera- ence, contributed to the institution’s ability to tion overseas since II.104 Prior to that, a stake out its claims in the Amazon. It succeeded, Brazilian general supervised the withdrawal of despite the heavy pressure exerted on the Brazilian Cuban troops from Angola.105 government by foreign environmental groups, Brazil’s involvement in and An- governments, and lending institutions to rein in gola stems from the country’s long-standing ties to the occupation and development of the rainforest. the two former Portuguese colonies. Both coun- Under President Collor, whose neoliberal eco- tries, especially Angola, have been the site of Brazil- nomic program made him more susceptible to in- ian investment, particularly in developing Angola’s ternational opinion and whose political strength petroleum industry. The army ministry saw the An- (at least initially) made him willing to challenge golan mission as a good opportunity for training, the military, the advancement of Project Calha and the army’s mission there is also undoubtedly Norte practically came to a halt. The project was linked to Brazil’s positive assessment of the coun- subject to scrutiny on environmental grounds and try’s investment . The United Nations was deprived of funds by civilian ministers and sought Brazilian participation in its Angola and politicians for whom it was not a priority. Mozambique missions because of the common Collor’s successor, Itamar Franco, allowed mili- language. Recently, U.S. Secretary of Defense tary influence to expand in response to his own be- William Perry expressed interest in seeing greater leaguered presidency and conceded to military Brazilian participation in UN peacekeeping lobbying for SIVAM. The go-ahead for the surveil- efforts.106 lance system, approved in 1993, came in We should not expect to see Brazil assume a the wake of extensive saber-rattling over the dwin- peacekeeping role on the scale of the Argentine dling funds devoted to the military’s budget. How- armed forces. Brazil’s foreign ministry does not re- ever, the program has been suspended over gard such operations as key to the country’s charges of corruption in the contracting process. broader foreign policy goals. Even though impor- Despite the scandal in the SIVAM program, Brazil’s tant segments of Brazil’s civilian and military lead- president since 1995, Fernando Henrique Car- ership have ceased to embrace anti-American doso, has done little so far to restrict military activi- strains of Third World nationalism, Brazil still re- ties vis-à-vis Amazonia, which will most likely sists coming under the influence of the United remain the principal focus of the Brazilian armed States and international organizations subject to forces’ activities. If past patterns serve as any indi- heavy U.S. influence. Much more than Argentina, cation, though, a weakening of the military politi- Brazil has tried to remain independent in its eco- cally will mean less maneuvering room for the nomic and foreign-policy making even as it under- institution even with respect to one of its most goes economic restructuring and the shift to a legitimate and widely supported missions. more open market economy. Moreover, peacekeeping remains tangential to Peacekeeping. Brazil’s military has participated in the establishment of an institutional purpose capa- a few international peacekeeping efforts, but such ble of preserving a major military organization. In operations are far from a central mission for the contemporary Latin America, only a very weak- country’s armed services. Between 1965 and ened and discredited military, like the Argentine, 1966—when Brazil was the principal Latin Ameri- would embrace peacekeeping as a central mission. can contributor to the Inter-American Peace Force Even in such cases, the military regards it as “sec- in the —and the end of 1993, ond best” to combat roles. As such, the Brazilian Brazil had little involvement in international mili- military is concerned that allocating money and re- tary missions. At the present time, Brazil has small sources to peace operations will detract from contingents of troops in Mozambique (at one other, more central, missions.107 Such reasoning is point, up to 850 soldiers), , and consistent with the military’s resistance to aban- the former Yugoslavia.103 In 1995, after much don sensitive military technology programs.108 It 25

is also consistent with the traditional aspiration of trafficking.111 Many regard the army as the most the officer corps to see Brazil develop into an im- obvious institution to combat them. portant and relatively independent power. No one disputes that crime in Brazil’s urban centers is a grave problem, especially in Rio de Internal security. The Brazilian military’s role Janeiro. Gambling, racketeering, gang violence, the definition goes beyond the conventional defense trafficking of arms and drugs, and general disorder and peacekeeping activities discussed above to in- create a tremendous sense of public insecurity. For clude internal security and civic action. Many polit- the last several years, the hills surrounding Rio de ical leaders and citizens alike regard the problems Janeiro have witnessed nightly shootouts. From surrounding these internal missions as more im- time to time, gangs descend onto the beaches of mediate than those supporting the military’s exter- the city and rob people en masse. The police tend nal defense roles. Internal missions bolster the to be corrupt, lack credibility, and are outgunned army’s organizational justification in particular by criminal gangs.112 The military maintains that and thereby help this service branch resist budget fighting crime is a job for the police.113 At the same cuts and reductions in force levels. In contrast to time, the military is well aware that the crime prob- the situation in Argentina, comparatively solid lem will not be resolved short of an all-out reform public support for the Brazilian military regime and reequipping of the police, something that has allowed the military as an institution to keep Brazil’s civilian leadership has yet to tackle in a traditional internal activities and even acquire comprehensive way.114 Military leaders also note some new ones. In light of these and other factors, that it is not their prerogative to set policy but, the army in Brazil has maintained a highly diversi- rather, to respond to civilian orders. Recent years fied role definition. have given rise to numerous civilian-initiated pro- Internal security missions enlist military troops posals to deploy army troops to combat urban vio- in what are essentially police or national guard lence. Two particular instances of military functions, including combating crime in urban participation in crime control deserve mention areas and drug interdiction. Civilian and military since they reveal the sources of civilian and mili- support for military involvement in such activities tary support for the army’s participation in inter- is mixed, but army troops have nonetheless car- nal security as well as the bases of its reservations ried out these functions in recent years, at least on regarding such activities. a temporary or emergency basis. Internal security Military troops were deployed to guard Rio de roles rest squarely within the tradition of the Janeiro during the 1992 United Nations environ- Brazilian armed forces, as all Brazilian constitu- mental conference. The army’s massive presence tions have sanctioned military involvement in in the city reduced the incidence of crime sharply guaranteeing “law and order.”109 The constitution and led to an outpouring of public praise and sug- in place since 1988 allows the military to continue gestions that the army assume regular police func- to play this traditional central role but goes further tions. Charged with safeguarding the city during than previous basic laws in making sure that civil- the Earth Summit, military intelligence mapped ian authorities decide the terms of the military’s out areas particularly prone to problems stemming involvement. from drugs, arms trafficking, and criminal gangs. What constitutes Brazil’s current internal secu- The army drew up a plan of action should conflict rity problems? The threat to stability posed by the spiral out of control during the conference. country’s radical left in the 1960s has all but disap- The army became more deeply involved in in- peared. Brazil’s most important leftist party, the ternal security in the fall of 1994. By August of that Workers’ Party, is firmly committed to electoral year, organized crime and related gang violence, politics. The demise of certainly low- gambling racketeers (bicheiros), and general dis- ers the probability that threats to internal security order in the slums of Rio de Janeiro (much of it re- of the kind that prompted the military to intervene lated to the trafficking of arms and drugs) had in the 1960s will return.110 Nevertheless, other in- reached such alarming proportions that civilian ternal conflicts remain and are even on the rise, in- authorities were forced to consider taking aggres- cluding crime in Brazil’s major cities and drug sive action to combat it. They looked to the army. 26

The great majority of the city’s residents supported military involvement in such roles should go only the idea of the institution’s intervention: 82 per- as far as providing logistical support and not ex- cent favored such a prospect, 13 percent rejected tend to direct operations.124 it, and 5 percent expressed uncertainty.115 The army has demonstrated on several occa- In an offensive called “Operation Rio,” the army sions that it does not want to abdicate its guardian commanded its own soldiers, the , role, enshrined in the constitutional prerogative to the federal police, and the state’s civil police in a maintain “law and order.” But at the same time, the massive sweep of the favelas (slums) of Rio de unfolding of Operation Rio indicated that most of- Janeiro. The operation, described as a “sweeping ficers reject the development of a regular and out” of the favelas, lasted from to De- central mission in internal security. A frequently cember 30, 1994.116 The purpose was to over- stated objection is that public security puts the in- whelm traffickers and gangs, remove the large stitution at the center of society’s conflicts without caches of arms that had accumulated in the hill- granting its leaders broader policymaking author- sides, and put in place public works for the impov- ity. Another objection is that police duties do not erished residents of the city’s favelas.117 Operation require distinctive military skills, diminishing the Rio was not an independent military initiative. army’s unique professional standing and dragging Rather, it was launched as a joint initiative of the it into situations for which its soldiers are not pre- state and the pared. The potential for president after undertak- corruption in fighting orga- ing careful planning and nized crime is a further legal precautions.118 Presi- nlike the Argentine concern. Asking poorly dent Cardoso approved military, which is paid military personnel to another military sweep of interdict drugs and inter- the favelas in March 1995, necessarily confined to vene in other forms of calling for participation U crime that involve large from all three service modest external activities, amounts of money is to branches.119 Before assum- tempt fate. ing the presidency, Car- Brazil’s army retains the doso maintained that it Civic Action. Civic action was not appropriate for the popular support to operate roles are part of a long- military to be involved in standing tradition in the police duties due to their on the domestic front. Brazilian armed forces. lack of proper training.120 They are rooted in notions Yet given the gravity of the of the military as an agent situation, which he likened to an “undeclared civil of development and a state- and nation-builder.125 war,” he eventually sent them back in. Many Brazilian officers continue to think of their Support for army intervention rose from 82 per- institution as a force for national integration and cent to 86 percent in a poll conducted after sol- the sole representative of the state in remote re- diers first occupied the streets of the city.121 gions of a vast and underdeveloped country. Con- Overall support for the military as an institution crete examples of enlisting military troops in civic ran high in the aftermath of the fall 1994 opera- action include the construction of roads, bridges, tion, despite the occurrence of human rights viola- dams, and other infrastructure projects, and the tions.122 As the weeks passed, especially after provision of education, food, and field health ser- human rights violations were exposed, the army vices in impoverished and remote areas. reiterated its position that public security not be As the institution with the most penetration into part of a permanent mission but, rather, only an the country’s interior, the Brazilian military began episodic role during emergencies. Military leaders its social action mission at the end of the last cen- appeared increasingly concerned about staying in tury.126 The 1950s and 1960s witnessed renewed the favelas too long and having public sentiment attention to military involvement in such activities turn against the army troops.123 They stressed that when U.S. policymakers tried to mobilize Latin 27

American militaries to assume development roles jeopardize their ability to perform and acquire re- in order to diminish the attraction of leftist move- sources for more sophisticated combat roles? ments among the continent’s poor.127 The Brazil- Another objection is that domestic assignments ian military has revisited civic action in recent in general immerse the military in social and eco- years, beginning with the Franco administration nomic problems, which could eventually pose a (1992–94). Since then, the army has stepped up ef- threat to institutional boundaries. Many officers forts in poverty-stricken areas to distribute do- seek to lift the institution out of the kinds of con- nated food; construct roads, public housing, and flicts in which it was mired for over two decades. sanitation systems; and provide field health and Yet another source of resistance stems from the at educational services. In the first four months of least partially correct perception that the U.S. de- one program’s existence, the army distributed ba- fense establishment is trying to mobilize support sic foodstuffs to over eleven hundred municipali- for noncombat roles on the part of Latin American ties. Eight battalions of army engineers—over two militaries, while denigrating their conventional de- thousand men—are currently engaged in an effort fense missions. to repair over eighteen hundred kilometers of Nevertheless, ample civilian support exists for roads in several remote states.128 military involvement in civic action. Proposals to The armed forces have regarded the assumption enlist the energies of soldiers and the logistical ca- of greater development and civic action roles as a pacity of the military in antipoverty efforts have re- mixed blessing. They cannot deny that abject ceived more substantial and unequivocal support poverty and underdevelopment are problematic from civilians than efforts to deepen military in- and could even constitute a threat to security inso- volvement in sophisticated external defense roles. far as frustrations stemming from misery and in- As a whole, Brazil’s legislature is amenable to the equality could eventually lead to mass social idea, even though it keeps the institution involved unrest. In reaction to a wave of supermarket loot- in the domestic sphere. Legislators from the Work- ings across the country, a top officer recently pro- ers’ Party favor this activity for the military, despite claimed, “Today, misery, not communism, their general exhortations to turn the military’s at- threatens to subvert the social order.”129 tention outward.131 Most civilian leaders regard Civic action also expands the organizational jus- poverty as a more pressing problem than the exter- tification of the army at a time when downsizing nal threats facing the country. Moreover, they view and budget cuts are a real danger to the military’s social action as a better use of the country’s limited vitality. The army has been rather open about resources. agreeing to take on social functions conditional upon gaining budgetary resources for doing so.130 Assessing the Direction of Military Another motivating factor is the improvement in Missions the army’s public image that comes with civic ac- tion. Army leaders perceive (probably correctly) In sum, Brazil’s armed forces have a very diversi- that social development roles help the institution fied role definition, with a foothold in functions in- appear as “a friend of the people.” Another per- volving conventional external defense as well as ception is that carrying out tasks that have con- internal security. Brazilian politicians have demon- crete and immediate social utility helps boost the strated a reluctance to continue funding expensive morale of soldiers at a time when the identity and military programs against unlikely, intangible ene- direction of the institution are unclear. mies. Military missions that make a social contri- On the other hand, military leaders have reser- bution in some concrete and immediate way are vations about enlisting soldiers to combat poverty on the rise. Pressure to scale down the military and underdevelopment. Their first reservation budget and the combination of low external is shared by all relatively advanced professional threats and the numerous social and internal secu- militaries: Should military troops regularly engage rity problems that beset the country militate in noncombat roles; that is, roles that do not call against an exclusive expansion of the army’s ener- on distinctly military training? Will doing so di- gies in the direction of conventional defense and minish their status as professionals and eventually toward involvement in internal security and social 28

action. This has begun to occur despite high mili- national issues. Since 1985, civilian politicians have tary interest in building up missions related to the indeed curbed the military’s tendency to venture former and reservations about deeper involvement autonomously into extramilitary activities. Yet in the latter. “mission creep” and the subsequent unraveling of Unlike the Argentine military, which is necessar- civilian control nevertheless remain a danger when ily confined to modest external activities, Brazil’s the military takes on internal functions. Moreover, army retains the popular support to operate on the it does not bode well for democracy that the army, domestic front. But in contrast to its Chilean coun- upon expanding into internal operations, comes to terpart, it lacks sufficient clout to pick and choose be regarded as more effective than the civilian po- its activities. Hence, no activity enjoys the status of a lice. Nor is it salutary for civilian supremacy that primary mission. The lack of a concrete definition of military units are virtually the sole representatives the military’s place and function is therefore great- of public authority in many rural areas. est in Brazil, compared with Argentina or Chile. Creeping jurisdiction would not present such a Brazil’s army is torn between professional impulses high risk if Brazil’s civilian governments tended to to turn outward and pragmatic political considera- be more effective. With the partial exception of the tions to continue its traditional internal security current administration of Fernando Henrique Car- and nation-building focus. Absent the occurrence doso, which has successfully brought down infla- of a major political movement to discredit the mili- tion and promoted economic growth, all of Brazil’s tary (along the lines of the Proceso in Argentina), post-1985 governments have been marked by po- traditional missions continue to reemerge and rein- litical and economic instability, a context that ren- force current developments shaping military role ders more difficult the maintenance of stable and definitions. confined military roles.132 While Brazil’s current Does the situation that has begun to develop in democracy has so far been able to survive despite Brazil present cause for concern? Put simply, in corruption, hyperinflation, and stagnant growth, in terms of the two broad risks for democracy and past years the country was not able to sustain de- civilian supremacy noted at the outset, if civilian mocratic rule in the midst of poor political, social, governments in some countries undergoing a re- and economic performance. Hence, in a country assessment of civil-military relations and military where social problems remain profound, civilian roles err by going too far in isolating or excluding political institutions are weak and often ineffective, the institution (for example, Argentina under and economic stability is far from assured, the fail- Alfonsín), Brazil’s civilian leadership can be faulted ure to delimit the boundaries of military jurisdic- for keeping the domain of military roles overly tion and provide the institution’s members with a broad and inclusive, thus failing to transform his- clear sense of identity and direction is indeed cause torical patterns of military activism in wide-ranging for concern. 29

explain the current profile of the institution. The political and economic strength of the Chilean armed forces is what allows them a high degree of freedom in choosing the roles they wish to per- form. Officers regard as desirable and prestigious missions relating to national defense in a strict sense, and these have prevailed over noncombat THE CHILEAN MILITARY functions. Stated more dramatically by one U.S. army officer who participated in joint exercises Political Strength and with the in 1992, “Chilean officers 4Professionalization are obsessed with war-fighting.”134 There is evidence of the military’s desire for an expanded (vis-à-vis pre-1973 levels) role in Chilean development, particularly in the sphere of science, technology, territorial occupation and bor- der consolidation, and the exploitation and protec- tion of the country’s natural resources. Yet to the extent that this orientation exists, it stems much more from the armed forces’ confidence and con- viction of their own broader importance, which grew under the Pinochet dictatorship, than from a defensive need to enhance organizational purpose. ivilian-imposed constraints on the military Supremely confident in their institution, senior of- have been the lowest in Chile. The politi- ficers view the armed forces as uniquely qualified Ccal and economic autonomy and strength to guide the country into the future. According to of the Chilean armed forces in the postauthoritar- one analyst, “ who wear the army uniform ian period have allowed them to act on their still see themselves as symbolizing the finest attrib- renewed interest in enhancing military profession- utes of the Fatherland, as having a historical voca- alism. Chile’s armed services are heavily engaged tion, and as playing social and developmental in national defense, strictly defined. Unlike its roles—and doing so successfully.”135 counterpart in Brazil, which faces greater bud- What factors have enabled the Chilean military getary constraints, the Chilean military is not mak- to elude some of the constraints faced by their ing noncombat tasks a major part of its regular role counterparts in Argentina and Brazil? Many of definition, although it is involved in national devel- these factors go back to the dictatorship of opment to some degree, and the constitution does 1973–90 and to the negotiated transition back to charge it with a tutelary political role (to “guaran- democratic rule. The armed forces presided over tee the institutional order of the Republic”). In con- what eventually became a showcase model of an trast to the Argentine armed forces, the Chilean open economy. Many Chileans—while critical of military’s participation in international peacekeep- the human rights offenses that occurred under mil- ing missions has been minimal. Instead, the armed itary rule—credit the regime with saving the coun- forces in Chile are engaged primarily in preparing try from chaos and putting it on a path to success. for conventional defense. While insufficient for victory, the 43 percent of the The current direction of the Chilean military vote that General Augusto Pinochet garnered in corresponds with the generally apolitical nature of the 1988 plebiscite to determine whether he the institution roughly from 1938 to 1970.133 would remain in power for eight more years re- However, given the military’s sharp break with this flects the considerable support that still existed apolitical stance beginning with the coup of 1973 for the regime. Public opinion polls suggest that and continuing throughout the seventeen-year- the military continues to enjoy a fair degree of long dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet, public support.136 Such support was critical to something more than tradition is necessary to General Pinochet’s ability to wrest and sustain the 30

institutional prerogatives that insulate the military for any reformist government to pass measures from forces that might otherwise seek to reduce its weakening military influence. institutional and professional strength. In addition to expressly political prerogatives, What do these prerogatives consist of? The the military enjoys important economic privileges 1980 constitution and the Leyes Orgánicas Consti- that underpin the combat role definition it is tucionales for the armed forces conferred guaran- assuming. The first of these privileges, enshrined tees of autonomy on the military and police, while in the Ley Orgánica de las Fuerzas Armadas of limiting executive, judicial, and legislative author- 1989, ensures that the armed forces receive bud- ity. Concessions to the military included a provi- getary allocations equivalent to at least those of sion for General Pinochet to remain at the helm of 1989 levels in real terms. To ensure that its for- the army until 1997 and immunity for all military tunes would not be tied to the whims of civilian officers—from the commander-in-chief down (in- politicians and to the electoral imperatives to cluding the chief of the police, or carabineros)— which democracy would give rise, the military from dismissal by the president. The prerogatives sought to guarantee its own fiscal autonomy be- also included a powerful, military-dominated Na- fore it departed from power.139 tional Security Council, whose authority extends The second noteworthy economic prerogative beyond advising the president to exercising veto of the Chilean military provides it with 10 percent power over policies affecting national security. The of all profits from exports of the state mo- National Security Council nopoly, . This pre- gives the military a strong- rogative represents an hold in the executive advance on what the armed branch. Notwithstanding n short, the Chilean military forces claimed previously. the passage of reforms in In 1973, the armed forces 1989 that have weakened enjoys an unusual degree of enjoyed the right to 10 per- the council’s formal author- independence from civilian cent of all copper profits, ity and deprived the armed I but with a floor on returns forces of a majority pres- authority. set at U.S.$90 million. In ence on it, the council re- 1986, a new law (No. mains a central locus of 18.445) retained the 10 per- military influence.137 cent provision, but raised General Pinochet’s blueprint of a “protected the floor to U.S.$180 million. In recent years, the democracy” consisted not only of a military with armed forces have extracted upwards of U.S.$400 considerable autonomy but also a strong political million annually from this extrabudgetary source. right wing. Both actors had been allies since the The funds channeled to the military through the rise of leftist radicalism in the early 1970s and copper surtax are divided equally among the three were expected to support each other against the in- branches and designated expressly for the pur- evitable reemergence of the center-left in a new chase of equipment. Because it pays for new democracy. Thus beyond measures to expand weaponry, the money from the copper surtax has specifically military prerogatives, the outgoing au- indirectly expanded the military’s ability to in- thoritarian regime made provisions to overrepre- crease the numbers and salaries of its personnel. sent the right in the Senate. The designation of The payroll for the armed forces has doubled since nine senators, coupled with the introduction of a the 1970s (in contrast to most other Latin Ameri- “binomial majoritarian system,” was designed for can militaries), and this level of expenditure is this purpose.138 Conservative politicians were ex- guaranteed to continue due to the constitutional pected to defend the military prerogatives put in arrangements the military secured before leaving place by the Pinochet regime. The overrepresenta- power.140 tion of conservative parties and the formidable ob- From time to time, civilian politicians have pro- stacles to amending the constitution and the Leyes posed reallocating money from the copper fund for Orgánicas (requiring a two-thirds vote in both education, health, or other social programs.141 Be- houses of the legislature) would make it difficult cause the military jealously guards this prerogative, 31

it would surely resist losing its control over the than the Brazilian military. How does the relatively fund. If such reforms advanced before General privileged position of the Chilean armed services Pinochet’s departure in 1997, the general himself affect their role definition? could be expected to lead the struggle against their passage and implementation. Moreover, given the Military Missions overrepresentation of the political right in the Con- gress, it is far from clear whether advocates of re- Unlike the Argentine and Brazilian militaries, forms to eliminate these military prerogatives whose repertoire of missions has been defined could even garner enough support among largely in a prohibitive manner (according to what civilians. they cannot do), the Chilean military has taken a In short, the Chilean military enjoys an unusual proactive approach to assuming its own roles in degree of independence from civilian authority.142 the post–Cold War era. The new democratic pe- In neither Argentina nor Brazil does the military riod has given rise to frequent public articulations possess such standing. This has allowed Chile to by the military leadership of the institution’s razón keep up defense expenditures, advance in the de ser (reason for being). Uniformed leaders have modernization of weaponry, and elevate the train- also tried to educate civilians about national de- ing and skills of its troops. Chile’s per capita de- fense and the military’s contribution to it, and to fense spending is roughly twice that of Argentina, build support for their preferred missions among four times that of Peru, and ten times that of the political leadership and civilian population in Brazil.143 Historically, Chile was not a country with general. Behind these efforts to train their own large military budgets. If one examines defense civilian cadres is the desire to sustain the strong in- spending as a percentage of fiscal expenditures (a stitutional position of the armed forces and their valid way to see where defense stands in relation to national defense goals, especially should civilian other government priorities), the Chilean military reforms erode the military’s political and eco- did not fare particularly well compared to its coun- nomic autonomy. terparts in neighboring Argentina, Brazil, or Peru Chile’s military leaders state clearly that conven- in the decades between 1940 and 1970. On this ba- tional external defense is the institution’s overrid- sis, Chile ranked fourth in the postwar years in re- ing mission, and they are taking active steps to lation to these comparable Latin American promote this activity. They have participated only powers.144 minimally in international peacekeeping efforts, Chile’s military numbers 91,800 for a popula- despite UN requests and prodding by the U.S. tion of only 13.5 million. Brazil has a force of Army’s Southern Command, and play a small role 296,700 for a population of 156 million and Ar- in internal security. Military-initiated proposals are gentina has 65,000 active troops for a population under consideration that would provide the insti- of roughly 33.5 million.145 Thus with less than half tution with a higher level of involvement in na- of Argentina’s population, Chile has nearly 27,000 tional development. more military personnel. In fact, in proportion to At the present time, all three services are pursu- its population, Chile has the largest standing mili- ing programs to modernize their weapons systems tary force in South America, even exceeding those and enhance training. Their considerable insula- of , Peru, and Colombia, countries in which tion from civilian decision making and their steady the military is busily engaged in combating drug source of income give them a more solid and pre- cartels and guerrilla groups. Consistent with their dictable basis on which to chart future programs. relatively privileged position, the Chilean armed The military’s objective is to maintain readiness to forces also provide more extensive training for re- fight against real and perceived threats from the cruits than their counterparts in Argentina and country’s three principal regional rivals: Argentina, Brazil. There is no question that obligatory military Peru, and Bolivia. Although none of these coun- service will remain in place.146 tries poses an immediate threat of war, the Chilean In short, the Chilean military enjoys a level of in- officer corps continues to view these traditional ri- stitutional and professional strength far in excess vals with distrust.147 Chile’s disputes with Ar- of the Argentine armed forces, and greater also gentina over parts of Patagonia date back to the 32

last century. Chile fought the most important becoming more deeply engaged in peace missions. postindependence war in nineteenth-century Chile rejected the idea of maintaining a prepared South America with Bolivia and Peru (the War of contingent that would be available whenever nec- the Pacific) between 1879 and 1883, which shaped essary for UN peacekeeping missions. On several the Chilean military’s view about the need for pre- occasions, it also rejected UN requests for troop paredness for over a century. Although neither Ar- assistance.150 The reasons for these refusals have gentina, Peru, or Bolivia is presently at its peak varied somewhat according to the specific in- militarily, Chile’s armed services want to be pre- stance; but overall, the military’s resolute stance pared for the possible strengthening of these mili- against deeper involvement and that its overriding taries.148 For this and other reasons, the Chilean mission is to deter, fight, and defeat Chile’s armed forces seek to enhance the training and enemies reflect a relatively privileged position to skills of soldiers and purchase or develop sophisti- decline such tasks and still maintain itself as a vi- cated technology that will afford them greater in- able organization. dependence from the United States and other With respect to internal security, the Chilean major powers. military plays a negligible role even though a The army has been busy pursuing a moderniza- broad provision for such a mission exists in the tion program since the early 1990s. This service constitution.151 After the coup of 1973, the military branch lags behind the others because part of its conducted counterinsurgency operations in con- organizational energies were devoted to the gov- junction with the carabineros, Chile’s heavily ernment during military rule. Following the trend armed and disciplined police force. Chile’s first among contemporary armies, Chilean army lead- postauthoritarian government returned the cara- ers are trying to work toward developing a more bineros to the Interior Ministry after a seventeen- mobile, flexible, rapidly deployable, and efficient year period under the Ministry of Defense, force. The army’s modernization program empha- underscoring internal security as the preserve of sizes informatics and advanced electronic warfare; the police and not the military.152 It also excluded in particular, it seeks to strengthen anti-air and the army from working with the newly created anti-armor defense. Military training is being reori- Oficina Coordinadora de Seguridad Pública (Coor- ented along these lines at a recently constructed dinating Agency of Public Security), the civilian-led training center, the Centro de Entrenamiento Op- agency responsible for coordinating the cara- erativo y Táctico. Beyond reequipping and training bineros’ antiterrorist program.153 Evidently, the the army in an effort to make it a viable, modern military did little to resist these moves, suggesting war-fighting organization, its leadership has also that it does not desire regular participation in developed a new center for strategic thought, the counterinsurgency or internal security conflicts as Centro de Estudios Estratégicos, with this aim in a central role.154 mind. The country’s navy and air force have fol- Notwithstanding the renewed attention the lowed suit, pursuing their own modernization pro- Chilean military has paid to the strictly military as- grams to project Chile’s presence in the sea and to pects of national defense, the armed forces are enhance its air power.149 moving increasingly into development roles as As for international peacekeeping, Chile has well.155 The institution’s tradition includes civic been reluctant to assign large numbers of service- action, but not nearly on the order carried out by men to such missions. It has sent modest numbers militaries in the less-developed, less-integrated na- to Cambodia, El Salvador, and Pakistan, and tions of Latin America, including Brazil.156 The the Persian Gulf to take part more as observers specific type of development projects the armed than as members of missions with a more distinc- forces are currently pursuing focus on the occupa- tive military character. In general, however, Chile’s tion and exploitation of land and sea in order to reactions to UN requests for greater participation, enhance Chile’s economic modernization and sov- and a progressive increase in the degree of involve- ereignty. ment with each request—from observers, to techni- Territorial occupation and national integration cal-assistance specialists, and then to combat essentially are the goals of the army’s Fronteras troops—reveal considerable reservations about Interiores (“Interior Borders”) project, whose 33

extramilitary activities nevertheless correspond other nations. The views these ocean well with Chile’s ongoing efforts to modernize its resources as rightfully belonging to Chile. economy further. The rationale behind Fronteras The three principal projects in the Mar Presen- Interiores is that the country’s border regions (es- cial program are the development of ocean ; pecially in the extreme north, south, and eastern conducting marine and other scientific investiga- strip of the country adjacent to Argentina) need tions; and the construction of a port on Easter Is- more vibrant regional economies. The military’s land, which would allow the navy to exercise a hope is that boosting these regions’ economic greater sovereign presence in protecting and ad- value will have a “pull effect” and help to distribute vancing Chilean interests without violating inter- Chile’s very unevenly concentrated population national law.159 over more of the nation’s territory. Ninety percent While staking out claims for scientific explo- of Chile’s population inhabits the area between the ration and economic exploitation of deep sea re- cities of La Serena and . In the army’s sources is undoubtedly part of the reason for Mar view, occupying virtually deserted territory not Presencial, the goal of projecting Chilean power only establishes a base for development efforts but and sovereignty onto the high seas undoubtedly guards against potential encroachments on sover- also motivates this program. Recalling a central eign territory from across the border. The army tenet of Chilean nationalism—that Chile’s destiny leadership has repeatedly asserted that the con- hinges on predominance in the South Pacific—the quest of the nation’s underdeveloped hinterland project’s goals are both economic and geopolitical. has always been a military mission, but in fact it ap- Mar Presencial would expand Chile’s maritime ju- pears to represent the reinvigoration of an older risdiction from 1.3 to 9.1 million square miles. policy: the army’s drive under the dictatorship to Based on a unique Chilean interpretation of the modernize Chile.157 General Pinochet is fond of re- 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, Mar Pres- peating that the country should take advantage of encial contradicts United States policy on the UN the resources and capacity the army can contribute treaty. Mar Presencial is still only an idea, but its to the Fronteras Interiores project, which would implementation would surely require Chilean begin with the extensive construction of infrastruc- naval power to establish and defend the nation’s ture. So far, the army has conducted studies of the presence on the high seas.160 border regions and drawn up proposals about how to develop them, but civilian authorities have Assessing the Current Direction of yet to approve the project.158 Military Missions in Chile Similarly, Chile’s navy recently formulated a twenty-year plan to project its presence into the Pa- The Chilean military remains a strong political and cific Ocean, fortify Chile’s rights in its territorial professional institution. Its professional strength sea, and expand scientific and oceanographic pro- and its demonstrated capacity to continue making grams. This project draws on the navy’s perception professional advancements stem in no small mea- of the ocean as the natural space for Chile’s devel- sure from its solid political and economic stand- opment and growth. The idea for Mar Presencial ing. A comparison with Argentina and Brazil, (“Sea Presence”) was formulated in 1989 and envi- where the military has been less able to defend sions staking out Chile’s claims beyond the coun- strictly military aspects of national defense, lends try’s two-hundred-nautical-mile exclusive support to this thesis. The Chilean armed forces economic zone to include a huge area eastward to are progressing more rapidly than their neighbors and southward to . The in building up their arsenal, although they do not 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea recog- rival their Brazilian and Argentine counterparts in nizes this area as part of the “high seas” and, as sophisticated missile and nuclear-related technol- such, open to all nations. The navy’s ultimate goal ogy. It is reasonable to expect that unless and until in the Mar Presencial program is to stake an even- the political and economic autonomy of the tual claim of Chilean sovereignty over this area, Chilean military declines markedly, the institu- thereby closing off this portion of the high seas tion’s ability to enhance its external defense capa- and its resources to commercial exploitation by bilities will surpass that of the armed forces in 34

neighboring countries, including especially the officer corps is well aware that Argentina is los- Argentina. ing ground to Chile, which not only has a strong What concerns does the Chilean situation raise? and prepared reserve but also possesses air superi- First of all, it should be noted that an examination ority over Argentina.161 of the political and professional standing of the Similarly, while other countries have shown Chilean armed forces, compared to the Argentine some interest in collective security arrangements and Brazilian, suggests an obvious correlation that in the region, Chile has signaled its refusal to take is not lost on the institutions themselves: The part. There are as yet no signs that the growing mil- greater the political strength (and, by implication, itary imbalance (more in terms of the rate of economic strength) of the military institution in Chile’s advance than its absolute capability) poses question, the better off it is in strictly military or a direct and concrete threat to peace in the region. professional terms. Stated differently, the more the However, concern among neighboring militaries military is forced to accept subordination to civil- impedes them from letting down their guard and ian authority, the more it exposes itself to contem- accepting with much confidence the trend toward porary domestic and international pressures that smaller and less heavily equipped armed services. militate in favor of limiting the military’s external As for the Chilean military’s recent proposals to defense capabilities. If notions about objective expand into development roles, while signifying civilian control have any validity (namely, that that the long period of military rule may have led granting the military maneuvering room in the to a more permanent entrenchment of the institu- sphere of national defense will create disincentives tion in the political, social, and economic fabric of for domestic political involvement), the reward the country, programs such as Fronteras Interiores system for military subordination to civilian au- and Mar Presencial do not portend the kind of mis- thority in the major countries of Latin America is sion creep that could be injurious to democracy in misguided. If civil-military relations are based on a countries with weak civil societies and ineffective political compact that exchanges civilian funding civilian governments. In countries such as Brazil, for the military’s obedience, what happens to the Peru, and Ecuador, nation-states that are less inte- compact when the money starts to dwindle? grated and where political and economic stability Another potential problem the Chilean case is more elusive, military role expansion—especially raises for the region stems from the fact that it is in internal security but also in civic action—carries simply out of step with the trend in neighboring the risk that men in uniform will come to believe countries. While the Argentine military is busy that they have more competence than civilians to keeping global peace, Chile is buying arms and manage governmental affairs and may well be per- training soldiers for a conventional war. Both ceived as such by society. However, the impressive Argentina and Brazil have cut back on the training performance of Chile’s elected center-left govern- of troops, but Chile proceeds with full force, creat- ments since 1990 in maintaining Pinochet’s eco- ing the general impression that it would be better nomic growth policies and in advancing prepared than its neighbors to fight an actual war equity-enhancing social reforms and keeping so- should the eventuality arise. Although the Argen- cial order leaves little room for the military to pre- tine armed forces have grudgingly accepted their sent itself, or be seen as, a superior governing civilian-imposed boundaries, at least provisionally, alternative. 35

for civilian authority.162 If missions matter insofar as they serve as the basis for the military’s indepen- dent commitment to political neutrality, then civil- ians must work to define honorable and credible roles that draw the military out of functions that can lead them into politics. Subjective control suffers from several draw- backs. When implemented by civilian elites who CONCLUSION are willing to use the military for their own domes- tic purposes, subjective control can politicize the 5 institution and keep its members politically in- volved. Or, in order to prevent a slide into military activism and interventionism, a strategy of subjec- tive control can pressure civilians to improve their management of the government’s affairs. For the time being, the ability of civilians to keep their own house in order is not a major cause for concern in either Argentina, Brazil, or Chile, but this leaves the important issue of civilian control vulnerable to a myriad of factors beyond the control of elected officials. Nevertheless, civilian leaders should work hard to resolve pressing problems, such as he current political and economic climate terrorism, rampant crime, and economic and polit- in Latin America presents at once opportu- ical chaos, that have historically led the military to Tnities for military reform and difficulties in intervene in the affairs of government. reorienting the military away from the internal The political strength of the armed forces and arena and toward robust and professional external their ability to command economic resources goes roles. The demise of communism and the decline a long way in determining whether the military can of insurgency groups within Latin America, and overcome traditional role definitions, stepping out the broad support for democratic rule from practi- of internal security and civic action functions and cally every segment of Latin American society—in- adopting an exclusive focus on external defense. cluding the military—bodes well for shrinking the The greater the political clout of the armed forces military’s jurisdiction. However, the diminution of and the more resources they can command, the regional disputes and the rise of drug trafficking more confidence and ability they have to focus (al- and other “gray-area” threats, combined with pres- most exclusively) on developing robust conven- sure on military budgets, constrain the develop- tional defense roles. This describes the case of ment of strictly professional military missions. Chile. Objective control, which rests on defining clear At the other end of the spectrum, where the and nonpolitical military missions, is indeed a armed forces have extremely low political standing worthwhile goal for Latin America’s civilian gov- and face serious economic obstacles, they will be ernments to pursue. If one risk in redefining mili- more or less forced into accepting a modest role tary missions is overinclusion, while another is definition based on external functions in light of excessive exclusion, the proper response should social objections to their involvement in the do- follow the contours of objective control, or what mestic sphere. This characterizes the situation of Joseph Nye calls the “liberal bargain,” in which the Argentine military during roughly the last civilians respect the military’s special role in pro- decade. viding for defense and support adequate funding Where the military finds itself in an inter- for appropriate military missions. In return, the mediate position—with enough social support to military recognizes that it is accountable to the rule continue operating in the domestic realm and suf- of law and must remain nonpartisan in its respect ficient budgetary allocations to aspire to strength- 36

ening conventional defense but insufficient to do to draw the military out of internal roles that maintain the organizational justification for this could keep them mired in social and political con- mission—it is usually subject to role expansion and flicts. I then turn to the question of what policies diversification. This describes the Brazilian mili- the United States should pursue in this area. tary. First of all, civilians must do everything possible While the Chilean case suggests a strong posi- to promote downsizing and restructuring so that tive association between political and professional the armed forces save money on personnel and strength, the Argentine case reflects the difficulty other basic operating costs in order to up con- of reconciling political weakness with strong pro- ventional defense capabilities with existing re- fessional status. If political strength is required for sources. They should, in other words, increase exercising institutional and professional strength military preparedness and professionalism by en- (as the Chilean case suggests), and if such institu- couraging leading officers to do more with less; for tional or professional strength is the basis of objec- example, by reducing standing troop levels and tive control, then the incentives for military redirecting money toward newer weapons sys- subordination to civilian authority would seem to tems. In a further effort to find legitimate ways of be misguided. Argentina’s Menem has managed to channeling the energies and attention of the mili- at least partially overcome this apparent “contra- tary outward, civilian authorities should promote diction of civilian control” by creating a basis for external ventures such as peacekeeping operations objective control without dedicating massive and other kinds of collective security efforts. amounts of financial resources to the armed Although the strategy of objective control en- forces.163 He has allowed the military ample au- tails the creation of a separate sphere for the mili- tonomy in its own institutional affairs and has also tary, this should not be implemented at the engaged officers and soldiers alike in a credible ex- expense of trying to integrate the institution fully ternal orientation—international peacekeeping— into the civilian world. In this connection, civilians while holding the military’s political involvement need to take steps toward turning around their his- in check. torically disparaging view of the military profes- Based on the patterns elicited in these case stud- sion in Latin America. Measures that could serve ies, the following are shorthand recommendations this end include the promotion of educational ex- to civilian policymakers seeking to reform these changes between civilian and military institutions Latin American militaries in a direction more com- and the training of civilian defense specialists who patible with sustained democratic rule. In Ar- can interact positively with military officers. gentina, they should stay the course. In Brazil, they Civilians should also build up police and other should define military roles more clearly, more nonsecurity forces and rely upon only them to narrowly, and outside the realm internal functions. handle what police typically handle: stopping In Chile, they should try to attenuate the military’s crime and maintaining social order. To make sure political prerogatives (a frontal assault would be the distinction between military and police func- politically impossible), yet taking caution to pre- tions is clear, civilian officials could delineate in serve some of the objective control mechanisms al- clear and explicit terms where the jurisdiction of ready in place. each institution begins and ends. In this connec- If “missions matter” and objective forms of con- tion, a reform of the police is imperative in many trol are desired, what policies can civilians enact in countries, such as Brazil, so that the military does the current political and economic milieu to keep not continue to be the “default option” when civil- up their end of the “bargain” and encourage the ians decide they need to impose order. A reform of military to focus on strictly military functions? The the police must include measures to root out cor- following constitute fuller policy recommenda- ruption and to force greater compliance with hu- tions with these goals in mind. The first set focuses man rights standards. on what civilian leaders in Latin America should Similarly, U.S. policies should encourage the do to focus military attention outward and to cre- professional development of Latin American mili- ate the basis for objective control. The second fo- taries based on the premise of “shared security.” cuses explicitly on what civilian authorities should Technological modernization could be promoted 37

through a variety of programs, such as equipment sustained civilian control, such as intelligence op- donations, discounted sales/procurements, and erations. While the case studies offer relatively less participation in joint programs. The development evidence to draw such conclusions with regard to of professional norms and codes of conduct fitting these particular programs, their relevance for Latin for the military in a democracy could be promoted American civilian governments that are combat- through the maintenance or expansion of the U.S. ting drug cartels’ operations (for example, Colom- Department of Defense’s International Military Ed- bia and Bolivia) lies in trying to assess the political ucation and Training (IMET) program. New IMET implications of enlisting the military’s help in such programs in place since 1991 have focused on campaigns, based on crucial similarities in the civil-military relations, trying to impart to Latin civil-military relations of these and the case-study American militaries norms involving accountabil- countries. ity—including the protection of human rights—and Civic action and development roles may seem subordination to civilian authority. innocuous, at least in the short and medium terms, To promote the simultaneous goals of downsiz- but they may be difficult to reconcile with the long- ing and professional development, the United term goal of trying to reduce the comprehensive States should encourage some standardization of role that the military has historically played in the military spending as a confidence-building mea- country’s society, economy, and politics. Rather sure among Latin American states. Similarly, it than invite the armed forces to become involved in would behoove the United States to promote col- “transitional roles” that emphasize domestic func- lective or cooperative security arrangements in the tions, the United States should recognize that the framework of diplomatic initiatives, since the issue activist history of most Latin American militaries is still sensitive among the continent’s civilian and imbues such roles with higher significance than military leaders alike. Such measures would effec- when U.S. forces adopt them. tively provide Latin American states with the assur- In short, if Latin American governments are seri- ance to promote downsizing among their armed ous about seizing the present moment to redefine forces. Downsizing, in turn, would safely and grad- the historical role of the military, they need to cre- ually inhibit these militaries from taking on ex- ate the conditions for objective control. They can panded role definitions in an effort to enhance do this by encouraging professional development their organizational justification. and discouraging involvement in extramilitary While taking measures to enhance professional functions. How military missions are defined will development and reduce force levels among Latin largely determine whether the armed forces lose America’s militaries, the United States should also their traditional role as social guardians and come be wary of pushing noncombat tasks on them. In to see themselves as concerned specifically and general, the United States should be cautious not solely with questions of external defense. The ef- to force new missions on reluctant Latin American fectiveness of civilian governance will also be vital military establishments. Officers may resist even in shaping future military conduct. However, given sensible suggestions if they perceive them as pater- the myriad of factors affecting whether future civil- nalistic interference by the superpower to the ian leaders can preside over governments well north. enough and provide enough political stability to Drug interdiction carries the risk of undermin- preclude a return to military guardianship, the ing institutional integrity through corruption. careful definition and adoption of military mis- Counternarcotics operations also threaten to draw sions with limited potential for role expansion is the military into other internal tasks detrimental to nothing short of imperative. 38

5. Thomaz Guedes da Costa, “Post–Cold War Mili- NOTES tary Relations between the United States and Latin America,” in Security, Democracy, and Development in U.S.–Latin American Relations, ed. Lars Schoultz, William C. Smith, and Au- gusto Varas (New Brunswick: Transaction Publi- cations, 1994), 139–40. I would like to thank Claudio Fuentes, Joe Klaits, 6. Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Brook Larmer, Peter Pavilionis, Francisco Rojas, Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton Univer- Luis Tibiletti, and Kurt Weyland for their contribu- sity Press, 1971). tions to this monograph. Special thanks go to Ursula Tafe, my invaluable research assistant at the 7. “Why Have Defense Ties in the Americas?,” ad- United States Institute of Peace. I would also like to dress delivered by U.S. Secretary of Defense acknowledge the financial assistance of the Univer- William J. Perry on 26 April 1995 at the Annual sity Research Council of Vanderbilt University and Strategy Symposium, cosponsored by the United the United States Institute of Peace. States Army Southern Command and the Insti- tute for National , National De- 1. Robert Olson, “Concepts for Future Defense and fense University, April 25–26, 1995, Miami, Hemi- Military Relations with Counterparts,” in Florida. spheric Security in Transition: Adjusting to the Post-1995 Environment , ed. L. Erik Kjonnerod 8. David G. Bradford, “Planning for Victory in the (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Drug War,” Military Review 74, no. 10 ( Press, 1995), 205. 1994): 15–24.

2. Georges Fauriol, “Thinking About U.S. Defense 9. Guedes da Costa, “Post–Cold War Military Rela- Hemispheric Secu- Policy in Latin America,” in tions,” 144. rity in Transition: Adjusting to the Post-1995 Environment, ed. L. Erik Kjonnerod (Washing- 10. Marcella, “Forging New Strategic Rela- ton, D.C.: National Defense University Press, tionships,” Military Review 74, no. 10 (October 1995), 31. 1994): 31–42.

3. Michael Desch, “What is the Mission of a Demo- 11.William F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, Internal cratic Military in the Post–Cold War Era?” in Security and Military Power (Columbus: Ohio Civil-Military Relations and the Consolidation State University Press, 1966). of Democracy (Washington, D.C.: International Forum for Democratic Studies and the George C. 12.See J. Samuel Fitch, “Military Role Beliefs in Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Latin American Democracies: Context, Ideology, 1995), 6–8. Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz and Doctrine in Argentina and Ecuador” (Paper define doctrine in the following way: “Military presented at the XIX International Congress of doctrine is the official, usually consensual, state- the Latin American Studies Association, Septem- ment of what a service is and does. It is a basic ber 28–30, 1995, Washington, D.C.), 77. guidebook.”; see their article, “Civil-Military Rela- tions in the United States: The State of the De- 13.Fitch, “Military Role Beliefs in Latin American bate,” The Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1 Democracies,” 78. (1995): 206. 14.Felipe Agüero, “The Latin American Military: De- 4. “Hemispheric Military Leaders Pledge Increased velopment, Reform, and ‘Nation-Building’?” in Cooperation,” in NotiSur—Latin American Politi- Security, Democracy, and Development in cal Affairs [Latin American Data Base], vol. 5, no. U.S.–Latin American Relations, ed. Lars 29 (August 4, 1995). Schoultz, William C. Smith, and Augusto Varas 39

(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994), leaders are abandoning objective control, trying 244. to influence issues once within the domain of military autonomy and asking the institution to 15. David Pion-Berlin, “Theories and Theory-Build- play a greater role in internal activities, such as ing in Civil-Military Relations” (Department of antinarcotics operations, disaster relief, and in- Political Science, University of California, River- frastructure development and repair. Civil- side, photocopy), 7. military relations have come under strain in the process. See Michael C. Desch, “Mission Matters: 16. See remarks of Andrés Fontana as reported in The End of the Cold War and Future Civil- Rapporteur’s Report of Presentations at the May Military Relations” (John M. Olin Institute for 4–6, 1995 Conference, “Civil-Military Relations Strategic Studies, Harvard University, June 1995, in Latin America” (Washington, D.C.: The photocopy), 19. Democracy Projects, 1995), 9. 25. The preservation of ecology is also listed as a 17. See remarks of John Cope as reported in Rappor- subsidiary mission. However, there is no firm in- teur’s Report, “Civil-Military Relations in Latin dication that the armed forces are actually carry- America,” 10. ing out this mission. See “Misión Principal y Subsidiarias del Ejercito,” Verde Oliva, no. 8 18.Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: De- (November 1993): 7. mocratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 26. Frederic Ruiz-Ramón, “Depoliticization of Mili- 1991), 252. tary Organizations: A Theoretical Framework, Policy Implications, and Case Studies of , 19.Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State , Argentina, and ” (Ph.D. diss., Har- (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 8. vard University, 1994), 311–18.

20. Huntington, The Third Wave, 252. 27. Deborah L. Norden, Military Rebellion in Ar- gentina: Between Coups and Consolidation 21.I employ the term “professional” following (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, Samuel P. Huntington, who emphasizes the di- 1996). mensions of “expertise, responsibility, and cor- porateness.” I do not equate “professional” with 28. William C. Smith, and the Cri- “apolitical,” as is sometimes done. To define the sis of the Argentine Political Economy (Stan- latter in terms of the former would invalidate on ford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 35. methodological grounds along the argument that professionalism helps draw the military out 29. Public opinion data collected in Argentina be- of politics. See Huntington, The Soldier and the tween 1992 and 1994 show persistent negative State, 8. opinion of the armed forces in general. The data from 1992 report that 55 percent of 22. Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of In- surveyed believed the military’s prestige had di- ternal Warfare and Military Role Expansion,” in minished over time, and 23 percent believed that Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, Future, the institution’s prestige would continue to di- ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven: minish into the future. Data collected between Press, 1973), 47–65. 1986 and 1994 reveal that positive public opin- ion of the armed forces, while increasing from a 23. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 80. low of 24.6 percent in 1987 to a high of 40.2 per- cent in 1990, appeared to be stalled at percent- 24. Even in the United States, where the armed ser- ages in the low to mid-30s (31.2 percent in 1991, vices arguably face more war-fighting possibili- 36.7 percent in 1992, and 36.3 percent in 1993). ties than most Latin American militaries, civilian See Eduardo Rubilar, “Chilenos y argentinos 40

opinan de sus FF.AA.,” La Nación, October 18, force to pursue the development of the contro- 1992; “Percepciones y opiniones sobre las FF.AA. versial CONDOR ballistic missile program, which en Argentina y Chile analisis comparativo de dos began in 1979. See Ruiz-Ramón, “Depoliticiza- estudios,” Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad 7, no. 2 tion of Military Organizations,” 364. (April–June 1992): 30–35. See also, “Imagen publica de las fuerzas armadas,” Cuaderno, no. 36. Deborah L. Norden, “Between Coups and Con- 51 (: Centro de Estudios Unión solidation: Military Rebellion in Post-Authoritar- para la Nueva Mayoría, April 1994): 4–5, 16; and ian Argentina” (Ph.D. diss., University of “Sondeos de Opinión sobre imagen de las California, Berkeley, 1992), 164. (Italics mine.) fuerzas armadas,” Cuaderno, no. 86 (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Unión para la Nueva 37. Complex generational and intraservice divisions Los Mayoria, June 1994): 2, 4. were also at work. See Marcelo Fabián Sain, Levantamientos Carapintada, 1987–1991, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América 30. See Herbert Chandler Huser, “Civil-Military Rela- Latina, 1994); and Norden, Military Rebellion in tions in Argentina: The Alfonsín Years, Argentina. 1983–1989” (Ph.D. diss., George Washington University, 1991); Norden, Military Rebellion in 38. The carapintadas developed an increasingly na- Argentina; Ruiz-Ramón, “Depoliticization of Mil- tionalist outlook in response to President Men- itary Organizations”; and David Pion-Berlin, “Be- em’s neo-liberal economic and foreign policy tween Confrontation and Accommodation: orientation. Military and Government Policy in Democratic Journal of Latin American Studies Argentina,” 39. Pion-Berlin, “Theory and Theory-Building,” 7–9. 23, no. 3 (October 1991): 543–571. 40. Among other demands, the rebels wanted the 31. Thomas Scheetz, “Military Expenditures in government to elevate the status of the army’s South America” (United Nations Disarmament carapintada faction in order to address the insti- Conference, Asunción, , working paper, tution’s budgetary problems and to veer off or 1993). slow its course in foreign policy in general, but in foreign economic policy in particular. 32. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms 41. See ”La Ley de Seguridad Interior crea un sis- Transfers, 1993–1994 (Washington, D.C.: ACDA tema no militar,” Cronista Comercial, July 30, Publications, 1994), 52. 1990. Accompanying the Domestic Security Law was the creation of a bicameral Investigation 33. See U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Committee, composed of six senators and six Agency, World Military Expenditures, 52. deputies, to monitor the work of the national se- curity and intelligence bodies. See “Guardians’ Buenos Aires Herald 34. J. Samuel Fitch, “Military Role Beliefs in Latin guardians,” , December 23, American Democracies.” (United States Institute 1991. of Peace, Washington, D.C., 1993, photocopy). 42. “El Ejército condiciona su intervención por el tema de la seguridad interna,” La Nación, Janu- 35. Apparently, Alfonsín deliberately tried to in- ary 19, 1994. crease the status of the navy and air force at the expense of the army. In the first two years of his 43. Fitch, “Military Role Beliefs in Latin American government, the navy’s share of the total defense Democracies.” budget rose from 37 percent to 43.4 percent, but the army’s share fell from 36.5 percent to less 44. “Integrating Factor,” Buenos Aires Herald, De- than 33 percent. In a similar vein, while Alfonsín cember 20, 1994. cut many army programs, he allowed the air 41

45. “Jefe del Ejército de EE.UU. realiza visita oficial 53. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, al país,” Los , March 24, 1992. World Military Expenditures, 52.

46. On the Menem administration’s relations with 54. “Retreating to Advance,” Buenos Aires Herald, the United States, see Anabella Busso, “Menem y September 28, 1992. Estados Unidos: Un Nuevo Rumbo en la Politica Exterior Argentina,” in La Politica Exterior del 55. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Gobierno de Menem (Rosario, Argentina: Cen- World Military Expenditures, 52. tro de Estudios en Relaciones Internacionales de Rosario, 1994), 53–109. Regarding Menem’s re- 56. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, sistance to assign drug-interdiction roles to the World Military Expenditures, 52. Argentine military, see “Descartan intervención militar en tareas de inteligencia interna,” Rio Ne- 57. Two entire subsecretariats of the Ministry of De- gro, March 25, 1994. fense were devoted to the privatization and re- structuring of military-controlled firms. 47. “Cooperación militar contra el cólera,” La Nación, February 14, 1992. 58. See “Venderán este mes bienes del Ejército,” La Nación, December 3, 1991. See also “Confirman 48. Barber and Ronning, Internal Security and Mili- que se venderán 71 inmuebles del Ejército,” La tary Power, 124–25. Prensa, December 3, 1991.

49. Fitch, “Military Role Beliefs in Latin American 59. “Elogian el ‘corage’ de Menem al anular el Democracies,” 74. proyecto ‘Cóndor II,’” La Prensa, June 8, 1991. See also “Menem felicitado por desmantelar el 50. A presidential initiative in August 1994 (later Cóndor,” La Voz del Interior, January 21, 1993. passed by the legislature) eliminated conscrip- tion. 60. “La Argentina se suma,” La Razón, February 10, 1995, p. 11. 51. Public opinion surveys carried out after this inci- dent suggested that only 25 percent of all Argen- 61. See Patrice Franko, “De Facto Demilitarization: tine citizens favored the continuation of Budget-Driven Downsizing in Latin America,” compulsory military service. See “Rebeldes con Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Af- Causas,” Pagina, no. 12 (May 28, 1994). For a fairs 36, no. 1 (Spring 1994): 37–74. breakdown of opinion toward conscription based on gender, age, political affiliation, and 62. But there is a sense in which the military aspect level of education, see “Sondeo favorable a la of the question (i.e., changes in defense policies) eliminación del servicio militar obligatorio,” La have not accompanied the move toward eco- Nueva Provincia, October 2, 1994. nomic integration. “La cuestión militar en la inte- gración,” Ambito Financiero, March 22, 1991. 52. Leaders of the armed services, while they would have preferred a higher degree of consultation 63. See “Argentina Weighs Offer to Buy Falkland Is- regarding the terms of the shift, basically ac- landers’ Allegiance,” New York Times, June 8, cepted the decision and noted that the earlier 1995, p. A13. system of compulsory military service corre- sponded to the “socio-cultural, economic, politi- 64. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, cal, and military situation of the early years of the World Military Expenditures, 52. century, which were not the same as those of the end of the century.” See “Quick-Marching the 65. “La indefensión ocupa hoy el primer plano,” El Army into the Future,” Buenos Aires Herald, Informador Público, November 5, 1993, p. 4. June 28, 1994. See also “Desde 1983 se redujo a la mitad el 42

número de militares de alto rango,” La Nación, cial officials, see “Las FF.AA. están controladas, August 16, 1993. Compared to other militaries in afirmó el presidente,” Rio Negro, September 23, Latin America and Western , the ratio of 1994. generals per total officials is quite small (1/160 in the , as compared to, for exam- 74.A special edition of the military journal Revista ple, 1/79 in the Chilean army and 1/75 in the del Suboficial was dedicated to the question of French army). Argentine involvement in UN peacekeeping missions. See Revista del Suboficial 75, no. 611 66. For a statement that reflects this perception by (March–April 1994). the military, see “Predominio de imagen positiva en la opiníon pública sobre las Fuerzas Ar- 75. Fitch, “Military Role Beliefs in Latin American madas.” Tiempo Militar 1, no. 3 (April 9, 1993). Democracies,” 73.

67. A March 17, 1995 interview the author con- 76. Another disadvantage of peacekeeping is that it ducted with Emilio Ossés, former head is starting to strain financial and logistical re- of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Menem presi- sources. With UN deficits putting increased fi- dency, revealed the constraints perceived by offi- nancial burdens on countries, cers on being outspoken. Admiral Ossés was Argentina is frequently saddled with having to “asked” to step down after expressing once too pay for its contribution. In 1994 alone, Argentina often his frustrations about low military budgets spent $60 million to maintain 1,548 soldiers de- and for having said publicly that the government ployed in El Salvador, Haiti, Croatia, , decided the military budget on economic factors Cyprus, Kuwait, Angola, Mozambique, Cambo- alone. See “Ossés pidió evitar una visión exclusi- dia, and the Western . “Las misiones de vamente economicista,” La Nación, May 15, paz tocaron ,” Cronista, January 25, 1994. 1991. See also, “Almirante Ossés: no existe hipótesis de conflicto,” La Nueva Provincia, Sep- 77. “¿Adónde va el Ejército?” Clarín, , tember 28, 1991. 1994.

68. See Rosendo Fraga, La Cuestión Militar en los 78. David Wurmser and Nancy Bearg Dyke, “The Noventa (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Professionalization of Peacekeeping, A Study Unión para la Nueva Mayoría, 1993), 187–96; Group Report,” ed. Robert B. Oakley, Indar Jit and Deborah L. Norden, “Keeping the Peace, Rikhye, and Kenneth M. Jensen (Washington, Outside and In: Argentina’s United Nations Mis- D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, working sions,” International Peacekeeping 2, no. 3 (Au- paper, 1993), 8. tumn 1995): 330–49. For a military perspective on peacekeeping, see “La Argentina y las mi- 79. Civilians who have worked in the Defense Min- siones de paz,” Revista del Suboficial 75, no. 611 istry report that a high degree of “de facto” mili- (March–April 1994). tary influence—in large part due to the omission of civilian policymakers—persists over issues that 69. Fraga, La Cuestión Militar en los Noventa, 195. require a degree of technical knowledge. Author interviews with Virgilio Beltrán, former subsecre- 70. Norden, “Keeping the Peace,” 14. tary of politics and strategy in the Menem ad- ministration, March 6, 1995; Rut Diamint, 71. “Las misiones de paz tocaron techo,” Cronista, technical assistant in Subsecretariat of Politics January 25, 1994. and Strategy, March 7, 1995; and Guillermo Gasio, director of the National Defense School, 72. “Argentina en el Desfile de la Victoria,” Cronista March 15, 1995. Comercial, June 11, 1991. 80. “El Presupuesto de Defensa para 1993 es supe- 73. For a comparison of military salaries at various rior a la suma de las partidas de Educación, Cul- ranks to those of executive, legislative, and judi- 43

tura, Salud y Acción Social,” La Maga, January 6, 89. See Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military 1993. Rule in Brazil: 1964–1985 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 273. 81. “El 80% del gasto va a los salarios,” Cronista Comercial, May 12, 1991. 90. Patrice M. Franko, “The U.S. and South America: Collaborators or Competitors?,” in Hemispheric 82. Thomas Scheetz, “El Marco Teórico, Político y Security in Transition: Adjusting to the Post- Económico para una Reforma Militar en la 1995 Environment, ed. L. Erik Kjonnerod Argentina,” in Defensa No Provocativa: una (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, propuesta de reforma militar para la Argentina, 1995), 196. See also Carlos H. Acuña and ed. Cnl. (R) Gustavo Caceres and Thomas William C. Smith, “The Politics of Arms Produc- Scheetz (Buenos Aires: Editorial Buenos Aires, tion and the among the New Democ- 1995), 76–93. racies of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile,” in Security, Democracy, and Development in 83. Author interview with Virgilio Beltrán, former U.S.–Latin American Relations, ed. Lars subsecretary of politics and strategy in the Schoultz, William C. Smith, and Augusto Varas Menem administration, March 6, 1995. (Miami: North–South Center, University of Mi- ami, 1994), 224. 84. For an elaboration on some of these ideas, see Wendy Hunter, “The Brazilian Military after the 91. Computed from Secretaria de Planejamento e Cold War: In Search of a Mission,” Studies in Coordenação da Presidência da República, Comparative International Development 28, no. Anuário Estatístico do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: 4 (Winter 1994): 31–49. Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Es- tatística-IBGE, 1985–1993). In computing these The Military in Politics 85. See Stepan, ; and Peter figures, I have corrected for the fact that this Brazil: A Political Analysis Flynn, (Boulder source includes the government’s internal debt Colo.: Westview Press, 1978). and social security spending in the total budget. The former increased greatly in the 1980s. The 86. For a comparison of the degree of repression in latter, previously in a special budget, began to be Rethinking these countries, see Alfred Stepan, included in the overall government budget after Military Politics: Brazil and the 1988. Not correcting for this anomaly (that is, in- (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), cluding these budget items) vastly exaggerates 70. On public support for Brazil’s military the relative decline of military spending. regimes, see Kurt von Mettenheim, “The Brazil- ian Voter in Democratic Transition, 1974–1982,” 92. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Comparative Politics 23, no. 1 (October 1990): World Military Expenditures, 55. 23–44; see also Barbara Geddes and John Zaller, “Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian 93. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Regimes,” American Journal of Political Science World Military Expenditures, 55. 33, no. 2 (May 1989): 319–47. 94. See remarks by Thomaz Guedes da Costa as re- 87. See Wendy Hunter, “Back to the Barracks? The ported in C. Psaila, Redefining National Se- Military in Post-Authoritarian Brazil” (Ph.D. curity in Latin America: A Workshop Report, diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1992), Woodrow Wilson International Center for Schol- chapter 3. ars, Latin American Program, Working Paper 204 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Inter- 88. See Wendy Hunter, “Politicians Against Soldiers: national Center for Scholars, 1993), 9. When as- Contesting the Military in Postauthoritarian sessing such complaints, it should be kept in Comparative Politics Brazil,” 27, no. 4 (July mind that the Brazilian military has spent large 1995): 425–43, especially 436–39. sums of money on the development of highly so- 44

phisticated technology. Hence, it is not surpris- “Security in the Post-Summit Americas,” Univer- ing that it cannot cover basic operations. sity of Miami North–South Center, Fort Leslie J. McNair, Washington, D.C., March 1995), 19 95. Malorí José Pompermayer, “The State and the (note 7). Frontier in Brazil: A Case Study of the Amazon” (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1979), 89. 105. “Governo estuda envio de tropas a Angola,” Folha de São Paulo, June 15, 1993. 96. Henrique Paulo Bahiana, As Forças Armadas e o Desenvolvimento do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Edi- 106. “EUA querem Brasil em operações no Exterior,” tores Bloch, 1974), 45. Estado de São Paulo, November 19, 1994.

97. As U.S. military bases in were in the 107. Comments of Colonel Luis Carlos Guedes deliv- process of closing, U.S. officials asked their ered at the conference “Confidence-Building Brazilian counterparts if they could use part of Measures in the Southern Cone,” Stimson Cen- the Brazilian Amazon for jungle training. When ter/Naval War College/Institute for National Brazil responded negatively, the United States Strategic Studies, National Defense University, went to Guyana. In explaining its decision, Brazil Washington, D.C., May 25, 1995. accused the United States of having ulterior mo- tives. See “O inimigo criado,” Estado de São 108. Acuña and Smith, “The Politics of Arms Paulo, August 3, 1993, p. 3; and “Desocupação Production.” do Panamá preocupa,” Estado de São Paulo, Au- gust 15, 1993. 109. See Hunter, “Back to the Barracks?,” chapter 3, for a fuller discussion on this point. 98. See “PCB tem tarefa para militar,” Jornal do Brasil, April 22, 1989, p. 2. 110.It deserves reiteration here that Latin American militaries have not completely discarded the pos- 99. Elizabeth Allen, “Calha Norte: Military Develop- sibility of renewed guerrilla insurgency. See ment in Brazilian Amazonia,” Development and “Chefes de 16 exércitos debatem ‘subversão’ na Change 23 (1992): 71–99. América Latina,” Jornal do Brasil, November 9, 1993. 100. On the movement of troops to the Amazon, see Istoé “A floresta verde-oliva,” , April 13, 1994, 111.For three different opinions on whether the mili- pp. 40–42. tary should fight drug trafficking, see “As Forças Armadas devem combater o crime?,” Folha de 101. See “Collor baixa decreto que amplia presença São Paulo, April 9, 1994. miliar nas regiões de fronteira,” Gazeta Mercan- til, August 11, 1992. The jurisdiction of the 112. Recent opinion polls continue to suggest that northern command includes the states of Pará, the public has more trust in the military than in Maranhão, Amapá, and part of Tocantins. either the militarized state police or the civil po- 102. Michael S. Oswald, “Brazil’s Amazon Protection lice. While 40 percent of those polled expressed System: Security and ‘Sustainable’ Development confidence in the military, only 21 percent said for the 1990s?” (Latin American Studies Pro- they trusted the police (either category). “A Hora Jornal do Brasil gram: University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, da Reflexão,” , June 11, 1995. photocopy, 1994). 113. “Militares discutem sua missão com Itamar,” Jor- nal do Brasil 103. “Brasil vai á guerra,” Istoé, , 1994. , January 30, 1993.

104. Daniel Zirker, “The Brazilian Military and the 114. Brazil’s federal system presents a major obstacle Amazon Region: National Security vs. the Envi- to a thorough reform of the police. The milita- ronment?” (Paper presented at the conference, rized state police (Policia Militar) is under the 45

control of Brazil’s still very powerful , 129. “Para SAE, guerra social ameaça a segurança,” for whom such reform is not a high priority. Folha de São Paulo, November 16, 1992.

115. See “Cariocas apóiam Exército na luta contra vio- 130. “Exército aceita nova função social,” Jornal do lência,” Jornal do Brasil, August 23, 1994. Brasil, February 16, 1993. See also “Exército es- pera com atuação social sensibilizar revisão con- 116. “Exército pronto para combater crime no Rio,” stitucional,” Jornal do Brasil, February 21, 1993. Jornal do Brasil, August 23, 1994. 131.“A Role for the Military,” Latin American Weekly 117. “Plano militar terá três prioridades,” Jornal do Report, , 1993, p. 52. Brasil, November 3, 1994. 132. For details, see Scott Mainwaring, “Democracy in 118. “Itamar quer que militares subam morro,” Folha Brazil and the Southern Cone: Achievements de São Paulo, October 27, 1994. and Problems,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 37, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 119. “Reanudarán operativo militar en Rio de 113–79. Janeiro,” Clarin, March 27, 1995. 133. Frederick M. Nunn, The Military in Chilean 120. “Tanques não sobem morro,” Veja, November 2, History: Essays on Civil-Military Relations 1994. 1810–1973 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976), 182, 188, 193, 242. 121.“População aprova operação do Exército,” Cor- reio Braziliense, November 13, 1994. 134. Confidential interview with the author.

122. “Comando do Exército vive fase popular,” Jornal 135. Frederick M. Nunn, “The South American Mili- do Brasil, November 6, 1994. tary and (Re)Democratization: Professional Thought and Self-Perception,” Journal of Inter- 123. “Zenildo promote investigar denúncia de tor- american Studies and World Affairs 37, no. 2 tura,” Jornal de Brasília, December 1, 1994; (Summer 1995): 20. “Exército enfrenta oposição para sair do Rio,” Folha de São Paulo, December 2, 1994. 136. Andrés Fontana, “Chile y Argentina: Percep- ciones Arcerca del Rol de las Fuerzas Armadas” 124. “Militares defendem ‘intervenção branca’ no (Buenos Aires, Fundación Simón Rodríguez, July Rio,” Jornal do Brasil, October 24, 1994. 1992, photocopy). See also Eduardo Rubilar, “Chilenos y argentinos opinan de sus FF.AA.,” La 125. Lucian W. Pye, “Armies in the Process of Political Nación, October 18, 1992. Modernization,” in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. John J. Johnson 137. Informative sources about the terms of Chile’s (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). negotiated transition include Mark Ensalaco, “In with the New, Out with the Old? The Democra- 126. “Exército: ação social com as prefeituras,” O tising Impact of Constitutional Reform in Chile,” Globo, January 28, 1993. Journal of Latin American Studies 26, no. 2 (May 1994): 409–29; and Brian Loveman, “¿Mis- 127. Agüero, “The Latin American Military.” ión Cumplida? Civil Military Relations and the Chilean Political Transition,” Journal of Inter- 128. For these and other recent examples of army in- american Studies and World Affairs 33, no. 3 volvement in civic action, see “Militares prestam (Fall 1991): 35–74. serviços à sociedade,” Correio Braziliense, Au- gust 25, 1994, p. 6. 138. This system, designed under the assumption that the center-left coalition would have a majority and that the right would have 46

slightly more than one-third of the vote, makes it 145. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The possible for a party (alliance) commanding a lit- Military Balance, 1993–1994 (: tle more than 33 percent of the vote to end up Brassey’s, 1993), 227. with one-half of all legislative seats. 146. Augusto Varas and Claudio Fuentes, “Servicio 139. See Francisco Aravena Rojas, “Chile y el gasto Militar Obligatoria,” chapter 4 in Defensa Na- militar: un criterio histórico y jurídico de cional, Chile 1990–1994: Modernización y De- asignación,” in Gasto Militar en América Latina: sarrollo, 164–88. Procesos de decisiones y actores claves, ed. Francis Rojas Aravena (: Centro Interna- 147. A recent public seminar sponsored by the Army cional para el Desarrollo Económico [CINDE] and attested to this persistent distrust of neighboring Facultad Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales Bolivia, Peru, and Argentina. See Academia de [FLACSO], 1994), 239–77. See also, Guillermo Guerra, Seminario: Política de Defensa, Memor- Patillo, “Evolución y Estructura de Gasto de las ial del Ejército de Chile, no. 441, 1992. Fuerzas Armadas de Chile, 1970–1990,” Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad 7, no. 2 (April–June 1992): 148. María Irene , “Los secretos del HV-3,” Hoy, 1–13; and Augusto Varas and Claudio Fuentes, no. 730 (July 15–21, 1991), pp. 6–7. Defensa Nacional, Chile 1990–1994: Modern- ización y Desarrollo (Santiago: FLACSO, 1994). 149. For a brief but informative discussion of the ma- jor projects of each branch, see Varas and 140. Patillo, “Evolución y Estructura,” 10, 12. Fuentes, Defensa Nacional, 35–68. See also Claudio S. Fuentes, “Los Efectos de una Nueva 141. See Silvia Yermani, “CUT pide bajar gasto mili- Realidad Internacional en las Fuerzas Armadas tar,” La Nación, , 1992. See also Teresa de América Latina: El Caso Chileno” (Paper pre- Espinoza, “Ley Reservada del Cobre debe ser sented at the XVIII International Congress of the eliminada, afirmó ministro Hales,” La Epoca, Latin American Studies Association, Atlanta, December 20, 1992. Georgia, March 10–12, 1994).

142. It should be noted, however, that this autonomy 150. See “Chile Ha Sido Reticente a Enviar Personal is far from absolute. Given Chile’s broader de- de las FF.AA. al Extranjero,” , Febru- mocratic framework, the military is necessarily ary 9, 1995, p. C3; and “Esperan Aumento de counterbalanced by competing groups. The mili- Participación Chilena en Misiones de Paz,” El tary budget has decreased in recent years in rela- Mercurio, January 11, 1994, pp. A1, A12. tion to social spending. In the years between 1989 and 1992, defense expenditures steadily 151. Survey opinion data show some public support fell from 12.82 percent to 10.08 percent of the for such participation. Of all those polled in national budget. In the same period, the percent- Chile, 26 percent felt it was legitimate for the age of the budget devoted to social spending armed forces to carry out functions related to rose from 62.13 percent to 65.64 percent. See order and public security. See Andrés Fontana, República de Chile, Ministerio de , “Chile y Argentina.” See also “Chilenos y Dirección de Presupuestos, Estadísticas de Fi- Argentinos opinan de sus FF.AA.,” La Nación, nanzas Públicas, 1989–1992 (Santiago: Ministe- October 18, 1992. rio de Hacienda, June 1993), 57. 152. See “Carabineros lose military status,” Latin 143. “Chile’s Army Stands Tall, and Casts a Shadow,” American Weekly Report, November 15, 1990, New York Times, January 26, 1990, p. E4. p. 11.

144. Nunn, The Military in Chilean History, 250–51. 47

153. “No part for army in anti-terrorist unit,” Latin 1994, pp. A1, A12; “Pinochet Llamó a Dejar de American Regional Reports—Southern Cone, Lado Confrontaciones,” El Mercurio, August 20, May 30, 1991, p. 6. 1993, pp. A1, A20. See also “La Conquista de las fronteras interiores,” La Nación,July 5, 1994; 154. “FF.AA. y de Oreden No Objetan Dirección Civil and “Ejército Pide Desarrollar Nuevos de para Inteligencia,” El Mercurio, April 18, 1991, Población,” El Mercurio, , 1994. p. C3. 159. See the three-part series in El Diario by Jorge 155. Nunn, “The South American Military and Busch, “El Mar Presencial: Actualidad, (Re)Democratization”: 20. Desafíos y Futuro,” May 28, 1991, p. 2; “El Mar Presencial: Actualidad, Desafíos y Futuro,” May Internal Security and Mili- 156. Barber and Ronning, 29, 1991, p. 2; and “El Mar Presencial: Actuali- tary Power , 62, 185, 239. dad, Desafíos y Futuro,” May 31, 1991.

157. Author interview with Jorge Burgos, undersecre- 160. James L. Zackrison and Lt. James E. Meason, tary of the Army, Ministry of Defense, Santiago, “Subject: Chile’s Theory of Mar Presencial” (un- Chile, February 7, 1995. published paper, 11 November 1994).

158. See “Ejército Plantea Crear Comisión Sobre 161.“Admiral Gets the Chop,” Latin American Re- ‘Fronteras Interiores,’” El Mercurio, July 19, gional Reports—Southern Cone,, 1992, 3; 49 ABOUT THE AUTHOR

“US Aircraft Not the Start of Ar- gentina–Chile Arms Race,” Latin Ameri- can Regional Reports—Southern Cone,July 2, 1992, p. 8.

162. See Joseph Nye’s concluding remarks in Civil-Military Relations and the Consolidation of Democracy (Wash- ington, D.C.: International Forum for Democratic Studies, 1995), 20–21.

163. For a further elaboration of this contra- diction, see Wendy Hunter, “Contradictions of Civilian Control: Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in the 1990s,” Third World Quarterly 15, no. 4 (1994): 633–53. 51 ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

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