Drug Policy Briefing No. 34 December 2010

The ‘miracle of San Martín’ and symptoms of ‘alternative development’ in

By Hugo Cabieses1

Since 2007 the Peruvian government, through the National Commission for Conclusions & Recommendations Development and Life without Drugs  We recommend a three-pillar strategy of (DEVIDA) and more recently the President Integral Harm Reduction: Concerning pro- of the Republic himself, have been present- duction and crops we propose comprehen- 2 ing the “Miracle of San Martin Model” as sive sustainable human development- with the path to follow in to achieve drug people and with legal coca- that respects supply reduction in a targeted area within local cultures and knowledge, protects the the country that was previously plagued by ecology, manages natural resources, coca crops, guerrilla insurgency, lack of strengthens social and public institutions. State presence and ecological damage.  Promote an efficient credit system- not a The model contains four complimentary money lender, allocate permanent technical actions within one strategy: first, the help, subsidize prices in order to protect eradication of coca crops in a voluntary them from the fluctuations of international and/or compulsory manner; secondly, prices and, above all, to encourage the eradication as a precondition to securing purchase of these products and others for governability and security in the zones in internal consumption. which the strategy is applied; thirdly, coordination of the various activities of  Change the exportation strategy to an state and private entities and international internal market strategy, to not make forced cooperation; fourthly, the promotion of or ‘voluntary’ crop eradication a precondi- sustainable economic activities. tion for development, and to talk with the farmers about alternative crops and econo- The strategy intends to demonstrate the mies in areas which are mainly suited to success of these actions in order to repro- forestry, agro-forestry and ecotourism. duce them in other areas within the coun- try and abroad as the only intelligent and  The government and international successful way of reducing poverty, ensur- cooperation should facilitate and promote ing governability, and generating hope national and international private invest- amongst the people and agricultural pro- ment in the coca zones through fostering ducers in the zones in which it is applied. systems of contract agriculture and creating “clusters”, or territorial conglomerations that Rómulo Pizarro, executive president of guarantee the competetivity of different DEVIDA, and his co-workers have activities which should not be only agricul- succeeded in launching a huge publicity tural, but alternative methods of generating campaign to promote the San Martin family income to that of coca cultivation model. The model, however, reminds us destined for cocaine production. more of the miracles of his namesake San

Transnational Institute | 1 place in Bangkok, is the discussion on the “On the subject of public security and the suitability and replication of the “San fight against terrorism, as I said in the Martín model”. beginning these are still insufficient, although in the Huallaga region some success has been Whist recognizing its short-term successes, achieved through eradication, crop we maintain that this model is not new, and substitution and the San Martin Model.” that it is not replicable, nor will it withstand (President Alan García, Mensaje, 28 July, the test of time. What is more, the model is 2010) not ecologically sustainable, and it doesn’t remedy the ‘symptoms of alternative “This model is recognised by nations as an development’. integral development plan as one of its core components is the theme of alternative crops” THE CONTEXT (Rómulo Pizarro, Washington, Inforegión, 4 The region of San Martín is located in May, 2010) Northeastern Peru and is divided into 10 provinces and 77 districts with a total “San Martín is very close to becoming the first population of 777,694. There are 1,500 region to free itself from drug trafficking farming communities and 66 native activity and drug production. Its producers communities on its land. Its ecosystem is (ex coca farmers) are seeing their cacao being favourable to agricultural development, transformed into La Orquíde chocolates, their making this its largest economic activity, organic and ecological coffee into Oro Verde with 61% of the population economically roasted coffee (winner of the Grano de Oro active, but not the most profitable, since prize in 2003), and how their delicious palm 83% of those dedicated to agricultural hearts compete in quality and price on any activity are unskilled labourers whose daily market”. wage is between US$2 and $3. (Rómulo Pizarro, El Comercio, 25 June, 2010) San Martín lacks qualified and technified agricultural producers, but also lacks supporting infrastructure – electric power Martín de Porres, that saint who made dog, and well maintained roads -, all of which a rat and cat eat from one plate. result of the centralism that characterised the country for decades. Through a resolution of the 53rd session of the UN’s Commission on Narcotic Drugs The region is also characterised by zones at (CND), they managed to get the model risk from geodynamic phenomena that onto the international agenda. This reads: provoke periodic landslides, strong winds and flooding, due to the intensive defores- “5. Welcomes the proposal of Peru and tation process that is estimated at 40,747 Thailand to jointly host an international hectares per year. Its natural agro forestry workshop, to be held in Thailand in resources have not yet been sufficiently November 2010, consisting of visits to taken advantage of, due to the absence of various alternative development sites and integral development policies and projects. discussions on best practices and lessons learned in alternative development with San Martín has been traditionally known as practitioners in the field, back to back with a “colonizable” area, suited to the extrac- an international conference on alternative tion and providing of food. This notion was development among all stakeholders, to be at the root of the famous boom of barbasco organized in close collaboration with the and wood extraction, and of tobacco, rice, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.3 maize, and currently of sugar cane mono- One central focus of the seminar, to take crops. 67% of the region’s population is

2 | Transnational Institute classified as poor (earning less than US$2 for legality and agree to promote eradica- per day) and the basic basket of goods in tion. According to this institution, the “San the rural area is equivalent to US$ 44 per Martín Model” combined the people’s month. desire for change with the zone’s excellent productive potential in agriculture, live It is impossible to ignore the social and stock farming, agro forestry and tourism. security issues that have contributed to the Added to which the State made major increase in poverty in San Martín. In the investments in road, energy, and commu- nineties the region was emblematic of coca nication infrastructure and basic social leaf and coca base paste production because infrastructure that included strengthening 4 of the production along the river Huallaga public and private institutions and better- and in particular in the province of Toca- ing local workers’ skills. che. Contrary to all predictions, illegal coca cultivation encouraged by drug trafficking The result of this immense joint effort of reached 30 thousand planted hectares to- local authorities, producers associations, wards 1990. At that time, when the country State and international cooperation in was the largest coca leaf producer in the agreement with DEVIDA, has produced world, up to 55 percent of all coca culti- the following results and indicators:6 vated in Peru was grown in the Huallaga region alone.  Poverty in the region was reduced from 68.2 % in 2001 to 33.2 % in 2008 and ex- Between the years of 1984 and 1992, along treme poverty dropped from 43.0 % to with the guerrilla insurgency activities of 14.5% percent. This came about thanks, in the Peruvian – the part, to the fact that 46,606 families com- Shining Path (PCP-SL) and of the Túpac mitted to developing legal activities that Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) have resulted in 235 thousand hectares of illegal drug trafficking (TID) developed in crops such as rice, coffee, cacao, palm oil, the area. This financed the activities of maize and cotton, with a gross value of 330 those rebel organisations with cash and million dollars, figures that are increasing protection provided. each year.

All of this contributed to an increase in  Areas of illegal coca crops were reduced deforestation, a social crisis and a situation to 321 hectares, as much through voluntary of violence, given the strong participation reduction actions as through forced eradi- of terrorist subversion. This last activity cation. A dramatic reduction in the coca- greatly added to the regions’ problems as it drug trafficking economy has been aborted the organisation and mobilisation achieved: in 1992 it represented 46 % of the process of the working class-peasants gross value of San Martin’s production, which had developed between the seventies whilst in 2008 it was only 0.5 %. and the nineties, thus causing a drastic breaking up of the social fabric and cutting  Thanks to the cooperation of the USA short the lives of a generation of young through USAID, the revenue of cacao social activists.5 farmers rose from 3 million dollars in 2003 to 20 million in 2008. This figure will con- THE MIRACLE tinue to rise to reach 35 million in 2011, once the whole sown area comes into pro- According to DEVIDA, the violence and duction. drug trafficking that occurred in this region was responsible for provoking the change  The farmers are organised entrepreneu- of attitude necessary, amongst the popula- rially in order to achieve better market con- tion and local authorities, for them to opt ditions, which in 2011 will enable sales of

Transnational Institute | 3 52 million dollars in coffee, cacao and palm The programme’s strategy prioritises exten- oil produced within the framework of the sive cultivation for large-scale production war on drugs in Peru. This achievement destined for export in a zone not suited to counts on the support of international this type of agriculture due to ecological cooperation. fragility and soil quality. The programme is not sustainable in the long-term as it  The sowing of 48,868 hectares of alterna- depends on international demand and tive crops to coca has been brought about; prices of endorsed products (cacao, coffee, 15,506 land ownership titles have been palm hearts, sugar cane and palm oil). granted; 26 different community groups and producers’ cooperatives have been What is more, we maintain that this established and strengthened; credit sys- “model”, whilst it has helped reduce po- tems aimed at producers’ organisations verty and coca crops, strengthen local have been established; two palm oil extrac- councils and producers associations, im- tion plants have been set up and one palm prove marketing etc., in the short, medium heart processing centre run by farming and long term it also confirms the most businesses; and 1,858 economic and basic common symptoms produced by “alterna- social infrastructure projects have been tive development” everywhere it has been carried out, including the Tocache-Juanjui- implemented: Tarapoto highway.  The symptom known in Peru as ‘obris-  Five local governments have been mo’ (carrying out projects with political strengthened through management skills motives). This is the act of laying down training courses. A study of economic cement, sand and metal to open health ecological zonification and a territorial centres, educational facilities, water and planning strategy have been carried out in drainage systems, sports grounds, muni- the province of Tocache. cipal buildings, bridges, collection centres, local tracks, bridges and highways, making LIMITATIONS AND SYMPTOMS sure these carry the slogan plaques and flags of the governmental agencies and The “Miracle of San Martín” has been en- voluntary sources but subsequently not dorsed with extensive support from the maintaining them. North American development agency USAID, the United Nations Office on  The symptom of “mono-production” Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Ger- that promotes between one and five main man Technical Cooperation (GTZ) products for exportation. These supposedly through a debt exchange programme with substitute coca crops such as, in the case of KfW (German Development Bank). It is a San Martín, coffee, cacao, palm hearts, coca crop substitution programme that palm oil and sugar cane for ethanol. Given replaces coca crops with cacao, coffee, palm the quantities needed to meet globalisation, oil and palm hearts crops destined for ex- extensive and intensive cultivation of these portation. Although it has been promoted products will continue to have an impact fairly successfully since 2002, it does not on the fragile Andean-Amazonian ecologi- come without certain significant problems. cal system. The programme reaches very few produc-  The ‘plantismo’ syndrome in which ers, as the “beneficiaries” represent less processing plants are installed but end up than a quarter of the entire region’s pro- being white elephants. They supposedly ducers. It’s a strategy of mono-production resolve low exportation prices by “adding in a zone of biodiversity and therefore value”, but the plants don’t operate due to brings about severe environmental impact. lack of management.

4 | Transnational Institute  The ‘demandismo’ syndrome character- development strategies.9 And in Peru, since ised by reaching out to international coop- August 2002, integral development has eration without government commitment been employed that includes the gradual, because 'the guilt of drug trafficking' manual and agreed self implemented belongs to those on the outside and they reduction of coca crops.10 must pay for this.7 Unfortunately, two decades later, the evo-  The quest for dollars or euros syndrome, lution of the economic, ecological, social in which the objective is focused on obtain- and political-institutional impacts of these ing money rather than promoting a strat- ‘alternative development’ models leave egy of sustainable rural development in much to be desired with respect to the relevant the areas through a specific State intended goals such as the decrease of policy on the topic of coca and drugs. illegal crops, rural integral development in the coca crop zones and the elimination of  And finally, the symptom of ‘addiction poverty. The consensus seems to be that we to the failure of prohibitionism’, which are facing a great failure. signifies continuing the same action of the last 36 years – Nixon launched the “war on ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT VS drugs” in 1974! – without thinking up an RURAL DEVELOPMENT alternative to the “prohibitionist” and “supply-side economics” paradigm. Furthermore, there exists a controversy with respect to the basic concept of ‘rural NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN development’. The discussion is not only an academic one, as the zones to which alter- The “San Martín Model” isn’t really a new native development is being directed, take proposal for ‘alternative development’. On away resources from other zones and an international level it has gone from sectors of governmental focus and inter- being an eradication and crop substitution national cooperation. approach (Asia in the seventies) to an era- dication and income substitution approach This is the complaint of organisations (Bolivia and Peru in the eighties) to become working with rural development, who during the nineties, and so far in the XXI argue that the concentration of resources century, different competitive approaches for ‘alternative development’ takes away that have, for the most part, been a hin- attention and funding from other zones drance to the Andean countries achieving with higher poverty levels or better 8 common policies. ecological and economic-productive potential.11 In Peru in the first half of the nineties alter- native development was characterised by On the other hand, although there are sig- actions that did not involve forced eradica- nificant differences from one country to tion with the farmers as designated conver- another,12 there are two determining phe- sation partners. In Bolivia up until 1998 nomena for the three Andean countries: the and in Peru from1996, the prerequisite evolution of the cocaine market and its actions of agreed and/or forced manual prices, which determine the total cultivated eradication were done without compensa- areas in the three countries; and the re- tion, after which alternative development structuring of coca leaf and paste produc- projects would be implemented. tion brought about by the traffickers them- From the early nineties Colombia applied selves who adapt easily, quickly and effi- intensive eradication through aerial ciently to interdiction actions and changes 13 spraying as a precondition for alternative in consumption patterns.

Transnational Institute | 5 ERADICATION AND INEFFICIENT populations of each zone. The selected ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT productive options were not compatible, in several cases, with the agro-ecological high The inefficiency and failure of forced eradi- forest zones that, generally speaking, are cation and of ‘alternative development’, as not suitable for exportation agriculture. well as the increase of coca and its deriva- tives, has produced three side effects that  A significant proportion of the agricul- have made the problem worse: the ‘balloon’ tural products promoted were not aimed at effect, or transferring of coca crops from building local and regional markets but one region and/or country to another;14 the instead at exportation, the prices of which ‘mercury’ effect,15 or dispersion of crops were fluctuating and had a tendency to within one or multiple zones; and the decline, except between 2006 and 2009. ‘membrane’16 or ‘fronterization’ effect, which is the location of illegal crops in the  There were failures in the choice of borders between countries. technological-productive packet for the farming family, whose main resource is From 1995 on, Peru has driven projects in family labour. Some of the alternative the coca crop zones with the objectives of economical activities did not obtain the reducing rural poverty, promoting sustain- desired returns, which caused the produc- able development, containing migration ers to go back to coca cultivation. Although from mountains to forest, protecting the some products were as profitable as coca in Andean-Amazonian environment, and the short term – rice, kidney beans, palm diminishing illegal coca crops. But this hearts, cacao, sesame and barbasco for effort has proved inefficient in as far as the example, they did not have secure and sus- desired objectives are concerned17 as it is tainable markets. The farmers underesti- obvious that rural poverty has not been mated costs and overestimated returns and reduced, that sustainable development this resulted in them developing activities remains unresolved, migration to the that were not ultimately profitable. They forests continues, as does the slash and did not manage to boost sustainable agro- burning of forests for coca and “alternative silvopastoral activities sustainable for the development” products, and that illegal farming family, whose available labour coca crops have been dispersed, turning force covers various ecological areas them into a “moving target”. But it is also throughout the year. Lastly, there was no true that these objectives were too ambi- access to favourable rural credit since the tious given that such minimal national and existing lending systems were newly emerg- international resources were supposed to ing and focused on collateralized loans for resolve such a complex problem. urban-commercial ventures with mid-level revenue. This lack of access to credit The inefficiency of alternative development affected the competitiveness of its products. has various technical, social and political causes that we summarise as follows: DEFICIENCIES AND LESSONS

 The projects were based on the principle The experiment driven in Peru has various of eradicating coca crops without an strategic deficiencies, with the exception of understanding of the socio-cultural and the San Martín model: lack of prior econo- economical-ecological complexities this mic-ecological zonification studies; lack of crop carries. There was no prior identifica- participation of the peasant families and tion of products and activities concordant local authorities in decisions for the pro- with the availability and potential of soils gramme; lack of building local markets in and with the knowledge and cultures of the zones unsuited to exportation agriculture

6 | Transnational Institute and mono-production; and lack of econo-  Voluntary participation of existent pro- mic and ecological sustainability of the ducer organisations should be promoted. plans, programmes and projects. This means using their requests as a start- ing point and gearing their productive Because of this, coca crops in Peru have proposals towards the market, developing shown an erratic behaviour that can be seen business skills on the basis of contract in the following facts: sowing and adopting participatory metho- dologies in order to do this, with gender  Between 1975 and 1990 Peru’s coca perspective and respecting the differences crops grew from 30,000 to 150,000 culti- and value of the native cultures. vated hectares. The consequence was major social instability, human rights violations,  Because of the agro-ecological condi- insurgency and guerrilla activity linked to tions of the coca crop zones, in general not illegal drug trafficking. suited to extensive agricultural production,  Between 1991 and 1994, a period of it is preferable not to prioritise traditional decriminalisation of cocaleros (coca farm- exportation crops (like coffee and cacao) or ers) and control of the insurgency and mono-crops (of rice or maize), but instead guerrilla activity, coca crop growth was the building of local markets, productive halted at around 130,000 hectares. diversification inspired by ancestral orga- nisation of ecological areas and sustainable  Between 1995 and 1997 a dramatic de- management of the Andean-Amazonian crease in the price of coca and its deriva- biodiversity, drawing up marketing agree- tives was recorded, as it was for cultivated ments between regional businesses and areas, which dropped to 51,000 hectares. town councils in the High-Andean and/or This period saw the relative success of coastal regions. ‘alternative development’: military control of insurgency and guerrilla activity and  Rather than blindly or indirectly donat- State control of the incipient cocaleros’ ing and subsidizing, the State and inter- movement. national coorperation should facilitate and promote national and international private  From 1998 an increase in prices was investment in the coca zones through fos- once again reported and coca leaf crops tering systems of contract agriculture and also increased to 65,000 hectares. This creating “clusters”, or territorial conglo- figure is currently maintained.18 The result merations that guarantee the competivity of was the relative failure of ‘alternative different activities which should not be development’, major mobilisations only agricultural, but alternative methods amongst the cocaleros, particularly from of generating family income to that of 1999 on, and a sort of “embolsamiento” or illegal coca production. “pocketing”19 of the insurgency and guerrilla activity linked to drug trafficking. ARE THERE ALTERNATIVES?

Some important lessons can be learned There are alternatives to illegal coca pro- from the experiences of these years: duction whilst maintaining the necessary amount for traditional consumption and its  ‘Alternative development’ is not a uni- beneficial commercialization, rejecting the que model but one that should be applied existing satanization of this plant, and in a particular way to each zone.20 It is not making the farmers a part of the solution. compatible with forced eradication or crop But for these alternatives to work, calls for a spraying. The reduction of crops should be radical change of the assumptions and a consequence of development and not a diagnosis with which they have been work- prerequisite for it. ing up until now.

Transnational Institute | 7 The first assumption is based on a simple should be put before the cart. That is to say (not to say stupid) formula: coca=cocaine= that true rural development should be pro- dollars=exportation. Supporters of this moted and not this false ‘alternative devel- formula claim that it is necessary to find an opment’ that is neither of the two things. exportation product as profitable as coca And most importantly, the concept of pro- and its derivatives in order for the coca duction for exportation should be elimi- farmers return to legal cultivation. Accord- nated and the ‘internal market’ concept ing to the second assumption, drug traf- embraced. The small-scale successes ficking is a problem of national security, achieved up until now have not withstood which means the “war on drugs” approach the test of time, nor have they proved ecol- must be applied. The third is that the prob- ogically sustainable. lem is one of supply and therefore crops Agricultural production for exportation in must be eradicated and sprayed. The fourth the high Andean forest is a pipe dream and is that eradication/spraying of crops will the farmers need to be told this in clear increase the street value of cocaine, worsen terms, going back to square one. Our main the quality and increase citizen security. exportable wealth is the biodiversity of These assumptions are based on a misdiag- these zones, ecotourism, integral and sus- nosis; that farmers who cultivate coca are tainable forest management, not slash and mono-producers and “drug-farmers” burn for exportation products, carbon whose only goal is to increase their income capture and the funds available for this in the shortest possible time. This is not purpose. To continue what USAID and true. The farmers cultivate various pro- UNODC have been promoting over the last ducts and develop various economic activi- 20 years means that as well as keeping us ties, coca being only one of these. The “addicted to failure”, we are promoting problem is that the macro-economic and ecological change and a plan for the de- agricultural sector policies have been drawn struction of Amazonian agriculture as a up behind the peasant farmers’ backs and replacement for coca leaf farming. This is a without taking into account the character- zone suited to forestry and limited livestock istics of the Amazon. They ignore the agri- farming for local and regional markets, not cultural productive capacity of the high and for exportation in the current situation of low forests, an area suited to forestry and globalisation. not agriculture or livestock farming unless they wish to destroy the ecology and the WHAT ABOUT THE SAN MARTÍN environment. MODEL?

Destroying the environment and ecology is The "San Martín model", unlike Plan what coca farming does when linked to Colombia, is not a police-military model, it illegal drug trafficking, but coffee, cacao, does not prioritise forced manual eradica- palm oil, sugar cane, soy, rice or maize tion of coca, although it does not reject it, it crops produce the same or worse anti- does not promote spraying of crops – in ecological effects. The devastation that has Peru these actions are prohibited although occurred is not only due to coca but also to some say they have proof that they happen the type of agricultural exploitation for – and it is not part of an anti-subversion exportation or intensive livestock farming strategy. In any case the San Martin model that literally “flattens” the forest, once the is no better than Plan Colombia. Despite slash and burn process has been performed. their differences both models sing the same tune: that of the “war on drugs”, which is What needs to be done is quite the opposite based on extreme prohibitionism and failed from what been done up until now with the ‘ofertismo’ (‘supply-side economics’ or help of USAID and the UNODC. The horse policy based on supply).

8 | Transnational Institute The best way the government could help The control of supply strategy attempts to farmers of cacao and other products they push street prices of drugs ever higher in promote would be to secure an efficient order to affect the purse strings of consum- credit system- not a money lender, allocate ers and thus decrease consumption. It also permanent technical help, subsidize prices attempts to lower the quality or purity of in order to protect them from the fluctua- street drugs in order to affect consumers’ tions of international prices and, above all, health thus inhibiting their consumption to encourage the purchase of these pro- levels. It maintains that less availability of ducts and others for internal consumption. drugs improves citizen safety as there are consequently less small-scale vendors and In order for the coca farmer not to return other dealers. to this crop it is necessary to change the exportation strategy to an internal market This concept is based on prohibition of strategy, to not make forced or ‘voluntary’ consumption, persecution of consumers crop eradication a precondition for and small-scale vendors, eradication of development, and to talk with the farmers crops as a precondition for promoting about alternative crops and economies in alternative development and applying areas which are mainly suited to forestry, police and military activity in cities, regions agro-forestry and ecotourism. and entire countries in order to seize drugs, arrest “drug traffickers” and combat NO TO THE ‘WAR ON DRUGS’ “narco-terrorism”.

The main difficulty in promoting a ‘crop WORKING TOWARDS INTEGRAL HARM substitution’ strategy is the ‘war on drugs’ REDUCTION itself as it encourages the eradication or decrease of coca crops and provokes the The failure of “supply-side economics”, ‘balloon” (transfer), ‘mercury’ (dispersion) prohibitionism and the policies that and ‘membrane’ (‘fronterization’) effects accompany this strategy has been inter- mentioned earlier. Added to this, stands a nationally recognised by even the most biased, anti-rural, anti-peasant and anti- important advocates amongst the drug indigenous government policy which control authorities who defend and apply destroys traditional food crops and primary them, starting with UNODC. But a debate forests, spews out CO2, increases global focused on the topic of prohibition vs lega- warming and causes social chaos and lization, or war vs liberalization would be endemic violence. very limited. Instead of this we recommend a three-pillar strategy of Integral Harm It is therefore necessary to begin by reject- Reduction: ing a war on drugs based on the concept of national security imposed by the govern-  Concerning production and crops we ment of the USA, and on the fundamental- propose comprehensive sustainable human ist prohibitionism present in the interna- development- with people and with legal tional conventions of the UN, subscribed to coca- that respects local cultures and and written into the national legislations of knowledge, protects the ecology, manages these nations. Both the war and prohibi- natural resources, strengthens social and tionism are based on a “supply-side econo- public institutions- the State being one of mics” or “ofertista” concept, which sees the these- and develops economic activities- problem of drugs as something external, not commodities or bio-combustibles- coming from “outside” and not as part of aimed at local and regional markets, not “the internal”. exportation.

Transnational Institute | 9  Concerning drug consumption we pro- Puno who, ten years ago, shared with me pose the decriminalization of soft drugs, his frustration with ‘alternative develop- like cannabis; the de-satanization of plants ment’ in a workshop organised by the with medicinal and/or “mind altering” AIDIA-GTZ21 project: "For us alternative properties, such as coca; the controlled development signifies when we ask for salt to administration of hard drugs- cocaine and make dried meat and they give us detergent heroin mainly - in authorised hospitals and which we don’t know how wash clothes with, pharmacies. The use of substitution thera- we ask for seeds and credit to produce crops pies must be encouraged- methadone, oral and they produce cement and stones to cocaine, etc. The so-called “therapeutic inaugurate buildings, we want technical communities” especially those that use and help and agricultural and livestock farming abuse religion, must be controlled through training and they give us participative powerful preventative and informative workshops to get information out of us, we media campaigns by the State and within ask for information about the international civil society. The language used in the cam- funds and they say they cant give it because paigns to deter consumption should be it’s secret”. This frustration is that of many carefully monitored to avoid the use of farmers from the coca cultivation areas, expressions that condemn the coca leaf or which is why they protest.22 that insinuate that the coca farmer is a ‘drug farmer’ or a ‘stupid tool used by the For a significant though minority sector of traffickers’, or “for every 10 leaves 9 go to the farmers of Peru’s high tropical forests - illegal drug trafficking” or that the people 50 thousand coca farmers out of 350 involved in the cocaine trade or cocaine thousand farmers -, coca is an intermediary chewers are ‘malnourished addicts’ and plant to prevent them being forgotten by that to consume cocaine is an ‘indigenous the market, the State and by the country. habit’. It should also avoid campaigns that But what is more, it is a plant used in order suggest that those of us who defend alter- to be included and respected as citizens. native strategies are ‘in conspiracy with the Why insist that the coca farmers are a drug traffickers’. problem? Why not support their proposal to be a major part of the solution? This  Concerning illegal drug trafficking, we message, almost a demand, features in all of propose applying operative intelligence for the acts signed by ministries and civil the locating and seizing of drug lords, com- servants of the past governments – Fuji- panies, money laundering bankers and mori, Paniagua, Toledo and García – and employers; strong sanctions – that are able the farmers’ representatives and local to be verified and monitored – for police, authorities of various coca farming areas. military, judges and political authorities The subject of coca is complex and proble- involved in drug trafficking crimes as well matic. So much so that for the last 25 years as for the “thieves” of children, young back- efforts to eradicate coca have been operat- packers and couriers to get them involved ing whilst coca crops have moved, spread in the “business”. In this way the real out and located to countries’ borders. But targets would be hit and not consumers and what is more, as we have seen in the INEI/ small time vendors, emptying the prisons DEVIDA survey carried out in 2003, there of young offenders. are more coca consumers (coqueros) than BY WAY OF CONCLUSION we thought, four million people of which 2 million are regular users. At the same time I will now quote the words of my friend the National Coca Enterprise (ENACO) Dante Deza, a peasant farmer from the only takes 30 percent of the total for legal valley of Alto Inambari in the forest of consumption. Which means it is not realis-

10 | Transnational Institute tic to continue promoting the idea that the alternative development programmes and the pro- solution to the problem of coca crops is to posal to organise an international workshop and con- ference on alternative development”, Viena eradicate them as a precondition for an E/2010/28; E/CN.7/2010/18, The event in Bangkok uncertain and generally unsuccessful ‘alter- was postponed to be rescheduled in 2011, because of native development’. a lack of interest to participate by high ranking officials. In the words of Antonio Brack Egg, current 4. San Martín is divided by the River Huallaga into: Minister for the Environment: “Coca holds Bajo Huallaga, Huallaga Central and Alto Huallaga. a place of honour for the Andean and Ama- 5. According to the report by the Truth and Recon- zonian societies. To chew the leaf gives the ciliation Commission 800 victims were reported in body proteins, fats, carbohydrates, vitamins San Martín, but the true figure is estimated at three and minerals. Because of this the solution to times as many. the serious problem currently brought about 6. See: Pizarro Pizarro, Rómulo; El Modelo San by cocaine consumption- one of the 14 Martín: Aportes para una Estrategia de Desarrollo alkaloids of the coca plant- can not be found Rural; DEVIDA, Lima, 23 June 2010 and “El in the eradication of its traditional uses.”23 narcotráfico en el Perú: Situación Actual y Prospectiva”, Lima, DEVIDA, 5 Agosto 2010. The And as Azucena Veramendi, coca farmer statistics vary slightly from one report to another. and ex- mayoress of Cuyaco in the Monzón 7. The efforts of Rómulo Pizarro, Executive Presi- valley said at the start of 2004 during the dent of DEVIDA, must however be acknowledged. second conference of the National He reached agreements with the National Treasury through the so called Rapid Impact Plans (PIR) that Confederation of Coca Producers of Peru involved various ministries and government agen- (CONPACCP) that took place in Lima: cies. This is how, when faced with severe decrease in "For us alternative development means that support from the USA for “alternative develop- they plant the projects on a table, cultivate ment”– 126.6 million dollars in 2006 to 59.3 million dollars in 2009 –, Pizarro managed to obtain pledges them on a blackboard, harvest them on a in 2007 from 5 executor entities with 6 projects to a computer and then sell them in television value of 4 million dollars, rising in 2010 to 38 exec- adverts”. utants* with 52 projects of 34.4 million dollars, although at the start of this year the then Minister of It is necessary to talk with all of those who Economy and Finance, Mercedes Aráoz , tried, wish to be respected and included. Agree- bizarrely, to cancel this effort. ment and discussion are not synonyms of 8. See the chronological frameworks suggested by weakness but of humanity and intelligence. Ignacio Mederiz and Jean Pierre Male in "Alternative Development in the Andes: A Practical Guide " (Estudis S.A.; Barcelona, July 1997). The outline of approaches is by Graham Farrell and Peter O'Brien in NOTES "Strategies to reduce the supply of illegal drugs " (in: Debate Agrario Nro. 22; CEPES; Lima, October 1. Economist, graduate of the Universidad del Pacíf- 1995), to which I have added the last “approach” in ico (Lima), associate of the Centre for Research on my document: “A Discussion on drugs and alternati- Drugs and Human Rights (CIDDH), associate ve development, crisis and increase of coca in Peru researcher at Transnational Institute (TNI) Amster- and more questions” (CAE-2002, Universidad del dam, secretary of Sustainable Rural Development Pacífico; Lima, November 2002). (DRIS), coordinator of the Programme DRIS/ZA- MANU in Cusco and Madre de Dios, researcher for 9. Spraying has been prohibited in Bolivia since Law the Peruvian Forum on International Relations 1008 was passed in1988. In Peru, in March 2000 a (FOPRI), consultant for rural Andean-Amazonian Supreme Decree was enacted that banned the use of development and technical consultant for agricul- pesticides in the eradication of coca crops. tural producers in coca farming areas in Peru. 10. It was applied as a pilot project in Aguaytía, part 2. See “The Miracle of San Martin” at: of Alto Huallaga and Apurímac-Ene as a result of the http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0t48FLeqrZw and 2000 and 2003 strikes and marches. See an account http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zelLHBM0Xm0& and results by Hugo Cabieses and others in Hablan feature=related los Diablos, Amazonia, coca y el narcotráfico en Peru: 3. Resolution 53/6 “Promoting best practices and les- escritos urgentes (Abya Yala, TNI and MLAL; Quito, sons learned for the sustainability and integrality of 2005).

Transnational Institute | 11 11. See an in depth discussion on this topic in Hugo 19. There is a debate about the guerilla activity of the Cabieses and Eduardo Musso; Alternative develop- Peruvian Communist Party “the Shining Path” – ment and rural development: Debates on limits and divided into three groups – has it reemerged or are possibilities (IICA-Centro Regional Andino, Lima, they leftovers with no political prospects, hit men August 1999). working for the drug trade. My observation is that 12. See a comparative table in my article “Ruraliza- there are two groups here, different and conflicting, tion of alternative development in Peru: debates, who carry out intermittent actions in the Valley of typologies and reconsiderations” (Proceedings from the River Apurímac-Ene (VRAE) and in two targeted the international seminar New Rurality in Latin zones of Alto Huallaga, that there is no proof they are America ,Bogotá, 22-24 August 2000; Universidad working with the ringleaders in prison in Lima and Javeriana; Bogota, 2001). Likewise, Francisco elsewhere. They are most definitely “pocketed” Thoumi gives a comparative analysis of the effects of (“embolsados”) for now. ‘drug trafficking’ and drugs policies in the Andean 20. In my opinion it is impossible to apply a “pat- countries in his book The drugs empire: drug traffick- tern” of rural development that is extremely diverse ing, economy and society in the Andes (IEPRI- and spread out, in high forest regions. I suggested a Universidad Nacional de Colombia and Planeta “typology” of coca farming areas- traditional, old, Editores; Bogota, September 2002). and new-defined by its coordination with coca crop 13. Mederiz & Male, 1997, pg. 38. farming and the socio-demographic history of each area. But even with this approach, development 14. As happened when coca crops were “transferred” intervention must be adapted to each area, the from Peru to Colombia between 1993 and 1997. proposals placed within the framework of a National According to “official” statistics, in 1992 coca farm- Strategy, discussed and approved by the Govern- ing in the three Andean countries covered a total of ment, Parliament and Society. I have desribed this in 211.700 hectares, and in 2001 this figure was 223.700 the book Concepts, typologies and strategies for alter- hectares, despite the eradication and spraying of native development in Peru (edited with Udo Theilen, more than 455.000 hectares during this time. AIDIA/GTZ, Lima, February 1999) and in the article 15. It was Ricardo Soberón who began to describe the “Peru: coca crops, virtual success and donation phenomenon in this way at the start of the year 2000. market” (DRIS; Lima, 2000). This effect came into evidence in Peru between 1996 21. Consultancy and Research Pilot Project for and 2000, when forced coca crop eradication was Integral Andean-Amazonian development (AIDIA) reinitiated, and also in Bolivia between 1997 and by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), that 2001 with the implementation of “Plan Dignidad”, operated between June 1996 and August 1999, both these situations saw the appearance of new designing policies and strategies of alternative crops in various valleys where they had not previ- development. I was national coordinator of this ously been recorded. project until its completion. See Cabieses & Theilen, 16. Eduardo Musso coined this phrase at the begin- 1999. ning of 2001 when he began to record coca crops 22. During 2002 there were six farmers’ strikes along the river Putumayo at the border with Colom- (Quillabamba, Tingo María, Monzón, Aguaytía and bia, the river Yavarí at the border with Brazil and twice in Apurímac-Ene) and two protest marches along the rivers Inambari and Tambopata at the (Monzón to Huanuco and Apurímac-Ene to Ayacu- border with Bolivia. A similar phenomenon hap- cho). Thousands of people from the coca farming pened in South-East Asia between Laos and Thailand areas mobilized for two basic reasons: against forced in the eighties, and in the borders between Colombia eradication of their coca crops and against the failure and Venezuela, and Colombia and Ecuador between of ‘alternative development’, proposing a different 1992 and 1999. strategy. With these same approaches and others, 17. Except in the case of San Martín and only in the such as the reappreciation and industrialization of short term. the coca leaf, registration of coca farmers and the need to promote a gradual and agreed coca crop 18. Together with Ricardo Soberón, Róger Rumrrill, reduction, ensued further farmers’ strikes and protest Eduardo Musso, Ibán de Rementaría and others, we marches to Lima over the course of the following questioned whether official coca crop statistics under years. This has been described in the book “Hablan the Fujimori regime were “political”, not technical and the result of “virtual successes” necessary for the los Diablos” (Cabieses, 2005). North American authorities (Cabieses, 2000). In 23. See: Ecología: Enciclopedia Temática del Perú April 2002 we made statements on this subject and as Tomo VI; “El Comercio”, Lima, 2004. I worked at DEVIDA, they forced me to “amend them”, but not the statistics supplied: 60.000 hectares of crops in 2001 compared to the 34.100 “official” crops (See “El Comercio” 8 and 10 April 2002).

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