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India and Counterforce: a Question of Evidence MAY 2020 India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence Rajesh Rajagopalan India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence Rajesh Rajagopalan ABOUT THE AUTHOR Rajesh Rajagopalan is a Professor at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. ISBN: 978-93-90159-12-3 ©2020 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permisson in writing from ORF. India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence ABSTRACT Even as India has had a long-running debate about many aspects of its nuclear doctrine, most importantly, its No First Use (NFU) policy, the country continues to maintain the NFU. This paper makes a critical assessment of recent arguments made by Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang that India may be reconsidering its NFU policy because of counterforce “temptations”. The paper dissects the evidence they present—statements made by mostly retired officials, and discrete bits of technology that India is acquiring—and shows why they are unconvincing. Further, the paper illustrates why the relatively smaller Indian nuclear arsenal both preclude any counterforce first-strike doctrine, and is an indication that India is not pursuing such a doctrinal change. Although a decision to abandon the NFU cannot be ruled out, this is unlikely to be the result of the kind of thinking and preparation outlined by Clary and Narang. Attribution: Rajesh Rajagopalan, “India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 247, May 2020, Observer Research Foundation. ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 247 MAY 2020 5 India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence INTRODUCTION Since India declared itself a nuclear power in 1998, a decade after it reportedly built its first nuclear weapons, there have been significant debates about both India’s nuclear path and its consequences. These debates are vast, well-detailed, and necessary: they highlight potential problems, challenges, costs and dangers, as well as the logic and benefits of India’s nuclear policy. Irrespective of whether or not one agrees with the arguments and positions taken in these debates, they encourage a more careful thinking about the choices India faces. With hindsight, it has become clear that many of the fears expressed about India’s nuclear policy in the immediate aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests were unfounded. For one, the expectation of uncontrolled escalation to the nuclear level has remained unrealised, despite several crises and even an intense but limited war in Kargil. Ultimately, leaders on both sides have demonstrated both calculation and reasonable risk-aversion. Similarly, expectations of an unbridled nuclear arms race in South Asia have turned out to be overblown. India has continued to maintain a No First Use (NFU) doctrine and its nuclear forces have remained relatively small despite the country having two nuclear adversaries. Indeed, New Delhi has shown scant concern about Pakistan’s slightly larger nuclear arsenal, and there has been no indication of any arms race of the action-reaction kind. To be sure, these nuclear debates have helped sensitise the region— in particular, the decision-makers—to the dangers of an arms race. After all, the logic of nuclear deterrence can be counterintuitive to standard military logic. For example, invulnerability is a danger in nuclear relations because any state that achieves it faces the temptation of launching an attack on its adversary. The logic of NFU is similarly 6 ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 247 MAY 2020 India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence counterintuitive: a country that faces no existential threats (in addition to being the strongest and most powerful one in its neighbourhood) has little need to use nuclear weapons first. This was a conclusion that many Indian civilian strategists reached, both because they understood how India’s circumstances dictated the country’s choices and they learned the right lessons from the useless and wasteful Cold War nuclear arms race. Recent statements by senior Indian officials such as former Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar suggest that this logic may not be well- understood.1 This should be a matter of concern because retreating from NFU will prove to be of little benefit to India and – assuming India follows through with its logic – could make managing and controlling the country’s nuclear arsenal much more difficult. This is why it is particularly concerning when scholars conclude that India may be embarking on just this path, as Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang argue in their early 2019 essay.2 Clary and Narang have written an important article that needs to be taken seriously and viewed critically. They map recent developments in India’s nuclear weapons program and the continuing Indian debate about how to wield its nuclear arsenal. They tie these elements together to argue that India’s nuclear doctrine may be shifting towards a “conscious pursuit of more flexible options beyond countervalue targeting—namely, counterforce options against Pakistan’s longer- range nuclear systems” (p. 8). They acknowledge (p. 9) that a counterforce doctrine itself would be consistent with India’s massive retaliation strategy (as well as with India’s No First Use or NFU policy). But because such a doctrine would put at risk Pakistan’s long-range nuclear forces, they argue that this could potentially lead Pakistan to begin any nuclear attack on India with a full-scale assault. In turn, this ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 247 MAY 2020 7 India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence may force India to consider a preemptive counterforce attack to destroy Pakistan’s long-range nuclear forces before they attack. This last link in their chain of reasoning, assuming that Indian decision-makers are thinking along these lines, would represent a change in India’s NFU policy. Theirs is an important argument that needs to be taken seriously for a number of reasons. First, both are experienced security studies scholars who have spent a considerable number of years looking at India’s security and foreign policies, but particularly India’s nuclear policy and doctrine. Their work needs to be engaged with seriously. Second, they have amassed and woven together a large volume of circumstantial evidence in making their case, which also needs to be considered seriously. Moreover, it is published in an academic journal that is considered the number one in security studies and one of the top three in the broader international relations field. Third, their argument goes against the grain of much of the existing academic literature on India’s nuclear doctrine. If they are correct, it calls for a fundamental reconsideration of how scholars and analysts have understood India’s nuclear doctrine. Finally, and most importantly, their argument has obvious policy implications. If India’s nuclear doctrine is indeed changing towards counterforce and first use, it could represent a growing danger for nuclear stability between India and Pakistan. This paper agrees with Clary and Narang that if India gives up its NFU policy for a preemptive counterforce attack, it indeed “would mark a seismic shift in Indian nuclear strategy” (p. 9), and one that would carry “significant risks” (p. 10). This paper outlines key issues that undermine Clary and Narang’s essay. The first section addresses the lack of clarity in their claims. The second section examines their claims about changes in Indian 8 ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 247 MAY 2020 India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence thinking about its nuclear doctrine. The penultimate section considers the question of India’s technological advances that Clary and Narang suggest could be used for a counterforce strategy. The paper concludes with a few observations about the likely trajectory of India’s nuclear doctrine. I. UNRAVELLING THE CLAIM: COUNTERFORCe “TEMPTATIONS” OR FIRST STRIKE STRATEGY? There are two aspects to what Clary and Narang present as evidence of a shift in India’s nuclear doctrine: what their claim is regarding the status of that doctrine; and the nature of the change in the doctrine. Status of India’s nuclear doctrine Clary and Narang fail to make their central claim unambiguous: is India only facing a counterforce “temptation” or is it planning to shift to counterforce, or has already shifted to counterforce? The title of their essay suggests only that India may be facing counterforce “temptations”, not that the doctrine itself is changing or has changed. This tentativeness is maintained in the first two paragraphs of their introduction, when they write that although India acquired nuclear weapons only reluctantly, “continued nuclear restraint is less certain” (p. 7), pointing to the kind of capabilities India is developing that is inconsistent with such restraint. When they suggest that continued nuclear restraint is less certain, it suggests a future change to the doctrine, not one that has already taken place. In other words, capability development could change in Indian policy in the future; the Indian nuclear doctrine has not yet changed. In the succeeding paragraph, however, the authors state that their argument is “that these apparently discrepant capability developments ORF OCCASIONAL PAPER # 247 MAY 2020 9 India and Counterforce: A Question of Evidence are most likely the result of India’s conscious pursuit of more flexible options beyond countervalue targeting—namely, counterforce options against Pakistan’s longer-range nuclear systems” (p. 8., emphasis added). This goes well beyond just “temptations”: it is now a “conscious pursuit”, but only of counterforce “options” and not of a counterforce strategy (this paper will address this issue in later sections). Despite the caveat (“most likely”), the “conscious pursuit” is important because it implies that India has already made a decision to move towards counterforce and is now building the forces to operationalise the new strategy. They reiterate this in a latter part of their essay: “India has been developing the components necessary”, they write, “for such a [first strike] strategy” (p.
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