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NO. 48 AUGUST 2021 Introduction

The Rush for the Pole A Furious Start to ’s Council Chairmanship Michael Paul

Russia assumed the Chairmanship of the at the 12th Ministerial in Reykjavik, on 20 May 2021. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov described his first meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken the previous day as “constructive”. Two days before the meeting, however, Lavrov warned the West against encroaching in the Arctic: “It has been absolutely clear for everyone for a long time that this is our territory.” But what exactly did he mean? The polar region claimed by Russia in its March 2021 submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf? Or the ongoing disputes over the ? Moscow is working to fortify its positions in the Arctic through a combination of aggressive rhetoric and offers of dialogue, in another example of its ambivalent policy mix of security and cooperation.

The four priorities of the Icelandic Chair- So which issues will Russia prioritise? manship (2019–21) were “the Arctic The Arctic commission set up by the Secu- marine environment, climate and green rity Council of the Russian Federation met energy solutions, people and communities in October 2020 to prepare the Chairman- of the Arctic, and a stronger Arctic Coun- ship. Not entirely surprisingly, Dmitry cil”. was proud of what it had Medvedev, as deputy chair of the Security achieved, said Foreign Minister Gudlaugur Council, underlined the importance of Thor Thordarson: Covid-19 had affected the national security given the perceived threat work of the Chairmanship, he said, but in to Russia from its NATO neighbours. Sub- the end most of the plans had been carried sequent remarks by Nikolay Korchunov, through, including an initiative against Russia’s senior official for the Arctic, on the Arctic plastic pollution and marine litter. other hand, hewed to the Arctic Council’s Even more importantly, Iceland managed traditional cooperation-led agenda. Like to finalise a long-term strategy for the Iceland, Russia has set four priorities for its work of the Arctic Council, which was also Chairmanship: improving living conditions adopted in Reykjavik. Its spectrum spans for the people of the Arctic, including in- from climate, ecosystems, marine environ- digenous peoples; environmental protec- ment, social development, sustainable tion, including the consequences of climate development, research and communication, change (with special attention to perma- to strengthening the Council itself. frost); socio-economic development (in Rus-

sia concentrating on settlements in the concerns of Nordic NATO allies and part- northern regions and along the Northern ners like Sweden. Washington has thus Sea Route); and strengthening the Arctic helped to add new elements of deterrence Council as a basis for multilateral coopera- to Oslo’s traditional policy of balance to- tion. wards Moscow. Important as these issues may be, the While Washington is not actively seek- geopolitical and security aspects of the Rus- ing a further deterioration of relations, sian Arctic agenda remain volatile. there are few openings for constructive cooperation, aside from negotiations over strategic stability (and a successor to New USA-Russia Relations START). In the Arctic mutually advanta- geous cooperation is both necessary and “The Arctic is one of few fields where Rus- possible. sia and the USA successfully manage to That said, the tensions provoked by Rus- have a dialogue on a decent level,” notes sia’s show of force close to its border with Yuri Averyanov, First Deputy Secretary of Ukraine in April cast the priorities of the the Russian Security Council, because the Russian Chairmanship in an extremely Arctic agenda focusses on “practical ques- ambivalent light. The conjunction of cur- tions” like coastguarding, fishery manage- rent threats with unsettled territorial claims ment and maritime safety. “This is a good around the creates a dangerous model also for other fields of Russian- mix. The spectacular operation in 2007 to American relations: to start with concrete plant the Russian flag on the seabed 4,000 and practical questions and then move on metres below the North Pole has not been with more general issues.” forgotten. Russian polar researcher and While Korchunov worked to calm the former Duma deputy left waters before the Reykjavik Ministerial, no doubts as to the mission’s purpose: To Foreign Minister Lavrov warned that “this is prove that “the Arctic is Russian”. our land and our waters” and criticised “neighbours like Norway who are trying to justify the need for NATO to come into the The Rush for the North Pole Arctic”. At almost the same time President told the Russian World War According to data Russia provided to the II commemoration committee: “Everyone UN Commission on the Limits of the Con- wants to bite us or bite off a piece of Russia. tinental Shelf in 2015 and 2019, Moscow But anyone who tries it should know that claims an area of 1.2 million square kilo- we will knock out their teeth so that they metres in the Arctic, including the North cannot bite.” Both warnings were addressed Pole. Almost half –500,000 km2 – overlaps to the United States, but also meant for its with the Danish claim. Nordic allies. Russia expanded its submission in March Nor can the new tone in Washington be 2021, on the basis of additional data gath- ignored: in his latest memoir ex-President ered by two Russian ice-breakers in autumn Barack Obama calls Putin the leader of a 2020. The claim now stretches from the “criminal syndicate”; Biden calls him a North Pole to the edges of ’s and “killer”. The deployment of four B-1B bomb- ’s exclusive economic zones, ers to Orland Air Base on Norway’s west adding a further 705,000 km2. “This is a coast and the expansion of defence coopera- maximalist submission. You cannot claim tion with Oslo also send a clear message any more,” commented the Canadian politi- to Russia: air and naval bases are available cal scientist Robert Huebert. “In effect, for bilateral operations. These measures they’re claiming the entire as respond to the sustained Russian military their continental shelf in regards to where build-up in the Arctic and the associated

SWP Comment 48 August 2021

2 their Arctic comes up against Canada’s and in the 2017 intelligence assessment, and Denmark’s.” in November 2020 lawyers for a Russian Copenhagen claims 895,000 km2 on the foundation did in fact recommend such an basis of its Greenland baselines – an area approach: Moscow, they said, did not need almost twenty times the size of Denmark the United Nations’ approval. It could itself. The claim, which also includes the simply declare that the continental shelf North Pole, was already laid out in the King- belonged to Russia and act accordingly. dom’s Arctic strategy of 2011. Initially Den- That would mirror China’s actions in the mark applied for an area of 150,000 km2 South China Sea, where it ignored the 2016 agreed with Canada. But in 2013 Canada’s ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitra- then Prime Minister Stephen Harper re- tion and is claiming territory that belongs nounced the deal, insisting that the Cana- to neighbouring countries. dian submission include the North Pole. In Unlike , however, Moscow is well- response Copenhagen and submitted positioned to gain considerable territory the maximalist claim outlined above in simply by complying with the Law of the December 2014. Sea. There is no real reason for a fight over The Danish and Canadian claims overlap the North Pole; the are still follow- with Russia’s. Initially Moscow regarded ing the rules and have every incentive to this more as an opportunity than a prob- continue doing so. It is not as if they have lem, hoping that the three states would be any shortage of Arctic continental shelf. able to agree among themselves. But the Denmark is also hoping for a mutual reso- Russians changed their tactic after a May lution among the Arctic states, although it 2019 meeting in Ottawa ended without would still not exclude the possibility that agreement, now expanding its demands Moscow might “choose another approach at instead. a later stage, should the UN process fail to Russia has everything to gain from ce- result in an outcome acceptable to Russia”. menting the application of the Law of the So the possibility of Putin exploiting an Sea in the Arctic. But at the same time, it opportunity to create facts on the ground is planning to invest several billion more cannot be entirely excluded, especially roubles in construction at its northernmost where Washington is paying much more airfield, on the archipel- attention to the Indo-Pacific. Thus, Mos- ago. From there, fighter aircraft can fly as cow’s support for a dialogue on military far as the North Pole. security in the Arctic also fits with Wash- ington’s interest in containing escalation risks in the Arctic and North Atlantic. On the High Seas and in Court … On the other hand, sustaining the threat posture offers Russia opportunities to In the of May 2008 the maintain its geopolitical status. Russia’s five Arctic coastal states rejected the idea of activities in Europe and Putin’s enthusiasm any legal regime modelled on the for the ’s new “doomsday” Treaty of 1959. Instead they stressed their weapons, including the nuclear-powered intention to clarify their sovereign rights underwater drone Poseidon, suggest that the and obligations according to the existing Kremlin shares that assessment. Where Law of the Sea. Moscow holds the military dynamic largely Just a few years after the Ilulissat Decla- in its control, as in eastern Ukraine, escala- ration, however, the Danish intelligence risk tion can serve Russia’s interests. On the assessment suggested that if the UN Com- other hand Russia needs peace and stability mission rejected the Russian submission in the Arctic to advance its gigantic invest- Moscow could challenge its competence ment projects. and neutrality and override its recommen- dations. The Danish warning was repeated

SWP Comment 48 August 2021

3 On Thin Ice Arctic Council appear secondary to Russia. Nevertheless the Russian Chairmanship has In Reykjavik Foreign Minister Lavrov explic- laid out an ambitious programme for the itly welcomed the prospect of a resumption next two years. This gives grounds to hope of meetings of the Arctic states’ senior mili- that the Kremlin might devote more energy tary leaders. Doing so in session as desig- to population, environment and sustaina- nated chair – even though the Arctic bility. Ideally the Arctic could even regain Council is not concerned with matters of its role as a place of cooperation and a military security – underlines the impor- stabilising factor in international politics. tance Moscow attributes to resuming dia- It remains a geopolitical mystery wheth- © Stiftung Wissenschaft logue. One might almost think the Kremlin er a Russian, Canadian, Danish or even und Politik, 2021 was trying to create a fig leaf for its own Greenland flag will one day fly over the All rights reserved aggressive rhetoric. North Pole. Russia’s current mix of aggres- It would be unwise, however, to expect sive rhetoric and openness for dialogue This Comment reflects too much from the constructive coopera- keeps partners guessing while the Kremlin the author’s views. tion discussed in Reykjavik. Russia will not avoids concrete concessions. That does not The online version of hesitate to use bilateral talks with the make dialogue among the Arctic states any this publication contains United States to underline its geopolitical easier, especially as the ice on which they functioning links to other status and to try to normalise relations stand is getting ever thinner. SWP texts and other relevant without changing its aggressive policy to- sources. wards Ukraine and the West. In its own SWP Comments are subject interest, Moscow would be well advised to to internal peer review, fact- avoid misinformation and distortion – checking and copy-editing. although the best defence is when myths For further information on turn out to be absurd. our quality control pro- For example, Putin’s aforementioned cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- threat alludes to Moscow’s ire over former berlin.org/en/about-swp/ US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s quality-management-for- alleged “designs on Siberia”. Albright left swp-publications/ the government twenty years ago and never said anything of the sort (but according to a SWP retired KGB general a special unit for tele- Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik pathy had succeeded in reading Albright’s German Institute for mind). International and Lavrov’s warning that “this is our land Security Affairs and our waters” was referring not to Rus- sian claims to the continental shelf, but to Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin the waters along the Northern Sea Route. Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Unlike Washington, Moscow regards that as Fax +49 30 880 07-100 an international waterway. www.swp-berlin.org Russia requires peace and stability in the [email protected] Arctic if it is to advance its plans to extract coal, oil and gas and ship them via the ISSN (Print) 1861-1761 ISSN (Online) 2747-5107 Northern Sea Route, whose modernisation doi: 10.18449/2021C48 will demand considerable investment. To that extent national security – here con- Translation by Meredith Dale cretely the energy sector and its military protection – generally enjoys priority, (English version of SWP-Aktuell 47/2021) whereas the traditional concerns of the

Dr. Michael Paul is Senior Fellow in the International Security Research Division.

SWP Comment 48 August 2021

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