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Post Quantum Secure Authentication Methods Suitable for Quantum Key Distribution Eötvös Loránd University Faculty of Informatics Post Quantum Secure Authentication methods suitable for Quantum Key Distribution Dr. Zoltán Istenes Mohammad Rashid Zamani Professor at ELTE Computer Science Dr. Andreas Peter Assistant Professor at UTwente Dr. Benedek Kovács Senior Specialist at Ericsson Budapest, 2018. Statement of thesis submission and originality I hereby confirm the submission of the Master Thesis Work on the Computer Science MSc course with author and title: Name of Student: Mohammad Rashid Zamani Code of Student: FANMN7 Title of Thesis: Post Quantum Secure Authentication Methods Suitable for Quantum Key Distribution Supervisor: Dr. Zoltán Istenes Computer Science at Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Informatics. In consciousness of my full legal and disciplinary responsibility I hereby claim that the submitted thesis work is my own original intellectual product, the use of referenced literature is done according to the general rules of copyright. I understand that in the case of thesis works the following acts are considered plagiarism: • literal quotation without quotation marks and reference; • citation of content without reference; • presenting others’ published thoughts as own thoughts. Budapest, July 4, 2018 student i Abstract Quantum Key Distribution occurs over two communication channels: classical and quan- tum. While the quantum channel is somewhat secure by quantum principles, the classical channel need to be authenticated using cryptographic algorithms. Unfortunately, the au- thentication algorithms and the methods suggested are not taking into consideration the problems practical implementations are facing. Moreover, there are areas which has not been discussed by the literature such as the quantum application layer in communication over classical channel. This study identifies the hurdles practical implementations of QKD are facing and proposes a solution which take into consideration these needs. Moreover, it suggests new protocols and approaches suitable for QKD post processing authentication. ii Dedication To the butterfly and the bee. iii Acknowledgement "Always two there are, no more, no less. A master and an apprentice." — Yoda iv CONTENTS Contents 1 Background 1 1.1 Quantum Information Theory and Cryptography . .3 1.2 Quantum Key Distribution . .5 1.2.1 BB84 . .5 1.3 Cryptographic Authentication . .8 1.3.1 Authentication in QKD . .8 1.4 Scope . .9 1.5 Outline . 11 2 Related Literature Analysis 13 2.1 QKD Post Processing . 14 2.1.1 Key Sifting . 15 2.1.2 Confirmation . 15 2.1.3 Error Correction . 16 2.1.4 Privacy Amplification . 16 2.2 QKD Authentication . 17 2.2.1 Block Cipher Based MACs . 18 2.2.2 Cryptographic Hash Based MAC . 25 2.2.3 Universal Hash Based MAC . 30 2.3 QKD Network Implementations . 32 2.3.1 DARPA QKD Network . 34 2.3.2 SECQOC QKD Network . 36 2.3.3 SwissQuantum . 40 2.3.4 Wuhu QKD Network . 42 2.3.5 Los Alamos National Laboratory NQC . 43 2.4 Summary . 45 2.4.1 Post Processing . 45 v CONTENTS 2.4.2 Authentication . 47 2.4.3 QKD Networks . 56 3 Contribution 61 3.1 Solution Architecture . 61 3.2 Quantum Post Processing Daemon . 64 3.2.1 Authentication Algorithm . 66 3.3 Authenticated Post Processing Protocol . 67 3.4 Sample Run . 68 3.4.1 Error 0xE ................................. 70 3.4.2 Initial Setup 0x0 ............................. 71 3.4.3 Sifting 0x1 ................................ 74 3.5 Key Management Layer . 76 4 Discussion 79 4.1 Solution Design Philosophy . 79 4.1.1 Architecture . 81 4.1.2 Authentication . 82 4.1.3 APPP . 82 4.2 Solution Comparison . 82 4.3 Conclusion . 84 vi LIST OF FIGURES List of Figures 1.1 BB84 schematic run . .5 1.2 Photon polarization . .6 1.3 BB84 protocol flow . .7 2.1 Key transformation in post processing. 14 2.2 CMAC . 20 2.3 PMAC . 21 2.4 GCTR . 22 2.5 GCM . 23 2.6 GHASH . 24 2.7 Sponge Construction . 27 2.8 Hash Benchmark . 29 2.9 QKD Network . 32 2.10 QKD Network Architecture . 33 2.11 DARPA Architecture . 35 2.12 QBB link . 37 2.13 QBB node . 38 2.14 SECQOC network . 39 2.15 Q3P protocol stack . 40 2.16 Q3P packet header. 41 2.17 Wuhu network. 42 2.18 Los Alamos QKD network . 43 2.19 Los Alamos user registration . 44 3.1 Solution Architecture . 63 3.2 IPSec AH . 66 3.3 Solution Protocol Stack . 66 3.4 APPP constant header. 67 vii LIST OF FIGURES 3.5 APPP communication sequence . 70 3.6 QKD Error header. 70 3.7 APPP Initial Setup header QKD instantiation request . 71 3.8 APPP chunk request . 73 3.9 APPP constant header 2 . 74 3.10 APPP sifting . 75 3.11 APPP Post Processing Sifting Confirmation. 75 3.12 Keys transformation though the system. 78 viii LIST OF TABLES List of Tables 2.1 Stream ciphers benchmark . 51 2.2 Skylake benchmark . 52 2.3 auth256 benchmark . 55 3.1 APPP constant header fields. 68 3.2 APPP version 0b000 Header Type values. 69 3.3 Sb values. 75 ix Acronyms Acronyms AES Advanced Encryption System. 4, 18, 19, 23, 24, 35, 43, 49–54, 77, 80 AH Internet Protocol Security Authentication Header. vii, 65–67, 76, 83, 84 AL Application Layer. 34, 62, 77 API Application Programming Interface. 40, 57, 62, 77 APPP Authenticated Post Processing Protocol. vi– ix, 12, 65, 67–76, 79–82, 85 BB84 QKD protocol, Bennett and Brassard pro- posed in 1984. v, 5–7, 9, 10, 13–17, 35, 36, 42, 44–47, 59, 61, 68, 69 CBC Cipher Block Chaining. 20, 21, 24, 25 CMAC Cipher-based Message Authentication Code. 20, 51 cpb Cycles per Byte. 10, 27, 29, 31, 49, 51, 53, 54 CPU Centeral Processing Unit. 19, 27, 28, 31, 48–52 CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check. 44 CTR Counter Mode. 22, 23, 31, 51, 52 DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. v, 34–37, 57, 59, 65, 80 DES Data Encryption Standard. 2, 25, 50 x Acronyms ECB Electronic Codebook. 21 ESP Internet Protocol Security Encapsulating Se- curity Payload. 35, 84 ETSI European Telecommunications Standards In- stitute. 57, 63, 80 FFT Fast Fourier Transform. 31 FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard. 28, 30 Gbps Giga bit per second. 10, 80, 81 GCM Galois/Counter Mode. vii, 22, 23, 51–54 GHz Giga Hertz. 49 GMAC Galois/Counter Mode Message Authentica- tion Code. 22–24, 31, 52, 55 HAIFA HAsh Iterative FrAmework. 26, 30 HMAC Hash-Based Message Authentication Code. 29, 30, 35, 53, 55, 59 ICB Initial Counter Block. 22 ICV Integrity Checking Value. 66 IETF Internet Engineering Task Force. 50, 52 IKE Internet Key Encapsulation protocol. 35, 36, 57 IP Internet Protocol. 34, 38, 39, 42, 48, 49, 63–65, 67, 71, 73, 74, 76, 82–84 IPSec Internet Protocol Security. vii, 34–36, 41, 48, 49, 61, 62, 65–67, 76, 77, 81–84 ITS Information-Theoretic Secure. 2–4, 10, 18, 31, 34, 36–38, 43, 48, 50, 54–56, 66, 76, 80, 85 IV Initial Vector. 22 KDF Key Derivation Function. 30, 35, 55, 59, 65, 72 xi Acronyms KEP Key Encapsulation Protocols. 34, 35, 57, 64 KMAC KECCAK-family Message Authentication Code. 29, 30, 53, 55, 76 KML Key Management Layer. vi, 34, 43, 62–64, 67, 76, 77, 80, 85 LDPC Low-Density Parity-Check code. 16, 44, 46, 47 MAC Message Authentication Code. v, 8, 9, 13, 14, 17–21, 23–25, 28–31, 49–51, 53, 54, 80, 85 MBps Mega Bytes per Second. 49, 80 Mbps Mega bits per Second. 80 MD Merkle-Damgård. 26, 30, 59 MHz Mega Hertz. 27 MITM Man-In-The-Middle. 8, 10, 15, 46 MTU Maximum Transfer Unit. 65, 83 NIC Network Interface Controller. 49 NIST National Institute of Standards and Technol- ogy. 28, 30, 50, 52, 54, 64 NQC Network-centric Quantum Communication. v, 43 NSA National Security Agency. 50 OSI Open Systems Interconnection. 34, 38, 41, 62, 64, 67 OTP One Time Pad. 2, 3, 36, 37, 41, 43, 57, 58, 77, 80, 85 PDU Payload Data Unit. 65 PKI Public Key Infrastructure. 2, 41 PMAC Parallelized Message Authentication Code. 21, 24 xii Acronyms PRF Psuedo Random Function. 18, 19, 23, 30 Q3P Quantum Point-to-Point Protocol. vii, 37–40, 48, 49, 59, 64, 82–84 QAN Quantum Access Node. 38 QBB Quantum BackBone. vii, 36–39, 41, 58, 62 QBER qubit Error Rate. 14–16, 46, 69, 72 QID Quantum-device Identifier. 63, 71, 72 QKD Quantum Key Distribution. ii, v–viii, 4, 5, 9– 14, 17, 28, 32–43, 45–49, 56–59, 61–63, 65, 68– 72, 76, 77, 79, 80, 82, 84, 85 QKDAL Quantum Key Distribution Application Layer. 40, 83 QKDLL Quantum Key Distribution Link.
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