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The Foundation, China, and Cultural Change Author(s): Frank Ninkovich Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of American History, Vol. 70, No. 4 (Mar., 1984), pp. 799-820 Published by: Organization of American Historians Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1899749 . Accessed: 09/04/2012 03:08

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http://www.jstor.org The RockefellerFoundation, China, and CulturalChange

FrankNinkovich

In 1915,on hearingof the RockefellerFoundation's desire to set up a medical schoolin Peking,Paul Reinsch,the minister to China,remarked approvinglythat the foundation'splans were "in full accordancewith the traditionsof our past relationswith China, wherethe activitiesof our people havebeen religious, cultural and educationalin a fargreater measure than they have been commercial."Reinsch's comment highlights two key elementsof the relationshipbetween the United States and China: the vital role that policymakersassigned to the culturaldimension of that relationship; and the convictionthat the managementof culturalcontacts was properlya non- governmentalfunction. The RockefellerFoundation's attempt over the course of fortyyears to channelChina's modernizationin a liberaldirection epito- mizes themarriage of national interest and privatepolicymaking. At the same time,the Rockefeller experiment in themanagement of ideas also providesan exampleof how an importantaspect of United States foreign relations can be understood"less fromthe studyof diplomatic correspondence in government archivesthan from an examinationof extragovernmental forces. " ' Despite the factthat the bulk of its expenditureswould be made in medi- cine, the foundationalways definedits purposesin sweepingcivilizational termsthat transcended its seeminglynarrow focus on medicalmatters. That expansiveoutlook first became evidentin the educationalorigins of its China program,which articulated the cultural objectives that would become the hall- markof its handlingof Chinese affairs. In October1906 ErnestDeWitt Burton FrankNinkovich is assistantprofessor of history at St. John'sUniversity. 1 Paul Reinschto WallaceButtrick, Dec. 1, 1915,box 1, series1, RG 4, RockefellerFoundation Archives(Rockefeller Archive Center, North Tarrytown, N.Y.); MorrellHeald and LawrenceS. Kaplan, Cultureand Diplomacy: The AmericanExperience (Westport, Conn., 1977), 6. The philanthropicorigins of United States cultural diplomacy are surveyed in FrankA. Ninkovich,The Diplomacyof Ideas: U.S. ForeignPolicy and CulturalRelations, 1938-1950 (Cambridge,Eng., 1981), 8-23. For a summaryof the overseascultural activities of the philanthropicfoundations betweenthe two worldwars, see MerleCurti, American Abroad: A History(New Brunswick,N.J., 1963), 301-38.

The Journalof American History Vol. 70 No. 4 March 1984 799 800 The Journalof American History of the Universityof Chicago wroteto Wallace Buttrickof the Rockefeller- funded General Education Board with an idea that seemed, to Burton, "nothing less than magnificent":the creation in China of a university modeled on the Universityof Chicago. The university'sinterest in the proposal-inspiredby a returnedChina missionaryalarmed at whatseemed to be a runawayChinese culturalnationalism-came at a time when many thoughtfulAmericans were becoming concerned about the courseof Chinese development.Recent events such as the Boxer Rebellion,the boycottof Americangoods in protestover immigration restrictions, and theChinese rush to be educatedin Japanwere signs of a growinghostility to Westerntutelage. Betrayinghis anxietyto a groupof students,Burton told them that "China is like a boat shootingthe dangerousrapids of the greatriver in Yangtze." The arrangementwhereby the remission of the Boxer Indemnity was earmarkedfor the provisionof American-styleeducation was one attemptto counteract thoseominous developments; Burton's proposal, which emphasized the trans- plantationto China of institutionalstructures as well as knowledge,was another.2 JohnD. Rockefellerand his adviserseventually proved receptive to theidea. Throughthe lucrativeoperations of StandardOil in the Far East and through his regularcontributions to the AmericanBaptist Missionary Society, Rocke- fellerhad a long-standingpersonal interest in China. More important,his closest adviser,the Baptistminister Frederick T. Gates, who had a fondness foreducational schemes and who was a primemover in persuadingRockefeller to fundthe Universityof Chicago, smiled on theplan and was its mostenthu- siastic promoter.As earlyas 1905, when arguingthat Rockefellerought to expandand systematizehis giving,he had suggestedpresciently the creation of "a fund for the promotionof Christianethics and Christiancivilization throughoutthe world." At the same timethat Burton was settinghis ideas to paper,Gates was independentlysounding out the variousAmerican mission- arysocieties about the feasibility of a similarproposal.3 The resultwas the creationin 1908,under auspices, ofthe Rockefeller-funded Oriental Education Commission, headed by Burton, to surveyat firsthand the possibilitiesfor philanthropic action. Although deeply committedto the Christianevangelization of China, Burtonwas 2 ErnestDeWitt Burtonto Buttrick,Oct. 27, 1906, box 1, series 601A, RG 1.1, Rockefeller FoundationArchives; William M. McKibbento AndrewMacLeish, n.d., ibid.; Burton,speech draft,n.d., box 4, series 1, ErnestDeWitt BurtonPapers (RegensteinLibrary, University of Chicago). For the contrastingapproaches of the BoxerIndemnity scholarship program and the Rockefellerphilanthropy, see Peter Buck, AmericanScience and Modern China, 1876-1936 (Cambridge,Eng., 1980), 46-90. 3Burton to Buttrick,Nov. 26, Nov. 30, 1906,box 1, series600, RG 1.1, Archives;, Chapters in MyLife (, 1977), 209. Forthe importance of China to StandardOil and JohnD. Rockefeller'smissionary interests, see AllanNevins, Study in Power:John D. Rockefeller,Industrialist and Philanthropist(2 vols.,New York,1953), II, 391; and AlvinMoscow, The RockefellerInheritance (Garden City, N.Y., 1977), 74-75. ForFrederick TaylorGates's interestsand influence,see RaymondB. Fosdick,The Storyof the Rockefeller Foundation(New York, 1952), 80-82; and JohnZ. Bowers,Western Medicine in a ChinesePalace: PekingUnion Medical College, 1917-1951 ([New York], 1972), 30-31. The RockefellerFoundation and China 801 equallyinterested in assistingthat nation's successful modernization, the two processesbeing in any case interdependentin his view. HarryPratt Judson, presidentof the Universityof Chicago,believed that a researchuniversity in China would effect"almost a social revolution"by inculcating new standards ofindividual and social morality,by means of "a trainingin new conceptions ofpolitical and social organization."Not surprisingly,then, the commission's reportconcluded that rationality, in particularthe scientificrationality em- bodied in Westernuniversities, was the solution to the riddle of China's successfulmodernization. A researchuniversity would "developthe scientific spirit, high moral ideas . . . and greater strength of character." Like a gyroscope,the universitywould act as a moralstabilizer while also providing the dynamicintellectual resources needed to plot China's new historical course.4 Those recommendations,although they coincided nicely with Gates's desires,soon provedimpracticable. For one thing,because of the expectation that a secular institutionwould face demands for Chinese control,the prevailingfear of Chinese dishonestyand incompetencerendered such a course"out ofthe question. " Probablya greaterimpediment was theconsider- able hostilityof the missionaryboards, always a powerfulinfluence in Rocke- fellercouncils, to the idea ofsecular education. Checked by theirveto power, Gates devised an alternativescheme that he hoped would satisfyall con- cerned."Might we not do in medicinein China what we had failedin our attemptto do in Universityeducation?" he asked. Thinkingalong the same lines,Jerome D. Greene,secretary of the newly incorporated Rockefeller Foun- dation,argued in 1913 thatan investmentin medicine"would lighta lamp whichwould burn for centuries. " Warmingto theidea, thefoundation invited a numberof prominent educators and representativesof the major missionary societiesto its officesin January1914 to debatehow bestto deal withChina's future.5 The most common analogyused by those presentat this conferenceto describeChina's situation,one thatwould become the leitmotif of foundation analysesover the years, pictured China as a feudalsociety poised at thebrink ofmodernity. As a subsequentfoundation report would conclude, the advent of the Chinese Republic,besides marking a changeof government,also offered "the brightesttime for striking at theroots of superstition."Inasmuch as all the participantsviewed the Chinese as a flawedand backwardpeople, more than superficialassistance would be requiredto removethe "radicallyfalse viewsof life and radically false views of nature" that formed the greatest barri- 4Ernest DeWitt Burton, "The Christian Universityand the World-WideMission of Christianity,"Christian Courier, Sept. 19, 1907,p. 2; HarryPratt Judson to StarrJ. Murphy, April 24, 1909,box 4, series1, BurtonPapers; Ernest DeWitt Burton and Thomas Crowder Chamberlin, "Reportof the Oriental Education Commission of the University of Chicago," vol. II, Dec. 1909, pp. 348, 399-413,box 1, series600, RG 1.1, RockefellerFoundation Archives; Burton to Judson, March11, 1909,box 4, series1, BurtonPapers. 5 MaryE. Ferguson,China Medical Boardand PekingUnion Medical College:A Chronicleof FruitfulCollaboration, 1914-1951 (New York, 1970), 14; JeromeD. Greene,"Educational and OtherNeeds in the Far East," Nov. 22, 1913,box 24, series900, RG 3, RockefellerFoundation Archives;Jerome D. Greeneto Burton,Dec. 22, 1913,box 4, series1, BurtonPapers. 802 The Journalof American History cade to progress.Of China's many deficiencies,the most frequentlymen- tioned,and the one consideredto be the most serious,was the lack of what was called "the scientificspirit." Among others, Charles W. Eliot,president of HarvardUniversity, deplored the traditional reliance on intuitionand medita- tion, in contrastto "the inductivemethod of ascertainingtruth." ,assistant secretary of the General EducationBoard, also lamented "the inabilityof thesepeople to graspthe inductivemethod-to put two and two together."Progressive Chinese, the conferenceparticipants believed, were conscious of those inadequaciesand would welcome Americaneduca- tional assistancein effectingcultural, as well as technological,moderniza- tion.6 A few of the participants,Burton among them, continued to pressfor the adoptionof the universityproject in the beliefthat a medical programwas morea palliativethan a fundamentalcultural cure, but theyreceived only a polite hearing. Not only did the originalobjections still apply, but the Rockefellers,recently embroiled in a long and noisybrouhaha over congres- sional incorporationof the foundation,were anxious to avoid controversial involvements.More importantto the defeatof a purelyeducational program, however,was the majoritybelief that a medical approach,besides deflecting domesticand foreigncriticisms, could serve as thecatalyst for a culturalmeta- morphosis.7 True, an investmentin medicine seemed preferablefor narrow practical reasons.If one argumentin favorof a Chinaprogram was thenation's so-called plasticity,by the same token the ongoingpossibility of disruptiveturmoil would make long-termplanning very difficult. Because medicine was pre- sumed to be relativelynoncontroversial, it seemed to offerthe greatest assuranceof continuity.According to JohnD. Rockefeller,Jr., medicine was "a nonpartisan work and one whichwould interest all ofthe people regardless of the governmentchanges. " A counterpointto the cautious approach, however,was the thrillingvision of a China purgedof its traditionalism,one dayleading the world in medicalknowledge. Given the Rockefeller success in reorientingAmerican medical education on a scientificbasis, the foundation seemed in a position, as Gates's son exuberantlyput it, "to give super- medicineto China." Shortlyafter the conference,the foundationcreated the China Medical Board(CMB) and afterfurther study decided to builda first-rate medicalschool in Peking.8 6 China Medical Commissionof the RockefellerFoundation, Medicine in China (New York, 1914),89; "China Conferenceof the Rockefeller Foundation, January 19 and 20, 1914," verbatim minutes,pp. 4, 56, 97, 103,box 26, series601, RG 1.1, RockefellerFoundation Archives; Charles W. Eliot,Some Roads towards Peace: A Reportto theTrustees of the Endowment on Observations Madein Chinaand Japan in 1912 (Washington,1914), 5. 'Burton to FrederickT. Gates, Feb. 9, 1914, box 5, series 1, BurtonPapers; PaulPMonroe to Burton,Feb. 12, 1914,ibid. 8 FrederickL. Gates Diary, Aug. 11, 1915, p. 2, box 33, series 601, RG 1.1, Rockefeller FoundationArchives; Jerome D. Greene,"Memo on theRockefeller Foundation," Aug. 12, 1913, box 21, series 900, RG 3, ibid. The idea of China as a traditionalsociety that possessed the potentialfor a radicalleap to modernityis notso paradoxicalas it mayseem. A similarnotion has The RockefellerFoundation and China 803

Gates's approachseemed also to make sense in thelarge view. Althoughthe idea ofa researchuniversity was rejectedin favorof a proposalthat seemed to emphasizea healingmission, all the earlytalk of implantingthe "scientific spirit"was not forgotten;the foundation would continueto view medicineas an alternativemeans of promoting the original goal ofa rationalizedChina. As JohnD. Rockefeller,Jr., explained at its dedicationceremonies in 1921, the Peking Union Medical College (PUMC) was intendedto be an excellent ,but it had another,more important, role to play: to offerthe best of Westerncivilization "not only in medical science but in mental developmentand spiritual culture." That the latter was more than an incidentalor secondarypurpose was confirmedsome fifteenyears later by the CMB trustees,who stated the foundation'sobjectives in more explicit,if somewhatstilted, fashion: "There can be no doubt,though scarcely expressed but well understoodnevertheless, that the chiefresult to be attainedwas the creationof an exampleon Chinesesoil, ofhow a techniquehas becomeavail- able of acquiringknowledge of naturalphenomena by scientificmethods." The aim, theyconcluded, was not to impartWestern scientific technique per se but "to developthe circumstances under which Science flourishes. " 9 The importationof modern scientific knowledge and technologywas bound to be revolutionary,but as the foregoingstatement suggests, the trusteeshad somethingeven moreportentous in mind:the implantationof a self-sustain- ing ethos and cultureof science. They soughtto nurturea professionaltradi- tionthat was itselfhostile to tradition,one that,in thewords of Edward Shils, in its eagernessto discoverthe unknown"denies the validityof knowledge drawnfrom the past in whateversphere science is conducted."If science is, as RobertK. Mertonhas maintained,"organized skepticism," its acceptancealso entails"a latentquestioning of certain bases ofestablished routine, authority, vestedprocedures, and therealm of the 'sacred'generally." With the inherent tensionbetween science and traditionas a basic postulate,the founders of the CMB countedon the introductionof the "inductivemethod" to tradition- bound China to producethe most far-reachingcultural transformations. In- deed, accordingto JohnMott, their purpose was nothing less than to "establish ideals in a countrywhere everythingdepends on customs and traditions."Implicit in that view was theirbelief that the diffusionof the scientificoutlook would stimulate a liberal approach not only in the beenstated more recently in theform of a " ofevolutionary potential," which holds that less- developedsocieties have a leapfroggingpotential for moving to new and comparativelyadvanced levels of development,in part because of the developmentaldrag caused by the greater specializationof "muscle-bound"modern societies. Elman R. Service,"The Law ofEvolutionary Potential,"in Evolutionand Culture,ed. MarshallD. Sahlinsand ElmanR. Service(Ann Arbor, 1960),93-122. 9 Addressesand Papers: Dedication Ceremonies and MedicalConference: Peking Union Medical College,September 15-22, 1921 (Peking,China, 1922), 64; China Medical Board,Inc. trustees, memo, [1936],box 14, series601, RG 1, RockefellerFoundation Archives. For a descriptionof lingeringreligious influence and resentmentagainst the secularorientation of PekingUnion Medical College (PUMC), see MaryBrown Bullock, An AmericanTransplant: The Rockefeller Foundationand Peking Union Medical College (Berkeley, 1980), 66-70. 804 The Journalof AmericanHistory intellectualrealm but, by extension,in politics as well, forscience and a liberalpolity seemed to themto dependon thesame basicvalues. 10 In its progressiveemphasis on the leadershipof a small cadre of medical expertsand on the educationof a scientificelite, its preferencefor medical researchover more populist approaches to medicalcare, and its promotionof qualityover quantity,the PUMC was narrowlyconceived. That narrowness was purposeful,however: its founderssought to use highlyconcentrated means forthe achievementof great ends. Theirfaith in the capacityof medi- cine as science to serveas the vehiclefor a culturalrevolution in China was rootedin a positivisttradition that assumed, in GeorgeW. Stocking,Jr.'s, words,that "in a fundamentalsense, cultureand the growthof rationality were one and the same." Accordingto that view, which was based on a "rationalisticVictorian conception of man" thathad morein commonwith nineteenth-centuryevolutionist doctrines than with modernanthropological conceptsof culture,societies evolved in a universalpattern from primitive, irrationalforms to modern,liberal-rational entities. At the same time,how- ever,that approach was partof an emergingpragmatist perspective that had as one ofits centraltenets, according to one historian,"a beliefthat inquiry itself could stabilizeand sustaina culture."Science, maintained foundation execu- tive WickliffeRose, "determinesthe mentalattitude of a people, affectsthe entiresystem of education, and carrieswith it theshaping of a civilization." In any event,if the scientificattitude was in factthe "genius" ofmodern civili- zation,a culturalcore thateventually permeated and absorbedthe peripheral areas, then fromthe foundation'sperspective to concentratesolely on the essentialsmade sense.1' In theirfaith in theirability to managethe introduction of Western rational- ity,the CMB's founderswere in perfectaccord with E. B. Tylor'sdictum that "the science of cultureis essentiallya reformer'sscience." Accordingto the prevailinghorticultural analogy, that scientificcore could be transplanted fromculture to culture,with far-reachingconsequences. Typical was the remarkof one foundationrepresentative, who wrotewhile in China: "If a livingroot were planted,with fruitand seed, how rich and fertilethe soil mightprove to be." Similarly,Roger ShermanGreene, the PUMC's first residentdirector, was talkingabout more than medicine when he hopedthat 10 EdwardShils, Tradition(Chicago, 1981), 100-01; RobertK. Merton,The Sociologyof Science: Theoreticaland EmpiricalInvestigations, ed. NormanW. Storer(Chicago, 1973), 264; Elvin Hatch, Theoriesof Man and Culture(New York, 1973), 22; "China Conferenceof the RockefellerFoundation, January 19 and20, 1914," p. 141. 11George W. Stocking,Jr., ed., The Shapingof American Anthropology, 1883-1911: A Franz Boas Reader(New York, 1974), 221; GeorgeW. Stocking,Jr., Race, Culture,and Evolution: Essays in the Historyof Anthropology(New York, 1968), 105; MortonG. White,Social Thoughtin America:The Revolt against Formalism (New York, 1949), 53; David A. Hollinger,"The Problem of Pragmatismin AmericanHistory," Journal of AmericanHistory, 67 (June1980), 92-100; WaldemarA. Nielsen,The Big Foundations(New York,1972), 56. Forcriticisms of the emphasis on science,professionalism, and elitism,see E. RichardBrown, "Rockefeller Medicine in China: Professionalismand Imperialism, " in Philanthropyand CulturalImperialism: The Foundationsat Home and Abroad,ed. RobertF. Arnove(Boston, 1980), 123-46; and Bullock,American Trans- plant,44-47. The RockefellerFoundation and China 805

"a littlehelp wiselyapplied from outside might set in motioninternal forces that would themselvesproduce results of the greatestbenefit." The belief thatcultural change would occur by slow diffusionof the scientificethos to the tradition-boundmasses was inarguablyelitist, but the foundationhoped that, as with the progressionfrom seedling to forest,the PUMC's effects would in time be widespread.The foundation'soutlook was also, undoubt- edly,self-serving; no altruismis altogetherdevoid of self-interest.Given all that, however,it was a species of idealism, partlybecause of its liberal historicism,but also because of the underlyingconviction that ideas, rather thanpower, were the key to fundamentalsocial and culturalchange. 12 In principle,at least, the CMB was an experimentin mutualadaptation, or acculturation,whose goal, as described by Paul Monroe, was "the amalgamationof the cultureof the Westwith that of the East so thatthe best of each may be retainedand the least valuable of each eliminated."On the symboliclevel, the architecturaldesign of the PUMC, with its traditional sloping tile roofs disguisingthe modern two- and three-storybuildings beneath, was selected deliberately"to make the college not something imposedfrom without, but an agencywhich shall in timebecome an intimate, organicpart of a developingChinese civilization."In anotherconcession to Chinesecultural sensibilities, the institution's founders intended it to become autonomous,with responsibility and controlgradually passing to theChinese. Ifthe devolution of responsibility was the "ultimateaim," however,it would perforcebe reachedonly through "a painfullyslow process" of acculturation to Westernscientific values. Paradoxically,according to that formula,the Chinesecould asserttheir individuality and independenceonly after they had satisfactorilyinternalized universal-that is, liberal-rational-ideals.Despite all thereferences to two-waytraffic, for the timebeing at least the thorough- fareof scientific internationalism would be a one-waystreet. 13 The foundation'scultural ambitions were evidentalso in the choice of a nonmedicalman, RogerSherman Greene, Jerome D. Greene'sbrother and a veteranof the consularservice in China, as residentdirector of the PUMC. RogerSherman Greene viewed the PUMC as an instrumentof international functionalism,as anotherdevice to producethe interdependencethat Emile Durkheimcalled "organicsolidarity." In RogerSherman Greene's words, "by workingtogether in internationaltrade, in communications,education, scien- tificresearch, , and othernormal human activities, the final step to some formof political organizationthat shall safeguardthe peace of the world may prove less difficultand less revolutionarythan it has hitherto 12 EdwardBurnett Tylor, Primitive Culture (2 vols., Boston,1874), II, 453; FrederickL. Gates Diary,Dec. 15, 1915,pp. 488-89, box 33, series601, RG 1.1, RockefellerFoundation Archives; RogerSherman Greene, paper preparedfor joint conferenceof National Medical Missionary Associationof China and Medical Missionary Association, Jan. 1917, box 25, ibid. 13 Paul Monroe, "A Reporton EducationalConditions in China, RockefellerFoundation," [Autumn1913], p. 2, box 9, ibid.; "The CMB: A Memorandumon Purpose,Policy, and Program," Dec. 3, 1919,box 25, series601, ibid.; RockefellerFoundation, Annual Report, 1917 (New York, 1918),44. See also the carefullyworded rationale by RaymondB. Fosdick.Fosdick, Story of the RockefellerFoundation, 91. 806 The Journalof American History appeared."At the same time,consistent with the metascientificpurposes of the PUMC, he recognizedthat functional interdependence could be cemented only by the diffusionof universal,scientific norms. He realized also that this transvaluationof values could be achievedonly with difficulty,and he was not shy about warninggraduates of the premedicalschool of the value conflictsthat their modern scientific education would bringthem. "You will freeyourselves from many errors and prejudicesthat have limitedyou in the past," he toldthem and predicted that, in momentsof crisis, "you will feelthe necessityof holding firmly to the truthas you see it, and franklyavowing the new faithto whichyou have come." Althoughharboring no illusions about thedifficulties of deracination, Roger Sherman Greene suffered no doubtscon- cerningits desirability. 14 Forthe first ten years of its existence,the CMB set aboutenergetically in its missionto regeneratethe Chinesespirit. It erectedan imposingphysical plant and undertookthe promotionof advancedresearch and special studies,the trainingof doctors and nurses,and a programof fellowships and grants-in-aid to missionarymedical institutions. The CMB's activitieswere furthered also by the extracurricularinterests of its residentdirector, who maintainedclose ties with the Americandiplomatic community in Peking. RogerSherman Greene was instrumentalin channelingthe second remissionof the Boxer Indemnityinto the creationof the China Foundationfor the Promotionof Education and Culture,which, "devoted to the developmentof scientific knowledge," nicely complementedthe RockefellerFoundation's cultural interestsin China.15 In themid-1920s, however, the status of the CMB and thefoundation's atti- tude towardits China programunderwent a significantchange, partly as a resultof events within China, partly for financial reasons, and partlybecause of a reorganizationof the foundation. In China an upsurgeof nationalism pro- duceda seriesof regulations from the Ministry of Education that demanded at least nominalChinese controlover private educational institutions. For the CMB, the messagewas painfullyclear: the time was fastapproaching when Chinese influencewithin the medical school would be predominant.More important,perhaps, as a cause for concernwere the unexpectedlyheavy demandsthat the PUMC had placedupon the foundation's financial resources. To deal withthose problems, the foundation in 1928 separatedthe CMB from the foundation,incorporated it as a separate entity,provided it with an endowment,and placed it on a dietof decreasing annual subsidiesin thehope of stanchingthe financialhemorrhage. With Chinese representationon the "4Emile Durkheim,The Division ofLabor in Society(Glencoe, Ill., 1960), 111-32;Addresses and Papers,52-53; RogerSherman Greene, address delivered at openingof the secondyear of the PUMC premedicalschool, Sept. 1918,box 62, China Medical Boardof New York,Inc. Records (RockefellerArchive Center). For a biographyof Roger Sherman Greene, see WarrenCohen, The ChineseConnection: Roger S. Greene,Thomas W. Lamont,George E. Sokolskyand American- EastAsian Relations (New York, 1978). 15Bowers,Western Medicine, 40-44, 47-60, 63-75; Ferguson,China Medical Board, 13-59; Bullock,American Transplant, 78-95; RogerSherman Greene to MarjorieK. Eggleston,June 15, 1925,box 53, series1, RG 4, RockefellerFoundation Archives. The RockefellerFoundation and China 807

PUMC boardand withChinese administration of the college, but with funding and highpolicy continuing to emanatefrom New York,it was hopedthat both Chinese sensibilitiesand the foundation'sdesire to retainultimate control couldbe satisfied.16 The severanceof the CMB fromdirect foundation supervision and thecessa- tionof what had been an open-endedbudgetary commitment were the results also of some disillusionmentwith the PUMC's performance.The foundation expresseda growingconcern, as one memorandumlater put it,with "assuring a greaterreturn on the Foundation'sprevious large financialinvestment, particularlyin connectionwith the PUMC. " Gates,by now a foundationelder statesman,noted in an acerbic 1927 memo to JohnD. Rockefeller,Jr., that China was in anarchy,with little prospect of stability, and concludedthat "we should forthe presentreduce our commitmentsto the minimumand await developments."His skepticismwas perfectlyconsistent with the original beliefthat the PUMC and medicinewere not ends in themselves.As always, thefoundation made policy judgments in termsof its major goal ofinfluencing thecourse of Chinese civilization in a liberaldirection, and hereit foundlittle evidenceof substantive achievement.'7 The reappraisalwas relatedto an organizationaland philosophicalferment thentaking place withinthe foundationthat had the indirecteffect of down- gradingits medical experiment.A reorganizationof the variousRockefeller philanthropiesin 1929 and theirplacement under the umbrellaof the Rocke- fellerFoundation in a new divisionalstructure produced a greatercentraliza- tionand articulationof purpose. That reorganizationwas in partthe result of a feelingthat Rockefeller giving had developed"historically" -that is, chaoti- cally-and thata bureaucratichardening of the arteries,accompanied by the developmentof vested interests, was preventinga morerational use offunds. To providea badlyneeded sense of direction,the foundationadopted "the advancementof knowledge"as its guidingstrategy, a principlethat had been implicitin much of its givingbut thatonly now receivedsystematic articu- lation.18 Those changes,far from signaling an end to its interestin China or in its objectives,enabled the foundationto definemore sharplythe relationship betweenends and means. In 1924 Flexnerstressed that "progressdepends, in the firstinstance, on neithermoney nor machinery,but on ideas-or, more accurately,on men withideas.... It is withideas ratherthan projects that the Foundationsmust concern themselves." Therefore, with the exceptionof the globalcampaigns against disease conductedby the InternationalHealth Divi- 16 Bullock,American Transplant, 48-65; GeorgeVincent to RogerSherman Greene, Dec. 13, 1927, box 13, series601, RG 1.1, RockefellerFoundation Archives; Thomas M. DeBevoise to RaymondFosdick, Dec. 18, 1926,ibid. 17 SelskarM. Gunn,"China and theRockefeller Foundation," Jan. 23, 1934,box 12,series 601, RG 1.1,Rockefeller Foundation Archives; Frederick T. Gates,"World Philanthropy," Jan. 7, 1927, box 3, FrederickT. GatesPapers (Rockefeller Archive Center). 18 Vincentto RogerSherman Greene, Dec. 18, 1925,box 13, series601, RG 1.1, Rockefeller FoundationArchives; report of Committeeon Reorganization,Nov. 5, 1926,box 19, series900, RG 3, ibid. 808 The journal of American History

sion (IHD), the focuswould henceforthbe on the fundingof researchrather thanon educationin generalor on operatingprograms. 19 Crucially,however, the new emphasis was on knowledgethat could be applied,not on knowledgefor its own sake. Influentialfigures such as the lawyerRaymond B. Fosdick,soon to become the foundationpresident, be- lieved that scientificanalysis and tested fact should be made available for social purposes,to the point that he could speak almost mysticallyof "the possibilities of ultimate social intelligence." Reflecting that new instrumentalistorientation, a resolutionadopted by the trusteesearly in 1929 stipulatedthat henceforth "the possibilitiesof social experimentationwere to be keptconstantly in mind." A fewyears later a foundationofficer stated more bluntlythat policy would aim at "the advanceof knowledge,with the idea of social controlas a generalguiding line."20 From that perspective, the problem withthe PUMC was its ivorytower preoccupation with pure research, not its emphasison scienceand knowledge. The reorientationtook place in a decade when the fledglingsocial sciences appearedto be on theverge of a takeoffin theirdevelopment, which the Rocke- fellerphilanthropies had done much to promote.The foundationperceived nothingsinister or undemocraticin the renewedfaith in the possibilitiesof scientificsocial intelligence.As Edmund E. Day put it, "If we cannot get anywherewith the scientificattitude in the social field,if we cannot effect anythinglike substantialcontrol on the basis of scientificstudy of social phenomena,then the prospectof civilizationassumes differentcolor." It seemed as much a matterof historicalnecessity as of ideologyto pursuethe new branchof knowledge to itswidely ramifying frontiers.21 Grantingthe beneficialconsequences of the change of direction,some trustees,nevertheless, blanched at its practicalimplications. "We used to be so carefulabout enteringpolitics," moaned Frederick Strauss, thereby illumi- natingone reasonbehind the foundation'searlier fixation with medicine; the new approachseemed to him to be "loaded with dynamite."His objections wereoverridden, however, by the arguments of Fosdick, who reassuredStrauss thatthe Laura SpelmanRockefeller Memorial, another family philanthropy, had longbeen engagedin such fundingand that,moreover, foundation inter- ests wereadequately protected by a policyof indirect funding. "If thereis any taint about this work," he concluded-a point that he was not preparedto concedein anycase-"the taintis once removed."x22 19 Abraham Flexner,memo, Jan. 18-19, 1924, box 22, series 900, RG 3, ibid. 20 RaymondB. Fosdick,Chronicle of a Generation:An Autobiography(New York, 1958), 275-78; resolutions adopted Jan. 3, 1929, box 1, series 910, RG 3, Rockefeller Foundation Archives; 'Report on the Conference of Officers of the Rockefeller Foundation and General Education Board, October 10-11, 1938," box 23, series 900, ibid. 21 Social Science Division staffminutes, Jan. 14, 1930, box 1, series 910, RG 3, Rockefeller Foundation Archives; Donald Fisher, "American Philanthropy and the Social Sciences: The Reproductionof a Conservative Ideology," in Philanthropyand Cultural Imperialism, ed. Arnove, 238-39. For social control as "a central theoretical thrust" of sociologists by 1920, see Morris Janowitz,The LastHalf-Century: Societal Change and Politics in America(Chicago, 1978), 39. 22 Henry van Wesep, notes of informalmeeting of Rockefellertrustees, officers, and directorsat Princeton,Oct. 28-30, 1930, box 22, series 900, RG 3, RockefellerFoundation Archives. The RockefellerFoundation and China 809

The new concernwith social researchmerged with the foundation'stradi- tionalinterest in publichealth to producea comprehensiveapproach to social control.By 1930 the foundationwas displayinginterest, through the IHD, in promotingholistic programsof communitydevelopment in southeastern Europe. Foundationofficers increasingly discussed whether the foundation was 'equipped or preparedto undertakea programlooking towardsthe systematicand uniformadvance of all essentialphases of lifein a restricted area, hopingthereby to meet the fullneeds of the communityrather than an isolatedneed such as public health." That patternof thinking,revealing an awarenessthat public health was necessarilybound up withsocial, economic, and political conditions,led inexorablyto the conclusion that planned improvementsin publichealth demanded the applicationnot onlyof medical expertisebut also of the knowledgederived from the varioussocial sciences. Viewingthose functionalinterconnections in a broadpolitical and historical context,foundation officers hoped that the developmentof prosperousand stablecommunities would ultimately"produce a formof Governmentwhich would bringincreased welfare and well-beingto thepeople." As it turnedout, that all-inclusive conception of rural reconstructionreceived its most extensivetrial not in Europebut in China.23 The RockefellerFoundation's China programin the 1930s was the brain- child of Selskar M. Gunn, a foundationvice-president and directorof the IHD's Europeanprograms. In mid-1931Gunn visited China and was dis- pleasedwith what he saw. Usinga phrasethat was sureto catchthe attention of foundationpolicymakers, he reporteddramatically that "Westernciviliza- tion is underfire in China." The governmentin Nankingleft him with the feeling,as he relatedto foundationpresident , that "it was more like a groupof youngsters running a highschool societyrather than the affairs of a countryof 450,000,000people." Anothervisit caused him to question, giventhe prevalencein China of amateurismand rampantnationalism, the value ofthe PUMC as an instrumentof modernization. "It is a fairquestion if the results obtainedare commensuratewith the effort,"he wrote. Gunn concludedthat the foundation'sprogram in China was "no longerin touch withthe times or thebest we could find."Rather than admit defeat, however, Gunn arguedthat the foundationwas still "singularlywell adaptedto take a signficantpart in helpingChina in its strugglefor stability and progress." 24 What Gunn and his associateshad in mindwas prosaicin descriptionbut breathtakingin conceptual sweep. While on the surfaceconcerned with questions of agriculturaleconomics such as animal husbandry,veterinary medicine,and plantbreeding as well as withequally down-to-earth problems suchas sanitationand public health, their ambitious proposal was nothingless than a design for comprehensivesocial planning.In that schema, "rural 23 Selskar M. Gunn, statement in brief summary of the conferenceof trustees and officersat Princeton,Oct. 1930, box 4, series 911, ibid.; mimeographedexcerpt from George K. Strode diary, Feb. 25, 1931, box 1, series 910, ibid. 24 Selskar M. Gunn, "Report on Visit to China, June9-July 30, 1931," box 12, series 601, RG 1.1, ibid.; Selskar M. Gunn to Max Mason, Jan.23, 1934, ibid. 810 The Journalof American History reconstruction"was a euphemismfor broad social reformunder social scien- tificauspices. Foundation policymakers recoiled only at makingexplicit what theyhad in mind. Typical of theircaution was Day's warningthat "it is unwise to put ruralreconstruction in China explicitlyunder the captionof social planning.To do this has no advantage,and some manifestdisadvan- tages."A25 As theprogram was conceived,the goal ofhelping China was onlyincidental to thelarger experiment in social controland planningthat would bridge what was recognizedas the existing"disjunction between scientific research and social practice."Indeed, Gunn justifiedthe programbefore the trusteeswith theargument that China "providesthe social scienceswith something which has heretoforebeen lacking,namely, a 'laboratory',where experiments can be carriedon undercontrolled conditions." Gunn's assistantin China, JohnB. Grant,held out the prospectof broader applications. He arguedthat "demon- strationof principlecan take place in China long beforeit will occur in this countrydue to the absence of vested traditionalinterests in the former.'" Grant'sview exemplifiedthe beliefthat traditional societies possessed fewer structuralimpediments to acceleratedmodernization than existed in the industrializedsocieties. The Committeeon Appraisaland Plan, reportingto thefoundation trustees in December1934, agreed that "indeed there is a sense in which China mightbecome a vast laboratoryin the social sciences,with implicationsthat would be internationalin scope." AlthoughGunn had hoped to integratehis multidisciplinaryprogram with the foundation'sother divisionalinterests, the China programwas inauguratedin 1935 as an enter- priseoutside the foundation'sexisting bureaucratic structure. The program's autonomywas in itselfa signof the importance attached to it.26 The instrumentoriginally selected to implementthe China programwas the Mass Education Movement under the leadershipof Yale-educatedY. C. "Jimmy"Yen. FollowingWorld War I, Yen had created,under Young Men's ChristianAssociation (YMCA) auspices,a literacyprogram that relied on the one thousandmost commonly used Chinese characters,which were imparted in onlyninety-six hours of classroomwork with the help of speciallydevised textbooksand educationaltechniques. By themid-1930s Yen claimedto have providedforty million Chinese peasants with basic readingskills. On the assumptionthat literacy was onlya means to improvingthe conditions of life, 25 JohnB. Grant, "Principles of the China Program," March 1935, box 14, ibid.; Edmund E. Day to Gunn, June 25, 1935, box 12, ibid.; John B. Grant interview by Saul Benison, 1960-1961, transcript,pp. 350-52, Columbia Oral History Collection (, New York). Fosdick somewhat disingenuously discusses the experimentunder the heading of "Agriculture." Fosdick, Storyof the Rockefeller Foundation, 183-84. 26 China Program Progress Report, July 1, 1935-Feb. 15, 1937, box 13, series 601, RG 1.1, RockefellerFoundation Archives; JohnB. Grant to Gunn, Oct. 25, 1934, box 2, ibid.; reportof the Committee on Appraisal and Plan, Trustees' Conference, Dec. 11, 1934, box 24, series 900, RG 3, ibid. Peter Buck argues that Americans were faced with a choice between socially irrelevant science or scientificallyirrelevant social programs, either of which would ensure some form of Chinese backwardness. The rural reconstruction program, by blending science, reform, and politics, was designed to overcome that dilemma. Buck, AmericanScience and ModernChina, 220. The RockefellerFoundation and China 811

Yen branchedout into new fields,tackling matters such as scientificagri- culture,cooperative marketing, public health, and, not least, the integrityof local government.Gunn described his initialmeeting with Yen as "one ofthe most inspiringaccounts of any activitythat I have heard." The premisewas that,by the bootstrapsof research and education,one could pull the Chinese peasantout ofhis povertyand backwardness. By 1935the Chinese government had givenYen the runof a county(hsien) of 400,000 populationas a fieldfor his experiments,and Gunn proclaimedhis success to be "one of our major interestsin China.''27 Yen's work had one major drawback,however. From the foundation's perspective,the Mass Education Movement's usefulness lay mainly in promotionand applicationrather than in the processof research,which was moreproperly the sphereof the universities.The foundation'spurpose was, afterall, "to bridgethe gap between knowledgeand its utilization," and knowledgemust be developedby academicexperts. Thus whenYen ran afoul ofprovincial authorities in mid-1936,the foundation saw thisas a "blessingin disguise"and tookthe opportunityto recastthe rural reconstruction program alonglines more in harmonywith its social scientificbent. In April1936 Grant formedthe NorthChina Council on RuralReconstruction (NCCRR), which representeda numberof leading Chinese universitiesin additionto Yen's organization.The NCCRR, viewed as "a more logical and permanentsocial trainingand investigativeorganization," soon became the centerpieceof the Chinaprogram.28 In its desireto achievepractical results, the foundation early had decidedto providesupport "chiefly to projectswhich have governmentconnections." The rationalefor that approach, as well as an explanationof the foundation's enthusiasm,was evidentin thejustification for a grantto theNCCRR in 1937: In China,which is verybackward and less organized[than the United States], it is possiblefor universities to obtainthe actual operation of government organizations throughthe appointmentof universitystaff members to importantadministrative positions,such as magistrates,commissioners of education,civil affairs, etc. This control,at least at the beginning, is fundamentally important and essential if the social sciencesare to be providedwith what might be termedopportunities for controlled laboratoryfacilities. Throughthe creationof departmentsof economics, public works, social administration,and civil administrationand by its authorityto nominate officials,the NCCRR was in a positionto bringtogether research, training of personnel,and politicaladministration in a single,all-encompassing package. 27 Extractfrom 1931 Gunnreport, box 7, series601, RG 1.1, RockefellerFoundation Archives; Gunnto Mason,March 23, March24, 1935,ibid.; Grantinterview, 325A, 325B. In 1929 JohnD. Rockefeller,Jr., personally contributed $100,000 to Y. C. Yen's organization.Roger Sherman Greeneto R. H. Tawney,Nov. 24, 1932, box 7, series 601, RG 1.1, RockefellerFoundation Archives. 28 Gunnto Mason, Sept.9, 1935,box 14, series601, RG 1.1, RockefellerFoundation Archives; Gunnto Fosdick,Sept. 25, 1936,box 7, ibid.; mimeographedexcerpt from Confidential Monthly Reportto Trustees,Feb. 1937,box 10,ibid. 812 The Journalof American History

Thus the revisedorganization appeared to providea unique opportunityfor combiningknowledge with power.29 A surveyof the foundation'sgrants provides a clearerpicture of its inten- tions.In additionto fundingthe obligatoryprograms in composting,develop- ingmodern farm implements, controlling gastrointestinal diseases, and plant and animal breeding,the foundationmade more socially orientedexpendi- tures.It awardedfunds to studiesof birthcontrol since it viewed population increaseas "an outstandingproblem" for China. It providedmoneys for trans- formingelementary schools into "integratedschools" thatwould becomethe "dynamicsource of activitiesof all kinds" (each villageschoolteacher to be a "generalissimo'"who would coordinateand guidevillage activities). Adequate libraryservices, vocabularies and grammarsfor adult education,studies of educationalfinance aimed at a moreequitable distribution of funds,research aimed at findingout "how . . . the unsophisticatedrural Chinese really think,"public healthprograms, funding for a clearinghouse forrural recon- structionefforts throughout the country,fellowships-all those and more wereintended, as a progressreport stated, to constitute"a comprehensiveex- perimentalprogram of research, education and application,designed to bridge thegap between a ruralmedieval society and twentiethcentury knowledge. '30 Overshadowingthese plans was the questionof the Nankinggovernment's willingnessto back a programof social reformin the countrysidethat was bound to upset vested interests.Unfortunately, Chiang Kai-shek'sdilemma wouldremain unchanged for years to come: theexisting system, by perpetuat- inginequities in land tenure,played into thehands of the Communists;but a programof thoroughgoing reform aimed at eliminatingthe Communist danger would underminethe elites thatformed the mainstayof Chiang's regime.In any case, the foundationwas by no means unaware of the political pitfalls awaitingit. "Whatconcerns me in termsof the China program,"Gunn wrote to Fosdickearly in 1937, "is to arriveat a conclusionas to thereal honestyof the Chinese Governmentin connectionwith its NationalReconstruction pro- gram." A letterfrom Mayling Soong Chiang (Madame Chiang) intendedto offerpraise and encouragementfor the foundation'sexperiment, might also have caused seriousconcern. While laudingthe idea of ruralreconstruction, Madame Chiangalso confidedthat it fitin nicelywith "the spiritand aims of the New Life Movement," a reactionary,neo-Confucian drive that har- monizedonly superficially with the foundation's objectives in China.3' The potentialdifferences with Chiang'sregime never came to a head, how- ever, as the outbreakof the Sino-JapaneseWar in July1937 marked the 29 Grant authorization #37148,April 7, 1937, ibid.; JohnB. Grant interview,331. 30 See grant authorizations 4, 6-10, 35-36, [19371, box 10, series 601, RG 1.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives; FranklinHo interviewby Crystal Lorch Seidman, 1965-1966, transcript,pp. 112-13, Columbia Oral History Collection. For details of the rural reconstructionprogram, see James C. Thomson, Jr., While China Faced West: American Reformersin Nationalist China, 1928-1937 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 140-48. 31 Gunn to Fosdick, Feb. 23, 1937, box 14, series 601, RG 1.1, RockefellerFoundation Archives; Mayling Soong Chiang [Madame Chiang Kai-shek] to Gunn, Feb. 5, 1937, copy in box 12, ibid.; Thomson, While China Faced West, 152-60. The RockefellerFoundation and China 813 effectiveend ofthe China program.At first,the effectsof the war were not all negative,for the transferof the majorNationalist institutions to westernand southwesternChina providedopportunities as well as setbacks,especially for Yen's organization.It directedcomplete political restructurings in Hunan and Szechwan,and the establishmentof a school ofpublic administration further strengthenedits connectionwith the government.One of the foundation representativeson the scene even arguedthat the Mass EducationMovement was now in a position "to lay the foundationfor a reformedpolitical system. "32 That view turnedout to be wishfulthinking. Overall, as Gunn acknowl- edgedto Fosdick,the outlookfor the China programwas "prettywretched." Because the experimentalfield areas ofthe NCCRR werein thewar zones, all fieldwork had to be relocatedand startedafresh. More seriously,the univer- sities,which formed the institutionalcore of the program,were eitherunder Japanesecontrol or had been forced,with all the attendantdisorganization, to relocate.Even assumingcontainment of the conflictand continuedNation- alist interestand funding,relocation and reorganizationunder wartime condi- tionscould accomplishrelatively little. Problems of distance,transportation, and communicationwere great enough effectivelyto bury the idea of a programbased on cooperatingeducational and politicalinstitutions. After a periodof oscillationbetween despair and renewedhopes of success, by 1939 the NCCRR was clearly"a dormantor inactivebody." Consequently,the foundationpursued an "orderlyliquidation" of the programby providing taperinggrants to themain institutionsover a periodof four years. Those out- lays were justifiedas "conservation"grants that sought to hold togetherthe assembledexperienced personnel, in the hope that theymight find postwar employmentunder governmental auspices.33 The foundation'sfascination with China and the emphasis on socially appliedresearch were also evidentin the projectsfunded by the Humanities Division in the 1930s. Despite some calls forthe additionof a humanistic dimensionto thefoundation's China policy,prior to theappointment of David H. Stevensas directorof the HumanitiesDivision in 1932 it had provided fundsmostly for arcane antiquarian studies and conservativework in graduate schools. Withits new interestin social control,the foundationreplaced its rarefiedview ofculture with a determinationto putcultural values to practical use. Soon the foundation's aspirations in that area turned decidedly nonacademic, as the "controllingpurpose" became "to increase the importanceof culturalvalues in contemporarylife." The new consensus 32 Grantto Gunn,May 11, 1938,box 7, series601, RG 1.1, RockefellerFoundation Archives; SelskarM. Gunn,"Recommendations for China Program,1939-1940," March 24, 1939,box 13, ibid. 33 Gunnto Fosdick,Dec. 30, 1937,box 14, ibid.; Gunnto M. C. Balfour,Sept. 9, 1940,ibid.; ThomasB. Applegetto Gunn,March 1, 1940,ibid.; transcriptof telephone conversation between Gunnand Fosdick, Jan. 24, 1940,ibid. Another factor in thedecision to terminatethe program was a growingdisillusionment with Yen's administrativetalents. M. C. Balfourcomplained that "he seems to be mostlywords, words, words!" Balfourto Gunn,Jan. 1, 1940,box 12, ibid.; Grant, memo,July 24, 1937,box 14,ibid.; Gunnto Balfour,Dec. 12, 1939,ibid. 814 The Journalof American History demandedthat "the values of the humanitiesbe broughtmore directlyinto contactwith daily living." As Stevenslater put it, the humanities"have no partin 'pure research',or in antiquarianknowledge for its own sake; their referenceis alwaysto humanconduct and expression."34 In 1934 the HumanitiesDivision announcedan explicitinterest in promot- ing internationalunderstanding through cultural means. Stevenswas con- vincedthat the humanities,like the sciences,were internationalistin thrust and that they could advance the same progressivecultural mission. His thinkingwas informedby a universalistEnlightenment belief that an inter- change of cultural values, in addition to reducinginternational tensions caused by misunderstanding,would result in "the discoveryof common originsfor differentiated national ideas and ideals." The programwas also culturallyrelativist in thesense thatit stressedcross-fertilization and cultural tradingwhile it specificallyrejected "selling" ideas and evenoutright giving in the spiritof charity. Yet in thismixture universalism predominated, with the resultthat practice often differed from preachment. For example, after praising the idea of culturalautonomy, Stevens could still concludethat "the usual distinctionof developedand backwardcountries is as sound withrelation to culturalinterests as forpublic health. "35 With Stevensassuming the role of "patronsaint" in Far Easternstudies, China became the main focus and model for the humanitiesprogram in culturalrelations. The foundationimplemented the program partly by funding satellite organizationssuch as the Instituteof Pacific Relations and the AmericanCouncil of Learned Societies, which were concerned with improving United States-East Asian relationsat the intellectuallevel. Some of the foundation'smoney went also into buildingthe archivaland bibliographical toolsof a new bilingualscholarship. The mostimportant step, however, was a programof fellowshipsby which Chinese and American scholars could becomeacquainted with each other'scultures, thus becoming interpreters of theirsocieties and ambassadorsof mutual understandingand goodwill.The foundationenvisioned the trainingof new, strategicallypositioned educa- tional elites who would have influencebeyond their relatively small num- bers: "It is highlydesirable [that] attention be givento the placingof these men at strategicpoints of nationalinfluence. They and theirfollowers will producethe translations and theofficial expositions . .. thatwill helpthe next generationto live in a 'spherical'world." In thatview culturalinterchange, education,and political internationalismwere interlinkedparts of a single evolutionaryprocess of mutual accommodation. That theUnited States lagged behind the more nationalisticEuropean powers in its promotionof Asian 34David H. Stevens,"Time in theHumanities Program," Sept. 1949,pp. 1, 7, box 2, series911, RG 3, ibid.; David H. Stevens,"Aims of the Programin the Humanities,"Nov. 18, 1934,p. 1, ibid.; "Reportof Committee on Appraisaland Plan," Dec. 11, 1934,p. 73,ibid.; "The Humanities Program,A Reviewof the Period 1934 to 1939," Oct. 25, 1939,p. 8, ibid. 35 Mimeographedextract from agenda of Special Trustees Meeting, April 11, 1933,ibid.; David H. Stevens,"The Humanitiesin Theoryand Practice," March 31, 1937,pp. 5-6, ibid. The RockefellerFoundation and China 815 scholarshipwas an additionalfactor in the decision to speed the program's development. 36 For the humanitiesthe centralproblem of internationalismwas language, both in its role as a barrierto communicationand in its possibilitiesas a vehicle of improvedunderstanding. One facetof the internationalismof the 1930s was a renewed interestin an auxiliary internationallanguage- auxiliary,because native tonguescould not be replacedin the foreseeable future.Linguistic internationalists were dividedinto two camps: those who favoredthe adoption of a constructedlanguage such as Esperanto,whose chief virtuewas its relativefreedom from the taint of culturalimperialism; and thosewho advocatedthe spreadof a livinglanguage such as English,whose main selling point was its already widespreaduse. The main thrustof linguisticreform in the 1930s,however, was thedesire to addressthe nuts and boltsissues ofthe language question. According to theanthropologist Edward Sapir,the idea of an internationallanguage was no longerdiscussed solely in idealisticterms but was "moreand moretaking on theaspect of a practicalor technologicalproblem and of an exercisein the cleaningup of the thought process." Once the technicalbreakthrough was achieved,though, its imple- mentationwas anothermatter.37 The foundation'scontribution to the solution of those problemswas to fosterthe spread within China ofthe system of Basic English,a creationof the pioneeringlinguistic work of the Englishscholars I. A. Richardsand C. K. Ogden. Ogden and Richardsfelt that the futurelay with English,not least becauseit was technicallyanalyzable into a compactnumber of 850 wordsand operations that provided all the essential meanings. Indeed, in their remarkableattempt to get at the essence of language,the two feltthey had achievedan age-olddream: the distillation of a "limitedset ofwords in terms of which the meaningof all otherwords might be stated." Explainingthe structureand functionof Basic English, Richards franklyavowed the internationalistpurpose behind his technicalinnovations. "We can no longer riskletting any large section of the human race live in separation,"he argued, "cut offfrom the fullest possible communication with the rest." By 1940 over one hundredbooks, includingof course the New Testament,had been translatedinto Basic English.38 36 David H. Stevensto Gunn,June 22, 1933,box 1, ibid.; "New Programin theHumanities," April10, 1935, box 3, ibid. For David H. Stevens'srole in Far Easternstudies, see RobertE. Yahnke,ed., A Time of Humanities:An Oral History:Recollections of David H. Stevensas Directorin the Division of the Humanities,Rockefeller Foundation, 1930-50, as Narratedto RobertE. Gard(Madison, 1976), 61-69. One ofthe Rockefeller fellows was a youngscholar by the nameof John King Fairbank. Stevens to Gunn,June 22, 1933,box 1, series911, RG 3, Rockefeller FoundationArchives. 37 EdwardSapir, "The Functionof an InternationalAuxiliary Language," in HerbertN. Shenton,Edward Sapir, and OttoJespersen, International Communication: A Symposiumon the LanguageProblem (London, 1931), 93; HerbertN. Shenton,"A Social Problem," in ibid. 13-18. 38 I. A. Richards,Basic Englishand Its Uses (NewYork, 1943), 5, 18,26; mimeographedexcerpt fromTrustees Confidential Bulletin, April 1940, box 1, series911, RG 3, RockefellerFoundation Archives.Actually, Basic Englishdisplays characteristics of both a constructedand a living language.See MarioPei, One Languagefor the World (New York, 1958), 234-35. 816 The Journalof American History

The OrthologicalInstitute of China, which Ogden and Richardsformed in 1933 to implementtheir linguistic idealism, soon became the recipientof RockefellerFoundation grants. It conducted experimentalclasses, taught coursesin a numberof universities,experimented with radio broadcasts, and undertookthe translationinto Basic Englishof Chinese and Englishclassics. Afterwar brokeout in 1937, the instituteconcentrated its workin Kunming under the directionof Robert Winterof .With the cooperationof the Ministry of Education in Yunnanprovince, it hopedto train enoughteachers to staffthe schools adequately.As withthe rural reconstruc- tion program,however, the war spelled the effectiveend by 1943 to the foundation'srole.39 The practicaltask of the OrthologicalInstitute was to institutionalizethe effectiveteaching of Basic Englishin Chinese middle schools. Betweenthe immediate technical objectives and the long-rangeinternationalist aims, however, lay an intermediateset of ideological assumptions concerning Chinese culturalrequirements. Richards and R. D. Jamesonof Tsinghua Universitysought to reorientChinese intellectualsaway fromtheir classical humanistconcerns into modernscientific modes of thought.According to Jameson,the program'sobject was 'to make available to Chinese the logical or analyticalhabit of thoughtwhich has been the cause of much of our own progressin the sciences." It was, presumably,an antidoteto whathe termed the 'synthetic"habits of Chinese thought. Pleading for continued funding for the institutein 1939,Richards argued that "the mentalquality, as I see it, of the futureChina may turnupon it." For all its originality,that linguistic experimentrepresented but anothertwist in thefoundation's continuing con- cernwith inculcating the spirit behind the scientific method as a basic cultural trait.40 Withthe outbreakof the PacificWar, the Rockefeller Foundation's cultural initiativesin China,for all practicalpurposes, came to an end. Althoughfoun- dationstaffers continued to expressa concernwith China's world-historical destiny reminiscentof that voiced thirtyyears earlier by foundation patriarchs,the isolationand chaos ofwartime China, a ruinousinflation, and an unadvantageousrate of exchangeprecluded any new programdepartures. The postwaryears proved equally unpropitiousfor action as the social and political upheavals of civil war ruled out any substantiveexpenditures. If anything,the civil warfurnished convincing arguments for divestiture, and in 1947 the foundationtook the opportunityto sever its commitmentto the 39"The Orthological Institute," n.d., box 48, series 601, RG 1.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives; grant proposal, May 15, 1942, ibid.; memo by JohnMarshall, April 26, 1944, box 13, ibid. 40 R. D. Jameson, "Notes on the Present Position of Basic in China," March 7, 1935, box 48, ibid.; I. A. Richards to Stevens, March 8, 1939, ibid.; mimeographed excerpts from Trustees Confidential Bulletin, April 1940, box 1, series 911, RG 3, ibid. At the same time that he sought to introduce Western analytical concepts to the Chinese with a minimum of cross-cultural confusion, I. A. Richards wanted classical Chinese humanist thought to remain accessible to Western and Chinese scholars. I. A. Richards, Mencius on the Mind: Experiments in Multiple Definition (London, 1932), xiii. The RockefellerFoundation and China 817

PUMC, whichhad longbeen a substantialand worrisomedrain on itsfinancial resources.Thus untilthe Nationalist-Communist conflict ground to a military decision in 1949, the variousfoundation divisions were reducedto waiting anxiouslyfor opportunities that never came.4' Whatcan we make ofthat forty-year experience? That thefoundation's pro- gramswere, at least in part,successful is unquestioned.The foundationintro- ducedWestern medicine-to be adaptedby the Chinese to theirown purposes, to be sure-and, in a numberof other disciplines, both Chinese and Americans derivedbadly needed knowledge of each otheras a resultof the foundation's generosityand foresight.These were always secondaryobjectives in the foundation'shierarchy of priorities,however. Through a varietyof instru- mentalities-medical,social scientific,and humanistic-itsoverarching goal had been to influencethe courseof Chinesecivilization and to channelit in a liberal-democraticdirection. If measuredin termsof the culturalobjectives thatit proclaimedrepeatedly, the most striking feature of the foundation's in- volvementwas the disparitybetween the immensityof its ambitionand the meagernessof its results. If that was culturalimperialism, it was characterized moreby hubris than by hegemony, as China's culturerefused to fititself to the patternof the foundation's vision.42 Despite its fixationon the scientificideal, the Rockefellerstrategy was guided less by objectivitythan by what modernsocial science, somewhat belatedly,has come to recognizeas an ethnocentricallydistorted vision of the modernizationprocess. A factuallycomplex historical relationship between modernityand traditionwas converted,in thefoundation's belief system, into mutuallyexclusive ideal types,a polaritythat was furtherrigidified by a normativeoverlay in whichmodernity was identifiedwith virtue and tradition withvice. That all-or-nothingthinking in whichmodernization was equated withWesternization, American-style, left little scope for the operation of what has been called the "modernityof tradition,"whereby modernization can be based on indigenousvalues and institutionalstructures that are both more adaptableand pertinaceousthan imagined. Most parochialof all, perhaps,was 41 JosephWillits, memo, Sept. 30, 1942, box 23, series 900, RG 3, RockefellerFoundation Archives;Willits and RogerEvans, memo, Jan. 4, 1944,box 13,ibid.; Fosdick,memo, March 29, 1944,ibid.; Fosdick,memo, Oct. 21, 1946, box 12, series601, RG 1.1, ibid.; Ferguson,China MedicalBoard, 197-98. 42 Forthe foundation's assessment of its achievements,see RaymondB. Fosdick,"Foreword," in Ferguson,China Medical Board, 5; and Fosdick,Chronicle of a Generation,274. Forthe charge of culturalimperialism, see Brown,"Rockefeller Medicine in China." This accusationseems excessivelydramatic. Although imperialism is a formof power,not all powerrelationships, the culturalvariety included, are imperialistic.Any contact between cultures at differentlevels of developmentis boundto be asymmetricaland is moresensibly described, at least initially,in termsof power differential than of empire.A sensiblecriterion for determining the existenceof "informalimperialism" is what Tony Smith calls "effectivedomination," something the foundationhardly exercised over Chinese culture (the desire to achieveit is somethingelse again). Tony Smith, The Patternof Imperialism:The United States, Great Britain,and the Late- IndastrializingWorld since 1815 (Cambridge,Eng., 1981), 6. Moreover,the adoption of a culture of science,with all thedilemmas implied in such a course,is an objectivethat most developing societiesthemselves choose, sooner or later, to pursue.Finally, although the foundation assumed otherwise,it seemsclear today that science can be promotedin a widerange of political contexts. 818 The Journalof American History thefoundation's transparently historicist faith in theinevitable triumph of the liberalWorld Spirit, a faiththat made no allowances forthe less reassuring outcomesof the real historical process.43 Those assumptions,so beguilingin theory,appear to have had littleconnec- tionto hardrealities. Nowhere was thefoundation's idealistic innocence more evidentthan in its stubbornfaith in thecapacity of ideas to effectfundamental social change. By reducing internationalismto the internationalismof science, it based its hopes on an intellectualformula that ignored the social and politicaldeterminants of scientific endeavor; and in choosingto stressthe causal efficacyof science, foundation planners neglected the fact that science, which was at least as much consequenceas cause in the historyof Western development,would also have to come to termswith Chinese history.44The idea of modernizationthrough science, althoughfavored by a few Chinese intellectuals,never provided a seriousalternative to the idea of a politically groundedtransformation, with the result that the foundation'spolitical strat- egyconsisted of little more than naive faiththat its purposeswould somehow be acceptableto thepowers that be. That positionamounted, despite hopes to the contrary,to a dissociationof knowledgeand power that isolated the foundation'smodernizing ambitions from the revolutionaryrealities of Chinesepolitics.45 Nevertheless,the foundation'sexperience was not irrelevantto America's China policy,past or present.From the standpointof institutionaldevelop- ment,the pioneeringexperiments in culturalrelations, as in so many other areas ofpublic policy where corporate philanthropy took the lead, provideda classic exampleof the transitionfrom private to public management.46After thefoundation's efforts faltered in thelate 1930s,the federal government soon steppedin to take up the slack as the State Department'snewly created Division of CulturalRelations launched a China programof its own in 1942. Discontinuitiesexisted, of course, especially in the department'seagerness to promotethe diffusionof liberal political ideals in contrastto thefoundation's reconditeemphasis on theculture of science. Such differencesaside, the State Department'scultural efforts, which relied heavilyon the enthusiasticco-

43 For typical revisionist views of modernization, see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics," Comparative Politics, 3 (April 1971), 293-98; JosephR. Gusfield, "Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change," American Journal of Sociology, 72 (Jan. 1966), 351-62; and Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Modernityof Tradition: Political Development in India (Chicago, 1967), 3-14. 44 See, forexample, Merton, Sociology of Science, 266, 272-73, 278. 45 For a similar conclusion with respect to education and politics, see Philip West, Yenching Universityand Sino-Westem Relations, 1916-1952 (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), 247-48. For the debate within China over the value of science and liberal rationalism, see D. W. Y. Kwok, Scientism in Chinese Thought, 1900-1950 (New Haven, 1965), 3-160; JeromeB. Grieder,Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance: Liberalism in the Chinese Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), 94-135; and Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modem China (Cambridge,Mass., 1960), 333-37. 46 Nielsen, Big Foundations, 379-80; Robert H. Bremner, American Philanthropy (Chicago, 1960), 3; James A. Field, Jr.,America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882 (Princeton, 1969), x. The RockefellerFoundation and China 819

operationof the philanthropic and educationalestablishments, closely resem- bledin conceptionand executionthose of its philanthropicprecursors. Thus to the extentthat the pre-WorldWar II UnitedStates can be said to have had an organizedpolicy of culturalrelations at all, it was a privatepolicy heavily influencedby corporate philanthropy.47 Ifthe foundation's practices were precedents for the government'sdebut in the specializedrealm of culturaldiplomacy, its assumptionsalso transcended theirimmediate philanthropic locus byvirtue of their lodgment in highpolicy. That was less a resultof directinfluence than of a commoncultural outlook, forthe foundation's views were at thesame timereflections of basic American values and expressionsof the Americanbelief that the progressof world historywas shapedmore by culturalprocesses than by powerrelationships. Consequently,we cannotbe surprisedto discoverthose beliefsas a crucial ingredientin America'sOpen Door policy,an officialdoctrine that envisioned the creation,in theritual phrase, of a "strong,democratic China." The Open Door policyhas usuallybeen thoughtof as an economicstrategy designed to maintainthe United States' position in the shiftingEast Asianpower balance. If a "strong,democratic China" was indeedthe desideratumof UnitedStates policymakers,however, it is more accuratelycomprehended in terms of modernization,which, as C. E. Black argues,can be thoughtof "primarilyas acculturation-theadoption of the culturetraits of anothersociety." In con- trastto theofficial diplomatic record, which understandably focuses on report- ing the dramaticpolitical upheavals in East Asia, the Rockefellerexperience reveals in theirpristine form some of the culturalassumptions underlying UnitedStates policy.48 Forall its obviousshortcomings, we cannotdismiss the Rockefeller effort as so muchquixotic idealism or "sentimentalimperialism," if only for the nega- tivereason that straightforwardly political or imperialistictechniques would havebeen even less effectual.49We can, however,draw a morepositive conclu- sion as well. Althoughtheir diagnosis of China's ailmentsproceeded from excessivelyethnocentric assumptions and althoughtheir prescriptionfor recoverylacked an appreciationof the need forrevolutionary political medi- cine, in their dogged attachmentto cultural modernizationfoundation thinkersnevertheless grasped the essentialsof the historicalsituation with a moresolid appreciationof the national interest than those who viewedChina fromthe avowedly"realistic" perspectiveof balance of powerand political ideology.For in theirrealization that internationaldynamics went beyond

47 WilmaFairbank, America's Cultural Experiment in China, 1942-1949(Washington, 1976); Frank Ninkovich, "Cultural Relations and American China Policy, 1942-1945," Pacific Historical Review, 49 (Aug. 1980), 471-98. 48 MichaelSchaller, The UnitedStates and Chinain theTwentieth Century (New York, 1979), 71-73; AkiraIriye, Across the Pacific: An InnerHistory of American-East Asian Relations (New York,1967), 117-24; Warren I. Cohen,America's Response to China:An InterpretativeHistory of Sino-American Relations (New York, 1980), 41, 51, 250; C. E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization:A Studyin ComparativeHistory (New York, 1966), 50. 49 James C. Thomson, Jr.,Peter W. Stanley, and JohnCurtis Perry,Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia (New York, 1981), 310-11. 820 The Journalof American History

the commonplacesof power politics and in theirintuitive insight into the growinginternational importance of modernization,they were essentially correctin theirinterpretation of the broad sweep of history. 50 Their imperfect, culture-boundunderstanding of historical dynamics contributed to numerous ironiesand misperceptionsin the Sino-Americanrelationship, some of them tragic.As the presentChinese leadership'sconcern with modernizationand science attests,however, that understanding at least had the virtueof being historicallyrelevant to questions that remain of fundamentalcommon interestand continueto bindthe two nations together. 50 For argumentsstressing the coequal status of modernization and power, see Edward L. Morse, Modernization and the Transformationof International Relations (New York, 1976), xiv-xviii; Marion J. Levy, Jr.,Modernization and the Structure of Societies: A Setting for International Affairs(2 vols., Princeton, 1966), II, 734; and Ralph Pettman, State and Class: A Sociology of InternationalAffairs (New York, 1979), 65, 264-65.