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Case Study 2 FIELD CASE STUDY 2: BULYANHULU, TANZANIA By: David Reyes Field study completed December 9 - 18, 2015 Field Case Study 2: Bulyanhulu, Tanzania SUMMARY The Bulyanhulu Mine comprises an underground mine, processing plant and associated facilities located south of Lake Victoria in north-west Tanzania. The mine is owned and operated by Acacia Mining PLC, in which Barrick Gold Corporation holds a majority interest. Gold was first discovered by local farmers in 1976 and subsequently became the site of intensive artisanal mining activity. This was tacitly supported by the policies of the then socialist leaning national government creating a strong sense of direct ownership among the local, artisanal miners. Legal and fiscal reforms beginning in the 1980s gradually opened the country to foreign investment, finally allowing foreign participation in the mining sector. In 1994 Sutton Resources began systematic exploration at Bulyanhulu, quickly establishing the potential for a large scale mining operation. In 1995, acting on the legal basis that all mineral resources belong to the state, the central government ordered the artisanal miners to vacate the site; few did so. In 1996, the central government authorized the eviction of the artisanal miners. The miners were subsequently forcibly displaced by the police under the direction of the District Commissioner, with attendant allegations of the entombment of a number of miners. In 1999 Barrick purchased Sutton and commenced construction of the mine. Operations commenced in 2001 with Bulyanhulu the third largest gold mine in Africa. Barrick reorganized its interest in 2010 and again in 2014 creating a separate holding company, Acacia Mining PLC, for its African assets. The Bulyanhulu Gold Mine is not generally thought of as being mired in conflict despite the highly conflictive start in 1996. There have been troubles since then, notably a major strike in 2007 that resulted in mass dismissals and decimation of the union, but outwardly the mine displays an apparent ability to avoid escalating conflict. Nevertheless, the field site study revealed previous accounts that the mine started badly and that a resilient relationship with local communities has never really been established. The eviction of the artisanal miners in 1996 created a sense of sudden, violent dispossession that persists to today. The consequence is sustained resentment that has never been addressed by either the company or government: ‘you stole our gold!’ Further, for the communities, government policy and the laws that opened the country to foreign investment are seen as both enabling and supporting the company without considering community concerns. Until recently, the central government was evidently determined to maintain close control on the local situation, apparently unwilling to give space to others. In this environment, the company is looked to as the only accessible provider of benefits and a ‘you owe us’ attitude prevails. In turn, as Bulyanhulu seeks to prevent hindrances to its daily activities, there is a tendency to promise and provide short-lived benefits, effectively doing more to contain than to address the root causes of conflict. In practice, many years have passed since the company has been credited with any sustainable growth taking place outside of the mine and the level of dependency is very high. People understand that the mine will eventually become exhausted and resent not getting ahead. On the other hand, central government appears to be happy with, or at least willing to allow the de facto appeasement and containment approach to community relations often employed by the company. In more detail, the quality of relations between the company and community has been subject to frequent changes that can be related to the posture of individual General Managers at the mine. There have been 13 General Managers in the 17 years from mine construction to the present, all of whom were given substantial discretion as to how to manage relationships. Ironically, the manager most highly regarded by the communities, and is reputed to have created the best period of community relations, also oversaw the 2007 strike and mass dismissal of more than a thousand workers. Nevertheless, he is recalled as being honest and fair with all people, qualities that set him THE RISE IN CONFLICT ASSOCIATED WITH MINING OPERATIONS: WHAT LIES BENEATH? 2 Field Case Study 2: Bulyanhulu, Tanzania apart in the eyes of community members compared to other managers. Over the life of the mine to date, an ‘us-and-them’ attitude has developed among workers at the mine, which is also present in the host communities. Many people are unhappy with their situation. Culturally, the local population is peaceful, tolerant and not inclined to conflict. A pervasive pattern of passive aggression towards the company prevails, but some people are beginning to contemplate more open, confrontational conflict. INTRODUCTION The Bulyanhulu Gold Mine is not generally thought of as being mired in conflict. Bulyanhulu did have a very conflicted beginning in the mid-1990s and there have been troubles since then but what made it interesting for the Unraveling Mining Conflict project (UMC) was its apparent ability to avoid escalating conflict. Events that might have been expected to spark a firestorm instead seemed to have resulted in stable and perhaps even positive outcomes. This suggested the potential to learn lessons about how the various actors in a mining context can keep conflict from degenerating and, ideally, how conflict can be made beneficial for all involved. CONTEXT Tanzania1 This section aims to provide historical and present-day facts about Tanzania, highlighting elements that can help in understanding conflict around Bulyanhulu. Tanzania is situated in East Africa along the Indian Ocean just south of the equator. It was formed in 1964 when Tanganyika and Zanzibar merged to create a single country. The nation is comprised of 130 tribes whose religious makeup is roughly divided into thirds between Christianity, Islam and traditional beliefs. Eight other countries share a border with Tanzania, several of which are perhaps best known internationally for their violent conflicts over the past 20-30 years – The Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Mozambique, Rwanda and Burundi. Even Kenya, long considered one of the region’s most stable countries, has struggled with intertribal tensions, election-related violence and terrorism during the past decade. Tanzania has not been immune from problems like these but, in terms of scale, it has enjoyed relative stability. In 1884, Germans began colonizing Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania) and, two years later, reached an agreement with Britain establishing German administrative control. In pre-colonial times some gold was collected and traded but, according to the Tanzanian Chamber of Minerals and Energy, “The first commercial mining for gold was undertaken in the area surrounding Lake Victoria under the German colonial administrations in the 1890s.”2 Indeed, some Tanzanian small-scale miners today attribute their trade to the Germans. After the First World War, the League of Nations gave Britain a mandate over Tanganyika, which the United Nations then converted to a trusteeship after the Second World War.3 Britain’s mandate and then its trusteeship enabled British and South African companies to start exploiting the territory’s rich gold deposits as well as other minerals and gemstones. Also during this period, the British established English Common Law as the basis for the Tanzanian legal system that still exists today. Independence came to Tanganyika in 1961, with Julius Nyerere taking the post of prime minister. Nyerere then became president a year later when Tanganyika became a republic. In 1963, Zanzibar THE RISE IN CONFLICT ASSOCIATED WITH MINING OPERATIONS: WHAT LIES BENEATH? 3 Field Case Study 2: Bulyanhulu, Tanzania became independent and was initially ruled by a sultanate. Shortly after, in 1964, the Sultanate was overthrown by leftist revolutionaries. Nyerere’s political ideology was similar and an agreement was reached to merge Tanganyika and Zanzibar into the United Republic of Tanzania. Nyerere was the first president and the man who led the ouster of Zanzibar’s sultanate, Abeid Amani Karume, was vice-president. Nyerere was reelected unopposed every five years until he retired in 1985. To understand the situation today it is important to note that he wanted Tanzania to be self-reliant according to an ideology he called African socialism. As a result, foreign mining interests were pushed out as the sector was “brought under the direct control of the state and public institutions.”4 It is also important to note that, for Nyerere, instilling a sense of national identity and unity was a top priority. Tribal affiliations and traditions were discouraged and customary land rights were eliminated. Swahili became the national language and everyone was expected to speak it. Land was placed under the control of village councils and people were encouraged to participate in collective farming. Young employees of the state – teachers, civil servants, health care providers, etc. – were not allowed to live and work in their home regions for a number of years after starting their careers so that they would intermix and intermarry with people from other parts of the country. Like many socialist leaders from the post-colonial era, Nyerere’s methods are subject to criticism and debate. Nevertheless, many Tanzanians today attribute their resilience against tribalism and identity- driven conflict to Nyerere’s policies. And, there are those who still argue that the country’s natural resources belong to the people and should not be sold to investors, particularly foreign investors. Nyerere’s successors had different ideas, however. After he left office in 1985, the government began privatizing mineral rights. This opened the door for local investors in the mining sector. According to one report, “Small-scale and artisanal miners were the major producers of minerals in Tanzania from 1987 to 1997.”5 But the shift away from socialism did not stop at small-scale local investment.
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