Baltic Security and Defence Review, 2013

Baltic Security and Defence Review ______

Volume 15, Issue 1 2013

Editorial Board

Editor: Dr. James S. Corum, Dean, Baltic Defence College Deputy editor Mr. James Rogers, Baltic Defence College Harold E. Raugh, Jr., Ph.D. Command Historian, V Corps Lt. Col. John Andreas Olsen PhD, Norwegian Air Force, Dean, Norwegian Defence University College Dr. Augustine Meaher, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College Dr. Hannu Kari, Finnish National Defence University Dr. Maja Ericksson, Swedish National Defence Academy Erik Mannik, International Centre for Defence Studies Dr. Olaf Mertelsmann, Tartu University Dr. Margarita Seselgyte, Vilnius University Lithuania Dr. Zaneta Ozolina, University of Latvia

Layout: Oliver Toots Cover and print: Tartu University Press www.tyk.ee Electronic version of the Baltic Security and Defence Review can be accessed on the website of the Baltic Defence College at www.bdcol.ee All articles of the Baltic Security and Defence Review are also available through the International Relations and Security Network (ISN) at www.isn.ethz.ch All inquiries should be made to the Baltic Defence College, Riia 12, 51013 Tartu, Estonia, ph: +372 717 6000, fax: +372 717 6050, e-mail: [email protected] Disclaimer: The Baltic Defence College publishes the Baltic Security and Defence Review as a journal of research and commentary on security issues in order to facilitate academic discussion. The views presented in the articles are those only of the authors, and do not represent any official views of the three Baltic States, or their armed forces, or of the Baltic Defence College Baltic Security & Defence Review Vol 15, Issue 1 ,2013

Contents

Targeting and Adaptation in Combat: Examining the Libya Case By Lt. Col. Rui Romão, Pilot, Portuguese Air Force...... 5

Light Attack to the Rescue Solving a Critical Capability Gap in Irregular Warfare By Col. Russell J. Smith, USAF ret., Beechcraft Corporation...... 27

The Legal Framework of the Use of Armed Force Revisited By Dr. René Värk ...... 56

Comparing Contemporary Counterinsurgency Doctrines and Theories By Major Marc Verret, Canadian Army ...... 95

Commemorating the Fallen for Friendship and Encouragement: The Commemoration of Fallen Soldiers in the Military Culture in the Baltic Sea Region 1919-1939. By Dr. Fredrik Eriksson, Dr. Johan Eellend and Dr. Piotr Wawrzeniuk of the Swedish National Defence University ...... 123

Baltic Region Energy Security—The Trouble with European Solidarity By Col (ret) Risto Gabrielsson and Col (ret) Zdzislaw Sliwa, Baltic Defence College ...... 144

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Note from the Editor—Issue 1 2013

The Baltic Defence College has produced another issue of the Baltic Security and Defence Review with a good mix of articles that cover current military issues such as the use of airpower, providing the right equipment to allied nations, and counterinsurgency doctrine. But we also have a mandate to encourage scholarship in the broader aspects of security, so we have included an article on international law and on Baltic region energy security. Of course, we do not ignore the military history of the Baltic region so we have a good article on the military/social history of the region so that the reader can better understand the Baltic military heritage. Call for Articles

The BSDR is a peer reviewed academic journal and we publish articles on issues considering all aspects of Baltic security, as well as articles that deal with aspects of European security and broader conflict as well as current issues that affect the NATO nations, such as counterinsurgency and recent campaigns. Of course, we still try to maintain a Baltic focus. We are published in both print and e-editions We invite scholars and officers to submit articles for the Baltic Security and Defence Review. Articles should be in English, well-researched, and be between 6,000 and 12,000 words. Articles are to be submitted in word format electronically to the editor. We use Chicago style endnote citations. Each article will be published after a blind review process. If an author has any questions we can send a style guide. If you are interested in submitting an article to the BSDR please send an email to the editor: Dr. James Corum, Dean of the Baltic Defence College, Tartu Estonia. Email: [email protected] Disclaimer: Articles published in the Baltic Security and Defence Review are works intended to provoke academic thought and discussion under the Baltic Defence College’s mandate to provide a high quality higher military education. The views expressed in the articles are those of the author’s and do not represent the official views of the Baltic Defence College or the governments of Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania (the three nations that own the Baltic Defence College).

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Targeting and Adaptation in Combat: Examining the Libya Case

By Lt. Col. Rui Romão, Pilot, Portuguese Air Force

Introduction

The directions from the commander were clear: “no boots on the ground, no comms with the rebels”. The UN mandate was clear: “member states…acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements…to take all necessary measures…to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.”1 In a matter of weeks after the crisis erupted, NATO was leading an international coalition operation over Libya with no time to fix all the split ends. Determination and a firm direction and guidance were necessary to overcome deficiencies in preparation. As soon as operations got under way, several shortfalls were uncovered: the capacity to feed the ATO cycle in such a dynamic/kinetic operation with the right amount of intelligence was just not there. NATO simply did not have enough trained personnel to fill all the manning requirements to sustain the operation’s needs. There was an over reliance on US critical enablers such as SEAD/EW, ISR and AAR capabilities, essential to the operation’s success. The initial command and control structure proved to be not responsive enough and the situation on the ground demanded quick adaptations. These and many other pitfalls were brought to the surface by numerous news reports, both official and non-official, that seeded the idea that NATO is not suited for this kind of situation and that NATO is highly dependent on the goodwill of certain nations if it is to conduct its military operations. Although there is truth to many of the lessons identified, a deeper analysis reveals a different story. In spite of all the shortfalls the Alliance was able to overcome the many strategic, operational and tactical challenges with great success. By looking at how many discrepancies were corrected during Operation Unified Protector (OUP) carried out in

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2011 to protect the civilians of Libya against the Kaddafi regime. The author argues that this operation was an example of successful adaptation in the midst of combat. As OUP was coming to a closure NATO’s top military commander, Admiral Stravridis, in an interview with the media laid out his main concern by saying, "top of my list is targeting-- the ability to fuse intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and produce coherent, precision targeting that does not cause collateral damage."2 This article will examine the targeting process and its links with intelligence and operational planning. It will analyze the way many identified problems were fixed during combat; the way command and control structure was fine-tuned for the mission, how manning deficiencies were overcome, how information sharing between nations was put in place, and how the target folder production capability was improved.

Commander’s Objectives, Guidance and Intent (D&G)

This is the single most important phase of the targeting process.3 It is about translating strategy into tasks. It is about translating the political and military objectives, guidance and intent into specific actions that are logically linked to NATO’s desired end state. If strategy and guidance are weak, tactical tasks will only emphasize that. The consequences of a weak command and control structure that gives bad targeting guidance can have dramatic strategic effects on the CJTF Mission. As Commander John Patch, a US Navy Intelligence Officer put it, “Notwithstanding the most precise and capable weaponry ever, any targeting effort absent coherent strategy or executed outside the art and rules of war can spell campaign defeat” Targeting is all about effects, whether those are good or bad effects depends strongly on the Joint Force Commander Guidance (JFC D&G) and the way it is carried out. For Operation Unified Protector (OUP), the established Combined Forces Air Component (CFAC) mission was very clear and it, “was derived from operational and strategic level OPLANs, the strategic political military guidance from the NAC, the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, and the objectives issued in the Berlin Ministerial on April 14, 2011: “CFAC is to conduct air

6 Baltic Security & Defence Review Vol 15, Issue 1 ,2013 operations in the airspace of the Joint Operations Area, in order to protect civilians in Libya through the employment of kinetic and non- kinetic means against belligerent actors attacking or threatening to attack civilians or civilian-populated areas, and enforcing an air arms embargo and a no-fly zone, while permitting approved non-NATO flight activity and enabling the delivery of humanitarian aid.”4 The OPLAN lays out the legal framework and general guidance for targeting. It has the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved target sets for lethal and non-lethal engagement, prohibited targets, and restricted ones. It establishes the Rules of Engagement (ROE), the use of force, and the Collateral Damage Estimate Methodology to prevent unnecessary loss of human life. The approved target sets of NAC during Operation Unified Protector (OUP) were related to ground forces or units preparing for engagement in areas populated by civilians. It also took care of facilities for ground forces such as ammunition storage and warehouses, armed groups or mercenaries, and militias. The same applied for naval and air force facilities and ports.

In short, the OPLAN describes what every functional area has to do in order to accomplish the given mission lawfully and comes from the Operations Planning Process where the Intelligence cycle has a special contribution. In NATO it results from a collaborative process between the strategic, operational and tactical levels. In this Alliance, because every nation has a say, it requires a well-established command and control structure from the political to the tactical level oriented towards the desired endstate.5 Not having this, and not assuring a unified command and unity of effort will cause unintended effects with undesired strategic consequences. This condition, this requirement for success, was hardly in place when Operation Odyssey Dawn was initiated in Libya. The French Air Force Rafale and Mirage fighter bombers that began strikes around Benghazi on the afternoon of 19 March, 2011 without having previously eliminated Kaddafi’s integrated air defense system (IADS) is the first example of a lack of operational coordination between the US, the operation Odyssey Dawn lead nation, and the French counterpart.

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The fact that this attack was announced by the French president Nicolas Sarkozy to the secretary of state Hillary Clinton and the British Prime Minister David Cameron during a summit that took place that very same weekend at the Ely