may 2020

India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence

Rajesh Rajagopalan

India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence

Rajesh Rajagopalan about the author

Rajesh Rajagopalan is a Professor at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

ISBN: 978-93-90159-12-3

©2020 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permisson in writing from ORF. India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence

India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence

Abstract

Even as India has had a long-running debate about many aspects of its nuclear doctrine, most importantly, its (NFU) policy, the country continues to maintain the NFU. This paper makes a critical assessment of recent arguments made by Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang that India may be reconsidering its NFU policy because of counterforce “temptations”. The paper dissects the evidence they present—statements made by mostly retired officials, and discrete bits of technology that India is acquiring—and shows why they are unconvincing. Further, the paper illustrates why the relatively smaller Indian nuclear arsenal both preclude any counterforce first-strike doctrine, and is an indication that India is not pursuing such a doctrinal change. Although a decision to abandon the NFU cannot be ruled out, this is unlikely to be the result of the kind of thinking and preparation outlined by Clary and Narang.

Attribution: Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 247, May 2020, Observer Research Foundation.

ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 247  may 2020 5 India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence

Introduction

Since India declared itself a nuclear power in 1998, a decade after it reportedly built its first nuclear weapons, there have been significant debates about both India’s nuclear path and its consequences. These debates are vast, well-detailed, and necessary: they highlight potential problems, challenges, costs and dangers, as well as the logic and benefits of India’s nuclear policy. Irrespective of whether or not one agrees with the arguments and positions taken in these debates, they encourage a more careful thinking about the choices India faces.

With hindsight, it has become clear that many of the fears expressed about India’s nuclear policy in the immediate aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests were unfounded. For one, the expectation of uncontrolled escalation to the nuclear level has remained unrealised, despite several crises and even an intense but limited war in Kargil. Ultimately, leaders on both sides have demonstrated both calculation and reasonable risk-aversion. Similarly, expectations of an unbridled nuclear arms race in South Asia have turned out to be overblown. India has continued to maintain a No First Use (NFU) doctrine and its nuclear forces have remained relatively small despite the country having two nuclear adversaries. Indeed, New has shown scant concern about Pakistan’s slightly larger nuclear arsenal, and there has been no indication of any arms race of the action-reaction kind.

To be sure, these nuclear debates have helped sensitise the region— in particular, the decision-makers—to the dangers of an arms race. After all, the logic of nuclear deterrence can be counterintuitive to standard military logic. For example, invulnerability is a danger in nuclear relations because any state that achieves it faces the temptation of launching an attack on its adversary. The logic of NFU is similarly

6 ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 247  may 2020 India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence counterintuitive: a country that faces no existential threats (in addition to being the strongest and most powerful one in its neighbourhood) has little need to use nuclear weapons first.