The Need for Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the United Nations Security Council
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THE NEED FOR EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL by Adewale Wale Adeleke J.D. Loyola University School of Law,1994 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAW in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (School of Law) We accept this thesis as conforming Jp^he required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1997 © Adewale Wale Adeleke, 1997 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date U-frS-'n QE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT The United Nations is composed of six principal organs. These are the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, the Secretariat, and the Trusteeship Council. But, as the organ conferred with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, amongst other vital functions, the Security Council is without doubt the most important organ of the United Nations. At the San Francisco Conference which led to the establishment of the U.N., it was agreed that the Security Council shall consist of 11 members, 5 permanent and 6 non-permanent. In recognition of the fact that peace could not be maintained without the cooperation of the Major Powers (China, U.S.S.R., U.S.A., U.K., and France) the 5 Major Powers became Permanent Members of the Security Council. Additionally, decisions of the Council on substantive matters was subject to the concurring votes, so called veto right, of all five Permanent Members. Between 1945 and 1963, membership of the United Nations increased from 51 to 113. Thus, the Security Council was increased from 11 to 15, by the creation of 4 more non-permanent seats. Since 1963, U.N. membership has increased from 113 to 185 with most of the new members coming from Africa and Asia. The present distribution of permanent seats does not reflect the increased representation from Africa, Latin America, and Asia, nor the emergence of economic giants such as Japan and Germany, the second and third largest contributors to the U.N. regular budget. Furthermore, the abuse of the veto has led to a call for an elimination or a limitation of the veto. In addressing these problems, I divided the U.N. into four time periods: the pre-U.N., the San Francisco Conference, Security Council practice from 1945 to 1990, and post cold-war practice, 1991 till present. In examining each period I relied on ii official documents including the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, the San Francisco Conference Papers, and Repertory of Security Council Practice. My conclusion is that there should be an increase in the permanent and non- permanent seats of the Security Council to make it more representative, and that while the veto needs to be preserved, there is a need to limit the scope of the veto. TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ...ii Table of Contents ...iv List of Tables ...vii Acknowledgement ...viii Dedication ...ix I. Introduction. ...1 II. What are the principles and assumptions underlying the U.N. and the Security Council? a. Fundamental Principles of 1945. ...6 b. Fundamental Assumptions Underlying the U.N. in 1945. ...13 c. Fundamental Assumptions Underlying the Security Council in 1945. ...16 III. The History of the Veto. ...19 a. Is there a Need for Veto with respect to Enforcement Measures. ...30 b. Has Article 27(3) prevented the abuse or exercise of the veto with respect to the Pacific Settlement of Disputes. ...32 1. The Iranian Question. ...35 2. The Greek Question. ...36 3. The Syrian and Lebanese Question. ...40 4. The Spanish Question. ...42 5. The Corfu Channel Question. ...44 6. The Czechoslovak Question. ...46 c. Has Article 27(3) prevented the abuse / exercise of the veto by Permanent Members involved in a dispute with a non-permanent member (NPM). ...50 1. Disputes between a NPM and the Soviet Union. ...52 2. Dispute between a NPM and France. ...53 3. Dispute between a NPM and the United Kingdom. ...54 4. Disputes between a NPM and the United States. ...56 d. Possible solution to abuse of Charter Article 27, paragraph 3 ...59 IV. Proposals to limit the scope of the veto. ...65 a. May the concept of the Double Veto be Justified Based on Part II, paragraph 2 of the San Francisco Statement. ...73 b. Whether the Rules of Procedure of the Security Council is compatible with the concept of double veto. ...78 iv c. May the letter requesting Security Council involvement serve as a means to limit the scope of the veto. ...82 V. Potential effects of Proposals to limit scope of the veto on future practice of the Security Council. ...87 VI. The Veto and Admission of New Members. ...102 1. The Membership Application Question ...103 2. The Question of Chinese Representation ...111 VII. The Security Council a. Functions and Power of the Security Council. ...120 b. What constitutes "Threat to Peace" ...122 c. Pacific Settlement & Collective Security Enforcement Action. ...124 VIII. Is there a need to expand the Security Council? ...129 a. The need for an Increase in Permanent Membership. ...135 b. The need for an increase in Non-Permanent Membership. ...138 IX. Previous and Current Attempts to Reform the Security Council ...142 a. The Mandate of the OeWG -Cluster I and II. ...143 b. Overview of the Working Group Interim Report. 1. On the Expansion of the Security Council. ...144 2. On Permanent Membership. ...145 3. On Non-permanent Membership. ...146 4. On the voting procedure of the Security Council. ...148 X. Recommendations regarding the expansion of the Security Council a. On the composition and size of the expanded Security Council. ...149 b. The Problems of Regional Rivalry and the Selection of New Permanent Members. 1. Europe: Italy and Germany. ...158 2. Africa: Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa. ...161 3. Latin America & the Caribbean: Brazil and Mexico. ...164 4. Asia: India and Pakistan. ...166 C Possible solution to the problem of regional rivalry relative to the selection of a permanent member for each region. ...169 1. The Periodic Review Clause (PRC). ...170 2. The advantages of equitable geographical representation over regional representation. ...176 v XI. Concluding Remarks Bibliography Appendix 1 LIST OF TABLES Table I i. Subsidiary organs proposed under Article 29 but not established ...69 ii. Subsidiary organs established under Article 29 ...69 iii. Subsidiary organs proposed under Art. 29, but considered under Art. 34 ...69 Table II Distribution of vetoes and Security Council resolutions adopted from 1946-1997 ...88 TABLE III Distribution of Resolutions & Vetoes on Select No. of Issues (1946-1997) ...90 Table IV Distribution of vetoes on four issues (Membership, Middle East, South Africa, & Appointment of Secretary General). ...93 Table V Comparison of Security Council resolutions and vetoes from 1946-1990, and in the post cold war era, from 1991-1997. ...94 Table VI Historical comparison of coincidence of votes of members of the Security Council in 1995 with the votes of the U.S in the General Assembly & the Security Council. ...95 Table VII Allocation of permanent and non-permanent seats among regional groups, and number of member states from each regional group. ...97 Table VIII Historical comparison of coincidence of votes of select East European States with the votes of the United States in the General Assembly. ...97 Table IX Historical comparison of coincidence of votes of select African States with the votes of the United States in the General Assembly. ...98 Table X Historical comparison of coincidence of votes of select Asian States with the votes of the United States in the General Assembly. ...98 Table XI Historical comparison of coincidence of votes of select Latin American & Caribbean States with the votes of the United States in the General Assembly. ...98 Table XII Historical comparison of coincidence of votes of select NATO member States with the votes of the United States in the General Assembly. ...99 Table XIII Historical comparison of votes of different groups or blocs on a select number of issues with the votes of the United States in the General Assembly. ...99 vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I am indebted to Prof. P. Burns and Prof. M. Copithorne both of the UBC Faculty of Law, for the time they spent reviewing the numerous versions of this paper and for their invaluable advise and suggestions at each stage of this project. Without them, this paper would have been impossible. I would also like to express my gratitude to the many librarians, particularly at the library of Congress in Washington D.C., and at both the UBC law and main library for their willingness to assist me in my research. viii DEDICATION I will like to dedicate this paper to Zetha and Afolarin, my wife and son respectively, for their support, patience, for believing in me, and loving me unconditionally. Also to my Mother, Bola Adeleke, without whom I shudder to think of where I would be by now. I am indeed extremely lucky to have all of you in my life. ix I. Introduction The Security Council consists of five permanent members and ten non- permanent members, five of which are elected each year by the General Assembly for a term of two years.