SNIE 58-3-61

The Situation and Short-Run Outlook in

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THE PROBLEM

To analyze recent developments in Laos and to estimate the political and military prospects in Laos over the next two or three months.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Within the next few weeks the Laotian 3. In the absence of a political arrange­ crisis will probably enter a new phase con­ ment in the next few weeks, hostilities sisting either of a political arrangement are likely to be resumed by either the of some sort, renewed efforts in Laos and Phoumi forces or the Pathet Lao side. elsewhere to find a political solution while Phoumi's relative political and military the tenuous cease-fire remains, or a gen­ situation remains weak, and he probably eral breakdown of the cease-fire. (Para. believes that his only remaining hope il:! 11) a renewal of hostilities with outside as­ 2. Prospects for a political arrangement, sistance. In any event, the Communist. either at Geneva or in Laos, are only fair Pathet. Lao will probably undertake because of the wide differences remain­ limited operations designed to increase ing between Western and Bloc positions pressure for a political settlement and to and the suspicions and conflicting objec­ further consolidate their control. (Paras. tives among the Laotians. Such an ar­ 16-17) rangement would almost certainly have 4. We do not believe that the Lao Army to be based upon a coalition government can achieve a military solution in Laos under . As Prime or even force a north-south partition of Minister, Souvanna would acquire some the country without" sizable and long­ sources of independent strength and term outside military support. If the probably would try to pursue a neutralist Lao Army were to take the initiative and . course, at least at the outset. The Com­ were able to concentrate sufficient forces munists, however, would be able to bring for a major attack on any key Commu­ very strong pressures against him, and nist position, it p:.;obably could make some we believe that his control over the gov­ initial advance. It would not, however, ernment would become increasingly in­ be able to sustain a major effort, with­ effective. Over a period of time it would stand a serious counterattack, or prevent be increasingly unlikely that he could Communist seizure of the principal Lao­ prevent the Communists from acquiring tian towns along the Mekong River in a direct or indirect control. (Paras. 11-14) very short time. (Para. 18)

1 2

DISCUSSION

J. THE SITUATION Laos and have incr€)ased their military strength in the south alone to at least 7,500 5. At the time of the tenuous "cease-fire" in troops. They have mact,e an extensive propa­ Laos and the opening of the Geneva Confer­ ganda and political effort which has expanded ence in May, the combined /,' the area of Communist .:grassroots control. Pathet Lao and Sou vanna Phouma/Kong Le armed forces dominated the military situation 8. The position of the: Sou vanna/Kong Le in Laos. At that time, the Laotian Army group has been seriously undermined. Sou­ under General Phoumi was disorganized and vanna has no independ~ht political apparatus demoralized; if the Pathet Lao/Kong Le forGes of any significance at tiis disposal, and Kong Le's armed forces are weak in comparison with had continued their attacks, they probably • • ,I could have seized the important towns along elther the Phouml or; Pathet Lao forces. the Mekong River-Luang Prabang, , Moreover, the Souvanna/Kong Le forces are Thakhet, Savannakhet, and -which almost completely depeI1dent upon the Pathet still remained in the hands of Prince Boun Lao and the Bloc for communications, trans­ Oum's Royal Laotian Government. port, logistical, and financial support. Some of the group have becoIr}e increasingly resent­ 6. Nevertheless, the Communist powers de­ ful of their Communist allies and have at­ cided to accept a cease-fire and international tempted to prevent the Communists from negotiations. That decision probably re­ achieving a dominant military position and flected considerable concern for US prepara­ expanding their pOlitiyal influence in the tions for military intervention in Laos, a con­ countryside. However, they have not had the tingency which Hanoi, Peiping, and resources to match the Communist effort. probably all wish to avoid. Moreover, the Communists had achieved a strong position 9. During the cease-fire, Prince Boun Oum from which to make further gains: the Pathet and General Phoumi have concentrated on re­ Lao already held most of north and central building the Lao Army and redeploying it in Laos, and they held enough of southern Laos the Mekong Valley. As a result of US train­ to facilitate Hanoi's Communist Viet Cong ing efforts and the continued influx of equip­ ment and supplies, the offensive and defensive effort against President Diem and his govern­ • • r ment in . As for the rest of capabIlIties of the Lao ,Army have been im- Laos, the Communists probably estimated proved. The present number of troops in com­ that, in view of the military situation in Laos, bat units of the regular Lao Army is 29,200, they could negotiate an agreement which and there are 13,800 full-time Auto Defense would interpose no serious obstacle to eventual (ADC) troops. These figures, however, indi­ Communist domination of the Laotian Gov­ cate a greater military capability than is actu­ ernment through political means. ally available. Although army units qave demonstrated some effectiveness in limited 7. Although there has been no dramatic clearing operations and the morale of the change in the situation in Laos since the cease­ troops has apparently iPlproved, the Laotian fire, there has been a steady improvement in Government's logistical support of its troops in the overall position of the Communist element. The Pathet Lao armed forces have undergone the field continue& to be poor and the field extensive reorganization and have substan­ commanders are for the most part indecisive, tially augmented their equipment. Through weak, and poorly motivated. The major local recruitment and reinforcement from operational successes since the cease-fire have , Pathet Lao troop strength has been scored by Meo guerrilla units which have been greatly increased. They have made effectively harassed Communist lines of com­ considerable progress toward consolidating munication in the Plaine des Jarres area and their military positions in north and central forced the Communists! to divert a consider- 3

able number of troops in an effort to elimi­ claim to a neutralist position but he is de­ nate the Meo bases. pendent upon the Communist for support and could not agree to terms which were not ac­ 10. On the basis of recent and incomplete ceptable to the Communists. He works with evidence we believe that there has been a I Souphanouvong on a b~sis of equality but is sharp increase in the strength of the forces unwilling to accept equal status for Phoumi. opposing the government forces in Laos. Our Phoumi is still hoping for a military solution best estimate at present is that they number in Laos and probably" would not accept a about 31,000. In addition to about 16,000 political settlement which would be accept­ Pathet Lao, this figure includes 1,600 North able to Sou vanna Phouma unless the US Vietnamese cadre and specialist personnel who forced him to do so. For these reasons, Boun operate the logistics and communications Qum and General Phoumi almost certainly do systems, man the field and antiaircraft not intend genuinely to seek a negotiated po­ artillery, and provide technical and tactical litical settlement. guidance at all levels of the Pathet Lao/Kong Le effort; four North,Vietnamese infantry bat­ 13. If the present crisis moves into a political talions (about 1,600 men) serving as special phase as the result of a'rrangements made at assault forces; 4,000 troops in Kong Le's com­ Geneva and among the three Laotian Princes, mand; and 8,000 in Phong Saly under Kham it would almost certainly have to be on the Ouane who, like Kong Le, is responsive to basis of a coalition government under Sou­ Souvanna Phouma. vanna Phouma. Souvanna probably has aspirations for performing a role as a neutral­ II. THE PROSPECTS ist leader in Laos and in Southeast Asia. However, Souvanna is not a free agent and it 11. Within the next few weeks the Laotian is unlikely that he would be able to steer a crisis will probably enter a new phase con­ truly neutral course. As Prime Minister, he sisting either of a political arrangement of would probably try at least at the outset to some sort, renewed efforts in Laos and else­ maintain a neutralist position and to reduce where to find a political solution while the his near total dependence upon the Com­ tenuous cease-fire remains, or a general break­ munists. He indicated in his talks with down of the cease-fire. At present, the pros­ Ambassador Harriman an awareness of Com­ pects for a political arrangement are only fair. munist strength and i~tentions in Laos and There are wide differences between the West­ a desire to avoid Communist domination. ern and Bloc positions on a number of major However, the Communists would still be able points at issue at Geneva. Although the to bring very strong pressures against him. Communists have recently displayed a con­ Although control of the government would ciliatory attitude and have shown some will­ give Souvanna some sO,urces of independent ingness to compromise on minor issues, the strength he does not now have, the Commu­ Bloc powers, particularly Peiping and Hanoi, nists would retain a large part of their armed appear confident in their strong bargaining position, and have shown no inclination to forces and their political apparatus, either make major compromises for the sake of overtly or covertly, to insure their continued reaching agreement. dominance of major parts of the country, to influence any future elections, and to main­ 12. Moreover, general agreement among the tain Communist pressure against South major Western and Bloc powers at Geneva Vietnam. ' would not necessarily assure a pOlitical "solu­ tion" in Laos because of the mutual suspicions 14. Souvanna's ability to resist Communist and conflicting objectives among the Laotian pressures on him and to offset Communist in­ elements represented by the three princes, fluence in the countryside would depend both Souphanouvong, Souvanna Phouma, and upon the achievement of effective interna­ Boun Oum. Souphanouvong represents the tional controls to insure Laotian neutrality Communist position. Souvanna Phouma lays and upon the full support and cooperation of 4

the Boun Oum/Phoumi element with Sou­ might be renewed by either the Phoumi forces vanna to provide firm resistance to Pathet Lao or by the Pathet Lao/Kong Le side. Both demands and pressure. We do not believe have certain motivations. General Phoumi's that the Communist powers, particularly political and military si~uation remains weak Peiping and Hanoi, would agree to effective and he probably believes that his only re­ international controls. Although US pressure maining hope is a renewal of hostilities in on Boun Oum and Phoumi might force them which he would have outside assistance. If to accept a coalition government under Sou­ he thought he could resl)..llle hostilities in such vanna Phouma, they would not willingly sup­ a manner as to bring the US into the conflict, port Souvanna and probably would seek by he almost certainly would do so. Moreover, every means they could to undermine him. General Phoumi is sometimes disposed to mis­ Consequently, although a coalition govern­ interpret the extent of US commitment to him. ment under Souvanna might at first appear 17. We do not believe it likely that within the to be holding a neutralist course, we believe next two or three month!? the Communists will that Souvanna's control over the Laotian Gov­ undertake conventional operations to seize ernment would become increasingly ineffec~ and hold key cities in the Mekong River Valley. tive. Over a period of time it would be in­ Instead, they probably will increase their creasingly unlikely that he could prevent the limited operations to maintain pressure for a Communists from acquiring direct or indi­ political settlement and to consolidate further rect control. their control. They probably will increase their efforts to eliminate Meo resistance in the 15. A continuation of the .present tenuous Plaine des Jarres area and increase the scale cease-fire line, or any attempt to formalize or of their own guerrilla activities in areas under consolidate it, would probably not be tolerated nominal Lao Army control. The Communists by Peiping and Hanoi unless it were backed up thus will be able to further consolidate their by substantially increased non-Communist control in northern Laos and, at the same time, military force. A durable partition of the prevent the Lao Army from preparing for at­ country would almost certainly require a long­ tacks on key Communist-held areas. term commitment of outside forces, including 18. We do not believe that the Lao Army can US troops, to the defense of the Mekong achieve a military solution in Laos or even Valley. Any effort by US or SEATO forces to force a north-south partition of the country expand the area under non-Communist con­ without sizable and long-term outside mili­ trol would run serious risk of intervention by tary support. If the Lao Army were to take North Vietnamese troops or volunteers.1 the initiative and were able to concentrate sufficient forces for a major attack on any key , 16. If a political arrangement is not reached Communist position, it probably could make in the next few weeks, we believe it likely that some initial advance. It would not, however, the cease-fire will break down. Hostilities be able to sustain a major effort, withstand a serious counterattack, or prevent Communist I See SNIE 10-2-61, "Likelihood of Major Commu­ nist Military Intervention in Mainland Southeast seizure of the principal Laotian towns along Asia," dated 27 (TOP SECRETi'--___-' the Mekong River in a very short time.

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