Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

Backbone of the Syrian Revolt WP Inclusion of Rural Sunnis Key for International Efforts to End Conflict

Khaled Yacoub Oweis S

Syria’s descent into civil war following the military crackdown on the peaceful protest movement in 2011 has thrust the country’s rural Sunnis to the forefront. As the civil war dragged on, the countryside became the recruiting reservoir for rival jihadist fac- tions after the demise of the Arab- and Western-backed Free . Divisions within the Syrian political opposition based in Istanbul also delayed the formation of a provisional government. Foreseeing a strengthened Iran, some of these jihadists have put out feelers to the West. Whether and how they could contribute to conflict resolu- tion needs to be explored. Yet on the ground, the jihadists have largely failed at admin- istering the areas they have captured. That evolving disparity – disenchantment with the militants and lack of appetite for a return to Assad’s rule – offers an opportunity to reactivate the dormant opposition government, which Germany initially backed but then let drift.

Up to the eve of the Syrian revolt in March Observing the street protests that even- 2011, President Bashar al-Assad’s regime tually toppled the rulers of Tunisia and maintained that it was immune to Arab Egypt at the height of the , the Spring contagion effects because it was “in Assad regime boosted its security presence sync” with its people – unlike Tunisia or in , especially on public squares. Egypt. A massive security presence in urban The relatively looser grip in the countryside centers underpinned a false appearance of was a factor contributing to the first major confidence that betrayed the brittleness of demonstrations breaking out in the south- the regime under the surface. After crushing ern Hauran Plain. As soon as the protests a violent Islamist and secular opposition, began, Assad relied on the Alawite core of culminating in the 1982 sacking of the regime to respond with force, including and the massacre of thousands of its inhab- tanks. Behind infantry and armored units itants, Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad, had came Alawite secret police whose mission expanded the police state. Cities were was to prevent defections. The Fourth Divi- ringed by security installations whose per- sion, a praetorian guard led by Assad’s sonnel were overwhelmingly drawn from brother Maher, spearheaded the crackdown. Assad’s minority Alawite sect.

Khaled Yacoub Oweis is a fellow in the project “The fragmentation of ” realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) SWP Comments 39 and funded by the German Foreign Office. August 2015

1 Sunnis Fall Back on Rural Reservoir fighting Assad’s forces and their Shiite mili- The uprising took on a Sunni character tia allies from Iran, Lebanon, , and Af- from the outset. Since Bashar became presi- ghanistan. In 2013–2015, the jihadists, dent in 2000, the state, the economy, and mainly the Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front, national resources had become increasingly Ahrar al-Sham (Free Men of the Levant), and concentrated in the hands of the Alawite Jaish al-Islam (the Army of Islam), seized ruling class at the expense of broader soci- swathes of countryside and rural towns, ety, which is mostly Sunni. Minority repre- mainly west of the north-south highway in sentatives, in particular Syria’s Christian the provinces of Hama, Homs, and Deraa, clergy, were broadly part of a socio-econom- in the region on the outskirts of ic alliance that underpinned the regime. Damascus, and in the northern provinces of Deployment of security agents in public Aleppo and Idlib near Turkey. spaces also meant that mosques became the While the three groups often feud, they main meeting point for demonstrators, share a broad animosity toward the Islamic quickly adding a religious and confessional State, the al-Qaeda breakaway whose June touch to the uprising. Nonetheless, mem- 2014 declaration of a Caliphate in Syria and bers of various minorities took part in the Iraq they regard as dubious on religious protest movement. Their participation grounds. The jihadists also distrust officers lessened when the revolt began militarizing who defected from Assad’s army, partly in the second half of 2011 and regime bom- because defectors tend to be less religious bardment pulverized Sunni neighborhoods. and are seen as more prone to infiltration Military defections were mainly Sunni, by the Assad regime. In some regions, the starting with soldiers from rural regions groups have imposed strict de facto Islamic where the regime sent tanks to crush the law. Unlike in areas controlled by the Islam- protest movement. Soon rural officers were ic State, mutilation and beheadings are setting up the so-called rare, but the rigidness of religious codes, (FSA) in July/August 2011. The FSA was such as forcing people to attend prayer, and initially supported by Arab and Western mismanagement of services and infrastruc- nations, whose differences contributed to ture, appear to have stoked discontent with its failure to consolidate into a coherent their rule. force. Rivalries, especially between Saudi The jihadists initially capitalized on the Arabia and Qatar, also contributed to the failure to govern of the FSA and its allies in failure of the political opposition to unite the Istanbul-based National Coalition of and form a single organization that could Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces provide an alternative to Assad. The United (the Coalition). A functioning opposition States, Jordan, and the United Arab Emir- government was only formed in September ates were more reluctant than Turkey, 2013, following prolonged wrangling in the Qatar, and Saudi Arabia to back FSA bri- Coalition and despite U.S. opposition. By gades to the point where they would be- then jihadists were in control of extensive come strong enough to topple Assad. Awash territory and the had advanced with Gulf Arab cash, corruption festered into the Euphrates Basin in eastern Syria. among certain FSA units, particularly in Indeed, the ouster of two Western- and northern Syria, as they failed to respond to Arab-backed FSA units from Idlib by the the Assad war machine. Nusra Front in 2014–2015 appears to have been welcomed by local communities because the FSA in the north was seen as Jihadist Ascendancy largely corrupt and doing little to dislodge With the FSA’s reputation sullied, jihadist the Assad regime. formations began overshadowing the FSA But in June 2015, protests broke out in in 2012, replacing it as the military core areas controlled by the Nusra Front in Idlib

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2 and by Jaish al-Islam in Ghouta, demanding infiltrate Iraq, where their jihadist ideology services and an end to corruption and arbi- was further consolidated. trary arrests. At the same time, resentment Courtship of the jihadists was accompa- against Alawite rule in jihadist-held rural nied by broader tolerance of Islamists, Syria appears to have remained strong as which aided the rise of . Assad’s air force has continued to hit the Alloush’s father Abdullah, a Ghouta cleric civilian population with barrel bombs and living in Saudi Arabia, remains well con- memories of the crackdown on the initially nected with the Wahhabi clerical estab- peaceful protest movement remain fresh. lishment behind the Saudi monarchy. The father and son’s brand of austere Islam avoided the bellicose rhetoric of the Syrian Rural Jihadists at a Glance jihadists who went to Iraq and their readi- ness to brand their enemies as apostates. Jaish al-Islam: Led by Saudi-backed cleric Boosted by his father’s reputation, Zahran Zahran Alloush, Jaish al-Islam is active Alloush preached a more nuanced ideology in the outskirts of Damascus and the that also appealed to educated city dwellers. Qalamoun Mountains near Lebanon. His religious seminars in Ghouta, for exam- Ahrar al-Sham: Seen as the best organised ple, drew adherents from the northern rebel unit, headed by Abu Jaber al-Khafaji, Damascus neighborhood of Barzeh. But an engineer from the countryside near Alloush was arrested in 2009 as part of a Aleppo. crackdown on jihadists who had fought in Nusra Front: Led by Abu Mohammed al- Iraq. Prompted by U.S. pressure, the opera- Golani, also known as al-Fateh (the con- tion also extended to more moderate clerics queror), who is thought to be a Syrian of seen as having carved out some independ- rural origin. Racked by internal divisions, ence, such as Alloush. Three months after the al-Qaeda affiliate remains tough in the beginning of the revolt, in June 2011, combat. Alloush was released from Jaish al-Fatah: A northern alliance mainly near Damascus, together with hundreds of comprised of the Nusra Front and Ahrar al- jihadist veterans of the Iraq conflict. Their Sham. The group captured the provincial release helped militarize the Syrian revolt capital of Idlib from the Assad regime in and bring a militant leadership to the top May 2013. of its rural core. Alloush himself turned more hardline.

Assad Regime Plays with Fire Prompted by regional calculations, Assad From Preacher to Strongman helped lay the foundations for the transfor- Once free, Alloush, with the help of his mation of the Syrian countryside into a father, set up what became known as Jaish jihadist hotbed after the U.S. invasion that al-Islam, a rebel formation drawn mostly toppled Saddam Hussein in 2003 and re- from Eastern Ghouta, which is separated sulted in a strengthened Iran. Despite its from Damascus by the contested neighbor- strong ties with Tehran, the Assad regime hood of Jobar. The group’s ideology has appeared threatened by the U.S. presence followed Alloush’s pronouncements, which next door and sought to undermine the changed as he sought to cast himself as a transformation of post-Saddam Iraq. The statesman acceptable to international Syrian authorities encouraged the emer- powers. In the wake of the military coup gence of a new breed of jihadist cleric in that ousted Egyptian President Mohamed rural regions. Playing the role of agitators, Morsi in 2013, Alloush denounced democ- these clerics helped recruit fighters to racy as a Western ploy. He called for the Umayyad Caliphate to be revived and for

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3 Syria to be “cleansed” of . In 2015, Rifai, brothers forced into exile in Cairo Alloush dropped his public opposition to a and Istanbul after the revolt. A minor mili- representative government and came out as tary player, Jund al-Sham, links Alloush to a verbal proponent of communal coexist- Damascene clerics and Sunni merchants ence. whose priority is for the capital to be spared Militarily, Jaish al-Islam has also read- destruction similar to Aleppo. Alloush has justed. In the first two years, inexperience also been courted by Moaz al-Khatib, the and relative weakness caused the death of former head of the opposition Coalition. hundreds of rebel recruits in Ghouta in Khatib, a Damascene, was ousted from the ambushes by Assad’s forces and . Coalition in 2013, partly due to his skepti- The internal organization of Jaish al-Islam cism of the soundness of confronting Assad slowly improved as the group captured militarily. Indeed, beyond a brief shelling of large arms depots from the Assad regime Damascus in early 2015, which was met by and extended its supply lines to Jordan, an accelerated regime barrel bombing, Alloush important but unreliable conduit for Saudi has done little to alter the stalemate with aid for anti-Assad forces. Jaish al-Islam also Assad’s forces in the capital, focusing in- took over tunnels and crossing points into stead on consolidating his grip on Eastern Damascus that enriched combatants and Ghouta. profiteers on both sides through informal His efforts have been largely successful, taxation of goods, protection rackets, and but at a price. Jaish al-Islam’s local standing exorbitant prices. appears to have taken a beating: In July Drawing comparisons with the Assad 2015, Abu Suleiman Tafour, head of the family, Alloush promoted his relatives to opposition judicial council in Ghouta re- senior positions in Jaish al-Islam and ex- signed in protest at Jaish al-Islam’s deten- panded his influence. In 2014 Jaish al-Islam tion without charge of sixty members of expelled several hundred members of the Jaish al-Umma. Activist Anas al-Khouli was Islamic State from eastern Ghouta, most of detained for two weeks after filming de- whom had infiltrated the area from their monstrations against Alloush demanding home district of Hajar al-Aswad in southern the release of the detainees. These events Damascus. Jaish al-Islam also routed Jaish were, however, overshadowed by the killing al-Umma, a local group in Douma that of a demonstrator in an area of the town of started out as a non-ideological rebel force Hammouriya patrolled by Failaq al-Rahman, but later adopted jihadist rhetoric in rivalry which led to a crowd seizing and beating with Alloush. Jaish al-Umma launched an Failaq al-Rahman’s commander Abdulnaser attack on Damascus in 2012 that shook Shumair, after marching on his home. Assad’s grip on the capital but ultimately Shumair’s public humiliation strengthened failed. Alloush as the strongman of Eastern Ghouta. Alloush reached an uneasy understand- Still, Alloush has been dogged by the ing with larger jihadist groups in the form suspected involvement of Jaish al-Islam in of the Unified Military Command for East- the December 2013 kidnapping and dis- ern Ghouta. Established in 2014, the nomi- appearance of human rights lawyer Razan nal alliance comprises Ahrar al-Sham, Zaitouneh and three of her comrades. The whose leadership stems mostly from rural four had fled regime persecution in Damas- Hama and Idlib, and Failaq al-Rahman, cus to Alloush’s hometown of Douma. which is led by Abdul Nasser Shumair, a Fiercely independent, Zaitouneh drew the former captain in Assad’s army from rural ire of Jaish al-Islam for establishing a net- Homs. A smaller player in the grouping is work of mostly secular activists and advo- the Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union, which is cating non-violence. linked to Damascene clerics opposed to Assad such as Sariya al-Rifai and Osama al-

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4 Alloush – Pick of Regional Powers the FSA remains a significant player. The The disappearance of what became known mostly desert east, which accounts for all of as the “Douma Four” did little to diminish Syria’s oil production, has been divided outside support for Alloush. Regionally, between the Assad regime, the Islamic expansion of the Islamic State helped Jaish State, and Kurdish militias. Demonstrating al-Islam be seen as an alternative to more depth of organization, Ahrar al-Sham has extreme groups encroaching on Damascus, repeatedly bounced back from major set- a specter that has kept Washington practi- backs, the latest being the death in Septem- cally opposed to removing Assad and raised ber 2014 of its leader Hassan Abboud in an tension between the United States and explosion in Idlib. Abboud was another Saudi Arabia, amongst others. Alloush’s former prisoner released from Sednaya by Saudi backing appears to have grown after the Assad regime. The attack also killed Salman bin Abdulaziz succeeded the late most of Ahrar al-Sham’s top tier, who were Abdullah as king in January 2015. Salman meeting Abboud amid an internal debate is seen as having retrenched to the Salafist about altering the group’s jihadist creed in Wahhabist base of the monarchy. One of favor of a more pragmatic variety. The new his first initiatives was a proposal for a approach aimed at expanding cooperation meeting in Saudi Arabia to reorganize the with other brigades and outside powers to and integrate rebel bri- remove Assad and counter the Islamic State. gades in the new structure, with a promi- A process of moderating Ahrar al-Sham’s nent role for Alloush. But the project ap- rhetoric, which was started by Abboud, pears to have been put on hold, with rifts accelerated after his death as the group fell deepening between Saudi Arabia and under the influence of Turkey. Ankara has Turkey on one side and other Western and strengthened ties with militant Islamist Arab members of the Friends of Syria alli- and other rebel units in northern Syria to ance nominally backing the Syrian opposi- counter the expansion of Kurdish militias tion, on the other. on its borders. In an unusual move, in July In April 2015, Alloush made a publicized 2015 Ahrar al-Sham published opinion trip to Turkey and improved ties with pieces in two leading Western dailies, Jordan, which is not keen to see Assad fall, underlining its openness to talks with the and says its focus is fighting the Islamic United States on how to build a democratic State. Jordan is a main ally in the U.S. air alternative to Assad that would protect campaign against the Islamic State, which minorities. This contrasted with the group’s is carried out with the tacit cooperation of manifesto emphasizing an “Islamic soci- the Assad regime. As soon as U.S. or allied ety.” The articles also indicated that Ahrar warplanes take off from the Azraq air base al-Sham could ally with Washington in the in Jordan, the Assad regime turns off its air fight against the Islamic State. In an appar- defenses to allow the jets to reach Islamic ent reference to U.S. help for the Kurdish State targets in eastern Syria. On a lesser Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is scale, the raids have hit the Nusra Front pitted against the Islamic State in north- and occasionally, Ahrar al-Sham in Idlib eastern Syria and distrusted by many Arabs and Aleppo, while Jaish al-Islam has not for pursuing de facto separatism, Ahrar al- been targeted. Sham stated that only a native Syrian Sunni alternative could defeat the Islamic State. The PYD is an affiliate of the Kurdistan Resilience Marks Ahrar al-Sham Workers’ Party (PKK), which is branded a Today, Ahrar al-Sham and the Nusra Front terrorist organization in the United States, dominate the countryside outside Assad’s Europe, and Turkey. Ahrar al-Sham’s public control, except in the southern province of remake appears to have the support of a Deraa (see SWP Comments 5/2015), where wing that includes the group’s new leader,

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5 Abu Jaber al-Khafaji, another former inmate Libi and a Tunisian known as Safina killed of Sednaya prison. But others in leading more than twenty Druze villagers in Idlib positions are more hardline and many in June 2015. The massacre came only rank-and-file members are ideologically weeks after Abu Muhammed al-Golani, the inspired by al-Qaeda. Nusra Front’s leader, had adopted a slightly softer tone toward Syria’s minorities, as opposed to the Islamic State for example. In Jihadist Cooperation and its Limits an interview with Qatari-owned , The Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham are Golani affirmed that Alawites and Druze members of Jaish al-Fatah, an Islamist “need to return to Islam,” but said the alliance that was set up in March 2015 in Nusra Front would spare civilians from the apparent coordination with Turkey. It has two sects. But the interview was a white- captured most of the province of Idlib wash and Golani was not asked about an from the Assad regime and FSA remnants. incursion by the Nusra Front into the Hoping to emulate that success, in April Alawite Mountain in Latakia governorate 2015 the Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham set in 2013 that resulted in the killing and up the “Ansar al- operations room” kidnapping of hundreds of mainly Alawite to capture the contested city of Aleppo. As civilians. Golani also insisted on what he of late July, efforts by anti-Assad forces to saw as a need to enforce Sharia law, al- take the western part of Aleppo have fal- though its arbitrary application appears to tered due to regime resistance and rebels have alienated some of the group’s rural diverting resources to counter an Islamic base. A Syrian called Abu Islah, one of the State incursion into the northern Aleppo Nusra Front’s religious enforcers in Idlib, countryside. oversaw a public execution of a middle- At the same time, violence between aged woman for alleged prostitution in the Ahrar al-Sham and the Nusra Front persists. town of Maarat Misreen in January 2015. In 2013 Ahrar al-Sham elbowed out the Shortly after this, Abu Islah was assassinat- Nusra Front and other rebel brigades to ed in apparent revenge, but civilians con- take control of the main Bab al-Hawa cross- tinue to be easy targets for erratic edicts. In ing into Turkey, which has become a sig- al-Yarmouk camp on the edge of Damascus, nificant source of revenues from de facto Nusra Front members executed two Pales- tariffs. Early in 2015, Nusra Front fighters tinian youths in December 2014 for “cursing in the town of Binnij in Idlib killed Judge God.” Several others in the camp were held Abu Asyad al-Yemeni, a Yemeni recruit who on the same charge but released, apparent- was the main Ahrar al-Sham figure in the ly because they were Syrians and came Islamic Council for the Management of from influential families or had relatives in Liberated Areas in Idlib Countryside. other rebel groups. Seen as indecisive and not in full control, Golani appears to have contributed to the Internal Feuds Weaken Nusra Front Nusra Front’s apparent lack of discipline. Lacking the organizational strength of For example, he allowed a public dispute to Ahrar al-Sham, the Nusra Front appears to fester between two main ideological figures be fragmenting under the weight of inter- nominally under his authority. The social nal disputes exacerbated by a strong pres- media feud pitted Abu Marya al-Qahtani, an ence of foreign jihadists. Tensions between Iraqi who advocated the need to placate the foreign fighters, known as al-muhajiroun in local population and cooperate with other reference to early followers of the Prophet rebels, against Sami al-Aridi, a Jordanian who traveled to join him, and Syrian Nusra who emphasized a harsher jihadist ap- Front members grew after a unit headed by proach regardless of any lack of grassroots a Libyan jihadist known as Abu Abdallah al- support. Qahtani also warned against

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6 currents in the Nusra Front and Ahrar al- supervised exams for thousands of students Sham that sympathize with the Islamic in Idlib after Jaish al-Fatah took control of State and said the Islamic State had infil- the province. trated Jaish al-Fatah in the north. In a move A local council also operates in Idlib city, signaling the ascendancy of the hardliners, the provincial capital, but it does not adver- Qahtani was eventually removed from his tise itself. Administratively, Jaish al-Fatah’s position as ideological head of the Nusra takeover of Idlib appears to have been a Front in 2014 and replaced by Aridi. In July debacle, resulting in lawlessness and loot- 2015, a Nusra Front commander known as ing of public and private property. Under- Saleh Hama, who was close to Qahtani, was scoring the limits to the Nusra Front’s reportedly dismissed. tolerance of any presence for the main- stream political opposition, in July 2015 the Front and an allied militia sacked a police Governing Failures station linked to the Coalition structures in Highlighting the Nusra Front’s organiza- the town of Kfar Nubul in Idlib. The assail- tional weakness, its rigid running of daily ants detained the station’s personnel and affairs and imposition in 2015 of a religious stole cars and other equipment. tax in some regions in the north were met by apathy or outright opposition, prompt- ing a subsequent relaxation. In the Idlib Outside Powers Hesitate town of Maarat al-Numaan, situated on the Following the capture of most of Idlib main north-south highway connecting governorate by May 2015, opposition hopes Damascus and Aleppo, for example, the were high that Jaish al-Fatah would sweep Nusra Front had by mid-2015 eased back on south to the neighboring governorate of closing shops at prayer time and forcing Hama, home to a major base for Assad’s their owners attend the mosques. The group airforce, and break a stalemate pitting also backed down from a ban on mosques Sunni and Alawite villages against each broadcasting religious chants over loud- other in the Ghab Plain west of Hama city. speakers during the holy month of Rama- But the flow of weapons from Turkey to dan. Nusra Front considers the chants un- Jaish al-Fatah and FSA units cooperating Islamic, but the edict was challenged by with it appears to have dropped since May Ahmad Alwan, a local cleric with a signifi- 2015. The slowdown coincided with U.S. cant following. diplomatic pressure on Turkey and Arab The relative leniency of the Nusra Front Gulf nations to curb support for the mili- in the region is partly due to Abu al-Hareth, tant Islamists in the north and apparent the group’s local commander, who is opposition to military operations that from Maarat al-Numaan. While an FSA unit might weaken Assad to a point where he known as Brigade 13 also operates in could fall without an alternative acceptable Maarat al-Numaan, power belongs to Nusra to Washington. The mass killing of the Front, which controls the Sharia-based Druze in Idlib also raised Western fears of judicial system that replaced the regime. larger massacres if Jaish al-Fatah were to Yet, a deterioration in services and the lack end up in control of Alawite territory. of a functioning infrastructure in the town Aware of the damage supporting militants prompted the Nusra Front to grant the could do to its relations with Washington, newly-elected Local Administrative Council Turkey has apparently tried to nudge the a greater role in June 2015. The council is Nusra Front toward severing its links with part of a civil network linked to the oppo- al-Qaeda, a main reason for the U.S. desig- sition government, which is based in nation of the Nusra Front as a terrorist Gaziantep in Turkey. In the education group. Golani, mindful of the power of sector, opposition government officials foreign fighters within the Nusra Front and

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7 their military value in fighting the Assad outright popular vote in each governorate, regime, dismissed any such suggestions. the second one on a more local basis to give sway to minorities. But a political solution remains far off, Conclusion and Recommendations even if U.N. Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura With the exception of the Nusra Front, has contacted jihadist factions. These talks Syria’s rural jihadists are leaning toward need to be widened to reach international pragmatism. One of the motivations seems consensus on cooperating with the - to be a fear that the July 2015 nuclear deal ists. For example, the Friends of Syria could with Tehran could result in increasing regard whether Ahrar al-Sham facilitates Iranian support for Assad and a change in the functioning of the opposition govern- the military balance. The jihadists have also ment as a test for its new rhetoric. In this seen how U.S. air support has enabled Kurd- sense, the administrative failure of the ish militias to roll back the Islamic State, jihadists offers a renewed opportunity to

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und which has been stepping up its attacks on support the moderate opposition to Assad. Politik, 2015 anti-Assad forces. Among the jihadists, Jaish But Turkey, which has narrowed some of All rights reserved al-Islam has come closest to positioning its differences with Washington over Syria, These Comments reflect itself as the Arab Sunni equivalent of the would need to agree to help. solely the author’s views. Kurdish militia, expecting outside backers Since its formation in 2013, the opposi- SWP to turn a blind eye to its brutality as long as tion government has been looking to Ger- Stiftung Wissenschaft und it fights more extreme groups and does not many, which has been engaged in capacity- Politik German Institute for jeopardize Assad’s grip on power. building and structural reform, for in- International and With the West indicating through creased support. Day-to-day funding, which Security Affairs stepped up contacts with Alloush that it has been sourced from Qatar, has been Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 can live with Jaish al-Islam, chances are intermittent, resulting in operational inter- 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 fading that the fate of , ruptions. So far, most German support Fax +49 30 880 07-100 an iconic figure of the uprising, will ever to the government has been channeled www.swp-berlin.org become known. The impunity with which through an international fund dedicated [email protected] her abduction was carried out will likely to specific projects. But opposition govern- ISSN 1861-1761 go down as the death knell of the aspira- ment officials say the mechanism has been tions of the Syrian revolt for a civic plural- too slow, especially as an administrative istic society. At the same time, without the gap develops in northern Syria. Faster and engagement of Jaish al-Islam and the hard- larger German funding, for example, to line rural groups no international solution fill the salary gaps left by sporadic Qatari can be enforced. Even less ambitious steps, support, would test the opposition’s view such as sparing residential areas from that the time is ripe to get service and infra- fighting, require their agreement because structure projects off the ground despite the jihadists can scuttle any arrangement jihadist control. This would be one of the on the ground. few options left for the West to help pro- Ultimately, ways need to be found to vide an alternative to the Assad dictator- prevent a re-emergence of the Alawite ship and jihadist rule, as well as help a police state in new guise or a -style local population in dire need. takeover. Such prospects appear impossible without the departure of Assad, the main symbol of Sunni disenfranchisement, and a curbing of the power of Alawite security operatives. In a new political system, Sunni power would also need to be checked, for example, through a dual-chamber parlia- ment. One chamber could be elected by

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