Security Implications of EU Enlargement

By Dr. Gerd Föhrenbach*

I. Introduction of conflicts, the democratization of state II. Political Aspects structures, and the modernization of 1 The introduction of the Euro on Janu- economies and societies. However, the The Treaty on European Union ary 1, 2002 was a defining moment for “old” member states do not yet seem to many people in the participating coun- be fully aware of the challenges that come The Treaty of Amsterdam, which came tries. The new currency has drawn atten- with the entry of 12, perhaps even 18 into force on 1 May 1999, referred for the tion to the European Union (EU) and new members.2 The debate in the gen- first time to the territorial integrity of the stimulated the debate on the future of eral public has largely focused on finan- EU and the preservation of its external the Union. It has become clear that after cial issues. borders. According to Article 11, paragraph the introduction of the Euro the next The accession of the new members will 1 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), big project which EU members will have have not only economic and financial the Union shall define and implement a to deal with is the admission of a number consequences, but will also affect security common foreign and security policy of new members. policy. The following analysis concentrates (CFSP), whose objectives include: The enlargement of the EU, which will on the implications of EU enlargement “- to safeguard the common values, probably begin in 2004, creates many in the field of security policy. In particu- fundamental interests, independence and opportunities for the European conti- lar, it will highlight some of the prob- integrity of the Union in conformity with nent. Officials in European capitals hope lems that may arise in a Union consisting the principles of the United Nations that it will lead to the peaceful resolution of up to 33 members. Charter; (...) * Dr. Gerd Föhrenbach, Research Fellow, Bundeswehr Office for Studies and Exercises. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.

7 - to preserve peace and strengthen in- quences”5 after enlargement, as a task force defense policy (ESDP) since 1999 should ternational security, in accordance with of the European Parliament has pointed not obscure the fact that the national in- the principles of the United Nations out. It remains to be seen to what extent terests of the EU member states still differ Charter, as well as the principles of the EU member states will comply with the significantly. The more members the EU Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of principle of solidarity in an enlarged Un- has in the future, the more difficult the the Paris Charter, including those on exter- ion if - to give but one example - rela- task of fashioning a coherent foreign nal borders (...).”3 tions between Russia and the Baltic States policy for the Union will be. The neces- This comes close to an at least indirect were to sharply deteriorate. sity of making most decisions unani- “definition of the Union as a security Another source of friction in case of a mously has proved to be a time-consum- 4 space”. crisis might be the different membership ing procedure, which hampers quick po- Furthermore, EU member states have structures of the EU and the WEU. Only litical action. Despite this, barely any committed themselves to solidarity. Arti- ten of the fifteen EU states are currently progress was made in Nice by the EU’s cle 11, paragraph 2 TEU stipulates that full members of the WEU; five countries heads of states and governments towards the members “shall support the Union’s (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland and extending qualified majority voting. Ar- external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and Sweden) have partly strong reservations ticle 23 TEU states that decisions with mutual solidarity”. EU members “shall about military co-operation with the EU. military and defense implications will be 6 refrain from any action which is contrary A transferral of the Article 5 military as- taken unanimously by the Council. This to the interests of the Union or likely to sistance commitment of the WEU treaty system of decision-making will continue impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force does not presently seem to be politically to provide individual member states with in international relations.” feasible although a common defence the option of vetoing the majority’s in- These provisions do not of course have would provide a good basis for co-opera- terests.7 the same value as the Article 5 mutual as- tion in crisis management operations. In the future, it will thus be absolutely sistance clauses of the treaties of the North necessary to renounce the narrow, national Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Co-operation mechanisms perspectives in the field of foreign and the Western European Union (WEU). Nev- security policy in order to find forms of ertheless, the principle of territorial in- The remarkable progress achieved in flexible integration. It is widely acknowl- tegrity might have “very serious conse- the field of the European security and edged that an EU consisting of 25, 30 or

8 even more states cannot be governed with often appears that it is mainly the EU’s the mechanisms created for the six found- The Future of Integration prosperity which has attracted the candi- ing members. There are already several dates, not the notion of co-operation and modes of differentiation existing in to- However, there is an ongoing contro- integration (although this is a key pre- day’s EU: the Schengen agreement (to versy between the old members as to the requisite for the EU’s economic success). which only 13 of the 15 members ac- future of the EU. Between Berlin and Brussels’s demands for an improvement ceded), the economic and monetary un- Paris, the two self-proclaimed “engines” of the co-operation among the states of ion (only 12 of the 15), the WEU mu- of the EU, profound differences exist South-Eastern Europe, for example, are tual military assistance commitment (only about the direction which the European sometimes regarded in that region, occa- 9 10 of the 15), a number of “opt-out” project should take. In an open letter sionally even by high government offi- 12 clauses and other exceptions such as in published in October 2001, Jacques cials, as a “dirty trick” to keep the Bal- Delors, Felipe Gonzalez, Helmut Kohl and kans away from Europe. In none of the environmental policy.8 In principle, the Jacques Santer criticized “continuing ma- candidate countries can a “sense of proposals for the formation of a “core jor weaknesses”10 within the EU which supranational eros”13 be observed, as Europe” (as espoused by German Chris- could be exacerbated by enlargement: Werner Weidenfeld said, “the candidate tian Democratic politicians Wolfgang “Divided over Economic Monetary states do not comprehend the Western Schäuble and Karl Lamers), a “centre of Union as well as over defence, Europe can European founding notion - gaining com- gravity” (German Foreign Minister agree neither on the objectives and meth- mon sovereignty by relinquishing national Joschka Fischer) or an “avantgarde” ods of integration, nor on what more is sovereignty.”14 (French President Jacques Chirac) all pur- needed in order to make a success of en- Against this background, an increas- sue the same objective: the preservation largement.”11 ing number of voices can be heard de- of the ability to act effectively in an en- The entry of new EU members might manding a consolidation of the Union larged Union. EU members must create well deepen the differences. Those new before enlargement takes place. Helmut the necessary conditions which will allow members in Central and Eastern Europe Schmidt, a former German chancellor, and the process of integration to continue, if which until 1991 belonged to the “East- Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, a former French need be on several tracks and in different ern bloc” are likely to defend vigorously president, have been warning that “[h]aste varieties. their still young national sovereignty. It to enlarge the Union can lead it into a

9 sequence of severe crises in the first dec- of Luxemburg, said after the lengthy ne- Department of Defense believe that Tur- ade of the new century.”15 Full integra- gotiations at the European Council in key might even try to blockade the is- tion is not a realistic goal for 30 coun- Nice, “Never before have I realized so land.19 tries that are very different in their po- clearly how fragile Europe is.”18 If, as most observers expect, no settle- litical traditions, culture and economic ment on the future of the country can be development, the two elder statesmen reached before the conclusion of the en- maintain. They conclude that “[t]o attempt III. Security Aspects largement negotiations, the EU will find integration with that many countries can itself in a complicated position. If no agree- only lead to complete failure.“16 Alongside the political ramifications of ment has been reached, the accession of Furthermore, scepticism towards enlargement, the EU will face a range of the Greek part is likely to trigger a crisis. “Brussels” is growing among the popula- security challenges. The possibility of a war between the two tion in the current member states. On NATO allies cannot be excluded either. average, only 48% of EU citizens support Cyprus However, if the EU were to decide to their country’s membership. Merely 41% postpone extending membership to Cy- of EU-Europeans say they tend to trust The accession of the Republic of Cy- prus, Brussels might run the risk that the Union’s institutions and bodies; al- prus will most likely pose serious diffi- Greece will stymie the entire enlargement most the same percentage of people (40%) culties. Despite a slight easing of tensions process. Although the European Commis- say they tend not to trust it.17 A decline between Greece and Turkey over recent sion seems to anticipate the entry of the in support for the EU can even be ob- months, the EU entry of the Greek-Cyp- divided island, it remains unclear what served in some of the candidate countries. riot part of the island might exacerbate the EU will eventually do.20 To sum up, it seems possible that en- the problems there, rather than help to largement might lead to a weakening of solve them. In November 2001, Turkish The Balkans the Union, with far-reaching negative Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, who or- consequences for all members. It is by no dered the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, In the context of the 1999 air campaign means certain that the EU success story threatened to annex the Turkish-occupied against Yugoslavia, the EU held out the can be continued after enlargement. As northern bit of the country if Cyprus prospect of membership to states in Jean-Claude Juncker, the Prime Minister were to join the EU. Officials in the U.S. South-Eastern Europe, which, in the words

10 of EU Commissioner Günther Verheugen, unrealistically low expenditures”.24 To be Moscow’s position towards the EU and “would otherwise have had to wait long true, considerable amounts of money have the enlargement process has by and large [for such an offer].”21 The well-intended already flowed into the region. But even been positive. The Russian “Medium-Term aim of the “Stability Pact for South-East- the European Council had to recognize Strategy for Development of Relations ern Europe” has been to discourage the “the need to provide support in a much between the Russian Federation and the peoples in the Balkans from the use of more co-ordinated, coherent fashion”.25 European Union (2000-2010)“28 is aimed violence by showing them the way to Eu- If the effort to stabilize the region is to at, inter alia, the mobilization of “the eco- rope. The EU is now facing the challenge be eventually successful, it has to remain nomic potential and managerial experi- of having to deal with huge, often exag- a very important issue on the West’s po- ence of the European Union to promote gerated expectations and the disappoint- litical agenda. Diminished attention to the the development of a socially oriented ments which accompany them. need to re-build South-Eastern Europe market economy of Russia”. During the A significant improvement of the secu- might result in developments which could period under review, Russia does not in- rity conditions in the Balkans, which lead to the Balkanization of Europe in- tend to join the EU. Moscow is seeking would - at least in the medium term - allow stead of the Europeanization of the Bal- “to ensure pan-European security by the the termination of the West’s military pres- kans.26 Europeans themselves without both iso- ence, has yet to occur.22 There is a certain lation of the United States and NATO danger that the EU might be overwhelmed Relations with Russia and their dominance on the continent“. by the complexity of the Balkan quandary. The European Security and Defense Policy Javier Solana, the EU’s high representative Due to its size, its nuclear arsenal and (ESDP) is seen as an instrument which for foreign and security policy, admits, “My the minorities living in many Central and could counterbalance the “Nato-centrism” worry is whether we can solve the prob- Eastern European states, Russia must still in Europe. lems in the Balkans (...).”23 be considered an element of considerable Against this background, the caution A part of the overall picture is what uncertainty for Europe. It thus made per- of some officials in Central and Eastern has been called one of the “unfortunate fect sense to concentrate on Russia in the European capitals in their stance towards traditions” of Western policy towards the first “common strategy” that the EU de- ESDP becomes understandable. In Poland, Balkans, namely “to pursue grand objec- vised in 1999 in the framework of the Hungary, the Czech Republic and the tives without firm determination and with CFSP.27 Baltic States a sense of unease can be dis-

11 cerned with regard to the possibility that viet Union. The involvement of the management, by 2003 the EU intends to ESDP might weaken NATO and its secu- Kremlin in the future development of the be able to provide, inter alia, up to 5,000 rity guarantee.29 EU will in any case be important, but the police officers, up to 2,000 civil protec- One may assume that a more distinctly quality of mutual relations will be deter- tion specialists and up to 200 civil admin- military profile of the EU is likely to al- mined by Moscow’s domestic and foreign istration experts for international missions. ter relations with Russia. Moscow may policy. Their task will be to strengthen the rule of decide to take a tougher stance vis-à-vis law, administrative structures and civil Brussels if, for example, the future EU ESDP protection in countries outside the EU. rapid reaction force were to be deployed Despite the progress that has been in what Russia regards as its “near abroad” According to the German foreign of- achieved in the field of ESDP over the or if the EU were to develop a nuclear fice, the creation of a common European last two years, some important aspects have strategy (see below).30 However, a substan- Security and Defense Policy is a “key to be clarified if the European defense tial deterioration of Russia’s relations with project for the realization of Political efforts are to be successful in an enlarged the EU seems improbable since links to Union”.32 The objective is to “render the Union. Firstly, there is the issue of geo- the largest integrated economic area of EU capable of independent action (...) in graphical limits. Where will EU forces be the world are indispensable to Moscow. the whole spectrum of non-military and deployed? So far, EU members have been Currently, the struggle against terror- military crisis management”.33 The effec- unable to agree on where the Union’s ism forms the basis of a possible re-orien- tive combination of civilian and military interests and responsibilities stretch. Prob- tation of relations between the West and means is to become the “hallmark” of the ably not all political players are aware that Russia. Nevertheless, the actions of the EU in the 21st century. In the military there is hardly a part of the world which Kremlin will be decisive, not its rhetoric. sector, EU members have agreed to be ca- is not linked with one or several EU mem- It is widely known that Russia maintains pable of deploying 50-60,000 troops within ber states by defence relationships. Opin- close links to states such as Libya, Iran 60 days and sustaining forces for at least ions among the members of the Union and Iraq which have supported interna- one year by the year 2003 (European Head- also differ with regard to the legitimacy tional terrorism.31 Moscow also plays a line Goal). The forces will be charged with of force, risk-taking, acceptance of casual- dubious role in several of the conflicts the implementation of the so-called ties and the legal problems in multina- on the southern rim of the former So- Petersberg tasks.34 As to civilian crisis tional units.35 Presumably none of these

12 problems will be any easier to solve in an the so-called Capabilities Commitment expanded Union. Conference38 in November 2000, EU Relations with the U.S. and NATO A second question is which EU coun- members have considerable deficiencies try would be able to provide major troop in their capabilities (examples are strate- The commitment of NATO and its contingents were the mission to take place gic sea- and air-lift, interoperability and leading power America is indispensable in an area other than the regions where command and control systems). In view for security and stability on the Euro- EU and NATO members are already of the budgetary pressures in all Euro- pean continent. Europe and the U.S. share militarily involved? British soldiers, for pean countries, major improvements will common values, which have provided the example, are presently deployed in Cy- be very hard to achieve. NATO Secre- foundation for those structures that have prus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Gulf tary-General Lord Robertson said in preserved peace, freedom and prosperity region, southern Turkey, Sierra Leone, the mid-2001 about the ESDP efforts of the in the North Atlantic region for many Falkland Islands and East Timor. The Brit- Europeans, “They‘ve accomplished only decades. Furthermore, the presence of the ish Ministry of Defence has therefore about half the agreed-on projects for U.S. in the Old World serves as a safe- made the reduction of overstretch its “first strengthening defense capacities, and they guard against the reawakening of Euro- priority”.36 In the German Bundeswehr, were only the easier ones.“39 The new pean rivalries and thus helps to maintain too, the reservoir of forces for the current EU member states, whose societies and the balance of power on the continent. missions is “still far to small”,37 says Gen- economies are all undergoing a difficult Tensions are nevertheless visible in the eral Harald Kujat, the Chief of the Ger- transformation process, are unlikely to transatlantic relationship, which mainly man Federal Armed Forces Staff and in- be able to make significant contributions stem from different geostrategic perspec- coming Chairman of NATO’s Military to the improvement of the EU’s mili- tives. The U.S. is both politically and Committee. This means apparently, to be tary capabilities. Since the requirements militarily active almost all over the globe. succinct, that major EU missions can only for the accomplishment of difficult mis- By contrast, the Europeans usually con- be accomplished if the necessary troops are sions will not be given in the medium fine themselves to their home region and drawn from other crisis operations, which term, military operations under the ae- adjacent regions. The defence of the com- would in turn put those missions at risk. gis of the EU will for a longer time be mon interests of the West - access to the Thirdly, the issue of military capabili- limited to the lower end of the oil reserves in the Persian Gulf, securing ties has to be mentioned. As shown at Petersberg spectrum. the openness of the international ship-

13 ping lanes, to give but two examples - is a long time of conducting a military op- the weight of the country within NATO mostly left to the Americans. At the same eration similar to the 1999 air campaign and the EU. Berlin’s influence depends time, Washington has to realize that quite against Yugoslavia without the Americans. on numerous factors, including the abil- often the EU’s ESDP rhetoric is not It is therefore self-evident that NATO and ity to co-operate successfully with its al- matched by the Europeans’ willingness to the EU have to reach a “complementary lies and partners. In this respect, observ- invest in the modernization of their division of military tasks”42 on a case-by- ers say difficulties have been growing be- forces. It remains to be seen whether the case basis. cause Germany apparently lacks the will- terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 will ingness to allocate sufficient funding to lead to a fundamental re-orientation. Expectations of Germany meet the commitments it has made to the Of course, there is a certain contradic- Alliance.43 Senior military officers in tion between Washington’s demand for The EU candidate countries have high NATO are worried that Berlin’s position improved military capabilities on the one expectations regarding Germany’s role in on NATO and ESDP “could increasingly hand and its anxiety about losing influ- Europe. Due to the size of its economy be confined to rhetorical approval”.44 ence on the other. This requires, firstly, and population, the Federal Republic is Such a policy could lead in the longer the development of a transatlantic security considered the principal EU power by the term to a decline in influence in both and defense identity.40 EU members have aspirant states. In an enlarged Union, decision-shaping and decision-making. to understand that the protection of their Germany will, even more so than in the Another aspect is the strength of the world-wide interests necessitates a sustained past, have to play a leading role - in the German armed forces. According to the political as well as financial and military political and economic field, but also in “Cornerstones” paper of the Federal Min- commitment. For its part, America should security and defence policy. This offers ister of Defence, the Bundeswehr must bear in mind that, since the international much opportunity but it also requires the be capable of sustaining one major op- system is prone to crises, the future rapid Germans to assume responsibility and to eration or two medium-size operations reaction force of the EU will be a source set good examples. over a longer period of time.45 Yet its of support for NATO and will thus add Over the last decade, however, tenden- missions in the Balkans, which are com- value to the transatlantic relationship.41 cies have become apparent in German se- parable to two medium-size operations, Secondly, the EU has to acknowledge curity and defence policy that have given are already posing serious challenges to its limits. Europe will not be capable for cause for concern. One aspect relates to the Bundeswehr. A major crisis elsewhere

14 requiring a military response would put sis, act totally independently and without offers the opportunity to finally overcome the armed forces in a very difficult posi- approval of the European partners.48 All the politically, economically and cultur- tion.46 Without jeopardizing other mis- the same, nuclear strategy is a topic that ally injustified division of Europe. The sions, Germany would probably not be most EU governments are reluctant to take co-operative structures which the former able to provide a major contingent in case up because of the general public’s deep- enemies developed in the framework of of, say, an Article 5 attack on Turkey. If seated aversion towards nuclear matters. the European Economic Community and, there is one lesson that can be learned Article 17 TEU, however, states that the subsequently, the European Union have from the events of 11 September 2001, common foreign and security policy shall provided essential prerequisites for un- however, it should be the realization that include “all questions relating to the secu- heard-of prosperity and lasting stability numerous unpredictable risks continue to rity of the Union” (although ESDP cur- in Western Europe. There are many rea- exist in the world. The Bundeswehr has rently only refers to the Petersberg tasks). sons to believe that enlargement will help to have the forces and the capabilities to Provided that the process of integration to achieve similar successes in the candi- combat these risks and threats. As Ger- continues after enlargement, a debate on date countries. man Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping the nuclear facets of ESDP would thus be Nonetheless, enlargement will funda- 49 said, “Europe has global responsibility”.47 part of the logic of integration. Ger- mentally change the Union. The assertion Not only the candidate countries expect many and France already agreed in 1996 that the EU has stepped into a “strategic to start talks on the “role of nuclear de- a corresponding sense of responsibility trap”51 by promising to accept new mem- terrence in the context of European de- from the largest EU member. bers is probably an exaggeration. But the fence policy”,50 but contacts have not been multitude of challenges the EU is facing intensified. Nuclear Strategy will require sustained efforts to continue the success story of the Union. The objec- In the medium term, the EU’s defence IV. Conclusions tive of this analysis was to examine some efforts might raise the issue of a Euro- of the political and security problems pean nuclear concept. In fact, over recent The end of the Cold War has opened a whose resolution will be crucial for the years it has become ever less plausible to “window of opportunity” of historic di- future of the EU. imagine a British or French nuclear mensions. More than half a century after As to the political aspects of enlarge- policy which would, in the event of a cri- World War II, the enlargement of the EU ment, it has to be noted that the EU will

15 become more heterogeneous, which will Beside these conceptual issues, above and Macedonia were given a prospect of acceding necessitate the introduction of new, more all two factors are crucial for a common in the framework of the Stability Pact. In 1993, EU heads of states and governments flexible mechanisms for co-operation. To foreign and security policy. Firstly, there laid down several economic and political criteria attempt to govern the Union with the has to be a sincere willingness to co-op- which have to be fulfilled for membership, the so- rules of the Fifteen, which essentially origi- eration on the part of both the current called Copenhagen criteria. See Copenhagen Eu- nate from the six founding members, will and the future members of the EU. In a ropean Council, Presidency Conclusions, 21/22 June 1993. prove unfeasible. Fundamental reforms crisis as well as during “normal” times se- 3 Italics G.F. are necessary. These should focus in par- curity policy requires the ability to act 4 Elfriede Regelsberger/Mathias Jopp, “Die ticular on the voting procedures and efficiently and effectively. It should be in Stärkung der Handlungsfähigkeit der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik”, should allow a broadening of qualified the interest of all members to pursue this Mathias Jopp/Andreas Maurer/Otto Schmuck majority voting. In areas where this can- objective. Secondly, adequate resources are (eds.), Die Europäische Union nach Amsterdam: not be attained, changes would be desir- needed in order to meet the defence-re- Analysen und Stellungnahmen zum neuen EU-Vertrag, able to prevent individual member states lated commitments that EU members have Bonn 1998, pp. 155-171; here: p. 159 (Institut für Europäische Politik, Analysen zur Europapolitik, from blocking other countries. Further- made. Only a Union which has convinc- vol. 13) (translation G.F.). more, the rights of the European Parlia- ing political, civil and military means at 5 European Parliament, The Common Foreign ment must be strengthened. its disposal will become a credible and and Security Policy and Enlargement of the Euro- Since the institutional framework for successful player in security policy. pean Union, Briefing no. 30, Luxemburg, 14 March 2000, p. 8. ESDP has largely been established, the next 6 Exceptions include the CFSP instruments of big step in the field of security policy 1 See Wolfgang Wessels, ”Zukunftsfähig? Die joint action and common position, about which would be to define a common security Europäische Union à 27”, Internationale Politik, decisions can be made by a qualified majority vol. 56, no. 2/2001, pp. 13-22; here: p. 14f. (Article 23 paragraph 2 TEU). In political prac- strategy. As yet, there is no European stra- 2 Currently the EU is conducting accession ne- tice, decisions have seldom been taken by major- tegic culture. Efforts should be made to gotiations with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua- ity voting. See Elfriede Regelsberger, “Die find common answers to questions such nia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach as to the wider interests of the EU and a the Czech Republic, Hungary and Cyprus. Tur- ‘Nizza’ - begrenzter Reformeifer und außervert- key is considered a candidate country although ragliche Dynamik”, Integration, vol. 24, no. 2/2001, corresponding military concept. The goal the beginning of accession negotiations has been pp. 156-168; here: p. 158. could be the publication of a European linked to some political criteria. Furthermore, 7 See Martin Kremer/Uwe Schmalz, “Nach Nizza white book. Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Yugoslavia, Croatia - Perspektiven der Gemeinsamen Europäischen

16 Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik”, Integration, 17 See European Commission, Eurobarometer: Pub- 26 See Varwick, “Die EU nach dem Kosovo-Krieg”, vol. 24, no. 2/2001, pp. 167-178; here: p. 172. lic Opinion in the European Union, Report No. 55, p. 187. 8 Nonetheless, it has to be kept in mind that Brussels, October 2001, pp. 11 and 34. 27 See Cologne European Council, Common these forms of differentiation were decided on 18 Quoted in: Michaela Wiegel, “Versprechen Strategy of the European Union for Russia, 4 unanimously even by those members who did gehalten, Vertrauen gebrochen”, Frankfurter June 1999. not wish to participate. In an EU of 28 or 30 Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 December 2000, p. 3 (trans- 28 See Medium-Term Strategy for Development members still depending on unanimous decisions, lation G.F.). of Relations between the Russian Federation and problems may arise insofar as one or several coun- 19 See Joseph Fitchett, “Turkey’s Warning on the European Union (2000-2010), Internet http:// tries might reject a specific form of differentiation Cyprus Vexes Western Allies”, International Herald europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/ for itself while simultaneously trying to block the Tribune, 9 November 2001, p. 5 and “Crisis Ahead”, russian_medium_term_strategy/ (see ibid. for the realization of the project by the others. The Economist, 8 September 2001, p. 36/37. following quotations). 9 See, for example, Jochen Hehn, “Jospin weist 20 See “Die EU rechnet mit Aufnahme eines 29 See Peter van Ham, Europe’s New Defense Ambi- deutsche EU-Visionen zurück”, Die Welt, 29 May geteilten Zypern”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, tions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia, The 2001, p. 8 and “‘Flötenspieler‘ Fischer: Védrine 14 November 2001, p. 6. Marshall Center Papers, no. 1, Garmisch- hält wenig von den Europavisionen seines 21 Günther Verheugen, Interview with the Partenkirchen, 30 April 2000, p. 25f. deutschen Kollegen”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19 September 1999, quoted 30 See ibid., p. 30f. 21 November 2000, p. 10. in: Johannes Varwick, “Die EU nach dem Kosovo- 31 See Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. and Russia Escalate 10 Groupement d’études et de recherches Notre Krieg: Ein überforderter Stabilitätsanker?”, Joachim War of Words Over Arming Rogue States”, Inter- Europe, A Wake-Up Call for Europe, 15 October Krause (ed.), Kosovo - Humanitäre Intervention und national Herald Tribune, 21 March 2001, p. 4 and 2001, in: Internet http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr/ kooperative Sicherheit in Europa, Opladen 2000, pp. “Poacher Turned Gamekeeper”, The Economist, 22 appel-en.htm. 185-200; here: p. 186 (translation G.F.). September 2001, p. 32. 11 Ibid. 22 See R. Jeffrey Smith, “Rule of Law Elusive as 32 German Foreign Office, A New Chapter in 12 Udo Bergdoll, “Nur einig nach Europa”, UN And NATO Run Kosovo”, International Her- the CFSP: The European Security and Defence Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5 September 2001, p. 1 (trans- ald Tribune, 30 July 2001, p. 10 and Justin L. C. Policy (ESDP), December 2000, Internet http:// lation G.F.). Eldridge, “Kosovo: Land of Uncertainty”, Euro- www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/eu_politik/ 13 Werner Weidenfeld, “Die Europäische pean Security, vol. 10, no. 2 (Summer 2001), S. 34-66. gasp/esvp_html. Zeitenwende”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 De- 23 “’Das ist eine Reifeprüfung für die EU’”, In- 33 Ibid. cember 2000, p. 8 (translation G.F.). terview with Javier Solana, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18/ 34 Humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and peace- 14 Ibid. 19 November 2000, p. 12 (translation G.F.). making missions. 15 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing/Helmut Schmidt, 24 Berthold Kohler, “Was die NATO riskiert”, 35 Alyson J. K. Bailes, “European Defence: An- “Time to Slow Down and Consolidate Around Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 August 2001, p. 1 other Set of Questions”, RUSI Journal, February ‘Euro-Europe’”, International Herald Tribune, 11 (translation G.F.). 2000, p. 38-43; here: p. 38f. April 2000. 25 Lisbon European Council, Presidency Con- 36 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, White 16 Ibid. clusions, 23/24 March 2000, paragraph 54. Paper 1999, paragraph 70.

17 37 Harald Kujat, Rede anlässlich des Sicherheits- 47 Rudolf Scharping, “Europa hat globale und Verteidigungspolitischen Kongresses des Verantwortung”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 Wehr- und Sicherheitspolitischen Arbeitskreises March 2001, p. 12 (translation G.F.). der CSU, München, 22 September 2001 (transla- 48 See André Dumoulin, “L’Identité européenne tion G.F.). de sécurité et de défense et la dissuasion nucléaire”, 38 See European Union, Military Capabilities Défense Nationale, vol. 56 (2000), no. 8/9, pp. 20-37; Commitment Declaration, Brussels, 20 Novem- here: p. 25. ber 2000, Internet http://ue.eu.int/pesc/military/ 49 See Peter Schmidt, “Braucht eine europäische en/CCC.htm. Verteidigungspolitik ein Nuklearkonzept? 39 Quoted in: John Vincour, “Economic Dimensionen der Bewertung”, Erich Reiter (ed.), Slowdown Forces Europe to Scale Back Ambi- Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2000, Wien tions”, International Herald Tribune, 10 July 2001, p. 2000, pp. 301-319; here: p. 307f. 1/6; here: p. 1. 50 Gemeinsames deutsch-französisches Sicher- 40 See Holger H. Mey, Internationale Entwicklungen heits- und Verteidigungskonzept, Nürnberg, 9 am Beginn des dritten Jahrtausends, unpublished December 1996, paragraph 3.1 (translation G.F.). manuscript, Bonn, 30 June 2000, p. 77. 51 Varwick, “Die EU nach dem Kosovo-Krieg”, 41 See Kremer/Schmalz, “Nach Nizza - Pers- S. 199 (translation G.F.). pektiven der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik”, p. 170. 42 Ibid. (translation G.F.). 43 See Karl Feldmeyer, “Von den Kosten des Sparens”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 June 2001, p. 1. 44 General (rtd.) Klaus Reinhardt, “’Wo bleibt eure Zuverlässigkeit im Bündnis?’”, Die Welt, 16 August 2001 (translation G.F.). 45 See The Federal Minister of Defence, The Bundeswehr - Advancing Steadily into the 21st Century: Cornerstones of a Fundamental Renewal, Bonn 2000, paragraph 54. 46 See Karl Feldmeyer, “Auf dem Balkan überfordert”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 July 2001, p. 1

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